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University of California, Berkeley
The Great Enterprise
Et surtout, il conviendrait de ne pas oublier que dans la vie tout se mêle, réalités de longue, de moyenne et de courte durée. Entre ces éléments, l'histoire n'est pas choix, mais mélange.

Fernand Braudel, *Annales* 8.1:73.

The greatness of the empire, the cause of its life or death, the incipiency of its rise or fall, are not to be found in the distance beyond it. You cannot reach into it from afar and turn its pivot.

The Great Enterprise

The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China

IN TWO VOLUMES • VOLUME I

Frederic Wakeman, Jr.
To my mother and father
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## Ming Reign Eras

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temple Name</th>
<th>Reign Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1368–1398 Taizu</td>
<td>Hongwu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1399–1402 Huizong</td>
<td>Jianwen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1403–1424 Chengzu (Taizong)</td>
<td>Yongle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1425 Renzong</td>
<td>Hongxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1426–1435 Xuanzong</td>
<td>Xuande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1436–1449 Yingzong</td>
<td>Zhengtong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1450–1456 Daizong</td>
<td>Jingtai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1457–1464 Yingzong (resumed government)</td>
<td>Tianshun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1465–1487 Xianzong</td>
<td>Chenghua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1488–1505 Xiaozong</td>
<td>Hongzhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1506–1521 Wuzong</td>
<td>Zhengde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1522–1566 Shizong</td>
<td>Jiajing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1567–1572 Muzong</td>
<td>Longqing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1573–1619 Shenzong</td>
<td>Wanli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1620 Guangzong</td>
<td>Taichang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1621–1627 Xizong</td>
<td>Tianqi</td>
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<td>1628–1644 Sizong</td>
<td>Chongzhen</td>
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<tr>
<td>1645 Anzong</td>
<td>Hongguang</td>
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<tr>
<td>1646 Shaozong</td>
<td>Longwu</td>
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<td>1647–1661</td>
<td>Yongli</td>
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## Qing Reign Eras

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1662–1722 Shengzu Ren huangdi</td>
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<td>1723–1735 Shizong Xian huangdi</td>
<td>Yongzheng</td>
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<td>1736–1795 Gaozong Chun huangdi</td>
<td>Qianlong</td>
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<tr>
<td>1796–1820 Renzong Rui huangdi</td>
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<tr>
<td>1821–1850 Xuanzong Cheng huangdi</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1851–1861 Wenzong Xian huangdi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862–1874 Muzong Yi huangdi</td>
<td>Tongzhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875–1907 Dezong Jing huangdi</td>
<td>Guangxu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908–1911</td>
<td>Xuantong</td>
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## Chinese Weights and Measures

### Linear Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Unit</th>
<th>U.S. Customary Equivalent</th>
<th>Metric Equivalent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 fen</td>
<td>0.141 inches</td>
<td>0.358 centimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 cun</td>
<td>1.41 inches</td>
<td>3.581 centimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 chi</td>
<td>14.1 inches</td>
<td>35.814 centimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 zhang</td>
<td>141 inches</td>
<td>3.581 meters</td>
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### Itinerary Measures

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 chi</td>
<td>12.1 inches</td>
<td>30.734 centimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bu</td>
<td>60.5 inches</td>
<td>1.536 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 li</td>
<td>1821.15 feet</td>
<td>0.555 kilometers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### Area

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<tr>
<th>Chinese Unit</th>
<th>U.S. Customary Equivalent</th>
<th>Metric Equivalent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 mu</td>
<td>0.16 acres</td>
<td>0.064 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 qing</td>
<td>16.16 acres</td>
<td>6.539 hectares</td>
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### Weights

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Chinese Unit</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1 liang (tael)</td>
<td>1.327 ounces</td>
<td>37.62 grams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 jin (catty)</td>
<td>1.33 pounds</td>
<td>603.277 grams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 dan (picul)</td>
<td>133.33 pounds</td>
<td>60.477 kilograms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 shi (stone)</td>
<td>160 pounds</td>
<td>72.574 kilograms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Volume

<table>
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<th>Chinese Unit</th>
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<th>Metric Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 sheng</td>
<td>1.87 pints</td>
<td>1.031 liters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 dou</td>
<td>2.34 gallons</td>
<td>10.31 liters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Chinese measures differ from period to period and place to place. Thus, linear measures are based upon the standard *chi* accepted by Pottinger and Qiying at Nanjing during the treaty negotiations of 1842. (Various standard values for *chi* during the Ming ranged from 12.584 inches to 13.422 inches.) The itinerary measures are the ones the Catholic mis-
Ming Reign Eras

Missionaries and the Kangxi Emperor agreed upon in 1700 to survey the empire. Land measures are based upon the measuring rule provided to the English Consul Balfour by the Shanghai prefect to mark off the land for the consulate in 1843. Weights are based upon the official standards used in Beijing in 1648. Volume values are roughly based on 19th-century averages, when there was no acceptable national standard. S. Wells Williams, *The Chinese Commercial Guide*, pp. 278–289.
Introduction

When the conquered people are enlightened and the conquerors half-savage as when the nations of the north invaded the Roman Empire or the Mongols invaded China, the power which the barbarian has won by his victory enables him to keep on a level with the civilized man and to go forward as his equal until he becomes his rival; one has force to support him and the other intelligence; the former admires the knowledge and arts of the conquered and the latter envies the conqueror's power. In the end the barbarians invite the civilized people into their palaces and the civilized open their schools to the barbarians.

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 330.

The fall of the Ming house and the rise of the Qing regime in 1644 was the most dramatic dynastic succession in all of Chinese history. Yet in spite of the Manchus' immediate occupation of the Forbidden City just six weeks after the Ming emperor committed suicide behind his vermilion palaces in Beijing, the transition from Ming to Qing was no sudden coup d'état. Whether from our own detached perspective in the present, or from the closer vantage points of Ming subjects and Qing conquerors at the time, the change must appear part of a much longer process: the economic decline of 17th-century commerce, the social disintegration of the Ming order, and the political consolidation of Qing rule.

Late Ming China’s connection with a global monetary system is
by now quite clear to historians. Because of a constant deficit of the balance of payments in favor of Chinese goods and industries, silver flowed to China from throughout the world. The “tomb of European moneys” since Roman times, China during the 17th century, through trade with the Spanish Philippines, became the major recipient of American silver. As much as twenty percent of all silver mined in Spanish America came directly across the Pacific via galleon to Manila and thence to China to pay for silks and porcelains. Other American bullion found its way indirectly through

1 Li Tingxian, “Shi Kefa de pingjia wenti,” pp. 244–245; William S. Atwell, “Time and Money,” pp. 25–28, “Centuries passed and nothing changed. Whatever their source: the silver mines of old Serbia; the Alps; Sardinia; the gold washings of the Sudan and Ethiopia, or even Sofala by way of North Africa and Egypt; from the silver mines of Schwaz in the Inn Valley; of Neusohl in Hungary, Mansfeld in Saxony, Kuttenberg near Prague, or the mines of the Erz-Gebirge; from the mines in the Northwest after the first years of the 16th century—whatever their origin, precious metals once absorbed into Mediterranean life were fed into the stream that continually flowed eastward. In the Black Sea, Syria, and Egypt, the Mediterranean trade balance was always in deficit. Trade with the Far East was only possible thanks to exports of gold and silver, which depleted Mediterranean bullion reserves. It has even been suggested, not unconvincingly, that the vitality of the Roman Empire was sapped by the hemorrhage of precious metals.” Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, p. 464. But see also Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System II, pp. 17, 108–109. Wallerstein’s claim that East Asia was external to the world economy is refuted by Braudel. See Fernand Braudel, Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, pp. 43, 93–94.

2 Judging from the silver receipts of the Taicang Treasury, which was the chief receiving agency in Beijing for the imperial government, this influx had become a torrent of specie by 1571, when the annual income of the treasury jumped from 2.3 million taels (86,250 kilos of silver) to 3.1 million taels (116,250 kilos). The boom coincided with a relaxation of trade restrictions (1567), the foundation of Nagasaki (1570), and the selection of Manila as the Spanish administrative capital of the Philippines (1571). It also occurred at a time when the development of the mercury amalgamation process of silver refining caused production of the metal to triple and then quintuple in centers like Potosí in the viceroyalty of Peru. Atwell, “Time,” pp. 30–31, 53; Braudel, Mediterranean, p. 476; John E. Wills, Jr., “Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang,” p. 213.

3 In 1597 the galleons brought 345,000 kilograms of silver from Acapulco to
the Central Asian trade to Bokhara. As much as half of the precious metals mined in the New World may in this way have ended up in China. When this is combined with the silver exported from Japan—which was anywhere from 150,000 to 187,000 kilograms a year—the total amount of specie annually reaching China in the first third of the 17th century was probably about 250–265,000 kilograms.

Although at a considerable remove, the Chinese economy could not fail to be badly affected by the severe depression that struck

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4 Chaunu’s estimate is a bit less than this. He concludes that the Far East received a little more than a third of the entire amount of American silver production. Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques, p. 269. During the 16th century the mercenaries employed by the Spaniards in Flanders demanded payment in gold, which was furnished by Genovese bankers who converted the New World silver provided by Spain into gold bullion from the trade with the Far East. During the “long reign of silver” (ca. 1550–1680) this conjuncture created a global economic system. “This Italy/China axis, beginning in America and running right around the world either through the Mediterranean or the Cape of Good Hope, can be considered Structure, a permanent and outstanding feature of the world economy which remained undisturbed until the 20th century.” Braudel, Mediterranean, pp. 499–500. See also Leonard Blussé, “Le ‘Modern World System’ et l’extrême-orient,” p. 96.

5 William S. Atwell, “Notes on Silver, Foreign Trade, and the Late Ming Economy,” pp. 1–10; Michel Devèze, “L’Impact du monde chinois sur la France, l’Angleterre et la Russie au XVIIIe siècle,” pp. 8–9; S.A.M. Adshead, “The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China,” p. 275; Ray Huang, “Fiscal Administration during the Ming Dynasty,” pp. 124–125. Japan exported silver and copper to China and imported gold because the exchange rate of silver for gold was so favorable compared to most other places, including Japan itself. During the 1580s gold was exchanged for silver in China at a ratio of 1 to 4; the ratio in Europe was 1 to 12. By 1650 the European ratio was 1 to 15. Braudel, Mediterranean, pp. 459, 499. Atwell has a lower estimate of the amount of Japanese silver exported than most other economic historians. He estimates that between 1560 and 1600, Japan’s silver exports averaged between 33,000 and 48,000 kilograms per year. Atwell, “Time,” p. 31. Chaunu estimated that the global mass of the silver furnished by both Japan and America was between four and five thousand tons in less than two centuries. Pierre Chaunu, “Manille et Macao,” pp. 568–681.
the worldwide trading system centered on Seville between 1620 and 1660. Before the European trade depression of the 1620s, the numbers of Chinese ships calling at Manila amounted to as many as forty-one per year. By 1629 this number had fallen to six vessels, and as trade relations with Central Asia attenuated at the same time, the supply of silver reaching China from the New World dwindled. During the 1630s, silver began to flow again in great

6 Chaunu, “Manille et Macao,” p. 555; Jan de Vries, *Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600–1750*, p. 20. Chaunu singles out five different turning points in the trading situation between China and Europe: (1) from 1555 to 1570 when the Iberian presence suddenly connected the China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean; (2) between 1580 and 1590 when there was a rupture between Manila and Macao and a collapse of the European economy at the time of the Spanish Armada; (3) around 1600 when the Dutch Company arrived in the Indian Ocean; (4) between 1615 and 1620 when the Dutch blockaded Molucca and cut off communications between Macao and the Indian Ocean; and (5) between 1640 and 1644 when Ming China fell, the Japanese massacred the Macanese embassy, the disunion of the Iberian crown divided Macao from Manila, and the beginning of the Rites Controversy was signalled by the 1645 Bull of Innocent X. “The Chinese recoil occurs at the same moment as the European recoil. The catastrophic movement of the China trade registers therefore a double decline: the lowering undoubtedly of American exports of silver, but at the same time the passing in China of a cycle like the Fronde, or better yet, a parade of devastating cycles.” Chaunu, “Manille et Macao,” p. 579. Braudel sees only one major shift, which he calls a “turning point in world history,” after the first and second decades of the 17th century when imports of American treasure slowed. The possible causes of this included higher mining costs according to the law of diminishing returns, the retention of larger amounts of bullion in America through fraud and in order to meet local currency requirements, and the decimation of the indigenous population which hindered recruitment of labor needed for silver extraction. Braudel, *Mediterranean*, p. 536. See also Earl J. Hamilton, *American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501–1650*, pp. 293; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy*, pp. 20, 25–27; idem, *Modern World System II*, pp. 3, 109; Carlo M. Cipolla, *Before the Industrial Revolution*, pp. 212–216; Jacob Klaveren, *General Economic History*, pp. 152–153.

7 Adshead, “Seventeenth Century,” p. 276. Economic recoils in turn produced economic recoils; effects in turn became causes. However, the Chinese domestic crisis may have helped trigger the global crisis. “We can speak of the major conjunctural domination of China in Manila to the degree that there is a conformity between the secular and intercyclical fluctuation of the Chinese trade
quantities. The Manila galleon continued to bring supplies from New Spain, the Macaoese carried Japanese silver to Canton, and yet more specie came from Goa to Macao through the straits of Malacca. But then, in the late 1630s and early 1640s, this flow was even more drastically interrupted, just at a time when the highly commercialized regional economy of the lower Yangzi had come to depend more and more upon expanding amounts of money to counter inflation. After 1634 Philip IV took measures to restrict

and the global trade; to a degree even more where the amplitude of the secular and intercyclical fluctuation of movements with China is much greater than the amplitude of the indices of total activity. We can therefore conclude that in spite of appearances, it is the ups and downs of trade with the Chinese continent which commands the ups and downs of the galleon trade itself.” Chaunu, Les Philippines, p. 267. See also K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660–1760, pp. 456–458.
9 Atwell, “Time,” p. 33. During the period from the 16th to the 18th century, with a few exceptions, the intrinsic value of all currencies declined. This decline was associated with the expansion of the Atlantic economy, first drawing on the gold supplies and enslaving part of the population of Africa, and then mining the treasures of America. In the short run, deflation of silver may have slowed down a rise in nominal prices (which actually began to climb in western Europe before the massive import of specie). But in the long run nominal prices rose in conjunction with the production of silver in the New World. The “price revolution of the late 16th century” resulted in an immense European inflation that drove prices to levels 3 to 4 times as high as they were in 1500. Contemporaries of Philip II were astonished by the constantly rising prices which discernibly increased the cost of living. In the first half of the 17th century real wages were less than one-half those of the late 15th and early 16th centuries; and in the 1620s, Europeans frequently complained about how poor their diet was compared to what their ancestors had been known to eat three or four generations earlier. Almost all European currencies—including the relatively stable pound sterling—had to be devalued in the 1620s and 1630s. E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson, eds., Cambridge Economic History of Europe, pp. 382–383, 400–405, 428, 458, 484; Braudel, Mediterranean, p. 517. The inflation also struck the Ottoman empire where goods like wheat, copper, and wool were smuggled out to meet the demands of the growing European market. An analysis of the budgets of hospices kept for the free lodging of travellers and students in Istanbul shows a consistent price inflation. If the 1489–1490 prices are assigned an index of 100, then prices reached 182.49 in 1585–1586, and 272.79 in 1604–1605. Ömer Lutfi Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Six-
the shipment of exports from Acapulco; in the winter of 1639–1640 many of the Chinese merchants in Manila were massacred by the Spanish and natives; in 1640 the Japanese cut off all trade with Macao; and in 1641 Malacca fell to the Dutch who severed the connection between Goa and Macao. Chinese silver imports plummeted.\(^{10}\)

One of the secular effects of the long-term decline in the importation of specie may have been a steadily worsening inflation during the late Ming—an inflation that drove up the price of grain in heavily populated areas like Jiangnan in the Yangzi River delta, causing great hardship to the urban population there.\(^{11}\) The immediate impact of the drastic curtailment of silver shipments between 1635 and 1640 was even worse on residents of that area, which depended so much upon sericulture for its livelihood. As the international trade in silk waned, silk-growing areas like Huzhou in

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10 Atwell, “Silver,” pp. 10–15. After combining all of his indices, Chaunu concluded that after 1640 there was not a single index for which the evolution was not that of a “catastrophic and exponential decrease.” Chaunu, Les Philippines, p. 250. To put it another way: if one takes the trade at Manila between 1611 and 1615 as one point, and then takes the trade during 1666 to 1670 as another, one finds that the reduction in the value of the trade was in the proportion of forty to one. Pinpointing the change at the year 1642, Chaunu described this as “the pure and simple disappearance of an economic space,” or “the dead time of the world conjuncture.” Chaunu, “Manille et Macao,” p. 562. See also Braudel, Afterthoughts, p. 42; Wallerstein, Modern World System II, p. 17.

11 In Songjiang, for instance, where a serious drought occurred in 1630, the price of one dou (peck) of rice was 120 cash in 1632. By 1639, one dou was worth 300 cash. In northern Zhejiang, where a picul of rice had sold for 1 tael, the price rose to 4 taels by 1641. Fu Yiling, Mingdai Jiangnan shimin jingji shitan, p. 74; Helen Dunstan, “The Late Ming Epidemics,” pp. 11–12. See also Frederic Wakeman Jr., ed., Ming and Qing Historical Studies in the People’s Republic of China, p. 81; Geiss, “Peking under the Ming,” p. 144. While food prices rose during the late 1630s and early 1640s, prices for other goods fell. China thus appeared to have, in contrast to earlier inflation, a general deflation with a sharp rise in the price of necessities caused by hoarding, poor harvests, and speculation. (Private communication from William Atwell.)
northern Zhejiang grew economically depressed. At the same time, climate and disease took their toll. Unusually severe weather struck China during the period 1626–1640, with extreme droughts being followed by major floods. Frequent famines, accompanied by plagues of locusts and smallpox, produced starvation and mass death during this same period. The result was an extraordinary depopulation during the late Ming; one scholar has even suggested

13 This was around the beginning of what some historians have called “the little ice age of Louis XIV,” a period known by solar physicists as “the Maunder minimum” stretching from 1645 to 1715 when the earth’s climate (perhaps corresponding to reduced solar radiation measured by sunspot activity and carbon 14 anomalies in tree-trunk rings) fell to the lowest temperatures since A.D. 1000. H. H. Lamb, The Changing Climate, pp. 10–11, 65–66, 174; John A. Eddy, “Climate and the Role of the Sun,” pp. 726, 739–740, 743–744; idem, “The Maunder Minimum,” pp. 1191, 1195–1196, 1199; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Times of Peace, Times of Famine, pp. 58–59; de Vries, Economy of Europe, p. 12; Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, pp. 18–19. There is abundant evidence of both increased drought and cold in China during this period, when the growing season in north China was two weeks shorter than it is now. Gong Gaofa, Chen Enzhi, Wen Huanran, “Heilongjiang sheng de qihou bianhua,” p. 130. Periods of excessive drought noted in local gazetteers for the Yellow River and Huai River plain are the years 1024, 1297, 1326, 1465, 1506, 1509, 1585, 1640, 1650, 1669, and 1786. In 1638, according to the Shandong yunhe beikao, the Grand Canal dried up; and in 1640, “There was a great drought. The course of the Yellow River dried up. Vagrants filled the roads and people ate each other.” Suining zhigao [Draft history of Suining], juan 15, cited in Xu Jinzhi, “Huang-Huai pingyuan qihou lishi jizai zhengli,” p. 184. During this same period, the lakes of both the middle Yangzi and the Huai froze over in winter. Ibid., p. 188; G. William Skinner, “Marketing Systems and Regional Economies,” p. 77; Zhu Kezhen, “Zhongguo jin wuqian nian lai qihou bianqian de chubu yanjiu,” pp. 30–31.
that between 1585 and 1645 the population of China may have dropped by as much as forty percent.\textsuperscript{15} There was in any case an unusual demographic dip in China during the years coinciding with the global economic depression, all of which has led historians to believe that China participated in the same general 17th-century crisis that gripped the Mediterranean world.\textsuperscript{16}

From the perspective of many of those actually suffering from the inflationary trends of the late Ming, the economic difficulties of the period were mainly to be attributed to the growing monetization of the economy. It was quite common during the late 16th and early 17th centuries to bemoan commercialization and exalt the simpler life of a century or two earlier, when people were much more self-sufficient and much less caught up in marketing relationships.\textsuperscript{17} One early 17th-century gazetteer, for instance, contrasted the moral and economic tranquility of the Hongzhi reign (1488–1505)—when arable fields were plentiful, houses were abundant, mountains forested, villages peaceful, and bandits absent—with the turmoil and social disruption of the Jiajing period

\textsuperscript{15} Elvin, \textit{Pattern}, p. 311. During the 1641 epidemic in Tongxiang county (Jiaxing prefecture, Jiangnan), eighty to ninety percent of the households were infected. In some large households of ten to twenty people, not a single person survived. "The worms crawled out of the door and the neighbors did not dare put in a foot." Chen Qide, \textit{Zai huang jishi}, cited in Dunstan, \"Epidemics," p. 29. In neighboring Huzhou prefecture, which was one of the most densely inhabited areas of China, about thirty percent of the population was wiped out between 1640 and 1642. Mi Chu Wiens, \textit{"Lord and Peasant,"} pp. 10, 36; Chin Shih, \textit{"Peasant Economy and Rural Society in the Lake Tai Area,"} ch. 5, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{16} Adshead, \"Seventeenth Century," p. 272. See also Michel Cartier, \"Nouvelles données sur la démographie chinoise à l'époque des Ming," \textit{passim}; Eric Hobsbawm, \"From Feudalism to Capitalism," p. 162. Some economic historians have been reluctant to call this contraction a "crisis." See for example: Wallerstein, \textit{Modern World System II}, pp. 5–7, 18, 33; and Cipolla, \textit{Before the Industrial Revolution}, p. 231. However, from a demographic point of view, the 17th century was an era of population stagnation. De Vries, \textit{Economy of Europe}, pp. 4–6; Braudel, \textit{Capitalism}, p. 3.

(1522–1566)—when property frequently changed hands, prices fluctuated, rich and poor drew socially apart, and market conditions grew complicated. By 1600, the gazetteer stated, the situation was even worse: “One out of a hundred is wealthy, but nine out of ten are impoverished. The impoverished are unable to oppose the wealthy so that, contrary to what should be, the few control the many. Silver and copper cash seem to dominate even Heaven and Earth.”

Others attributed the economic difficulties of the late Ming to a systemic breakdown affecting the entire social order. The early Ming pattern of a self-sustaining administration, with taxes in kind supplied by tax collectors among the people, military costs covered by self-sufficient hereditary garrisons, and labor services provided by corvée or permanently registered hereditary occupational groups, had depended upon the central government’s ability to maintain efficient registration and allocation procedures. The monetization of the economy, the move of the main capital to Beijing away from the major grain producing regions in the lower Yangzi River delta, and the lack of rational procedures at the center of the bureaucracy to perpetuate the ideally self-sustaining population units all led to a breakdown of this system. For example, the

18 This famous and often quoted passage is from the gazetteer of She county in Xin’an, southern Anhui. I have used the excellent translation in Willard J. Peterson, Bitter Gourd, p. 70.
19 Henri Maspéro, “Comment tombe une dynastie chinoise”; Ray Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance, p. 64; idem, “Military Expenditures in 16th C. Ming China,” p. 85.
20 Early Ming administration has been described in this manner: “Local officials were not even permitted to enter the rural areas. Villages were organized into self-governing units with ‘virtuous elders’ assuming the responsibility of disciplining the populace in each local community. In fiscal administration, priority was given to accounting control, rather than to field operations. The emperor’s frugality was such that both the government budget and the administrative overhead were reduced to a minimum. Since the supply procedure laid stress on lateral transactions at the lower level, there was no need to build up the logistical capacity of the middle echelon.” Ray Huang, Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China, p. 44.
21 Wei Qingyuan, Mingdai huangce zhidu, pp. 206–207; Ray Huang, Taxation, pp. 44–46; idem, “Ni Yuan-lu’s ‘Realism,’” p. 417; Liang Fangzhong,
civil service plus the kinsmen of the emperor were supposed to live off imperial prebends which had, during the early Ming when the capital was in Nanjing, been fixed in bushels of rice. When the capital was moved north, the rice stipends were converted into payments of another kind: first paper currency, then bolts of cloth, and finally silver. The rate of exchange was based upon grain prices at that time. During the following two centuries, grain prices had risen more or less constantly, yet the stipend expressed in taels (ounces) of silver remained relatively constant. By 1629, the annual subsidies to civil officers and imperial clansmen (of which there were approximately 40,000 in the capital alone) in Beijing amounted only to 150,000 taels or less than one percent of the national budget. Such salaries were, of course, pitifully low;


22 Officials were consequently grossly underpaid. A minister of Rank Two received 152 ounces of silver annually, but relied mainly on cash gifts from officials in the provinces for a yearly income that might be ten times his official salary. Lower-ranking officials, who were unlikely to receive such gifts, simply went into debt. A ministry secretary at Rank Six only received 35 ounces of silver, which probably did not cover his household rent. Adshead, "Seventeenth Century," p. 3.

23 Huang, "Fiscal Administration," p. 76; Ping-ti Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China, p. 22. The official establishment of the Ming was very large: about 100,000 civil and military officials, 100,000 eunuch officials, more than 100,000 members of the imperial guards, and over 100,000 royal kinsmen. In 1522, approximately 150,000 superfluous sinecurists were removed from the government's payroll. Wang Sizhi and Jin Chengji, "Cong Qing chu de lizhi kan fengjian guanliao zhengzhi," p. 136; Huang, Taxation, p. 59. Although
and officials at all levels had to maintain their subsistence by acquiring additional income through embezzlement and other illegal means. In 1643 the Chongzhen Emperor decided to test the reliability of the military rationing system and secretly checked to see how much of a Ministry of War allotment of 40,000 taels dispensed for supplies actually reached the northeastern garrisons in Liaodong. His investigators reported that none of the funds had reached their destination; they had simply disappeared along the way.

Many officials believed that the Ming emperors had no one to blame but themselves for this state of affairs. Especially condemned was the Wanli Emperor (r. 1573–1619), who repeatedly diverted government funds for palace building, confusing the privy and public purses, and who allowed his purveyors to deduct regularly a twenty percent kickback on all costs regardless of what other “squeeze” they made. But regardless of his own particular heedlessness and irresponsibility, the Wanli Emperor was simply one among many Ming emperors who had to support an enormous personal establishment in the Forbidden City. By the 17th century there were three thousand court ladies and close to twenty

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many lower-ranking imperial kinsmen were impoverished, the higher-ranking princes lived well, and were themselves a crushing burden on the rural economy. In Henan alone there were eight major princes and numerous minor nobility who together consumed 300,000 of the 800,000 piculs of grain collected in the 43 northern districts of the province. This represented 60% of all the revenue retained in the province. Huang, *Taxation*, p. 179; R. V. DesForges, “Rebellion in the Central Plain,” p. 2.


25 Li Qing, *Sanyuan biji, fuzhong*, p. 12b.

thousand eunuchs in the imperial palace in Beijing.\textsuperscript{27} The eunuchs were partly there to look after the emperor’s wives, but that constituted a minor portion of their functions. Acting as the emperor’s private servants, they administered a large bureaucracy composed of twelve palace directorates, controlled the imperial tax bureaus and government storehouses, managed the government’s salt monopoly and copper mines, collected the rents from the imperial estates (which at one time engrossed one-seventh of the private property in the country and took up most of the land in the eight districts around the capital), supervised the Guards Army protecting the capital, and formed a secret police force (the dreaded Eastern Depot or \textit{Dong chang}) that had complete powers of arrest, torture, and even execution quite apart from the regular judiciary.\textsuperscript{28} A powerful arm of the throne, the eunuch establishment attracted

\textsuperscript{27} Huang, 1587, p. 13; Geiss, “Peking under the Ming,” p. 29. Much higher figures of 9,000 palace women and 100,000 eunuchs are given in Taisuke Mitamura, \textit{Chinese Eunuchs}, p. 53. See also: Ulrich Hans-Richard Mammitzsch, “Wei Chung-hsien,” p. 15; Charles O. Hucker, \textit{The Ming Dynasty}, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{28} Mitamura, \textit{Eunuchs}, pp. 70–71; Preston M. Torbert, \textit{The Ch’ing Imperial Household Department}, pp. 9–10; F. W. Mote, “The Growth of Chinese Despotism,” p. 20. The Eastern Depot was established in 1420 to watch over and check the power of the commanders of the imperial bodyguard (the Embroidered Uniform Guard or \textit{jinyi weij}), which was the original secret police organized in 1382 directly under the emperor’s command. The actual investigation work of the Eastern Depot was conducted by Embroidered Uniform guardsmen under eunuch supervision. Mammitzsch, “Wei Chung-hsien,” pp. 52–53; Robert B. Crawford, “Eunuch Power in the Ming Dynasty,” pp. 128–131. In addition to the Eastern Depot, there was also a Western Depot, which was another secret service organ, established in 1477. Hucker, \textit{Ming Dynasty}, p. 95. The \textit{jinyi weij} can be traced back to an earlier secret service founded by Ming Taizu on a Yuan pattern in 1356 when he was setting up his military government at Taiping. Romeyn Taylor, “Yuan Origins of the Wei-so System,” p. 33. There may also have been yet another espionage organization staffed by Buddhist and Daoist monks. Franz Munzel, “Some Remarks on Ming T’ai-tsu,” p. 389. For the close relationship between the development of the secret police and the growth of imperial autocracy, see Peter Greiner, \textit{Die Brokatuniform-Brigade der Ming-Zeit von den Anfängen bis zum Ende der T’ien-Shun Periode}, pp. 159–167; Mote, “Despotism,” pp. 20–21.
more *castrati* than it could readily support.\(^\text{29}\) The opportunities in the palace for corruption, petty and otherwise, were endless; and the eunuch directorates ended by being an enormous financial burden for the Ming ruling house during its later days. Ironically, eunuchs themselves often acted as the emperor's tax collectors for the supernumerary charges that were tacked on to regular tax quotas as commercial imposts during the late Ming, but they still failed to pay for themselves.\(^\text{30}\) Despite emergency land tax increases after 1618, the Ministry of Finance was fortunate to be able to account for seventy percent of the 21,000,000 taels it was supposed to receive.\(^\text{31}\) The emperor's privy purse, which was partly filled by funds from the public coffers, did not fare much better. The dynasty's fiscal starvation was aptly, if somewhat comically, depicted in an anecdote detailing an incident that supposedly occurred in 1643. During that autumn the Chongzhen Emperor expressed his desire to check the inventory of some of the rooms in his Treasury.

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29 The enrollment of numerous eunuchs in the throne's service was consistently the result of earlier emperors' needs for private agents of their own to control the outer bureaucracy. Crawford, "Eunuch Power," p. 116; Mammitzsch, "Wei Chung-hsien," pp. 152–153. Many poor young men had themselves castrated in order to seek employment. In the Zhengde reign (1506–1521) the government had to set aside the Southern Park (Nan yuan) in the southern suburbs of Beijing as a place to put up 3,500 castrati who had presented themselves for employment but for whom there were no positions. In 1621, when the Tianqi Emperor announced plans to employ 3,000 more eunuchs in the palace service, 20,000 castrati applied for the positions. Mitamura, *Eunuchs*, pp. 71–72; Torbert, *Household Department*, p. 10; Geiss, "Peking under the Ming," p. 125. Young men also sometimes had themselves castrated to escape military service. Crawford, "Eunuch Power," p. 125.

30 Saeki Yuichi, "Shikiyo no hen," p. 87.

31 There were seven increases altogether between 1618 and 1639, coming to about one-tenth of the basic assessment, that is, to about 0.5 taels per mou of cultivated land. Huang, "Fiscal Administration," pp. 118–120. See also Wan Yan, *Chongzhen changbian*, p. 27. In addition to the 21,000,000 taels of land taxes, the government also regularly received every year in the late 16th century 10,000,000 taels of commuted service levy; 2,000,000 taels of salt monopoly revenue; and 4,000,000 taels of miscellaneous income designated for the Taicang Treasury. Huang, *Taxation*, pp. 274–275.
The doorkeeper, when summoned, repeatedly pretended that he could not find the proper keys to open the vault. When the strong room finally was opened, the emperor found it empty of all but a small red box with a few faded receipts.32

In addition to being such a visible burden on the public fisc, eunuchs also symbolized to the public at large the isolation of most late Ming monarchs from their outer court and bureaucracy.33 Functioning as intermediaries between the inner court and the outside world, eunuch palace directors soon assumed the task of transmitting memorials from the ministries to the throne, and drafting the monarch's rescripts and edicts in return. Consequently, it became unnecessary for the emperor himself to deal with the regular bureaucracy directly.34 Whereas earlier Ming emperors like Taizu (the Hongwu Emperor) and Chengzu (the Yongle Emperor) had used their private agents to increase their own personal control over the government, the growing strength of the eunuchs caused later Ming rulers actually to lose power and authority over the bureaucracy. Sometimes becoming mere puppets in the hands of the personal secretaries and eunuch directors who shielded them from the outside, emperors simply ceased seeing their regular ministers at all. There was not a single court audience between 1469 and 1497; and during the sixteenth century, Shizong (the Jiajing Emperor) and Shenzong (the Wanli Emperor) each held only a single audience with their ministry heads.35 Consequently, officials who

32 Wen Bing, *Liehuang*, p. 218. In 1643 one young Anhui degree-holder suggested printing 30,000,000 taels worth of paper money, even though there were no reserves to back up the notes. The emperor was so desperate that he almost went ahead with this scheme until he was warned that merchants would not accept the issue and that the silk stores would withhold their merchandise rather than take the worthless bills. Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa et le contexte politique et social de la Chine au moment de l'invasion mandchoue,” pp. 10–11. The Taicang Treasury was also exhausted by then, even though it had held reserves of 6 million taels (225,000 kilos) of silver. But that was sixty years earlier. By 1644, there was hardly any specie at all left. Atwell, “Time,” pp. 33–35; Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “The Shun Interregnum of 1644,” p. 44.
33 Miyazaki Ichisada, “Mindai So-Shō chihō no shidaifu to minshū,” p. 22.
had never even set eyes upon their monarch—a shadowy figure somewhere deep within the palace—lost confidence in the certainty of any strategic outcome. Knowing that personal whim might prevail in each case, they formed alliances with individual eunuch directors, or gathered informal (and illegal) political factions of their own to promote decisions.\(^{36}\) Practices of political patronage through the examination system deepened this factionalism, so that by the 1620s the central bureaucracy was riven with deep cleavages that led ultimately to political purges and life-and-death struggles between groups like the Donglin Academy literati and the eunuch director Wei Zhongxian’s allies. Even relatively trivial issues became inflamed by such factionalism, and the result was often a deadlock rather than a decision.\(^{37}\)

Under these conditions, both economic and political, the social fabric of the empire began to unravel. By the Chongzhen era (1628–1644) the poor and starving were coming to the cities, trying to support themselves by begging or stealing; and one could see entire rural districts deserted in central China.\(^{38}\) There were more and more signs of growing public indignation on the part of the

\(10\text{–}11.\) For the reasons behind the Wanli Emperor’s refusal to see his officials, i.e. his “strike” against his own bureaucracy, see Huang, 1587, pp. 75–103.

\(36\) It is a self-evident axiom of bureaucratic organization that, “The higher the degree of uncertainty inherent in a bureau’s function, the greater will be its proliferation of subformal channels and messages.” Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, p. 114.


\(38\) Albert Chan, “Decline,” pp. 188, 199–200. During the middle and late years of the Ming dynasty millions of people became refugees, fleeing rural districts where official gentry had engrossed much of the land. These refugees (*liumin*), many of whom became bandits or pirates, were usually the first to suffer in times of drought or flood. During the 1640 famine in Henan, where one *dou* (peck) of rice sold for 3,000 cash and one *dou* of wheat for 2,700, refugees simply consumed each other, fathers eating sons and wives their husbands. Li Xun, “Gongyuan shiliu shiji de Zhongguo haidao,” pp. 1–2; Hong Huanchun, “Lun Mingmo nongmin zhengquan de gemingxing he fengjianxing,” p. 71.
indigent, as well as those members of the gentry shocked by the growing animosity between rich and poor during these years. A folk song of the period, addressed to the Lord of Heaven, is tellingly worded:

Old skymaster,
You're getting on, your ears are deaf, your eyes are gone.
Can't see people, can't hear words.
Glory for those who kill and burn;
For those who fast and read the scriptures,
Starvation.
Fall down, old master sky, how can you be so high?
How can you be so high? Come down to earth.

In addition, public services collapsed. In 1629 the government postal system was ordered cut by thirty percent to reduce costs, but the result was a breakdown in communications, so that officials themselves had to hire mercenaries to travel on the highways of the empire. As many posts fell vacant, the “arteries" (xuemai) of the empire were blocked, and after 1630 officials in the provinces could no longer be certain that their memorials would reach the capital.

39 Okuzaki Hiroshi, Chūgoku kyōshin jinushi no kenkyū, p. 34.
40 Mi Chu Wiens, “Masters and Bondservants,” p. 63.
41 In the years after 1636, for example, the government simply abandoned the broken or flooded dikes below Xiangyang on the Han River. Vast amounts of land below Zhongxiang and nearly as far as Wuchang were for years transformed into swamps and robbers' retreats for peasants driven off their lands by incessant flooding. Pierre-Etienne Will, “Un Cycle hydraulique en Chine,” p. 275–276.
42 The government post system, founded by Ming Taizu, had originally been provisioned by wealthy families who supplied horses or boats, while poorer peasants were assigned to be couriers. Private parties used the system, however, and postal use permits were freely sold on the open market. By 1624, those unfortunate enough to be assigned the provisioning responsibility were being bankrupted. However, the couriers had become a profession of their own, and when the system was cut back these men were thrown out of work and many became bandits. Albert Chan, “Decline,” pp. 213–216; Ray Huang, “Ni Yuan-lu,” p. 8.
Throughout China, then, there were numerous instances in the 1630s of public services being taken over by private parties: firefighting, public works, irrigation, charitable homes, relief granaries, even public law and order. Conscientious magistrates paid out of pocket to hire private militiamen, and local gentry drilled their own “village troops” (xiangbing) for self-defense. For the enemy at the gates could just as easily be a peasant rebel as a regular Ming soldier. When thirty thousand soldiers of General Zuo Liangyu entered Hubei in 1636, ostensibly to pursue the rebel Zhang Xianzhong, the inhabitants had to flee into palisades in the hills to save their wives’ honor and their own lives. And later, in 1642 and 1643 when General Zuo mutinied against his own Ming emperor, the residents of Jiangnan felt that they may have had more to fear from him than from the rebels themselves. Whether

Posts in both the central and provincial governments remained unfilled. There were supposed to be over fifty supervising secretaries and over one hundred censors, for example, yet at one time during the Wanli period there were only four people filling those posts in the six ministries. In the capital at one point there were no censors at all; and in the provinces, often when an official retired or died in office, no successor was ever appointed. Zhao Yi, Nianer shi zhaji, p. 731 (juan 35).


45 Shi Jiyan, for instance, was a magistrate in Shanxi in 1635. He hired his own militia in 1635 and had a monk, expert in the martial arts, train them. He Zhiji, ed., Anhui tongzhi, 209:4b. Another example of this kind of individual initiative is the case of Xu Biao, the xunfu of Baoding in the early 1640s who, for local self-defense, trained his own army of 7,000 men in the latest military techniques. Dai Mingshi, “Baoding cheng shou jilüe,” p. 3. This practice of creating semi-private armies, staffed by an official’s mufu (tent government), had begun in the mid-sixteenth century when commanders like Hu Zongxian had to defend the lower Yangzi and coastal regions from pirate attacks. Merrilyn Fitzpatrick, “Local Interests and the anti-Pirate Administration in China’s South-east,” p. 2. See also Wen Juntian, Zhongguo baojia zhidu, p. 173; Ray Huang, 1587, p. 159; Li Xun, “Gongyuan shiliu shiji de Zhongguo haidao,” p. 5; Kuhn, Rebellion, 220; David Harrison Shore, “Last Court of Ming China,” pp. 53–55; Wills, “Maritime China,” pp. 219–220; So, Japanese Piracy, p. 150.

46 Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 25. For another illustration of imperial troops killing peaceful peasants instead of bandits or rebels, see: Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, zhong, p. 2a.

47 Xu Zi, Xiaotian jinian, 64:908; Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, 7:59; Wan Yan,
fighting on the side of the emperor or along with the rebels dedicated to his overthrow, armies like Zuo Liangyu's reflected a general pattern of uncontrolled militarization during the last decades of the Ming. Stable social structures thus seemed to be giving way to ambulant military states which finally brought down a ruling house long overwhelmed by social forces it could not control.48 In 1645, a year after he had taken over Beijing, the Qing Prince-Regent Dorgon had a pithier assessment of the fall of the Ming:

The Chongzhen Emperor was all right. It's just that his military officers were of bogus merit and trumped up their victories, while his civil officials were greedy and broke the law. That's why he lost the empire.49

From the perspective of the Qing rulers who eventually won the empire Chongzhen and his ancestors had lost, the gain was a military and political effort. The great enterprise had begun long before 1644—perhaps around 1618 with the fall of Fushun in the northeast—and it was ultimately to require about two-thirds of a century to be completed, culminating with the Kangxi Emperor's (r. 1662-1722) victory over the Three Feudatories and the Zheng regime on Taiwan in the early 1680s. The political consolidation of Qing rule was consequently a long and drawn out process, beginning with a period of preparation along the northern marches of the Ming empire, passing through a time of experimentation as adjustments were made to the Ming institutions which the Manchus had inherited in Beijing, and then resulting in a subtle blend of Chinese and barbarian modes of rule in which Manchus and Han each had to accept the reality of Qing power in and on terms not initially their own.

_Congzhen changbian_, p. 23. At this same time, the Ming official Shi Kefa wrote openly to the gentry of Huizhou that there was absolutely no difference at all between regular government troops and rebel armies. Both raided with equal viciousness and ferocity, and both were the bane of the people. Shi Kefà, _Shi Zhongzheng gong ji_, 2:17a.

48 The term "ambulant military states" is Bayley's. See C. C. Bayley, _War and Society in Renaissance Florence_, passim.

49 _Duoergun shezheng seji_, p. 5.
Critical to this political process of rise, adjustment, and fulfillment were the Chinese who collaborated in the Manchus' development into imperial Confucian dynasts. These Chinese played different roles at different times, and their social backgrounds corresponded to successive stages of the conquest: early transfrontiersmen who took on a Manchu identity among the tribal aristocracy as Nurhaci rose to power, Liaodong militarists who formed a new Han banner elite of their own as the northern provinces were brought under domination, freebooters from Shandong who taught the Manchus how to use Western artillery, northern Chinese landed gentry who claimed high political roles for themselves in exchange for helping Dorgon take over the central government in Beijing, and Jiangnan literati who accepted jobs as pacification commissioners in order to facilitate the civil conquest of the south without bloodshed and strife. With the exception perhaps of the first group, none of these Chinese supporters of the Qing remained without ambivalence toward the Manchus. And on the other side, viewing their Chinese allies as necessary to their own cause, the Manchus were not without comparable ambivalences of their own. Individual Manchu rulers could not do without the collaboration of Chinese officials in order to best members of their own aristocracy; and yet they also knew how quickly they, as monarchs in the Han imperial style, could easily become too sinified to retain the loyalty and affection of their own people. And as much as they were grateful to the most helpful Chinese collaborators for teaching them how to rule the empire in Confucian ways, so were some Manchu rulers also contemptuous of these turncoats, despising their sense of expediency and condemning their moral compromise.

The immediate price of this mutual accommodation, which led to the great Pax Manchurica of the 18th century when the Chinese were as powerful as they have ever been in their history, was a certain moral uneasiness. In return for giving up the illusory ethical heroism of the late Ming, Chinese adherents of the Qing dynasty gained a substantial opportunity to carry out the kinds of political

50 Paul S. Ropp, Dissent in Early Modern China, p. 41.
reforms that actually did stabilize the central government in a way that the more flamboyant literati of the Chongzhen court could never accomplish. In exchange for the right to say that they had lived up to their Confucian vocation by effectively "pulling the people out of the water and fire," however, those same collaborators also lost the self-conviction of social idealists they had earlier admired themselves. The uneasiness this provoked had two important effects. The first was the relinquishment of a certain kind of intellectual autonomy and moral commitment, so that ethical philosophers became scholarly academicians and political leaders turned into bureaucratic administrators. The second was an enhancement of the mandarinate's zeal for conservative reforms—reforms which ended by building up the power of the central government to such a point that the Chinese state was able to recover from the 17th-century crisis sooner than any other major power in the world. 51 Although this recovery was paradoxically premature, the restoration of dynastic order brought a new permanence to the ancien régime. 52 The Manchus, therefore, had every reason to be

51 As will be argued later, China set the foundations for its recovery in the Shunzhi and early Kangxi periods. Economic recovery actually began in 1682 or 1683. Wei Qingyuan, "Youguan Qingdai qianqi kuangye zhengce de yichang da lunzhan," p. 3; Peng Zeyi, "Qingdai qianqi shougongye de fazhan," p. 9. See also Braudel, Capitalism, pp. 13-14. Europe recovered differentially. The German countries, ravaged by the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), began to recover about the same time as China. However, the more developed parts of Europe did not begin to recover until later: France and the Netherlands in the 1690s, Spain and England in the 1720s and 1730s. According to Pierre Goubert, in the Beauvais region the period of recession ("phase B") lasted from 1630 to 1730. Rich and Wilson, Cambridge Economic History of Europe, pp. 405-406, 429; Wallerstein, Modern World System II, p. 245. For England's demographic increase after 1710, see E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, The Population History of England, 1541-1871, p. 162.

52 In this sense, which may be overly teleological, China's postwar recovery was a pseudo-solution to its systemic defects. If the evolution of the nation-state, as it developed in early modern Europe, is regarded as progressive, then the solution offered by the Qing allowed the system to recover from the crisis in a way that diverged from the solutions devised by other countries suffering from the same global economic and social catastrophe. For the relationship between systematically threatening crises and adaptive evolution, see René Thom, "Crise et catastrophe," p. 38; Fernand Braudel, "Histoire et sciences sociales," pp. 749-750.
proud of their particular reconstruction of the old imperial system; though looked down on as barbarians, they had presented an effective solution of their own design to the Central Kingdom’s difficulties. For that reason alone, Chinese ambivalence about the Qing’s great enterprise was certain to endure as long as the alien dynasty continued to reign, unchallenged, over their realm.\footnote{The term “great enterprise,” which describes a Confucian dynasty’s effort to gain and hold the Mandate of Heaven by ruling the “under-Heaven” (tianxia) of China, is a translation of the colloquial phrase da shi and occasionally of the more classical expression hong ye.}
CHAPTER ONE

The Northern Frontier

But the moving horsemen did not hear that I spoke the Han tongue; Their captain took me for a Tartar born and had me bound in chains. They are sending me away to the southeast, to a low and swampy land provided with hardly any kit and no protective drugs. Thinking of this my voice chokes and I ask of Heaven above, Was I spared from death only to spend the rest of my years in sorrow? My native village in Liang plain I shall not see again; My wife and children in the Tartars’ land I have fruitlessly deserted. When I fell among Tartars and was taken prisoner, I pined for the land of Han. Now that I am back in the land of Han, they would have turned me into a Tartar. Had I but known what my fate would be, I would not have started home! For the two lands, so wide apart, are alike in the sorrow they bring Tartar prisoners in chains! Of all the sorrows of all the prisoners mine is the hardest to bear! Never in the world has so great a wrong fallen to the lot of man—A Han heart and a Han tongue set in the body of a Turk.


The foundation of the Ming dynasty in 1368 was inextricably linked to the expulsion of the Mongols from the Central Plain (Zhongyuan) and the establishment of Chinese military colonies
beyond the Great Wall. Throughout the dynasty and nearly until its end in the seventeenth century, the protection of the northern frontier remained the empire's primary concern. Japanese, Koreans and Annamese—declared the founder, Ming Taizu, in 1371—were “no more than mosquitos and scorpions,” but the northern barbarians had to be considered a continuous and vital “danger to our heart and stomach.” To guard against this danger, Ming Taizu

1 Xue Hong, “Mingdai chuqi Jianzhou nızhen de qianxi,” pp. 52–54, 56; Yang Yang, “Shilun Mingdai Liaodong dusi weijun tuntian zhi,” p. 13; Qu Ruiyu et al., “Qing ruguan qian dui Dongbei de tongyi,” p. 112; Tamura Jitsuzô, ed., Mindai Man-Môshi kenkyû, pp. 74–75; D. Pokotilov, History of the Eastern Mongols during the Ming Dynasty, pp. 11–14. Charles O. Hucker believes that “the decisiveness of the Chinese victory over the northern nomads was not wholly appreciated by the founder of the Ming dynasty.” Because the Manchus were not nomads, Hucker goes so far as to claim that after 1368 “the tension between farmer and nomad was no longer a major theme in Chinese history.” Charles O. Hucker, The Ming Dynasty, p. 2. But see also John D. Langlois, Jr., “Introduction,” pp. 18–19. In the 1520s the literatus Zhu Yunming wrote: “The remote peoples of the lands encircling our seas, and all our furred and feathered neighbors, though they walk somewhat erect like men, are not our kind. They form themselves into regional confederations; if they are appeased then it is [like a swarm] of wasps or ants, if they are rejected then it is like the jing and xiao [who ungratefully devour their father and mother].” Christian Murck, “Chu Yun-ming and Cultural Commitment in Su-chou,” pp. 441–442. There was a continuing suspicion on the part of many Chinese of Mongols or Central Asiatics settled in China, who were regarded as security risks. Henry Serruys, “Were the Ming Against the Mongols Settling in North China?” p. 136.

2 It was primarily to protect the northern frontier that Ming Taizu invested the Ming princes and enfeoffed them in the north in 1369 as fan wang (protective feudatories, or frontier princes) who were supposed to constitute a kind of screen along the borders of the empire. Edward L. Farmer, Early Ming Government, pp. 74–75.

3 Lo Jung-pang, “Policy Formulation and Decision Making on Issues Respecting Peace and War,” pp. 52–3. See also Frederick W. Mote, “The T’u-mu Incident of 1449,” p. 272; Farmer, Early Ming, p. 12; Geiss, “Peking under the Ming,” p. 12; Henry Serruys, “The Mongols of Kansu during the Ming,” p. 330; and Langlois, “Introduction,” pp. 14–15, 17. Ming Taizu’s ethnocentrism is well known. Although on other occasions he accepted the legitimacy of Yuan rule, in November of 1367 as he marched north, Zhu Yuanzhang directed the following words to the people of North China: “Ever since ancient times, rulers have governed the empire. It has always been a case of China occupying the
established an enormous military establishment of three million soldiers divided into three groups: the capital guards, twelve divisions of imperial bodyguards, and the provincial weisuo armies.\textsuperscript{4}

**The Ming Weisuo System**

Of these the weisuo, which were first set up in Nanjing before Ming Taizu actually announced the new dynasty, were the most important. Inspired by the Mongol Yuan dynasty’s garrisons and modeled after the household militia (\textit{jubing}) of Toba Wei, Sui, and Tang times, the weisuo were also designed to be economically self-sufficient military colonies (\textit{tuntian}).\textsuperscript{5} At first, each of the soldiers

\begin{itemize}
\item interior and managing the barbarians, and the barbarians being outside and submitting to China. There was no such thing as the barbarians occupying China and governing the empire. From the time the Song fortunes declined, the Yuan was created by northern barbarians entering and residing in China. As for our Chinese people, it must be that Heaven’s will is that we Chinese should pacify them. How could the barbarians rule them? I fear that the heart-land has long been stained with the stink of mutton and the people are troubled. Therefore I have led forth the armies to make a clean sweep. My aim is to chase out the Mongol slaves, to do away with anarchy and assure the people of their safety, to cleanse China of shame.” Yao Guangxiao et al., eds., \textit{Ming shilu}, Hongwu 26:10–11b, translated in Farmer, \textit{Early Ming}, pp. 37–38. See also Mi Chu Wiens, “Anti-Manchu Thought during the early Ch’ing,” pp. 3–4; John Dardess, “Ming T’ai-tsu on the Yüan,” p. 7.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{4} The \textit{wei} or “guards” were province-wide military units, consisting of 5,600 men divided into 5 battalions of 1,120 each. A battalion was composed of 10 companies of 110 men. The \textit{su} were chilias (\textit{qianhu suo}) located at strategic points within provinces and allocated to prefectural military districts; they usually numbered 1,128 soldiers. It should be pointed out that the weisuo system enabled the state to disperse across the entire country the enormous number of men placed under arms during the militaristic fourteenth century. Romeyn Taylor, “Social Origins of the Ming Dynasty,” pp. 1–3; Albert Chan, “The Decline and Fall of the Ming Dynasty,” ch. 4; Robert Bruce Crawford, “The Life and Thought of Chang Chü-cheng,” p. 45; Mark Elvin, \textit{The Pattern of the Chinese Past}, pp. 91–100; Ray Huang, \textit{Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China}, pp. 64–66.

\textsuperscript{5} The scheme was initially proposed in 1363 by Zhang Chang, formerly Minister of Finance in the Yuan government which Ming Taizu helped overthrow. Romeyn Taylor, “Yuan Origins of the Wei-so System,” pp. 23–24. See also Ray Huang, \textit{Taxation}, pp. 287–288.
was supposedly granted 15 mu (0.9 hectares) of arable land to grow his own food supply. By 1365 the devastated war zone of the middle Yangzi had been reclaimed for military colony fields, and eventually each soldier's household was assigned 50 mu of land along with oxen and tools, and its members were exempted from land taxes and corvée. Within twenty-five years this weisuo system enabled the provincial guards to produce about 300 million kilograms of grain per year, sufficient to support one million troops, and making it possible for the central government to maintain a large frontier defense force without having to pay any monthly rations from its own treasuries.\(^6\)

Each commandery was composed of hereditary military families (junhu) whose status was assigned in perpetuity. Their commanders were also assigned by rotation to hereditary office, so that while the weisuo system on the one hand represented the power of the imperial state to determine one's status, it also displayed a strong feudalizing potential.\(^7\) Hereditary military ranks could develop strong personal ties based upon their own caste identity. Every effort was therefore made to prevent close bonds from forming between the commanding officers and the rank and file, and to keep the entire military establishment under careful civilian control. In each wei, command was divided among three different officials: the provincial military commander in charge of the regional military commission, the provincial administration office, and the provincial investigation office. The military registers for the entire system were placed under the control of the Chief Military Command of the Five Armies (Wu jun dudu fu), and the power to mobilize the armies was vested in the civilian officials in the Ministry of War. When the time came to mobilize the wei and

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\(^7\) Some military ranks in the capital were circulating, but the commander, vice commander, and assistant commander of the guards; and the chiliarchs, assistant chiliarchs, military judges, and centurions were all hereditary offices. These were all garrison-level posts. Tactical commands, and appointments to the regional military commissions in the provinces and the chief military commissions in the capital, were given to officers at the emperor's behest. They retained, for purposes of inheritance, their original garrison-level ranks. Hucker, *Ming Dynasty*, p. 52; Taylor, “Wei-so,” p. 39.
suo, the individual units were detached from their commanderies and placed under the tactical command of a general appointed by the Chief Military Command and answering to a generalissimo (tongshuai) who was usually a government minister.8

The perpetuation of this elaborate self-supporting military system mainly depended upon the maintenance of the quality and commitment of the hereditary military families. An ominous sign of decay occurred during the latter part of the 15th century when powerful families in the capital began to draft soldiers as workers to build tombs and palaces.9 Soon, military officers in the provinces were also transforming troopers into laborers, or “selling leisure” (mai xian) to soldiers who paid two hundred cash a month to be exempted from military drill. This became such a lucrative arrangement that merchants’ sons were known to bribe their way into military office in order to line their own pockets, or to register their own servants on the military rolls and embezzle the rations assigned to them. Some officers carved estates out of the fields of the former military colonies and forced the soldiers under their command to work as serfs on their lands.10 Deprived of rations and so exploited, many hereditary soldiers tried to rid themselves

8 By the end of the 14th century, the provincial military commands totaled seventeen and comprised 329 wei and 65 independent battalions. In the 15th century, the army was increased in size to 547 wei and 2,593 suo. The appointment of a generalissimo was regularly made after 1467. Between 1400–1600 over 310 wei and suo were created in the northeast. Wang Zhonghan, “Mingdai núzhèn rén dé fénbu,” pp. 27–48; Crawford, “Chang Chū-cheng,” pp. 46–47; Charles O. Hucker, The Censorial System of Ming China, pp. 34–45.

9 The deterioration of the Ming army was unprecedented in Chinese history. By the early 16th century the 78 Guards units around Beijing which were supposed to provide 380,000 troops had no more than 50–60,000 soldiers, of whom only 10,000 actually bore arms. When Mongol horsemen rode within sight of the city gates, none dared sally to challenge them. Ray Huang, “Military Expenditures in 16th C. Ming China,” pp. 39–43, 56–57; idem, Taxation, pp. 67–68, 290.

10 “There probably is no class of people in the country as degraded and as lazy as the soldiers. . . . When they are not actually engaged in military activities they are assigned to the lowest menial employments, such as carrying palanquins, tending pack animals, and other such servile occupations.” Matteo Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 89–90.
of their military status, and by the early 16th century it was claimed that as many as eighty percent of the total number of soldiers had deserted in some commands and that numerous frontier garrisons were operating at only half-strength. When ordered to mobilize their troops, commanders had to fill their rolls with temporarily hired miners and salt workers, or employ mercenaries from Liaodong and Shaanxi who were usually drawn from the same social quarters as the rebels they fought.

As though to compensate for their armies' depleted ranks, late Ming rulers devoted more and more attention to repairing the Great Wall, which was reinforced in brick and lengthened in spots. This defensive mentality did not simply coincide with the decline of the weisuo units. It could be traced back to the Yongle reign of the third Ming emperor, Chengzu, who had usurped the throne from his nephew and who correspondingly feared the power of his fraternal rival, the Prince of Ning, whose armies occupied what is now Chengde (Rehe) north of the Great Wall. In 1403 Ming Chengzu ordered the Prince of Ning to pull his armies back from that strategic area and turn it over to the Urianghai Mongols who had supported his own coup d'état. At the same time, he also relinquished the Ming garrisons in the northern half of the loop of the Yellow River, and linked together the remaining defense commands in Liaodong, Guangning and Datong with extensions of the Great Wall. This meant abandoning the area around Dongsheng to northern tribesmen, and in 1462—thirteen

12 Crawford, "Chang Chü-cheng," pp. 53–57; Albert Chan, "Decline and Fall," ch. 4. By 1569 the regular army was estimated to be at one-quarter strength. Huang, Taxation, p. 290.
13 Elvin, Pattern, pp. 91–106. The systematic refortification of the Great Wall began in 1472, just when the Ming economy was beginning to recover from the mid-15th century slump. Huang, Taxation, p. 285.
14 The Urianghai (Wuliangha) were the tribes scattered from the Nerchinsk region west to the forest land of the upper Irtysh on the Sino-Russian border. Rolf Trauzettel, "Sung Patriotism as a First Step Toward Chinese Nationalism," pp. 11–13.
15 Yet curiously enough, the Yongle Emperor was conventionally viewed as having secured the north against the Mongols because he established his main capital in Beijing. A poem from late Ming times reads: "The cruel Tartar
years after the infamous Tumu incident, when Emperor Yingzong was captured by Essen’s Oirat Mongols—the Ordos was lost to Chakhar tribesmen.  

The Ming government was not altogether passive, however, when it came to controlling the area beyond the Great Wall, and for nearly sixty years after 1390 Mongol raids virtually ceased while Ming troops extended Chinese authority over the northeast to the borders of Korea.  

16 Wolfgang Franke, “Yü Ch’ien, Staatsmann und Kriegsminister, 1398–1457,” p. 97; Wu Chi-hua, “The Contraction of Forward Defenses on the North China Frontier during the Ming Dynasty,” p. 10. Geiss, “Peking under the Ming,” pp. 108–111; Luc Kwanten, Imperial Nomads, pp. 274–275. Owen Lattimore’s discussion of the limits of the extension of the Western Roman Empire in Britain and on the Rhine and Danube is suggestive in this regard. “As in China the range of military striking power exceeded the range of ability to conquer and incorporate. The range of uniform civil administration exceeded that of economic integration. The northern frontier at which an attempt was made to exclude the barbarians was also the limit beyond which uniform blocks of cultivated territory with a uniform complement of cities and administrative services could not be added to the state; the limit within which the standardized tribute largely in kind and not costing too much in transport could be gathered by the state and beyond which trade was essentially centrifugal, draining the state of more than it brought in.” Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, p. 487.

17 The Ming frontier defense force initially took a very aggressive position vis-à-vis the Mongols. Every year General Xu Da, who made the former Yuan capital (now renamed Beijing) his headquarters, would issue forth with his armies to strike at remnant Mongol forces in the north. In 1372, however, he and Li Wenzhong suffered a serious defeat at the hands of Kǒkō Temūr. In 1373, therefore, Ming Taizu ordered the two generals to adopt a more defensive policy of not pursuing the enemy so deeply into his own territory, and the population on either side of Shanhaiguan was moved to the interior of Hebei. In 1380 policy changed once more, and in 1387–1388, 200,000 Ming soldiers moved beyond the Great Wall and decisively defeated Mongol forces in the northeast, along the Sungari River, and eventually in Buir Nor itself, where the young khan was killed. T. C. Lin, “Manchuria in the Ming Empire,” pp. 2–10; Hucker, Ming Dynasty, pp. 29–30, 63; Kwanten, Imperial Nomads, pp. 263–264; Hou Jen-chih, “Frontier Horse Markets in the Ming Dynasty,” pp. 311–313; Farmer, Early Ming, pp. 61–63.
into the region; and later, during the 1540s, Grand Secretary Xia Yan launched a campaign to recover the Ordos from the Mongols.\textsuperscript{18} The Ming tactical commander, Zeng Xian, who was head of the Three Frontiers (Sanbian), drove the enemy out of the Ordos in 1547; but the following year Altan Khan’s Tumed Mongols raided across the frontier, and in 1550 Altan Khan himself rode beneath the walls of Beijing.\textsuperscript{19} The end result was a discrediting of the forward policy of Xia Yan in the later years of the 16th century. Yan Song, the infamous chief minister of Shizong, the Jiajing Emperor, adopted a defensive posture after bringing about Xia Yan’s death; and in 1570 Zhang Juzheng, who was to become Grand Secretary for Shenzong, the Wanli Emperor, appeased Altan Khan by naming him a Chinese prince and by offering the Mongols generous frontier trading privileges.\textsuperscript{20}

These were not incontrovertible policies.\textsuperscript{21} One official accused Zhang Juzheng of “putting up a false front to deceive our fatherly

\textsuperscript{18} Wolfgang Franke, “Chinesische Feldzüge durch die Mongolei im frühen 15. Jahrhundert,” pp. 82–88; idem, “Yü Ch’ien,” p. 95. It has been pointed out that, as long as the Yongle Emperor continued to force the Mongols to retreat farther into the steppes, there was no need for an advance line of defense—a kind of early warning system—beyond Datong. Once that aggressive military posture was abandoned, however, the Mongols could camp close to the Great Wall and ride down upon Datong and Beijing without warning. Geiss, “Peking under the Ming,” pp. 57–62.

\textsuperscript{19} L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., \textit{Dictionary of Ming Biography}, pp. 6, 530, 1304–1305; Morris Rossabi, \textit{China and Inner Asia from 1368 to the Present}, pp. 45–46. The Three Frontiers were Gansu, Ningxia and Yansui. The headquarters command was located at Guyuan, while the Suliao commander-in-chief was garrisoned at Miyun. Under Altan Khan, an eastern Mongol confederation was created, and the old capital at Qaraqorum was reclaimed. Kwanten, \textit{Imperial Nomads}, p. 278.


\textsuperscript{21} Goodrich and Fang, \textit{Ming Biography}, p. 6; Serruys, “Ming Against Mongols?” p. 137. In the public’s eye, the policy of appeasement by trading with the Mongols was associated with the infamous Chou Luan. Heroic resistance was associated with his opponent, Yang Jiisheng. When the throne favored Chou Luan, Yang was degraded and dismissed from court. Chou Luan fell from favor, however, when it was rumored not only that he was trading with the
emperor” by pretending that his arrangement with Altan Khan benefitted the Central Plain.

Now we turn China’s fineries such as silk and embroideries to be the daily wear of savages. Tributary trade it may be called; but actually this is appeasement. The administrators of the frontier use the so-called trading privileges to bribe the savage tribes, who in turn blackmail us with threats of plunder.  

And Yan Song was typified in the public’s eye as a treacherous minister and compared with Li Linfu (the Tang official accused of treasonable dealings with the Tartars) and Qin Gui (the Song minister who betrayed the patriotic Yue Fei in 1141).  

Mongols privately, but also that he had claimed a false victory over the Mongols at Gubeikou pass and had presented the court with the heads of eighty peasants his men had cut off in place of the real enemy. Yang briefly returned to court, but he was soon denounced by Yan Song and sentenced to death in 1555. Yang Jisheng’s wife then sent a petition to the emperor, offering to die in place of her husband, and then to lead an army of ghosts and spirits to battle with the enemy on behalf of the Ming throne. Yan Song withheld the petition, which became very famous. Indeed, the Shunzhi Emperor celebrated Yang Jisheng’s loyalty in a special ceremony held in 1656. Nelson I. Wu, “Tung Ch’i-ch’ang,” pp. 264–267; Herbert A. Giles, A Chinese Biographical Dictionary, pp. 168, 187; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, pp. 1503–1505. Yang Jisheng held that loyalty, like filial piety, was an obligation which could not be evaded, and that one was bound to perform both filial and loyalist activities if only by keeping one’s mind on the emperor while serving one’s parents. Yang Jisheng, Yang Zhongmin gong ji, 257:9.  

Huang, “Grand Canal,” p. 123.  

From a Mongolian perspective, Yan Song was only being realistic when he maintained that Altan and his troops were “merely a group of food-looting bandits—nothing to worry about.” Sechin Jagchid, “Patterns of Trade and Conflict Between China and the Nomads of Mongolia,” p. 197. The comparison with Li Linfu is made in the popular 17th-century tale about Shen Lian. E. B. Howell, trans., “Chin Ku Ch’i Kuan: The Persecution of Shen Lien,” p. 318–320, 412. Another story from the late Ming Sanyan collection, entitled “The Diplomacy of Li T’ai-po,” gives some indication of stereotyped views of Sino-barbarian relations. In the story, the ruler of Bohai demands the surrender of certain Korean cities from Tang Xuanzong (r. 713–755). Li Bo’s fictional answer to this ultimatum was: “It has always been recognized as inadvisable for an egg to come into violent contact with a stone, or for a snake
A Jurchen (Nüzhen), as seen by a late Ming portraitist. The Chinese caption on the original print’s overleaf explains that Jurchen live at the foot of the Changbai Mountains, and that they wear deerskin shoes and fish-scale clothing. Wang Qi, Sancai tuhui [Illustrated compendium on the three powers] (1609), renwu (men) 12:4b.
Nevertheless, the alternative to such a "loose rein" upon the northern tribesmen was a vigorous policy of promoting advanced outposts and large garrisons which grew all the more expensive as the Ming government’s *weisuo* system aged. Even though the numbers of troops in the hereditary ranks declined, the numbers of officers steadily rose. In the capital army itself there had only been about 2,700 officers in the late 14th century. By mid-15th century there were 30,000 officers, drawing in addition to their rice rations 480,000 taels of silver each year. These expenses steadily increased. By late 16th century, when the authorized strength of the army was 1,200,000 men, basic pay alone—if proffered in entirety—would have cost 20,000,000 taels of silver. Some of this outlay could be attributed to the hiring of voluntary troops (*bing*) to replace the depleted hereditary ranks: a combat infantryman received 18 taels per year, plus an additional 5 taels and subsidies for his family if he served on the frontier. There, the *kaizhong* system of 1492 which encouraged merchants to purvey grain in exchange for salt certificates had gradually been abandoned during the 1500s, and the price of rice had consequently risen to 5 taels per picul (60 kilos). 24 Necessarily, the frontier subsidies themselves had also steadily risen: from 50,000 taels in 1500 to 2,800,000 taels in 1573, and on to 3,600,000 taels in 1586. 25 To cover this, recourse was had to the Taicang Treasury which in the 1580s usually held

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... Moreover, the small states beyond the sea, subject to Korea, are as compared to the Middle Kingdom, no bigger than a prefecture; the quantity of their stores and the number of their troops are but one ten-thousandth of Our resources. Your anger is like that of a mantis... Do not cause us to come and wipe you utterly out, thus making you a laughingstock for the other barbarians!" Howell, trans., *Chìn Kū Ch’i Kuan: The Inconstancy of Madame Chuang*, p. 79–80.


25 In the late 16th century, when about 500,000 men, supplied with at least 100,000 horses, were serving on the northern frontier, the basic monthly maintenance of a soldier was about 2 taels. In the 1550s mercenaries were paid about 6 taels per year in wages; by the early 17th century, the standard rate was 18 taels. Ray Huang, *Taxation*, pp. 285–290; idem, "Military Expenditures," pp. 43–44.
6,000,000 taels in reserves annually topped up with provincial deposits. But the steadily rising frontier subsidies, plus the 12,000,000 taels of expenses of three wars fought in the late 16th century against the Mongols in northwestern Asia, the aborigines in southwestern China and the Japanese in Korea, depleted these reserves. By 1618 the Taicang Treasury was reduced to 120,000 taels; and after the Manchu victories of that year, Ming Shenzong reluctantly had to dip deep into his privy purse (the Dongyu Treasury then contained well over 3,000,000 taels) to make up 500,000 taels in deficits for the Ministry of War.26

To help cover these rising costs, special taxes were introduced. The following year, 1619, saw the imposition of Liao xiang (rations for the military forces in the northeast), a surcharge of approximately nine percent on all prefectures in the realm save those right in the imperial domains around the capital.27 This raised an additional 5,200,000 taels, which barely covered the costs of the 180,000 soldiers and 90,000 combat horses of the Liaodong commandery alone, not to speak of the other eight areas that made up the Nine Frontiers (Jiu bian).28 Overall defense costs continued to

27 Chu Hua, Hucheng biaokao, 1:5b–6a; Huang, Taxation, p. 163.
28 The Nine Frontiers were the tactical military commands of Liaodong, Jizhou in northern Hebei, Xuanfu near Kalgan, Datong, Yansui [Yan’an and Suide in Shaanxi], three fortified passes in Shanxi, Guyuan, Ningxia and Gansu. These were fluid units superimposed upon the provinces and the territorial jurisdictions of the regional military commissions, which assigned men and officers as needed to tactical duty and which appointed ad hoc generals from among nobles in the chief military commissions in the capital. Hucker, Ming Dynasty, p. 65; Hou Jen-chih, “Horse Markets,” pp. 309–311; Huang, “Military Expenditures,” p. 44. Merely to supply the Liaodong commandery the following supplies were needed: 3,240,000 taels of silver in basic salaries, 1,080,000 piculs of rice in military rations, 216,000 bundles of grass for horse feed, 972,000 piculs of beans for horse food. Bows cost 2 taels apiece and single arrows 6/10ths of a tael. The fleet which was supposed to ship these supplies north from Tianjin only numbered 700 ships—instead of the 4,000 vessels theoretically assigned—so that many of the supplies had to be sent north by slow and expensive oxcarts. Huang, “Grand Canal,” pp. 127–131.
mount throughout the frontier zone during the next few years. Moreover, the price of goods kept climbing: rice had doubled in price between 1520 and 1620, and it was to rise another twenty percent between 1620 and 1644. Additional tax surcharges were levied in 1630, especially on the quotas of Jiangnan in the Yangzi delta, but spiraling military expenses outran these new revenues.

**Chinese Frontiersmen and Manchu Bondservants**

By then the garrisons that did exist beyond the Great Wall were organized quite differently from the original weisuo forces. Even within the Central Plain, local brigades and battalions were now personally dominated by officers who routinely spent ten to twelve years in a command instead of being rotated to a new assignment. At the center, the Chief Military Command had lost its authority and had become a mere secretariat. The three-way provincial military command system of checks and balances had been superseded by the practice of appointing surveillance officials to “patrol and pacify” (xun fu) an area, and by 1550 these censors had turned into permanent governors. They in turn answered to a su-

29 During 1624, for example, 6,240 zhang [approximately 11,000 meters] of wall and 321 watchtowers were repaired or constructed; and the costs of this kind of work kept increasing during 1625. Yao Guangxiao et al., eds., Ming shilu, Tianqi 51:17a, and 55:19b–20a (hereafter cited as Ming shilu). According to Hucker, the campaigns against the Manchus between 1618 and 1627 cost approximately 60 million taels, or about half of the total income of the state during that same period. Hucker, Censorial System, p. 158–159.

30 Michel Cartier, “Notes sur l’histoire des prix en Chine du XIVe au XVIIe siècle.” Price figures for this period are not reliable.

31 Chu, Hucheng beikao, 5:5b–6a. By September, 1639, the supreme commander at Guangning, Gao Qiqian, was reporting that no military supplies had been delivered for five months, and that provisions at the Great Wall were utterly exhausted. Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, 1:237.

32 Memorial from Shi Kefà dated January 21, 1644, in Wan Yan, Chongzhen changbian, p. 57.

33 Huang, Taxation, pp. 29–30. The xunfu was originally a censor bearing the
premier commander for military affairs (zongdu junwu), who usually remained a high-ranking civil official but who combined fiscal and military authority in the region under his jurisdiction. 34 

In the frontier zones these supreme commanders threatened to become satraps. While the garrisons within the Great Wall were manned by conscripts replacing the old hereditary jun, in the northeast there continued to exist military households, many of them living as colonists originally sent from Shandong or Shanxi but by now strongly identified with the region of Liaodong itself. 35 These Liaodong military families engaged in trade and agriculture, but they were primarily soldiers who had developed into a kind of martial caste. Sons succeeded fathers as unit commanders, a process regularly recognized by the central government in Beijing, and sub-officers developed personal ties with their superiors while leading their own liegemen (jiading) in brigades of their own. The central government was of two minds about these professional military households and their armies. Some officials, like Grand Secretary Zhang Juzheng in the 1580s and Commander-in-


35 Lattimore, pointing out that the vernacular designation for the northeast was kouwai [outside the passes], made the following observation: "The comparable emotions of the emigrating Chinese, when it is a question of migrating beyond the Great Wall—but not when it is a question of emigrating to, say, the south seas—are, in the first place, a feeling of risking himself beyond the wall (the defensive wall) and, in the second place, after he has once become established, a feeling that he is now in a superior position with regard to China. He is no longer defended by the Great Wall frontier; it is China that is defended by the Great Wall frontier; it is China that is defended by the wall from him and his compeers. In other words, there is a partial and curious, but most significant substitution of regional feeling for race or national feeling." Lattimore, Manchuria, p. 8. He further argues that this regional feeling is characterized by a particular social psychology, shared by "barbarian" and Han alike, which looks back upon China as a promised land to be, perhaps, conquered. "The criterion of success for the adventurer starting out with his back towards China and his face toward the wilderness, became the ability to turn about and, as a member of the privileged population of the privileged reservoir, face towards China; which thus took the place of the wilderness as the 'promised land,' the source of wealth and the proper field for the exercise of power." Ibid., pp. 60–61.
Chief Xiong Tingbi in the early 1600s, believed that the only way to keep the frontier well defended was to recognize, and even encourage, these semi-permanent commands.\(^\text{36}\) Others, particularly members of the Censorate, opposed this kind of decentralization; and leaders of the statecraft school in the late Ming likened the development of such armies to the rise of warlords during the late Tang period.\(^\text{37}\) As long as the Ming government held a modicum of control over the northeast, the Liaodong military families remained loyal; but the degree of central control was always somewhat tenuous. Strictly cultural loyalty—Chinese versus barbarians—long prevailed, of course; but over time some of these frontier soldiers found it easier to identify themselves with martial leaders of the tribesmen than with civil ministers of the Ming emperor. As frontiersmen, in fact, they formed a community of their own.\(^\text{38}\)

\(^{36}\) Zhang Juzheng supported generals like Qi Jiguang and Li Chengliang when they tried to form personally controlled armies (Qi Jiguang revived the ancient ritual of drinking animal blood in wine from a common cup with his officers, who swore an oath together with him). Heinrich Busch, “The Tung-lin Academy and its Political and Philosophical Significance,” p. 16; Ray Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance, p. 185. Xiong, who was jingliüe (commander-in-chief) of Liaodong at various times during the early 17th century, proposed that an effective frontier defense policy depended upon long-term appointments of officials in command there. See the memorial dated September 8, 1609, in Qian-kun zhengqi ji, 282:41b–42 (hereafter cited as Qian-kun).


\(^{38}\) “A frontier population is marginal where—to take a common-place example—a frontier is emphasized by tariffs on goods exported and imported, it is normal for many people in both frontier populations to engage in smuggling. A frontier dweller’s political loyalty to his own country may in this way be emphatically modified by his economic self-interest in illegal dealing with the foreigners across the border. Moreover, while the motive is economic, the activities cannot be limited to the economic. They inevitably set up their own nexus of social contact and joint interest. Men of both border populations working together in this way, become a ‘we’ group to whom others of their own nationality, and especially the authorities, are ‘they.’ To this extent it is often possible to describe the border populations on both sides of the frontier taken together as a joint community that is functionally recognizable though not institutionally defined. It is not surprising that the ambivalent loyalties of frontier people are often conspicuous and historically important.” Lattimore, “Frontier History,” p. 470.
Because the lines dividing Chinese frontiersmen and barbarian tribesmen were not always that clearly drawn, assimilation on both sides was not unusual. Just as many of the earliest wei and suo consisted of Mongol garrisons, so did a number of Yuan armies defeated in Gansu in 1369 by Ming troops contain Chinese soldiers. Later, in the sixteenth century, Chinese continued to join the Mongols, serving them as advisors and diplomatic aides. In fact, an entire community of White Lotus sectarians, consisting of tens of thousands of people, migrated into Mongol territory.

39 Nor was it characteristic only of the late imperial period. There were several paradigmatic renegades during the former Han. Wei Lü (1st and 2nd centuries B.C.), a famous Han musician of Turkish descent, joined the Xiongnu, who made him a prince. Even more famous was Li Ling (1st and 2nd centuries B.C.), who was one of Wudi’s military officers. Although he on one occasion successfully reconnoitered Xiongnu territory, on another mission he and his men were surrounded by Xiongnu to whom he eventually surrendered. Li Ling went on to teach the Xiongnu Chinese methods of warfare, married one of the khan’s daughters and stayed in their service for 20 years. Giles, *Biographical Dictionary*, pp. 450, 865.

40 Rossabi, *Inner Asia*, p. 41: Jagchid, “Patterns,” p. 199. Some Mongols became famous Ming military officers. Mangui (d. 1630), who settled in China proper as a young man, joined the Great Wall garrison forces and rose to become head of the Ningyuan defenses in 1623. Valorous in battle, he was wounded after relieving Ningyuan in July, 1627, and led the defense of Beijing in 1629 against the Manchus. He was killed in a fight outside the south wall of the capital. Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period*, pp. 561–562. Lattimore noted in the 1930s the tremendous disparity between Mongols and Chinese, and pointed out the existence of “mixed classes” between the two peoples among the advanced colonists, squatters, caravan traders, and interpreters in inner Mongolia. If such a person was Chinese, rather than Mongol, then he usually came from a family with a tradition of activity among the Mongols or which had intermarried with the Mongols. Such a person normally took a Mongol wife, conformed to Mongol customs, and gave up much of his Chineseness. However, after “going native” as a young man, the renegade often returned to his Chinese community as an old man, just as though his life was lived in separate compartments: one for youth and one for old age. Lattimore, *Manchuria*, pp. 54–60.

41 Hou Jen-chih, “Horse Markets,” p. 313. Li Huai—“Monkey Li”—surrendered to the Mongols in 1515–1516 and became one of their military leaders, conducting raids across the Great Wall. Serruys, “Ming Against Mongols?” p. 137.
and sought the protection of Altan Khan during the Jiajing period. In the northeast, too, Chinese could be found among the Jurchen who were the ancestors of the later Manchus. Some of these were certainly prisoners of war, but others were probably renegade soldiers who joined the Manchus voluntarily. On the one hand, their assimilation reflected the openness of Manchus to acculturated outsiders, including a Korean population in the forested mountains of what are now the borderlands of North Korea, Siberia, and Jilin province. On the other, it may also have

42 Richard Hon-chun Shek, “Religion and Society in Late Ming,” passim; Daniel L. Overmyer, “Alternatives,” pp. 162–163. For a reference to this in late Ming fiction, see Howell, “Shen Lien,” pp. 414–417. When the Ming government entered into negotiations with the Mongols over Bahanaji, its representatives demanded that the khan turn over Chinese defectors in his ranks. The 9 men whom the khan delivered to the Ming authorities in 1570 were publicly executed in Beijing. Hou, “Horse Markets,” pp. 321–322. See also Rossabi, Inner Asia, pp. 46–47; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, p. 6.

43 Ming frontier authorities distinguished between three different main groups of Jurchen: the Jianzhou Jurchen, the Haixi Jurchen, and the “wild” (ye) Jurchen who traded at Kaiyuan. The Jianzhou Jurchen became the Manchus. Wang, “Mingdai nüzhen ren de fenbu,” p. 2; Rossabi, Inner Asia, pp. 50–51; Qu et al. “Qing ruguan qian,” p. 115; Mo Dongyin, “Mingmo Jianzhou nüzhen de fazhan ji qi jianguo,” p. 99. For the migrations of the Jianzhou Jurchen, see Zheng Tianting, Tan wei ji, pp. 36–38; Xue Hong, “Mingdai chuqi Jianzhou nüzhen de qianxi,” pp. 54–64; Lin, “Manchuria,” pp. 13–14, 17–19. The term Manchu (Chinese Manzhou, Manchu Manju) first appeared in the records in 1613, was used in court correspondence with the Korean monarch in 1627, and was officially adopted in 1635. Xue Hong, “Shilun Manzu gongtongti de xingcheng,” pp. 9–10; Zheng, Tan wei ji, pp. 33–34; Gertraude Roth Li, “The Rise of the Early Manchu State,” pp. 10, 13. Although the Manchu Veritable Records mainly refer to the people as Jusen before that time, hereafter in the text the Jianzhou Jurchen who joined Nurhaci and became known as the Manchus will for convenience be called by their later name.

44 Preston M. Torbert, The Ch’ing Imperial Household Department, p. 15.

45 Lattimore claimed, without knowing of the inter-ethnic strife of the 1620s, that: “The Manchus were, from the beginning, without either the strong tribal consciousness or the strong historical traditions of the Mongols. They appear to have filtered in from the outer no-man’s land to the ‘reservoir’ and though they endowed themselves offhand with a tradition of dissent from the
stemmed from special qualities inherent among the Liaodong settlers themselves, including military skills and virtues. Taking Manchu names and adopting tribal customs, these Liaodong soldiers actually became transfrontiersmen, crossing the boundaries of their own culture so that they eventually lost their identity as

Nüchen-Chin [i.e., Jurchen-Jin], they rose to power with such rapidity that they never thoroughly absorbed the tradition and spirit of the ‘reservoir’; they rather created a new modified ‘reservoir’ and regional tradition of their own. This very immaturity facilitated their extraordinarily rapid and thorough assumption of Chinese characteristics.” Lattimore, Manchuria, p. 44. Lattimore’s explanation characteristically combined geographical and economic factors. The Chinese penetrated the far northeast as traders in luxury goods; therefore, they did not colonize. The Manchus penetrated the ‘reservoir’ zone to the south, on the other hand, as forest hunters and herders of reindeer who took on garden agriculture as a supplement to their hunting economy, and gradually elevated that form of agriculture until it resembled Chinese cultivation patterns, with many villages centering around small walled cities. The Manchus therefore survived and prospered thanks to their cultural adaptability, conforming to Mongol standards when they were with Mongols, and to Chinese when they were with Han. At the same time, they retained their tribal ability to organize hunting/military units. “It is possible,” Lattimore suggested, “that the rapid adoption of a Chinese economy and culture, together with lack of inland water and seacoast trade to bind them to the Chinese, accounted largely for the border bickerings which finally resulted in the Manchu conquest.” Ibid., p. 19.

46 Referring to French renegades among the Indians of North America, Governor Denonville wrote from Canada to Louis XIV in 1685: “It has long been believed that in order to make the savages French we should draw them closer to us, but there is every reason to admit that this was a mistake. Those who have been brought into contact with us have not become French, and the French who frequented them changed into savages. They affected to dress and live like them.” Alexis de Tocqueville remarked in this regard: “The [French] were not slow in forming connections with the daughters of the natives. But unfortunately there was some secret affinity between the Indian character and their own. Instead of giving the barbarians the tastes and habits of civilized life, they themselves often became passionately attached to the savage life. They became the most dangerous of the denizens of the wilderness, winning the Indian’s friendship by exaggerating both his vices and his virtues.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pp. 329–330, where Denonville is also quoted.
Chinese, seeming in manner, dialect, custom, and physique to be more akin to the Manchus than to their former countrymen.\(^47\)

Given the loss of Chinese identity, including a Han name, it is difficult to identify these transfrontiersmen among the early Manchus.\(^48\) There is reason to believe that Dahai (d. 1632), who was fluent in both Chinese and Manchu, and who was in charge of all of Nurhaci’s written communications with the Ming and Korean governments, was a descendant of a transfrontiersman’s family.\(^49\)

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\(^{47}\) At one point during the campaigns against the Manchus, when the Ming Ministry of War paid a 150 taels bounty for the head of any Manchu killed, Liaodong people were often hunted down instead because they were physically mistaken for Manchus. Chan, “Decline and Fall,” pp. 149–150, 156. The term, “transfrontiersman,” is Philip Curtin’s. Allen Isaacman uses it to describe groups like the Pereira family which migrated from Goa in the mid-1700s to the Zambesi River area, and intermarried with the family of the king of Chewa, eventually becoming recognized as sovereigns by them. Transfrontiersmen thus differ from frontiersmen in that the latter might have wives beyond the frontier but retain their primordial loyalty to the kinship network in the European community. Frontiersmen might eventually develop a hybrid culture, but transfrontiersmen in this case lost their European identity altogether. Indeed, transfrontiersmen like the Pereiras attacked the Portuguese in the 19th century. Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, “The Prazeros as Transfrontiersmen,” pp. 19, 35–36, note 5.

\(^{48}\) See, for example, Tamura, Mindai Man-Mōshi kenkyū, pp. 297–339.

\(^{49}\) Nurhaci also had Dahai translate the Ming penal code and several military works into Manchu. Dahai is credited with adding diacritical marks to Old Manchu in 1632, thereby creating the newer and more standard version of the written language coined by the interpreter Erdeni, who was probably also a transfrontiersman. In 1629–1630 when the Manchus came into the Central Plain and reached the gates of Beijing, it was Dahai who wrote the proclamations and messages in Chinese. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 213–214. There is a reference in the Korean Veritable Records to a Chinese man of letters being in charge of Nurhaci’s communications with foreign rulers. Because Dahai had that responsibility, this is strong evidence of Dahai’s Han origins. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 59–60. Scholars of Qing history owe a great debt to Dr. Roth Li, who has done such pioneering work with the early Manchu texts, and whose Ph.D. thesis is the foundation upon which the remainder of this chapter is constructed. The kinds of early Manchu documents with which she has worked were first discovered in 1905 by Naitō Torajirō in Mukden. Some of these were published between 1955 and 1962 as the Mambun Rōtō
There are also indications that sixteen entire companies of Chinese adherents served among what were eventually to become the Manchu banner forces. In 1623 a distinction was drawn by Nurhaci between Chinese who had joined the Manchus prior to 1619 and those who had joined later. The former, he said, should be treated just as though they were Manchus, suggesting the degree to which they had become assimilated by then to the Manchu way of life. Nurhaci's desire also made it quite clear that, in effect, these assimilated Chinese companies were for all practical purposes considered the same as Manchu military forces.  

The majority of Chinese living with the Manchus in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, however, were not assimilated as Manchu tribesmen. Rather, as prisoners of war, they were treated

(Old Manchu Documents), being 1778 copies of the originals and covering the years of 1607–1626 and 1626–1636. These versions were romanized in Manchu pronunciation and translated into Japanese by Kanda Nobuo and a team of scholars. After the Mambun Rōtō was finished, the originals of the 1778 copies were found in the Palace Museum on Taiwan, and were published in 1969 under the title Manzhou jiudang (Old Manchu Documents). These were written in the ancient Manchu script without diacritical marks, and they sometimes consist of several versions of a given document. Although "for historical inquiries there are only a few significant differences between the original and the copy," Dr. Roth Li has consulted both in her pathbreaking work on early Qing history. See Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," pp. 2–3.

50 Nurhaci's decree read: "Judge those Chinese who have been with us since Fe Ala days on the same basis as the Manchus." Fe Ala was Nurhaci's capital from 1603 to 1619. Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," pp. 29–30, 190; Tie Yuqin, "Lun Qing ruguan qian ducheng chengguo yu gongdian de yanbian," p. 3. An example of this kind of assimilated Chinese was Fei Yingdong, the famous archer who submitted to Nurhaci in 1595 and, after marrying one of his daughters, became a brigadier general. Fei Yingdong's son was Tulai, the fearsome warrior who led the Qing emperor's bodyguards (hujun) against Jiazhou in 1637. Tulai was ennobled as Duke of Zhaoxun. Tulai's wife was from the Manchu Gioro clan, and their daughter was the future Empress Xiaokang, the Shunzhi Emperor's wife. The Kangxi Emperor was thus descended from a transfrontiersman's family, being part Manchu, part Mongol and part Chinese. "Notices of Eminent Statesmen of the Present Dynasty," p. 98. Lawrence D. Kessler, *K'ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch'ing Rule*, pp. 53–54; Zheng, *Tan wei ji*, p. 51.
The Manchus distinguished between Mongol and Chinese adherents who had been “accepted” (shou) as free households (minhu) and were treated like the Manchus themselves, and those who had been “captured” (huo) and were classified as ren chư (humans and animals) to be gifted as chattel to the warriors. The economic function of the latter, who were sometimes called bond-servants (boo-i, literally “household person”), varied considerably. Some simply acted as personal servants to the Manchus themselves. Others worked on the landed estates which Nurhaci and other Manchu leaders acquired after 1596 and managed through estate stewards. Perhaps their most important role inso-

51 Zheng, Tan wei ji, p. 2. According to an entry in the Ming Veritable Records as early as 1385, when Ming forces moved into Liaodong, they found that the Jurchen (niuzhen) there had captured (huo) prisoners and “enslaved them” (nu zhi). Wada Sei, “Minsho ni okeru Joshin shakai no hensen,” p. 92.


53 The legal status of these chattel was somewhat different from that of Roman or German slaves. On the one hand, they were viewed as private property that could be stolen or inherited; yet, on the other, they were treated as individual personalities who could own property and assume debts. Chinese slaves could litigate against each other, and they could not be killed with impunity. Zheng, Tan wei ji, pp. 88–89; Meng Zhaoxin, “Qing chu ‘taoren fa’ shitan,” pp. 4–5; Torbert, Household Department, pp. 53–55.

54 Although hunting continuously provided the Manchus with food, clothing material, and furs to trade, by the late 16th century the cultivation of millet, wheat, and gaoliang had become their mainstay of subsistence. Along the Tunggiya and Suzi Rivers even the hillsides and mountain tops were used to grow crops, cultivated by freeholding tillers. After about 1600, the Manchu chiefs imposed labor duties upon the population of each ninu, which was supposed to send 10 male adults and contribute 4 draft animals to grow crops for the military unit. At the same time, the Manchu aristocracy used prisoners of war to till their own estates. The amount of estates expanded significantly after 1618 with the conquest of Liaodong, yet each estate remained a relatively small unit. After 1625 the average estate, which was a kind of artificial village, consisted of 9–13 adult males. Wealthy nobles owned a number of these. In 1634, for example, the son of Daisan possessed 23 estates with a total of 503 slave cultivators. The stewards were usually chosen from among the wealthiest members of the lineage group on the estate. Zheng, Tan wei ji, pp. 4, 18; Li Yanguang, “1644 nian yiqian Manzu de shehui jingji xingtai,” pp. 142–143;
far as the rise of the Manchus to supreme military power was concerned, was their participation in industry and commerce.\(^{55}\)

It was Chinese and Korean captives, for instance, who taught the Jurchen how to make weapons from iron smuggled out of China and Korea in the late 15th century.\(^{56}\) After 1599, the Manchus even learned how to mine and smelt their own iron.\(^{57}\) By the early 1600s there were hundreds of foreign craftsmen in Nurhaci’s capital at Hetu Ala, making bows and arrows, iron tools, and sets of military armor.\(^{58}\) The city itself was built with the help of Chinese masons, and the funds that made its construction possible came in turn from the trade in hides, precious stones, and ginseng which the Manchus conducted with China and Korea. Chinese

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Torbert, *Household Department*, p. 18. In 1619 Nurhaci ordered his officers “to let the Chinese people till the fields of the border and after building the city of Jiefan, station soldiers there to oversee the working of the fields.” And after Liaodong was annexed, he ordered that the Chinese prisoners be made to “shave their heads, live where they were and till the fields” instead of being killed. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 109.

55 Torbert, *Household Department*, p. 56. Artisans and craftsmen among the captured were always spared. They were exempted from taxes and corvée and they received free allotments of food and servants. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 110–111. For a listing of the commercial activities of the Manchus at this time, see: Zheng, *Tan wei ji*, pp. 18–19. “In the early Wanli period, they sold sables, ginseng, and pine lumber to make a profit.” *Wanli wugong lu*, juan 11, cited in Mo, “Mingmo Jianzhou nüzhen,” p. 75.

56 Initially the Jurchen were sold iron agricultural implements by the Chinese, but they discovered how to turn plowshares into swords in the 1470s, and the Chinese and Koreans subsequently prohibited the export of iron. Torbert, *Household Department*, p. 15.


58 The first Manchu capital was built at Lanhada, near Hetu Ala, in 1587. Also called Ningguta, the city was surrounded by stone walls topped with ramparts. Nurhaci’s kinsmen lived inside the city, while 20,000 households of elite warriors dwelt outside the walls. By the north gate lived the armourers and ironworkers; by the south gate were the bow and arrow makers; and outside the east gate stretched Nurhaci’s 18 warehouses, containing more than 130 rooms of stored grain. Mo, “Mingmo Jianzhou nüzhen,” pp. 5, 84–85; Tie, “Lun Qing ruguan qian ducheng chengguo yu gongdian de yanbian,” pp. 2–3.
bondservants were above all important to the ginseng trade, which grew significantly during the early 17th century when new methods of processing the drug were developed. These commercial developments altogether gave the Manchus an important economic advantage during the struggle for military supremacy that broke out between the tribes occupying the walled fortresses of the northeast during and after the 1580s.

At that time military leadership in the area was vested in the hands of the Hada chieftain, who commanded a confederation of tribes in the Haixi area known as the Yehe, Ula, Hoifa, and Hunehe.

59 In 1605, Nurhaci had his people taught how to dry and store ginseng so that it would not rot. Even so, when Xiong Tingbi prohibited trade with the Manchus in 1609, over 100 jin of ginseng (worth its weight in silver on the retail market in China) spoiled within two years. Mo, “Mingmo Jianzhou nüzhen,” p. 75; Xie Guozhen, Mingdai shehui jingji shiliao xuanbian, pp. 86–87. The revenues from the ginseng trade must have been substantial, because by the 1620s there was abundant silver among the Manchus. In fact, price controls had to be imposed. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 30–33, 105–108.

60 Wei Yuan, in his Shengwu ji (Record of Imperial Military Exploits), juan 1, called the early Manchu kingdom “a country of city-dwelling hunters.” Mo, “Mingmo Jianzhou nüzhen,” p. 84; Sei Wada, “Some Problems Concerning the Rise of T’ai-tsu, the Founder of the Manchu Dynasty,” passim; Torbert, Household Department, p. 14. In macroregional terms, the northeast was a growing economy during the late Ming, when China’s northwest had clearly declined, partly as a result of commercial disbalances caused when that area became a peripheral zone for the booming southeastern portion of China. While Manchuria’s southern part was fertile, the northern portion was rich in precious minerals like gold, and its forests teemed with fur-bearing game. Given these economic advantages, the northeast experienced an initial boom during the Wanli period, when the expansion of a moneyed market in China proper created a flourishing demand for goods like sables and ginseng. Building their cities on trade, the Manchus’ own society grew increasingly complex. More and more reliance was placed upon purchased grain rather than upon hunting as a way of life. Economic expectations were also enhanced. When the 17th-century economic crisis afflicted China proper, its effects were felt in the northeast as well, and may have played no small part in spurring the Manchus to military conquest. Moreover, the northeast also grew much colder during this period; harvests must have grown skimpy in Liaoyang, where frost appeared 15–20 days earlier in the mid-1600s than it does now. Gong Gaofa, Chen Enzhi, Wen Huanran, “Heilongjiang sheng de qihou bianhua,” p. 130.
The authority of the Hada chieftain was legitimated by the Ming commander-in-chief of the Liaodong zone, Li Chengliang, who conferred upon him the title of Duzhihuishi. Farther to the east along the Yalu River were another set of tribes generally known then as the Jianzhou Jurchen who also accepted, albeit somewhat restively, the rule of the Hada. During the early 1580s they, along with some of the other subordinate tribes of the area, began to turn away from the Hada and toward the Yehe, who like most of the major tribes in this area tended now to live in walled fortresses. Observing this instability, General Li Chengliang decided in 1583, with the aid and support of a transfrontiersman named Nikan Wailan (which in Manchu literally means “Chinese official”), to intervene with Ming troops.

The Rise of Nurhaci

During the late Ming, it was standard practice to try to maintain an equilibrium among the various tribes and thus prevent any single group from becoming all powerful in the northeast. Usually

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61 According to the *Manchu Veritable Records*: “At that time everywhere the country was in disorder. . . . The bandits were like bees, arising one after the other and calling themselves han, beile, and amban. Each gasan [commanding a territorial group of different kinsmen] set himself up as a leader, and each mukun [in charge of a lineage organization] set himself up as an elder; and they fought against themselves, brother against brother, voluntarily committing fratricide in common. Those who had the most strength in the clan (zu) attacked and subjugated the weak. Chaos reigned.” Mo, “Mingmo Jianzhou nüzhen,” p. 95. The historian Zheng Tianting attributes this social disorder to the state of crisis of the Manchu slave system owing to the changes in the forces of production when the Manchus become economically more diversified. Certainly, part of the turmoil stemmed from Manchu-Han rivalries owing to Li Chengliang’s decision in 1573–1576 to move the major military encampment at Gushan to Kuandian, which was a major Jianzhou Jurchen agricultural area in what is now Xinbin county (Liaoning). Beginning in 1585 Han colonists began to open up waste lands there, and came into conflict with the natives. Zheng, *Tàn wei ji*, pp. 6–7, 21–23.

this equilibrium was perpetuated by distributing special trading permits in a balanced way among all the tribes while conferring an important Ming title on one among them as a temporary leader to keep the peace.63 If this policy was working well there was no need for Ming troops to intervene other than by sallying forth from their garrisons in cities like Kaiyuan every winter to "burn the wastes" (shao huang) of prairie grass, set up camp in the tribal areas, and receive the various chieftains who would be gifted with food, wine, clothing and cosmetics.64 But this time an entire confederation appeared to be breaking up and Li Chengliang must have felt that more direct intervention would be necessary. Advised by Nikan Wailan, General Li attacked one of the Hada chieftain's rivals, and—perhaps accidentally—killed the father and grandfather of a Jianzhou Jurchen lineage called the Aisin Gioro.65

63 These patents (qi) specified the name of the chief, the number of persons that he could take with him on a tribute mission, and the number of tribute missions he could conduct within a given period of time. Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," p. 13. Owen Lattimore argued that this system created new kinds of authority that may have constituted a kind of proto-feudalism. "The new character of authority seems to be directly related to the function of the chief as representative of his tribe recognized by the Chinese in order to provide institutions and conventions for the coexistence of the Chinese community and the tribal communities. The fact that the Chinese make him their go-between reinforces the power of the chief over his own people. In this way the hereditary principle is strengthened and the family of chiefs may come to have a vested interest in perpetuating the subordination of the people as a whole in order to sustain its own authority. A status of this kind is quite compatible with occasional leadership of tribal insurrections against the dominant people. Frontier phenomena of this kind are probably one of the origins of feudalism. They are notable in the history of Tibet and it would be interesting to compare them with frontier history elsewhere; for instance, the history of the Highland clans of Scotland." Lattimore, Frontier History, p. 476.

64 Zheng Tianting, "Qing ruguan qian," p. 89; idem, Tan wei ji, p. 4.

65 The ancestry of the Aisin Gioro has been traced back to Mengge Timur, who was a hereditary chiliarch appointed by the Yuan to rule the region around the Songhua River. Nurhaci's father and grandfather were both confirmed as local officials by the Ming, and three times came to Beijing with Li Chengliang. Xue, "Mingdai chuqi Jianzhou nüzhen," pp. 50–51; Zheng Tianting, Tan wei ji, p. 4.
Although the elder orphan, whose name was Nurhaci, was quickly allowed to inherit his father’s Ming title of dudu and a herd of warhorses, the young man determined in 1583 to set out on a vendetta against the transfrontiersman Nikan Wailan in retaliation.66

Nurhaci’s vendetta, which in 1586 resulted in the death of Nikan Wailan, must have made him appear a suitable candidate for the overlordship of the confederation, insofar as he was neither of the Hada nor Yehe tribes and was therefore unlikely to achieve hegemony.67 In any event, by 1589 the Ming frontier command had decided to invest him with the title of Duzhihuishi and to recognize his paramountcy within the Yalu region.68 Nurhaci himself, as the acknowledged leader of the Manchu tribes there, had already built his own castle-town and was able to arrange uneasy marriage alliances with the Yehe and Hada.69 His followers, who constituted a formidable cavalry force, were supported by their chiefs’ own manors, which provided them with produce and weapons.70

68 Qu et al., “Qing ruguan qian,” pp. 110–113.
69 For the Manchus’ use of marriage alliances, see Zheng, Tan wei ji, pp. 59–61; Mo, “Mingmo Jianzhou nüzhen,” pp. 76–79.
70 Nurhaci’s brother, Surhaci, shared power with him. Nurhaci killed Surhaci in 1611. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 16. Elvin minimizes the importance of the Manchu cavalry, which he describes as being used as a rearguard reserve force behind a vanguard of armored pikemen and swordsmen and a second line of lightly armored archers. Elvin, Pattern, pp. 106–107. However, others argue more compellingly that the cavalry was usually decisive in battles, overrunning Ming troops at times, and avoiding combat with superior numbers on other occasions. Ultimately, Qing banner troops were divided into five different categories: escorts (qinjin), who were Manchus and Mongols trained in archery from horseback or on foot to guard the emperor; light cavalry (xiaoji), who were also trained in archery; vanguards (qianfeng), who were Manchus or Mongols trained in horseback and foot archery, as well as partly trained in using scaling ladders, muskets, and artillery; guards (hu-jun), who were both trained in horseback and foot archery and in musketry; and infantry (bujun), who were trained in foot archery. Zheng, Tan wei ji, pp. 173–174. See also Wu Wei-ping, “Eight Banners,” p. 35.
Nurhaci’s attack on Tomo Bira in August-September, 1586. Outside of the city’s walls, which his men were then assaulting, Nurhaci spied forty of Nikan Wailan’s personal guards on foot. Without regard for his own safety, Nurhaci galloped forward alone and with arrow and sword killed several. Nikan Wailan escaped, but later his head was brought to Nurhaci. This picture of the Manchu leader on horseback is from the Manju i yargiyan kooli [The Manchu veritable records], reproduced from a ms. copy of the Chinese text transcribed from the triglot ms. of 1781 (1930), 8 vols. (double leaves).
As Nurhaci’s power grew, so did the concern of his erstwhile allies in the confederation. In 1591 the Yehe chief, Narimbulu, decided to force matters to a head, and demanded territory from Nurhaci. When the Manchu leader refused, Narimbulu led the Hada and Hoifa tribes against Nurhaci. Two years later a decisive battle was fought at a place called Jaka along the Hun River. There, in a great victory, Nurhaci killed 4,000 of Narimbulu’s men and captured 3,000 of his war-horses. Shortly after that, cementing alliances with the Western Mongols, Nurhaci proceeded to establish his hegemony. In relatively short order he annexed the Hada (1599), destroyed the Hoifa (1607), took over the Ula (1613), and overthrew the Yehe (1619).

Nurhaci’s military successes, and especially his annexations of other tribal groups, made necessary a new organizational structure for the confederation that was now fundamentally changing the balance of power in the northeast. At first, Nurhaci conducted his campaigns with the Manchus’ ordinary small hunting units of ten to twelve warriors who were related either by blood or marriage, belonging to the same hala (clan) or mukun (sib); or else were residents of the same falga (li, or hamlet), gasan (zhai, or fort), or hoton (zhen, city). The conquest of the Hada and the incorporation of their tribal units during 1599–1601, however, made a more formal mode of organization desirable, at least in principle. In 1601 a new form of organization was decreed, inspired by earlier Mongol units of warfare. According to this blueprint, each 300 households of warriors were to form a company (Manchu niru, Chinese zuolung) under a nirui ejen or company leader. Gradually, after 1601, these companies were to be formed into bat-

71 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 17–18.
72 For Nurhaci’s co-optation of Mongol tribal leaders, see Kwanten, Imperial Nomads, pp. 282–283.
74 Franz Michael has explained the Chinese origins of this “banner system,” but David Farquhar has underscored its Mongol influences. Although Nurhaci did have a major Chinese adviser during this period who was named Gong Zhenglu, there is no evidence that Gong inspired the formation of the banner system. David M. Farquhar, “The Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy,” p. 204.
talions (jalan or canling) of five companies each, and banners (gusa or qi) of ten battalions each. There was to be a total of four banners, each assigned a different color (yellow, white, blue, and red) and commanded by a lieutenant-general (gusa ejen or dutong). By 1614 there were altogether about 400 companies, though undoubtedly these were not as large as 300 households each. Their leaders, who largely remained hereditary leaders, were in 1615 given official appointments along with their military ranks; and the original four banners were doubled in number by the addition of bordered colors.\(^75\)

At the same time new kinds of senior leaders were named: amban (counselors) and beile (chieftains).\(^76\) The amban were first appointed in 1613, when Nurhaci turned to five of his sons-in-law for support against his heir Cuyen, who conspired to seize the throne.\(^77\) While these five of his closest supporters were appointed

\(^75\) These military ranks were designated with Chinese terms after 1621. They were also used for bureaucratic posts for both Manchu and Chinese officials. The banners were thus consciously conceived of as a dual military-civil organization. Later, in 1630, Hung Taiji said: “If our country (guo) goes forth, then they are our soldiers; if it enters, then they are our people (min). Tilling and fighting are [the bannermen's] two activities. They have never neglected the one solely to do the other.” Qing Taizong shilu, juan 7, cited in Qu et al., “Qing ruguan qian,” p. 121. The banners can also be seen as a political instrument for bringing the free-wheeling Jurchen under the more direct control of their Manchu authorities. A formidable fighting and economic instrument was forged, though the cost of this was the further subordination of the rank-and-file, which was handed over from one high-ranking feudal official to another by the khan. Li Yanguang, “1644 nian yiqian Manzu de shehui jingji xingtai,” p. 144. See also Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 25–27, 58–59; “Wu, “Eight Banners,” pp. 12–14; David M. Farquhar, “Mongolian vs. Chinese Elements in the Early Manchu State,” pp. 12–14.

\(^76\) The word amban literally means “high official.” Beile originally meant the leader of an independent Jurchen tribe. After Nurhaci brought these tribes under control, the heirs of the former beile were allowed to use that same title. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 10–11.

\(^77\) The Manchus by this time recognized the principle of hereditary succession. In order to test his oldest son’s abilities, Nurhaci in 1613 entrusted administration of the tribal government to Cuyen. Shortly after that Cuyen’s younger brothers (Daisan, Manggultai, Amin and Hung Taiji) reported that he had tried to force them to swear an oath against Nurhaci, who eventually had Cuyen killed in 1615. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 17–18.
Sunja amban (Five Counselors), his four remaining sons were named Hosoi beile (Senior Chieftains) in 1615. Soon four more junior beile were added, so that each banner was under an individual beile’s general supervision. Each beile considered the banner his own property, but he only directly commanded the guard units (bayara) within each gusa. Both banner administration and direct control of the military forces remained instead in the hands of the gusa ejen appointed by Nurhaci. The banner system thus represented a compromise between Nurhaci’s direct personal control as khan over his army as a whole, and the individual beile’s aristocratic privilege.

Nurhaci’s tribal authority over his confederation of followers was conferred upon him by virtue of his proclamation as khan (Mongol “emperor”; Manchu, han). He had acquired this title in 1607 when a delegation of Khalka Mongols led by Prince Enggeder of the Bayud tribe came to see Nurhaci, kowtowed before him, and addressed him as “Respected Emperor” (Kündelen Khan). Until that time he had simply been known by his Manchu title of “Wise Prince” (Sure Beile). After 1607 and until 1616 he employed the Manchu title “Wise Respected Emperor” (Sure kündulen Han).

By 1615, however, when his ambitions and accomplishments were simultaneously expanding, he began to search for a new and more transcendent source of authority which would elevate him decisively above other chieftains and even his own beile, whom he never really trusted. He found that new source in the ancestral history of his own people, whose distant forefathers had once ruled the Central Plain.

The Manchus were descended from the same Tungusic tribal people who had founded the Jin dynasty (1115–1234) that drove the Song south and ruled most of north China. For the Jin leaders,

78 The five amban, all of whom were members of Nurhaci’s lineage (mukun) were Eidu, Fiongdon, Hohori, Anfiyanggu, and Darhan Hiya. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 18.
79 Torbert, Household Department, p. 19.
80 Farquhar, “Mongolian Policy,” pp. 198–199. Nurhaci had good relations with the Khalka Mongols since 1594, when he exchanged wives and concubines with them.
81 Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 8, 23.
On February 29, 1616, Nurhaci, as Taizu, established a reign era and ascended the imperial throne. *Manju i yargiyan kooli* [The Manchu veritable records] 1781.
too, imperial ambitions had coincided with the effort to create a more hierarchical form of monarchical authority inspired by the Chinese state to the south, and intended to reduce the competitive influence of other tribal chieftains of whom the khan was only *primus inter pares.* 82 Now, Nurhaci was told repeatedly by his advisor Erdeni—probably also a transfrontiersman—that the lines of light that had been sighted in the night sky in 1612, 1614, and 1615, were omens of an imminent change in the imperial Mandate of Heaven. 83 Subsequently, in 1616, Nurhaci took a crucial step toward the ultimate conquest of China by announcing the foundation of the Latter Jin dynasty. 84

Although creation of a Jin *guo* (state or kingdom) did not necessarily mean ultimate rivalry with the Ming, the Chinese had already long been alarmed by Nurhaci’s emergence as a supreme khan in the Jianzhou and Haixi areas. 85 Xiong Tingbi, the regional inspector for Liaodong during 1608–1611, for example, had quickly recognized the threat which Nurhaci posed, and had suggested as early as 1609 that the Ming government open negotiations with this potential rival in order to buy itself time in which to strengthen its defenses in the northeast. 86 For suggesting even momentary concessions, however, Xiong placed himself in grave jeopardy vis-à-vis censors at the Ming court to whom this approach smacked of craven appeasement—bound to encourage, rather than deter, Manchu aggressiveness. Impeached, Xiong was removed from the Liaodong post two years later, and Nurhaci continued to develop his momentum toward conquest. 87 Instead of negotiating

83 The 1610s and ’20s were a period of spectacular northern lights, with a great surge in sightings of aurorae in Europe. John A. Eddy, “The Maunder Minimum,” p. 1194.
84 Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 37.
85 This was exemplified by the Kuandian incident of 1605, when Li Chengliang tried to withdraw all Han settlers from Manchu-held lands. Zheng, 田象吉, pp. 22–23. China, Korea, and Mongolia were all described in the Manchu texts as *gurun*—countries or *guo*. Except for size and wealth they are treated as being essentially equal. Farquhar, “Mongolian Policy,” p. 199.
86 Memorial dated August 30, 1609, in Qian-kun, 282:31b–35.
87 Xiong was impeached by Zhu Yigui, a censor attached to the Ministry of
with Nurhaci, the Chinese closed down the official tribute trade which the Manchus conducted at frontier markets; and, in 1613 when the Yehe were being threatened, General Zhang Chengyin supported them with military aid and warned Nurhaci not to press his campaign against them.  

Whether because of economic pressure or because of the Ming intervention on the side of the Yehe, Nurhaci decided in 1618 to confront Chinese forces directly in the occupied zone of Liaodong.  

Listing “Seven Great Vexations” (Qi da hen) against the Ming on May 7, 1618, he led ten thousand of his men to attack the garrison town of Fushun the following day.

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War. At the time, Xiong pointed out that most censors in the capital had an unrealistic view of how easy it was to fight the barbarians. The frontier defenses, he argued, were actually in a lamentable state. Yet when frontier officials tried to take the responsibility on themselves for negotiating tactically with the barbarian tribesmen, they were attacked by censorial officials irresponsibly. Memorials dated September 8, 1609, and December 27, 1609, in Qian-kun, 282:35b–43, 283:20.

88 Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 34. See also Erich Hauer, trans., Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo fang-lüeh, pp. 49–50 (hereafter cited as Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo). At this time Nurhaci did publicly acknowledge the sovereignty of the Ming emperor. Zheng, T’an wei ji, p. 17.

89 As early as 1615 Nurhaci became concerned about the lack of food in the area around Hetu Ala which was already being intensively cultivated. “Now that we have captured so many Chinese and animals, how shall we feed them?” he asked. The attack on Yehe in 1615, and then on Liaodong in 1618 may have been to increase the Manchus’ supply of food. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 34–36. The pressure upon the Manchus to find new supplies of food must have been increased by the growing cold of the “little ice age.” In the 20th century, between 1923 and 1954, the rivers of Heilongjiang froze over in mid-November. During the “little ice age,” they froze over at least two weeks earlier. During the modern period, with only 80 (in the far north) to 140 (in the far south) frostless days, it is hard even to harvest one crop in Heilongjiang. In the 17th century, agriculture must have suffered considerably, even in the Songhua and Liao River areas.

90 Da Qing Manzhou shilu, pp. 196–199, 201–202. The Manzhou shilu was copied out between 1780 and 1782 from the Taizu shilu tu (Veritable Records and Pictures of Taizu), which was compiled in 1635, and the Taizu Wu huangdi shilu (Veritable Records of Taizu Wu huangdi), which was compiled in 1644. The contents of the Manzhou shilu and the Taizu Wu huangdi shilu are entirely the same; there are only a few characters that are different. Although there is no Manchu version of the Taizu shilu known to be in existence, there are three
The Annexation of Liaodong

Fushun, on the Hun River about ten kilometers east of what was to become Shengjing (Shenyang, Mukden), was an important trading city and military garrison. The garrison was commanded by a Liaodong major named Li Yongfang who had met Nurhaci on an earlier occasion when communications were exchanged between the Chinese and the Manchus. When Nurhaci arrived outside of Fushun on May 9, he ordered a messenger to carry a letter to Major Li. The letter explained that the Manchus were there because the soldiers of “your Ming country helped the Yehe.” Claiming to be leading an expedition of imperial punishment (zheng), Nurhaci called for the surrender of the city, which would otherwise be attacked.

If there is a battle then the arrows shot by our soldiers will strike all in sight. If you are hit, you will surely die. Your strength cannot withstand. Even though you die in battle, there is no profit. If you come out and surrender, our soldiers will not enter the city. The soldiers attached to you will be given complete protection. But suppose our soldiers do attack and enter. The old and young inside the city will surely be in jeopardy, your official salaries will be taken away and your ranks will soon be reduced [for losing the battle].

Juan of the original Manchu version (that is, the Mukden jiuben) of the Taizu Wu huangdi shilu on Taiwan. It is clear, after comparing those three juan with the three corresponding Chinese ones in the Taizu Wu huangdi, that the latter text is a faithful rendition of the original Manchu Veritable Records, which in turn were based upon the old Manchu documents. Therefore, the Chinese Manzhou shilu which is being cited here and is translated in parts below is as close as we can get to the original missing Manchu primary sources. On this textual matter, see Chen Jiexian, Manwen Qing shilu yanjiu, pp. 77, 91–92, 96–97, 104. For the attack on Fushun, see also Franz Michael, The Origin of Manchu Rule in China, pp. 120–124; Wu, “Eight Banners,” p. 15; Li Hongbin, “Lun Manzu yinxiang Nuerhachi,” p. 237.

91 Inside the city walls there were about sixty merchants, originally from Shanxi, trading in ginseng, sables, and pearls. Saeki Tomi, “Qingdai de Shanxi shangren,” p. 282.

On the other hand, if the city were to surrender, then Nurhaci promised not to permit any of his officers or soldiers to seize any of the Ming soldiers' relatives as chattel, nor would he force Li and his men to change their own Chinese customs. They would not even be forced to follow Manchu custom and shave their foreheads, braiding their topknot into a queue.  

If you submit without fighting I will not change your great doro (guiding principles; Ch., lǐ yì) at all. I will let you live just as you did before. I will promote not only the people with great knowledge and foresight but also many other people, give them daughters in marriage and care for them. I will give you a higher position than you have and treat you like one of my officials of the first degree.

After the first attack, Li Yongfang surrendered the city, bringing along with him the thousand or so families of the men under his command, and including some of the Liaodong gentry like Fan Wencheng, a local degree-holder.

Li’s surrender was, until then, an extraordinary event. A Ming army major, commanding his own garrison, had turned over that

93 Da Qing Manzhou shilu, pp. 203–204; Zhou Yuanlian, “Jian ping Nuerhachi,” pp. 9–10. This was a considerable concession, inasmuch as the shaved forehead and queue had been, since at least the time of Toba Wei, associated with the northern tribes. Later, as the Manchus conquered other parts of Liaoyang, this policy changed. When Kaiyuan fell, Nurhaci ordered that anyone who joined them—be he Korean or Han Chinese—would have to shave his head and wear the queue. This order was repeated by Nurhaci to the Korean king in 1621. Zheng Tianing, Qing shi tan wei, pp. 51–52; idem, Tan wei ji, pp. 81–82. For the connection between the queue and subjugation to barbarians, see Robert Cremer, “Chou Mi and Hsiu Tuan,” p. 86.

94 Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 42. The Manchu word doro means both “correct government” and the “way” or the “correct path.” It thus translates the Chinese word dao, as well as the word lǐ, meaning “ceremony” or “ritual.” Farquhar, “Mongolian Policy,” p. 202.

These two paintings show Nurhaci taking Fushun from the heights he commands on the left. To the right, kneeling and saluting respectfully, is Li Yongfang, whose name is written alongside him in Manchu and Chinese. Behind the surrendering Ming commander, Manchu soldiers storm the wall and open the city gates from within. *Manju i yargiyan kooli* [The Manchu veritable records] 1781.

city to the Jurchens. In exchange, he was treated neither as a trans-frontiersman to be assimilated nor as a Chinese to be enslaved as a bondservant, but rather as a Chinese frontiersman admitted into the ranks of the Jin aristocracy.\(^6\) He was given one of Nurhaci’s granddaughter’s hands in marriage, higher rank than he had held before, the right to keep his own men as retainers, and the privilege, later, of fighting as a lieutenant-general at the side of Nurhaci, as well as of participating honorably in the invasion of Korea in 1627. Indeed, Li Yongfang was to die as a viscount in 1634, and all of his

nine sons were to continue the family service to the Manchu throne thereafter. 97

The fall of Fushun, which was followed by a total rout of the column sent to its relief, was a humiliating blow for the Ming court. 98 Wanli's ministers turned to an old soldier, Yang Hao, for help, even though General Yang had a mixed military record. Commander of the campaign in Korea against Hideyoshi, he had had some success before his army of 40,000 men was badly defeated by the Japanese in 1598. Temporarily disgraced, Yang Hao had been recalled and sent to Liaodong as an administrator in 1610. That experience, plus the disgrace of Zhang Chengyin, helped bring about his recall this time to accept a post as Vice-Minister of War and to go to Liaodong to coordinate a campaign against Nurhaci to recover the lost territory. 99

Yang Hao's campaign was an utter disaster. On April 5, 1619, four separate armies, supposedly totalling 470,000 troops, were mustered at Shenyang (Mukden). Actually adding up to about 90,000 soldiers, the armies were supposed to march separately before converging simultaneously on Hetu Ala (Xingjing) ten days later. None of the armies held to the proper schedule. On April 14, a day early, Du Song's army approached Nurhaci's capital and was annihilated near Sarhu. 100 The next day, Ma Lin's forces were destroyed at Sanggiyan Hada; and on April 17, the mixed Korean-

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97 Er chen zhuan, 2:1–5. Li Yongfang did not always have Nurhaci's confidence. In 1622 he opposed the khan's wish to slaughter part of the Han population wanting to flee back into Ming territory. Nurhaci was furious, and accused Li of thinking that "the Ming emperor is permanent and I am just temporary." Li Yongfang was demoted, and though his rank was later restored, he never recovered Nurhaci's full support. Nevertheless, Li did not respond to the many letters sent to him by Ming secret agents, trying to get him to rejoin the Chinese imperial army at his former position. Zhou Yuanlian, "Jian ping Nuerhachi," pp. 27–28.

98 Generals Zhang Chengyin and Po Fengxiang at Guangning and Liaoyang sent 10,000 men to reinforce Fushun. They were totally defeated by the Manchus. Peng Sunyi, Shanzhong wenjian lu, 2:2b–3a.


100 Huang Ts'ing k'ai-kuo, pp. 74–77.
Chinese troops of Liu Ting were routed at Dungge-Gau.\(^{101}\) Yang Hao returned to Shenyang with his own division intact, but bearing the news that at least 45,000 Ming troops had been slaughtered. Suspected by the Donglin Academy’s self-righteous leader Gao Panlong of having had secret dealings of his own with Nurhaci, General Yang was impeached, arrested, and later executed.\(^{102}\)

The court now had no recourse, it seemed, but to turn once more to Xiong Tingbi, who was appointed Liaodong commander-in-chief. Once again, Xiong found himself caught between the inept military defenses in Liaodong and the impatient Censorate in Beijing. It would take time and money to repair those defenses, but the court was neither willing to be patient nor generous enough to see that task through.\(^{103}\) Sniped at by various bureaucratic factions at court, and held accountable for news that the Manchus had taken Kaiyuan on July 26, and Tieling on September 3, 1619, Xiong Tingbi was replaced by General Yuan Yingtai.\(^{104}\) But Yuan Yingtai fared much worse. First Shenyang—supposed to be so well fortified as to be impregnable—fell to the Manchus, who were aided by Mongol fifth columnists inside the moated city.\(^{105}\) Then, when Yuan sent an army out from Liaoyang on May 11,

101 Ibid., pp. 77–82.
103 Memorials dated August 14, 1619 and September 30, 1619, in Qian-kun, 284:5, 18b.
105 Shenyang had an elaborate system of external moats and heavily guarded redoubts. These defenses collapsed, however, when the Ming generals sent 300 cavalrymen out to engage the Manchus, who routed them and chased them back in through the opened east gate. The people inside the city fled toward the west wall. According to an eyewitness’s account: “Inside the city men and women, old and weak, all scattered toward the west wall. All of them fell to the bottom of the wall, some dying and some being wounded. In fact, the accumulated dead [covered] half of the wall.” Kang et al., “Ming-Man guanxi shiliao,” p. 183. See also Sun Wenliang, “Ming yu Hou Jin,” p. 5. The grandfather of Cao Yin, Kangxi’s bondservant and aide, surrendered on this occasion. Spence, Ts’ao Yin, p. 1.
1621, his troops were routed and that city fell two days later, the Ming general committing suicide in full regalia. By the beginning of summer, all of the lands east of the Liao River and south to the strategic Ming garrison of Jinzhou were occupied by Nurhaci's armies.

The annexation of Liaodong brought yet more adherents to the side of the Manchus. One of the most important of these was Ma Yujin, a good friend of Xiong Tingbi. The Ma family, originally of Penglai, Shandong, had since late Ming times been virtual natives of Liaoyang, where one of the Ma ancestors had been appointed a police captain. The first really distinguished member of the family was Ma Chongde, who had served as a Ming magistrate in Jiangnan, and who was so well liked in the districts he governed because of his fairness and incorruptibility that he was worshipped by many as a local deity. Ma Yujin himself had an excellent record as a Ming military officer on the frontier, and he participated actively in the defense of Liaodong during the Manchu offensive in 1621. In fact, his reputation was so good that when his garrison was overrun by the Manchus, it was assumed that he had died a hero's death. News of this was carried back to his wife, née Zhao, in Liaoyang; and she, in an act of stupefying loyalty to her husband and the Ming cause he represented, led more than forty household relatives and retainers into suicide, jumping into a well with her own granddaughter in her arms. Ma Yujin, however, had not died heroically, but had instead sur-

106 Certain pro-Manchu military elements within Liaoyang secretly let ropes hang over the crenellated parapets on the west side of the city. The city wall being 15 li square, the inhabitants were unaware that Manchu soldiers had climbed up the ramparts during the night. In fact, their presence remained undiscovered until 4:00 that afternoon. Panic spread across the city, and the garrison commander, Xue Guoyong, committed suicide. Kang et al., "Ming-Man guanxi shiliao," p. 183.

107 Huang-Ts'ing k'ai-kuo, pp. 103–109; Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," p. 35; Wu, "Eight Banners," p. 16; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 957.

108 Ma shi jia pu, Xing shu [Biographical sketch of the deceased], n.p.

109 Shao Changheng, Shao Zixiang quan ji, 5:21–22a.

110 Jiang Shiquan, Zhongya tang ji, 3:8b; Ma shi jia pu, Shendao bei [Stone inscription of the divine way], n.p.; Jiang Shiquan, Jiang Shiquan jiu zhong qu, Ma Wenyi gong zhuan, p. 1a.
rendered to the enemy. And his son, Ma Mingpei, was to become, many years later, the Manchus' viceroy in Nanjing.  

The Jin khan's occupation of Liaodong was not undertaken without resistance by some of the Manchu leaders themselves. The earlier strategy of Nurhaci, formulated during the campaign against the Ula in 1613, was to destroy the enemy by a systematic devastation of the countryside around its walled cities, which would then be starved into submission. This accorded well with the wishes of his tribal lieutenants, who would share such a war's booty—chattel, livestock, grain and specie—amongst themselves. After the enemy's rural areas had been wasted and its cities looted, the _beile_ and their bannermen could return to the Manchu homeland in the hills farther east where the weather was cool and the grazing abundant. Now Nurhaci was trying to bring them permanently to the plains in the west, establishing one new capital after another, each successively closer to the Chinese settlements in Liaoxi.  

"Let us proceed westward toward China, build a city at Jiefan and live there," he had commanded in 1619. But even though he had promised the Manchu chieftains to "pasture the herds inside the Chinese border," and to "let our falcons fly and go hunting," the _beile_ had been loath to give up their tribal pastur-lands and military independence. They had gone along with Nurhaci when he had left Jiefan in September of 1619 and had moved across the Hun River to Sarhu, but the proposal to establish yet another Manchu capital at Liaoyang brought their opposition; and Nurhaci was forced to chastize his most recalcitrant son, Amin. Nevertheless, by the end of 1621 the Manchu occupation of Liaodong was completed, and Nurhaci had established his permanent seat at Liaoyang, the new Jin capital.

111 _Ma shi jia pu, zuanxu_ (compiled records), n.p.  
113 Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," p. 45, and see also p. 112.  
114 _Huang-Ts'ing k'ai-kuo_, pp. 110, 116–117; Mo, "Mingmo Jianzhou nūzhèn," pp. 85–86; Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," p. 46. The punishments meted out to his _amban_ at this time may have been connected with this opposition. Three of the five counselors died immediately after the entry into Liaodong. Adun was arrested and killed in 1621, and a few months later Darhan Hiya was arrested. In 1623 Erdeni was executed for conspiring with the _beile_ against the khan. Ibid., p. 47.
The Manchu annexation of Liaodong led to Xiong Tingbi’s final reinstatement. But, once again, Xiong’s caution conflicted with the desire of others to move ahead more rapidly than he wished. Backed by some of the members of the Donglin movement, like Hou Zhenyang (father of Hou Tongzeng), Xiong Tingbi came into conflict with a court favorite, Wang Huazhen, who was military administrator of the Guangning district. Wang had worked out an elaborate scheme for recovering the territory lost to the Manchus by building a series of forts on the left bank of the Liao River, hiring four hundred thousand Mongol mercenaries, and enlisting Korean auxiliaries to attack Nurhaci’s armies on their flank. These proposals were received with great acclaim at court, even though Xiong Tingbi insisted that the plan was far too risky. While the two sides continued to bicker at court, however, the Manchus struck once more early in 1622. This time they were to cross the Liao River, entering the agricultural area colonized by Chinese settlers.

Manchu-Chinese Ethnic Conflict

Perhaps because of his imperial ambitions, Nurhaci had tried to attract Chinese support quite actively after the annexation of Liaodong; and he had addressed himself specifically to the inhabitants of Liaoxi on the other side of the river. These proclamations had promised to provide grain and clothing to the Chinese settlers there if they would accept his rule.

Do not think that the land and houses will not be yours, that they will belong to a master. All will equally be the khan’s subjects and will live and work the fields on an equal basis.

115 Memorials dated October-November, 1621, and November-December, 1621, and one without a date in Qian-kun, 286:1b–10, 12–14, and 288:13–14.
Nurhaci had also appealed to the sense of social injustice which the poorer people of Liaoxi may have experienced.

Formerly the rich people of your country took a lot of land, hired people to work it and sold what they did not eat. The poor people who had no land and no grain had to buy [food] to keep alive. After they had no more goods to sell they became beggars. Rather than letting the rich accumulate their grain and have it rot away, or letting them pile up the goods for no use, one should raise the begging poor. If the people hear about it they will praise it, and there will be happiness for later generations.\(^\text{119}\)

Finally, he had promised the inhabitants of Guangning and other cities in Liaoxi that if they were to welcome his men and surrender to them, then his soldiers would not rob or steal, and the Chinese would be allowed to keep their families intact under his authority.\(^\text{120}\)

Between February 10 and March 11 of 1622, Nurhaci’s warriors crossed the Liao River. Major Bao Chengxian moved his troops out of Guangning to try to block their advance. His men were routed, but he managed to evade capture. Wang Huazhen, still charged with the defense of Guangning, abandoned whatever plans he had held for an offensive and fell back on the fort at Dalinghe, leaving the city of Guangning in the hands of Major Sun Degong, a native of Liaodong. When Nurhaci’s soldiers reached Guangning, Sun Degong promptly surrendered the city; and shortly afterwards, Bao Chengxian also came forward and surrendered. Both men were appointed lieutenant-generals and went on to serve Nurhaci well, Bao becoming something of a specialist in writing letters to other Ming commanders, inviting them to become turncoats (bianjie).\(^\text{121}\) Meanwhile, hearing of the fall of Guangning, Wang Huazhen fled with his army to the Great Wall at Shanhaiguan, and there his soldiers poured through the gates, carrying Xiong Tingbi’s men with them. Wang was arrested and later executed. Xiong, implicated as well in some officials’ eyes, was also arrested.

\(^{119}\) Ibid., p. 39.
\(^{120}\) Ibid., pp. 40–41.
\(^{121}\) Er chen zhuan, v. 2, 4:13–17, and v. 4, 7:28–29; Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, pp. 113–115.
Chinese gunners defending Liaoyang against the Manchus. Although the attacking Manchus were not armed with guns, they still prevailed. In this drawing we see a single arrow speeding through the air and almost reaching the barrel of the Chinese gunner, who fires a musket with a biped support. A hail of arrows will follow this one, and in craven anticipation, several of the Ming gunners have already begun to turn and run. *Manju i yargiyan kooli* [The Manchu veritable records] 1781.
His guilt or innocence was the subject of a heated debate, involving members of the so-called Donglin party (who generally defended Xiong) and allies of the powerful chief eunuch Wei Zhongxian (who specifically accused him). 122 Three years later charges of treason were formally circulated, and an official named Feng Quan, who had firsthand knowledge about conditions in Liaodong and who had risen to be grand secretary with Wei Zhongxian’s support in 1625, helped bring about Xiong Zhongxian’s support in 1625, helped bring about Xiong Tingbi’s execution. After decapitation Xiong’s head was passed along the frontier as a warning to other commanders not to betray the Ming cause to the enemy. 123

The expansion of Nurhaci’s Latter Jin state into Liaodong and parts of Liaoxi brought as many as one million Chinese under his control. 124 Many of these were treated as slaves, though that category of subordination now received more careful state regulation than it had earlier. Masters could no longer punish slaves on their own; and if mistreated, the slaves could be taken away by the Manchu government and given to someone else. 125 These legal

122 The Donglin movement, which centered upon the academy of that same name founded in 1604 at Wuxi by Gao Panlong and Gu Xiancheng, called for reviving “the great spirit of superior men” (junzi zhi qi) to bring order and peace to the empire. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “The Price of Autonomy,” p. 51.

123 Zhang Qiyun, ed., Qing shi, p. 259; Er chen zhuan, v. 5, 9:28; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 240–241. Feng Quan, who passed his jinshi examination and became a bachelor in the Hanlin Academy in 1613, was from Zhuozhou in Beizhili. In 1619 he had joined his father, Feng Shengming, who held an important frontier post in Liaodong. When his father shared in the disgrace following the fall of Fushun, Feng Quan also fell into disfavor. It is usually that reason which is given for Feng Quan’s attempts to cultivate Wei Zhongxian, through whose efforts in 1624 he recovered his official post, and with whose support in 1625 he became a grand secretary.

124 Albert J. Feuerwerker, “From ‘Feudalism’ to ‘Capitalism’ in Recent Historical Writing from Mainland China,” p. 358; Robert B. Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback, p. 24.

125 In 1621, Nurhaci ordered all members of the eight houses to count the number of Chinese on their privately owned estates. This poll was intended to make it possible for the khan to take a certain number of these chattel for himself. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 52–55. Zheng, Tan wei ji, pp. 19–20.
changes may have reflected the tendency, after the conquest of Liaodong, to grant Manchu officials tokso (units of land to which were attached a certain number of adult males) and bondservants in lieu of salary.126 But this paternalistic concern certainly also reflected Nurhaci’s decision to accept Chinese who surrendered as special wards to be “nourished” (yang or ujihe) by the state.127 Indeed, Nurhaci at this time even denied the absolute division between freemen and slaves that had existed earlier in Manchu society. One of his proclamations during this period read:

Why should we make a difference between lord and slaves or great and mean people? If someone has come over to us because he hates his country, exerts himself fully and makes an effort, we will not think of him as a slave or as a mean man.128

Although it was more likely that a Chinese from a poor household would end up as chattel than as freeman, there was not a direct conferral of status according to the occupation or rank of the person who had surrendered. As it turned out, men like Li Yongfang were the exception. Most Chinese who surrendered and who were given official appointments in the Latter Jin army and government were of relatively low status.129 In fact, Nurhaci appeared to be-

126 Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 55–58. Most of the bondservants who later served the Manchus were members of Chinese families captured at Fushun and Shenyang. Torbert, Household Department, pp. 16–17.

127 The use of this term goes back at least to 1613 when Nurhaci offered to “nourish” the Yehe whom he was attacking in the city of Wusu. In this context, yang (ujihe, or sometimes uiji and ujimbi) means to foster a multitude of people and nourish them with benevolence, i.e., take on dependents who then become helpers. In 1619 when Ming officials at Kaiyuan were invited to surrender, yang or ujihe was used, meaning that they would not be turned into slaves. Zheng Tianting, “Qing ruguan qian,” p. 92; and Tan wei ji, p. 8.


129 A list of Chinese officials appointed shortly after the Liaodong conquest consists of 4 merchants, a discharged lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, 4 adjutants, 1 lieutenant, 11 local post commanders or guard officials, 4 bodyguards, 4 sergeants, 3 xiucai (including Fan Wencheng), 2 officials in charge of seals, 3 secretaries, 1 interpreter, and 11 men without any rank whatsoever. Most of these were given appointments as majors (youji) or lieutenants (beiguan) in
lieve that it was better to accept Chinese of lower-ranking status and reward them for their accomplishments than automatically to confer high rank upon a turncoat just because he was a high-ranking Ming official in the first place.

Those people who became officials by bringing merit to their [Ming] emperor and by giving presents to officials are constantly aware of the fact that they are original [Ming] officials. They do not exert themselves on our behalf. . . . Do not dig out your old [Ming] merits. If there are people who have brought benefit since I came to Liaodong, write it down.

And, in contrast to later reigns, under Nurhaci's rule Chinese turncoats did not occupy particularly important government positions. Dahai—who may have been a transfrontiersman—lost his position in 1623. Fan Wencheng and other turncoats like Ning Wanwo, who were so prominent later on, do not appear in the pages of the Old Manchu Records. And one of the most prominent renegades, Aita (who was also a transfrontiersman, originally named Liu Xingzha), actually turned back in the other direction and joined the Ming warlord Mao Wenlong in 1627, to be killed later by the Manchus for his treachery toward them.

In general, then, the adherence of so many Chinese, whether voluntary turncoats or reluctant zhuangding (estate serfs), was not necessarily a major benefit of Nurhaci's annexation of Liaodong. Part of his mandate as ruler of the Latter Jin required him to invite and accept Chinese from Liaoxi, but settling them in Liaodong along with the Manchus who had now taken over the area did not

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Nurhaci's army. Ibid., p. 60. Generally speaking, before 1631 captured prisoners of war were likely to become bondservants and serve as slaves in private households. Families of condemned criminals were also enslaved. Bondservant status was hereditary, and such slaves could be freely bought and sold. Out of a list of 813 men of Chinese nationality who were made bondservants, 532 were residents of Shenyang, 83 of Liaoyang, and 66 of Fushun—all cities captured between 1618 and 1621, when most of the Chinese bondservants were probably acquired. Spence, Ts'ao Yin, pp. 7–9.

130 Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," p. 64.
131 Ibid., pp. 176–177.
prove to be entirely easy. The solution which was proposed was to settle the Chinese and Jurchens together in the same household, which meant in effect placing Manchu bannermen in Chinese homes. Each was supposed to contribute his own labor to farming, but in fact the Manchus abused the Chinese, acting as though the Chinese men should do all the labor and treating the Chinese women as though they were their servants. The combination of this mistreatment and a meagre supply of food led in 1623 to a rash of incidents between the Manchus and Chinese. The Chinese host families poisoned the food and water supplies of the Manchus, burned buildings, and killed some of the Manchu border guards.

Nurhaci’s response to these communal disturbances was to pull back from the policy of equal treatment, and to adopt racial discrimination. “Do you not know that [the Chinese] killed and poisoned our women and children at Yaozhou after our troops left?” he angrily asked his eight beile, and he went on to upbraid the banner leaders for being too easy on the Chinese.

Why do you let the Chinese in leading positions be equal to you? If a Jusen has committed some crime, look for his merits. Ask what he has accomplished. If there is any little reason, use it as a pretext to pardon him. If a Chinese has committed a crime deserving capital punishment, if he did not make an all-out effort as he should have, or if he stole things, why not kill him and all his descendants and relatives instead of letting him get away with a beating.

For the time being co-occupancy continued, but no new joint households were created; and, when individual households were moved into Nurhaci’s new capital at Shenyang, they were assigned to live in ethnically separated quarters. In addition to being segregated, Chinese were not allowed to carry weapons while Jurchens,

132 Ibid., pp. 67–76.
133 Gertraude Roth, “The Manchu-Chinese Relationship, 1618–1636,” passim. Fugitive laws, in effect since 1587, were also strengthened at this time. Meng Zhaoxin, “Qing chu ‘taoren fa’ shitan,” pp. 1–2; Yang Xuechen, “Guanyu Qing chu de ‘taoren fa’” p. 47.
whether banner soldiers or not, were required to bear arms at all times.\textsuperscript{135}

The discrimination to prevent a Chinese revolt may even have been its cause in 1625. During the fall of that year many Manchu soldiers and people were killed, and some among the Chinese reportedly sent messengers to nearby Ming garrisons requesting military aid to rescue them and take them back to the Chinese side. In November, Nurhaci took severe measures. Reasoning that the Chinese commoners had been deluded and misled by the Ming xiucai (degree-holding gentry) in their midst, he ordered Manchu officials to purge these leaders from each village after a thorough investigation:

\textit{It is not the people who have been promoted by us to be officials; it is those who were formerly in official positions who responded to the treacherous propaganda from outside and stirred up the local people. Execute those people.}\textsuperscript{136}

It is not known how many \textit{xiucai} were actually killed (though obviously some, like Fan Wencheng, survived), but the records do show that for the following year, the Chinese population in Liaodong was organized into the khan’s own newly standardized \textit{tokso} of thirteen households under individual headmen (\textit{jangturi}), and given oxen to work assigned plots of land. Nurhaci thus took advantage of the communal conflict to bring yet more Chinese captives under his own control, on the grounds that if these \textit{tokso}

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p. 84. The capital was established at Shenyang in 1625. The beile opposed moving the capital once more, pointing out that Nurhaci had already built a palace at what is now the eastern tomb. However Nurhaci said that good strategy dictated the move. From Shenyang (which was later to be named Mukden) it would be very easy to cross the Liao River to attack the Ming \textit{nan chao} (southern dynasty) in that direction, while the Koreans could be engaged to the southeast, and the Mongols were only 2–3 days away to the north. Tie Yuqin, “Lun Qing ruguan qian ducheng chengguo yu gongdian de yanbian,” pp. 6–9. See also Wu, “Eight Banners,” p. 16.

\textsuperscript{136} Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 85–86.
were placed under the individual *heile* the Chinese would be mistreated or killed in vengeance.\textsuperscript{137}

The difficulty of absorbing a million or so Chinese into the new Jin state combined with technological disadvantages in warfare to halt Nurhaci’s advance after the fall of Guangning. At that time he had announced his intention to invade the Central Plain: “My great army will enter Shanhaiguan in 1623–24.”\textsuperscript{138} But the plan was not realized. Confronting him were major fortifications at Dalinghe, Jinzhou, Songshan, and Shanhaiguan itself. Guangning had virtually been turned over to Nurhaci’s men by Wang Hua-zhen’s hasty retreat and Sun Degong’s rapid surrender. Now, as the tense and strained ethnic relations between Manchus and the Chinese in Liaodong were sure to become known to Ming commanders of these redoubts north of the Great Wall, more surrenders of that sort were unlikely. Furthermore, Nurhaci’s own men were not expert in siege warfare, and they lacked all knowledge of the advances in weaponry that had been made in Ming China since the advent of the most recently developed European artillery.\textsuperscript{139}

**New Military Technology and the Forward Policy**

The main source of this European artillery was Macao, which had established some of the finest foundries in the world. The “red barbarian” (*hongyi*) cannons which were cast there were enormous

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., p. 89.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., p. 43.

\textsuperscript{139} Ming frontier troops used bronze or iron muzzle loaders called *folangji* (from *farangi* or “franks,” which is what the Portuguese were sometimes called), which were probably of European origin. Dating from the 16th century, these guns had a caliber of about 40 millimeters and a top range of 2,000 feet. They were fired from special battle wagons drawn by mules. Ming soldiers also carried “fowling pieces” (*niaoqiang*), which were defensive weapons about 4 meters long fired by a matchlock holding a burning fuse, modeled after the snapping matchlock introduced to East Asia by Portuguese in the late 1500s. Harold L. Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor’s Eyes*, pp. 139–140; Ray Huang, *1587*, p. 179. See also Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism*, p. 294.
by Chinese standards, and allegedly fired with “a rumble that could be heard for several tens of leagues.” Among the first to bring this weaponry to the attention of the Ming court were Christians. In 1620, Matteo Ricci’s convert Xu Guangqi suggested that Portuguese cannons be used by the Ming armies; and the proposal was seconded by another Christian, Li Zhizao, Minister of Rites in Nanjing. As a result, four “red barbarian” cannons were sent to Beijing in 1621. However, the decision to import Portuguese cannon was not undisputed. The connection between this new technology and Christianity, which was a persecuted sect during the late Wanli and Tianqi periods, made the use

140 The largest cannons were 23 hang (7 meters) long, and weighed more than 3,000 jin (1,800 kilos). Not all the foreign-style cannons were this large. In addition to the culverin mentioned later, there were small “red barbarian cannons” like the ones used by the Southern Ming loyalists against Shang Kexi. (Europeans were forced to recognize the superiority in siege warfare of such cannons after they were deployed in Italy by Charles VIII in September, 1494. Braudel, op. cit., p. 287.) One dug up in 1956 in Hong Kong, dated Yongli 4, was 1.7 meters long, had a calibre of 8 centimeters, and weighed 250 kilos. Luo Xianglin, “Xianggang xin faxian,” p. 1.

141 As early as 1596, Chen Yan demonstrated to the Ming court the superiority of barbarian muskets (niaochong), which had twice the range of Chinese fowling pieces. Zhao Shizhen, Shen qi pu, pp. 7b–8a. In 1616, 33 years after the first residence had been established in Zhaoqing, there were thirteen European Catholic priests active in Ming China, and about 5,000 Chinese converts. Many of the elite converts were aligned with the Donglin movement, especially in opposition to Buddhism and religious syncretism (the Three Teachings). Douglas Lancashire, “Buddhist Reaction to Christianity in Late Ming China,” p. 101; Erich Zürcher, “The First Anti-Christian Movement in China,” p. 189.

142 C. R. Boxer, Expedições militares portuguesas em auxílio dos Mings contra os Manchus, pp. 5–10; George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants, pp. 157–158.

143 In the collection of writings compiled in 1640 under the title Sheng chao po xie ji (Collection of writings of the sacred dynasty for the countering of heterodoxy), the Chinese opponents to Christianity claimed that foreign cannons would blow up in the faces of the gunners rather than hit the enemy. This assertion was made after two of the cannon used in 1642 exploded, killing several Chinese bystanders. Jonathan D. Spence, To Change China, p. 9; Lancashire, “Chinese Reactions to the Work of Matteo Ricci,” p. 110; idem, “Anti-Christian Polemics in 17th Century China,” pp. 221, 224.
of foreign artillery distasteful to some ministers. In Fujian, for instance, where Catholicism was particularly strong, and where converts like Zhang Geng were to express the hope that Christianity would save China from disorder, military circles especially feared Western expansion and associated Christianity with a subversive plot to erode the proper Confucian sense of hierarchy that was supposed to keep China strong.

Nevertheless, opposition to the use of foreign weapons wavered in the face of their patent superiority. After the fall of Guangning, Sun Yuanhua, a Christian who had studied European mathematics and technology with Xu Guangqi, proposed equipping a Chinese force with Portuguese cannons in order to defend the Ming garrisons in the northeast. With the support of Donglin figures like Hou Zhenyang, Sun Yuanhua succeeded in getting his proposal adopted. In 1623 four Portuguese cannoniers came north from Macao, and European cannons were acquired and put into use defending the garrisons beyond the Great Wall by leading commanders like Sun Chengzong and Yuan Chonghuan. Sun himself became governor of Dengzhou and Laizhou on the Shandong peninsula, and there he established a headquarters for this activity. In 1630, two hundred Macanese cannoniers were hired as mercen-


145 Zürcher, “Anti-Christian Movement,” p. 189. One reason for the success of Catholicism in Fujian was the protection which Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao (1559–1627) gave to converts. Though not a convert himself, he was an acquaintance of the Catholic Father Aleni (1582–1649). Ye was succeeded as a protector to the missionaries by Zhang Geng, who did become a convert. In addition to writing a number of works on the missionaries, Zhang also wrote tracts arguing that rather than being ministers to a lord (*chen to jun*), participating in an earthly hierarchy, men should be friends (*you*) together beneath the heavenly lord (*tian zhu*), God. Li Tianyou, *Mingmo Jiangyin, Jia

aries and sent to Dengzhou under Goncalves Texeira and Antonio del Capo.\textsuperscript{147} Although the main body of artillerymen was detained at Nanchang and eventually sent back to Macao, their interpreter, Father João Rodrigues, went on to Dengzhou where he taught Sun Yuanhua and his officers, who included the Liaodong militarists Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming, how to make and use the new artillery.\textsuperscript{148} Meanwhile, at court, under the reign of the more tolerant Zhuangliedli, the Chongzhen Emperor, the Catholics again pressed for more reliance on European technology. At the recommendation of Xu Guangqi, Father Adam Schall von Bell supervised a reform of the calendar, and in July 1642 was asked by the Chongzhen Emperor to establish a foundry to cast cannons.\textsuperscript{149} Although the Jesuit was inexperienced, he reluctantly agreed to build a foundry close to the palace with workmen placed at his disposal, and ended up casting twenty pieces, most of which could throw a forty pound shot.\textsuperscript{150} Thus, beginning in 1623 and continuing on into the 1630s and early 1640s, the Ming armed forces acquired the capability in northeastern Asia of using European firearms and cannons both to defend their main garrisons and to attack enemy positions.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{147} C. R. Boxer, Expedições, pp. 15 ff.; Dunne, Giants, p. 216.
\textsuperscript{148} Inaba, Shinchô zenshi, 1:298–299; João Rodrigues, This Island of Japan, pp. 15–16. The main body of cannoniers was turned back in part because certain Cantonese merchants, eager to preserve their foreign trade monopoly, were afraid that the Portuguese might win free trading rights in exchange for their military aid. Consequently, they bribed anti-Christian ministers at court to persuade the emperor to send Texeira’s men back to Canton. Dunne, Giants, pp. 215–216.
\textsuperscript{149} Ch’en Shou-yi, “The Religious Influence of the Early Jesuits on Emperor Ch’ung-cheng of the Ming Dynasty,” pp. 399 ff.
\textsuperscript{150} C. W. Allan, Jesuits at the Court of Peking, pp. 135–136. Dunne, Giants, pp. 317–318. He also cast culverins (lighter guns of greater length which could be placed on special carriages on the backs of camels or even on the backs of two men). The larger cannons were intended to supplement the “generalissimo” (daijiangjun) cannons referred to in some texts. See Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 9:27b. The “generalissimo,” which weighed over 500 kilograms and was conveyed by wagon, fired a mixed charge of explosives, pebbles, and tiny iron balls at point-blank range against attacking cavalry. Huang, 1587, p. 180.
\textsuperscript{151} Manuel Tavres Bocarro claimed in 1635 that the Chinese had no skill in the
With this new capability came also a fresh leadership, determined to renew Ming fortunes in Liaodong. The figure most prominently associated with this Chinese military revival was Yuan Chonghuan, a civil official from Guangdong who had long had an interest in Liaodong military affairs and who prided himself on being a “frontier talent” (bian cai). He had just been transferred to a tour of duty in the capital from a magistracy in the south when Guangning fell to the Manchus, and Yuan rode out to Shanhaiguan himself to see what the extent of the debacle had been. After returning to the capital he sent a memorial in to the Tianqi Emperor. “Give me horses, soldiers, money and provisions,” the petition boldly read, “and I alone can hold Shanhaiguan.” Shortly after this he was appointed to the Liaodong command.

Yuan Chonghuan’s superior officer was Wang Zaijin. Like his unfortunate predecessor, Xiong Tingbi, Commander-in-Chief Wang was concerned about the lack of logistical support for a forward policy. Rather than strengthen distant outposts, he preferred to settle Karacin Mongol tribes as a buffer just north of the Great Wall and consolidate the inner line of defenses by extending earthworks eight leagues out from Shanhaiguan. There he planned to build an additional fort which would be manned by 40,000 soldiers as a further protection for the strategic point of entry at the juncture of the Great Wall and the North China Sea. Emperor Xizong was intrigued by the plan and sent his favorite tutor, Sun

handling of artillery, “wherefore they rely on the Portuguese in this respect.” C. R. Boxer, “Macao, Three Hundred Years Ago,” p. 305; see also Boxer, Expedições, pp. 20–23. Although the Ming certainly did continue to use Portuguese mercenaries (troops under Nicolau Ferreira fought at the siege of Guilin in 1647 when the Yongli forces resisted the Qing armies), they had developed an expertise of their own by 1626. Historians have observed that this new military technology rendered the archery of steppe cavalry ineffective against well-disciplined infantry, and this made it possible for adjacent agrarian empires—Russia and China—to partition the Eurasian steppes between themselves in the late 17th century. William H. NeNeill, Plagues and Peoples, p. 196.

152 Yuan (1584–1630) was from Dongguan. He passed his jinshi examination in 1619. Much of the biographical detail that follows is drawn from Liang Fu, Lingnan lishi renwu cong tan, pp. 85–95; and Zhang Tingyu et al., comps., Ming shi, (Guofang yanjiuyuan), pp. 2936 ff. (hereafter cited as Ming shi).
Chengzong (1563–1638), out to assess its reliability. Sun was not favorably struck at all. Instead, after interrogating Wang Zaijin, he returned to report that Wang was not going to draw the 40,000 troops from the existing garrison at Shanhaiguan, but instead planned to request that additional amount of men from the beleaguered Ministry of War. Furthermore, the need for this additional fortress was not clear to Sun, and he therefore urged the emperor to consider other alternatives, including a much more aggressive plan suggested by Yuan Chonghuan to situate the empire’s major defense point two hundred li farther north at Liaoning Xingcheng, which might then become the jumping-off point for the recovery of Liaodong. For the moment the emperor decided to support Sun Chengzong and Yuan Chonghuan. After sacking Wang Zaijin on September 21, 1622, he named Sun concurrently Minister of War and Grand Secretary, giving him discretionary power to solve the military situation. In turn, Yuan Chonghuan was placed in authority to reinforce the walls of Ningyuan and use it as a base from which to recover surrounding towns near Jinzhou.  

Xizong’s support was only momentary because he was even then receiving conflicting advice from other counselors. Indeed, the debate over defense policy was shaping up into a major conflict between the “righteous” literati supporting the Donglin Academy partisans who called for a revival of fundamental Confucian values in the bureaucracy and an end to arbitrary despotism, and the allies of the chief eunuch Wei Zhongxian who symbolized the unbridled and arbitrary power of the inner court around the imperial throne. The Donglin position was by now quite established, and it was based upon a stereotyped version of events which cast officials like Yuan Chonghuan in the mold of such famous patriots as Yue Fei, proponent of an irredentist policy against the former Jin during the 12th century. According to the viewpoint of some Donglin partisans, a “forward” policy of recovering Liaodong and stemming the advance of the Jurchens would have succeeded had it not been undone by treacherous ministers like Xiong Tingbi who advocated appeasement. Often basing their opinions on very

little verified knowledge about conditions in the frontier zone, Donglin leaders like Gao Panlong and the soon-to-be martyred Yang Lian thus helped identify advocates of a conservative policy of negotiations and of reduced defense expenditures with a long history of cowardly betrayal. The issue of where to situate the Ming defense line was consequently translated into a heroic historical struggle between patriotic ministers and self-serving traitors.\(^{155}\)

The opponents of the Donglin policy of forward outposts argued that the schemes were unrealistic, especially given the paucity of resources available. To devote attention to that distant frontier at this time was particularly shortsighted because it meant neglecting the much more serious problem of suppressing rebellions within China. Officials like Xu Ruke maintained that it would be quite easy to dispel the foreign enemy—the barbarians outside the Great Wall—once internal rebels had been pacified. For the time being, Liaodong was capable of taking care of itself, and the court could turn to it after the really important crisis had been solved at home.\(^{156}\)

\(^{155}\) Wolfgang Franke, “Yü Ch’ien,” p. 121. For their accusations identifying Xiong Tingbi and concessions on the frontier with treachery, see Gao Panlong’s undated memorials in Qian-kun, 261:31b–32 and 262:28; and Yang Lian’s memorial dated 1620 in Ibid., 299:10. My assertion about the ignorance of conditions on the frontier is based upon Liu Xianting’s remark concerning Fang Yizhi’s Quanbian lüeji (Report on the entire frontier). He said that this work from the early Chongzhen period was composed when Fang was a department director in the Ministry of War. However, the work was not based upon the Veritable Records but rather upon hearsay. Yet this was the kind of work, Liu concluded, that most officials depended upon for information about the frontier. Liu Xianting, Guangyang zaji, pp. 139–140. One should note, however, that works are known to have existed that may have contained fairly detailed information on frontier life. Yan Jiheng, who was Wen Tiren’s tutor, wrote a book called Ninety-nine Ways of Destroying the Manchus (Jiushijiu pian) during this period; but the book was destroyed during the Qianlong literary inquisition, and there are no extant copies. See L. Carrington Goodrich, “The Ninety-nine Ways of Destroying the Manchus.”

\(^{156}\) Xu Ruke’s memorial, n.d., is in Qian-kun, 290:9. Xu (1562–1626), who was from Suzhou, was best known for crushing She Chongming’s uprising in Sichuan. Zhang Qiyun, ed., Qing shi, p. 249. In two famous letters to his
ever, other officials added rather more sinister overtones. Not only was the forward policy wrongheaded, they implied: it was also the product of a cabal of self-seeking partisans. Was not Yuan Chonghuan, the official most closely identified with irredentism, the student of Han Kuang, a noted Donglin supporter? And was Yuan not recommended for office by Cheng Jiming, who was a fellow student (tongmensheng) of Yang Lian?157 Were all these officials not just protecting each other by covering up the real causes for defeat in Liaodong, which were ministerial incompetence and corruption? Why was it that when officials were singled out for blame for defeat they always ended up being enemies of the Donglin? Was it not a matter of some concern that so much power in the empire had fallen into the hands of Donglin officials like Yang Lian and Zuo Guangdou who formed a “deviant clique” (xie dang) of their own? Was not the deterioration of the government in recent years really due to their unfaithfulness to the emperor and to the formation of cliques?158

As the debate grew more heated in 1624 and 1625, with proponents of the forward policy arguing that half the Shanhaiguan garrison should be sent to Guangning to recover the city from the Manchus, the eunuch Wei Zhongxian prevented Sun Chengzong from obtaining audiences with the emperor to present that side of the matter.159 Denouncing Sun, who had been despatched to Shanhaiguan to supervise its defenses, as a warlord, Wei Zhongxian sent his eunuch spies to the garrison to gather evidence for his own attack on the man.160 When Sun opposed the arrest of Yang Lian, the Donglin leader accused by Wei of taking bribes, Sun in turn

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fellow student (tongnian) Wen Zhanchi, Xu argued that the minor rebellions in Sichuan and Guizhou should be settled before turning to the Liaodong problem. See Qian-kun, 294:36–37.

157 Ming shi, v. 4, pp. 2846–2847.


159 Ming shilu, Tianqi 52:9b–10a.

160 Mingwang shuilüe, p. 278; Ming shi, p. 3049.
was criticized for a minor military defeat suffered by one of his lieutenants and forced to resign from the Liaodong command in November, 1625. Gao Di, the man who took his place, was widely regarded as a follower of Wei Zhongxian.\textsuperscript{161}

Gao Di presented himself to the Tianqi Emperor as someone who could clean up the corruption and maladministration in the Liaodong command. He promised to institute policies to prevent future defection by seeking out and dismissing potential traitors, to assign realistic command responsibilities to given units, to improve the weaponry of his troops, and to tighten up military discipline in the ranks.\textsuperscript{162} Above all, Gao Di insisted upon the importance of pulling back from positions of weakness where the Ming army might be vulnerable to attack. It was far better, he argued, to strengthen the inner line of defense at Shanhaiguan than to send provisions on to forward positions like Ningyuan. The walled towns in the Jinzhou area were consequently to be abandoned, and Yuan Chonghuan was told that he would henceforth be short on supplies.\textsuperscript{163}

**Nurhaci’s Death and His Successor’s Negotiations**

Even though Yuan Chonghuan now had good reason to withdraw from Ningyuan, he elected to remain there, relying upon the Portuguese cannons that he had placed at various points along the inner city walls to defend his forces against Nurhaci’s impending at-

\textsuperscript{161} Wei Zhongxian’s case for a purge in 1625 rested upon accusations of military malfeasance and conspiracy in the northeast. According to confessions extracted under torture (Wei Zhongxian had been appointed head of the Eastern Depot two years earlier and thus controlled the secret police), such leading Donglin figures as Yang Lian, Zuo Guangdou, Wei Dazhong, Yuan Huazhong, Gu Dazhang, and Zhou Chaorui were involved in a conspiracy to form a separate military command on the northeastern frontier. Their treason—it was claimed—had endangered the empire’s security. By August, 1625, all of the prisoners had died under torture. Mammitzsch, “Wei Chung-hsien,” pp. 161, 233–234, 238.

\textsuperscript{162} Ming shilu, Tianqi 55:42b.

\textsuperscript{163} Ming shilu, Tianqi 58:57b, 59:4b.
tack. For, knowing of the Ming court’s change in strategy now that Gao Di was in command, Nurhaci was bound to try to take this important outpost. On February 19, 1626, the Jin khan surrounded the city, and on the following day mounted his first assault. Yuan Chonghuan deliberately abandoned the outer walls of the city to draw the Jurchen troops in closer where they were fully prone to the “red barbarian” cannons as well as to ballistae and flaming oil. Nurhaci continued to press the siege but after six days the superior Chinese defenses took their toll. Perhaps wounded himself, Nurhaci withdrew his army. Seven months later, on September 30, 1626, the great khan of the Latter Jin sickened and died.

Gao Di and the Ming court had given Ningyuan up as being lost. News of Yuan’s victory came as a glorious surprise, and for that period of his ascendancy even the eunuch Wei Zhongxian supported Yuan Chonghuan while the irredentist policy seemed vindicated. But Yuan Chonghuan was so buoyed by his success that he failed to take full advantage of the Manchus’ willingness to undertake peace negotiations. The combination of the Ming military victory and severe economic hardship had inclined the second Manchu khan, Nurhaci’s son Hung Taiji (r. 1626–1643), to work out a new relationship with the Ming state. On February 23, 1627, the Jin sent a letter to Yuan Chonghuan in Ningyuan. The letter consisted of a detailed account of the “Seven Great Vexations,” specifying all of the wrongs suffered by the Manchus at the hands of the Ming, followed by an offer to establish peaceful relations and exchange gifts. The suggestion that they exchange pres-

164 Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, pp. 133–134, 140.
165 The Chinese may have fought more fiercely than usual because of the massacres in Liaodong. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 6.
166 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 1:4a.
167 Many people were starving in the territory ruled by the Latter Jin. In the second lunar month of 1627, more than twenty thousand people living under the Manchus were sent across the Yalu River into Korea to get food. At that time, Hung Taiji also bluntly warned the Korean government that if it would not provide grain supplies as tribute to help the Latter Jin feed its people, then the Manchus would get the food themselves by force, that is, by invading Korea. Jiu Manzhou dang yizhu: Qing Taizong chao, p. 178.
Nurhaci’s men failing to take Ningyuan in 1626. The Chinese artillery by then was much more sophisticated and the gunners better protected behind the thick ramparts which the sappers (probably Chinese turncoats) are trying to undermine in this picture. Nurhaci may have been wounded at this battle. *Manju i yargiyan kooli* [The Manchu veritable records] 1781.
ents was a thinly veiled demand by the Manchus for tribute from the Chinese, amounting to an initial payment of millions of taels, followed by annual gifts that undoubtedly amounted to much less than the yearly Liaodong military budget but still represented a heavy and humiliating burden. On April 20, their two envoys returned from Ningyuan with three Han messengers bringing Yuan Chonghuan’s response. The tone of the letter was condescending and even admonishing. Pointing out that much blood had been spilled on both sides, Yuan took issue with the “Seven Great Vexations” and suggested that the khan write in a less splenetic tone if he truly wished to have peace. Moreover, added Yuan, that would only be realized when the Manchus returned the cities they had conquered and the prisoners they had captured since the war began.

This time Hung Taiji was much more concessive. In his response to Yuan Chonghuan, which was sent on May 22, 1627, the khan did flatly refuse to discuss returning the cities and captives they had seized, because these were the gift of Heaven, but he said that he was willing to forget the “Seven Great Vexations” and assured Yuan that he was acting in good faith. As proof Hung Taiji reduced his demand for initial gifts by exactly one-half, and the annual tribute by 90,000 taels of gold. But Yuan had no reason to pursue the matter further because his support at court was even stronger now than after the victory at Ningyuan. The death of the Tianqi Emperor meant the ultimate defeat and disgrace of his favorite eunuch, Wei Zhongxian, and the temporary return to power of a number of literati purged for their Donglin connections. These men, led by Qian Longxi, backed Yuan Chonghuan

168 The initial gift from the Ming to the Jin was to consist of 100,000 taels of gold; 1,000,000 taels of silver; 1,000,000 rolls of satin; and 10,000,000 rolls of fine blue linen (Manchu samsu). Thereafter, the Ming was to send every year 100,000 taels of gold; 100,000 taels of silver; 100,000 rolls of satin; and 300,000 rolls of fine blue linen in exchange for 10 pearls, 1,000 sableskins, and 1,000 catties of ginseng. Jiu Manzhou dang yizhu: Qing Taizong chao, p. 164.
169 Ibid., pp. 165–166.
170 Ibid., p. 169.
unquestioningly. Knowing this, Yuan pursued a more aggressive and offensive policy in the northeast and ordered that the abandoned defenses at Jinzhou and Dalinghe be reoccupied as military colonies (tun) and refortified as major defense posts. This was not the answer the Manchu khan had wanted, but he was perfectly ready to act upon intelligence reports of these new military measures. On June 18, 1627, when he received news of the refortification work, Hung Taiji ordered his princes and officials to ready themselves for a new set of offensives against the Ming. Peace talks had failed and hostilities would again begin.

Meanwhile, Yuan Chonghuan was recalled to Beijing and granted the special honor of being given an individual audience with the newly enthroned Chongzhen Emperor, who wished to discuss Ming strategy in the northeast. During that important meeting Yuan outlined his own plan for territorial self-defense, “using the people of Liao to defend the territory of Liao, and the territory of Liao to nourish the people of Liao.” And he once again made a promise to the throne: all of the Ming territories lost to the northern barbarians would be recovered within the next five years.

But this time Yuan Chonghuan was not to keep his promise. Although the Chongzhen Emperor subsequently appointed Yuan Minister of War and gave him full powers in Ningyuan to supervise the campaign in Liaodong, Yuan’s plans were to fail. Only a little more than a year later the new Jin khan, Hung Taiji, would be leading an invasion of China proper, his Manchu warriors nearly reaching the gates of Beijing.

171 Qian Longxi had been one of the proponents of writing up a ni’an (lit., “refractory case”) which was a bureaucratic bill of attainder listing Wei Zhongxian’s crimes and, more importantly, enumerating his allies in the civil bureaucracy. Ming shi, p. 2845; Xie Guozhen, Ming-Qing zhi ji dangshe yundong kao, pp. 77–78.


173 Liang Fu, Lingnan lishi renwu congton, p. 92.
The Chongzhen Court

Around them boomed the rhetoric of time,
The smells and furniture of the known world
Where conscience worshipped an aesthetic order
And what was unsuccessful was condemned;
And, at the centre of its vast self-love,
The emperor and his pleasures, dreading death.

W. H. Auden, "Kairos and Logos."

When the Prince of Xin inherited the throne in 1627, officials spoke hopefully of a restoration (zhongxing) of the dynasty's fortunes.¹ On the occasion of the monarch's formal enthronement as the Chongzhen Emperor the following year, Censor Yang He was even so bold as to detail the empire's military decline since the days of its founders, and to declare that the only way to recover

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¹ Qian Xing, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 4. The Tianqi Emperor died on September 30, 1627. L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, p. xxi. When the Chongzhen Emperor ascended the throne, he announced his intention to model himself on the sage rulers Yao and Shun. Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, fushang, 1b. For a brief bibliographical evaluation of some of the chronicles covering the Chongzhen reign, see Yao Jiaji, "Ming ji yuwen kao bu," pp. 137–148.
their original dynamism (yuan qi) was by vigorously putting an end to corruption and partisanship.\(^2\) It was thus with every intention of thoroughgoing improvement that the new sovereign began his reign by attacking the sort of ministerial incompetence and bureaucratic favoritism that had seemed to characterize his half-witted brother’s brief reign as the Tianqi Emperor (1621–1627). But instead of attempting a major reform of the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy, including the ranks of department directors and even of government clerks, Chongzhen directed his attention to higher civil and military officials. For the new emperor, who was the most intelligent (if not the most learned) ruler China had seen for some time, came to the throne with the passionate conviction that few of his chief ministers were to be trusted, and that most were likely to form cabals against him.\(^3\)

As the years passed, this conviction approached paranoia—a state of mind that was fed by reports from his special agents and secret police.\(^4\) Hundreds of political prisoners were thrown into

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2 Zheng Tianting and Sun Yue, comps., Mingmo nongmin qiyi shiliao, pp. 2–3. Chongzhen was the name of the reign era of the Ming dynasty’s seventeenth emperor. Strictly speaking, he should be referred to by his dynastic title (Zhuangliedi) or his posthumous name (Sizong). For the sake of convenience, however, he shall hereafter simply be called Chongzhen.

3 Chongzhen was very fond of reading, especially historical works. Li, Sanyuan biji, shang, 15a. Although the great Kangxi Emperor (r. 1662–1722) criticized Chongzhen for being unable to ride a horse and for not being very knowledgeable about the classics, he did not blame him for the fall of the dynasty: “He had at least tried to govern, but there was nothing that he could do about the state of the country.” The Qing emperor instead blamed the Chongzhen Emperor’s three predecessors—the Wanli, Taichang and Tianqi Emperors—and ordered that no offerings be made to those three in the state temples. Jonathan D. Spence, Emperor of China, p. 89. For the mental weakness of the Tianqi Emperor, who died at the age of 23, see: Ulrich Hans-Richard Mammitzsch, “Wei Chung-hsien,” pp. 119–120; and Ray Huang, “Ni Yuan-lu’s ‘Realism,’” p. 419.

4 The emperor revived the Embroidered Uniform Guard, whose officers he called “my confidential ministers”; he also came to rely increasingly upon the eunuchs, whose Eastern Depot soon resumed activity. Li, Sanyuan biji, shang, 2b.
jail. Five dozens of army field commanders were executed. And of the long string of fifty grand secretaries who served the Chongzhen Emperor during his seventeen-year reign, a total of four were seized and executed. The ministers who lasted the longest in office were those who convinced the emperor that their own particular opponents were leaders of cliques (pai) or factions (dang). The Chongzhen Emperor’s obsessive fear of factionalism stemmed from knowledge of the terrible bloodletting that had stained the later years of the Tianqi reign, when the eunuch Wei Zhongxian and the emperor’s foster mother, Madame Ke, had persecuted so many scholars and officials associated with the Donglin Academy and the political movement that bore its name. Criticized for corruption and nepotism by these righteous literati who claimed that they were renovating political life with fundamental Confucian moralism, Wei Zhongxian and Madame Ke had encouraged their own bureaucratic allies to compile a denunciation of the Donglin movement under the title, Important Cases of the Three Reigns (Sancho yaodian). This compilation, which included lists of names of officials identified as Donglin sympathizers, was the instrument used by Wei and Ke to justify the arrests, torture, and executions of their political enemies.

The Chongzhen Emperor was determined to put a stop to this kind of political factionalism. Shortly after his brother died, he

5 The jails of Beijing were so full and the dockets so crowded that, on January 21, 1644, the emperor ordered the Minister of Punishments to speed up court trials because too many people were dying in prison. Wan Yan, Chongzhen changbian, p. 56.
6 Ray Huang, “Fiscal Administration during the Ming Dynasty,” p. 119. During the Chongzhen reign, seven of the emperor’s regional commanders (zongdu), eleven of his provincial administration commissioners (xunfu), and fourteen of his ministers of war were either executed, or died in jail, or were forced to commit suicide. Zhao Yi, Nianer shi zhaji, p. 753 (juan 36).
7 Between 1641 and 1644 alone, there were 18 different members of the Grand Secretariat. William S. Atwell, “From Education to Politics,” p. 356.
8 Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, 1:231.
11 At first, the new emperor preferred not to investigate the matter for fear of
ordered the arrest and interrogation of Madame Ke, who was found guilty of intending to poison the new emperor and replace him with an heir from one of the imperial concubines guarded in her own quarters. Madame Ke's agonizing death by "ten thousand slices" made Wei Zhongxian realize that his own days were soon to end. When he learned that he was to be arrested by the emperor's command, he committed suicide. As the investigation spread, officials identified as members of the Wei–Ke conspiracy were also arrested; and to make an example of the kind of punishment he would mete out in the future against such conspiracies, the emperor ordered that Wei Zhongxian's body be dug up and dismembered, thereby refusing him a whole existence in the afterlife.¹²

Despite such horrifying punishments, factionalism continued to pervade the Chongzhen court, partly because members of the Donglin party who had survived the eunuch's purges thought that the time had now come for them to take their revenge on all those who had been associates of Wei Zhongxian, regardless of the degree of their complicity.¹³ For instance, Feng Quan—who was held responsible for the accusations against Xiong Tingbi in 1625—was attacked even though he had parted ways with Wei in July, 1626, when he had lost his position as grand secretary.¹⁴ But because he had been one of the three chief editors of the Important opening new partisan controversy. One early supporter of Wei Zhongxian proposed opportunistically that the emperor resolve the issue by purging both Donglin and anti-Donglin groups. Ni Yuanlu, the future Minister of Finance and loyalist martyr, came to the defense of the Donglin, and Chongzhen consequently banished many supporters of Wei Zhongxian, recalled a number of Donglin members, and proscribed the Sanchao yaodian. Huang, "Ni's Realism," pp. 418–419.

¹³ On April 9, 1629, the Ministry of Punishments was ordered by the emperor to draw up indictments called "Cases of Sedition" (Ni'an), and 168 officials were arraigned for punishment according to 7 different categories of crimes. Many of those who were accused claimed only passing contact with Wei Zhongxian. Gu Yingtai, Ming shi jishi benmo, 71:28.
**Cases of the Three Reigns**, Feng Quan was brought under indictment and only just managed to bribe his way out of captivity in order to retire to his home in Zhuozhou.  

Another even more celebrated example was the playwright Ruan Dacheng. Descended from a well known Huaining official household in Anhui, Ruan had been slated for appointment in 1624 to the important evaluative post of chief supervising secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Personnel. Even though Ruan was nominated for this appointment by the Donglin leader Zuo Guangdou, other important Donglin figures like Zhao Nanxing, Yang Lian and Gao Panlong opposed the appointment. Ostensibly scorning him because of his supposed frivolity, they blocked his promotion and he was instead named to the same post in the far less important Ministry of Works. However, Ruan Dacheng refused to let his entry into the Ministry of Personnel be barred, and he courted eunuch support, including the support of Wei Zhongxian who was then on the rise himself. Afterwards, when Wei Zhongxian had established his hegemony, Ruan Dacheng became an ally of the eunuch, serving as Vice Minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifice. Although he bragged to several friends that the arrests and deaths of Yang Lian and Zuo Guangdou had partly been his doing, Ruan later broke with Wei Zhongxian and resigned from office. Then, when the eunuch’s power was broken, Ruan resumed office under the Chongzhen Emperor, presenting himself as a non-partisan opposed to the excesses of either side. Nevertheless, his earlier activities were recalled, cast in the worst possible light, and used to force him out of office on April 12, 1629. Officials like Feng Quan and Ruan Dacheng were thus

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15 *Er chen zhuan*, 9:28. Feng Quan was among the 129 officials who were in the fifth category of followers of Wei Zhongxian. Members of this group were demeaned to the status of commoner for three years as punishment. Zhao Yi, *Nianer shi zhaji*, p. 747 (juan 35).

16 Ruan’s family included several well-known 16th-century officials and literati, including the poet Ruan Zihua. Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period*, p. 398.

viewed by Donglin sympathizers as men who had betrayed their calling as ru (scholars) in order to curry favor with the chief eunuch. And other civil servants who had aligned themselves with Wei Zhongxian were publicly condemned as well, even though matters were hardly ever as black and white as the Donglin leaders and their ancillaries liked to pretend.18

However, fine legal discrimination was one of the casualties of the political struggles of the 1620s. Just as foreign policy issues became polarized into absolute stereotypes, so did domestic political matters become defined by “righteous literati” as a struggle between heroic moralists and unscrupulous intriguers. Nor was this only the point of view of Donglin members alone. During the height of the struggle between the Donglin party and Wei Zhongxian, many other members of the gentry were also politically mobilized, so that the attitudes of the Donglin Academy group came to be shared by large numbers of literati, and especially by the many who had joined one or another of the many literary societies then in the process of formation in central and south China.19

Gentry Clubs

The establishment of these gentry clubs during the late Ming, and indeed the party movements as a whole during the 1620s and ’30s, reflected the expansion of the upper rungs of the social hierarchy at that time, and the consequent development of a new kind of political system in which bureaucratic differences were articulated into extra-bureaucratic social movements.20 The expansion of the upper classes was most visible in the richest part of China, Jiangnan, which comprised the later provinces of Anhui and Jiangsu. There, not only did extremely wealthy merchant households spring up in

18 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “The Price of Autonomy.”
20 Jerry Dennerline, “Politics of Examination,” passim.
“The Gathering of Eighteen Scholars of Yinzhou” by Chou Ying (ca. 1490–1552) shows literati examining antiquities, including bronze ritual vessels. Collection of the National Palace Museum, Taiwan, China.
the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the number of moderately well-to-do families also increased visibly.\textsuperscript{21}

At the same time, the fifteen-fold expansion of district-level degree-holders created an unprecedented crush for entry into the higher metropolitan elite.\textsuperscript{22} These often frustrated *shengyuan* or *xiucai* (district degree-holders) formed a newly expanded and eminently visible stratum in the cities of the Yangzi River delta, cultivating a flamboyant dandyism that was often associated in contemporaries' eyes with sexual and social deviance.\textsuperscript{23} One disapp-

\textsuperscript{21} Fu Yiling, *Mingdai Jiangnan shimin jingji shitan*, pp. 46–47; idem, *Ming-Qing shidai shangren ji shangye ziben*, p. 37; Chin Shih, "Peasant Economy and Rural Society in the Lake Tai Area," ch. 3, pp. 42–45. The late Ming poet Wang Shizhen wrote of "seventeen wealthy families" whose fortunes each amounted to at least 500,000 taels. Fu Yiling, *Shangren*, p. 23. And Xu Guangqi, the famous Catholic convert who came from Shanghai *xian*, described how much envy and admiration the numerous merchant households in his city excited. Other writers also depicted the wealthy households of Jiangnan as serving their guests with gold bowls weighing 15 ounces apiece and using washcloths of the finest gold embroidery. Fu, *Mingdai Jiangnan*, pp. 29–30. Another mode of conspicuous consumption was art collecting, especially by wealthy merchants, for whom—according to a late Ming art dealer—"the difference between refinement and vulgarity [of a person] was thought to depend on whether or not he owns antiques." Cited in Sandi Chin and Cheng-chi Hsü, "Anhui Merchant Culture and Patronage," p. 22.

\textsuperscript{22} During the latter half of the 15th century, the imperial government also began selling studentships in the imperial academy, and by the 16th century many commoners who had the funds to do so purchased the title of *jiasheng*, which entitled them to take further examinations and be eligible for minor official appointment. By the Tianqi period, wealthy commoners were also purchasing the lowest regular examination degree and becoming *shengyuan*. These new members of the lower gentry were not held in great esteem in their own locales, where the group known as *xiangshen* (local gentry) usually held regularly acquired degrees; but elsewhere, and especially in urban areas, their status was much enhanced over that of commoners and carried with it the personal privilege of lifelong tax exemption. Tadao Sakai, "Confucianism and Popular Educational Works," p. 337; Miyazaki Ichisada, "Mindai So-Shō chihō no shidaifu to minshū," p. 21; Mori Masao, "The Gentry in the Ming," p. 35; Yamamoto Eishi, "Historical Studies in Japan, 1976," p. 17; Ping-ti Ho, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China*, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{23} Xie Zhaozhi (1567–1624) claimed that almost all of the scholar-officials of the time kept catamites. When they served outside the capital, they pretended
proving essayist, Li Dong, wrote: "It is well known that in the last twenty years in the cities of the southeast all of the shengyuan and literati from households that can afford it doll themselves up like women, wearing red and purple outer wraps and undergarments. I need say no more. . . ." The same scholar added in a poem that:

that their lovers were literary disciples. According to Xie, homosexuality began to flourish in China during the Jin period, and became especially prevalent during the last quarter of the 3rd century A.D., being practiced by all of the gentry (shidaifu) at that time. Because of the rise of Neo-Confucianism (daoxue) during the Song, homosexuality declined; but it had revived during the late Ming, especially in southeastern China. It was often said that Fujian and Guangdong were the centers of such sexual practices; actually, however, homosexuality was commonplace in Jiangnan as well. Southern officials—claimed Xie—had brought their habits with them to Beijing, where the wine-shops were filled with young male prostitutes (xiaochang) who worked as waiters and singing boys for the literati. Most prostitutes originally came from the Ningbo/Shaoxing region in Zhejiang, but there were also professional catamites from Linqing in Shandong, so that people frequently distinguished between "northern" and "southern" xiaochang. Xie Zhaozhi, Wu za zu, 8:4–5a. To the aggressive Dutchman Hans Putmans, who attacked the coast of Fujian during 1633–1635, the Chinese were "filthy pederasts." C. R. Boxer, "The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan," pp. 422–426. The Portuguese also spoke disapprovingly of the Chinese practice of sodomy, "which is not punished nor regarded askance among them." C. R. Boxer, "Macao, Three Hundred Years Ago," p. 303.

24 Li Dong, Jian wen zaji [Miscellaneous record of things seen and heard], juan 10, cited in Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, p. 107. A few years earlier, the Donglin scholar Zhao Nanxing had connected economic decline with conspicuous consumption, decrying the extravagance of the times. Men and women both—he claimed—devoted all their attention to colorful robes and shoes, lavishing their money on food and drink. Zhao Nanxing, Zhao Zhongyi gong wenji, 264:5b. The major change in fashions seems to have occurred in the 1540s, when men began wearing ribbed horsehair (zong) hats, lightweight summer socks, and rush (pu) shoes, especially the famous "yellow grass slippers" made by Yixing handicraftsmen. Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, p. 102. See also Kwan-wai So, Japanese Piracy in Ming China during the Sixteenth Century, pp. 130–131; Albert Chan, "The Decline and Fall of the Ming Dynasty," pp. 1–2. The association of gaudy clothing with political and social decadence has venerable antecedents in China. Xunzi (c. 300–237 B.C.) wrote: "The signs of a disorderly age are that [men’s] clothes are gaily colored, men are made up to look like women, customs are lewd, minds are set on profit, conduct is filthy, music is deviant and ornamentation is vile and variegated.
Yesterday I went to town
And came back home with tears on my gown.
All of those people in feminine finery
Actually turned out to be literati.25

Money spent on fine clothing and theater tickets, or gambled away in the teahouses of Suzhou, not only contributed to urban high life; it also drained the coffers of the households producing these scions and thus created greater social mobility.26 “If a family is well clothed and well fed,” a typical comment of the period ran, “then it encumbers itself with debts and loses its collateral of fields and houses. If there are sons of the sleek and fat, then they gather to gamble and wager their bag and baggage.”27

Extremely successful families—the truly notable households or eminent lineages (wang zu)—had to develop strategies to prevent this loss of their financial resources. Many households did. In the city of Jiaxing, for instance, there were over ninety great families whom contemporaries regarded as notable households. These families had extraordinary staying power, and often kept their wealth and influence for eight generations or more.28 Jiaxing, which was

The living are indulged in without any limits and the dead are sent off in a cheap and miserly way. Propriety and righteousness are deprecated; bravery and brawn are esteemed. If a person is poor he becomes a thief; rich a bandit. A well governed age is the opposite of this.” Xunzi jianzhu, p. 227.

25 Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, p. 107. Prudish contemporaries noted that the literati were very strict when it came to cultivating the proper prose style, but very lax as far as “deviant” sexual practices were concerned. Xie Zhaozhi, Wu za zu, 8:5b.

26 Expensive silver jewelry, especially metal worked into finely shaped hair ornaments representing animals and fish, was very much in vogue during the Chongzhen period. Li, Sanyuan biji, fushang 12a.

27 Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, p. 31. Young members of elite families were not always just dandies. There are many reports in the late Ming records of the sons or nephews of high officials running roughshod over the people and becoming feared (and despised) local bullies. Zhao, Nianer shi zhaji, p. 721 (juan 34).

28 One household lineage retained its local social standing for 21 generations, another for 18, and four others for 17 generations. The 91 great families chosen by Pan Guangdan for his pioneering study were selected partly on the basis of their appearance in local gazetteers and partly on the basis of other
on the border between Jiangnan and Zhejiang, did have certain economic advantages which might have made it less difficult for gentry families there to persist. In the middle 15th century the prefecture of Jiaxing had been divided into extra districts, and it was therefore quite easy to own land in one county and register it in another, thereby avoiding the payment of land taxes.29 But what really kept the Jiaxing lineages wealthy and powerful over the centuries was a successful strategy of carefully planning marriages with other lineages, many of them on the rise, in order to refresh the supply of talent and renew the economic resources available to the wang zu.30 For example, the Shen family, well known as a household that produced famous officials during the late Ming, intermarried frequently with local parvenus whose wealth sustained the education of its own literati.

Lord Shichuang [i.e., Shen Zong] could hardly find anyone who was a suitable son-in-law. One day he came into the city [of] Jiaxing from his country home and by chance encountered Bao Chizhou [i.e., Bao Ding] playing horses with a bamboo stick. He immediately wanted his [own] daughter to marry him and consulted his teacher, whom he invited to act as a matchmaker. At that time Chizhou’s father was a merchant who felt that one should not marry above one’s station. [The father] thanked him humbly but dared not [agree to marriage]. Lord [Shen] said, “Do not refuse so adamantly. My mind is already made up. On some other day it may prove auspicious [to you] for your son to have entered [the protection of] my household. This boy must be the one.” He returned home and told his wife, Lady Shen, “I have found a good son-in-

indices of prestige. Some idea of their prestige, and staying power, can be inferred from the success of these families in the wei ke (eminent examinations) at the metropolitan level. Of 440 successful wei ke candidates listed in the Ming, 12 were from Jiaxing; and of these, 10 were scions of the 91 families. Of 520 wei ke winners listed for the Qing, 28 were from Jiaxing, and of these 17 were from the great families. Pan Guangdan, Ming-Qing liangdai Jiaxing de wangzu, pp. 96–98.

29 Efforts by the government to stop this kind of tax evasion were frequently thwarted by the great lineages. Kawakatsu Mamoru, “Sekkō kakō fu no kanden mondai,” passim.

30 Pan, Jiaxing de wangzu, p. 127.
law in the city from the Bao family. He will make a name for himself. Some time in the future he will have rank, fame, title and emolument and will be just like me." Indeed Lord [Shen] became prefect of Guangzhou and Bao prefect of Chizhou so that his prediction was borne out.\(^1\)

The Jiaxing \textit{wang zu} also frequently married among themselves—there were at least 280 instances of marriage among the 91 notable families of the city—but these particular gentry households per- dured because they were so successful at combining an aristocratic cultural aloofness toward their social inferiors with a bourgeois receptivity to successful families newly risen to the middle classes.\(^2\)

That kind of permeability was a necessary trait for survival, given the unusual diffusion of the examination-system elite in Jiangnan during the late Ming. Unlike other provinces (except perhaps for Jiangxi) noted for producing large numbers of successful degree candidates, the area of Jiangnan was not characterized by a small number of talent-producing counties like Yuyao or Yin districts in Zhejiang, or Putian and Jinjiang in Fujian. Instead, as many as ten districts of Jiangnan each provided between one hundred and two hundred officials during the Ming period. Furthermore, in addition to having a fairly widespread distribution of politically significant districts, Jiangnan was also characterized by a much higher rate of gentry turnover as compared to other politi-

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1 Cited in ibid., p. 125. I have taken some liberties with the translation. Bao's father's statement that he did not want to have his son marry above the family's station is actually put in terms of Qi in \textit{juan 6} of the \textit{Zuo zhuan} commentary. Lord Shen's response is an allusion to the \textit{Gongyang} commentary of the same year: "Once you enter the highborn's gate then no one can block you from it." Lady Shen is referred to here as \textit{Anren}, which is the title of the wife of a sixth-grade official.

2 Pan, \textit{Jiaxing de wangzu}, pp. 122, 126. For the blurring of status distinctions among late Ming merchants, peasants, and scholars, and the reflection of this confusion of class concepts in the thought of the Taizhou school, see Wm. Theodore de Bary, "Individualism and Humanitarianism in Late Ming Thought," p. 173. But note also the simultaneous effort, in late Ming morality books, to maintain specific social differentiations, perhaps in response to the actual fusion of such categories. Sakai, "Confucianism," p. 346.
cally successful provinces.\textsuperscript{33} The official elite of Jiangnan was thus not dominated by single powerful gentry lineages in one or two key provincial counties. Nor did a single city dominate the region.\textsuperscript{34} Instead, the entire Yangzi basin, wealthiest of all parts of China, was characterized by a broadly distributed political elite with a strong sense of self-identity, laterally connected by common cultural symbols.\textsuperscript{35} The elite met across lineage lines and district barriers because of its wide horizontal dispersal. This meant that the normal media of gentry cohesiveness—poetry clubs, philosophical societies, academies—were unusually strong in this region.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{33} Over the entire Ming period, 59\% of the officials from Nanzhili (which comprised Jiangnan) had no other relatives also holding office, whereas 42\% of the officials from Zhejiang and 34\% of those from Fujian had relatives also in regular bureaucratic office. James B. Parsons, “The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy,” pp. 362–366, 382–386. The marriage ties between important families in Jiangnan frequently led to supra-local ties that produced a metropolitan outlook in many of these gentry, causing them to transcend merely local interests by becoming involved in national political disputes like the Donglin movement. Jerry Paul Dennerline, “The Mandarins and the Massacre of Chia-ting,” and idem, The Chia-ting Loyalists, passim.

\textsuperscript{34} If the Song can be seen as a period in which such great urban centers as Hangzhou and Kaifeng conglomerated, then a major characteristic of the late Ming was the growth of large market towns (often centers of the cotton trade) outside of these cities. There was a steady increase in the number of cities (\textit{shi}) and towns (\textit{zhen}) in Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, Taicang, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou prefectures from 1500 to 1800. Liu Shiji, “Ming–Qing shidai Jiangnan shizhen zhi shuliang fenxi,” p. 144; Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, pp. 103–104; Nishijima Sadao, “Shina shoki sengyō shijō no kōsatsu,” p. 132; Fu Yiling, Ming-Qing nonggun shehui jingji, pp. 68–70; Frederick W. Mote, “The Growth of Chinese Despotism,” pp. 127–129; idem, “The Transformation of Nanking,” pp. 63–65; P. Alvarez Semedo, Histoire universelle de la Chine, pp. 21–22; Etienne Balazs, Political Theory and Administrative Reality in Traditional China, pp. 8–10.

\textsuperscript{35} In terms of functional analysis, the latency sub-systems of society were more autonomous in Jiangnan than elsewhere in late Ming China. Since clan, office and perhaps even economic sub-systems were relatively separate and discrete, status crystallization took place rather more easily and more fixedly.

\textsuperscript{36} Tilemann Grimm, Erziehung und Politik im konfuzianischen China der Ming-Zeit, pp. 130–133.
Gentry coteries and clubs reflected not only the social coherence of the upper class, but also the general rise in mass literacy during the 16th and 17th centuries. As millions competed for the state examinations, a vast audience was created for a rapidly developing publishing industry. Publishers were willing to pay famous and successful literati thousands of taels of silver to compile collections of eight-legged essays illustrating the proper examination style. As Cai Yisuo, the Nanjing bookseller on Sanshanjie (Three Mountain Street) explains in Kong Shangren’s play, *The Peach Blossom Fan*:

As well as earning a handsome profit by these transactions, I have helped to preserve and circulate the noblest thoughts of mankind. Even the doctors and masters of literature greet me with deference. I have reason to be satisfied with my reputation: this year the general civil service examination will be held again, and the finest literary talents will receive due honor. The government has endorsed a proposal by the Minister of Ceremonies, Qian Qianyi, advocating a new style of writing to express the spirit of the new reign. Consequently I have invited several leading critics to compile anthologies as models for composition. They will start work today. I’ll hang up my latest advertisement: “The style in vogue was created

37 According to the 1586 edition of the Shaoxing gazetteer: “Nowadays even the very poor would be ashamed if they did not instruct their sons in the classics. From tradesmen to local government runners, there are very few who cannot read or punctuate.” Ho, *Ladder of Success*, p. 251. Rawski’s figures suggest that functional literacy for males may have been as high as 35% or more for this highly developed area of China. Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, *Education and Popular Literacy in Ch’ing China*, passim.


39 T. S. Fisher, “Accommodation and Loyalism, Part Two, Lü Liu-liang’s Early Years,” pp. 133–137. Many students simply memorized model essays and did not even bother to read the *Four Books* and *Five Classics* carefully. A common theme of the social criticism of the late Ming, even before the dynasty fell, was that the time spent on learning the eight-legged examination style was a preoccupation which had led to the degeneration of the literati. Later, such formalism would be blamed for the collapse of the Ming. Willard J. Peterson, *Bitter Gourd*, pp. 56–58.
by men of renown, / Imitation of these models will please the chief examiner."\(^{40}\)

The bookstores selling these anthologies also marketed *she gao*: drafts of essays written by members of literary societies. The *she gao* (lit., “club drafts”) were mainly designed to bring the names of bright young literary talents to the attention of future state examiners. By publicizing the names of club members who had successfully passed the examinations, the *she gao* also attracted readers who hoped to learn how to improve their own powers of composition.\(^ {41}\) But the publishing business was not only—as Huang Zongxi once put it—“a world of eight-legged essays.”\(^ {42}\) Publishers like Feng Menglong printed works of fiction like his own *Sanyan* collection, as well as contemporary biographies, books of topical interest, and anthologies of poetry compiled by famous literati like Ai Nanying (1583–1646). Of course, poetic style was also a component of the state examinations; but the selection and publication of poetry anthologies by individuals or by literary societies was mainly intended to establish fresh canons of criticism during a period of keen aesthetic interest and poetic flowering.\(^ {43}\)

Late Ming poetry and belles lettres were dominated by the influence of Wang Shizhen (1526–1590) and a classicist group which he led known as the “Seven Masters” (*Qi zi*) of the Ming. Rebelling against the formalism of Song prose and the sparse “grand secretariat style” (*taige ti*) so popular in the 15th century, Wang, his mentor Li Panlong (1514–1570), and the other classicists who formed part of this “movement to return to the ancient style”

\(^{40}\) K’ung Shang-jen, *The Peach Blossom Fan*, pp. 212–213. The “new regime” is the Southern Ming government of the Prince of Fu, founded in 1644. The chief examiner, of course, was Qian Qianyi.
\(^{42}\) Xie Guozhen, *Dangshe yundong*, p. 146.
(guwen yundong), popularized the florid prose style of the Qin-Han period and copied the ornamental poetry of the late Tang. Poets of the late 16th century, like the Changshu scholar Qu Chunren who founded the Fushui Mountain Manor literary society (Fushui shan zhuang she) in 1584, continued self-consciously to develop this imitative aestheticism. Qu's studio, which later became the studio of the great 17th-century master Qian Qianyi, was the center of a circle of poetic cognoscenti who were interested in reviving medieval poetry and who wrote frequently in a quite ornamental style. Gradually, however, a reaction against such mannered antique ornateness began to set in, and even Wang Shizhen was found wanting in naturalness and spontaneity by poets like Ai Nanying, who scathingly criticized his contemporaries for their literary pretentiousness. In a letter to his fellow poet, Chen Zilong, Ai Nanying wrote: “Later scholars and lesser masters need no longer read books and no longer do composition. They merely have to have the Qianhou si bu gao [Wang Shizhen’s collected works] on the book shelf every time they have a banquet, the better to scissors-and-paste it into an essay.”

Not everyone agreed with Ai Nanying’s condemnation of Wang Shizhen, but by the late 1620s most literary circles favored a return to ancient prose (guwen) stylists like Liu Ji or Ouyang Xiu. Po-
etry clubs founded during this period thus tended less to be circles of aesthetically refined connoisseurs than brotherhoods of literati pledged together to renew poetic excellence and overcome the literary and philosophical decadence of the age. The Kuangshe, which was founded around 1620 by the brilliant Jintan poet Zhou Zhong, by its very name—the Assistance Society—suggested this purpose. And the Nanshe (Southern Society), also dating from 1620, was similarly devoted. In the words of one of its members, Shen Shoumin: “As fellow artists we listened to each other in repose and while awake, were severe with each other morning and night, and shared each other’s praise and blame.”

Criticism of each other’s poetic style was only one activity of the literary and philosophical societies founded in the 1620s. Along with collegial criticism and mutual moral reinforcement went the collective effort to recover the fundamental meanings of the classics and thereby help to restore order to a society that seemed to have lost its moral bearings. Central to this conception of recovering the fundamental significance of the classical canon was the idea that no single person could accomplish such an important task alone. This was because each individual had his own particular and even eccentric way of interpreting the meaning of the classical texts. But in literary societies and academies, and through discussions and lectures (jiangxue), collective critical discoveries would make this restoration possible.

In 1624, a time of growing philosophical agitation, several of the societies of Jiangnan came together to form the Yingshe, which was named after Yingtian prefecture around Nanjing and which symbolized the union of literati circles along both the upper and lower reaches of the Yangzi River. The Ying Society was ac-

49 Zhou Zhong’s family was listed among the guizu (honorable lineages) of Jintan. His father, Zhou Taishi, was the administration commissioner of Yunnan province. Xu Zi, Xiaotian jizhuan, pp. 206–207.

50 Zhu, “Mingji nan Yingshe kao,” p. 545. There were 16 members in the Nanshe, including Wan Yinglong and Wu Yingji.

51 Zhao Nanxing, Zhao Zhongyi gong wenji, 269:14–15a.

52 Miyazaki, “Mindai So-Shō chihō,” p. 24; Atwell, “Education to Politics,” p. 339. Ying was also an allusion to the passage from the Book of Changes that
tually composed of two separate branches: a southern group, descended from the old Fushui Mountain societies and led by a wealthy Changshu patron named Yang Yi (z. Zichang); and a northern group led by Zhou Zhong, founder of the Assistance Society which was now amalgamated into this new group.\textsuperscript{53} The inspiration for this new gathering was clearly that of Yang Yi, who also provided the necessary funds for travel and publishing costs. Setting up such a society seems to have appealed to his vanity; for, according to the Changshu gazetteer:

Yang Zichang of Changshu came from a wealthy family. Initially wanting in literary brilliance, he enjoyed associating with literati and became a close friend of Gu Linshi [i.e., Gu Menglin] of Tai-cang and the two Zhangs of Loudong. In this way he enjoyed the reputation of being surrounded by literary men.\textsuperscript{54}

But for the two Zhangs—Zhang Pu and Zhang Cai—the Ying Society answered a somewhat different need. Already profoundly dissatisfied with the shallow pedagogy and overly allusive poetry of other leading literary figures in Jiangnan, Zhang Pu and Zhang Cai had originally turned to each other for mutual encouragement and intellectual reinforcement in seeking a higher understanding of literature and philosophy.\textsuperscript{55} As early as 1623 Zhang Cai had moved into Zhang Pu’s studio in Loudong, and the two men together now encouraged Yang Yi to draw up a covenant (\textit{yue}) for this new society that would pledge the men together to clarify philosophical principles in spite of the age’s “empty” Chan practices, and to maintain the proper commentaries in the face of literary decadence. It was this pledge that the original forty-seven members made under the direction of Zhou Zhong, the nominal covenant leader (\textit{mengzhu}). And it was in order to live

\textsuperscript{53} Zhu, “Mingji nan Yingshe kao,” pp. 546–547. This is Wu Weiye’s account.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 543.
\textsuperscript{55} Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, pp. 52–53.
up to this oath that the Ying Society devoted itself to recruiting new members and to publishing classical commentaries, essays and literary anthologies.\textsuperscript{56} However, like many other gentry associations in Jiangnan, the Ying Society soon became embroiled in the political agitation surrounding the Donglin Academy’s struggle with Wei Zhongxian, and especially in the urban uprising of 1626 in Suzhou when Wei’s secret police tried to arrest one of his most courageous critics, a former official in the Ministry of Personnel named Zhou Shunchang.\textsuperscript{57}

Gentry involvement in urban demonstrations was not uncommon in the late Ming. Within the cities of Jiangnan there was considerable contact among lower-ranking literati, sons of merchants, businessmen, the \textit{demimonde}, and even the hucksters and vendors who filled the marketplace. This urban populace was quick to spring to the defense of the city against outsiders, and very often against the very officials appointed to govern them.\textsuperscript{58} Starting in 1567 with a riot in Changzhou, where local students and urbanites (\textit{shimin}) led a strike against the local magistrate, there began a series of urban demonstrations against unpopular government offi-

\textsuperscript{56} The Ying Society’s membership drive was led by Sun Chun, the person in charge of soliciting contributions (\textit{zheng sheyuan}). Sun performed this same function later for the Restoration Society, travelling all over the empire on club business. From Jiaxing, he was described by a fellow member of the society as being “so anxious to acquire friends [for the society] as to forget about his own self, and dutifully refusing to shun hardship.” Zhu, “Mingji nan Yingshe kao,” p. 576. One of the most famous and influential literary anthologies published during this period by this group was the collection edited by Zhang Pu and called \textit{Han Wei Liuchao baisan mingjia ji} [Collection of famous writers from the Han, Wei and Six Dynasties]. Yoshikawa, “Political Disengagement,” p. 21.


\textsuperscript{58} A strong tradition of local defense, centered upon craft guilds like the incense workers’ association of Suzhou, grew during the 1550s and ‘60s when Japanese and Chinese pirates invaded the Yangzi delta. Fu, \textit{Mingdai Jiangnan}, pp. 105, 123–125; Le P. Louis Gaillard, \textit{Nankin d’alors et d’aujourd’hui}, pp. 205–206; John E. Wills, Jr., “Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang,” pp. 210–211.
Compiled by imperial command in the early Qing period, the *Geng zhi tu* [Pictures of tilling and weaving] (1712), shows peasants transplanting rice seedlings in the fourth lunar month after the winter wheat has been harvested. The inscription reads: "After the wheat harvest the morning rain soaks in and a meridian wind [plays] in the locust trees. Cool summer streams run north and south, interlacing like a fish-net basket. Singing, they transplant the new seedlings, casting them in without a stop. Hands left, hands right, teaching us without confusion. For transplanting the seedlings, never forget to reward the toiling people." Jiao Bingzhen, *Peiwen zhai geng zhi tu* [The Peiwen studio pictures of tilling and weaving] (Tokyo reprint, 1892), part 1.
cials or against what was deemed to be excessive taxation. The government blamed this disorder on a degeneration of popular customs, and especially on a lack of proper respect for authority.

Recently, it has become the custom to engage in quarrelsome and superficial drivel. The people are much more contentious [than they used to be]. They use young students to assault and berate prefects. They use licentiatcetes to attack and abuse civil officials. They revile their superintendents, displaying couplets on every street corner. Their popular ballads, filled with spite, hatred and envy, are engraved on printing blocks.

After a lull, these movements sprang up again in 1587, which to contemporaries appeared to be a kind of turning point. Perhaps because of the spate of bad weather in Jiangnan at that time, there was a discernible increase in the number of demonstrations against "gluttonous officials and corrupt clerks" (tanguan wuli). In one city after another—Suzhou, Jiaxing, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Songjiang, and so on—younger scholars led attacks against those in authority, personally reviling local prefects, high officials in retirement, and so on. According to a contemporary perception, "They all began to stir at once, acting together without [prior] agreement, and in the people's hearts there was a change in manners and morals."

These late Ming urban social movements were of two different types. The most common was the sort described above: a union of lower classes and students against the upper classes in their midst

59 The 1567 riot was almost entirely a student demonstration against unfair examinations. Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, pp. 91, 111–12; Balazs, Political Theory, p. 11; Yuan, "Urban Riots and Disturbances," p. 286.
60 Ming shilu, Longqing j. 24, cited in Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, p. 110.
61 In 1586, winter frost destroyed the orchards of eastern Jiangnan. In 1587, heavy rains at harvest time destroyed the grain in awl. In 1588, spring drought brought famine. In 1589, the summer drought was so bad that the Treasury had to distribute public relief. Chu Hua, Hucheng beikao, 3:12. See also Mori Masao, "Jüroku-jūhachi seiki ni okeru kōsei to jinushi denko kankei," p. 74; Mi Chu Wiens, "Lord and Peasant," pp. 21–22.
who were held responsible for poor economic conditions and social exploitation. The union of lower degree-holders (shengyuan) and the urban populace (shimin) did not always provoke a hostile reaction, however; such mobs might also form in support of local officials who were believed to be protecting the interests of the non-privileged against the upper classes. Often this took the form of a demonstration protesting the transfer of an official who was especially responsive to lower-class interests, as during the Songjiang riots of 1593. In that case, the local prefect, Li Hou, had earned the support of the middle and lower classes by accepting a series of litigations against the great families and by commuting the corvée of urban artisans. When the central government tried to remove the man, the shengyuan posted proclamations at the gates of every district yamen in the prefecture and on the walls of most of the market towns (zhen). The central government was eventually forced to take military measures to stifle the unrest and carry out the transfer.

The second type of demonstration was a municipally coherent movement against the central government's authority, one that united all classes in the city together. During the late 16th century, a number of intermediate marketing centers formed in Jiangnan, and there was a consolidation of major urban centers like Suzhou and Songjiang. Around these important manufacturing, trading, and administrative cities there grew strong local allegiances. When imperial police forces or eunuch tax collectors threatened members of a city, or its economic well-being, the result could easily be

64 Fu, op. cit., pp. 115–116.
65 It has been argued that the Donglin movement represented a union between a rising merchant class and middle and small landlords who aimed to establish the hegemony of the landowning class over the imperial autocracy. The Donglin movement, in this view, wanted to strengthen the structure of the entire landlord class by opposing both centralizing despotism and the interests of very large landowners who were abusing their privileges and driving the lower classes into rebellion. Mizoguchi Yūzō, "Iwayuru Tōrinha jinshi no shisō," pp. 173–175, 195–196; Taniguchi Kikuo, "Peasant Rebellions in the Late Ming," p. 56.
a strongly united urban mass, even led by the upper gentry and wealthiest merchants and manned by shengyuan and urban poor. The tax riots of 1601 in Suzhou were of this sort, as was the famous 1626 outburst in that same city, incited by the government’s order to arrest Zhou Shunchang.

In the spring of 1626 Wei Zhongxian sent imperial agents (tiqi) from the capital with warrants for the arrest of several leading Donglin figures, including Zhou Shunchang in Suzhou. When news of Zhou’s arrest spread, local shengyuan from all around that part of Jiangnan were mobilized in protest. Led by a Suzhou scholar named Yang Tingshu, who was also a member of the Yingshe, thousands of the demonstrators carried a petition to the governor of the circuit, asking that he intercede for them and plead with the Tianqi Emperor for Zhou’s release. The governor re-

66 Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, p. 93. According to one sophisticated Marxian analysis of these movements, several different class structures co-existed: feudal landlords, gentry landlords, and managerial landlords (jingying dizhu). It was the third of these, however, who were the most active in the later phases of the Jiangnan tax resistance movement. Managerial landlords, who directly managed their own lands and were personally involved in irrigation and water control, supported the self-cultivators and middle and small landlords in their drive to be free of feudal taxation. During the height of the movement they allied with urban gentry (shi shen) to oppose the power of the state. Li Xun, “Lun Mingdai Jiangnan jitian shih,” p. 22.

67 Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, pp. 88–89. The leading figure among those high officials who, with or without Donglin connections, combined together to resist the levies of eunuchs like Chen Zeng, was Li Sancai. Though not a member of the Donglin himself, Li—who served as governor of the Huainan area—was famous for his popular resistance to extra taxes, and especially the mining levies during this period. Hou Wailu, Zhongguo sixiang tongshi, pp. 1110–1111; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, pp. 503, 847–850. For the 1601 revolt, see Yuan, “Urban Riots,” pp. 287–290; Shimizu Taiji, “Mindai no ryūmin to ryūzoku,” pp. 372–373. The 1601 tax riots also coincided with economic distress in the surrounding countryside. The result of severe floods in Jiaxing and Huzhou to the south was a steep rise in the price of both food and raw silk. Saeki Yūichi, “1601 nen ‘shikiyo no hen’ o meguru sho mondai,” p. 88.

68 Yang Tingshu was the most famous teacher in the Suzhou area, accepting humble as well as high-born pupils. During the 1630s he had more than 2,000 students. Atwell, “Education to Politics,” p. 347.
fused, “and the sound of weeping shook the earth.” If it had just been a matter of Zhou himself, whose fate attracted the support and backing of many young literati attracted to the Donglin cause, then the rest of the urban populace might not have joined the movement. But the presence of the imperial guardsmen, who were noted for their viciousness and cruelty, spurred on other elements in the city. An urban mob stormed the yamen, stomped one guardsman to death with wooden clogs, drove a number of others into the river, and—no longer restrained by the scholars in its midst—went on to seize a high civil official, Censor Huang Zunsu, at the courier station, tearing up his imperial warrants and burning his boat.

The rioters, however, failed to save Zhou Shunchang. Zhou was taken back to the capital and was so horribly tortured by Wei Zhongxian’s secret police that his friends later could not recognize the mutilated remains. There were other martyrs, too. Governor Mao Yilu treated the riots as an act of rebellion, and five of the leaders of the uprising were executed for treason. They, and the tomb that was built in their honor by the citizens of Suzhou, became symbols of righteous political courage. Other literati who had participated in the movement also became celebrated for their involvement; and members of the Ying Society, which had figured prominently in the campaign to save Zhou Shunchang, found themselves suddenly thrust into national prominence.

69 Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, p. 230. This edition of the Nanjiang yishi was edited in the 19th century by Li Yao, who entitled his work Nanjiang yishi kanben [Nanjiang yishi collated]. Lynn Struve states that this is more Li’s work than Wen’s. (Struve, personal communication.) However, because the basis of the work is Wen’s text, I continue to use the Taiwan wenxian congkan entry, viz., Wen Ruilin, etc.

70 According to a stele dated 1629 and inscribed by Zhang Pu to the memory of the martyrs, when the seizure of Zhou Shunchang “pained the hearts of the people of Wu,” the five men came forward “to die because of their extreme righteousness.” Suzhou lishi bowuguan, Jiangsu shifan xueyuan lishi xi, Nanjing daxue Ming-Qing yanjiushi, comps., Ming-Qing Suzhou gong-shang ye beike ji, p. 374. An additional monument, signed by 98 members of the Suzhou gentry, was inscribed by the famous scholar Wen Zhenmeng. Ibid., pp. 376–377.

71 Zhang Tingyu, et al., comps., Ming shi (Guofang yanjiuyuan), p. 3435; Fu,
Indeed, the Suzhou uprising of 1626 saw the virtual transformation of the Ying Society from a small coterie of scholars into a political movement that began to spread across the empire. Members were enrolled in other provinces like Fujian and Jiangxi; and when Zhang Pu had the great honor to be picked in 1628 to go to Beijing as an imperial degree-holder (engongsheng) to participate in the enthronement ceremonies, he was able to start a branch there. 72 During the following year, 1629, Zhang Pu and Sun Chun expanded the group’s activities even more. Invitations were sent out for a special meeting in Suzhou. There the new name of the association was given as the Fushe or Restoration Society, and 674 members from all over the country pledged together an oath of membership. 73 (see Figure 1.)

Although Zhang Pu and his comrades may have seen them-

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73 It is not precisely known when the original name, Yingshe, was dropped and this new one adopted. According to the Changshu gazetteer: “At first [Yang Yi] and several of his comrades formed the Yingshe. Later, when the two Zhangs flourished and their contacts grew, they changed its name to the Fushe.” Zhu Tan “Mingji nan Yingshe kao,” p. 543. The name Fushe is an allusion to the fu hexagram in the Book of Changes, which embodies the conception that after decay comes a turning point when banished life returns, the old is discarded and the new flourishes once again. See Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-lung,” p. 41. The archaistic notion of a classical restoration was very much in the air during the late Ming. The art historian James Cahill, in discussing a handscroll by Chen Hongshou depicting a meeting of the Grape Society at a temple in Beijing at the turn of the 17th century, has pointed out how the artist deliberately evoked a meeting of the White Lotus Society over a millennium earlier. “The implication is not that the Grape Society was a recreation of the White Lotus Society, but only that to portray the Grape Society meeting as if it were merely a modern unprecedented event, would somehow demean it. That double image representation, and the archaistic manner of drawing, invested it with a classical sternness and distance.” James Cahill, Fourth Norton Lecture (draft), Harvard University, 1979, p. 18. Huiyuan’s (334–416) White Lotus Society was, needless to say, not the same group that was to provoke the uprisings in Shandong in 1622. Atwell, “Education to Politics,” p. 334.
selves as younger versions of the Donglin partisans, they were careful to remain within the bounds of political acceptability. The charter oath of the Restoration Society was modeled after a proclamation of Ming Taizu, and consisted of moral injunctions, negatively rather than positively stated: do not disobey conventional norms, do not revile the classics, do not disregard wiser and more experienced men, and so forth. What mattered much more than the substance of the oath was the form of the pledge itself: a public gathering of nationally recruited literati who went on to sign a membership list and subscribe to a bulletin which was distributed by Zhang Pu throughout the empire. The 1629 Suzhou meeting was followed by further organizational activity in which more funds were raised, additional collections of writings were pub-

74 The oath has been translated numerous times. See, for example, Atwell, "Wen-she," p. 18.
lished, and leaders were appointed or selected in each district where there were members to coordinate Restoration Society activities.  

Even though the Fushe represented an entirely new kind of political movement in China, it was a coalition rather than a party. Membership was mainly a matter of participating in the annual meetings in Jiangnan (Suzhou in 1629, Nanjing in 1630, Suzhou again in 1632), and the lists of members' names collected by Zhang Pu and attached to the Fushe bulletin were largely records of attendance. Adherents retained much more direct membership and participated much more actively in their own constituent philosophical and literary societies than in the larger coalition represented by the annual Restoration Society meetings; and it was this pre-existing network of alliances that made it possible for the coalition to develop so quickly. Moreover, primary loyalties and membership were not usually transferred from the nuclear societies to the Restoration Society as such. Nominally affiliated, members mainly remained attached to their own district clubs, though they were capable of being mobilized into higher-level activity around discrete issues.

One of the best known groups in the coalition was the Incipience Society (Jishe) of Songjiang in eastern Jiangnan near Shanghai. The society, formally founded in 1629, was led by the scions of powerful local families—men like Peng Bin, Zhou Lixun, Xia Yunyi, and Xu Fuyuan. Xu Fuyuan, for instance, was the great-

75 Xie, Dangshe yundong, p. 163; Dennerline, “Massacre,” p. 102; Dennerline, Chia-ting, p. 33; Ono Kazuko, “Shinsho no shisō tōsei o megutte,” p. 342.
76 Atwell stresses the more centralized aspects (Atwell, “Wen-shé,” passim), but Xie Guozhen describes it as a confederation of pre-existing wenshe (Dangshe yundong, pp. 161–162.) Dennerline points out that in Jiading the Restoration Society was a disparate group composed of district school students with informal connections to the elite families. There it was even more of a coterie than a coalition. Dennerline, “Massacre,” p. 138; idem, Chia-ting, p. 30.
77 Miyazaki, “Mindai So-Shō chihō,” p. 25. The name of the society was taken from the “great treatise” in the Book of Changes where the character ji is translated as “seeds”: “The master said to know the seeds, that is divine indeed.” In this case the seeds were taken to be the germination of learning, which had been interrupted. See Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-lung,” p. 58.
78 Xie, Dangshe yundong, pp. 187–190. The group met in Peng Bin’s studio. Of
grandnephew of Xu Jie, the grand secretary of the 1560s who became one of the wealthiest landowners in Jiangnan and who earned the enmity of the famous reformer, Hai Rui; he was also the cousin of Xu Ben’gao, former director of the emperor’s secret police (*Jinyi wei*). But it was the so-called Three Masters of Yunxian—Li Wen, Song Zhengyu, and Chen Zilong—who had the greatest intellectual influence upon the group. Although Li Wen stood at the center of this group, being the sworn friend of both men, it was really Chen Zilong who led them all.

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79 Although Xu Fuyuan edited several sets of model examination essays and passed the 1642 *juren* examination, he failed the *jinshi* tests the following year. It was Xu Fuyuan who introduced the Zhejiang militia leader Xu Du to Chen Zilong when the latter was police magistrate of Shaoxing. After Xu Du revolted and Chen Zilong had him killed, Xu Fuyuan wrote a bitter letter to Chen, denouncing him for his action. Later Xu Fuyuan, who had tutored Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga) in the Imperial Academy, joined the Southern Ming government of the Prince of Lu, whom he accompanied into exile in 1651 on Jinmen (Quemoy). Imprisoned for a while in Annam during a loyalist mission to Yunnan, he returned to the mainland when Jinmen fell in 1663. He then went into hiding in the mountains of Guangdong where he passed away. Song Rulin, et al., comps., *Songjiang fuzhi*, p. 1253 (55:55b–56a); Chen Zilong, *Chen Zhongyu quan ji*, nianpu, shang, p. 12; Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-Lung,” pp. 59–60. For Xu Jie, see Goodrich and Fang, *Ming Biography*, pp. 575–576.

80 Yunxian was the name of Peng Bin’s studio where the fische coalesced in 1629. Xie, *Dangshe yundong*, pp. 188–189; Li Wen, Chen Zilong, and Song Zhengyu, *Yunxian sanzi xin shi hegao, xu, 1* and *zhuang, 2a.*

81 Atwell, “Education to Politics,” p. 347. Perhaps because of his later service to Dorgon, Li Wen does not have a biography in the local gazetteer. (Zhao Xianjia, comp., *Huating xianzhi.*) His friendship with Chen Zilong is described in Hou Fangyu, *Zhuanghui tang ji*, Siyi tang shiji, 5:10a. Although he and Chen Zilong studied together for the preliminary examinations, Chen alone went on to pass the *juren* tests of 1630. Li Wen is not shown to have held a gongsheng degree in the Huating roster, nor is he listed upon the roster of successful candidates in the Shanghai gazetteer: Ying Baoshi, comp., *Shanghai xianzhi*, p. 1087 (15:32a). Song Zhengyu, who also collaborated with the Qing government, passed his *jinshi* examination in 1647. Li, Chen, and Song, *Yunxian sanzi xin shi hegao, zhuang 2b.*
well known for his political bravado because he had denounced a close associate of Wei Zhongxian in 1625, Chen Zilong was both a fine poet and an excellent scholar. 82 As a poet, he had adopted his own *guwen* (ancient prose) forms, announcing to Ai Nanying that he preferred to follow Wang Shizhen’s style rather than to adhere to Ai’s own rigid and idiosyncratic patterns. 83 And as a scholar he was to edit, along with Xu Fuyuan, the famous *Collection of Writings on Ming Statecraft* (*Huang Ming jingshi wenbian*, 1638), which sought to recover the essential administrative institutions of the early Ming period, when the dynasty was at its strongest, and combine them with classical Confucian values in order to renew society in the present. 84

**Examination Life**

In addition to sharing this commitment to restore fundamental political values with Fushe leaders like Zhang Pu, Chen Zilong and his fellow Incipience Society members were attracted to the larger coalition by the prospect of enhancing their own opportunities to obtain the provincial or metropolitan degrees. 85 The re-

82 Chen led the attack in Songjiang against the corrupt Zhu Guosheng. Zhu, a member of the imperial family and a political ally of Wei Zhongxian, was notorious in Songjiang for using betrothal presents to seduce the daughters of wealthy families. Chen brought these matters into the open by writing a formal accusation of licentiousness against Zhu, and was attacked in turn by the latter’s friends. *Ming shi*, p. 3313; Gu Yanwu, *Tinglin shi wen ji*, *Tinglin shiji*, p. 12; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 102–103. Chen’s father was also a courageous scholar-official, who was a friend of the Donglin leader, Zou Yuanbiao. Supervisor of the workers constructing the tombs of the Wanli and Taichang Emperors, he prevented the eunuch overseers from embezzling project funds. He died in 1626, the same year Chen Zilong passed the sheng-yuan degree. Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-lung,” pp. 16–26.

83 Chen Zilong was seconded by Zhou Zhong, the founder of the Southern Society. Zhang Pu and Xia Yunyi had tried to reconcile the differences among the poets, but Ai Nanying had gone on in 1628 to denounce both Zhou Zhong and Chen Zilong in public. Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 96–97.


85 Although Chen Zilong’s name is on all the extant membership lists, he him-
evaluation of literary style, after all, was not just a matter of personal taste. If the *guwen* style proposed by Zhou Zhong and Zhang Pu became the style favored by the examiners, then members of the Restoration Society who had learned to write in this way stood a better chance of competing successfully for the provincial examinations held in Nanjing in 1630. Indeed, the annual meeting of the Fushe that year was timed to coincide with the triennial reunion of students for the civil service tests in that lovely southern city.

It was a paradoxical time—the examination period in Nanjing when candidates came together from all of Nanzhili. On the one hand, preparation for the tests (which were held every third year, beginning on the ninth day of the eighth lunar month) was grueling; and the exams themselves, taken over the course of three nights and two days in the massive labyrinthine compound, mildewd and damp on the north shore of the Qinhua Canal, were a demeaning ordeal. Pu Songling, who failed the provincial examinations many times, later described the “seven transformations of the examination candidate” in scathing terms.

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86 Thus, hopes of passing the examinations impelled thousands of students to try to study with Restoration Society leaders. “At this time the fame of the Fushe reached the poorest village [scholars] who fought to rush to the door of Zhang Pu and Zhou Zhong.” Biography of Zhang Lüxiang, cited in Pan, *Jiaxing de wangzu*, p. 297.

87 Matteo Ricci said the following of Nanjing in his diary, which was first published in 1615: “In the judgment of the Chinese this city surpasses all other cities in the world in beauty and in grandeur, and in this respect there are probably very few others superior or equal to it. It is literally filled with palaces and temples and towers and bridges, and these are scarcely surpassed by similar structures in Europe. In some respects it surpasses our European cities. The climate is mild and the soil is fertile. There is gaiety of spirit among the people, who are well mannered and nicely spoken, and the dense population is made up of all classes; of hoi-poloi, of the lettered aristocracy and the magistrates.” *Matteo Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 268–269.

88 For a description of the compound, see Ichisada Miyazaki, *China’s Examination Hell*, p. 41.
When he first enters the examination compound and walks along, panting under his heavy load of luggage, he is just like a beggar. Next, while undergoing the personal body search and being scolded by the clerks and shouted at by the soldiers, he is just like a prisoner. When he finally enters his cell and, along with the other candidates stretches his neck to peer out, he is just like the larva of a bee. When the examination is finished at last, and he leaves, his mind in a haze and his legs tottering, he is just like a sick bird that has been released from a cage. While he is wondering when the results will be announced and waiting to learn whether he passed or failed, so nervous that he is startled even by the rustling of the trees and the grass and is unable to sit or stand still, his restlessness is like that of a monkey on a leash. When at last the results are announced and he is definitely failed he loses his vitality like one dead, rolls over on his side, and lies there without moving, like a poisoned fly. Then, when he pulls himself together and stands up, he is provoked by every sight and sound, gradually flings away everything within his reach, and complains of the illiteracy of the examiners. When he calms down at last, he finds everything in the room broken. At this time he is like a pigeon smashing its own precious eggs. These are the seven transformations of a candidate.89

On the other hand, the period of residence in metropolitan Nanjing created a kind of enforced bachelorhood when, if married, a scholar was away from his family, living in parenthetical leisure and momentary abandonment in between the bouts of examination preparation. The dramatist Kong Shangren captured the paradoxical quality of the candidate's life when he had Chen Zhenhui sing in Taohua shan (Peach blossom fan):

> Hard by the examination halls
> Is the Qinhua pleasure-quarter.
> Young candidates compete
> At once for honors and for softer charms.90

89 Miyazaki, Examination Hell, pp. 57–58.
90 K'ung Shang-jen, The Peach Blossom Fan, p. 63. The gay quarter along the Qinhua River, just inside the southern wall of Nanjing, shimmered at night with lanterns hung from the richly carved balustrades of the courtesans' mansions. The quarter—which Peterson vividly describes—was lively all through
What with nights at the opera, banquets in bordellos, and sightseeing trips to the suburbs, there were many opportunities for scholars from Songjiang or Suzhou to meet more distant fellows from Huai’an or Xuzhou. It was probably on such an occasion, in fact, that Chen Zilong first met the famous Xuzhou painter and poet, Wan Shouqi.91

Wan Shouqi’s great-grandfather had prospered as a doctor, and both Shouqi’s grandfather and father had served as Ming censors. While his father, Wan Chongde, had held office in Yunnan and then later in the capital before being assigned to take charge of provisioning for the Liaodong command, the precocious young boy was taught by a series of tutors. It was claimed that by the age of fifteen sui (fourteen years) he had memorized over 200,000 words, and five years later in 1621 he succeeded in passing the prefectural examinations. Shortly after this honor, his father had asked leave to retire from office in Beijing in order to serve as a censor in Shandong. This was actually part of a plan to get him and his family away from the court during the increasingly tyrannical ascendancy of Wei Zhongxian. However, Shandong did not prove to be a very safe haven. The year 1622 saw a major White Lotus rebellion in southwestern Shandong, and in 1623 Wan Shouqi had left the province for Huai’an in Jiangsu where he lived with his close friend Huang Jiarui.92 Assigned by his father to study with the famed Zhejiang professor Wang Zizhi, Wan continued to master the classics while gaining a growing reputation as a poet and painter.93 In 1628, in fact, he had been among those who together with Zhang Pu were presented as promising young scholars to the newly throned Chongzhen at a special banquet in the Altar of

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91 For a description of the way Chen Zilong passed his time during the 1630 exam period, when he was lodged in a Buddhist hostel in Nanjing, see Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, shang, 12.
92 White Lotus sectarians also tried between 1622 and 1624 to foment uprisings in Jiangnan proper, around Lake Tai. Hamashima Atsutoshi, “Rural Society in Jiangnan during the Ming Dynasty,” p. 14.
93 Sometime during this period Wan Shouqi also married, for he had a daughter in 1625.
Heaven. He was thus already probably known to Chen Zilong by reputation before the examination candidates gathered in Nanjing that year, but this would have provided an opportunity for them to meet in person.  

The 1630 juren examinations were a moment of great triumph for Chen Zilong and his friends in the Restoration Society. Of the Songjiang candidates, only Peng Bin and Chen passed. But altogether—with Wei Zhongxian's followers in disgrace and the examiners reputed to be favorably inclined toward Restoration Society members—thirty Fushe men were passed. These included the leader of the Suzhou demonstration, Yang Tingshu, who was at the very top of the list, as well as Wu Weiye, the young heir from Taicang who had impetuously asked Zhang Pu to be his mentor, and Zhang Pu himself. To cap their victory, Wu Weiye, Yang Tingshu, and Chen Zilong, along with Wan Shouqi who had also passed, threw a dazzling party aboard a boat on the Qinhuai Canal just inside the old city wall of Nanjing. The guest

94 The best account of these years is in Luo Zhenyu, Wan Nianshao xiansheng nianpu. Wan Shouqi (z. Nianshao) left a partially completed autobiography (zizhi) in Wan Shouqi, Xi xi cao tang ji, 3:27–30a. There is also a brief biography in Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 800–801, and a very good survey of his life in Michele Pirazzoli and Hou Ching-lang, "Un Rouleau de Wan Shouqi." However, there is no biography in the Xuzhou gazetteer (Liu Yang, ed., Xuzhou fuzhi), nor in the gazetteer for Nanchang (Wei Yuankuang, comp., Nanchang xianzhi), whence his family originally came.

95 Atwell, "Education to Politics," p. 341.

96 Song et al., Songjiang fuzhi, p. 976 (45:55b).

97 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 230; Wu Weiye, Wushi jilan, tan sou shang, 17a; Dennerline, "Massacre," p. 102; Dennerline, Chia-t'ing, p. 34; Wu Shanjia, Fushe xingshi zhuanyi, 2:15b. The chief examiner for the Nanjing examination was Jiang Yueguang, who had been removed from office by Wei Zhongxian for his Donglin affiliation. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 143.

98 "People here travel more by boat than we in the West, and their boats are more ornate and more commodious than ours. A magistrate's yacht, for instance, will be large enough to accommodate his whole family with as much liberty as they would have at home. These are run at public expense and fitted with kitchen, bedrooms, and sitting room, and are decorated to look more like a rich man's home than like a houseboat. Sometimes they give sumptuous dinners aboard their yachts and make a pleasure cruise of it on the lake or along the river. The interior of such a yacht is usually finished in different
list included Zhang Pu, Shen Shoumin, Huang Zongxi, Peng Bin, and a number of other literati who were delighted to associate themselves with this sparkling group of confident and hopeful provincial graduates. The future indeed seemed theirs.\textsuperscript{99}

In the following year, 1631, the metropolitan examinations were held in Beijing, and the successful provincial candidates consequently travelled north.\textsuperscript{100} Zhang Pu’s trip was a triumphal procession, and as he went from place to place recruiting new members for the Restoration Society, officials in the capital spoke of a “Little Donglin” movement taking form.\textsuperscript{101} When the metropolitan examinations were held, 347 scholars won the jinshi degree. Of these, 62 men—nearly one in five—turned out to be members of the Restoration Society.\textsuperscript{102} The primus was Zhang Pu’s disciple, Wu Weiye, who went on to take a second place in the palace examinations, where the chief examiner was Zhou Yanru.\textsuperscript{103} In fact, the

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 colors with a highly polished bituminous paint, which the Portuguese call Ciara, and the ornamentation is as pleasing to the eye as the various mixtures of incense are to the nose.” Ricci, \textit{Sixteenth Century}, p. 80.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{100} During the late Ming period the cost of going to Beijing to take the metropolitan and palace examinations, including the cost of gifts, averaged about 600 taels. Miyazaki, \textit{Examination Hell}, p. 118; James Peter Geiss, “Peking under the Ming,” p. 198.

\textsuperscript{101} “When Lord Zhang was a first-degree graduate he assumed responsibility for the empire. As he reflected upon the virtuous men who had once been of the Donglin, he strongly wished to imitate them.” Hou Fangyu, \textit{Siyi tang shijii}, 5:7b. The term, “little Donglin,” did not just refer to the size of the Fushe. It also described its social composition. While the membership of the Donglin consisted of higher ranking officials at the ministerial level and prominent gentrymen, most of the Fushe members were lower-ranking local gentry, examination candidates, and students at the shengyuan level. Miyazaki Ichisada, “Zhang Pu to sono jidai,” p. 334.

\textsuperscript{102} Dennerline, “Examination,” \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{103} Lu Shiyi, \textit{Fushe jilüe}, pp. 65–67; Ma Daoyuan, \textit{Wu Meicun nianpu}, p. 22; Wu Weiye, \textit{Wushi jilan, tan sou shang}, p. 17a; Atwell, “Education to Politics,” p. 341; Dennerline, “Examination,” \textit{passim}. Although the palace examinations had been established by Song Taizu (r. 960–976) in the first place to serve as a check on the regular metropolitan examinations and to break up the formation of master-disciple relationships between examiners and candidates, they were by late Ming times just another way of elevating one’s
"Looking at the Examination Results" by Chou Ying (ca. 1490–1552). Scholars gather outside of the Hanlin Academy to find out if they have passed the metropolitan examinations. The lists of successful candidates are suspended above them beyond their reach. Collection of the National Palace Museum, Taiwan, China.

The success of the Restoration Society’s members was so stunning that some deserving Fushe candidates, like Chen Zilong, may not have passed because Zhou Yanru feared accusations of favoritism by his political opponents.  

Now, as Wu Weiye publicly attributed his success to Zhang Pu, the Restoration Society was seeing its members placed in the Hanlin

favorites at the expense of others. It was common practice then for candidates to write out the first fourteen lines of the examination which were formulaic and could be prepared in advance, and then show them to examiners whose favor and patronage they sought. The examiner could easily remember which opening belonged to which candidate, and so might favor that person when the time came to grade the tests. Miyazaki, Examination Hell, pp. 74–75, 93–94.

104 Because Zhou Yanru was a good friend of Wu Weiye’s father, several of Zhou’s enemies memorialized the throne suggesting that there might have been some collusion in the grading. Zhou Yanru therefore felt obliged to
Academy.\textsuperscript{105} Within two years of its founding, therefore, the Fushe was well on its way to occupying a commanding position in the Hanlin-dominated evaluation process of higher civil servants. The result was predictable. Once the Chongzhen Emperor fully realized the implication of this new political development, he began to believe his own suspicions about factionalism all the more correct and accurate. Personnel evaluation had been one of the major weapons used by the Donglin literati in their efforts to dominate the government of his brother. Now, a new “little Donglin” was evidently going to attempt the same strategy. It was consequently more important than ever for the emperor to retain personal control over the highest level of appointments.\textsuperscript{106}

The Chongzhen Emperor had been concerned about his control over the appointment of grand secretaries ever since his accession to the throne.\textsuperscript{107} Shortly after he became emperor, he had tried to

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\textsuperscript{105} Xie, \textit{Danshe yundong}, p. 164. The Hanlin Academy provided chief examiners for the metropolitan examinations, and for the provincial examinations in six of the most important provinces. Out of its ranks came the Minister and Vice-Minister of Rites, who were the overseers of the state examiners. One of the two Ministers of Personnel also had to be a Hanlin graduate; and every promotion in the regular bureaucracy had to be recommended by the Minister of Personnel along with the Director of the Bureau of Investigation, who was also frequently a Hanlin graduate. Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 22–25; Dennerline, \textit{Chia-ting}, pp. 18–23.

\textsuperscript{106} On the Donglin use of personnel evaluations, see Wakeman, “Price of Autonomy,” pp. 50–55.

\textsuperscript{107} Shortly after becoming emperor, Chongzhen introduced a kind of lottery in
institute a system of having his regular ministers submit a name-list of candidates for the post of grand secretary when one of the incumbents was dismissed or retired. At the time, his ministerial favorites were Wen Tiren and Zhou Yanru. To the Chongzhen Emperor’s surprise, when the list of nominees for grand secretary was handed in by his ministers, Zhou Yanru was not even included. Instead, the list was headed by the name of Qian Qianyi, who was clearly the choice of the majority of ministers consulted.

Qian Qianyi (1582–1664) was the most brilliant literary critic and one of the greatest poets of his generation. Born to a Chang-shu family used to maintaining its scholarly reputation, Qian Qianyi had passed the first degree at the age of seventeen sui, had been third on the juren examination list of 1606, and had gone on to take high honors in the metropolitan examinations of 1610. Before his career as a Hanlin compiler of the second class had actually begun, however, Qian had returned home to mourn the death of his father. Known for his love of luxury and connoisseurship, he began to gather around him during the next decade the most talented young poets and painters of the lower Yangzi. He befriended many of the best known artists of the Nanjing school; and, as a

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108 Zhou Yanru had become a favorite of the emperor in 1628 when the ministers had debated the court’s response to Yuan Chonghuan’s request for funds to pay his troops garrisoned in Jinhzhou. The troops had mutinied because of lack of pay. Most of the ministers believed that the emperor should dip into his privy purse to provide the soldiers’ pay. Zhou, who was then Vice-Minister of Rites, sensed that this suggestion displeased the emperor and therefore argued against the notion. This won him the throne’s favor. Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, p. 277; Li, Sanyuan biji, shang, 22a.

109 Xie, Danshe yundong, pp. 74–75.

poet, he joined the lyricists' attack against the Seven Masters of the 16th century.\textsuperscript{111}

In 1620 Qian Qianyi finally returned to government service, and was almost immediately posted to supervise the provincial examinations in Zhejiang. During his tenure of that post in 1621, Qian suffered the embarrassment of reporting an incident that in other circumstances might have merely been taken for a practical joke. In this instance, because it involved the Ministry of Rites which supervised the state examinations, and ultimately the emperor who sanctioned the entire system, it amounted to \textit{lèse majesté}. One of the candidates sitting for the degree cleverly ended each portion of his test with a word that looked perfectly harmless in its context. But if one put all of the end-words from each portion of the examination together, they formed an insulting doggerel. When the acrostic was discovered, the candidate tried to bribe the examiners, but they reported that defamation to their immediate supervisor, Qian Qianyi, who in turn recounted the incident to his superiors in the Ministry of Rites. At the time, Qian Qianyi only received a minor punishment for his entirely blameless part in the affair, and shortly afterwards was assigned to edit the \textit{Veritable Records}.\textsuperscript{112}

In 1625, while Qian Qianyi was serving as a court diarist and supervisor of instruction, the Wei Zhongxian clique began to purge all literati suspected of Donglin sympathies or connections. Qian

\textsuperscript{111} Qian regarded poetry as the spontaneous and direct expression of “native sensibility” (xingling). An admirer of such untrammeled, “style-flowing” (fengliu) poets of the turn of the 16th century as Zhu Hao and Li Yingzhen, Qian Qianyi said: “Poetry is where the heart’s wishes go. One molds his native sensibilities and wanders amidst scenery. Every person says what he wants to say—that’s all there is to it!” Lynn, “Orthodoxy,” p. 239. See also Christian Murck, “Chu Yun-ming and Cultural Commitment in Su-chou,” pp. 87–89.

himself was accused of being a member of the Donglin movement and was forced out of office. Now, in 1628, as the Donglin group maneuvered to get back into power, Qian’s literary background, his membership in the Hanlin, his Jiangnan connections, and his nearly total disengagement from previous clique membership made him a relatively attractive choice for senior grand secretary. After Liu Hongxun was dismissed from the secretariat at the end of 1628, therefore, Qian—who was now back in government service as Vice-Minister of Rites and Chief Supervisor of Instruction—was put forward by Donglin circles, in competition with Wen Tiren and Zhou Yanru.\(^\text{113}\)

Wen Tiren lost no time in finding a pretext to defeat Qian’s candidacy. Searching for a weapon against him, Wen reminded the Chongzhen Emperor that Qian had been accused of taking a bribe in the examination case of 1621, and argued that any candidate for the chief minister’s post had to have an absolutely blameless background. Perhaps more devastating, however, was the charge of factionalism which Wen Tiren leveled against his rival.\(^\text{114}\) Qian Qianyi’s behavior in 1621—Wen Tiren suggested—was part of a general pattern of personal irresponsibility and opportunism, which included the formation of a self-serving clique to promote his candidacy for chief grand secretary.\(^\text{115}\)

Three days later the Chongzhen Emperor called a meeting of his major officials in the Wenhua Palace to discuss a matter of grave

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113 Tan, Guo que, p. 5460; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, p. 277. He was actually nominated on November 28, 1628.

114 One reason for Wen Tiren’s relatively long tenure as the emperor’s favorite was his skill at exploiting the partisan controversies that still hung over the court in the wake of the crisis of the Tianqi years. He presented himself to the Chongzhen Emperor as a minister who would prevent the recurrence of such struggles by seeking out and extirpating any trace of factionalism. In practice, this meant attacking Donglin partisans. Wen, in fact, occasionally ran the risk of being called a partisan himself, especially when he brought former associates of Wei Zhongxian like Huo Weihua back into government service. But he was usually successful in portraying himself to the emperor as an official opposed to the “pure talk” (qinyi) cliques like the Donglin movement and the Restoration Society. Cao Rong, Chongzhen wushi zaixiang zhuan, juan 5; Atwell, “Fu-she,” pp. 26–27.

115 Gu, Ming shi jishi benmo, 66:16.
importance. Apparently none were informed in advance of the topic of discussion, and it came as a surprise when the emperor confronted Qian Qianyi on the spot with Wen Tiren’s accusations. Nevertheless, Qian must have responded vigorously in his own defense, because he managed to arouse Chongzhen’s suspicion of Wen Tiren’s own partisan motives. Yet, when others—including a supervising secretary in the Office of Scrutiny for Personnel—corroborated Qian Qianyi by saying that Wen Tiren was “a small man maligning a gentleman,” their support seemed in the emperor’s eyes to confirm Qian’s partisanship. The very fact that so many officials supported Qian, in other words, made Wen Tiren’s charges of there being a clique appear plausible to Chongzhen. The emperor therefore suddenly turned upon Qian Qianyi, harshly berated him for promoting factionalism, and ordered the Embroidered Uniform Guard to arrest him on the spot and throw him in prison.\(^116\) Like Feng Quan, Qian Qianyi was able to ransom himself out of custody, and though reduced to the status of a commoner with his name expunged from the official records, was free within the month to return to Jiangnan.\(^117\) In contemporaries’ eyes, however, this incident was a shocking example of the new emperor’s arbitrariness. It also represented a major victory for Wen Tiren, who remained securely in office for the next five years, and would become chief grand secretary thereafter.\(^118\)

### Wen Tiren’s Ascendancy

Even though Wen Tiren was nearly unchallengeable during his ascendancy as grand secretary after 1628, there were vigorous divisions of opinion at court over issues involving military policy in

\(^{116}\) Tan, *Guo que*, p. 5461; Li, *Sanyuan biji, fushang*, 4b–5a. The Ming History has a slightly different date for the meeting. Ming shi, p. 3492.

\(^{117}\) Qian was actually reduced in status on January 2, 1629. The student who had been accused of bribing him was, however, jailed. Tan, *Guo que*, p. 5464. See also Ku Chieh-kang, “A Study of Literary Persecution during the Ming,” pp. 291–293; Goodrich and Fang, *Ming Biography*, pp. 484, 1474.

\(^{118}\) Huang Zongxi regarded this incident as having precipitated the formation of the Fushe. Huang Zongxi, *Nanlei wending, qianji*, 5:11.
the northeast. After the successful defense of Ningyuan in 1626, the Liaodong commander-in-chief Yuan Chonghuan had promised the Tianqi Emperor that he would recover all the Ming territories lost to the Manchus within the following five years. In the meantime, however, a new factor had to be taken into consideration. During the first few years after Nurhaci’s annexation of Liaoyang in 1621, a steady stream of Chinese families had migrated to the west bank of the Yalu River where they sought the protection of an increasingly powerful Liaodong warlord named Mao Wenlong.

Mao Wenlong, a swordsman from Hangzhou, had been one of Wang Huazhen’s commanders. In 1621 his brief occupation of Zhenjiang on the Yalu River had been one of the few bright spots in a year of military disasters for the Ming government.\(^{119}\) Even though Nurhaci’s son Amin recaptured Zhenjiang shortly afterwards, Mao Wenlong became a lieutenant-general and established a base on the Korean border around the city of Tieshan (Iron Mountain: Kor., Cholsan), a few kilometers from the sea on a peninsula just east of the Yalu River. There he provided refuge and leadership for other military forces driven out of Liaoyang after it was taken by Nurhaci. His successful invasion of the Manchu homeland of Changbaishan in 1624, with the help of Korean allies, gained him strong backing at court.\(^{120}\) In spite of the opposition of the commander-in-chief of the Shandong garrison at Dengzhou, Mao was supplied with rations from the central government and even with special gifts from the Tianqi Emperor in 1625.\(^{121}\)

119 Erich Hauer, trans., Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo fang-lueh, pp. 111–112 (hereafter cited as Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo).

120 The Koreans were not eager to be drawn into the conflict between the Manchus and the Ming. To keep the Ming forces from looting their littoral, the Koreans secretly supplied Chinese border garrisons with grain, while at the same time trying to fend off Manchu requests for military reinforcements. Wu Han, comp., Chaoxian Li chao shilu zhong de Zhongguo shiliao, pp. 3684–3686. See also Li Guangtao, “Hong Chengzhou bei Ming shimo,” pp. 234–235.

121 Ming shi, pp. 2933–2934; Yao Guangxiao et al., eds., Ming shilu, Tianqi, 56:6, 58:5, 61:2 (hereafter cited as Ming shilu); Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 567. Shen Yourong, commander of the Dengzhou garrison and a veteran officer who had served against Wakō in the southeast and who had led numerous raids on the Liaodong coast, strongly opposed supporting Mao, and
In February, 1627, the Manchus launched their Korean campaign and captured Mao’s base at Tieshan, forcing him to retreat to an island near the mouth of the Yalu River.\(^{122}\) Although this place, which was called Pidao, was rocky and barren, it became an important entrepôt in the Shandong–Liaodong trade, as well as a "doorway" where Liaodong military commanders and their mercenaries could enroll under Mao Wenlong’s Ming banner.\(^{123}\) Mao Wenlong did use the island as a base from which to raid the mainland territories under Manchu occupation, but there was considerable controversy over the military value of these raids. Wen Tiren supported Mao Wenlong’s efforts, but other officials, including Yuan Chonghuan himself, thought them simple adventures and Mao’s military establishment on Pidao an expensive drain on scarce resources.\(^{124}\)

Moreover, Mao Wenlong began to give every appearance of wanting to set himself up as a satrap over the entire maritime region. In addition to opening secret pourparlers with the Manchus, Mao started to draw upon the resources of Dengzhou and Laizhou and to establish connections with military leaders there.\(^{125}\) After

\(^{122}\) *Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo*, p. 153.

\(^{123}\) Zhaolian, *Xiaoting zalu*, 10:29. Pidao, Yuncongdao and Dahuadao together form a group of islands just off the peninsula where Tieshan is located. *Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo*, p. 685.

\(^{124}\) *Ming shilu, Tianqi*, 58:5. Mao Wenlong demanded 200,000 taels a year in military rations. *Tan, Guo que*, p. 5487.

\(^{125}\) Mao Wenlong contacted the Manchus first, mentioning the possibility of peace. In the tenth lunar month of 1628 the khan responded by letter, saying
1627, when Yuan Chonghuan began to strengthen his positions along the military front between the Chinese and the Manchus, Mao's activities jeopardized and compromised the central authority of the regional commander, Yuan himself, and obviously provided Hung Taiji and the Manchus with an opportunity to drive a wedge between the Ming headquarters and its men in the field.\textsuperscript{126}

In order to reassert his own authority over the situation, and with an eye toward negotiations with the Manchus himself, Yuan Chonghuan decided in the summer of 1629 to move against Mao Wenlong personally. After consulting with Qian Longxi, his protector at court, Yuan announced that he was coming to Liaoyang to inspect the frontier forces. Arriving at Ningyuan, he proceeded to Mao Wenlong's redoubt at Shuangdao, bringing with him a contingent of his own naval and land forces, including a corps of archers. Upon arrival, on July 24, he presented 100,000 taels in rations and gold to some of Mao's soldiers.\textsuperscript{127} Then, on the pretext of reviewing his own troops, he lined up his company of archers in front of Mao's headquarters, surrounding the tent and cordoning off Mao from his own men. First he spoke to Mao Wenlong's lieutenants, delivering an oration that moved them to tears. Then, he turned to Mao, changing his tone altogether, and suddenly accosted him verbally, accusing him of abusing the ration system

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\textsuperscript{126} By the fall of 1628 Mao Wenlong was no longer obeying either the viceroy or court's orders. Court officials asked Yuan what he thought of Mao's insubordination. His response was quite curt. "If Wenlong can be used, then use him. If not, then it would not be hard to punish him." Then, late in the winter of 1628–1629, during the second lunar month, Mao Wenlong took his fleet to Penglai, where he and his men were mistaken for Manchus. The seaford did not do anything other than burn incense in a temple, but the incident created a hubbub at court, where officials clearly believed that Mao was getting out of control. Yuan subsequently ordered Mao Wenlong to place himself under the orders of the Ningyuan garrison command, but Mao made it quite clear that he intended to resist this. Feng Sunyi, \textit{Shanzhong wenjian lu}, 5:1b, 3a.

\textsuperscript{127} Mao had 28,000 troops. Yuan had gifts for 3,500 of them. Tan, \textit{Guo que}, p. 5487.
and of subverting the entire military chain of command. Altogether, Yuan Chonghuan detailed twelve different crimes, for which he said he had already impeached Mao Wenlong before the throne. After that, and before Mao Wenlong could answer, Yuan boldly turned to Mao’s own lieutenants and told them that he was willing to test his own sword upon himself: that is, if they did not agree that Mao should be killed, then he would urge them to kill him instead. The lieutenants were confused and hesitant, and while they remained irresolute Yuan ordered one of his own officers to behead Mao Wenlong in front of his tent with a double-edged sword. After the execution was rapidly carried out, Yuan divided Mao Wenlong’s army into four wings, placing the central one under the command of Mao’s adopted son, Mao Chenglu, and attaching them all to his own central banner.  

The murder of Mao Wenlong threw the frontier into turmoil, ultimately releasing many of the general’s freebooters to plunder on their own; it also made Yuan Chonghuan extremely vulnerable to rumors circulating at court that Mao had learned about secret negotiations taking place between Yuan and the Manchus. Then, as Yuan was being told to answer for the execution of Mao Wenlong, military disaster struck. In November, 1629, Hung Taiji moved his troops around Yuan’s Ningyuan defenses, and slipping through the friendly territory of the Tumed and the Karacin Mongols, invaded China through the Xifengkou passes. The raid was swiftly executed, and there was barely time for Yuan Chonghuan to send twenty thousand of his own troops under Zu Dashou’s command rapidly across Hebei from Shanhaiguan to defend the

128 Ibid., p. 5487; Bo Qizong, Dongjiang shimo, p. 337; Ming shi, p. 4092. According to another unofficial account of the incident, a slightly different set of events transpired. After Yuan and his men reached Shuangdao, Mao Wenlong entertained them with banquets for several days in his encampment. Yuan then reciprocated by holding his own banquet, for which he supplied the liquor. While the revel was being held, one of Yuan’s officers and some men who had hidden themselves in the banqueting hall suddenly sprang out of concealment, and beheaded Mao on the spot. Peng, Shanzhong wenjian lu, 5:3b.

129 Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, pp. 205–212; Ren Changzheng, “Qing Taizu Tai-zong shidai Ming Qing he zhan kao,” p. 25.
Ming capital. There, in front of the walls of Peking, after a series of skirmishes, General Zu Dashou succeeded in driving off the Manchu raiders. But in spite of his soldiers’ victory, Yuan Chonghuan was fatally compromised by this humiliating invasion. The Chongzhen Emperor personally blamed him for the disarray of his eastern armies, whose commanders were bickering among themselves over responsibility for defense. Fresh rumors about his contacts with the Manchus circulated, and there was even talk that he had invited them to attack the capital just to underscore his own indispensability to the court. Formally accused of treason on January 13, 1630, for having exceeded his authority by negotiating a truce with the Manchus, Yuan was judged guilty by the emperor. While his sponsors Qian Longxi and Cheng Jiming were sent to jail, Yuan Chonghuan was dismembered in the marketplace and his entire family was either killed or enslaved and driven into exile.

At these and other moments of military failure in Liaodong, ministers like Wen Tiren were apt to use the occasion to their best advantage. The consequence was a curious foreshortening of vision on the part of court ministers. While some genuinely struggled to come up with solutions for the northern frontier defense

130 Anon., Mingwang shulüe, pp. 276–277; Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, p. 215; Tan, Guo que, p. 5505.
131 Tan, Guo que, p. 5507.
132 The rumors actually originated with the Manchus themselves. The collaborator Fan Wencheng got word to the palace eunuchs—whose favor Yuan had never curried—that the Ming commander had secretly arranged a truce with them. The eunuchs in turn circulated the rumor outside the palace among the populace, and the eunuch police agent who was in charge of the case also told the emperor. It was not until scholars later began going through the Manchu Veritable Records that they discovered Yuan Chonghuan was completely innocent of these charges. Zhao, Nianer shi zhaji, p. 667 (juan 31). See also: George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants, p. 323.
133 Ming shi, p. 4093; Tan, Guo que, p. 5508.
134 Yuan was sentenced on January 25 and killed on September 22, 1630. Ming shi, p. 4093; Tan, Guo que, pp. 5543–5544; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, pp. 237, 484, 1475; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 955. Thereafter, officials were extremely reluctant to discuss openly the possibility of peaceful negotiations with the Manchus. Ren, “Qing Taizu Taizong shidai,” p. 49.
problem, others simply saw every military crisis in Liaodong as grist for the mill of partisan politics in the Chongzhen court. Wen Tiren and Zhou Yanru, for example, were uneasy co-occupants of the top ministerial rank after 1630, with Zhou nominally the senior of the two chief grand secretaries. Coveting the higher position, Wen Tiren prepared to move against Zhou. He was quick to use the occasion of an attack by Mao Wenlong’s former freebooters on Dengzhou to cast aspersions on Zhou Yanru’s competence. And when a little later Zhou was charged by the palace eunuch Wang Kun with accepting bribes, Wen Tiren said nothing in his former patron’s defense. Fearful of a court struggle, the emperor reluctantly abandoned his former favorite, and Zhou Yanru was forced to resign on July 25, 1633, leaving Wen Tiren as the senior grand secretary in command of the court.135

The Restoration Society members watched Wen Tiren’s rise with concern. As Wen grew more and more powerful, Zhang Pu became convinced that more support would have to be mustered outside the court. He therefore resigned his office in Beijing and returned to Jiangnan to chair the third annual meeting of the Fushe at Tiger Hill (Huqiu) in the northwestern suburbs of Suzhou in 1632.136 There was still some hope that Zhou Yanru would act in the society’s favor because he was a friend of Wu Weiyue’s father, but that hope was dashed with Zhou’s dismissal the following summer. The year afterwards, 1634, the Fushe lobbied vigorously for the appointment of Zheng Sanjun as Minister of Personnel, but the emperor finally gave the post to Wen Tiren’s choice, Nanjing Minister of Personnel Xie Sheng, who was summoned from the southern capital and appointed to the head of the central ministry on October 22, 1634.137 Within the year, however, and perhaps because Wen Tiren himself was compromised by rebel victories in western China, the emperor also named Wen Zhenmeng, who had

135 Gu Yingtai, Ming shi jishi benmo, 66:18; Tan, Guo que, p. 5612; Ming shi, p. 4097; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, p. 277.
137 He was summoned on September 13. Gu, Ming shi jishi benmo, 66:19; Tan, Guo que, p. 5656; Ming shi, p. 5662.
just served as an assistant metropolitan examiner, one of his grand secretaries.\(^{138}\)

Wen Zhenmeng, who was a descendant of the Song patriot Wen Tianxiang and of the Ming artist Wen Zhengming, was a good friend of the Restoration Society, having privately consulted Zhang Pu before selecting the top candidates in the jinshi examination that year. Wen Zhenmeng was also an aggressive political campaigner, and he immediately began trying to arouse support for a second major attack on Wen Tiren. There was no problem gaining allies in the outer bureaucracy: for nine months now there had been a steady procession of memorials against Wen Tiren, accusing him of either taking bribes or of corrupting politics.\(^{139}\) The difficulty was finding a third party among the grand secretaries whom Chongzhen trusted who would back up charges laid against Wen Tiren. As the Qian Qianyi case demonstrated, unless the emperor could be persuaded by a thoroughly neutral figure that an accusation was true, he was likely to take a chorus of impeachments as evidence that the accusers were in illicit collusion. Wen Zhenmeng tried to enlist the help of the Jiashan notable Qian Shisheng, who had been altogether out of the partisan controversies during his tenure as grand secretary, but who was thought to harbor sympathies for Donglin members and goals.\(^{140}\) Four months after taking office, therefore, Wen Zhenmeng publicly accused Wen Tiren of colluding with Xie Sheng in the appointment of higher officials, and in front of the emperor, he turned to Qian Shisheng for support. But Qian Shisheng refused to confirm the charges. The emperor consequently found Wen Zhenmeng guilty of partisanship and dismissed him from office.\(^{141}\) That was not the end of the Wen Zhenmeng affair, however. After Wen’s dismissal, the former Donglin leader Zheng Man openly criticized the government for


\(^{139}\) Tan, *Guo que*, pp. 5681, 5685, 5688, 5711.

\(^{140}\) Okuzaki Hiroshi, *Chōgoku kyōshin jinushi no kenkyū*, p. 577.

\(^{141}\) Wen was dismissed on December 15, 1635. Tan, *Guo que*, p. 5718. But see also: *Ming shi*, p. 4099.
purging a righteous minister. To Chongzhen this was once more evidence that factionalism was rife, and he decided to make an example of Zheng Man, who was seized by the secret police and tortured to death. By way of protest, the philosopher Huang Daozhou, who was Zheng Man’s classmate, resigned his post and returned home to Fujian.142

Qian Shisheng may have been unwilling to support Wen Zhen-meng’s attack on Wen Tiren because he viewed it as a political quarrel in which he had no stake. When it came to defending the southern literati’s economic interests, however, Qian was willing to play a much more active role. Six months after the Wen Zhen-meng affair, a military shengyuan named Li Jin proposed that the wealthy households of Jiangnan be assessed extra taxes to cover the exceptional military costs incurred in the simultaneous campaigns against the rebel forces of Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong within China, and against the Manchu armies outside the Great Wall.143 Li Jin’s proposal to tax the gentry of Jiangnan was vigorously debated at court on May 7, 1636, but in the end Grand Secretary Qian Shisheng managed to persuade Chongzhen that it would be a mistake to assess the one remaining peaceful enclave in the empire because it would simply incite rebellion there and lose the dynasty the support of the gentry in that area.144 Li Jin’s suggestion was turned down, and the extra assessments were levied instead on the wealthy households of Shandong and Henan. Northern landlords, then, had to bear the additional financial burden in place of the southern gentry.145

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142 Xie, Dangshe yundong, pp. 80–84; Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 92, 102–104, 149–150; idem, Chia-ting, pp. 50–51; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, pp. 1467–1468; Atwell, “Education to Politics,” p. 352.
143 Tan, Guo que, p. 5736. Li Jin presented his proposal on May 6, 1636. See also: Anon., Mingwang shulüe.
144 Gu, Ming shi jishi benmo, 72:40.
145 Shen Yiji, ed., Zhejiang tongzhi, p. 2689 (158:34b); Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, p. 238. In 1637 Yang Sichang asked that taxes be increased by 2,800,000 taels. (In 1638, there were also proposals to tax real estate rents—another measure that would have fallen heaviest on northern landlords—but the emperor turned this suggestion down.) Thus, the tax burden in the north grew steadily heavier, especially in poorer provinces like Henan.
The resentment of financially stricken northerners against the high-living literati of the south may have played some part in the impeachments that were subsequently brought against Qian Qianyi and the Restoration Society leaders, Zhang Pu and Zhang Cai, in March 1637. Mostly, however, the impeachments were instigated by Wen Tiren, who was determined to press his advantage against his political opponents by undermining their reputation for political probity. Wen secretly encouraged two Suzhou literati, Zhang Hanru and Lu Wensheng, to bring charges of personal corruption against Qian Qianyi, who was accused of condoning the nefarious activities of his retainers in Changshu; and against the two Zhangs, who were charged with personal graft and corruption, as well as with “throwing the empire into chaos” by undermining the authority of the central government over Jiangnan.146 These charges may have had some substance, but Wen Tiren for once overstepped his usual cautious bounds. When Qian Qianyi went to the chief palace eunuch, Cao Huachun, for protection, Wen Tiren (who still feigned personal disinterest in the matter) met privately with the emperor to warn him that Qian and Cao had formed a cabal.147 Chongzhen went ahead and ordered Qian Qianyi out of office on June 16, 1637, but at the same time he secretly called his chief eunuch and disclosed the conspiracy charges against him, confidentially telling him that his accuser was the chief grand secretary, Wen Tiren.148 Cao Huachun promptly responded that Wen Tiren had all along been part of the plot to

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In 1640, the magistrate of one district in Huaiqing prefecture reported that the regular tax quota of 90,000 piculs (approximately 9,630,000 liters) had been increased by more than one-fourth, amounting to 24,000 taels, in order to cover the new expenses. Li, *Sanyuan biji, shang*, 2a; R. V. Des Forges, “Rebellion in the Central Plain,” p. 5; Zhao, *Nianer shi zhaji*, p. 750 (juan 36).


147 Cao was sympathetic to Qian Qianyi because the poet had written an eloquent epitaph for Cao’s patron, the eunuch Wang An. S. K. Lao, “The Split within the Tunglin Movement and Its Consequences,” pp. 30–32; Goodrich and Fang, *Ming Biography*, pp. 1475–1476.

148 Qian Qianyi was jailed at this point. Chen Zilong, who was in Beijing to take
destroy Qian Qianyi’s reputation, having secretly incited Zhang Hanru to bring charges in the first place. The emperor was astonished, then outraged: the very minister who had so frequently expressed alarm about the existence of conspiracies was now engaged in one of his own. Ordering Zhang Hanru confined to a cangue until dead, the emperor demanded Wen Tiren’s resignation. The emperor’s confidant for nearly ten years, Wen Tiren was allowed to retire ignominiously on August 1, 1637, and he died the following year without ever regaining his sovereign’s trust.\(^{149}\)

### The Fundamentalists and Military Policy Disputes

Wen Tiren’s disgrace gave the fundamentalists an opportunity to recover some momentum of their own. Even before he fell, there was a fresh flourishing of literary societies in the south. In 1636 the Xuzhou poet Wan Shouqi began a new society in Nanjing, which included Shen Shoumin from the old Nanshe and Li Wen from the Jishe, as well as some younger men like Chen Mingxia and Fang Yizhi, who were preparing for the higher examinations.\(^{150}\) After the Fushe was cleared of the charges against it, that kind of activity quickened even more, and members of the Restoration Society continued to dominate the examination lists. Of the 301 jinshi awarded

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150 Luo Zhenyu, *Wan Nianshao xiansheng nianpu, wanpu* 5a. Chen Zilong and Fang Yizhi, scion of the famous Tongcheng Fangs, met in 1631, when both men found their views on poetry to be nearly identical. Chen praised Li Wen to Fang, who went out of his way to call on Li in Songjiang. The first night together, despite Fang’s fatigue, both men stayed up late excitedly discussing Qu Yuan’s *Li sao*. Peterson, *Bitter Gourd*, p. 29. Chen Zilong took and failed the 1634 *jinshi* examinations. Concerned about his future, he was now resolutely turning guests away from his home in order to concentrate on his studies. Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-lung,” p. 72.
in 1637, 37 were given to members of the Fushe.\footnote{151} Among them was Chen Zilong, who passed under the aegis of Huang Daozhou, the examiner who read his paper first.\footnote{152}

Most of the activity of the literary clubs centered upon Nanjing, which was rapidly becoming a major refuge for rural gentry families fleeing the strife of their native districts.\footnote{153} Life went on there, behind Nanjing’s huge and comforting walls, as though nothing would ever be allowed to intrude upon the pleasures of the privileged.\footnote{154} The poet Mao Xiang—who was one of the “Four Lords”

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\footnote{151}{Atwell, “Education to Politics,” p. 349.}
\footnote{152}{After his success, Chen Zilong was about to take up a judgeship in Guangdong when news came of his stepmother’s death. He collapsed in shock. Mourning regulations stipulated retirement until 1640. He spent the hiatus editing the \textit{Collection of Writings on Ming Statecraft} and Xu Guangqi’s \textit{Complete Book of Agricultural Science (Nongzheng quanshu)} together with Xu Fuyuan. By 1639 he had decided not to pursue an official career, partly because his “teacher,” Huang Daozhou, had been dismissed in 1638 after a struggle with Yang Sichang. However, Chen’s grandmother prevailed upon him to continue to serve the empire, and he left for Beijing in the spring of 1640. Upon arriving, he learned of the arrest of Huang and promptly tried to organize public support for him, only to be warned that his attempt might backfire. In the summer he was appointed prefectural judge of Shaoxing, and in September he left for Zhejiang. Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-lung,” pp. 74–75, 81–82, 90–91, 99–102. See also Li, \textit{Sanyuan biji, shang}, 22a.}
\footnote{153}{During the 1620s, members of the upper classes began bringing their families into Nanjing. As the Manchu raids continued, northerners arrived from Shandong and Beizhili. Then, with the Miao uprisings, officials came from Yunnan and Guizhou. Finally, during the 1630s, popular uprisings in districts around the Nanjing metropolitan area caused gentry members to send their families into the southern capital. After the 1634 uprising in Tongcheng, for instance, nine out of ten rich families of that area came to Nanjing to join other wealthy refugees from Henan and Huguang. Peterson, \textit{Bitter Gourd}, pp. 37–48.}
\footnote{154}{Nanjing’s inner wall was over 12 kilometers around, and ranged in height from 6 to 20 meters, and in width between 8 and 12 meters. It had 12 gates covered with iron plates and fortified with cannon. There was also an outer wall, built in 1390, which was 25 kilometers in circumference and had 15 gates. “The natives here,” Father Ricci wrote, “tell a story of two men who started from opposite sides of the city riding on horses toward each other, and it took a whole day before they came together.” Ricci, \textit{Sixteenth Century}, p. 269. See also Edward L. Farmer, \textit{Early Ming Government}, p. 56.}
(Si gongzi) of the lower Yangzi along with Fang Yizhi, Hou Fangyu, and Chen Zhenhui—has left an account of a Mid-Autumn Festival banquet in 1642 when he was reunited with his concubine after she had braved river bandits in order to reach the safety of Nanjing.\(^{155}\)

At Nanjing on the day of the Mid-Autumn Festival, the fellows of our literary society from various parts of the country . . . invited us to a banquet which was spread in a pavilion at Peachleaf Ferry (Taoye shuige). Among those present were Madame Gu of Meilou and Madame Li of Hanxiuzhai, my concubine’s near relatives, who had come to offer their congratulations upon her success in uniting with me. On that day the play [by Ruan Dacheng] entitled The Swallow Letter (Yanzijian) was newly performed, full of sweet and loving pathos, and when it came to the most touching point describing the separation and reunion of the hero and the heroine, my concubine wept and so did Madame Gu and Madame Li. The meeting of a crowd of scholars and beauties amongst towers and pavilions amid a scene of smoke and water and in the bright moonlight, with melodious dramatic songs cheering up one’s senses, was something to be remembered forever.\(^{156}\)

Mao Xiang’s concubine, Dong Xiaowan, whom he first met in 1639 when he went up to Nanjing to take the provincial examinations, was one of the most accomplished courtesans of the Qinhuai quarter, trained from the age of seven by her mother in music and drama, needlework and cuisine, poetry and calligraphy. She

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155 Mao Xiang’s father and grandfather were both high officials. The family, which may have been of Mongol origin, had lived in Rugao since the end of the Yuan dynasty. A precocious poet, Mao Xiang became at the age of 14 a friend and protégé of the painter Dong Qichang. He was one of the most handsome young men in Nanjing, and was later called by the courtesans who coveted him, “The Handsome Shadow of Donghai” (Donghai xiuying). Zhang Lüxiang, Chongding Yangyuan xiansheng quanji, pp. 134–135; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 566.

156 Mao P’i-chiang, The Reminiscences of Tung Hsiao-wan, pp. 31–32. The original Chinese title of this work is Ying mei an yiyu (Reminiscences of the convent of shadowy plum blossoms), written by Mao in memory of his concubine, Dong Xiaowan. Zhang Lüxiang, Chongding Yangyuan, xiii–xiv.
was also one of the most beautiful women in China, so contemporaries claimed, and when Mao Xiang reached the southern capital, Fang Yizhi tried to introduce his handsome friend to her. But Dong Xiaowan, tired of the life of a courtesan and longing to marry an accomplished gentleman, had left Qinhuaï to return to Suzhou with her mother. Mao Xiang went to see her there but then left, and for a brief period was infatuated with another famous beauty, Chen Yuanyuan, who later became the concubine of the warlord Wu Sangui. It would be several years before the Suzhou courtesan became his wife.

One of the reasons Mao Xiang left Nanjing and Suzhou to return to his home in Rugao was that he was constantly being pestered by other literati who wanted him to join their literary circles. There was keen competition then among the various literary societies for new members, and the measure of a man's influence was the size of his coterie. One of the literati most in search of influence then was Ruan Dacheng, the wealthy Anhui playwright who had been forced into retirement in 1629 because of his earlier connections with Wei Zhongxian. When his hometown of Huaining had been overrun by mounted bandits, Ruan Dacheng had moved to Nanjing where he sought to recover his political reputation by hiring military experts to brief him on frontier affairs, and to redeem his standing among literati by forming a literary club of his own. Many of the young students visiting Nanjing were courted by Ruan, who spared no expense to entertain them lavishly. Associates of the Restoration Society were dismayed by Ruan's success. Especially affected were the relatives of men who

157 Zhang, Chongding Yangyuan, pp. 133–134; Mao P'î-chiang, Reminiscences of Tung, p. 7.
158 Zhang, Chongding Yangyuan, pp. 135–137.
159 Mao Xiang described Chen Yuanyuan, who also wanted to become his concubine, in this way: "Nonchalant but charming, she walked with a graceful gait as if wafted by the wind. Dressed in pepper silk, she frequently turned around to look at her flowing skirt. Her elegant appearance closely resembled that of a lone phoenix fluttering behind a screen of mist." Mao, Reminiscences of Tung, pp. 10–11.
160 Zhang, Chongding Yangyuan, p. 139.
had been purged by Wei Zhongxian. Chen Zhenhui was such a person. His father, Chen Yuting, had been an outspoken Donglin member who was driven from office in 1624. The son was highly regarded in Jiangnan, and along with the other "four lords," commanded great respect as a writer and thinker.161

Chen Zhenhui was also intimately connected with the Zhou family of Jintan. His son, Chen Weimei, was married to the daughter of Zhou Biao—half-brother of the Fushe activist Zhou Zhong. Zhou Biao was an eminent Jiangnan literatus, having passed first in the provincial examinations of 1627. He went on to get his jinshi degree in 1628 and became a bureau secretary in the Ministry of Rites, just as the Wei Zhongxian clique was being purged and a new emperor was on the throne. Two of Zhou Biao's uncles were entered on the rolls of the ni'an as henchmen of the eunuch, and it may have been his shame over this familial iniquity that led Zhou Biao to commit an act that earned him national fame but cost him his gentry status. Zhou had the temerity to tell the Chongzhen Emperor that he should not irrationally appoint his own favorites to high ministerial rank. The emperor was angered by this impertinence and had Zhou Biao demeaned to commoner status. As a consequence, Zhou immediately gained a reputation for forthrightness and frankness, and when his relative-in-law, Chen Zhenhui, began to come together with other Donglin-related literati against Ruan Dacheng, Zhou Biao took a leading role.162

The result was the drafting of a special "Proclamation to Guard against Disorder in the Subordinate Capital" (Liu du fang luan gongjie). The proclamation, which was drawn up in 1638, was a searing denunciation of Ruan Dacheng, who was accused of engaging in bribery, extortion, influence peddling, and improper sexual relations with courtesans. When it appeared as an open letter to the emperor in 1639, the manifesto was signed by 140 literati, including such admired figures as Huang Zongxi, Wu Yingji, Yang Tingshu (leader of the Suzhou demonstrations in 1626), and

161 Peterson, Bitter Gourd, p. 29.
162 Xu Zi, Xiaotian jizhuan, p. 206.
Gu Gao (nephew of Gu Xiancheng, co-founder of the Donglin Academy), whose name headed the list.\(^{163}\) Ruan Dacheng was so humiliated by this public display of his failings that he tried to buy up all of the available copies of the Nanjing manifesto. Failing that, he fled the southern capital to nurse his resentment in hiding elsewhere.\(^{164}\)

The “Little Donglin” faction was much stronger in Nanjing than at court, where the emperor’s next choice for senior grand secretary was a rather colorless protégé of Wen Tiren named Xue Guoguan.\(^{165}\) Xue, like Wen Tiren, devoted much of his energy to convincing the Chongzhen Emperor that suggestions of ways to improve the deteriorating military situation both within and without the country were simply manifestations of partisanship and not real remedies at all. Yet the most reasonable of such proposals was put forward by an official who was not affiliated with any particular clique and was not even a member of the Hanlin network, which the Restoration Society now dominated. Yang Sichang, Minister of War, had in 1636 been appointed head of the military campaign to suppress Li Zicheng’s rebel armies.\(^{166}\) Now, in the spirit of change that accompanied Wen Tiren’s resignation, he an-

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163 Wen Ruilin, *Nanjiang yishi*, pp. 388–389; Zha Jizuo, *Guo shou lu*, p. 70; *Ming shi*, p. 2767. An excellent calligrapher and *guwen* poet, Gu Gao was a good friend of Yang Tingshu, and had participated in the 1626 Suzhou demonstrations. By lending his name to the denunciation, Gu brought all of the prestige and fame of Wuxi’s Donglin scholars into the fray.


166 Yang, the son of General Yang Hao, who had been so badly defeated in Liaodong in 1619, has been described as a finicky military commander who insisted on remaining in complete control of tactical decisions at the expense of strategic opportunities. Field commanders were frightened to act without his permission, and this sometimes meant not acting at all. Chan, “Decline and Fall,” pp. 110–111.
nounced that the dynasty could not afford to fight on two fronts simultaneously. Citing the appearance of a comet and other curious astronomical phenomena in the heavens, Yang urged the emperor on June 18, 1638, to open negotiations with the Manchus at once, being prepared to cede territory and establish trade relations with them in order to permit the dynasty’s armies to concentrate entirely on fighting the domestic rebels.¹⁶⁷

Yang Sichang was immediately branded an appeaser by the fundamentalists.¹⁶⁸ Still nostalgic for the irredentist strategy that Yuan Chonghuan represented, those who considered themselves “righteous literati” condemned Yang’s proposals nearly unanimously as a betrayal of the dynasty’s resolve to recover the far north. The opposition to negotiations was so intense that the emperor simply dared not adopt Yang’s new policy.¹⁶⁹

The fundamentalists’ bellicoseness was untimely. During the latter months of 1638, Hung Taiji’s armies poured past the Great Wall and raided deep into the Central Plain.¹⁷⁰ That winter they pillaged numerous cities, including Ji’nan and Tianjin; and just before they withdrew back into the northeast in March, 1639, the military governor at Luan in Anhui was prepared to move his ar-

167 Tan, Guo que, pp. 5808–5809; Gu, Ming shi jishi benmo, 72:44–45; Ming shi, p. 2857; Lo Jung-pang, “Policy Formulation and Decision Making on Issues Respecting Peace and War,” p. 68.
168 Tan, Guo que, p. 5810. The term “fundamentalists” seems an appropriate designation for the self-styled “righteous literati” who called, in the name of the Donglin or Fushe, for a revival of ancient learning (xìngfù gùxué) and a restoration of basic moral values in government. See Atwell, “Education to Politics,” pp. 345–346.
169 Lo, “Policy Formulation,” p. 69. The emperor believed that the primary enemy was the rebels, who were a “visceral disease,” whereas the Manchus were merely a “skin rash.” He told Yang Sichang, who frequently compared the Manchus to the Xiongnu and the Jin: “What’s the point in discussing the Han, Tang and Song? All that we have to do right now is to suppress the bandits, and then use all of our forces to control the enemy [outside the Great Wall]. What’s so hard about that?” Gu Cheng, “Lun Qingchu shenhui mao-dun,” p. 139.
170 Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, pp. 471–476; Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, shang, 8a.
mies north to defend the capital. That same man, Governor Shi Kefa, wrote to his wife at the time:

In the north, some fifty to seventy cities were destroyed by the invaders; countless people were killed. Just a few days ago all the officials and their family members in the capital city of Shandong province, Ji’nan, were slaughtered. It was really pitiful. When you see something like that, you realize that everything is ruled by fate.

How strange, though not inexplicable then, was the oblivion with which the Xuzhou painter Wan Shouqi and his companions gathered together in Beijing that same summer to compile yet another anthology of verse. Barely three months after the Manchu invasion, he and his comrades held their poetic celebrations in the capital apparently free of care.

The very best of them came from all over, joining together at the capital; Jiang Gai from Donghai, Qian Bangfan from Runzhou, Cheng Sui from Xin’an, and Wan Shouqi from Pengcheng, all gathered for this task. The worthies assembled late at night as the moon’s charioteer drove slowly overhead from the south, and they lifted their wine cups, composing poems.

Li Wen was in Beijing by then, too, and he would have known much more about the dangerous enemies across the Great Wall because his father, Li Fengshen, had just returned from exile there. But he too seemed heedless of the threat and complained of the

171 Shortly after the Manchus reached Ji’nan, pestilence—probably smallpox—broke out in a neighboring district in Shandong. Whether the Manchus brought the illness with them, or turned back because of it, is not known. Helen Dunstan, “The Late Ming Epidemics,” pp. 27–28.
173 Wan, Xi xi cao tang ji, 3:2b–3a.
174 Li Huan, ed., Guochao qixian leizheng, 139:17a.
routine of being at court and of his homesickness for the southland that he had left behind. In a poem to his friend Song Zhengyu in Jiangnan, Li Wen wrote:

A dwelling in the capital is not my home,
Nor is Yanyun my native place.
Caps and carriages do not suit me,
And paying visits is not my style.
Distant roads lie between me and my friend,
And my earlier life dissipates like a dream,
A phantasy dissolved in a lucid pool.\(^{175}\)

Though literati outside the government at times seemed heedless of the dangers facing the empire, the “caps and carriages” responsible for Ming defenses were by then faced with the impossible task of waging two military campaigns at once.\(^{176}\) The Minister of War, Yang Sichang, urged the emperor to consider raising taxes again, suggesting that more taxes in kind be commuted into money. Grand Secretary Xue Guoguan resisted this proposal, but the Chongzhen Emperor saw no alternative to a temporary tax increase.

If we do not assemble troops it is impossible to pacify the bandits, and if we do not raise taxes it is impossible to provision the troops. I am constrained to follow the court’s decision [to raise taxes], and will temporarily burden the people for one year. But let this be proclaimed to the empire so that the people may know: Our intention is only to spare them from harm.\(^{177}\)

Xue Guoguan’s proposal, on the other hand, was to try to cut

\(^{175}\) Li, Chen, and Song, *Yunxian sanzi xin shi hegao*, 2:16a. Yanyun means Beizhili; “caps and carriages” refer to high officials.

\(^{176}\) Geiss, “Peking under the Ming,” p. 20.

\(^{177}\) Xie, *Dangshe yundong*, pp. 84–85. See also Anon., *Mingwang shuluè*. To order taxes raised did not necessarily mean that revenues would increase immediately. At this time, Liu Zongzhou reported that in his own native district of Shanyin (Zhejiang), land taxes were collected two years ahead of time, and they were delivered to Beijing one year behind schedule. Ray Huang, “Fiscal Administration,” p. 126.
needless waste from the government's regular budget. Imperial sinecures and royal allowances were among the most glaring extravagances: surely the emperor had to recognize that the military emergency dictated ruthlessness where his own relatives were concerned. One of the most notorious cases concerned Li Guorui, who was the empress-dowager's grandnephew, and whose allowances came to a total of 400,000 taels. When the emperor took away Li Guorui's title and emoluments, however, the spendthrift sickened and died. Not only did the empress become deeply upset, but other members of the royal family fell ill, and there were even charges that the imperial geomancy had been disturbed. Frightened by this incident, the emperor enfeoffed Li Guorui's seventeen-year-old heir in his father's place and angrily turned against Xue Guoguan. Soon afterwards, in 1641, the post of senior grand secretary again fell vacant.178

Here was the opportunity for which the Restoration Society and its friends had long been waiting. Zhou Yanru, the fundamentalists' earlier hope, now stood waiting in the wings—still regarded with fondness by the emperor despite his earlier disgrace. Zhou was contacted by members of the Restoration Society who promised their support in exchange for his agreement both to curtail the activities of the eunuchs and secret police, and to nominate some of the leading figures among the Fushe members for important positions.179 Although their intentions may have been "righteous," the fundamentalists' means of getting Zhou Yanru into office were not above reproach. Paying out more than 60,000 taels of silver in bribes, the group had the eunuch Cao Huachun bring Zhou Yanru's name before the emperor.180 On October 15, 1641, his appointment as senior grand secretary was confirmed, and Zhou was told by his monarch that he now had a mandate to "get the empire to obey him."181

178 Ming shi, pp. 2869, 3367–3368. The heir was enfeoffed on March 18, 1641. Tan, Guo que, p. 5887.
180 Gu Yingtai, Ming shi jishi benmo, 66:22; Tan, Guo que, p. 5895.
181 Anon., Mingwang shulüe, p. 278. See also Tan, Guo que, p. 5906; Ming shi,
The Triumph and Defeat of Zhou Yanru

In the eyes of most people, Zhou’s appointment represented the triumph of the “Jiangnan clique.”

Although there was still a bloc of ministers from provinces “north of the river” (jiangbei) who looked to Grand Secretary Wu Sheng for protection, an entire contingent of former grand secretaries from Shandong (Zhang Sizhi, Fan Fucui, and eventually Xie Sheng) had been dropped from office. The ministerial shakeup of 1641, therefore, represented a major change in the higher bureaucracy: the Secretariat (Neige) and the ministries were coming under the domination of southerners. Now, in the twilight years of the dynasty, as more and more of the financial burden was falling on the gentry “north of the river,” less and less of the empire’s administrative power remained directly in their hands.

Zhou Yanru was not, however, in complete alignment with the Fushe group. When the military governorship (zongdu) of Fengyang in Anhui had to be filled, for example, he accepted the recommendation made by the Restoration Society’s bitter enemy, Ruan Dacheng, and named Ma Shiying, a financial expert from Guizhou who had been exiled to the frontier for peculation, to the post. And when the need was felt to appoint someone to take

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182 The 1641 shakeup also initiated a final period of constant office shuffling by the Chongzhen Emperor. Between now and the fall of Peking in April, 1644, there would be 18 different members of the Grand Secretariat, and 18 different ministers of state, with each man averaging less than one year in his position. Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-lung,” p. 124.

183 In August, 1642, for instance, Zhou Yanru thwarted the appointment of Zhang Pu and Zhang Cai to high positions. On that occasion, the emperor inquired after them and Huang Daozhou. Zhou Yanru told Chongzhen that the three men were excellent scholars, but too bookish as well as “biased” (pian). Li, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 5b-6a.

184 Ruan Dacheng sent a gift of 10,000 ounces of gold to Zhou to try to get reinstated himself. He also recommended Ma Shiying for office. Zhou Yanru felt that appointment would be too offensive to the Chongzhen Emperor, and so he only sent Ma’s name forward. Ma Shiying was not actually
charge of military tax levies, Zhou brought forth the name of Feng Quan, although the ensuing hue and cry from the “Little Donglin” forced him later to drop the recommendation. Yet Zhou Yanru did honor his agreement to try to bring some of the officials admired by the Restoration Society back into power. He nominated a number of literati they esteemed, including Liu Zongzhou, Fan Jingwen, Zheng Sanjun, Huang Daozhou, Zhang Guowei, Li Banghua and Ni Yuanlu. Not all of these men were given posts, but Zhang Pu—who was to fall mortally ill and die by the end of that year—had the consolation of seeing a number of courageous censors, silenced under Xue Guoguan’s grand secretaryship, back in office again.

The 1642 meeting of the Restoration Society was once again held at Tiger Hill, where the new chairman (zhumeng) was the poet Li Wen. A number of brilliant young scholars were present, including Chen Mingxia and Song Zhisheng, who would take first place in the metropolitan and palace examinations of 1643. Mao Xiang may also have been at this meeting, though his thoughts were not so much on the concerns of the empire as they were on his own love affairs. He had lost the beautiful Chen Yuanyuan—truly “a woman lovely enough to cause the fall of a city or kingdom” (qing cheng qing guo)—to an imperial kinsman (who in turn passed her on to General Wu Sangui); but quite by chance he had once again met the equally lovely Dong Xiaowan, who wanted to become his concubine. She was so deeply in debt to moneylenders in Suzhou, where her father had used her name to

appointed to the position of Supreme Coordinator of Fengyang until Gao Douguang lost the post and was arrested after having ceded five towns to the rebels. Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-ťa et le contexte politique et social de la Chine au moment de l’invasion mandchoue,” p. 54; Tan, Guo que, p. 5926.

186 Er chen zhuan, 9:28–29a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 240–241. Feng had played an important role in the defense of his native city, Zhuozhou, when the Manchus attacked it in 1638. His appointment would have been a concession to the Beizhili and Shandong landowners now hard pressed by extra taxation.

187 Gu Yingtai, Ming shi jishi benmo, 66:23.

188 Du Dengchun, Sheshi shimo, 11b–12a; Wu Shanjia, Fushe xingshi zhuan-lüe, 2:3a.
borrow, that Mao’s only hope of buying her freedom was to pass the provincial examinations. When he failed the Nanjing exams yet one more time in 1642, all seemed lost. The creditors in Suzhou, who had themselves been hoping for Mao to succeed so that they could recover their loans, became clamorous, and the couple might have gotten into serious legal trouble had news of their plight not reached Qian Qianyi, who admired Mao’s talent and enjoyed Dong’s cleverness. Even more important, Qian also felt a strong personal identification with Mao Xiang precisely because of the couple’s intense romance.189

Though a much older man, Qian Qianyi had also recently fallen in love with a courtesan: the famous poet and musician Liu Shi.190 Miss Liu had begun her own public life as an entertainer in Wujiang, and soon her aesthetic accomplishments were known throughout the empire. Bent upon marrying a star as bright as her own, Liu Shi had offered herself to the Songjiang luminary Chen Zilong. Chen, resisting temptation, sternly refused even to see her. She turned then to Qian Qianyi, whose concubine she became in 1641. Thereafter, much of his life focused on her. He built her a private library, and made her his official consort; together, the two of them seemed to embody to contemporaries what Qian’s poetic heir, Wang Shizhen, later called a “resonance of the soul” (shen yun).191

Deeply sympathizing with Dong Xiaowan, Qian Qianyi decided to help her himself. He went to Suzhou, paid off every one of her creditors, and redeemed bills that added up to a pile nearly one foot high. Then, after one of Mao Xiang’s students had purchased her freedom, Qian gave Dong a farewell banquet at the foot of Tiger Hill and sent her on by boat to Rugao where she for-

189 Zhang Lüxiang, Chongding Yangyuan, pp. 144–151.
190 Miss Liu’s family name was Yang; her ming, Ai (Love); and her zi, Miwu (Angelica Flower). She was also known as Madame Hedong.
mally entered the Mao household and became his concubine.\textsuperscript{192} Thereafter she was always at Mao's side, writing down the poet's verses, gathering materials from historical works for him to read, judging paintings and calligraphy, appraising stone seals and antique bronzes, playing his favorite songs on the various musical instruments she had mastered, or simply joining him in his frequent drinking bouts.\textsuperscript{193}

The silvery waves of the Changjiang hurried by as if it were the landscape scurrying forward beneath our winecups. My concubine drank quickly out of a big goblet, and we had hard and fast rules for our drinking bout. The singing girls attending the feast were all the worse for liquor and went reeling away, while she who used to be quiet and gentle was moved to such high exhilaration that day as I had seldom seen before.\textsuperscript{194}

Like Qian Qianyi and Liu Shi, Mao and his beloved were lambencies in a brilliant, shimmering age that was slowly losing its glow.

In Beijing, rumors spread that Grand Secretary Zhou Yanru had ordered workmen to build in front of his mansion a little kiosk designed to look like a jewelry store. In it sat his orderly, Dong Tingxian, masquerading as the jeweler, but there really to receive bribes from avid office seekers and merchants bidding among themselves for lucrative state contracts.\textsuperscript{195} Accusations of bribery on this scale did not endear Zhou Yanru to the Chongzhen Emperor, though he did appreciate his grand secretary's uncanny knack for anticipating the imperial will, however subtly it was indicated.\textsuperscript{196} Already the emperor was beginning to lay the blame for the failings of his regime upon his ministers, and Zhou was likely to be assigned the major share of the responsibility. At the court audience on New Year's Day, 1642, the emperor told Zhou Yanru and the assembled ministers: "The sage emperors of antiquity

\textsuperscript{192} Mao, \textit{Reminiscences of Tung}, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{193} Zhang Lüxiang, \textit{Chongding Yangyuan}, pp. 151–152.
\textsuperscript{194} Mao, \textit{Reminiscences of Tung}, p. 33. This was in the 9th lunar month, 1642.
\textsuperscript{195} Xie, \textit{Dangshe yundong}, p. 88; Li, \textit{Sanyuan biji, fushang}, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{196} Anon., \textit{Mingwang shulüe}, p. 276.
A scholar dresses his courtesan after they have made love. Note the similarity in male and female hair styles. The quilt on the bed is decorated with a Buddhist swastika pattern. From the Fengliu juechang ("Summum elegantium"), a set of prints based upon the erotic paintings of Tang Yin (1470–1524), in R. H. van Gulik, Erotic Colour Prints of the Ming Period, with an Essay on Chinese Sex Life from the Han to the Ch'ing Dynasty, B.C. 206–A.D. 1664 (Tokyo: privately published, 1951), 1:180. Reproduced through the courtesy of the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California.
were enlightened monarchs. They all venerated the way of the scholars. You officials are my scholars. If the ancestral altars are to be preserved in dignity, then it depends upon you gentlemen.”

However, it was not the accusations of corruption alone that in the end led to Zhou’s downfall and death. Rather, two other acts brought his demise: his attacks on the eunuchs, and his bungling of military affairs.

During the eight years since 1634, and partly because of his growing distrust of his ministers, the Chongzhen Emperor had come to rely more and more upon the inner court eunuchs for intelligence and advice. Although he had restricted their activities somewhat in 1640, the emperor still listened carefully to their opinions and trusted them considerably as confidential agents of the throne. In 1642, partly in response to his agreement with the fundamentalists, Grand Secretary Zhou Yanru took steps to curtail the powers of the Eastern Depot (Dong chang) or eunuch secret police. Seeing Zhou now as an enemy, influential eunuch leaders within the palace began to turn the emperor against his grand secretary, who soon fell into Chongzhen’s disfavor.

197 Chongzhen made a valiant attempt on lunar New Year’s day (January 30) of 1642 to strengthen the ties between himself and his ministers. All of the officials who normally only attended the outer court ceremonial were brought into the inner court in groups so that the emperor could personally express to them his admiration as well as his desire to be close to them in order to rule the empire better. However, the audience remained a very formal and stiff affair, and the emperor’s sense of grievance soon got the better of his hope to befriend his own officials. Li, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 1. Most contemporary texts echoed the emperor’s own belief that his ministers were prone to form cliques and follow their own selfish ways. A repeated refrain was: “The ministers were utterly self-interested and formed cliques while there were very few public-spirited and loyal ones.” Feng Menglong, Jiashen jiwen, 2a. Or, as the Kangxi Emperor later put it: “Though we do know that there were indeed evil eunuchs, it is completely incorrect to say it was the eunuchs’ power that caused the dynasty’s fall. It was, rather, a problem of factionalism, in which the Ming officials were fighting for power at court, competing with each other, and ignoring the needs of the country.” Spence, Emperor, p. 87.

198 Gu Yingtai, Ming shi jishi henmo, 74:77–78; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, p. 279.
At the same time, the military situation along the frontier worseneda disastrously. Already, in 1641, the Manchus had won new victories, and the emperor recalled the advice of his recently deceased minister, Yang Sichang, not to fight on two fronts at once.\(^{199}\) He therefore privately encouraged Yang’s protégé and successor as Minister of War, Chen Xinjia, to send envoys secretly to Hung Taiji to ask for peace terms.\(^{200}\) By mistake, one of the emperor’s notes to Chen about the negotiations was published in the *Beijing Gazette*, and the predictable uproar was so great among the fundamentalists over this act of appeasement that the emperor was forced to disavow Chen’s activities, arrest the minister on the grounds that he had exceeded his authority, and have him publicly executed in the marketplace.\(^{201}\) Consequently, when the Ming headquarters garrison of Songshan fell after a long siege on March 19, 1642, and the Manchus proposed pourparlers, suggesting that a new frontier be drawn directly north of Ningyuan westward along the Great Wall into Mongolia, the Chongzhen Emperor dared not even discuss the offer openly at court.\(^{202}\) On April 2, instead of sending an envoy to continue the discussions, the emperor had the Ningyuan commander, Wu Sangui, lead four thousand men in an attack on Ajige’s army at Dashan. The assault was easily repulsed, and the Manchus came away from the incident

\(^{199}\) *Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo*, pp. 511–514.

\(^{200}\) The emperor was privately encouraged by Xie Sheng, the grand secretary from Shandong, to use Chen as a channel of communication with the Manchu ruler. *Ming shi*, p. 2909.

\(^{201}\) Li, *Sanyuan biji, fushang*, 20b–21a; *Ming shi*, pp. 2908–2909, 3090. Chen carelessly left one of the emperor’s letters to him on top of his desk. It was the practice then for clerks to take official documents to the *Beijing Gazette* for posting and publication. Chen’s secretary saw the document and assumed it was a routine rescript which he promptly carried off to be published. After Chen Xinjia was executed, the venerable Xie Sheng was also attacked for being an appeaser, and was forced to return to his home in Dezhou where he remained in retirement until the Manchus finally came. Lo, “Policy Formulation,” pp. 68–69; *Er chen zhu*, 7:32–33; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 307–308. To the fundamentalists, Chen Xinjia was a “minister who obstructs the affairs of state.” Li, *Sanyuan biji, fushang*, 12a.

\(^{202}\) *Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo*, pp. 536–538.
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convinced of Chongzhen’s perfidy. They would offer the Ming court no more opportunities to negotiate a peaceful settlement.\(^{203}\)

That winter, the Manchus invaded China once again under the command of Nurhaci’s seventh son, Abatai. Zhao Guangbian, who was one of the two officials charged with coordinating the Ming defenses, failed to keep the Manchus from capturing Jizhou, a major town just northeast of Beijing which fell to the enemy on January 5, 1643.\(^{204}\) Zhao was stripped of his office for negligence and was threatened with worse punishment, but he was soon contacted by one of Zhou Yanru’s attendants and promised help toward reinstatement if he would give the grand secretary five thousand taels. After spending another twenty-five thousand in bribes Zhao was nearly impoverished, but he managed to avoid punishment and to recover his command.\(^{205}\) In the meantime, Grand Secretary Wu Sheng had been given orders by the emperor to halt the invaders. Zhou Yanru, eager to best his rival, in turn asked on May 21, 1643, to be given the command at Tongzhou where Fan Zhiwan had blocked the Manchus’ line of retreat.\(^{206}\) Reaching Tongzhou, Zhou “dared not sally to do battle, but spent the days with his aides-de-camp (muke) drinking wine and sending in spurious battle reports.”\(^{207}\) In fact, Zhou even concocted an entirely

\(^{203}\) Ibid., pp. 538–539, 544–545; Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 59:10; John Gilbert Reid, “Peking’s First Manchu Emperor,” p. 132; Xie, Dangshe yundong, a p. 90.

\(^{204}\) Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, pp. 558–561.

\(^{205}\) Qian Xing, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 7. This is one of the most reliable first-hand accounts of affairs at court during this period. The author insists that his work is no yeshi (historical romance) and that as a government functionary in the Censorate he reports only what he has seen and verified through careful questioning of others (p. 5). In his account, he often mentions that such-and-such a conversation was not overheard by anyone and therefore that he cannot report in detail upon particular court audiences. In other cases, he will explain how such private matters came to be known, e.g., through the person present on the occasion having recounted the conversation to his student (p. 83).

\(^{206}\) Ming shi, p. 4107; Tan, Guo que, p. 5971.

\(^{207}\) Anon., Mingwang shuilie, p. 278. See also Cao Rong, Chongzhen wushi zai-xiang zhuan, juan 5; Li, Sanyuan biji, zhong, 9a.
imaginary battle, which was of course described as a great victory over Abatai, and he returned on June 25 to put Fan Zhiwan and some of the other commanders’ names in for military citations. The emperor was so dazzled by the glowing accounts of his armies’ prowess that he gratefully ennobled Zhou Yanru with an aristocratic title and rank.

The truth was not to be kept hidden for long. From November 27, 1642, to January 27, 1643, the Manchus had marched for sixty days from the Great Wall through Beizhili, Shandong, and northern Jiangsu, taking 12,000 taels of gold and 2,200,000 taels of silver. As the enormity of this military spoliation began to sink in, Chongzhen gradually learned of his minister’s deceit and his generals’ cowardice. On July 1, Grand Secretary Wu Sheng was accused of tarrying and refusing to engage the enemy. Zhao Guangbian and Fan Zhiwan were stripped of their honors, thrown into jail, and executed. And on July 10, after his battle reports were declared to be merely fictions, Zhou Yanru was stripped of office as well. Although several high officials pleaded for royal leniency because of Zhou’s advanced years and distinguished rank, the Chongzhen Emperor was all the more adamant: precisely because he had been an official of the first degree, Zhou Yanru could not be forgiven for his treachery. After rejecting clemency, the emperor ordered Zhou Yanru to die. Out of respect for his years of service, however, Chongzhen allowed him to take his own life in prison, sparing him the much more painful death by slow strangulation he would otherwise have suffered.

208 Ming shi, p. 4107; Tan, Guo que, pp. 5975–5976.
209 Tan, Guo que, pp. 5974, 5976. In 1645 the Manchu Prince-Regent Dorgon told his ministers how amused he was to capture Ming military reports because the Chongzhen Emperor’s officers were always claiming false victories. “It was really very comical,” Dorgon remarked. Duoergun shezheng ri ji, pp. 5–6.
211 Ming shi, p. 4107; Tan, Guo que, p. 5976.
212 A number of other commanders were jailed as well. See Ming shi, p. 2922 for a list of their names.
213 Ming shi, p. 4107.
214 Tan, Guo que, p. 5977.
215 Li, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 11b–12a; Wan Yan, Chongzhen changbian, pp.
Zhou Yanru's death may have temporarily appeased the emperor's rage at being so poorly defended against his enemies, but it hardly compensated for the enormous human misery of that time. As rebels raided in the wake of the Manchus, reports from Linqing along the northern reaches of the Grand Canal in Shandong spoke of thirty percent of the population dying of starvation, thirty percent struck down by smallpox, and the remaining forty percent being forced into banditry to survive. And to the south around the canal city of Dongchang, all of the towns and villages were in ruins. A Ming Ministry of War despatch reported, in fact, that by the spring of 1643 "only one city, Jining, stands amidst a thousand leagues of weeds and wreckages." In the capital Li Wen wrote:

I lie awake hearing the spring rain
Whisper down the phoenix walls,
Rush through the jade gutters.
It patters against the golden temple bells,
And puts an end to prayers for more food.
The season is here to wash up our weapons:

48–51; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, p. 279. Zhou Yanru's battle reports were declared false by Li Guozhen, Li Guorui's heir. Zhou died on January 17, 1644.

216 The memorial from Zuo Maodi reporting these percentages went on to state that: "A picul of grain cost 24 taels. If a person perished, then he was taken to be eaten. Again from Yutai to Nanyang the wandering bandits had slaughtered [so many people] that corpses were piled up along the banks and the water did not on that account flow." Ming chen zouyi, juan 12, cited in Shimizu, "Ryūmin to ryūzoku," p. 378. Two major "bandit" armies operated in the area. One was led by a petty landowner named Yuan Shizhong. Yuan's army—said to number from 200,000 to 400,000—of "Buddha soldiers" (Fo bing) was an agglomerate of local defense groups commanded by rural magnates (tuhao). The army helped defend the Prince of Lu at Linqing against the Manchus. The other major force was commanded by a dog butcher named Li Qingshan, who was in direct contact with Li Zicheng, the rebel leader in neighboring Henan. Its animus was directed against landowners, just as Li Zicheng (who later killed Yuan Shizhong) was devoted to killing Ming princes, not protecting them. Satō Fumitoshi, "Minmatsu Yenjichû no ran ni tsuite," pp. 209, 218–223; idem, "Dozoku Riseizan," pp. 119–121.

217 Ray Huang, "The Grand Canal during the Ming Dynasty," p. 132.
Heaven’s bounty is sure to be boundless,  
Sooner or later responding to all that grows.\footnote{Li Wen, et al., Yunxian sanzi xin shi hegao, 5:3b. “Phoenix walls” (feng cheng) refers to the capital, as the phrase is used in Du Fu’s “Ode to the Night” (Ye shi). “Jade gutters” (yu lou) describes the imperial palace, as well as a kind of clepsydra used therein. “To wash up weapons” (xi bing) is to lay down arms.}

The only consolation available to the poet was offered by the season itself, which allowed the hope that, out of this detritus, spring might bring new life, and the rains of early summer some relief from arid despair. But in the west, and to the north, the enemies of the Ming, as though in closer harmony with nature, continued to grow and flourish.
The Manchu Quest for Power

I have heard that Songshan castle is still besieged. The fields are vacant; post horses are rarely seen. Our government is too apathetic even to sign military orders. Generals, given silver seals, stay with their troops in vain. Officials, robbed of their helmets, return as cold corpses.


When Nurhaci died on September 30, 1626, the Jin khan left no established heir. His legacy instead was a warning to his princes, the eight *beile*, never to allow a single one among them to emerge as a single powerful ruler. “When you select a leader for the country to succeed the father,” he had ordered, “do not make a powerful one leader. When a powerful one becomes khan, he will set his power above everything else; he will not be afraid to offend Heaven.” Perhaps Nurhaci had felt that his own kind of singular ambition, unrestrained, would ultimately jeopardize his patrimony; perhaps he had wished no successor to rival his own histor-

1 He was 68 years old when he passed away. Li Hongbin, “Lun Manzu yingxiong Nuerhachi,” p. 229.
ical fame. In any case, he had advocated a collective form of leadership for his surviving followers. "If you come together with the leader of the country when you eight princes have made your selection," he had concluded, "do not just assemble in ones or twos; come all together and rule the country collectively."3

There were four senior beile at the time of Nurhaci's death, each of whom was a natural son of the Jin khan. According to age Daisan ranked first, then Amin, Manggultai, and Hung Taiji.4 Of the four, Hung Taiji, the youngest, was the most powerful because he commanded two of the Manchus' eight banners. But his advantage was only relative, and he would have to secure the consent of the other three beile in order to become khan. At first, it seemed as though the price of this agreement would be the virtual dissolution of the entire enterprise initiated and developed by Nurhaci. As Hung Taiji later recalled the crisis:

At the time we bemoaned the death of the Emperor Taizu, Amin, the beile of the Bordered Blue Banner, sent [my uncle] Furdan to tell me: "I have consulted with all the beile. We will make you king, but after you succeed to the position of khan let me leave and live on the outer frontier." . . . If I let him live outside, then the two red, the two white, and the plain blue banners also could go across

3 Ibid., p. 51. It is clear from the old Manchu documents that Nurhaci consistently intended to have the eight hosoi beile rule collectively. In 1622, he had explained to them that, between rule by the strongest and rule by the khan, there lay yet a third way of government which was a collective form of administration by the beile themselves. Urging the eight princes to discuss policy matters together, he had then laid down specific regulations for establishing a consensus among them. Thus, conciliar tribal leadership was a long-standing goal for Nurhaci. Zhou Yuanliang, "Hou Jin ba heshuo beile 'gongzhi guozheng' lun," pp. 250–251.

4 Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, p. 9. Although Hung Taiji is known to many Westerners as Abahai, this name does not occur in the old Manchu records where the fourth son is identified as Hung Taiji (Huang Taizi), which is also sometimes written as Khungtaiji. Taizi does not mean "heir apparent," but is rather a Mongolian title of nobility which was given to most of Nurhaci's sons before 1615. Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," p. 11; Wei-ping Wu, "The Development and Decline of the Eight Banners," p. 16.
Nurhaci (1559–1626), the "Great Ancestor" (Taizu) of the Manchus. Guoli Beiping gugong bowuyuan wenxianguan, comp., Qingdai di hou xiang (Beiping, 1934).
the border and live outside. Then I am without a country and whose emperor shall I be? If I follow his suggestion the country will fall apart.5

But Daisan, the eldest beile, ultimately worked out a compromise. With the help of his own sons, Daisan nominated Hung Taiji as the supreme leader to whom the younger members of the ruling family would swear allegiance. In return, Hung Taiji publicly bowed down before his three elder brothers; and on state occasions, the four of them sat together on the same level, so that a form of collective leadership was indeed observed.6 However, this was an uneasy, and consequently unstable, political arrangement. Manggultai, Nurhaci’s third son, felt that he deserved to rule instead of his cadet.7 And Hung Taiji, in turn, fretted at the restraints of conciliar leadership, and looked elsewhere for a means to elevate himself well above his peers.8

Chinese Collaborators

He found one source of support in the Chinese population of Liaodong, whose loyalty Hung Taiji secured by asserting that the killings during the previous three years were a violation of the *guruni-i doro* (guiding principle of the country) and by blaming them on the former khan, his father.9 He also pointed out how lowly the position of the Chinese had been before he took the throne; and he took steps to improve both their social standing and their living conditions.10 His efforts took various forms. The laws governing

5 Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 120. See also Zhou Yuanlian, “Hou Jin ba heshuo beile,” p. 257.
7 In 1635 Manggultai, who had died two years earlier, was implicated posthumously in a plot to become khan. He had had seals made up with the inscription, “Emperor of the Great Jin,” on them. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 124.
8 Ibid., p. 126.
10 According to one of his edicts, which probably exaggerates the matter: “In
Han fugitives were lightened and Chinese legal forms were adopted. At the same time, the system of tokso was abolished, and a large number of Chinese bondservants were taken away from the direct control of Manchu officials and independently registered under Chinese official control so that the two races were more strictly segregated.  

Because silver was scarce at this time, Hung Taiji continued to pay his Manchu, Mongol, and Han officials with serfs in the form of zhuangding (estate laborers), but the numbers assigned to each office were lowered considerably.  

Moreover, those members of the beginning, the Chinese were all distributed as slaves to the Manchu officials; they could not ride the horses they owned, because the Manchus rode them. If an official were sick, he had to send his wife and daughters to the belle's household as servants. They belonged entirely to the Manchu officials and did not have enough to eat.” Ibid., pp. 138–139. In 1627, during the famine, Hung Taiji also decided to take 20,000 taels of silver out of the Manchu treasury to give to Ming peasants (baixing) to buy grain. Jiu Manzhou dang yizhu: Qing Taizong chao, p. 165.

11 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 1:5b; Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 139–140, 148–149.

12 The Chinese population was now divided into freemen and bondservants, and from both categories were drawn the zhuangding, who were able-bodied males from 18 to 60 sui eligible for military service. Every three years a census was conducted by the khan in order to replace disabled zhuangding with newly reclassified ones, or to shift surplus zhuangding from one unit to another. Both bound and free zhuangding were organized into regular military “outer companies” (wai niri), although bondservants were registered under their owner’s household and could not rise above the rank of infantryman or cavalryman. The bondservants of members of the imperial clan were organized into separate “inner companies” (nei niri) or “bondservant companies” (booi niri) which were attached to the banners of their owners. Wei-ping Wu, “Eight Banners,” pp. 24–28. The Manchus continued to give serfs or slaves to their officials during the 1630s. In 1638, Hung Taiji endorsed the system of giving wives, horses, and slaves to those among his followers who lacked them; and in 1640, there is a clear reference in a military report to the continued use of the distinction established in Nurhaci’s time between “captured” and “surrendered” prisoners of war. Zheng Tianting, “Qing ruguan qian Manzhou zu de shehui xingzhi,” pp. 93–94. For the princely estates around Shengjing established during Hung Taiji’s reign, see: Zheng Kecheng, “Duoergun dui Manzu fengjianhua de gongxian,” p. 10.
the Chinese population who were registered as minhu (free households) were assigned to live under the rule of Han officials in military colonies (tun) where regular Manchu bannermen were forbidden entry. The new khan also held state examinations to recruit bureaucratic followers from among bondservants, and relied more heavily than his father had upon the aid and advice of Chinese collaborating with the Manchus.

These Chinese collaborators in turn proposed a series of institutional changes that tended to centralize authority in Hung Taiji’s hands. In 1629 the secretariat or chancellery (shufang or wenguan) of the Jin khan was expanded by adding more Manchu baksi (secretaries). They were soon joined by over eighty Chinese lower degree-holders (xiucai), who transmitted memorials and foreign communications. At the same time, after being reminded point-

13 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 1:10b–11a; Wei-ping Wu, “Eight Banners,” p. 18; Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 7.
14 Preston M. Torbert, The Ch’ing Imperial Household Department, pp. 19–20; Robert B. Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback, p. 34. Nurhaci had held a civil service exam in 1625 when he selected over three hundred officials, but regular examinations of this sort only really developed during Hung Taiji’s reign. The first exam was in 1629 when two hundred officials were selected from bondservants and slaves in Manchu and Mongol households. Zheng Tianting, Tan wei ji, p. 88. After 1632 all Chinese officials in local administration or in the six boards had to pass an examination after three years of government service. This was repeated triennially. Manchu rhetoric about the value of examinations in recruiting rencai (talent) bears an unmistakable Confucian influence: “When the just are promoted and the bad discharged the great doro will be opened up; great talents will flourish more every day in our country and the educated will hear about it and truly follow in their hearts. By miraculously receiving [those] educated in the way, the great doro of the khan can be consolidated.” Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 146.
15 The Manchu baksi were called bethesi after 1631. Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 128–130. On the first day of the ninth lunar month of 1629, at Hung Taiji’s command, 300 Ming first degree-holders (shengyuan), including those who were the property of princes of the blood, sat for the state examinations. The 200 who passed were released from servitude and exempted from corvée and military duties to serve in the new secretariat. The secretariat was not altogether effective, however—perhaps because Han officials were not entrusted with top secret matters. Zhaolian, Xiaoting zalu, 2:7b; Joshua A. Fogel, trans., “Shantung in the Shun-chih Reign,” Part 1, pp. 19–20.
edly by his Chinese advisers that, “a city equal to the nation is the root of disorder,” Hung Taiji took steps to diminish the personal authority of each of the beile over the eight banners.\textsuperscript{16} Until then the spoils of war had been shared equally among each of the beile, who respectively dispensed rewards and gifts to their own followers. Henceforth, ordained Hung Taiji, thirty percent of all booty would first be placed in the khan’s treasury, while only the remaining seventy percent was to be shared among the heads of the Eight Houses. The money for rewards and for banqueting the bannermen would then be disbursed by the khan himself, and not by the beile as individual leaders.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, the collaborators urged that the amban (Chinese dachen, or counselors) be increased in number and assigned to individual banners to share the duties of the beile and sit with them on the council of princes and high officials. Hung Taiji accepted their advice because his needs and theirs coincided.\textsuperscript{18}

Stripped of their tribal rights to dispense feudal largesse and forced to share their personal authority over the banners with officials appointed by the khan, the senior beile must have regarded the Chinese who proposed these measures with even greater antipathy than before. Amin, who had already behaved fractiously while leading a military expedition into Korea in 1627, was the most likely to resist the khan’s new measures to treat the Chinese as separate but equal members of the realm.\textsuperscript{19} The opportunity for resistance soon arose.

\textsuperscript{16} Lawrence D. Kessler, \textit{K’ung-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{17} Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” p. 133.
\textsuperscript{19} After the defeat at Ningyuan and his father’s death in 1626, Hung Taiji opened negotiations with the Chinese. This secured his flank so that forces could be freed to invade Korea under the supreme command of Amin. As the Manchus neared the Korean capital, King Yi Chong (r. 1623–1649) took refuge on an offshore island. His envoys, however, promised to bring yearly tribute to the Manchus, who were in need of Korean grain. This was exactly what the Manchus had been hoping for, and the amban and beile on the expedition voted to accept these terms. Amin, however, only wanted booty, and intended to go
In November, 1629, Hung Taiji decided to mount the first of many attacks on China proper, that is, to invade the Central Plain beyond the Great Wall.\(^{20}\) Leaving Amin behind in Shenyang as regent of the Jin, Hung Taiji led his bannermen through Xifengkou to the very walls of Beijing.\(^{21}\) Although repulsed by General Zu Dashou, the Manchus still managed to capture and occupy four major cities inside the Great Wall: Luanzhou, Qian’an, Zunhua and Yongping.\(^{22}\) Hung Taiji treated the inhabitants of these cities with solicitude. His soldiers were ordered to discipline themselves, and the khan took special pains to welcome Chinese officers who surrendered, including the local magistrate, the garrison commander, and three high-ranking military officers: Meng Qiaofang, Yang Wenkui, and Yang Shengyuan. Colonel Meng and his men were immediately invited to Hung Taiji’s encampment near Shanhaiguan, where the khan deliberately sought to contrast his own accessibility with the Ming emperor’s aloofness. Laying out a banquet for the Ming officers in his tent, Hung Taiji toasted Meng with a golden goblet, saying: “We are not like your Ming master. All our officials are commanded to sit by our side and spill out their innermost feelings. We eat and drink together.” Colonel Meng subsequently entered the Manchus’ service.\(^{23}\)

\(\text{on and invade the capital. Only after firm opposition from the others did he give up this plan. Yet he pillaged several Korean cities anyway, in spite of their agreement to withdraw peaceably.} \)\( \text{Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 120–121, 165–167; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 1–2. For Manchu efforts in 1628 to secure badly needed Korean grain supplies, see Mark Mancell, “The Ch’ing Tribute System,” pp. 85–86.} \)

\(\text{20 Although the Central Plain was as much a symbol of China proper as an actual geographical area, it roughly corresponded to the region of the North China plain: Henan, western Shandong, and parts of Hebei and southern Shanxi. Robert Cremer, “Chou Mi and Hsiu Tuan,” p. 60.} \)

\(\text{21 Erich Hauer, trans., Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo fang-lüeh, pp. 205–216 (hereafter cited as Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo).} \)

\(\text{22 The Manchus also, in retaliation for the Ming’s having despoiled some of the royal tombs of the earlier Jin dynasty in Fangshan county, destroyed one of the Ming tombs. Mo Dongyin, “Mingmo Jianzhou nüzenhe fazhan ji qi jianguo,” p. 98.} \)

\(\text{23 Zhao Erxun, ed., Qing shi gao, liezhuan, 24:7. See also Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, pp. 221–225. Meng Qiaofang (1595–1654) was a native of Yongping, which} \)
Hung Taiji thus took the occasion of occupying these four northern Chinese cities to display his eagerness to accommodate the Han population and to welcome Ming turncoats. In April, 1630, he returned to Shenyang, however, and Amin took his place at the front, arriving at Yongping in early May. By then the Ming army commanded by General Zu Dashou was counterattacking the Manchus, and Amin lost control of Luanzhou. Ignoring the advice of the amban at his side to defend the other three cities and protect the residents from harm, Amin gave vent to the anger against the Chinese aroused by Hung Taiji’s enhancement of their power during the previous year. In June Amin ordered a general massacre of the civilian population of Qian’an and Yongping, sparing only some of the women. After this atavistic carnage, he took all of the livestock and goods, as well as the surviving women, as booty and abandoned the empty cities, leaving behind only a small Manchu garrison force which was quickly overwhelmed by Ming soldiers, who easily recovered the nearby deserted towns.24

When he learned of Amin’s slaughter, Hung Taiji professed outrage. Disavowing any responsibility for the massacre himself (“The khan had nothing to do with the crime”), Hung Taiji declared Amin an enemy of the state and had him arrested after his return to Shenyang in July, 1630.25 The council of heile and amban

is the first major city in Zhili which one reaches after passing through Shanhaiguan enroute to Beijing. Meng had been living there in retirement, after serving as a Ming army colonel. As a professional soldier who was also a native, he commanded the loyalty of many members of the Yongping garrison, and so incorporated those forces with the Manchu army after Hung Taiji accepted his offer of service. Later, when the Han banner forces were established, Meng’s men were enrolled in the Bordered Red Banner in which Meng himself held the post of company commander. After the Chongzhen Emperor learned of Colonel Meng’s defection, he ordered all of his kinsmen in Yongping prefecture killed. Er chen zhuan, 2: 6–7a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 572; Li Guangtao, “Hong Chengchou bei Ming shimo,” p. 245.

tried Amin and sentenced him to death, a punishment that was commuted to life imprisonment by the khan. Ten years later Amin died, still in jail.  

Amin’s arrest and conviction considerably strengthened the power and authority of the Jin throne. Not only was a major rival now eliminated; control of Amin’s Bordered Blue Banner was also passed on to another younger brother, Jirgalang, who was a close follower of Hung Taiji. The khan now personally dominated two of the eight banners, and heavily influenced the activities of a third. At the same time, Amin’s behavior reinforced Hung Taiji’s determination to continue to be conciliatory toward the Chinese in exchange for their support. He was convinced during this period that the kind of brutality that Amin had displayed was the result of ignorance about the Chinese, and that the Manchu people needed to learn more about the fundamental principles of civilization.

I hear that some officials do not want their children to study because [they say], “If our country wins, what is the use of book learning?” Amin lost Luanzhou and did not go to the rescue [of the other troops], and abandoned Zunhua, Qian’an, and Yongping only because he did not study and did not know the principles.

Ordering Manchu and Chinese officials to register all of their sons between the ages of eight and fifteen for study, Hung Taiji declared that within two or three years, “There will be many people with an education and we will be a civilized country.”

One immediate effect of the Yongping affair, then, was an intensification of Hung Taiji’s admiration for Chinese principles of government and of his reliance upon Chinese collaborators for political advice. During the next year the khan turned frequently to Lieutenant-Colonel Ning Wanwo, a Liaodong frontiersman who had a powerful impact on the formation of the early Manchu state. It was Ning Wanwo who proposed in 1633, when Hung

28 Ibid.
29 Ning Wanwo had helped secure the surrender of Yongping. During the battle
Taiji looked to the history of the Former Jin as a model for his own state, that in order to understand the arts of civil government, the khan should read *The Four Books*; in order to improve his military tactics, he should study the works of Sunzi and other military strategists; and in order to learn about the rise and fall of dynasties, he should consult *The Comprehensive Mirror for the Aid of Government.*[^30] It was also Ning Wanwo who recommended that regulations be drawn up for six boards, modeled on the Ming government’s six ministries, to administer the Jin government.[^31] Each of the six boards (which were established on August 5, 1631) was supervised by a *beile,* but most of the actual decisions were made by a staff of subordinate presidents and vice presidents, supervised by Hung Taiji’s brother, Dorgon.^[32] Although Chinese influence was quite limited within each board, the executive officers as a whole, along with the censors appointed as watchdogs by Hung Taiji, effectively supplanted the *beile,* who even nominally ceased to control the boards after a few years had passed.[^33]

[^31]: Corradini, “Civil Administration,” Hummel, *Eminent Chinese,* p. 592. The six boards and the six ministries are both the same in Chinese: *liú ke* or *liú hu.* Different terms are used here because Ming administrative titles are translated into English according to Charles O. Hucker, “Index of Terms and Titles in ‘Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty,’” whereas Qing titles are translated according to H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China.*  
[^32]: For Dorgon’s key role in helping establish the six boards, see Erich Hauer, “Prinz Dorgon,” pp. 20–21.  
[^33]: Many Manchus initially disputed the need for censors, arguing that the “southern dynasty” of the Ming had long had such “speaking officials” and was consequently in the process of being defeated by its enemies. Ning Wanwo denied that censors were a sign or cause of military weakness. He insisted that now that the six boards had been established, it was necessary to have officials who could impeach ministers in these new government agencies who committed crimes. Li Yuandu, *Guochao xianzheng,* 2:9a. Han officials constituted only one-sixth of the board presidents and vice-presidents. Of the four presidents in each board, two were Manchus, one was Mongol, and one was Chinese; and of the fourteen vice-presidents, eight were Manchus, four
Another consequence of the occupation of Yongping was the formation of separate Han military units composed of those Chinese soldiers who were willing to accompany the Manchus into battle.\textsuperscript{34} Chinese troops had, in fact, fought alongside Manchus since 1626, primarily serving as artillerymen armed with Chinese cannons and attached to the banners. Called \textit{ujen cooha} (heavy troops), they did not—in Hung Taiji's opinion—fight as fiercely and courageously as his Manchu warriors, but they did form effective assault troops for siege warfare.\textsuperscript{35} When the large garrison at Yongping surrendered, the Manchus had to decide whether to integrate these soldiers with the banners as \textit{ujen cooha}, or to set up a separate military structure under a trusted collaborator. The second solution was finally chosen, and three thousand Chinese troops (who probably also included Han conscripts from Manchu-held lands to the northeast) were formed into \textit{nikan cooha} (Han troops) and placed under the command of an experienced turncoat who, though not quite a transfrontiersman, had faithfully served the Manchus for the previous fourteen years. Tong Yangxing, who was related to a number of Liaodong officers in the Ming army, had gotten secretly in touch with Nurhaci in 1616 to arrange his defection.\textsuperscript{36} Although Ming officials had discovered the secret

\begin{itemize}
\item[34] Huang-Ts'ing \textit{k'ai-kuo}, p. 251.
\item[36] Tong Yangxing was a local notable from Kaiyuan who had many followers among his fellow townsmen and who was so excited by Nurhaci's rise that he decided to throw his own lot in with the Manchus. Other Tongs lived in Fushun. According to some sources, their ancestors were merchants of Jurchen stock who had become sinified, living under Ming rule in the cities and trading with the Manchus in food and furs. Other sources deny this, claiming that the Tongs were descended from a Ming officer who had settled in the northeast many generations before. A total of 22 Liaodong Tongs eventually surrendered to the Manchus, including Colonel Tong Yangzhen (d. 1621) who had fought valiantly in Korea against Hideyoshi's troops. Tong Yangxing
\end{itemize}
correspondence and had thrown Tong Yangxing in jail, he had managed to escape and join the Jin khan. Nurhaci had rewarded him by ennobling him as a baron and by giving him one of his daughters in marriage. As an imperial son-in-law (efi), then, Tong had helped Nurhaci occupy Liaoyang in 1621. Now, he was placed in command of the new nikan cooha by Hung Taiji and told to prepare them for military action.

At the same time, Tong Yangxing was given the responsibility of supervising the crew of Chinese artillery experts captured at Yongping who were familiar with the new techniques for casting Portuguese artillery: the “red barbarian” and “great general” cannons. These experts included Major Ding Qiming, a foundry foreman, and an ironsmith. On February 8, 1631, it was announced that the crew had completed its work and that forty of the new European artillery pieces had been cast. Thirteen days later Hung Taiji decreed that henceforth all of the Han people serving the Manchus were to come under the command of the imperial son-in-law Tong Yangxing; and that his word would be considered the same as the law of the land, to be obeyed by all Han officials under his charge.

The troops that Tong Yangxing had trained and the ordinance that he had prepared gave the Manchus a new and crucial advantage in the struggle for supremacy in northeast Asia. Armed with European artillery that was now deployed by men who had either first- or second-hand training from Portuguese gunners, the Chinese assault units were going to make it possible for Hung Taiji to recover the military advantage that his father had lost before the

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37 Li, Guochao xianzheng, 2:20–21a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 797.
38 Li, Guochao xianzheng, 2:21a; Zheng, Tan wei ji, p. 55.
39 Li, Guochao xianzheng, 2:21a; Zheng, Tan wei ji, p. 55.
40 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 8:3–4; Huang-Ts'ing k'ai-kuo, p. 244; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 797. The foundry artisan (zhujiang) was Wang Tianxiang, and the ironsmith (tiejiang) was Liu Jiping.

 himself died in 1647, bequeathing his title of viscount to his son Puhan. Zheng Tianting, Tan wei ji, pp. 53–55; Li, Guochao xianzheng, 2:20–21a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 797.
guns of Ningyuan in 1626. It had taken five years, and a crucial military raid into the Central Plain to get those gunners and artisans; but now the balance of warfare was going to shift decisively, due to the Manchus’ combination of swift and ferocious cavalry tactics with sustained and withering artillery techniques. The new military technology was not yet perfected by Tong Yangxing, and later Chinese adherents would bring even more military experience to the Manchu side. But now, in its initial stages, this new military capability was to be tested against the Ming bastion at Dalinghe, where it was critical to the Manchus’ victory in what was to prove an important turning point in their quest for power. Thus, the long Dalinghe siege, which deserves to be examined in detail, demonstrated both Hung Taiji’s heavy reliance upon old Chinese allies, and the Jin khan’s considerable skill at recruiting new ones.41

The Siege of Dalinghe

The Ming garrison town and trading center at Dalinghe was a formidable defense complex. The town itself, protected by thick walls, had to be reached through narrow passes which in turn were defended by a series of towns or castles (tai), over one hundred in number, impregnable to normal Manchu military tactics. Each castle-village was a miniature feudal manor ruled over by a warlord holding Ming military rank or occasionally bearing a Ming examination degree. The smallest of these walled settlements had a population of about seventy people; the largest, called Yuzizhang, contained over six hundred men and women, young and old, as well as seventy head of livestock. These castles, which could be sealed shut with heavy gates, were also well stocked with supplies; and during a siege the major shortage was likely to be gunpowder rather than food or water. The same could not be said for the city of Dalinghe itself in the autumn of 1631. At that time

41 For a summary of the siege that is described more specifically below, see: Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, pp. 261–268, 272–282.
General Zu Dashou (normally based in Jinzhou) was making an inspection tour of the frontier defenses, and his own contingent of troops raised the population of the city to about 30,000 people. Because of its unusually large population, the city had only enough food for, at the most, one month.\textsuperscript{42}

General Zu Dashou, the senior officer in the city, was a famous veteran of the marches. Patriarch of a clan of Liaodong warriors, he had been given command of the front line troops garrisoned in Jinzhou three years earlier.\textsuperscript{43} Of all the major Ming military commanders in service, his accomplishments were the most illustrious. No other officer could claim to have bested the Manchus so impressively: first, when he repulsed Hung Taiji from the gates of Beijing; and second, when he drove Amin’s soldiers out of Luanzhou. The army he commanded at Dalinghe had seen action many times during the last two years, and its 14,000 men (half infantry, half cavalry) were tough, seasoned troops.\textsuperscript{44}

Hung Taiji was not aware of this formidable defensive force when the two wings of his army of 20,000 Manchu, Mongol, and Han soldiers gathered outside Dalinghe in the early morning hours of September 1, 1631, a little over seven months after the Manchus had acquired their Portuguese artillery and barely four weeks since the six boards had been set up in Shenyang. Later that day, however, one of his patrols captured a Chinese inhabitant of Dalinghe and, after the prisoner was interrogated, the khan soon learned of Zu Dashou’s force, as well as of the recently completed repair work on the city walls. Clearly, a direct attack upon the city would cost the Manchus extremely heavy casualties. After checking the city defenses that same night, Hung Taiji held a meeting the following day with his beile and amban to discuss other tactics. It was decided to prepare for a long and careful siege by encircling the city with Manchu units while Tong Yangxing and his Han troops, armed with “red barbarian” cannons, stationed themselves on the

\textsuperscript{42} Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 9:32b, 10:4b–5, 21b. The population included 2,000 merchants, 3,000 workmen, a contingent of Mongols, and even a handful of Manchu fugitives from Jin justice.

\textsuperscript{43} Er chen zhuanyu, 4:5–7a.

\textsuperscript{44} Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 9:32b; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 769.
highway between Dalinghe and Quanzhou. At the same time, a palisade would be built and a moat 5 chi (1.8 metres) wide and 7 chi (2.5 metres) deep would be dug around the city walls to keep the Ming soldiers from escaping.

During the next few days, while Hung Taiji oversaw the operations from his vantage point on a mountain peak south of the city, there were a series of skirmishes between Ming squads sallying forth and Manchu cavalry containing them. The Manchus won most of these engagements, but it soon became obvious that before the city could fall, the castles surrounding it had to be taken. After sending a conventional letter inviting Zu Dashou to come over, Hung Taiji directed his men's efforts toward securing the surrender of the castles around Dalinghe. The ones farthest from the city were the most vulnerable to these appeals to yield, especially if they were uttered by Chinese already serving the Manchus. All of these Han soldiers and settlers knew full well what

45 In the Veritable Records Tong Yangxing's unit is called the Jiu Han bing (Old Han Troops).
46 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 9:21–23a. The size of the main Manchu force is given in Ibid., 9:41.
47 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 9:23. Hung Taiji himself tried to get the Mongols inside of Dalinghe to surrender to him on the grounds that the Jin and Mongol guo (countries) were originally the same. On September 6, he had an arrow shot over the city wall with a letter addressed to the Mongols there. In addition to promising "nourishment" (yang or ujihe)—that is, protection and patronage—for those who surrendered, the Jin khan wrote: "We Manchus and you Mongols originally belonged to the same country (guo). The Ming is a different country. It makes no sense for all of you to die for a different country, and I pity you all the more for that." Ibid., 9:24b. In the original version of the Veritable Records for this reign, the Manchus at this time referred to themselves simply as being of Jin guo (country of Jin). Sometime between 1649 and 1654, these words were changed either to read Manzhou (Manchus) or wo chao (our dynasty). Chen Jiexian, Manwen Qing shilu yanjiu, pp. 103–104. The original Manchu-language version of the Veritable Records for Taizong's reign has not been found, although in a personal communication Professor Ch'en Chieh-hsien has indicated that there may be one newly discovered in the Palace Museum on Taiwan. There are no entries for 1633 and 1634, nor for the period after 1636, in the Manzhou jiudang published by the Palace Museum in 1969. Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," pp. 2–3, 9.
had happened at Yongping a little over a year earlier. A Chinese in the service of the Manchus was thus better able to persuade them that they would not be killed if they surrendered than a Manchu who might have actually participated in the slaughter ordered by Amin. Ma Guangyuan, who had surrendered a year earlier at Yongping, consequently managed to get the defenders of a mountain t'ai south of the city to open their gates to him; and Fan Wencheng, who had joined the Manchus after the fall of Fushun in 1618, persuaded the ninety inhabitants (including one shengyuan like himself) of another tower west of the city to give themselves up and become “attached” (fu) to him on September 5. 48

The castles nearer the city walls were less prone to persuasion, but they were vulnerable to the Manchus’ new firepower. Beginning on September 7, Tong Yangxing’s artillerymen bombarded the walls of Dalinghe, as well as castles east and north of the city. Hundreds of dwellings were set on fire, and the projectiles forced the defenders of one t'ai to try to escape in the middle of the night, only to be cut down by the Manchus outside. 49 By September 10, four important fortifications outside the walls had fallen to the Jin forces, but the attack had to be called off when word came that Ming reinforcements were on their way from Songshan. 50

The first group of reinforcements only numbered 2,000, and they were easily defeated on September 11 by 300 Manchu bannermen. 51 However, the next group was three times that size. Hung Taiji had the foresight to post a force of 500 Manchu cavalry and 500 Mongol soldiers under the command of his half-brother Ajige, Prince Ying, but when the Ming reinforcements moved in under the cover of ground fog and set camp, the Jin troops were very nearly surprised. Fortunately for Ajige, the mist cleared away just long enough to reveal the enemy, and then returned in time to give him and his men a concealment of their own. Although they

48 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 9:23b–24a. See also Li, Guochao xian-zheng, 1:1b–2a.
49 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 9:27b–28a.
50 Ibid., 9:32b.
51 Ibid.
were outnumbered six to one, the Manchus slipped behind the Chinese soldiers and routed them, picking off stragglers as the enemy fled back to Jinzhou.\textsuperscript{52}

A Ming major captured in this engagement was then brought under the walls of Dalinghe to demoralize its defenders with news that the relief column had been smashed.\textsuperscript{53} But more help was on its way to General Zu. A large force of 40,000 soldiers commanded by Zu Dashou's brother-in-law, General Wu Xiang, and under the supervision of Grand Secretary Sun Chengzong was even then on its way to Jinzhou from Shanhaiguan.\textsuperscript{54} On October 7, news reached the Manchus that a portion of this force was already camped in front of Jinzhou, just on the other side of the Xiaoling River. Hung Taiji immediately sent half of his Guards on ahead to stem the point of their enemies' advance, and then four days later personally led another contingent, including 500 Old Han troops under Tong Yangxing, toward Jinzhou.\textsuperscript{55} After linking up with the Guards unit, Hung Taiji ordered the entire body to wait while he went ahead on his own with Dodo (Prince Yu, Nurhaci's fifteenth son) and 200 of his own guardsmen. Moving stealthily along the hillsides to escape discovery, the group of handpicked soldiers rode up to the Xiaoling River. There, on the other bank were camped 7,000 members of the expeditionary force. Without hesitating, Hung Taiji put on his battle armor and

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 9:33b–34a. Altogether, they captured 15 battle standards, 206 horses, 219 armored troops, and 1 Ming major.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 9:36.

\textsuperscript{54} The Manchus did not discover who commanded this force until October 26 when a scouting party caught and interrogated prisoners who told them that Wu Xiang and Sun Chengzong had fled back to Shanhaiguan after Zhang Chun's defeat on October 22. \textit{Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu}, 10:1b–2a. Wu Xiang, a Liaodong man whose family had migrated from Jiangsu, had gotten his military \textit{jinshi} degree in 1622 and was a professional soldier. Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, p. 877; Tsao Kai-fu, "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories against the Manchu Throne in China," p. 12.

\textsuperscript{55} By then the Guards (\textit{Hujun}) of the three upper banners constituted the Imperial Guards, which were placed under the command of a special Office of Imperial Guards. Wei-ping Wu, "Eight Banners," pp. 30–31.
told his officers to follow suit. Then at their head he led his banner men full tilt across the river and into the tents of the Chinese soldiers. The Han troops panicked. Even though there were thirty-five times as many Ming troops as Manchu guardsmen, the Chinese soldiers ran for the safety of the city walls with the banner men at their heels, shooting and cutting down as many as they could.56

A few hours later the larger Manchu–Han force fought a battle with the main body of Ming troops, and the victory was again the khan’s. But even though a Ming colonel was captured during this second encounter, the first battle was the most stunning accomplishment. Later that day, when the Manchu forces returned to Dalinghe to be welcomed three li outside the imperial camp by Daisan and the other heile, what was being celebrated above all else was the personal bravery and martial impetuosity of Hung Taiji himself.57 Indeed, the victories outside Dalinghe and Jinzhou were yet another means for the khan to set himself apart from his brothers.58

Meanwhile, within the city, the besieged inhabitants of Dalinghe were beginning to feel the pinch of short or, in some cases, nonexistent rations. The Manchus were skillful interrogators, and Hung Taiji knew of the shortages from captured prisoners of war.59 Fresh from his own triumph, he decided on October 13 to write General Zu Dashou once again, mentioning that he knew how bad the conditions were inside the besieged city, and promising the general wealth, honor, and respect in exchange for his surrender.

56 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 9:36b–37.
57 Ibid., 9:38.
58 It was shortly after this time that Manggultai was censured and demoted from a senior to a junior heile by the council of princes for having once drawn his sword against the khan. And it was also at this time that Daisan ridiculed the practice of having the three leaders sit on the same level, it being agreed that hereafter Daisan and Manggultai would sit below the imperial throne to the right and to the left. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 562–563.
59 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 9:32b. The khan specifically ordered that his men capture officers and not just rank-and-file or menials because the latter seldom had very good information. Ibid., 9:36a.
The emperor of the Manchu state (*Manzhou guo*) sends a letter to the great General Zu. Armies are deadly weapons and battles are dangerous matters. While there are some who long for war, among the people there is no one who does not long for peace. One can secure a victory in battle, but does that approach the joy of dwelling in peace? We have repeatedly sent envoys to discuss peace. Your ruler and ministers think of themselves as being in Heaven above so that they look down on us below as inferiors. In the end there has not been a single word back in response. We therefore, in great indignation, have raised our armies. For a long time the two countries have been in a state of war, but they have not gone forth to do battle with one another. Now, since the peace talks have been broken off, we have accordingly left troops behind to garrison and defend [Shenyang], and we are personally leading a great army to penetrate deeply [into your territory]. By good chance we met you, General, here, as though through preordained agreement. We are greatly pleased and we admire greatly the General’s innate sense of purpose. Willing it so, Heaven has wanted the two of us to see each other so that we can plan for the future.⁶⁰

There was no response from Zu Dashou.

Several weeks earlier, while Hung Taiji was away from his main camp in front of Dalinghe, Zu Dashou had sent a column of soldiers out from within the city to try to recover the fortifications southwest of the wall captured earlier by the Manchus.⁶¹ The attack had failed, but at the time it had worried Hung Taiji, and he had subsequently held a war council to discuss defensive measures to take if there should be a major sortie from the city by Zu Dashou’s main army.⁶² Now, much more confident after his victory over Sun Chengzong’s army, Hung Taiji decided to try to lure Zu’s men out of Dalinghe once again. On October 14, he secretly sent some porters and artillerymen toward Jinzhou. Ten li away, they

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⁶⁰ Ibid., 9:38b–39a. Also see *Er chen zhuan*, 4:3b–4a.
⁶¹ Hung Taiji had gone on September 25 to present Ajige with a gift and the traditional ceremonial toast with a golden goblet in honor of his victory over the Songshan reinforcements. *Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu*, 9:34–35a.
⁶² The khan even made contingency plans for retreating if the army were too strong to resist. Ibid., 9:35b–36a.
fired off several cannons and turned back toward Dalinghe, raising dust as if they were a large relief force. At the same time, Hung Taiji pretended to retreat to the hills with his guardsmen. When Zu Dashou saw the khan’s men withdrawing from their camp, he took the lure and sent out his own troops to attack the southwestern tai once more. They had just about set up their scaling ladders when the khan’s guardsmen rode down upon them, wounding hundreds and killing a number of them. The victory was a minor one, but Zu Dashou seemed to suffer a major psychological defeat. From this time on Dalinghe closed in upon itself: the gates remained shut, and none dared sally forth again.63

Among the Ming forces outside the city, however, there was still considerable cause for hope. Hung Taiji’s victory at Xiaolinghe had been only a minor engagement. The encounter was a tribute to his own courage, but the main body of Sun Chengzong’s relief force had never really engaged the Manchu Guards Army. So far, in fact, there had not yet been a major setpiece battle between the two sides. Rather, by speed, concealment, or surprise, the Manchus had managed to defeat the regular Ming armies sent to relieve Dalinghe. But what if they encountered the main body of Chinese soldiers fully prepared to receive them? How would they fare then?

On October 19, 1631, an army of 40,000 regular Ming infantry and cavalry under more than a hundred officers and commanded by Zhang Chun crossed the Xiaoling River heading toward Dalinghe. Such a great force moved slowly and cautiously. Once across the Xiaolinghe, Zhang Chun’s army set camp and threw up ramparts behind which they arrayed cannons. Manchu scouts soon discovered the position of the enemy force and reported back to Hung Taiji, who left half his own army at Dalinghe and took the rest with him to block the advance. But when he saw the size of the Ming army and the impregnability of its lines of defense, he had second thoughts. Dreading the casualties his own forces would take, he ordered his men back to their main camp at Dalinghe.

Zhang Chun waited three days before committing his own

army to the next step. At the hour of four drums (1 a.m.) on the morning of October 22 the Ming army broke camp. Because it was dark, the Ming troops did not arouse the attention of Manchu scouts until they were fifteen li from the city. Hung Taiji rapidly mustered his troops, and led a total of 20,000 Manchu, Mongol, and Han soldiers forth to confront a Ming army twice that size.

When Hung Taiji’s men reached the Ming force, they saw that Zhang Chun had already formed his 40,000 men into a defensive block protected on all four sides by cannons and muskets (niao-qiang). The Jin khan decided to attack head-on with his cavalry, divided into two wings. The right wing, which made for Zhang Chun's headquarters, rode into a fusillade, but still managed to break through the Ming lines. The left wing encountered heavy cannon fire and took numerous casualties, its charge falling short of the Chinese lines. Wheeling around, the remnants of the left wing poured through the gap made by the other cavalry column and managed to regroup beyond Zhang Chun’s tents. However, the Ming army also regrouped; and their arms would have carried the day had it not been for two other factors: Tong Yangxing’s artillery and a Ming plan which literally backfired.

While the Manchu cavalry were ineffectively milling about beyond Zhang Chun’s camp, Hung Taiji had ordered Tong Yangxing to place his Han forces east of the enemy and fire down upon them with artillery and fire arrows. The barrage took its toll, and in self-defense the Ming soldiers, the wind at their backs, set fires in the dry autumn grass which began to burn rapidly down toward Hung’s men. But fortune was on the Manchu side. Before the prairie fire had even gotten near Tong Yangxing’s line of gunners, the wind picked up and swung around nearly to the opposite direction, so that the flames and smoke blew back upon the Ming soldiers. Hung Taiji called for another frontal assault, and this time, even though his Manchu and Mongol cavalry and infantry suffered more casualties from the enemy guns, they fought on through, slaughtering the infantrymen and riding on to capture or kill as many of the cavalry troops as possible.

64 Ibid., 9:41-42.
65 Ibid., 9:42-43.
Altogether, thirty-four Ming officers were captured, including Zhang Chun himself. After the battle was over, the prisoners were brought before Hung Taiji, and one by one they each kowtowed before the khan. But when Zhang Chun’s turn came, he refused to bow down. Hung Taiji was furious. He grabbed a bow from a nearby guard and had nocked an arrow onto the string before Daisan was able to place himself between the prisoner and the khan. “Have we not always, up to now, received and nourished captured prisoners?” Daisan asked. “Since this person wants to die in order to achieve fame, why should we kill him just to carry out his will for him?” Other officials interceded as well, and some of the beile even bowed down to Hung Taiji, urging him to spare the Chinese official on their behalf. The khan finally relented, lowered the bow, and curtly dismissed Zhang Chun. Later that evening, Hung Taiji sent Dahai with some delicacies for Zhang Chun to eat, but the Ming commander refused them, saying:

My resolve to die has already been decided and I will not eat the gifts which His Majesty has given me. His Majesty’s intention is generous: he wants to keep me alive by feeding me, and I also realize that. However, an imperial minister does not serve two masters, and a chaste woman does not attend to two husbands. These phrases are not concocted by me; they are principles that have been established since earliest times.

Defending the Chongzhen Emperor as a just and intelligent monarch who had been betrayed by his ministers, Zhang Chun went on to speak bitterly of his own treatment by officials at the Ming court and reiterated his determination to die for his ruler. For three days, then, the Ming commander refused to take any of the food that was offered him. But on the third day Hung Taiji came in person to see him, and to present food with his own hands. Touched and grateful, Zhang Chun accepted the “nourishment” and began to eat again, signalling his willingness to serve this new master.

67 Ibid., 9:44.
68 Ibid., 9:46a. However, Zhang Chun refused to cut his hair in tribal style. Later, Hung Taiji ordered him to stay in a Lamaist temple until he was willing...
Zu Dashou’s Surrender and Betrayal

Hung Taiji had done well to curb his temper, and then to reassert the kind of personal charm that had won over Meng Qiaofang and some of the other Yongping defenders who were now fighting at his side against the defenders of Dalinghe. With Zhang Chun, the leader of the Ming army sent to rescue Dalinghe, now a follower, the Jin khan had a powerful array of names to use to sway Zu Dashou to come over also. On October 31, 1631, the Manchu ruler ordered that twenty-three of the civil and military officials who had decided to be “nourished” by him each write a letter expressing their own wishes that the besieged garrison surrender. Then, the khan ordered one of the officers to take the letters to Zu Dashou and two other commanding officers in the city: He Kegang and Zhang Cunren. But the officer was not allowed inside Dalinghe proper. After he knelt before Zu Dashou at the city gates and explained from whom the letters came and how the reinforcements had all been massacred or captured, Zu gave the man food and sent him back to the Manchus, saying: “You do not have to come back again. We would prefer to die in this city rather than surrender.”

When the officer returned to Hung Taiji he reported these words and said in addition that Zu, He, and Zhang did not trust the Manchus and believed that they would be killed if they surrendered, just as the Liaodong people had been slaughtered by the Manchus seven or eight years earlier. The Jin khan accordingly sent another letter into the city to reassure Zu Dashou and the other commanders:

In our country when we go to war, those who deserve death are killed and those who deserve leniency are forgiven. We decide whether to employ benevolence or sternness. How could we blame all of you? There certainly have been instances of Liaodong people being killed, but we later felt a deep sense of regret; and those who

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69 Da Qing Tiazong Wen huangdi shilu, 10:2a.
were treated leniently received even more of our benevolent nourishment. We believe that you may have already heard about that too. Very few of those who are presently receiving our nourishment have fled back to your country, and the people who were formerly officials in Liaodong and Guangning and who are now in our country are very grateful for receiving the bounty of our nourishment. They have not been ordered about. Rather, they themselves have created a Han army, establishing brigades (ying) and companies (dui) that wield the firearms we use in our battle assaults. We believe you must also know about this. Now then, after the victorious assault on Yongping, not a single person was slaughtered. Fathers and sons, husbands and wives, were not separated and ordered apart. Household property and goods were not seized and ordered confiscated. There was special mercy shown in bringing the people together in peace, and this was witnessed by all the people there.\textsuperscript{70}

Hung Taiji’s letter went on to cite numerous examples of the punishments meted out to Manchu and Mongol nobles who had killed Chinese prisoners against the khan’s orders. In addition, it pointedly reminded Zu Dashou and the others that while the siege was being levelled against them at Dalinghe, the Manchus had left their own imperial capital under the guard of Mongol troops, which was certainly dramatic evidence of their willingness to trust those who had surrendered (guishun) in order to receive the khan’s benevolent nurture (enyang). The same degree of trust would be theirs to receive once the two sides had sworn oaths together before Heaven and Earth.

The city of Dalinghe, its communications cut off, is sorely beset. There is no way that we cannot take it by force, no way that we cannot occupy it forever. Yet in uttering these words we realize that the wise and brave warriors of all the area east of Shanhaiguan are gathered together within these walls. Heaven will thus protect you so that all the generals assembled there can help us. For, if we were to kill you, what benefit would there be for us? How could that compare with our joining together with the generals assembled

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 10:2b–3a.
there to plan collectively the great enterprise [of conquering China]? That is why we again and again use persuasion to win you over, hoping to influence you who are not yet willing to serve together with us. That is why we utter these reassuring words.\(^71\)

The khan's letter ended with the suggestion that Zu Dashou send forth representatives to swear an oath in the Manchu camp, while the khan sent his own deputies into the city to swear an oath together with the Chinese general.\(^72\)

Hung Taiji's magnanimity may have been heartfelt, but it was also calculated to win over the Chinese officers inside Dalinghe as soon as possible. In spite of the great victory over Zhang Chun, the Manchus were now running out of supplies. Their large army could not sustain itself on foraging because there were simply no villages in the area that they could raid. Instead, all of the Chinese settlers were gathered in their fortified castle-towers with even the livestock kept inside, safe from rustlers and marauders.\(^73\)

Hearing no word from Zu Dashou, Hung Taiji decided to devote all of his effort to getting the largest of these castles—the settlement of Yuzizhang commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wang Jing—to surrender. Tong Yangxing and his entire contingent of Jiu Han bing (Old Han Troops), carrying 6 “red barbarian” cannons and 54 “general” cannons, were sent along with 500 Manchu troops to attack Yuzizhang fort, which was built into a mountainside and defended with stout walls. For three days the Chinese gunners pounded away, killing 57 people and driving the remaining soldiers within the castle into a state of shellshock. On November 5, when it was clear that his men were too panicked to fight back, Wang Jing surrendered.\(^74\)

The fall of Yuzizhang was crucial. Hearing of its surrender, the nearby forts opened their gates in turn, and the inhabitants of the more distant settlements abandoned their posts and fled. The new

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 10:4.
\(^{72}\) Ibid., 10:4b.
\(^{73}\) Ibid., 10:5b.
\(^{74}\) Ibid., 10:5. The Manchu-Han forces captured 240 males, 339 females, and 70 head of livestock.
supplies now available to the Manchus provided horses and soldiers with a month’s worth of rations. Clearly, the ability to continue the siege at Dalinghe depended upon this vital victory, which was in turn so obviously the result of Hung Taiji’s having prepared Chinese artillery units in advance.\(^75\)

While the Manchus were thus adequately supplied once again and capable of sustaining the siege yet a month longer, the Chinese inside Dalinghe were living in appalling conditions. On November 3 a man named Wang Shilong had climbed over the wall to surrender to the Manchus, and he reported that all of the merchants and traders in the city had already starved to death, that all but thirty of the cavalry horses had been killed for food, and that the soldiers were beginning to eat human flesh to survive.\(^76\) A few days later, the Manchus learned that the desperate Ming troops within Dalinghe were resorting to systematic cannibalism.\(^77\)

On November 7, Hung Taiji selected one of the officers who had surrendered with Zhang Chun and sent him to the city gates, where Zu Dashou spoke briefly with him. The khan wanted Zu to send one of his lieutenants to observe the conditions in the Man-

\(^{75}\) “If the great ‘red barbarian’ cannons had not been used in the attack, then Yuzizhang castle would certainly not have been easy to conquer. If this castle had not been conquered, then the rest of the forts would not have been abandoned or surrendered, but instead they would have been strongly defended. If each castle had been strongly defended, then there would have been no source of supplies and we would have had to transport them from Shenyang over a long and difficult road. Yet once Yuzizhang castle was taken, over one hundred surrounding forts heard of this and either were abandoned or surrendered. The rations we then acquired helped feed our soldiers and sustain our horses, and because of this we were able to continue the encirclement of Dalinghe. Their achievement in conquering the city was all because His Majesty had manufactured the great ‘red barbarian’ and ‘general’ cannons. From then on anyone who went out on campaign had to take along the hongyi and dajianguan cannons.” Ibid., 10:5b–6a.

\(^{76}\) Ibid., 10:4b.

\(^{77}\) Ibid., 10:6b–7a. First, they had taken the workmen who had repaired the city walls and had butchered them for meat. Then, when that supply was exhausted, they had killed the merchants and eaten their remains. After splitting and boiling their bones, they had desperately taken to culling the sick and weak from among the soldiers themselves, and slaughtered them for food.
chu camp, and shortly after that Major Han Dong came out from Dalinghe and visited the Jin headquarters briefly. When he returned to the city that evening he was able to tell Zu Dashou about the great numbers of firearms and supplies that the Manchus had captured from Zhang Chun’s army when the surrounding fort fell. For the first time since the siege began, Zu Dashou began to think seriously of surrender.78

In the meantime, the Jin khan decided to change the target of his appeal for surrender. On November 16 he wrote a letter to the people within the city and had it shot over the wall. Addressed to the commoners in the army, the letter castigated the Ming officers who were causing so much hardship to the people under their command just because they wanted to preserve their reputation by not surrendering. Referring to the cannibalism and noting that the officers would have much to answer for in the world of spirits for having eaten human flesh, Hung Taiji offered amnesty and high rank to those who would kill their officers and surrender to him.

“You all are xiao ren (small people): what fame is there for you in dying?”79 The day after that letter, another person managed to break out of Dalinghe and was picked up for questioning by a Manchu patrol. He revealed two important pieces of information. The first was that the officers were now keeping themselves alive by killing and eating members of the rank and file: the army was literally consuming itself. And the second was that Zu Dashou planned to try to break through the encirclement with his entire army on the 18th or 19th of November.80

Hung Taiji was not seriously alarmed about the possibility of a break-out. Since the beginning of the siege, his men had been steadily strengthening the moats and palisades that encircled the city, and it was very unlikely that the weakened Ming soldiers would be able to escape. Zu Dashou must have made the same es-

78 Ibid., 10:7b-8a. On November 9, the captured firearms and artillery as well as those who had surrendered when the towers fell were sent back to Shenyang with a supply column that had earlier come with provisions for the Manchus.
79 Ibid., 10:8b-9a.
80 Ibid., 10:9.
timation, because on November 18, the day planned for the sortie, an arrow was shot across the wall into the Manchu lines. It contained a letter from Zu Dashou and a letter from his eldest son, Zu Zerun, each requesting that one of Hung Taiji’s Chinese collaborators, Colonel Shi Tingzhu, come into the city to talk with them. The letters strongly implied that the commanders of Dalinghe were considering surrender.\textsuperscript{81}

The following day a negotiating party approached the southern gate of the city. It consisted of Colonel Shi, Lieutenant-Colonel Ning Wanwo, Dahai, and several other officers. Dahai spoke for the group, shouting up to Major Han Dong that they would not let Colonel Shi go into the city without a hostage of their own. After a while a man was lowered down from the wall. He claimed to be Zu Kefa, the adopted son of Zu Dashou. The negotiating party brought him back to the Ming camp, and he was taken to see Jirgalang and Yoto, then President of the Board of War and a strong supporter of the “nourishment” policy of conciliating Chinese captives.\textsuperscript{82} Zu Kefa tried to bow down before the two Manchu nobles, but Yoto refused to let him kowtow, saying: “Before this we opposed each other across the ramparts and then you were our sworn enemy. Now we have already begun peace talks and we should be as elder and younger brother. Why should you pay obeisance to us?” And so Zu Kefa, his identity now established, was seated in a position of honor beside the two Manchu nobles while Shi Tingzhu went back with the negotiating party to try to see Zu Dashou.\textsuperscript{83}

While Colonel Shi was away, Yoto had a long and important discussion with Zu Kefa—a discussion that helped the Manchus realize just how great an impact the Yongping massacre had had upon the military elite of the northeast. Yoto began by asking Zu Kefa why he and his father were so reluctant to surrender. Why would they want to die just to defend a city now mainly emptied

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 10:9b. Colonel Shi was the commander of one of two wings of Tong Yangxing’s Old Han Troops. Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, p. 797.

\textsuperscript{82} Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, p. 935. Yoto was Daisan’s eldest son and a favorite of Hung Taiji.

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Da Qing Tiazong Wen huangdi shilu}, 10:10a.
of its civilian population? Zu Kefa’s answer simply was that all of
the Chinese officers remembered what had happened at Yongping.
There the officers and commoners had all been promised kind
treatment and instead they had been killed. Yoto tried to explain
that this had been the work of one of the beile and not of Hung Taiji.
Ever since the new Jin emperor had ascended the throne, he
said, the Manchus had adopted the principle (liyi) of nourishing
the people. Had Zu Kefa not heard that the Jin emperor had a great
love for the common people because of his “humane heart and hu-
mane government”? Zu Kefa responded quite cautiously that,
yes, he had heard of the khan’s gifts of clothing and food to the poor,
and of his good treatment of the wealthy, both of which demon-
strated his virtue (de) as a ruler. Nevertheless, it was hard to forget
Yongping. There had been so many witnesses to that butchery just
a year earlier. Many of his countrymen were simply unwilling to
believe the khan now when he promised to nourish and reward
those who surrendered.84

When Shi Tingzhu returned later that evening, Zu Kefa was
taken back to the south wall and released, presumably to pass on
Yoto’s repeated reassurances to Zu Dashou and the other military
officers. Colonel Shi in the meantime reported to Hung Taiji that
the interview with General Zu had not gone as he had expected.
After being hoisted over the wall, Shi had not been taken to see Zu
Dashou as promised. Instead, he was given a message which ex-
pressed Zu’s concern about the Jin khan’s will to “accomplish the
great enterprise” (cheng da shi) of conquering China. Zu Dashou
and his men had no wish to join a Manchu khan who would soon
be withdrawing into his own territory at Shenyang, as he appeared
to have done after the occupation of Yongping. The Ming officers
had all left their immediate families behind in Jinzhou when they
came on their inspection tour to Dalinghe. To join the khan and
return with him to Shenyang meant giving up their loved ones
forever. However, if the khan was serious about “accomplishing
the great enterprise,” then the next step would be to attack Jin-
zhou. “If you acquire Jinzhou,” Zu Dashou concluded, “then

84 Ibid., 10:11.
we will also get the opportunity to see our wives and children again."\textsuperscript{85}

The next morning, November 19, two more letters were shot by bow and arrow into the Manchu camp. Both were from Zu Zerun, the general’s son: one for Colonel Shi, and one for the khan himself. The letter to Colonel Shi expressed some of the same personal concerns that Zu Dashou had voiced, while also apologizing for the rather confused situation in the city that had prevented General Zu from talking directly about all of this to the khan’s envoy. Zu Zerun explained that this was so because, just before Colonel Shi had arrived, a number of Ming officers had opposed granting an interview to the khan’s envoy. This reflected the still widespread concern that the Yongping episode might be repeated, and the officers’ preference to die with honor in the city rather than give up only to be murdered later. Zu Zerun himself favored the change of allegiance, but “my single sword was not able to overcome so many mouths.”\textsuperscript{86} His suggestion to Colonel Shi, therefore, was that the khan himself should come forward at the head of his army and call for surrender. This act would help convince the skeptics in the city that the khan did indeed intend to carry out the “great enterprise,” and would consequently sway people like himself who had left close relatives behind in Jinzhou or Yanjing (Beijing).

If the khan truly wants to accomplish the great enterprise, we will willingly lend our help. If he can make plans to take Yanjing, releasing my brother so that he can be rescued, then it is obvious that I, his elder brother, as well as the entire Zu lineage, will be deeply grateful.\textsuperscript{87}

Like his father, Zu Zerun was quite willing to help the Manchus conquer China if it would bring him back into touch with relatives who were virtual hostages of the Ming court in Beijing.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 10:10b-11a.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 10:13b.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 10:14a.
Zu Zerun’s letter to the khan was much more confiding than his letter to Colonel Shi, for reasons obvious in the text of the message itself. Zu wrote:

When you earlier sent people to invite us to surrender it was not easy to come to a decision in a word [or two], for there were a great many among the assembled officials who would not comply [with our wish to surrender]. One person said, “The khan is not the person to carry out the great enterprise (cheng da shi) [of conquering the Central Plain]. After he tricks us into surrendering he will take his army back [to Shenyang].” Another person said that this was a special trick to get us to surrender and then kill us; consequently, it was better to die than to change one’s allegiance (guishun). I addressed the crowd saying that the letter sent by the khan the day before yesterday clearly explained how there had formerly been massacres and how now there was a general policy of [guaranteeing captives’] safety. This was something everyone knew about, and there were only three people who did not believe these words and remained irresolute and troubled: He Kegang, Liu Tianlu, and Zu Zehong. He Kegang said, “The khan is not the person to accomplish the great enterprise. After taking Yongping he went back [to Shenyang]. He also slaughtered the people of Yongping. If we surrender and are released without being killed, he will still certainly go back with his army. Why [should] we surrender?” Zu Zehong of the Pingyi Brigade lied to all the Mongols to trick them into not surrendering to the khan. There were also people who had fled [from the Manchus] and who said, “The khan kills all people from enemy countries regardless of whether they are rich or poor. If anyone surrenders he will not be spared death.” This confused and confounded peoples’ intentions, and even though there had been a desire to change allegiances, all of a sudden it became hard to decide. Furthermore, General Zu also thought of his second son in Yanjing.

Let the khan order Colonel Shi to come [to the city again] and General Zu will tell him about these confidential matters. When Colonel Shi came before, General Zu wanted to meet him directly, but the assembled officials would not let him. Now I, Zerun, will arrange a compromise within [the city]. It seems as though there is more than half a chance that the great enterprise can be accomplished. That is why I have shot this letter out by bow direct to the khan so that he can send a spokesman. This is an extremely secret matter. There are many people in the city who suspect me. When
my letter arrives, keep it secret for the khan’s eyes only. Do not let any of the Han officials who were captured in battle and who are going back and forth with messages see it. There are four other colonels who share my feelings, but it is not convenient to mention their names. Therefore, I have not written them down. 88

The key to the city’s surrender, it seemed, was convincing the waverers that the “great enterprise” would be carried out; that in turn meant making concrete plans to attack Jinzhou. Hung Taiji therefore sent Shi Tingzhu out to Dalinghe again with the terse statement to Zu Dashou that: “You wish to set a plan to seize Jinzhou. Let a major official (da yuan) be sent forward for discussions.” 89 That evening Zu Kefa again came down from the city wall bearing a simple message: if the Manchus had a serious plan to attack Jinzhou right away, then he and his officers would join them. Otherwise, there was no point in surrendering. 90

Hung Taiji knew that his own army, especially now that it would likely be joined by thousands of starving men, did not have the provisions to go on and attack Jinzhou. The Manchu, Mongol, and Han troops under his command needed time to recuperate from the rigors of this campaign before attempting to take another major bastion. Yet he was unlikely to secure the surrender of this fortress unless he gave positive indication to Zu Dashou that the city of Jinzhou would soon be attacked. The khan’s solution was to entrust Zu Dashou himself with that task. Shi Tingzhu and Dahai were sent forward with the following message:

Since inviting you to surrender we have repeatedly attacked Jinzhou. We are afraid that our troops are too exhausted and that it would be difficult to plan an offensive. After you have surrendered, Jinzhou can be taken by force or seized by guile. You will be charged with this. 91

On November 20, General Zu’s answer was delivered to the khan. His plan for taking Jinzhou was almost deliberately ambiguous.

88 Ibid., 10:12-13a. 89 Ibid., 10:14a. 90 Ibid., 10:14b. 91 Ibid.
He said that he could either send a spy into Jinzhou to contact his younger brother (Zu Dale) who was on the garrison command there, though there was always the danger of the spy being caught and interrogated; or Zu Dashou could take his own troops there and pretend to be escaping from the Manchus in order to gain entry and turn the city over. In any case, “only the khan has the wisdom to decide which is better.” Whichever plan the khan chose, the die was now cast. General Zu’s letter went on to say: “I have already made up my mind to surrender. Let us swear before Heaven and Earth that the khan may kill or imprison me if I should flee or rebel once the surrender is done.”

On the morning of November 21, 1631, the gates of Dalinghe were thrown open. Two of Zu Dashou’s men escorted Colonel He Kegang outside the city wall and paraded him in front of the Manchus. He was, they said, the sole Ming officer who still refused to transfer his allegiance, and they had been ordered to execute him in front of the Jin khan. Colonel He died with dignity: he neither changed color nor uttered a cry when they killed him. But when they dragged his body back through the gate, the starving people inside fought to tear the meat from his corpse.

Soon afterward, a party of four colonels and two majors came out of the city to swear an oath to Heaven together with the khan and all his beile on behalf of Zu Dashou and thirty-seven other officers. The oath stated that if those who surrendered had been tricked and were later killed or had their wives harmed and households seized, then Heaven would inflict a punishment upon the perpetrators. Heaven would also punish any of the surrendering officers who had only pretended to change allegiance and who later fled or rebelled. After the oath was sworn by both sides, Zu Dashou formally surrendered the city. Of the 30,000 people who had been living there 82 days earlier when the siege began, only 11,682 survived.

93 Ibid., 10:15a.
94 There is a complete list of the officers who surrendered under Zu Dashou’s command in Er chen zhuàn, 4:20a–21a. For the Manchu practice of swearing an oath before Heaven, see Zheng Tianting, Tan wei ji, pp. 69–70.
95 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 10:15b–16, 20.
Later that day, Hung Taiji sent messengers to Zu Dashou's headquarters in the city, asking him to settle on a plan for taking Jinzhou. General Zu did not want to discuss the question with messengers, however, and he insisted upon seeing the khan himself. Hung Taiji was reluctant to receive Zu Dashou, warily remarking that hostilities were only just over and that inimical feelings might persist. But in the end he agreed to receive the general that same day at the hour of the first drum—seven p.m. After being invited with such hesitation, Zu Dashou expected a cool and overbearing reception. He was pleasantly surprised when the beile welcomed him in full ritual regalia one li away from the imperial encampment. And when General Zu reached the khan's tent, Hung Taiji himself came out to greet him, refused to let him kneel, and ushered him into the tent like an honored guest. Inside, as he had done with Meng Qiaofang, Hung Taiji had General Zu sit beside him and personally waited upon him, presenting him with a golden goblet, hat, riding jacket, and white horse. When the time came to serve the meal, General Zu was treated with the highest protocol, only the khan's elder brother, Daisan, ranking above him.96

In their earlier correspondence, Zu Dashou had suggested two possible plans for taking Jinzhou. Now he told the khan that the second of the two plans—which called for Zu himself to pretend that he had escaped from Dalinghe—seemed best to him.97 The khan agreed, and on the next day—November 22—he ordered several of his beile, including Dorgon, to prepare to accompany Zu Dashou to Jinzhou. The Manchu soldiers (altogether 48 officers and 4,000 rank-and-file) were told to make themselves Han clothing so that they could slip into the city along with Zu Dashou's personal contingent of 350 guardsmen. That night, however, a curious disturbance broke out in Dalinghe. Several hours before dawn shots were heard in the city, and cannons were fired. Zu Dashou and Hung Taiji both sent soldiers to investigate, but there was a heavy ground fog and whoever fired the weapons was able to escape discovery.98 The incident was without consequence,
but it seemed to disquiet Hung Taiji, who after all had earlier tried to inspire Zu’s men to mutiny against their officers. The next day he called for a meeting with all the beile, and spoke to them about his fears that Zu Dashou might rebel against them, especially if he was sent off to Jinzhou with his personal guardsmen. On the other hand, the khan went on to say, they had to accept that risk because the stakes were so high. If Zu Dashou kept his word and got Jinzhou to surrender to them, then the Ming would never again be able to use that city or Ningyuan as threats to the Manchu military power. Besides, Zu Dashou’s sons and nephews would be kept by the Manchus as, in effect, hostages; and that would give the general second thoughts about turning against them. 99

A little later that day Zu Dashou explained his scheme to the khan. He planned that evening to reach Jinzhou and enter the city on foot. He would tell people there that he had escaped from Dalinghe the night before. Instead of taking Manchus with him disguised as Han soldiers, he would persuade his own soldiers already inside Jinzhou—the ones still under his command there as brigade-general—to join him. If the governor, a man named Qiu, went along with the plan, his life would be spared; otherwise, the governor would have to be killed. If the khan heard a cannon fire on the next day, he would know that Zu Dashou had entered the city successfully; and when he heard more cannons fire on the third or fourth day, he would know that the coup had been carried out and that he could bring his own troops to the city to rejoin Zu Dashou. 100

The khan agreed to the plan. That evening after dinner with Hung Taiji, Zu Dashou and twenty-six retainers set off on horseback for Jinzhou, accompanied by Colonel Shi Tingzhu and several Manchu guardsmen. When they reached the Xiaoling River, Zu and his men dismounted. They crossed the river on foot and

99 Ibid., 10:19.
100 Ibid., 10:19b–20a. See also Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, pp. 283–284.
walked off in the darkness, heading for the walls of Jinzhou. That was the last Shi was to see of General Zu for the next ten years.101

On November 24, Hung Taiji and his men heard the sound of cannon fire from the direction of Jinzhou, but the sound was not repeated the following day nor the day after.102 Instead, on November 26, 1631, a messenger arrived at the Jin camp with word from Zu Dashou that he had made a mistake in not taking along more men. There were too many new soldiers in Jinzhou for his plan to work, for the moment at least, and he would need more time to prepare for the coup.103 Five days later, on December 1, another messenger arrived with a letter from the general. The letter described the difficulty of bringing matters to a conclusion, and repeated Zu's excuse that he had erred by not bringing more men with him to offset the number of new soldiers recently transferred to Jinzhou and now under the command of General Qiu, who remained quite suspicious of Zu Dashou's intentions.104 The governor's suspicions were all the more aroused by reports from three people who had managed to escape from Dalinghe before the city fell. For the time being, then, Zu was going to have to lie low. Because of the risk of being caught, he suggested they keep from communicating with each other for a year. Then, when the governor's suspicions had been lulled, they could resume contact and carry out their plan.105

Hung Taiji wrote guardedly back:

I would like to remain here, but how can I wait for good news? What if our fodder is depleted? It would be difficult to remain for long. Besides, while awaiting news from the general, all of the

101 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 10:20a.
102 Ibid., 10:20b.
103 Ibid., 10:20b–21a.
104 In years to come, General Zu never managed to overcome the residual suspicion of his Ming commanders. In fact, the Ming court's primary purpose in later sending Hong Chengchou to garrison Ningyuan was to keep watch over Zu Dashou lest he join his relatives in the Manchus' camp. Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, fisang, 15b.
105 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 10:22.
officers brought here to Dalinghe have in the meantime returned to Shenyang to graze their mounts and refurbish their weapons. Until the general has calculated the chances for success, what is left to say except that [I await] a speedy reply that supports my hopes? I will take care of the general’s sons and nephews myself. He need not be anxious.\(^{106}\)

This letter was never answered, nor were succeeding ones; and by 1635 it was to become clear that Zu Dashou, then fully in control of the Jinzhou garrison, was still loyal to the Ming. The khan’s gamble had been lost: Jinzhou remained in the enemy’s hands.\(^{107}\)

**Frontiersmen and Freebooters**

Despite Zu Dashou’s betrayal of the oath, the other officers—including General Zu’s sons and nephews—who had surrendered at Dalinghe remained loyal to the khan. In fact, they were to make an enormous contribution to the eventual conquest of China. By this single victory, Hung Taiji gained the support of the most experienced and able body of officers in the Ming imperial army. Many of them would go on to command armies of their own later on the Manchu side, serving Hung Taiji and his successors with considerable military distinction.\(^{108}\) For instance:

*Zu Zerun*, the eldest son of Zu Dashou, later joined the Solid Yellow Banner, and helped pacify Shanxi in 1644–1645. The following year he fought under Hong Chengchou, garrisoning Changsha and bringing Hunan under domination.\(^{109}\)

*Zu Kefa*, Dashou’s adopted son, helped plot the strategy for conquering China, persuaded Wu Sangui to join them, fought in the

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106 Ibid., 10:23.
107 Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 770. There was some pressure within the Jin court to attack Jinzhou regardless of Zu Dashou’s plans. See, for example, Luo Zhenyu, *Shiliao congkan chubian*, ce 3, zouyi (memorials), 1:4b–5a.
108 Most of them later joined the Han Bordered Yellow Banner. Sun Zhentao, *Qing shi shulun*, p. 28.
109 *Er chen zhuan*, 2:22.
decisive battle against Li Zicheng, and became brigade-general in command of the garrison of Wuchang in Hunan.  
Zu Zepu, Zerun's younger brother, became governor-general of Shanxi.  
Zu Zehong, Dashou's nephew, also joined the Solid Yellow Banner and served with distinction in several campaigns against the Ming.  
Liu Liangchen, from Beizhili, eventually joined the Bordered Yellow Banner. After serving in the armies that conquered Shanxi, he became brigade-general of the army in Gansu where he was killed fighting the White Cap Muslims in 1648.  
Liu Wu, a major at the time of the surrender, served as governor of southern Jiangxi, pacifying that area in 1646–1647. When Li Chengdong later revolted in Guangdong, joining the Prince of Gui, Liu Wu was made Vice-President of War, and he subsequently remained loyal to the dynasty and destroyed the army of Luo Rong.  
Sun Dingliao, from Liaoyang, was a colonel when Dalinghe fell. Rewarded by the Manchus with horses and silver, he was eventually attached to the Han Bordered Red Banner. He accompanied expeditions into Shanxi, fought with Dodo at Yangzhou, and helped pacify Jiangnan. Later he became commander-in-chief of the provincial army of Huguang, and was drowned during a battle against the forces of Li Xingtai, one of Zhang Xianzhong's former lieutenants.  
Zhang Cunren, from Liaoyang, was made a hereditary colonel of the first class when he surrendered. In 1636 he became President of the Censorate, although he remained a military leader. It was Zhang who suggested in 1640 and 1641 that Jinzhou be taken by sending propaganda to the Mongols inside the city, and who stressed the importance of getting Hong Chengchou to join the Manchus. In addition to serving as Jirgalang’s main artillery commander, Zhang subjugated much of Shanxi (his cannoniers were crucial in the victory at Taiyuan) under Yecen's command in 1644, and he accompanied Dodo to Henan and Jiangnan as an expert in siege warfare. Eventually, after pacifying Zhejiang and parts of Fujian, he was made governor-general of Zhili, Shandong, and Henan, dying in 1652 as a viscount.  

110 Ibid., 2:15–19.  
111 Ibid., 4:22b–23.  
112 Ibid., 2:24–25a.  
113 Ibid., 1:1–2a.  
114 Ibid., 2:20–22a.  
115 Ibid., 1:3–4.  
In fact, with the fall of Dalinghe in 1631, one can no longer speak of a war strictly between Chinese and Manchus. From that time on so much of the planning and military preparation was conducted for the Manchus by Chinese turncoats that this next stage of warfare can best be described as a struggle between the military elite of the northeastern frontier and the Ming court.\(^{117}\)

The officers who surrendered at Dalinghe were almost all from old Liaoyang frontier families which had served the Ming for generations. They were professional soldiers who lived by a strict code of personal honor. Once they made the decision to join the Manchus, they became fiercely loyal and proud followers of the khan. Two years later, another group of northeastern militarists began to join Hung Taiji's great enterprise, but their background was quite different. Liaodong freebooters originally from Shandong, these military adventurers were opportunistic and fickle. The stolid and dour Liaoyang frontiersmen thought of the other group as gamblers and drinkers, and deprecatingly called their leaders—Shang Kexi, Kong Youde, and Geng Zhongming—"The Three Miners from Shandong" (Shandong san kuangtu).\(^{118}\)

These adventurers had much in common: service under the Pidao warlord Mao Wenlong (who had been executed in front of

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\(^{117}\) "The Manchu military power was based on an alliance between Manchus and Mongols, and an amalgamation between the Manchus and the 'highly regional' Chinese of the 'reservoir.' This early grouping was perpetuated in regional subdivisions which had much of the character of 'spheres of interest,' which persisted up to the beginning of the modern period." Owen Latimore, *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict*, p. 43.

\(^{118}\) Luo Zhenyu, *Shiliao congkan chubian*, ce 4, zouyi 2:23a. Ning Wanwo, no mean drinker and gambler himself, so styled them in a formal memorial, in which he also declared that they were "without shape or shadow," mere robbers devoid of military talent. See also Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," p. 146. Shang Kexi was from a Liaodong military family, and his father had been killed in battle while serving the Ming. *Er chen zhuan*, 2:23–30; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 635–636. Kong Youde's family members had emigrated to Liaodong from Shandong, where they were supposed to be related to the Qufu Kongs. *Er chen zhuan*, 1:5–13; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 435–436. Geng Zhongming's family was also resident in Liaodong. *Er chen zhuan*, 4:26–29; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 416–417.
his troops by Yuan Chonghuan in 1629), advanced training with European artillery (arranged by the governor of Shandong, Sun Yuanhua), some experience in maritime warfare (learned while sailing back and forth from the Shandong peninsula to the islands off Liaodong and Korea), and an ability to attract devoted followers (who formed semi-feudal armies of liegemen completely under their own control). Several of them were later to become enfeoffed as the famous San Fan (Three Feudatories), whose rebellion against the Manchus in the 1670s nearly destroyed the new dynasty. Although the history of their origins is complicated, it illustrates not only their own social characteristics, but also the breakdown of Ming control over the northern seacoast as well.

When Yuan Chonghuan, the Ming commander-in-chief of the northeast, had killed Mao Wenlong in the summer of 1629, he had assumed that he could bring Mao’s lieutenants and their men under control. Some were amenable. Chen Ji, for instance, allowed himself to be enrolled in a regular Ming unit, as did Shang Kexi, who joined General Huang Long to fight against some of his former comrades-in-arms in open rebellion on the island base of Pidao. Others were not so tractable. Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming, who had earned military distinction in the Yalu campaign of 1621 under Mao, refused to accept Huang Long’s orders. Instead, they abandoned Pidao and crossed the gulf to Dengzhou, headquarters of the governor of Shandong, Sun Yuanhua. It is some indication of the military decentralization of the time that Sun Yuanhua was able to enlist these deserters in his own ranks. Kong Youde, for example, was made a lieutenant-colonel in the cavalry, and Geng Zhongming was assigned to the Dengzhou garrison, which was where Governor Sun cast his European-style cannons with the help of Portuguese soldiers under the command of Texeira Correa.

Sun Yuanhua was, in fact, closely involved with Zu Dashou’s military efforts in northeastern China. Governor Sun supervised

119 Dengzhou is modern Penglai.
the campaign of 1630 in which General Zu recovered Yongping, and he also ordered that Dalinghe’s walls be strengthened—which was the very activity which Zu Dashou had come north to inspect when he was suddenly encircled and besieged. When news reached Sun Yuanhua of the siege, he ordered Kong Youde to take 800 cavalrymen and join the forces at Jinzhou trying to relieve the garrison at Dalinghe. The trip north was not easy. Already, the first snows of winter had fallen, and even though the troops had permits to do so, they were unable to draw official rations enroute. Kong Youde’s orders notwithstanding, the men soon became surly and began looting. After consulting with one of his own lieutenants, Kong Youde decided to turn back into eastern Shandong and transform this random looting into a more concerted attack upon the cities of the area. On February 22, 1632, with the help of Geng Zhongming, Kong and his marauders captured Dengzhou. During the assault Texeira Correa and all but three of his Portuguese artillerymen were killed. Governor Sun Yuanhua was allowed to leave unharmed, although he was later arrested and executed by the Ming authorities for dereliction. The city of Dengzhou itself was soon transformed by Kong Youde into a base for other Liaodong freebooters who joined Kong’s Duyuan Army to raid the surrounding countryside and besiege Laizhou, the other major Ming garrison in the region.

Although Laizhou was able to resist the siege for six months, the Ming court was afraid that this separatist regime would soon control all of eastern Shandong. Assembling garrison troops from Baoding and Tianjin, the Ministry of War organized a major expeditionary force under Zu Dashou’s brother-in-law, General Wu Xiang. General Wu was also accompanied on this campaign by his own son, Wu Sangui, who was a military juren. After Kong Youde

122 In addition to Geng Zhongming, Li Yingyuan and his father Jiucheng, Chen Youshi, Mao Chenglu, and Chen Guangfu all acknowledged Kong Youde as their king (wang). These men came from some of the islands in the Zhili Gulf (Guanglu, for example, was occupied by Mao Chenglù) or from Lushun (later Port Arthur). Kong Youde set up an administration and had seals manufactured. *Er chen zhuan*, 1:1–3; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 686.
had lost several of his lieutenants in battles with this force of Liaodong men still loyal to the Ming, he decided to abandon Dengzhou and try to escape by sea to Liaodong. Kong lost more of his men in a series of running naval battles with Huang Long's patrol boats and Korean naval forces. Nevertheless, when Kong finally did reach Yunhean on the Liaodong coast, he and Geng Zhongming still had nearly 14,000 followers, including their soldiers' families. There they were greeted by Manchu emissaries, sent by Hung Taiji to garrison the seacoast and to await their arrival. After the Manchu forces helped them beat off their pursuers, Kong and Geng were given gold, feasts, and promises of land for settlement near Liaoyang if they would join the Manchus. On May 24, 1633, Kong and Geng pledged allegiance to the Jin khan; and, after being personally welcomed at Shengjing where they presented Hung Taiji with cannons, they were allowed to take their "Heavenly Protected Troops" (Tian you bing) and live together at Dongjing, a newly built city north of Liaoyang.

During the skirmishes with the Liaodong freebooters, General Huang Long was killed. His successor as commander of the Ming forces, Shen Shikui, deeply mistrusted Mao Wenlong's former lieutenant, Shang Kexi, who was then entrenched on Guanlu Island. Fearful of a mutiny, Shen determined to strike first. Receiving intelligence of this proposed attack, Shang Kexi planned to flee to Pidao Island, but a series of winter storms kept him from shipping his army there. Instead, he temporized in December, 1633, by sending messengers to the Ming court with a large sum of money, and Shen was forced to cancel his plans for an attack. In

123 Li Jiucheng and Chen Youshi were killed.
124 Li Yingyuan was killed; Mao Chenglu and Chen Guangfu were captured. Huang Long also killed Geng Zhongming's younger brother, Zhongge, who was serving under him and who plotted a revolt.
125 Kong led 8,014, and Geng had a contingent of 5,866. Luo Zhenyu, Shiliao congkan shubian, ce 4, zouyi 2:24.
the meantime Shang Kexi contacted the Manchus, and presented them with plans for capturing several Ming bases in the area, including the island of Shicheng. They in turn invited him to join the Jin cause. In February, 1634, Shang transported his entourage of several thousand households, plus military baggage, by boat to the mainland and marched to Shenyang. There he was warmly greeted by Hung Taiji. His 2,000 soldiers were renamed the “Heavenly Assisted Troops” (Tian zhu bing) and were settled at Haizhou, south of Liaoyang. Like Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming, Shang Kexi kept personal control over his army.127

The Liaodong marauders continued to remain apart from the other Han forces. Though nominally attached to the regular military command, they actually answered only to their own commanders, to whom they swore oaths of fealty and obedience.128 In contrast, the troops that had surrendered at Dalinghe were incorporated into the Old Han Army (Jiu Han jun), which enjoyed great prestige after the artillery victory there. After Tong Yangxing died in 1632, Ma Guangyuan assumed command of this army, which became during the next decade the nucleus for the Chinese Eight Banners. In 1637, as it continued to grow in size, the Old Han Army was divided into two wings under Ma and Shi Tingzhu; and two years later these were divided again to form Four Banners.129 In 1642, the Four Banners were divided once more to form Eight Banners.130 By then the Dalinghe adherents, along with the Old Han Army, had been completely reformed and

128 Kanda Nobuo, “The Role of San-fan in the Local Politics of Early Ch’ing,” passim. Kanda makes a convincing case for the “feudal” character of the Three Feudatories’ armies, and especially that of Wu Sangui.
129 Zheng, Tan wei ji, p. 56.
130 Wu, “Eight Banners,” pp. 21–23; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 797; Er chen zhuan, 7:17–19a. At this time the “Heavenly Protected Troops” and the “Heavenly Assisted Troops” were nominally joined with the Chinese banners, but this amounted to no more than registration of their officers as affiliates of individual banners. Kong Youde was made a member of the Plain Red Banner; Geng Zhongming, a member of the Plain Yellow Banner; and Shang Kexi, a member of the Bordered White Banner.
organized into companies patterned after the Manchu banner companies with their reservists and attached households. Their military commanders—the company captains—were in effect local government leaders, charged with the administration of the civil, fiscal, social, educational, and judicial affairs of the members of his group. Unlike the Manchu banner companies, however, these Chinese banners did not have Vanguards or Guards. Rather, they were simply divided into cavalrymen, armed with firearms (unlike the Manchus and Mongols who only used bows), and infantrymen who were foot archers.

The Chinese soldiers who joined Hung Taiji between 1631 and 1633 greatly enhanced the Manchus' capacity to wage war, but they also constituted an additional drain upon the economy. "Now our country has several tens of thousands of men under arms and our power has expanded," the Old Manchu Records commented in 1632, "but this year there is not enough food; the granaries are empty." There was thus considerable incentive to raid outside of Liaoxi, either to the west into Inner Mongolia where there were good grazing lands and horse markets, or down into the Central Plain across the Great Wall. In 1632, expeditions were sent to engage the Chahar Mongols in battle and to open a trading post at Kalgan (Zhangjiakou). And in 1634, the Manchus invaded Shanxi, attacking Datong and Daizhou with the aid of Kong Youde and his men. That same year yet another expedition of about

131 "The position of a hosoi prince in his banner was not feudal but political and administrative." Wu, "Eight Banners," p. 40. The banners were therefore perfectly designed for incorporating soldiers and their families once they surrendered to the Manchus. For instance, the banners incorporated captured Russians under their own captains, some of whom were fugitives from the Tsar's justice. Lo-shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, p. 8.

132 Wu, "Eight Banners," p. 31. The standard firearm, of which there are examples in the weapons collection in the former Manchu palace in Shenyang, was unrifled and about 50 caliber in size. The barrel, which was approximately 18 inches long, was cast with a fluted end to fit into a stock. The charge was set off with a single wick.


134 Ibid., p. 171; Huang-Ts'ing k'ai-kuo, pp. 296–302.

135 Huang-Ts'ing k'ai-kuo, pp. 341–344.
11,000 soldiers was sent into Inner Mongolia, where they defeated the Chahar Mongols, led by Ligdan (Lindan) Khan, and won the support of other Southern Mongol tribes. In addition to becoming important military allies, the tribesmen of Inner Mongolia constituted an essential source for supplying the Manchus with horses. The Ming army, which in the early 15th century had been supplied with 1,700,000 horses, was by now hard put to maintain 100,000 regular mounts for its cavalry. By taking over the Chahar breeding grounds and either raising horses of their own through the Imperial Stud or purchasing them from other Southern Mongols in exchange for grain and silk, the Manchus were able both to outfit themselves with sufficient mounts to fight the Ming and to prevent the Ming from getting those Mongol mounts themselves.

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136 Ibid., pp. 362–367; Wu, "Eight Banners," pp. 16, 34. Ligdan Khan was the last direct descendant of the 13th-century Mongol khans. Although he had tried to unify the Mongols, his greed for others' property and wealth had alienated many of the Mongol chiefs, who abandoned him when the Manchus attacked. Ligdan fled to the west and died in 1634. The following year, his son submitted to Hung Taiji, who thereby controlled most of the Mongols of Inner Mongolia. Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia from 1368 to the Present, p. 113.

137 S.A.M. Adshead, "Horse Administration under the Ch'ing," Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," p. 171. Because of the Mongol threat, early Ming rulers were quick to realize the importance of having an adequate supply of remounts for their armies. Ming Taizu ordered established a Pasturage Office (Yuanma si) which maintained 24 grazing zones in Shaanxi. By the end of the 15th century, however, only 6 of these remained, the rest having been taken over by Chinese farmers. The main supply of horses, therefore, came from tribal sources in the northeast, where 300,000 taels a year of silk and silver were exchanged for livestock, and in the northwest, where a special Tea Horse Office (Cha ma si) was set up to monopolize the sale of Sichuanese tea leaves in exchange for barbarian mounts. Initially, about 1 million jin of tea leaves were annually exchanged for 14,000 horses. The Oirat invasions of 1449, under Essen, completely devastated Ganzhou and Ningxia, driving horse traders out of the area. Though efforts were made during the Chenghua (1465–1487) and Zhengde reigns to revive the tea-horse trade, the state lost its monopoly and the supply of good horses consequently declined. The Mongol chief Yibula's invasion of Kokonor in 1509 and the Turfan chief Mansur's occupation of Hami in 1513 curtailed the trade
The New Manchu Mandate

The Manchu victories over the Chahar Mongols in 1634–1635 had another unforeseen consequence. During the campaign, the Manchus captured the great seal of the Mongol khan. This meant that Hung Taiji could call himself the successor to Chinggis Khan and the Yuan emperors.138 The new designation not only elevated his stature in Inner Asia, where he took on more and more the trappings of a universal king, including the sponsorship of the Tibetan Buddhism that the Mongols believed in; it also established an even stronger claim to the emperorship of China than his connection with the earlier Jin dynasty had done.139

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even further. By 1600 only about 3,000 horses a year were being purchased, and these were mainly mild-tempered geldings which were no match for Mongol and Manchu stallions bred for battle. Morris Rossabi, “The Tea and Horse Trade with Inner Asia during the Ming,” pp. 137–160; Rossabi, Inner Asia, pp. 82–83; Ray Huang, Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China, pp. 260–261.

139 Oshibuchi Hajime, “Shinchō zenki shakai zakkō,” p. 306. The link between the Mongol khanate and Buddhism was forged by Altan Khan in the 16th century. In 1578, at his invitation, the head of the ‘Bras-spuns Yellow Sect monastery in Lhasa met with a delegation of Mongol princes on the banks of the Kokonor River. The Tibetan dignitary Bṣod-nams-rgya-mtšo was given the title of “Universal Lama” (Dalai Lama); and he in turn declared Altan Khan to be the reincarnation of the emperor Qubilai. At the time of the Manchu expansion, the Tushetu Khan, who had been invested as leader of the Khalka Mongols north of the Gobi in Outer Mongolia by the Dalai Lama, declared that his own son was a “living buddha” and the embodiment of the messianic Maitreya. This effort to unify the Khalka Mongols under a theocratic leader failed, however, because the Eastern Khalka, under Setsen Khan in the Kerulen River basin, refused to accept the leadership of the Western Khalka. As early as 1637, some of these Khalka Mongols began offering tribute to the Manchus. L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, pp. 8–9; Rossabi, Inner Asia, pp. 112–115; Larry William Moses, The Political Role of Mongol Buddhism, pp. 92–93, 104–106. Privately Hung Taiji was contemptuous of the Mongols’ belief in Buddhism, thinking that it vitiated their cultural identity. “The Mongolian princes are abandoning the Mongolian language; their names are all in imitation of the lamas.” Nevertheless, in 1637 he invited the fifth Dalai Lama to
Hung Taiji was ambivalent about the prospect of ruling China. He sought the title of emperor, but he did not necessarily aspire to the dragon throne in Beijing. His major Chinese advisors—Ning Wanwo (who fell from favor in 1635 because of his addiction to gambling), Fan Wencheng, and Ma Guozhu—frequently urged him to attack China and occupy the Central Plain.\(^{140}\) Hung Taiji maintained, however, that he was not bent upon conquest. Rather, he was at war with the Ming state (\textit{guo}) because it refused to reply to his peace feelers.\(^{141}\) During the siege of Dalinghe, the khan had

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\text{Shenyang; in 1638 he completed the construction of a Yellow Temple to house the Yuan period statue of Mahakala, the flame-shrouded manifestation of Siva; and in 1640 the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama sent a letter to him which recognized him as a bodhisattva and which called him “Mañjuśrī-Great-Emperor.” David M. Farquhar, “Emperor as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the Ch‘ing Empire,” pp. 19–21; Walther Heissig, \textit{The Religions of Mongolia}, p. 32.}
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\(^{140}\) Li Yuandu, \textit{Guochao xianzheng}, 1:1b, and 2:9b; Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, p. 592; Oxnam, \textit{Horseback}, p. 30. In 1633 Hung Taiji had asked the \textit{beile} which he should subdue first: the Ming dynasty (\textit{chao}) or the Chahar Mongols. Dorgon, the future prince-regent, had selected the former, proposing that they capture and occupy Yanjing (Beijing). Zu Kefä had seconded this suggestion, pointing out that once the capital of the empire fell, the rest of the country was sure to come under their dominion too. Hung Taiji, however, felt that their strength was insufficient. Then, on March 21, 1635, a Ming \textit{shengyuan}, Shen Peirui, who had earlier joined the Manchus, submitted a memorial to Hung Taiji with the same suggestion. Shen pointed out that because the Ming armies were now mainly devoted to defeating the “wandering bandits” in the west, the Manchus could attack with impunity from the east. At the very least, this would force the Ming government to enter into negotiations on terms more favorable for the Manchus. Zheng Kecheng, “Duoergun,” pp. 4–5. That same year, 1635, Zhang Wenheng also argued: “This is just the time to take China. This is the opportunity to enter. . . . Only in the southeast there is no trouble, and even there the people are squeezed by corvée. Now, when east and west cannot protect each other, is the opportune time for us to enter China. . . . If at this time, which is given by Heaven, when the people are following you, you make a sincere effort, Heaven will support the Khan.” Roth Li, “Early Manchu State,” pp. 136–137. See also \textit{Huang-Ts‘ing k’ai-kuo}, p. 387.

\(^{141}\) Dahai told Zhang Chun at the time of his capture that they were at war because the Ming government had refused to respond to the six or seven messages sent by Hung Taiji requesting negotiations. \textit{Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu}, 9:45.
written Zu Dashou that he was absolutely sincere about negotiating a peace treaty with the Ming court, and that Ming officials were making a great error in likening such negotiations to the appeasement policies of the Northern Song. "Neither is your Ming ruler a descendant of the Song nor are we heir to the Jin. That was another time." And a little later when his ministers advised him to try to take Beijing, he is supposed to have said, somewhat vain-gloriously, that "The Ming have not been on good terms with our people, and it would be very easy to conquer them now. But I am aware of what an unbearable act it is to overthrow the ruler of China."

Yet Hung Taiji also appreciated the historical connection between strong centralized authority and Chinese imperial rule. As the history of the former Jin dynasty revealed, when the Jurchen had assumed direct control of North China in 1140, the Jin khan, as emperor, had vastly increased his own power at the expense of the tribal aristocracy. The trouble was, while sinification en-

142 Ibid., 9:31b.
143 This statement by Hung Taiji was quoted by the Kangxi Emperor. Spence, Emperor, p. 144. After the fall of Dalinghe, several Chinese ministers tried to persuade Hung Taiji to attack China. On May 8, 1632, Ning Wanwo sent in a memorial arguing that Dalinghe fell because of the "inner disorder" (nei huan) of China, and that the time had arrived to attack the "southern dynasty" (nan chao) and seize Shanhaiguan. (Even to speak of a "southern dynasty" was to imply parity, and hence rivalry for hegemony, with the Ming, as was obvious from the treaty of Shanyuan in 1004 described in the Liao dynastic history; see Suzanne E. Cahill, "Taoism at the Sung Court," p. 24.) Luo Zhenyu, Shiliao congkan chubian, ce 3, zouyi 1:14. On August 26, 1633, Zu Kefa told the emperor that if Beijing were captured, then all of the cities elsewhere in China would surrender; and all that they needed to do to capture Beijing was to take Shanhaiguan. Ibid., ce 4, zouyi 2:32b–33a. But Hung Taiji continued to reject this advice. In fact, in 1634 when he attacked China and rode under the walls of Datong, he again announced his willingness to discuss peace. Ren Changzheng, "Qing Taizu Taizong shidai Ming Qing he zhan kao," p. 49.
144 "The result was the enforced transformation of the Jurchen tribal organization into a sinicized political system with much more centralized authority in the central government than that of the Northern Sung." Jing-shen Tao, "The Influence of Jurchen Rule on Chinese Political Institutions," p. 127. Hung Taiji ordered on July 4, 1635, that special attention be paid to the his-
hanced the emperor's authority, it also corrupted the military values of the Jurchen warriors. The same thing could easily happen to the Manchus, and Hung Taiji feared that his people might be transformed from great hunters and fighters into wastrels who "hang around the marketplaces and simply amuse themselves." Thus, whereas he had strongly promoted Confucian education for the sons of Manchu and Chinese officials and openly favored Chinese collaborators during the early years of his reign, by the mid-1630s Hung Taiji was much more concerned with maintaining Manchu values and tribal virtues.

Hung Taiji's worries about sinification were aroused at this time precisely because the "great enterprise" was becoming more of a likelihood than ever before. With most of Mongolia unified under his banner and Korea nominally his vassal, Hung Taiji felt that he had acquired a mandate to assert his own independent rights to a Chinese form of emperorship quite apart from the historical legacy inherited from the Former Jin monarchy, or the religious kingship legitimized by Tibetan Buddhism. Taking the name of "Manchu" for his people, the khan proceeded on May 14, 1636, to change the name of his dynasty from Jin to Qing ("pure").

145 Roth Li, "Early Manchu State," p. 181. As Hung Taiji grew more fearful that later generations of Manchus would forget their native culture, his attitude towards Dorgon became ambivalent. Although he entrusted great responsibilities to Dorgon, he was suspicious of his brother precisely because Dorgon was sponsoring measures that led to greater sinification. Zheng Kecheng, "Duoergun," p. 1.


147 According to the Veritable Records, on May 12 the khan—now Emperor Wen—assembled his officials and began the first of many elaborate rites required to change both the reign era (from Tiancong to Chongde) and dynastic (from Jin to Qing) names. Hung Taiji—now Taizong in the chronicles—announced the change as being in accord with Heaven, stressing that the Korean court (whose envoy was present) had recognized his suzerainty, and that Mongolia had now been unified (tongyi), so that the under-Heaven (tianxia) was now filled with their country's presence. Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 28:17b–22. The Manchus believed that the sovereign ruled by virtue of a Heavenly Mandate: Chinese tianming, Manchu abkai fulingga.
Hung Taiji, who reigned as Taizong from 1636 to 1643. Guoli Beiping gugong bowuyuan wenxian guan, comp., *Qingdai di hou xiang* (Beijing, 1934).
cian rituals which ushered in the new reign era, his own title as emperor was confirmed even more emphatically in his subjects' eyes; and after this date he is better known by his Han imperial name, Taizong, than by his Manchu-Mongol name as khan, Hung Taiji.

Yet even as Taizong was founding a dynasty that claimed its own Mandate of Heaven in universalistic Chinese terms—abandoning the particularistic legitimation of his distant Jurchen forebears—the new Qing emperor continued to look back to the Jin for instructive guidance. For, Taizong—who wished to prevent the sinification of his society while sinifying the polity—knew that the history of the Jin offered valuable lessons for the present. On December 9, 1636, he therefore assembled all of the princes of the blood, beile, gusa ejen, grand secretaries, and other high officials, and told them that they should each read the basic annals of the Jin Emperor Shizong (r. 1161–1189). Shizong, he said, was one of the greatest rulers of all time: a monarch so wise that he deserved to be called a "little Yao or Shun," after the sage-kings of classical antiquity. The reason for this was that after the auspicious reigns of the early Jin emperors (Taizu, 1115–1122; and Taizong, 1123–1134), when the Central Plain was conquered, the Jin dynasty had entered a period of decline. The Emperor Xizong (r. 1135–1148) had "copied the evil customs of the Han people," becoming fond of liquor and sex.148 But when Shizong took the throne, there was a great revival of Jurchen customs. The emperor forbade his sons to copy Chinese habits and thus perpetuated the military vigor of the dynasty.149 The Manchus should take warning from this, Taizong said. If they as a people adopted Chinese clothing, with its cum-
bersome wide sleeves, and started carrying their bows on the left, forgetting the skills of horseback riding and archery, then the doro would be destroyed and the country would fall.

We are stating these words really for the consideration of our sons, grandsons, and their myriad descendants. How could we have any reason to change ourself? Yet we fear that hereafter our sons and grandsons will forget the old regulations and do away with horseback riding and archery in order to copy Han customs. That is why we are constantly gripped with this anxiety. The reason for our dynasty's [success] is because our officers and men are adept at horseback riding and archery. Hence, when they battle in the open, they win; when they attack a city, they seize it. Throughout the under-Heaven it is said of our troops: when they take a stand, they do not waver; when they advance, they never look back.150

Taizong's message was quite plain: he, like Shizong, would keep his people's martial vigor alive by perpetuating the old tribal customs. This was how the Manchus were going to reconcile the quest for power with its attainment, the search for victory with its fruits.151

During the next few years, Taizong continued to expand Manchu control over northeastern Asia. In December, 1638, after pillaging Baoding in the Central Plain, his Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese bannermen, along with the armies of Shang Kexi, Kong Youde, and Geng Zhongming (who were now enfeoffed as princes), invaded Korea—conquering that monarchy in less than two months.152 Then the Manchus turned their attention to the Ming naval base at Pidao, which was still occupied by Shang Kexi's for-


151 Taizong's growing nativism made him less responsive than earlier to Chinese advisers who struggled to improve the status of Han prisoners. In 1638, General Zhu Shichang, who had surrendered to Nurhaci, criticized the practice of making female prisoners caitiffs. For this, General Zhu was accused by Taizong of being a traitor, secretly in sympathy with the enemy. Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 9.

mer adversary, the warlord Shen Shikui. The Qing forces, including Shang Kexi’s men, stormed Pidao Island, killing Shen Shikui. His nephew, Shen Zhixiang, managed to escape to Shicheng, the other main Ming naval base in the gulf, with 4,000 members of the Pidao garrison. However, there was soon a falling out between Shen Zhixiang and the Ming court, and he turned coat to join the Manchus with his entire army.\footnote{153}

By 1639, then, Taizong had militarily subjugated both Korea and Inner Mongolia, and he had gained complete control of the Liaodong seacoast and the northern reaches of the Gulf of Zhili. Flanks secure, he proceeded to send a series of military expeditions north into the Amur Basin to subdue tribesmen there, while at the same time continuing to probe the Ming defenses guarding the Great Wall on the south. It had been, after all, six years since Zu Dashou had promised to open the gates of Jinzhou to him, and the Qing emperor evidently decided that the moment had finally come to take some action. Dodo, Shang Kexi, and Kong Youde attacked Jinzhou, but even though Ma Guangyuan’s artillerymen bombarded the city walls, the assault troops were repelled by Zu Dashou’s men and their Mongol auxiliaries. A second attack in 1640 also failed. In 1641, Hung Taiji therefore decided personally to devote all of his military efforts to conquering that city and the neighboring fortress of Songshan, 18 li away, which had a regular garrison of 3,000 soldiers.\footnote{154}

\footnotetext{153}{After his uncle’s death, Shen Zhixiang had taken over the warlord’s army as well as his rank of brigade-general. The court contested that self-arrogation, driving him into the Manchus’ arms. General Shen became a valuable adherent to the Manchus. He fought at Shanhaiguan against Li Zicheng, and he helped Kong Youde occupy Hunan, receiving a ducal title from the Qing emperor for his military accomplishments. \textit{Er chen zhuan}, 7:20–21a.}

\footnotetext{154}{\textit{Da Qing Tiazong Wen huangdi shilu}, 55:4b; Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, p. 769; \textit{Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo}, pp. 527–529.}
The Conquest of Songshan

The Ming commander-in-chief of the frontier defenses at that time was Hong Chengchou, a southerner from Fujian who had passed his jinshi examination in 1616. Though a civil servant, his accomplishments during the major part of his career had been mainly military. Hong had a genius for logistics, and he first came into prominence in the late 1620s in Shaanxi, collecting and providing military supplies for the Ming armies fighting bandits and rebels in the northwest. After he repelled Wang Zuogua's attack on Yizhou in 1629, his talents were quickly recognized. By 1631 he had become commander-in-chief of the Ming armies in northern Shaanxi, directly attacking the rebels there rather than buying them off with amnesties or military positions as his predecessor, Yang He, had done. In 1634, the supreme commander of all the campaigns, Chen Qiyu, was dismissed for precisely that error, having offered amnesties to Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong, who simply turned around and became rebels all over again. Hong Chengchou succeeded him as the military governor-general for five entire provinces (Henan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Huguang), and in 1638 he defeated Li Zicheng decisively at the famous pass called Tongguan, chasing him deep into the mountains for over a year. Perhaps because his own increasing stature as a regional viceroy frightened the court, Hong was impeached by Yang Sichang, Minister of War; but after a demotion, Hong was again called upon by the Chongzhen Emperor to assume a leading military position, being named in 1639 to the governor-generalship of the Ji-Liao border zone, and thus charged with holding the line in northeastern Zhili and Liaodong against the Qing armies.

Now realizing from the reports reaching him that the Manchus were mustering their best troops against Jinzhou and Songshan,

155 For a summary of Hong Chengchou's military activities against the rebels in Shaanxi, see Li Guangtao, "Hong Chengchou," pp. 229–231.
156 Chen had trapped the rebels in southeastern Shaanxi. He accepted their surrender, but when they were being sent under guard to their home districts, they rebelled and killed their guards. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 85.
Hong Chengchou immediately sent 10,000 soldiers to bolster Songshan, and then as many more soldiers as he could, drawing in reinforcements from garrisons like Xuanfu and Datong within the Great Wall. When these were combined with the regular frontier forces at Ningyuan under newly promoted Brigade-General Wu Sangui, who was Zu Dashou’s nephew, the total came to 130,000 men and 40,000 horses. However, Minister of War Chen Xinjia refused to allow Hong Chengchou to bring all of these men together into a single army which would march north en masse. Against Hong Chengchou’s strenuous objections, Minister Chen insisted on splitting the army into four different groups. When the columns converged—less an army than a horde—on the misty coastal circle of mountains, there was little sense of a unified command. Instead, seven different encampments were set up pell-mell, and no provision was made for a coordinated plan of battle. On September 23, to their dismay, the Ming forces learned that

158 On April 25, 1641, the Ministry of War received an intelligence report from an escaped banner slave of a large military convoy, armed with more than 30 da hongyi cannons, reaching Yizhou, a few kilometers northeast of Jinzhou. The force was commanded by Jirgalang, who proceeded to invest Jinzhou. Mongol mercenaries guarding the outside walls of the Ming garrison were suborned to surrender their positions, and although Zu Dashou’s men tried to prevent their defection, the Ming soldiers had to retreat into the fortress defended by the inner walls. There they had supplies enough to withstand many months of siege, but they took heavy casualties from artillery barrages laid down by Chinese bannermen and by a contingent of Korean artillerymen. The Koreans, who were reluctant allies of the Manchus, mainly succumbed to disease during the campaign. Meanwhile, the Ming court sent Supervising Secretary Zhang Ruqi to confer with Hong Chengchou, who advised extreme caution in the face of this onslaught. Zhang, on the other hand, saw this as an opportunity for the Ming armies to crush the enemy in one decisive set-piece engagement and therefore “urged battle” (cui zhan). For this ill-advised strategy he was later impeached. Wu Han, comp., Chaoyxian Li chao shilu zhong de Zhongguo shiliao, pp. 3680, 3683–3686; Li, “Hong Chengchou,” pp. 231–233, 236–237; Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 59:11a.

159 Li, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 234.

160 Ibid., p. 235.

161 The coastal plain was riven by mountain torrents which flowed into the sea. There is a vivid description of the battleground given by the Korean commander Yu Im to his king on November 11, 1641. Wu Han, Chaoyxian Li chao shilu, pp. 3686–3687.
the Manchu khan himself was at the head of the large Qing force that was even now reaching the ten-kilometer stretch between Jinzhou and Songshan. Panic began to spread among the Ming ranks. The following night, in the early hours of the morning, the Qing army attacked. The result was a rout. Generals Bai Guang’en, Li Fuming, and Tang Tong seized boats and took to sea with their remnant forces; Wu Sangui fell back with his men upon Ningyuan; and Hong Chengchou fled toward Songshan, where he and his men sought refuge within the fortress walls. By dawn’s light on September 25, the Manchu victors counted 53,783 Han corpses strewn “like geese and ducks” along the shoreline between Songshan and Rufengshan.  

News of the debacle at Songshan precipitated a fresh policy debate at the Ming court. A considerable number of officials argued for a military truce (xì bìng). But the prevailing opinion, expressed by Supervising Secretary Zhang Jinyan, was that cessation of hostilities not only meant abandoning Hong Chengchou and his men; it also was tantamount to relinquishing the Songshan–Jinzhou salient, which would put the defenses of Shanghaiguan in jeopardy. The emperor therefore commanded Wu Sangui, Bai Guang’en, and Li Fuming to reassemble their armies south of Songshan while an amphibious landing was to be made farther up the coast by 8,000 marines under the banner of Liu Yingguo. At the same time, Chongzhen also ordered the forces at Songshan to be prepared to sally forth when the reinforcements arrived.


163 A staff officer had managed to slip through the encircling Manchu lines to report on the plight of Hong Chengchou and his remnants at Songshan. He estimated that their supplies would run out by early spring, 1642, and pleaded for a relief expedition. Ming-Qing shiliao, yi, p. 337, cited in Li, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 239. Other estimates from the garrison at Datong were even more pessimistic because, under normal conditions, 3,000 piculs of grain were consumed by the horses and men in Songshan every day. Ming-Qing shiliao, yi, p. 335, cited in Li, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 239.

164 Ming tiben (routine memorial), cited in Li, “Hong Chengchou,” pp. 239–240.

The rescue mission faltered for lack of troops. According to a report from the Ming Ministry of War, the forces actually available for the expedition only amounted to 20,000 soldiers and 8,000 horses, whereas the entire Liaoxi littoral from Jinzhou to Songshan was filled with enemy troops. Moreover, the Manchu encirclement of both Songshan and Jinzhou was extremely difficult to break through, and the blockade was already taking a physical toll upon the defenders, who were gradually being forced to butcher their warhorses for food. In the end, half-heartedly, the Ming court gave up plans for the amphibious landing and despatched a mere 3,000 soldiers overland from Shanhaiguan to try to break through and rescue the demoralized men besieged behind the northern outposts’ walls.

Hong Chengchou did try to breach the Qing encirclement, but the soldiers that he sent out to clear the way for a sortie were soundly defeated by Han troops fighting alongside Bordered and Solid White Banners, and the survivors retreated back into the city. In January, 1642, another force of 6,000 infantry and cavalry was sent out, hoping to meet the column of 3,000 men being sent from Shanhaiguan to relieve them. This effort turned into a dis-

166 The forces available for the expedition were: 10,000 soldiers and 5,000 mounts commanded by Wu Sangu; 5,000 soldiers and 2,500 mounts under Bai Guang’en; and 5,000 soldiers and 500 mounts under Li Fuming. Ma Ke had an additional 6,500 men and 3,400 horses, and Tang Tong had about 10,000 troops, but these were guarding the passes at the Great Wall and could not be transferred. Ming-Qing shiliao, yi, p. 338, cited in Li, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 238.

167 Li, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 228. By December, 1641, the Manchus had dug moats all around the beleaguered cities, and had erected a palisade of stakes, topped with belled ropes and guarded by watchdogs. Ming-Qing shiliao, yi, p. 337, cited in Ibid., p. 239. Songshan’s water supply was partially cut off, and as of October 18, 1641, when two soldiers broke out of the blockade, there were only three months of food supply left. Two bowls of rice were being distributed every five days to the soldiers. Ming-Qing shiliao, yi, pp. 331, 336, cited in Li, “Hong Chengchou,” pp. 236, 239.


169 The Han commander on the Qing side was the artillery expert Tong Guoyin, who was Tong Yangxìng’s grandson. Li Yuandu, Guochao xianzheng, 2:26b.

170 Because of heavy snows, the main body of Qing soldiers had returned to
The reinforcements lost their nerve and refused to venture beyond Ningyuan, and Hong’s men who sallied forth at night, ran into the Manchu Solid Red and Yellow Banners under Dorgon at Hengshan. The force was completely lost to Hong, either through death in battle or desertion, and he did not now have enough troops left in his command to entertain any hope at all of breaking out of the envelopment and fighting his way back to Ningyuan.171

Taizong was well aware of Hong’s plight, and he decided to heed the counsel of Chinese advisors like Fan Wencheng and Zhang Cunren and offer Hong amnesty. In a long letter, probably written for him by Fan Wencheng, the Qing emperor reminded Hong that he was now deprived of any hope of rescue by troops from within China. The military fortunes of China were already decided, he went on to say, and the Ming government had no hope of holding onto the empire. The Manchus, on the other hand, had already proved that they were humane rulers. When Korea was conquered, the king had been well treated; and when Dalinghe had fallen, Zu Dashou’s officers had been saved. If Hong surrendered, then he and his sons would be spared as well.172

Hong Chengchou refused even to acknowledge this offer, but the permanent garrison commander, Colonel Xia Chengde, did secretly respond. Using his younger brother, Jinghai, as a go-between, Colonel Xia sent four separate clandestine messages to the Qing encampment. After offering his son as a hostage to the Manchus and agreeing to act as a fifth columnist (neiying), Xia was told by Haoge, Taizong’s eldest son, that the surrender would be accepted. On the night of March 18, 1642, the Manchus used two sets of scaling ladders to climb the south face of the city wall, which was defended by Colonel Xia’s men. From there the Manchus fanned out along the top of the wall and then dropped down

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171 Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, pp. 536–537; Er chen zhu, 3:3–4a. Other reinforcements were sent by Shen Tingyang by sea from Tianjin, but they were delayed several months. Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, vol. 1, p. 199.
172 Er chen zhu, 3:4–5a.
simultaneously from all four sides, taking the city completely by surprise. The next morning the Chinese were herded together helplessly under guard. Xia Chengde and his followers—1,863 men, women, and children—were led aside. So too were Regional Commander Hong Chengchou, Governor Qiu Minyang, and a few officers related to Chinese already serving the Manchus: the Zu brothers (Zu Dale, Daming, Dacheng) and Bai Guang’en’s son, Liangbi. The remaining military prisoners—more than one hundred officers and three thousand soldiers—were then slaughtered on the spot; their families—1,249 women and children—were kept alive to be slaves. 

Four days later, the Zu brothers and Bai Liangbi were joyfully reunited with their families on the Manchu side. Colonel Xia Chengde and Governor Qiu Minyang accepted amnesties and, later, positions in the Qing ranks. Hong Chengchou, however, had never formally surrendered. He was still a prisoner of war, and because he had remained defiant, Haoge wanted to behead him on the spot. But Fan Wencheng and Zhang Cunren pleaded with the beile for his life, arguing that Hong would make a superb adherent if he could be persuaded to serve. After all, here was the highest-ranking civil servant ever captured: an imperial governor-general famed throughout China for his victories over the rebel Li Zicheng. Surely it was worth the effort to keep this southerner alive and try to get him to join the Manchu cause. Tai-zong was persuaded and, on June 1, 1642, ordered that Hong Chengchou be brought to the Qing court at Shenyang.

173 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 59:6b-7a; Er chen zhuan, 9:4-5; Huang-Ts'ing k'ai-kuo, pp. 537-538.
174 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 59:8.
175 In 1643, Colonel Xia, 500 of his zhuangding (retainers), and 1,000 dependents were enrolled in the Han Solid White Banner. He and his men were eventually assigned to the occupation forces in Shandong. Er chen zhuan, 9:6a.
177 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 59:11a. Taizong is said to have received
Hong Chengchou Turns Coat

According to the official Qing version of his surrender, Hong expressed his overwhelming gratitude for being spared by Taizong, saying:

I had accepted the fact that I ought to be executed, but the Manchu Emperor (Meng huang) was compassionate and ordered that I be mercifully treated instead of killed. Now I am ordered to appear at court. Truly this minister knows that his own errors are grave ones, and dares not enter.178

Taizong subsequently told Hong that he could not blame Hong Chengchou for fighting for his own ruler—the Chongzhen Emperor—at the time Songshan fell. But now he expected the same kind of loyalty for himself because the Mandate of Heaven was shifting. The Manchus had won at Songshan because of “Heaven’s doing”; Heaven had recognized that the Qing emperor wished only to nourish mankind. “Exhaust your feelings to think of ways to repay us,” the emperor said, “and we will be satisfied.”179

Hong in the Chongzheng Palace by the Daqing Gate. He asked Hong how the Ming emperor could be so indifferent to the fate of his officials as to abandon them in battle. Hong Chengchou blamed this on the conflicting policies Chongzhen was advised to pursue by the numerous officials around the throne. Taizong refuted that reasoning, and pointedly commented: “Especially now the ruler is benighted and his ministers are deceptive. Therefore many have been killed unjustly, like this group which died in battle or was captured, or was compelled by circumstances to surrender. How could their wives and children be slaughtered [by the Ming emperor as a punishment] just because they themselves are in the enemy’s country, or their wealth taken as ransom in their own place, while their wives and sons are sentenced to death or banishment?” Hong was deeply moved by this concern for his own relatives whom he assumed dead by Ming imperial command. Donghua lu, entry dated June 1, 1642, cited in Li, “Hong Chengchou,” pp. 241–242.

178 Er chen zhuan, 3:6a. According to Zheng Tianting, Hong’s mind was changed by Zhang Cunren, who told Taizong that now that he was willing to serve, he should be ordered to shave his head. Zheng Tianting, Qing shi tan wei, p. 52.

179 Er chen zhuan, 3:6b. There were a number of fanciful accounts of Hong Chengchou’s defection. One version, well known after 1644, was that he re-
Taizong was so satisfied, in fact, that he celebrated Hong Chengchou’s change of allegiance with a sumptuous palace banquet fit for a prince or vassal khan. The Qing emperor could not attend the banquet himself, because he was still in mourning for his dead consort. However, he had Grand Secretary Hife apologize personally to Hong Chengchou for his absence. Afterwards some of the beile were angry, and they demanded to know why Taizong treated a Chinese prisoner—one who had not surrendered voluntarily in the first place—so deferentially. Taizong answered their question with one of his own. “What do we want in the end, that we should be combed by the wind and bathed by the rain [on campaign]?” His beile reflected, and answered, “We want the Central Plain.” The Qing emperor laughed then, and nodded, saying, “If I compare us to travelers, then you and I, your king, are like blind

fused to eat for nine days after being captured and then was force-fed soup until he revived. However, even then he insisted that he could not defect from the Ming court because he was such a high civil official, and a southerner as well. Frustrated, the Manchus released him, albeit with a horse and military escort. But after going through Shanhaiguan he met one of his servants who told him that everyone in the capital assumed him dead. The servant pointedly added that, “The three armies under your command have all ceased to exist, and you have lost all that territory.” Hong then felt that he had no choice but to return to the protection of the Qing emperor. Bao Yangsheng, Jiashen chaoshi xiaoji, 5:14a. Other accounts speak of Fan Wencheng trying to persuade Hong not to starve himself; or of the Qing emperor sending in his beautiful young wife, daughter of the Borjigit beile Sesang, to nurse him back to health; or of Taizong personally giving Hong Chengchou his coat to keep him warm, thereby earning his gratitude. Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, vol. 1, pp. 199–200; Li, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 241. One reason for the prevalence of these stories may be the unusual qualities of the collaborator himself. There would be many high-ranking southern literati later in the Qing government, but for such a person to join the Manchus and their Liaodong allies at that juncture must have been astonishing. See, for example: Kunshan yimin ninren Gu Yanwu (Wen Bing), Sheng’an benji (Jiayi shian), p. 35 (hereafter cited as Wen Bing, Jiayi shian). It was almost too easy to typify Hong Chengchou as a luan chen zei zi (rebellious minister and villainous son) and leave it at that; but people apparently hungered for more elaborate explanations of this perplexing deed.

180 Donghua lu, entry dated June 1, 1642, cited in Li, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 242.
men. But now I have found someone to show us the way. Should I not be joyful?"^{181}

In Beijing, when word reached the court that the fortress at Songshan had fallen to the Manchus, Hong Chengchou was presumed dead.^{182} In fact, his survival and defection to the Qing would not be discovered for more than two years.^{183} In the capital, literati mourned his self-sacrifice; and to inspire others to do their duty, the Chongzhen Emperor ordered a shrine (ci) built to his memory at the Dashi Temple west of the Zhengyang Gate.^{184} At the same time, the Ming emperor entered into secret correspondence with the Manchus to discuss peace terms.^{185}

181 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, vol. 1, p. 200. Hong Chengchou quickly earned the trust and respect of the Qing beile, who thought him the best Han official in their service. Zheng, "Duoergun," p. 8. Later, several officers who had served under Hong Chengchou in Shaanxi were to surrender to the Qing because of their former commander’s defection. These included General Li Benshen, who together with 103,000 soldiers joined Dodo; and General Liu Zeqing, who wrote to Hong when he transferred his allegiance from the Southern Ming to the Qing. Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, p. 91, cited in Li, "Hong Chengchou," pp. 255–256.

182 On May 10, 1642, special insignia honoring his death as a loyalist martyr were ordered prepared. On May 25, the Ministry of War made public a report from one of Wu Sanguí’s men, describing Hong’s final moments of obeisance to his Ming emperor, when he bowed to the west, before being decapitated. Ming-Qing shiliao, yi, p. 398, cited in Li, "Hong Chengchou," p. 242.

183 For an example of a memorial on February 27, 1644 discussing Hong’s death see Wan Yan, Chongzhen changbian, p. 81.

184 Bao, Jiashen chaoshi xiaoji, 5:15a. The shrine was later changed, in some embarrassment, to one honoring Guanyin. According to one account, one of Hong Chengchou’s servants—hoping for funds to cover the travel expenses of shipping Hong’s two wives and ten servants back home to Fujian—wrote to Chongzhen, describing the loyalist martyrdom of his master in great detail. The emperor was moved to tears, and personally conducted sacrifices at Hong’s shrine, even though several of his officials questioned the veracity of the report. However, there was such a public outpouring of grief over his martyrdom that few Liaodong officials dared report rumors that he was still alive. Zhang Yi, Ssu wen xu bi, 1:20; Li, "Hong Chengchou," pp. 228–229, 243–244.

185 Xie Guozhen, Danshe yundong, p. 90.
The Qing emperor’s Chinese advisors were mainly opposed to holding peace talks with the Ming court. Zu Keifa memorialized Taizong, fervently pleading with him to give up any idea of settlement short of conquest of the empire. “A peace negotiation policy,” he wrote, “will benefit them, not us.” Warning that the Ming government would simply use the truce to arm and train new troops, as well as to persuade the Mongols to join them against the Manchus, Zu Keifa also insisted that the Qing forces were strong enough to defeat the Ming imperial armies. “At present our iron cavalry is as numerous as the clouds, and if we add to that the mass of Mongols, then we have the capacity to take the empire. Even though the Ming is a large country, its forces have already been utterly exhausted.” The key, he declared, was simply to take Shanhaiguan, after which the remaining cities outside the Great Wall—Jinzhou, Ningyuan—could be seized. Then Beijing could be encircled and cut off from access to Tianjin or the west. Once Beijing fell—and fall it would, he insisted, because its defenses were even weaker than those at Dalinghe—the entire empire would follow its example and acknowledge the Qing regime.  

The peace talks debate was resolved for the Qing, however, by Ming fundamentalists’ attack on the appeasement policy in Beijing, and the Chongzhen Emperor’s pre-emptive decision on April 2, 1642, to send troops under Wu Sangui to attack Ajige’s camp rather than to have envoys appear. The Ming court would permit no peace talks. Consequently, the Manchus decided to

186 Er chen zhuan, 2:15–19. Tong Tulai completely agreed with this point of view, and so memorialized the emperor himself. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 796.
187 Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 59:10a.
188 Taizong did not, however, altogether abandon plans for negotiations with the Ming. When Abatai was preparing to invade China proper in October, 1642, Taizong told him that if he should be approached by Ming envoys wishing to open peace talks, then he should tell them that he was obeying the Manchu emperor’s orders to lead a punitive expedition into the Central Plain. If the Ming wished to discuss peace terms, then the dynasty should communicate directly with Taizong. On the other hand, the Qing emperor also told Abatai that if he encountered representatives of the “wandering bandits,” then he should cooperate with them, saying that the Ming was per-
press the attack against Jinzhou, which had been under siege for over a year and where General Zu Dashou again had to witness the men under his command resorting to cannibalism to stay alive.\(^{189}\)

## Jinzhou Falls

Among the officers captured at Songshan when it fell was Zu Dale, Zu Dashou’s younger brother.\(^{190}\) Already during the siege Zu Dashou had been confronted across Jinzhou’s walls by the sight of his sons, pleading with him to surrender to the Qing and join the rest of his family, but the old general had stubbornly resisted. Hearing that Songshan had fallen, and that his brother was now with the Qing, Zu Dashou made up his mind finally, after all these years, to open the gates of Jinzhou to the Manchus. He sent word to Jirgalang, the beile who commanded the forces outside, saying, “We have just heard that Songshan has fallen. If I can see my brother Zu Dale, then we will transfer our allegiance.”\(^{191}\) However, after Zu Dale had been taken to Jinzhou and the brothers had seen each other across the ramparts, Zu Dashou balked. Three of his lieutenants took out the message that he would only surrender after an oath ensuring his safety was sworn before Heaven with

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verse and lacked the Dao. Emissaries from the rebels should be brought back to Taizong for direct discussions. Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 5.

189 Li, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 240.

190 *Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu*, 59:11a.

191 Ibid., 59:12a. Initially, the Qing army investing Jinzhou was led by Dorgon. Without telling Taizong, however, Dorgon had decided to maintain the morale and vigor of his troops, as well as the vitality of their mounts which had no grass to graze upon around the barren garrison, by rotating up to 5 bannermen from each *nim* back to their homes for rest and recuperation. When Taizong heard of this he was infuriated. Dorgon requested the death sentence by way of punishment, and instead was demoted from first-rank prince of the blood (*qin wang*) to second-rank prince (*jun wang*). He was also fined 1,000 tael of silver, was deprived of two *nim*, and was recalled to Shengjing to work in the central government on May 1, 1641. Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 1. For Dorgon’s early titles, see Hauer, “Prinz Dorgon,” p. 10.
the assembled Manchu princes, then signed and sealed by all the parties to the agreement.\textsuperscript{192}

Jirgalang and the other Manchu princes lost their patience at this point, angered by what seemed to be Zu's outrageous audacity. They asked the envoys:

Are these words you've spoken actually the words of Zu Dashou? Or are they your own personal words? Yesterday he said that once he had seen Zu Dale, he would surrender. How can he now come out with these absurd words? We have besieged this city now until it is ready to fall any day. Why should we consider swearing an oath with you? If you want to surrender, then surrender. If you don't surrender, then that's all there is to it.\textsuperscript{193}

Holding two of the lieutenants hostage, the princes sent the third back to tell Zu Dashou of their ultimatum. The next day Zu contritely sent the message that: "Yesterday those were the absurd words of small men. They were not the words of General Zu, and he begs your forgiveness. If the princes order him to come forth today, then he will come today; if they order him to come forth tomorrow, then he will come tomorrow. Whatever the princes command, he will obey."\textsuperscript{194} On the morning of the next day, April 8, 1642, General Zu led his officials out at the head of his army and kowtowed before Jirgalang and the Manchu nobles. On April 9, after the Manchus had entered the city and taken over the garrison, Taizong's instructions arrived from Shengjing (Shenyang). Jinzhou's seven thousand soldiers and their dependents were to be nourished and fed, to be resettled elsewhere later. The starving civilian inhabitants of the city were to be put to the sword immediately. Jirgalang compiled, and the following day Zu Dashou was sent on to Shengjing to receive word directly from the Qing emperor of his own fate.\textsuperscript{195}

When General Zu reached Shengjing he was taken to the grace-

\textsuperscript{192} Da Qing Taizong Wen huangdi shilu, 59:12.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 59:12b.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 59:13–14a. See also Huang-Ts'ing k'ai-kuo, pp. 539–543.
fully proportioned Chongzheng Palace, just inside the Daqing Gate, to see the emperor. Taizong greeted him sternly, but not unkindly, saying:

You turned your back on us as your lord, and on your wife and kindred. We have already spoken with all of the ministers in the Inner Court (Neiyuan), and they say that Zu Dashou does not have to die because he has surrendered once again. Therefore, we have decided not to put you to death, and to let bygones be bygones. All will be well if you can serve us unstintingly from now on.196

It is easy to see why Taizong treated Zu Dashou so forgivingly. Not only had the man’s brothers, sons, nephews, and lieutenants become loyal and effective servitors of the Qing throne; the one major army still standing between the Manchus and Beijing was the Ningyuan garrison, commanded by another one of Zu Dashou’s nephews, Brigade-General Wu Sangui.197 Now that Zu Dashou had finally joined the Qing cause, it might be possible to persuade the nephew to defect as well.198 Shortly after being pardoned by the Manchu emperor, Zu Dashou wrote to Wu Sangui that:

Now Songshan and Jinzhou have fallen. Heaven has transferred [the Mandate] and the people’s hearts belong [to us]. Those who gain recognition by our new rulers are going to have to be thoroughly investigated. But if a person surrenders early, enfeoffment ceremonies can be held and they can be selected for extraordinary promotion [right away].199

196 Zhao Erxun, Qing shi gao, liezhuan 21:20a.
197 Although Wu’s army and his reputation were both damaged by the battle near Hengshan in 1641, he had already begun to rebuild his forces at Ningyuan. By 1644 the Ningyuan defense command would consist of 40,000 regular troops, plus an additional 70–80,000 irregulars from Liaodong. Peng Sunyi, Pingkou zhi, 10.3:11a. See also Tsao, “Three Feudatories,” p. 13.
198 Zhang Cunren wrote Wu Sangui a letter after the fall of Jinzhou, tersely explaining that city after city was falling to the Qing forces, and that “the fate of the Ming has been ordained.” Since Zu Dashou was his uncle, it now made every sense for Wu Sangui to consider serving the Manchus. Er chen zhuang, 2:21b.
199 Ibid., 2:17a.
For such services rendered, the former Ming general continued to earn the Qing emperor’s favor, and when Zu Dashou later died in Beijing, he was buried with full military honors as a member of the Solid Yellow Banner.200

Wu Sangui, as far as is known, never answered these appeals to surrender. He thus did not, we may surmise, entirely share Zu Dashou’s belief that the Mandate of Heaven had already shifted to the Qing. But neither did Taizong himself believe that the Ming empire was already theirs to take. After the fall of Songshan, when Zu Kefa had pleaded with him to break off negotiations and encircle Beijing, the Qing emperor had flatly refused, saying, “Shanhaiguan cannot be taken.”201 Taizong realized full well that there would have to be more of a blow to the empire than the loss of two of its border outposts for the Ming to fall. What gave him confidence, however, was knowing that, in their quest for power, the Manchus had already accumulated the civil and military talents they needed to make the transition from a frontier khanate to an imperial dynasty. When the mortal blow was finally struck by others, the Manchus would be ready to move.202

201 Er chen zhuan, 2:18a.
202 By April, 1643, on the eve of his death, Taizong had come to believe that the Ming was sure to fall. He still wanted to proceed cautiously. “Taking Yanjing,” he told his advisers, “is like chopping down a large tree. You want to start cutting from both sides at once. Then the tree will fall of its own accord.” Had his health been better, he probably would have led an invasion then himself. Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 4.
The Fall of Beijing

I’ve heard it said that west of the Huai
Sight of the old battlegrounds fills one with awe:
Bare the thousand leagues the bandits have come,
Sere the many mountains beneath the sun.
Travellers abandon those hearths with relief;
Natives must stay behind their lowly walls.
But if half the Central Plain is like this,
How is one going to escape the disaster?

Li Wen, *Dao chu xuyi jian zei suo shaocan chu* (On the Road Out: Gazing in Astonishment and Seeing Places Which the Bandits have Destroyed), in Li Wen, Chen Zilong, and Song Zhengyu, *Yunxian sanzi xin shi* hegao, 6:3b.

The peasant rebellions of the late Ming were generated by a combination of repeated famines during the 1630s and ’40s, and widespread government disintegration.¹ Only a fraction of Ming documents attributed the cause of the rebellions to high taxes. Most official sources singled out military arrears, supply deficiencies, and forced conscription as primary motives for rebellion.² And

² Ray Huang, “Fiscal Administration during the Ming Dynasty,” p. 127. But note that in 1641 when Zuo Maodi asked starving peasants along the Grand Canal what had caused their plight, they responded, “supplementary taxes” (*lian xiang*). Shimizu Taiji, “Mindai no ryūmin to ryūzoku,” p. 378.
while peasants made up the bulk of the rebel forces, their leaders were usually professional soldiers, military couriers, and lifelong bandits. The rebellions thus formed part of the general pattern of social militarization during the late Ming, with commanders easily passing back and forth from imperial to rebel camps. As Brigade-General Zuo Liangyu once put it to a local notable, the empire was in difficulty not because the rebels were invincible, but because the military leaders of the late Ming did not want to have the rebels completely destroyed.

The rebellions occurred in four distinct phases. The first, from 1627 to 1631, took place in Shaanxi where a series of mutinies and bandit attacks swelled into a steady plundering by discrete mobile bands. The second phase, 1631–1636, was also one of disorga-

3 In 1641 the Supervising Secretary Zhang Yuanshi memoralized that: “Local bandits (tukou) are different from wandering bandits (liukou). Local bandits are all just starving people. Assembled, they are robbers; dispersed, they are peasants. There is no better strategy than inducing them to surrender.” Wen Rulin, Nanjiang yishi, p. 382. Modern historians have also emphasized the difference between “local bandits” (tuzei) and “wandering bandits” (liuzei), pointing out that the relationship between them was stratified. Contemporaries thus distinguished between “small bandits” (xiao kou), “medium bandits” (zhong kou), and “large bandits” (da kou). Local bandits could evolve into mobile rebel armies as their numbers increased, however. Satō Fumitoshi, “Dozoku Riseizan no ran ni tsuite,” pp. 131–133. Taniguchi Kikuo, “Peasant Rebellions in the Late Ming,” pp. 65–66.

4 Albert Chan, The Decline and Fall of the Ming Dynasty, pp. 143–145. A French historian has even spoken of “la trahison de l’élite militaire” as the essential cause of the Chinese rebellions of this period, defining the revolts as a struggle of professional militarists against civil society. Roland Mousnier, Fureurs paysannes, p. 329. After the fall of Ming, the historical philosopher Wang Fuzhi wrote: “If we speak of the circumstances connecting past and present, then after the Three Dynasties (conventionally 2852–1123 B.C.), civil and military absolutely could not be brought together as one, just as the well-field could not be recovered nor the flesh restored after corporal punishment. . . . To use generals to administer the government of the realm is to put the military in charge while pretending to employ civilians. This is making civilian ministers out of military officers, rather than turning civil officials into military commanders.” Wang Fuzhi, Du Tong jian lun, p. 122.

5 For a chronological summary of the major late Ming revolts between 1627 and 1644, see Zheng Tianting and Sun Yue, comps., Mingmo nongmin qiyi shiliao, pp. 517–529.
nized raiding, but rebel units were larger and the terrain across which they moved was more extensive, covering most of the forested border areas of Huguang, Henan, and Shaanxi. The imperial government still retained military superiority, but civilian coordinators like Hong Chengchou found it increasingly difficult to ensure the obedience of professional military commanders like Zuo Liangyu. During the third phase, 1637–1641, the rebels coalesced into larger armies under Zhang Xianzhong and Li Zicheng. Although they suffered a temporary decline in 1640, they recovered their military strength in March, 1641, when the imperial forces under Yang Sichang lost Xiangyang to Zhang Xianzhong and Luoyang to Li Zicheng. After this pivotal year, the Ming government’s armies lost the upper hand, and both major rebel leaders felt the stirrings of dynastic ambition.

Li Zicheng Seeks the Mandate

For Li Zicheng, the shift from bandit general to putative monarch occurred in Henan, where Kaifeng fell to him in 1642 and where he secured the support of several local military leaders and gentry-


7 James B. Parsons, Peasant Rebellions of the Late Ming Dynasty, passim; Hauer, “Li Tze-ch’eng,” pp. 443–463; Uta Mikami Rouse, “Hu-k’ou yü-sheng chi,” pp. 7–8; Yao Xueyin, “Li Zicheng zi he chu ru Yu,” pp. 51–60. One reason military superiority shifted to the rebels was the reorganization which Li Zicheng carried out in his army, and especially the creation of special jingbing (picked troops). The jingbing were men aged 15 to 40 who daily practiced riding and archery exercises in which Li Zicheng himself participated. Artillery, naval, and sapper units were also created. At the same time artisans were organized into special tailors’ brigades, silversmiths’ brigades, musical brigades, and so forth. Finally, special shock troops called xiaoji (spirited chargers) were selected to serve in the vanguard of the cavalry. Jiang Zuyuan, “Lun Li Zicheng de junshi sixiang he zhihui caineng,” pp. 1–4.
men who later proved crucial to his dynastic plans. However, these were not the first gentry adherents to his cause. In 1634, partly through duress, an official named Song Qijiao had surrendered to Li Zicheng, and was to become his Minister of Personnel early in 1644. But Song’s importance in 1641–1642 was eclipsed by that of two other members of the gentry: Li Yan and Niu Jinxing. Li Yan was from Kaifeng, where he had a legendary reputation for siding with the exploited classes against avaricious gentry. Niu Jinxing, his classmate, was a hard-drinking Muslim juren from Baoji county who had been sentenced to imprisonment.

8 Northern Henan was firmly in Li Zicheng’s hands by the third lunar month of 1642, when all of the local zhai (military camps or stockades defended by rural magnates) acknowledged his authority.
9 Song Qijiao, from Qianzhou, Shaanxi, had served as a vice-director in the Ministry of Personnel. For a brief biographical account, see Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “The Shun Interregnum of 1644,” pp. 81–82.
10 Hauer, “Li Tze-cheng,” pp. 464–465; Parsons, Peasant Rebellions, pp. 91–92. According to some of the most reliable accounts of the period, Li Yan was a juren of 1617 whose father, Li Jingbo, had served as governor of Shandong under the Tianqi Emperor and then was disgraced by Donglin partisans for having been too close to Wei Zhongxian. Li Yan was said to have led a local uprising against exploitative landlords before joining Li Zicheng. Then, after becoming his adviser, he was said to have helped coin propaganda slogans and land reform policies for the rebel. See for example, Ji Liuqi, Mingji heilüe, pp. 209–210. Recently, Li Yan’s historicity has been called into question. Roger DesForges, in a recently published paper, has suggested that Li Yan was a composite of popular myths and gentry historiography. There is no direct evidence at all that Li Yan was a member of the Kaifeng gentry, nor that he was related to Li Jingbo, according to Gu Cheng, “Li Yan zhiyi,” p. 68. However, the Li Yan who is later frequently mentioned as being among the rebel’s advisers in 1643 and 1644 was, in my opinion, quite real, though his influence was exaggerated. This view is shared with Cao Guilin, research scholar in the Institute of History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who expressed a similar opinion in a seminar with members of the U.S. Ming-Qing Historians Delegation in June, 1979. Li Yan’s presence, especially when the Shun rebels discovered the corpse of Chongzhen’s consort in the palace, is described by Wu Weiye, Zhou Tonggu, and Lu Yingyang—all reliable sources. Wang Chunyu, “Li Yan ‘Xi jiāng yue,’ ‘Shang Luo za yì.’” For the argument that Li Zicheng’s taxation and land reform policies were formulated because of existing social conditions, rather than at Li Yan’s behest, see Wang Xingya, “Li Zicheng de fushui zhengce yanjiu,” p. 5.
for having thrashed a local clerk. 11 Both men joined Li Zicheng voluntarily and became important advisors. 12 Niu, in particular, encouraged the rebel to seek the support of other literati in the area, pointing out that many members of the upper gentry in Henan, Shaanxi, and Shanxi were disgruntled with the Ming government because they had been ousted from office by Donglin partisans, mainly from the south. 13

11 Zhao Shijin, Jiashen jishi, p. 17. See also Li Wenzhi, Wan-Ming minbian, p. 106; Li Guangtao, Mingji liukou shimo, p. 86; Zhao Zongfu, “Li Zicheng panluan shilüe,” p. 138; Morris Rossabi, “Muslim and Central Asian Revolts,” p. 189. Niu Jinxing was introduced to Li Zicheng by a friend who was a doctor. Niu told Li: “If you want to end up like a bandit, then there’s no need for my services. If you have great intentions (da zhi), then you should listen to what I have to say.” Li Zicheng was not very receptive to Niu’s advice that he cease looting, win the people’s hearts, and seize the Central Plain; and Niu therefore left the bandit’s camp and returned home to his family. Betrayed to the authorities by one of his lineage elders, however, Niu was sentenced to death. He managed to get his sentence commuted, and once he was released he rejoined Li Zicheng in Henan. Li was delighted to have Niu back and named him a grand secretary. According to hearsay, Niu subsequently issued edicts in Li’s name that read: “If a person kills someone, it will be as though he killed my father. If he rapes a woman, it will be as though he raped my mother.” Zhang Yi, Sou wen xu bi, 1:1.

12 Some historians have blamed Li Zicheng’s eventual failure upon advisors like Li Yan and Niu Jinxing who held such powerful positions in the Shun central government. They also attribute defeat to the many local gentrymen who joined the rebel cause, claiming that they only “pretended to surrender” in order to sabotage the movement later. Zhao Lisheng, “Li Zicheng difang zhengquan suo zao dizhu wuzhuang de pohuai,” pp. 44–45. The latter point is difficult to sustain in the light of accounts like that of Lei Yulin, who later wrote that he, as a member of the Shaanxi local gentry, had joined the rebels partly because he believed that the people had a right to rebel, given the miseries afflicting them; and partly because he thought that once they obtained power, the “wandering bandits” would of need correct their excesses. Qin Bo, “Hunjin Li Zicheng qiyi jun de yige neijian de zigongzhuang,” pp. 49–50.

13 Zhao Zongfu, “Li Zicheng,” p. 147. The eleven jinshi, seven juren, and three xiucai who were to enter Beijing in Li Zicheng’s ranks may well have represented just such an entourage of disgruntled northerners who felt supplanted by Donglin partisans. Qian Xing, Jiashen chuanxin lu, pp. 30–32. For an analysis of the composition of Li Zicheng’s government in Beijing, see Wakeman, “Shun Interregnum,” pp. 54–56.
Certainly, the “Little Donglin” was quite powerful during the ministry of Zhou Yanru after 1641. In fact, these years saw the culmination of the Restoration Society’s drive to dominate the civil service examinations. The jinshi examinations of 1643—the last given by the Ming dynasty—were the occasion of keen competition among the Jiangnan literati. One southern scholar who passed the metropolitan and palace exams at that time wrote to his brother that:

When the palace examination results were announced, the names of the three in the top rank appeared first. Those who did not make it began to wail. I thought they were becoming immortals. The worst even covered their eyes, shook their heads, and refused to see. It was the ultimate in covetousness. 14

And the most coveted positions of all were monopolized by Fushe members. The First Class (Yijia) consisted of:

1. Zhuangyuan (Primus)—Zhou Zhong
2. Bangyan (Secundus)—Song Zhisheng
3. Tanhua (Tertius)—Chen Mingxia

Each of these men was regarded as a Restoration Society member, having attended at least one of the Fushe meetings in the past. Meanwhile, prominent Fushe provincial administrators like Chen Zilong were also singled out at this time for special mention to the Chongzhen Emperor; and even though Zhou Yanru was replaced as chief grand secretary by Wei Zaode, the influence of the southerners continued to dominate the higher reaches of the bureaucracy. 15 (See Tables 1 and 2.) A majority of the ministers were from

14 Jerry Dennerline, The Chia-ting Loyalists, pp. 247–248; idem, “The Mandarins and the Massacre of Chia-ting,” p. 222. The exams of 1640 were also intensely competitive. Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, shang, 4a.
15 The disgrace of Zhou Yanru was followed by a series of new ministerial appointments, most of which were made on June 29, 1643. Zhang Tingyu et al., Ming shi (Guofang yanjiuyuan), p. 163 (hereafter cited as Ming shi). At that time, Jiang Dejing, Grand Secretary and Minister of Rites, was also dismissed for his opposition to the emperor’s proposal for additional military taxes.
Table 1.
Grand Secretaries in the Last Year of Chongzhen’s Reign

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UP TO JUNE, 1643</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhou Yanru</td>
<td>S. Jiangsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Sheng¹</td>
<td>Nanzhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Jingfang²</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFTER JUNE, 1643</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Zaode</td>
<td>Henan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Yan</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang Dejing³</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Jiantai</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fang Yuegong⁴</td>
<td>Huguang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1644 ADDITIONS⁵</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan Jingwen</td>
<td>Henan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiu Yu⁶</td>
<td>Huguang</td>
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</table>


¹Wu was a native of Yangzhou, and had been an obstinate foe of Wei Zhongxian. He also impeached Wen Tiren and Zhou Yanru for embezzlement, and is typically viewed in the sources as the main leader of the anti-Zhou Yanru clique. *Ming shi,* p. 2861.

²Huang resigned in late 1643. *Ming shi,* p. 2852.

³Jiang was a strong supporter of Ni Yuanlu. *Ming shi,* p. 2851; Xu Zi, *Xiaotian jinian fukao,* p. 35.

⁴Fang was also helped by Jiang Dejing after he was imprisoned for embezzlement in 1628. He was supposed to have gone to Jining in 1644 to take charge of grain transports, but never got out of the capital. He was killed by Li Zicheng. *Ming shi,* p. 2852; Xu, *Xiaotian,* p. 67.

⁵The appointments were made on lunar 1/29. Zhao Shijin, *Jiashen jishi,* p. 6.

⁶Qiu Yu and his family were also killed by Li. *Ming shi,* p. 2853.; Xu, *Xiaotian,* p. 34. He concurrently held the post of Vice-Minister of Rites. Zhao, *Jiashen jishi,* p. 6.

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Ibid., p. 2852. The new grand secretaries included Chen Yan as well as Wei Zaode, who was regarded as a student of Xue Guoguan. Consequently, there was talk of the revival of the “Wen Tiren clique.” However, the entire roster of new officials was mainly characterized by the presence of many southerners and by the addition of a number of new and relatively untried officials to higher posts. For Chen Yan, see Wen Bing, *Lieuang xiaozhi,* p. 228, and Wan Yan, *Chongzhen changbian,* p. 104.
Table 2.  
**Chongzhen's Ministers, 1643–1644**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
<th>Fujian</th>
<th>Zhejiang</th>
<th>Henan</th>
<th>Shandong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zheng Sanjun</td>
<td>Retired in 1643/5 on grounds of illness</td>
<td>Retired in 1644/3 on grounds of illness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Yuzhi</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Dismissed in 1643/5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fu Shuxun</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Transferred to Rites in 1643/10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ni Yuanlu</td>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RITES</th>
<th>Fujian</th>
<th>Zhejiang</th>
<th>Henan</th>
<th>Shandong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lin Yuji</td>
<td>Assumed office 1643/10; committed suicide when Li entered.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ni Yuanlu</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>Zhejiang</th>
<th>Henan</th>
<th>Shandong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Guowei</td>
<td>Dismissed in 1643/5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feng Yuanbiao</td>
<td>Retired in 1643/10 on grounds of illness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Jinyan</td>
<td>Surrendered to Li Zicheng</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>JUSTICE</th>
<th>Shandong</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Xin</td>
<td>Submitted to Li Zicheng</td>
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<tr>
<th>WORKS</th>
<th>Henan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fan Jingwen</td>
<td>Committed suicide when Li entered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Zhang Tingyu et al., comps., *Ming shi* (Kaiming shuju), pp. 1400–1468.  
Note: 1643/5 indicates the fifth lunar month of 1643.  
1Zheng was a famous Donglin partisan, impeached by Wei Zhongxian, and the man who purged many Wei supporters while he was Minister of Finance in Nanjing. Zheng also supported Liu Zongzhou in his attacks on Zhou Yanru and Zhang Guowei. Zhang Tingyu et al., comps., *Ming shi* (Guofang yanjiuyuan), p. 2877.  
2No biography in *Ming shi*.  
3No biography in *Ming shi*.  
4No biography in *Ming shi*.  
5Fan, 1614 *jinshi*, had resigned during the Donglin crisis, returning in 1628 as Vice-Minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifice. Many of his later years were spent in the Nanjing government. Then, after serving as Minister of Justice and Works, he became a grand secretary early in 1644. Zhang, *Ming shi* (Guofang yanjiuyuan), p. 2993; Xu Zi, *Xiaotian jinian fukao*, p. 34.
the south—the most prominent provincial contingent being the Zhejiang men headed by Ni Yuanlu, Minister of Finance. And the Censor-in-Chief, Li Banghua, was a well known scholar from Jiangxi.\footnote{Ji, Mingji beilüe, pp. 480–482.}

Although the newly appointed central government officials responsible for military affairs were not very competent, the imperial forces did not stand idly by while Li Zicheng ensconced himself in central and western Henan, an area hard hit by famine.\footnote{Zhang Guowei, who served for a time as Minister of War, was a sinecurist. Zhang Jinyan, from Henan, was appointed to the same post because of his suggestion that the army be reorganized into garrison divisions and an assault wing, even though his only military experience came from serving as supervising secretary in that government bureau. In that capacity he had earlier impeached Yang Sichang. Er chen zhu, 12:17; Ming shi, p. 2910; Xu Zi, Xiaotian jinian fukao, p. 27.} Military pressure from the Ming troops in Shaanxi, commanded by Sun Chuanting, forced Li in 1643 to move his headquarters into Huguang, where he established his own six ministries at Xiangyang and purged some of his unrulier subordinates. Then, at the advice of his gentry counsellors, he decided to return to his native Shaanxi where he could consolidate a base from which to strike at the Ming capital in Beijing. Sun Chuanting tried to forestall this by leading his soldiers down into Henan in the hope that Zuo Liangyu’s army would move up from Jiangxi and close upon Li’s flanks through Hunan.\footnote{This offensive was partly dictated by the interests of the Shaanxi landlords represented at court. As long as Sun remained in Shaanxi, his army’s expenses had to be covered by additional provincial levies. By getting him to attack Li Zicheng in Henan, the Shaanxi local gentry hoped to lessen its own financial burden.} However, Zuo refused to budge, and Sun eventually faced his enemy alone. Beginning on October 20, 1643, Sun did win a series of battles against Li, but his own supply line was stretched too far, and famine-stricken Henan could provide almost nothing to forage. In November, Sun’s weakened army began a cautious retreat which soon turned into a rout. By the 16th of that month, Li’s men held the strategic Tong Pass and knew that the road to Xi’an was open to them. Five days later Li Zicheng occupied the provincial capital, which he renamed Chang’an after
the old Tang capital. On the lunar New Year's Day of 1644 (February 8th), he capped his victories with the proclamation of the Yongchang reign era of the great Shun dynasty. Learning of these events several weeks later, the poet Li Wen, who had remained in Beijing with his father, wrote somberly that Li Zicheng now occupied the same strategic region whence so many successful dynasties had sprung: "the hundred-and-two mountains of Qin" were now in rebel hands, and Li Zicheng consequently controlled the last natural barrier save the Yellow River between the capital and the former bastion of Qin.

The Chongzhen Emperor was aware of the Ming capital's military jeopardy now that Li Zicheng dominated the northwest. On January 3, 1644, the emperor received a long memorial from Grand Secretary Huang Jingfang, who urged him to recall the border army of Wu Sangui from the northeastern frontier to supplement the badly trained troops of the capital army. Huang also pointed out that public security had almost completely broken down in Shaanxi and Henan. Circuit posts had been empty for years, many district magistracies were vacant, and because there was no revenue for military pay, not to speak of civil salaries, imperial troops in those provinces simply drove the peasants into banditry by seizing their meager crops. This kind of disorder was bound to continue spreading unless the emperor encouraged the local magnates (haoxia) and gentry to form militia units and create new local government administrations of their own.

The Chongzhen Emperor was not enthusiastic about this pro-

19 Hauer, "Li Tze-ch'eng," pp. 482–483. For the deliberate effort to link the Shun with the Tang dynasty, and Li Zicheng with Li Shimin, see Wakeman, "Shun Interregnum," p. 65.
20 Li Wen, "Hearing that Xi'an Has Been Lost Again," in Li Wen et al., Yunxian sanzi xin shi hegao, 8:19a.
21 By 1642, officials coming to Beijing from the south had to hire bodyguards of hundreds of "death-defying young men" in order to reach the capital. Ray Huang, "Ni Yuan-lu's 'Realism,'" p. 420.
23 Wan, Chongzhen changbian, p. 376. The memorial also pointed out that while Shaanxi generals were excellent strategists, three of the regular garrison soldiers stationed in Shaanxi were not worth a single border trooper. Huang
posal—partly because he feared that militia units might perpetrate even greater abuses, and partly because the recruitment of local braves in Henan and Shaanxi could not possibly redress the military balance in time to save the capital. Recalling the border garrisons certainly was an option, but it was not really considered at this moment. Instead, the emperor resorted to his usual device of appointing a fresh military commander. But the situation was so hopeless that when Yu Yinggui was ordered to take charge of the Shaanxi forces, he wept openly before the emperor and protested: "There are not enough military rations. Even if I go, it will be useless." And when Yu did finally try to prevent Li Zicheng's vanguards from crossing the Yellow River into Shanxi, it was already too late. On December 30, 1643, the first of Li's troops had begun to cross the river and were fanning across Shanxi province, breaking the initial line of the capital's defenses. The emperor furiously dismissed, and then imprisoned, his minister of war, Zhang Guo-wei; but by then Pingyang had been lost to the enemy altogether.

Jingfang had been appointed Minister of Revenue and Grand Secretary in the summer of 1643. Ming shi, p. 2852. See also: L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, p. 175. For an excellent analysis of the range of proposals for local militia made by scholar-officials at this time, see Jerry Dennerline, "Hsu Tu and the Lesson of Nanking," pp. 107–117.

24 At the very last moment, on April 5, 1644, the Ch'ongzhen Emperor finally did agree to summon militia, but by then it was far too late. For the debate on militia at court, see Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "Localism and Loyalism during the Ch'ing Conquest of Kiangnan," pp 50–53.

25 Qian Xing, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 7. See also: Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 15a. The government was completely out of military rations because of the war in the northeast. Between 1622 and 1640 the allocations of grain for the northeast tripled from one to three million piculs per year. Yet at the same time, the total amount of grain shipped from the south remained constant: about four million piculs per year. Furthermore, the land that was originally set aside to support the army garrisons in the north was no longer controlled by the government. As exactions increased in the north to support the military establishment, peasants fled their homes, and local tax revenues dropped all the more. Even local treasuries had no reserves to support the soldiers. James Peter Geiss, "Peking under the Ming," pp. 99–100, 204, 216.

26 After news of the fall of Pingyang reached the court, the Ch'ongzhen Emperor told his high officials: "It is not I, the ruler, who has lost the country. Every-
One measure of the dynasty’s dilemma was the gap between the attentiveness to administrative routine of the pettiest sort, and the unrealistic proposals for total reform put forward from time to time by wishful ministers. Officials regularly pleaded their modest incapacity, repented their embezzlements, flourished bureaucratic grievances—and introduced simplistic schemes for last-minute reform. After Li Zicheng’s victories in Henan, for instance, Grand Secretary Jiang Dejing responded to the emperor’s call for proposals with the ingenuous suggestion—based upon his reading of the Ming administrative statutes—that the court revive Ming Taizu’s practice of holding archery contests among his officials. If that were done, Jiang said, then the martial spirit of the regime might be revived, and the weisuo military colony system would flourish again. The emperor declared the suggestion a splendid idea, and commanded his officials to resuscitate the hopelessly moribund weisuo system forthwith. As one chronicler sarcastically commented about the emperor’s order: “It simply could not be done.”

thing accounts for the loss of the country. The empire of my ancestors, who were combed by the wind and washed by the rain, is all to be lost in one reign. How can I look upon their faces in the underworld? I am willing to lead an army in order to decide it in one battle. Yet, though death is not darkness, dying on the battlefield is not something I care to do.” Then he burst into tears. Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 16a. Zhang Guowei was arrested on New Year’s Day (February 8, 1644). On March 29, the gentry of Shandong petitioned in his favor, pleading for leniency, and on April 6, the emperor had Zhang brought from political prison into court for an interview. Three days later Zhang contributed 10,000 taels to help with military expenses and was enfeoffed as a hou. During the last week before Beijing fell, he was sent south to raise money in Jiangnan to help the dynasty. He remained there and joined the Southern Ming, being one of those who urged Zhu Yihai, the Prince of Lu, to become jianguo (administrator of the realm). He was one of the leading figures at the Shaoxing court. Wan, Chongzhen changbian, pp. 67, 96, 104; Wen Bing, Liehuang xiaozhi, pp. 228–230; Zhang Tingyu, et al., comps., Ming shi (Kaiming shuju), pp. 1500, 3099; Zha Jizuo, Dongshan guoyu, pp. 8–11.

27 Li, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 12a. See also: Xu, Xiaotian jinian fukao, p. 35. Other examples abound. For instance, during a court conference a few years earlier, one official suggested that the key to reducing tension between the Ming soldiers and the peasants was by telling the soldiers not to oppress the people.
Though sheer routine carried the reassurance that the Ming was not a falling empire, a dying government, most officials appeared to feel that the regime was doomed because it had lost the hearts of the people. Misery was evident on all sides: suffering from an epidemic of smallpox and from poor harvests that year, peasants flocked to the side of the rebels by tens of thousands. Zeng Yinglin, a supervising secretary in the Ministry of War, told the emperor that this was because of the oppression of his officials and the exploitation of the wealthy, who “clothe themselves with rent and feed themselves with taxes.” But what was to be done? Though Grand Secretary Wei Zaode insisted that most of Li Zicheng’s troops were forcibly impressed and argued that Ming soldiers should execute peasants who vacillated in their loyalties, few doubted that the rebel had gathered a spontaneous mass following. Ominous auguries confirmed the dynasty’s loss of the mandate to rule: at night, pedestrians passing by the main gate of the Forbidden City heard ghostly sounds of battle and phantasmic wails of grief.

The Chongzhen Emperor thought this a “good plan” and endorsed it, but seemingly gave no thought at all to the measures really needed to keep soldiers from pillaging farms and villages. Huang Zhijun, comp., Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 2584 (153:29a). To be sure, some suggestions were quite sensible, even though they could not be carried out for financial reasons. On December 17, 1643, for instance, Li Banghua proposed tax remissions, along with an increase in examination quotas and the assessment of corrupt yamen clerks for military expenses. Wan, Chongzhen changbian, pp. 22–24.

28 The afflicted person’s body broke out in sores and death was quite rapid. Liu Shangyou, Dingsi xiaoji, p. 1.
29 Wan, Chongzhen changbian, pp. 77–78. Zeng Yinglin pointed out that when the rebels arrived in an area, they captured the wealthy and held them for ransom. Since the wealthy had to pay out vast sums to free themselves anyway, why not follow the “equal fields method” and distribute money to the poor in advance in order to avert rebellion? See the version of Zeng’s memorial given in Tan Qian, Guo que, p. 6013.
30 Liu, Dingsi xiaoji, p. 3. This suggestion was made during the audience of April 22, 1644. For Li Zicheng’s popular support, partly gained because he kept his troops from harming the poor, see Wakeman, “Shun Interregnum,” pp. 45, 77. Chongzhen himself knew of the rebels’ popularity, and was correspondingly depressed. Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 13b.
31 Liu Shangyou, Dingsi xiaoji, p. 1. See also Li, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 12.
By this time the Chongzhen Emperor had directed most of his attention to the defense of the capital. The Beijing garrison was in a sorry state. The Three Camps (San ying), which at full strength were supposed to consist of at least 700,000 soldiers, had degenerated into an army of the old and the weak, of marketplace idlers and officers’ servants who were kept on the rosters so their commanders could collect rations.\(^{32}\) Two years earlier the emperor’s relative, Li Guozhen, had persuaded Chongzhen that he could get the garrison into shape, but the condition of the Three Camps actually degenerated under the command of this sharp-witted favorite, who took advantage of his “reforms” to bilk the public treasury and privy purse out of hundreds of thousands of tael.\(^{33}\) In the meantime, the more powerful palace eunuchs drafted the most fit of the garrison soldiers for their personal bodyguards, while the weaker succumbed to the plague that swept over the capital in 1643.\(^{34}\) The ones that remained were not only old and feeble, the laughingstock of the Beijing populace, they were also literally starving to death because the eunuchs in charge of the palace kitchens had stopped provisioning them.\(^{35}\)

32 The capital garrison had been virtually wiped out at the battle of Tumu in 1449 and never recovered full strength. After 1522 it was purposely reduced in size. By the time of Li Zicheng’s attack only 10–20% of the roster was actually present. Zhang Yi, *Sou wen xu bi*, 1:2b; Robert Bruce Crawford, *The Life and Thought of Chang Chü-cheng*, pp. 49–53. Ni Yuanlu actually proposed abolishing the institution of hereditary military households at this time. Huang, “Ni Yüan-lu’s ‘Realism’,” p. 425.

33 Li Qing, *Sanyuan biji*, fuzhong, 8a.

34 According to Tan Qian, trained divisions lost half their troops during the summer and autumn of that year, when the crowded inhabitants of Beijing succumbed in even greater numbers to what might have been either smallpox or bubonic plague. Helen Dunstan, “The Late Ming Epidemics,” pp. 7, 19–20, 28–29.

35 Qian, *Jia shen chuanxin lu*, pp. 12–13. During the fall and early winter months of 1643 it became very difficult to get grain to feed the troops. In late October, the emperor had ordered that 400,000 taels of silver be used to buy food. The official price of a picul of grain was 8 cash; in practice, grain sold for over one hundred times that rate. The wealthy of Beijing had long been hoarding grain, and they took advantage of the emperor’s purchase order to sell their stores at 1 tael per picul. The government had no choice but to buy from these
Yet where were the funds to pay and supply this ragtag army, or to hire mercenaries to replace it? The frontier defense forces already were costing the government 400,000 taels a month on paper, and yet the New and Old Treasuries only contained 4,200 taels of specie, and Ministry of Finance receipts had dwindled to nothing. In normal times, the emperor's annual personal income was more than four million taels of gold floral silver. However, those revenues too had declined, palace expenses were stupendous, and prices were soaring. Rumors notwithstanding, the profiteers, and quickly exhausted its quartermaster funds. Li, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 13a. For starvation and cannibalism as metaphors of the age, see: Shimizu, “Ryūmin to ryūzoku,” p. 380; and Dunstan, “Epidemics,” p. 13.

In the autumn of 1643 Minister of Finance Ni Yuanlu produced a military budget for the following year which anticipated less than 16 million taels in income and more than 21 million taels in expenditure. He suggested that the deficit be met by increasing the sale of salt and of official ranks, and by commuting punishments to fines. Chongzhen briefly considered issuing paper money as legal tender and even sent out eunuchs to gather mulberry tree fiber for making the notes. Fearful this would stir up rebellion among peasants wanting the mulberry trees left alone for sericulture, Ni persuaded the emperor to rescind the order. Ray Huang, “Ni Yüan-lu’s ‘Realism’,” pp. 423, 427–428.

Zhao Shijin, Jiashen jishi, p. 7. Appeals to the emperor to provide funds for the frontier defense command fell on deaf ears. On April 14, 1644, the Vice-Minister of Finance, Wu Fuzhong, reported that there were only eighty thousand taels left in the government treasury. Even though Wu insisted that these funds should be used to pay for the border garrisons (“If we do not have the Nine Border [defenses], then how can the capital be safely protected?”), the emperor insisted that no more rations be sent to the frontier and that all funds be devoted to the defense of the capital. Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 11. Later, while being told about the prime importance of virtue by the palace lecturer Ni Yuanlu, Chongzhen asked, “If virtue is really of such preponderant importance, how could it be usefully employed to solve the nation’s pressing problems, while pay and supply to the soldiers on the frontier are in arrears?” Both men only had 35 days left to live. Huang, “Ni Yüan-lu’s ‘Realism’,” p. 441.

Huang, “Fiscal Administration,” pp. 89–90. “Gold floral silver” was the top-grade silver used primarily for official salary payments.

The emperor supported approximately 70,000 eunuchs and 9,000 palace women. The palace kitchens served 10–15,000 people daily. Huang, “Fiscal Administration,” pp. 91–94. Price controls were announced on January 7,
emperor's privy purse contained no more than a few hundred thousand taels. To raise money, therefore, the Chongzhen Emperor decided to allow officials who had been convicted of taking bribes to earn their freedom by paying heavy fines. Seven prominent political prisoners were pardoned after they agreed to contribute part of their private fortunes to the defense of Beijing, and the emperor exerted pressure on his own relatives to make contributions as well. There were in addition some voluntary subscriptions, especially after it was announced that generous donors would be ennobled, and some corporate gifts from officials' provincial lodges (huiguan). But only two hundred thousand taels were collected in this way, and many of the fines that were paid actually failed to reach the Ming treasuries because the funds were siphoned off at lower levels by corrupt ministry clerks.

By the early months of 1644 the granaries were empty, and the capital garrison had not been paid in almost a year. As one general reported: “When you whip one soldier, he stands up, but at the same time another is lying down.”

The Debate to Move South

One solution, perhaps only a self-seeking one, was for the emperor to abandon the threatened city and establish a temporary headquarters at the southern capital of Nanjing. That possibility was first raised in a private morning audience in the Dezheng Palace by the Jiangxi official, Li Mingrui, who was a lecturer in the Hanlin Academy. The emperor had called in Li Mingrui along

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1644, but there is no evidence that they were enforced. Wan, *Chongzhen changbian*, p. 44.

40 Wakeman, “Shun Interregnum,” p. 78. But note that some sources claim that while the Taicang Treasury had no more than 1,300 taels, the privy treasury contained 400–500,000 ounces of specie. Li, *Sanyuan biji, zhong*, 21a.

41 This policy was adopted by the Ministry of Punishments on January 20, 1644. Wan, *Chongzhen changbian*, p. 44. See also Li, *Sanyuan biji, fuzhong*, 8b.


43 Huang, “Fiscal Administration,” p. 123. See also pp. 80–85, 126.
with the head of the Censorate, Li Banghua, and Lü Daqi, the former military governor of Jiujiang, on February 10 for consultation. In response to his ruler’s question about future policies, Li Mingrui answered bluntly, even recklessly insofar as he raised the spectre of the loss of the north. The presence of the rebels so close to the capital, said Li, was “a matter of life and death for the dynasty.” The only sensible course, he argued, was to move the court south to Nanjing. Startled, the Chongzhen Emperor pointed out to Li that this was a “serious matter, and not one easy to discuss.” Then he gestured heavenward and asked, “The superior realm cannot be known, is that not so?” Li Mingrui thought for a moment, then tried to assuage his ruler’s fatalism about the transfer of the Mandate of Heaven.

The Mandate is not necessarily inevitable. If one is good, he acquires it. If one is not good, he loses it. Heaven’s Mandate is subtle and secret, but it does rest on human actions. Humans make the decision to fulfill Heaven’s [Mandate]. Your Majesty sustains [the Mandate] here by rectifying your mind in harmony with Heaven. The slightest divergence [between the emperor’s mind and Heaven] is amplified to an enormous distance [unless you can] foretell its spiritual [intent]. Furthermore, since conditions have reached such an extreme, how can [Your Majesty] so lightly and indifferently let matters drift? If Your Majesty does not quickly decide at once, then another day it will be too late to repent. A person in the midst of affairs is liable to be misled, when those who are off to the side can see clearly. Your Majesty can make up your own sage mind within,

44 The two most detailed accounts of this audience are in Zou Yi, Mingji yiwen, pp. 18–20; and in Ji, Mingji beiüe, pp. 393–394. The words above come from Zou, p. 18. The two accounts tally closely, although the former is more detailed. Because Zou Yi was the disciple of Wu Weiye, who was in turn a close friend of Li Mingrui, this account presents Li in a most favorable light. However, there seems to be no question of Li Mingrui’s crucial role in the effort to get the Chongzhen Emperor to transfer his capital to Nanjing. See the relatively disinterested account in Dai Li and Wu Shu, Huailing liukou shizhong lu, p. 79. The audience is also mentioned in Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 63.
45 Ji, Mingji beiüe, p. 393.
46 Zou, Mingji yiwen, p. 18.
and regulate current conditions without—but this cannot be delayed a moment longer!\\(^{47}\)

The emperor might easily have taken umbrage at these remarks, which, by asserting the ruler’s voluntarism, also questioned his moral responsibility. But he chose not to view this as a ministerial reproach. Instead, he checked to make sure no one else was within hearing and answered:

I have been wanting to do this for a long time, but since no one suggested it for me, I have delayed until now. Your view is identical with mine. But what is to be done if the outer officials do not agree? This is an extremely serious matter. You should be secret about it, and above all do not divulge it lightly. If it is divulged, the guilt will be attributed to you.\\(^{48}\)

Having made his own position absolutely clear, the emperor asked about the practical aspects of a move south. How, in fact, would he get out of the capital? Li Mingrui explained that the best route would be via Shandong where he could pretend to be making a pilgrimage to the shrines of Wen Wang and Confucius. Once at Qufu, the royal coach could push rapidly on south, reaching the relative safety of the Huai’an area within twenty days. Then—Li assured the emperor—the entire country would be aroused. For, once the Chongzhen Emperor appeared outside the capital, the “dragons and tigers” of the realm would arise in response, and His Majesty “would carry the empire in the palm of his hand.” But—Li Mingrui audaciously warned—if the emperor stayed “immobile with upright dignity in Beijing,” then the dynasty would certainly fall. Stung by this prediction, the Chongzhen Emperor curtly answered: “I know it.” Then he dismissed the three men and returned to the inner palace.\\(^{49}\)

That evening the emperor invited Li Mingrui to have yet an-

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\(^{47}\) Ibid.
\(^{48}\) Ibid.; Ji, Mingji beilüe, p. 393.
\(^{49}\) Zou, Mingji yiwen, pp. 19–20.
other confidential meeting with him, and once they had been left alone, deluged the Hanlin scholar with questions. What provisions had he made for military reinforcements during the journey? Which officials would lead them? Where would they stop on the way? Li’s plan envisaged sending officials secretly on ahead to Jining to arrange for troop reinforcements and for stops at Jining and Huai’an, which were military havens in a troubled countryside. But where would the troop reinforcements come from, the emperor asked. Li admitted that all of the major army units were either defending the passes against the rebels or the frontier against the Manchus. Moreover, they could not afford to deplete the capital garrison altogether because soldiers would have to be left behind to guard the officials remaining in Beijing. It was therefore essential for them to gather a secret cadre of central government officials to recruit new troops from the eight prefectures around the capital.  

At this point, Li Mingrui raised the delicate matter of the emperor’s privy purse. Recruitment would be impossible without substantial funds, which would also be needed to pay “military rewards” to warlords along the escape route. The “privy purse must be used,” said Li. “If the rewards and bounties are insufficient, it will be extremely difficult to find a way out.” The emperor agreed that funds were badly needed, but insisted the privy purse was not the proper source. The Ministry of Finance would have to make some sort of arrangement for these special payments. Here, the two men reached an impasse. Li Mingrui insisted nearly as strongly that if they did use the last remaining reserves of the public treasury, then their northern border defenses would be fatally jeopardized; this would be tantamount to abandoning the Central Plain altogether, and their departure would be termed a flight. “I beg Your Majesty to think of the ancestral temples and of the altars of the soil. Decide and act, without waiting until you are already thirsty [and it is too late] to dig a well.” The Chongzhen Emperor nodded silently, but withheld ultimate approval. The hour  

50 Ibid., p. 20. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid.
was late—two drums had already sounded—and he wearily asked Li to leave.53

Three days later, on February 13, another recourse was suggested to the throne. Wu Linzheng, supervising secretary in the Ministry of Personnel, proposed that Wu Sangui be recalled from Ningyuan. But the emperor rejected this out of hand. Perhaps remembering what Li Mingrui had said, he refused to call back his northeastern army because that would mean sacrificing territory to the Manchus.54 Instead he turned eagerly to grasp at the straw offered him by the wealthy Grand Secretary Li Jiantai, who now promised to contribute a million taels of his own to outfit an army to relieve Li's native province of Shanxi.55 Unfortunately, Li Jiantai was only able to enlist the worst riffraff of the capital for his army—marketplace hangers-on and unemployed laborers who responded not at all to his calls for discipline.56 Ignorant of the army's mediocrity, the Chongzhen Emperor transformed the occasion of Li Jiantai's departure into a celebratory banquet, and then watched from the ramparts as the large force marched slowly to the west to the sounds of rolling drums and flapping banners.57 For the moment, all of the emperor's hopes rested upon the success of his

53 Ibid. Shortly after this meeting Chongzhen discussed the proposal to go south with his empress, Madame Zhou. She thought it a futile plan because it meant abandoning the ancestral temples in the north. Li, Sanyuan biji, zhong, 7b–8a.
54 Ji, Mingji beijie, pp. 394–395.
55 Ibid., p. 397. The emperor gave his permission to Li Jiantai to recruit an army on February 23, 1644. Although Li Jiantai had almost no military experience, he had considerable interest in protecting his family and property in Shanxi. Li's speech to the emperor is given in slightly different versions in Peng Sunyi, Pingkou zhi, 8:3; and in the Chongzhen shilu [Veritable records of the Chongzhen reign], 17:1a. The Chongzhen shilu is not an official compilation and its author is unknown. It appears in the Baqingslou ben copy of the Ming Veritable Records published by Liang Hongzhi as a photolithographic reprint of the manuscript formerly kept in the Jiangsu Provincial Library (Academia Sinica, Institute of History and Philology, 1940). For the kind of devastation suffered by important lineages in Shanxi during rebel invasions in the late Ming, see Ping-ti Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China, pp. 279–280.
56 Chongzhen shilu, 17:2; Qian, Jiashen chuanxinxu, p. 8; Peng, Pingkou zhi, 8:6.
57 Contemporaries estimated Li Jiantai's force to number 100,000. Zou, Mingji yiwen, p. 20.
grand secretary, to whom he had said, "As you thus go, Sir, it is as though I myself were going!" 58

From the very beginning, the expedition turned out to be a costly failure. Even before it left the city, diviners predicted defeat; and the harness pole of Li Jiantai's own carriage ominously snapped in two. 59 Once outside the walls, troops began dropping off at the rear of the column, and three thousand soldiers of the palace garrison audaciously returned to Beijing en masse. 60 Perhaps most disheartening was the reception of Li Jiantai's soldiers as they marched slowly—a mere thirty li a day—across Hebei. It was said in the capital that Li's troops could only get food from the peasants by pretending to be soldiers of Shun. 61 And it was also known that many cities closed their gates to the imperial troops, fearing this rabble more than the rebels themselves. 62

In the meantime, Li Zicheng advanced from the opposite direction. On February 26, even before Li Jiantai had reached Shanxi, couriers brought news to the court that the Shun rebels were spreading across the province. And the following day the ominous word came that Pingyang and all the prefectures bordering the Yellow River were in the rebels' hands. 63 On March 16, Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi, fell to Chuang Wang, "the dashing prince," which was the sobriquet Li Zicheng had adopted in 1636. The Ming local commander, Zhou Yuji, gallantly defended Ningwu Pass, but his was one of the few instances of firm resistance which

60 Wen, *Liehuang xiaozhi*, p. 226; Tan Qian, *Zaolin zazu*, ren, 1b.
62 At Guangzong (Shunde prefecture), Li Jiantai was even forced to besiege the city for three days; and when he finally did gain entry, he retaliated by killing the district magistrate and leaders of the local gentry. *Chongzhen shihu*, 17:3, 5.
63 "On February 28, 1643, there was a great wind and the daylight grew dark. The following dawn it was somewhat lighter. Then again on the third day in the afternoon smoke arose from the ridgepoles of each of the palaces, as though a fire had broken out. All of the ministers came out and they could see on the ridgepoles of each palace and gate a nearly imperceptible puffing of smoke, which was very light in color and which lasted for a long time before stopping. This was also said to be an omen." Li, *Sanyuan biji*, zhong, 9a.
Li Zicheng’s men encountered on this campaign. Throughout Shanxi and western Beizhili, “the civil and military officials had all lost their confidence in each other.” And in the marketplaces their subjects boldly chanted:

When Prince Chuang comes, we’ll open up our gates. Those who rob before he’s here are really just our mates. No food for our bellies, no clothes for our backs; We’re butchered for bribes and squeezed by the tax. Our bodies are heaped in the moats where they rot; We’ll rejoice if he’s coming and grieve if he’s not.

Powerless in the face of such public rejection, the local authorities in town after town simply opened their gates to the rebels. By April 7, Datong was in Li Zicheng’s hands, and his men moved on into Beizhili where they occupied Xuanfu (Xuanhua) ten days later. Now the Ming court’s only defense against this militant agglomeration of the poor and outcast of north China was the mod-

64 Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, vol. 1, pp. 249–250.
65 Liu, Dingsi xiaoji, p. 1. See also Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:2a.
66 Bao Yangsheng, Jiashen chaoshi xiaoji, 5:2b. During this victorious sweep across north China, Li Zicheng’s army gained allies among the exploited by killing off the “worms” that fed off of the people: yamen-worms (yadu), princely-household worms (fudu), magnate-worms (haodu), study-worms (xuedu, which refers to shengyuan who harmed the people), and official-worms (guandu, which refers to retainers of the local gentry, also called “adopted sons of gentry households”). Shimizu, “Ryūmin,” pp. 220–221.
67 Li Zicheng sent merchants ahead of his army to announce that the rebels would not kill civilians, nor seize wealth, nor violate women, nor trade unfairly. They would seize the goods of the wealthy, however, and distribute them to the poor. (From a copper seal issued by Li Zicheng around May, 1644, and unearthed in Beijing in 1959, it is possible to see that Li established a special office to divide the landed property of Ming officials among his “peasant troops.” Kuang-ching Liu, “World View and Peasant Rebellion,” p. 298.) They would also honor human talent, welcoming any scholars who cared to join them. Ji Liuqi, Mingji heilüe, cited in Zhao Lisheng, “Li Zicheng difang zhengquan,” p. 45.
68 That same day, because they had not been paid, the Ming troops at Changping, 50 kilometers northwest of Beijing, mutinied. Angela N. S. Hsi, “Wu San-kuei in 1644,” p. 444.
The garrison force at Juyong Pass, northwest of the capital. And even the Ming crown prince, fifteen-year-old Zhu Cilang, realized how little protection that afforded. While dutifully discussing the first section of the *Analects* with his palace tutor, Xiang Yu, he had come upon the lines, "Is it not pleasant? Is it not delightful?" The crown prince pondered them for a moment, then he said bitterly, "The two interrogative characters are a joke!" His tutor could only smile uneasily.

On March 6, the Chongzhen Emperor had again asked his officials to submit policy suggestions. His apparent open-mindedness encouraged those who privately wished to move south. A series of confidential memorials were thus relayed to the throne, putting forth one or another version of that scheme. Li Mingrui continued to be a leading proponent, and it was from the Hanlin Academy in which he served that many of these memorials came. Naturally enough, most of the advocates were southerners themselves. Ni Yuanlu (who had been removed as Minister of Finance after Grand Secretary Chen Yan persuaded the emperor he was too bookish) also favored the notion, and he helped secure the support of Xiang Yu, the crown prince's tutor, who was regarded by many as a former Donglin sympathizer. These officials formulated three different but related proposals.

The first was to have the emperor lead an imperial military expedition to "subdue" (zheng) the rebels, while leaving the crown prince in charge of Beijing. This plan accorded with a more general desire voiced by these literati to encourage the magnates and gentry of the empire to enroll militia forces to come to the em-

69 Tan Qian, *Zaolin zazu, ren*, 1b. The two "questions" are really part of two other phrases that form the famous opening lines of the *Analects*: "The Master said, 'Is it not pleasant to learn with a constant perseverance and application? Is it not delightful to have friends coming from distant quarters?'" *Analects* I.i, 1–2.

70 Qian, *Jiashen chuanxin lu*, p. 10.

71 Wang Youdian, *Shiwai*, p. 507 (4:29a). Xiang Yu had been driven out of office during Wei Zhongxian's ascendency because "he was partial to the purists (gingyi) from Jiangnan." Li, *Sanyuan biji, fazhong*, 22a.

72 Qian, *Jiashen chuanxin lu*, p. 11. For Chen Yan, a Sichuanese, see *Ming shi*, p. 2871; Xu Zi, *Xiaotian jinian fukao*, 3:71.
peror’s aid. The Grand Coordinator of Huai’an, Lu Zhenfei, had already organized seventy-two self-defense units, each trained and led by a lower degree-holder; it was felt that efforts like this would be enhanced elsewhere once the emperor left the inner courts of the Forbidden City. It mattered little that the emperor did not even know how to ride a horse. His mere presence on the battlefield would be a sure guarantee that “the loyal ministers, righteous scholars, bold heroes and knights errant” of the empire would respond to his summons, just as the men of Han had to that of Ming Taizu in his fight against the Mongols in the fourteenth century.

The second type of proposal was almost a corollary of the first, although southerners were more wary about voicing it openly because of the regional emphasis. Once free of the capital, the emperor could move into the part of the empire where loyal support was the strongest: the area of Jiangnan. By moving to Nanjing, the Chongzhen Emperor would be able to establish a second line of defense along the Yangzi River, with Jiujiang as the pivot point of a southern economic and military stronghold. As Li Mingrui pointed out, the model for this strategy was the Southern Song, which had ruled for another century-and-a-half after moving to Hangzhou. A similar move on the part of the Ming—he argued—would, under the circumstances, be quite appropriate and utterly consonant with the notion of expediency given in the Book of Changes. As Li Mingrui and Li Banghua discreetly discussed the

73 Peng, Píngkòu zhì, 10:6b. On April 13, 1644, Fang Yizhi requested to be allowed to go to the Huai area to summon hào xiá (magnates) to the emperor's rescue. Qìán, Jiáshèn chuànxìn lu, p. 11.
74 Zòu Yì, Míngjì yìwén, p. 23.
75 This was not the first time that such a southern strategy had been brought to the attention of the emperor. Shi Kefa and Jiang Yueguang had presented such a plan to the throne in a memorial submitted earlier that winter before the lunar new year. Yang De’en, Shì Kèfà niánpu, p. 30. See also Dennerline, “Hsu Tu,” p. 97. For Ni Yuanlu’s ideas on this question, see: Ray Huang, “Ni Yüan-lu’s ‘Realism,”’ pp. 420–422.
76 Zòu, Míngjì yìwén, p. 24. The parallel to the Southern Song is also suggested by Qìán Xìng’s title Jiáshèn chuànxìn lu, which immediately recalls Li Gang’s famous work (well known during the late Ming) Jìngkāng chuànxìn lu [Transmitted record of the Jingkang period]. This describes the period in 1125–1126
possibility of establishing a Southern Ming regime, they obviously felt that the success of such a venture depended upon having the emperor, rather than crown prince, lead the exodus to Nanjing. Li Mingrui explained that:

The heir apparent is young and inexperienced. [According to the Zuo zhuan,] “If the son receives the commands of another, it is injurious to his majesty; if he determines himself the commands, he is unfilial.” That is not as advantageous as His Majesty’s going in person.

Li thus hoped to leave the administration of the northern capital and protection of the royal altars in the hands of the crown prince while the father removed himself to Nanjing to create the administrative and economic base for a Southern Ming regime, protected

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77 Zou, Mingji yuwen, p. 22. Li Mingrui’s allusion to the Zuo zhuan was meant to point out that the crown prince should guard Beijing as administrator of the realm (jianguo), because only the emperor possessed the requisite authority to muster a successful military expedition against the rebels. My translation is taken from James Legge, The Chinese Classics (London, 1872), Vol. 5, Part 1, pp. 130–131. The passage in question explains that the Marquis of Jin proposed to send an army under his eldest son to subdue barbarian tribesmen in Shanxi. His minister remonstrated, arguing that the son should care for the she and ji (altars of the land and grain) and guard the capital as jianguo, while his father led the army. Jianguo later came to mean regent; that is, asking the taizi to jianguo was “requesting the heir apparent to become regent or ‘protector’—something short of ‘emperor’.” Herbert A. Giles, Chinese-English Dictionary (Shanghai, 1892), p. 201. But other references to jianguo in the Zuo zhuan seem to have meant that the crown prince oversaw administration while the emperor was away on a military expedition. In the Record of Rites, jianguo was the title applied to the daifu appointed by the emperor to supervise the affairs of the various states (guo) of the nobility (zhuhou). (Morohashi Tetsuji, Dai Kanwa jiten [Tokyo, 1943], 23032.30 [p. 5265,]) In other words, Li Mingrui was not suggesting that the emperor abdicate, as Huizong had done for Qinzong at Kaifeng.
by the armies of the lower Yangzi commanded by Shi Kefa. However, this ultimately meant abandoning the Central Plain to both the rebels and the barbarians, and leaving northerners like Wei Zaode in charge of the heir apparent in Beijing. Of course, there were no formal reasons why the northern officials could not proceed south as well at some point. But their landed interests in Hebei, Shandong, and Shanxi made this highly unlikely. Allusions to the *Spring and Autumn Annals* therefore failed to mitigate the northerners’ rigid opposition to this strategy, and the plan was defeated.  

78 Zou, *Mingji yiwen*, p. 23; Qian, *Jiashen chuanxin lu*, p. 10. Sacrifices to the *she* and *ji* formed part of a cult in ancient China which most authors have understood as being devoted to the earth god (*she*) and to the god of grain (*ji*). The *she*, however, was actually the locale of the communal altars to sacred trees and stones. The connection of these altars with emperorhood has always been very close. In *Mencius* VII.14 it is said that the people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; and the ruler is last. If a feudal lord endangers the altars to the *she* and *ji*, then he must be replaced. According to Sima Qian’s *Shi ji*, the *she* of the Central Plain (*zhongyuan*) was where the Yellow Emperor sacrificed. See Ling Chunsheng, “Zhongguo gudai she zhi yuanliu.” Protection of the altars of the soil and grain and of the Central Plain represented the cultural loyalty of the literati, and constituted one of the main Southern Ming appeals to recover the northern plain later. See, for example, Kunshan yimin ningren Gu Yanwu, *Sheng’an benji* [Basic annals of Sheng’an], Jingtuo yishi ed. (Taibei: Bank of Taiwan, 1964), p. 37. (This work, which is by Wen Bing, the son of Wen Zhenmeng, has been falsely attributed to Gu Yanwu and confused with the latter’s *Sheng’an huangdi benji* [Basic annals of the Sheng’an Emperor]. See Wolfgang Franke, *An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History*, 1.4.10 (p. 43). Henceforth, Wen Bing’s work will be identified by its original title, *Jiayi sheian*.) The position of the *she* and *ji* in imperial ritual has not always been constant. They have been merged at times, and dropped altogether from imperial sacrifices in other periods. During the Ming period, however, the *she* and *ji* represented the highest level of official worship. This was partly because the Fengshan ceremonies, performed at Mount Tai by the emperor, were no longer carried out after 1008, so that sacrifices to the *she* and *ji* were a kind of replacement. It was also because these latter ceremonies were amalgamated with the Ming royal house ancestral sacrifices by Ming Taizu when he reorganized the rituals in 1377. The two consort deities of *she* and *ji*, Goulong and Houji, who had been worshipped together at those altars ever since Zhou times, were replaced by
After the fall of Taiyuan—when the emperor again requested advice from officials in the six ministries, the offices of scrutiny, the Censorate, and the Hanlin Academy—a compromise solution was put forward by those who favored a southern move. Li Banghua submitted a secret memorial suggesting that the crown prince be sent south to consolidate Ming defenses in Jiangnan, while the emperor stayed behind to protect the northern capital. This compromise kept the emperor in the hands of the northerners while giving the southerners a legitimate heir in the event of the fall of the dynasty.79

Some time during the period April 3–5, 1644, the Chongzhen Emperor convened an audience to test official opinion of Li Banghua's proposal. Holding up the confidential memorial for all to see, the emperor asked Li to describe its contents. Li Banghua declined to speak. The emperor therefore read the document aloud and asked for the other officials' reactions. As one minister after another stepped forward to endorse the proposal, it became apparent that the hopeless military situation, coupled with the lobbying of the southerners, had turned opinion in favor of a move south. The highly esteemed Xiang Yu was naturally in favor of the proposal because he was tutor to the crown prince, but the most important swing vote was that of the Chief Grand Secretary and Ju-

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79 As part of Li Banghua's plan, Chen Zilong and Qi Biaojia had agreed on a scheme to place the crown prince at the head of the defenses of Jiangnan, with the Nanjing Minister of War, Shi Kefa, his second-in-command. Dennerline, "Chia-ting," p. 169.
nior Guardian of the Heir Apparent, Chen Yan. Chen’s support of Li Banghua put the emperor in a most difficult position.  

Initially, the Chongzhen Emperor had been “somewhat inclined” to go to Nanjing himself, leaving the care of the altars of the soil and grain—the she and ji—to his heir. But now that order of responsibility was to be reversed. If his son went south in his place to perpetuate the Ming “for another one hundred and fifty years” like the Southern Song, then it would be the reigning emperor’s holy duty to stay behind and look after the rites and sacrifices. Li Banghua’s proposal therefore amounted to a challenge to the emperor to sacrifice himself, and the ministerial démarche that had now taken place publicly placed the choice in open view before the court. The Chongzhen Emperor had little recourse but to declare grandiosely, “It is proper for a country’s ruler to die for the she and ji, and I will die happily!” Yet once this pretension had been uttered, the emperor could not refrain from bitterly adding, “Those who speak of moving [the crown prince south] want to have me skulk away and hold my head in shame.” Partly because of his visible displeasure, several ministers hastily began to change their stance. The decisive moment came when the supervising secretary of the Ministry of War, Guang Shiheng, angrily spoke out against Li Banghua, and identified Li Mingrui as the man behind these “heretical ideas.” Guang, himself a southerner from Tongcheng, was strongly committed to the defense of Beijing, and after

80 This and the following account of the court audience are based upon comparative use of Zou, Mingji yiwen, pp. 22–24; Ji, Mingji beiüe, pp. 394, 411, and 480–482; Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 10; Liu, Dingsi xiaoji, 3a; Wen, Liehuang xiaozi, p. 228; Gu Yingtai, Ming shi jishi benmo, 79:5; Li, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 19a; Tan, Guo que, p. 6031. All of these sources agree upon essentials, save the date of the audience; and most seem to feel it occurred on April 3, 1644. The temporal sequence of discussions indicates that there may actually have been a series of audiences, though I treat it as a single meeting. The major statements of each person, including the emperor, also agree in essentials despite some minor differences in phrasing.

81 Wen, Liehuang xiaozi, p. 228.

82 Zou, Mingji yiwen, p. 24. The wherewithal for such a move may not have even existed by this time. The main roads south were already cut by bandits and rebels. Li Xunzhi, Chongzhen chaoye ji, p. 184.
he so passionately condemned those who would abandon the capital, nineteen of the twenty-seven officials present voted to drop the plan altogether. This did not entirely please the emperor, who secretly wanted to go south instead of the crown prince but who was faced with a court majority in favor of keeping the entire government in Beijing. The result was that both sides incurred the emperor's anger. Saying on the one hand that "Guang Shiheng prevents me from going south," the emperor accused Li Mingrui, on the other, of forming a cabal (pengdang) against the throne.

If this is what all the ministers are constantly saying and the country [truly] is like this, then there is not a single loyal minister or righteous scholar to share the dynasty's troubles. Instead they plot. Well, the monarch is going to die for the altars of his ancestors like the morally upright of all time. My will is resolved. I will hear no more of this.

"Thus," commented one chronicle, "the discussion of moving south was laid to rest."

If neither the emperor nor the crown prince were to go south, as

83 Liu, Dingsi xiaoji, p. 3a. Some later believed that Guang Shiheng resisted the move south because he was secretly in touch with Li Zicheng and planned to surrender to the rebel. Dai and Wu, Huailing liukou, p. 79. Guang Shiheng did end up serving Li Zicheng. After the rebel took Beijing, Guang remained supervising secretary in the Ministry of War and was granted a private audience with Li Zicheng. Paradoxically, he still believed in the success of a Southern Ming regime. He wrote to his sons in Tongcheng, Anhui: "I have already received the benevolence of the Great Shun. You can all change your names and go away. You ought to exert yourselves in poetry and composition, so as not to fail the southern dynasty's examinations." Ji, Mingji beilüe, p. 87.

84 Zou, Mingji yiwen, p. 24. Apparently, the emperor was so angry he even thought of having Li Mingrui executed, but he was held back by Guang Shiheng's view that this would "trouble the hearts [of the people]." Ji, Mingji beilüe, p. 394. (However, Zou Yi has Guang urging the emperor to announce the death sentence. Zou, Mingji yiwen, p. 23.) The emperor's final comment was that, "He clearly belongs to a clique, but for the time being we will not pursue [the matter]." Li, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 19a.

85 Ji, Mingji beilüe, p. 411.
86 Ibid.
Guang Shiheng had argued, then steps would have to be taken to defend the capital. On April 6, Guang presented the throne with a proposal to recall all of the emperor’s major military commanders. The memorial conceded that such a step meant giving up territory to the Manchus, but it considered this only a temporary loss. Once the empire had recovered its strength by putting down the rebellion, those lands could be retaken.87

Guang Shiheng’s proposal was hotly debated at court. His supporters (Ni Yuanlu, Jin Zhijun, Wu Linzheng, and Sun Chengze) insisted that the government must face reality and immediately summon Wu Sangui from Ningyuan, Wang Yongji from Jizhou, and Tang Tong from Miyun.88 Otherwise, they argued, the capital was doomed. But the emperor’s other ministers could not agree to this plan. Some maintained that only one or two should be recalled; others stressed the importance of Wu Sangui’s army alone. The emperor’s two chief grand secretaries, Chen Yan and Wei Zaode, were vigorously opposed to recall, and they forcefully repeated the original argument against giving up territory to the Manchus. Wei, a native of Beizhili, was supported in turn by the Shandong warlord Liu Zeqing, whose own flanks would be exposed to attack if Wu’s forces were withdrawn from the defense of the Great Wall.89

87 Wan, Chongzhen changbian, p. 103. Guang also urged that the emperor send several “clever and talented administrators” to reactivate the grain transport system. The emperor caustically replied that if Guang knew of any such bureaucrats in his service, then the throne would certainly appreciate learning more about them.

88 Li, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 15–16a. According to Qian Xing (Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 9), Wang Yongji had requested permission the previous month to abandon his post and fall back behind the Great Wall. Permission was granted. Wang later served the Manchus as a key figure in the Board of Works, and then in the Board of Revenue, taking charge of Yellow River hydrology. Huang Zhijun, Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 2426 (144:23a).

89 Liu Zeqing, a brutal and corrupt military man from Caoxian in Shandong, had fought ably against the Manchus in Liaodong. In 1640 a famine struck his native region, banditry increased, and Liu was sent to occupy the province. His regime there was virtually a satrapy, absorbing tax shipments intended for the capital. When a censor, Han Ruyu, was despatched to the area to investigate and impeached Liu for lawlessness, the warlord sent assassins dis-
Briefly the decision was suspended. The Chongzhen Emperor still nourished a last flicker of hope that Li Jiantai’s army would halt the rebel advance. But on April 9, three days after the stalled debate, a despatch finally arrived from Li Jiantai, explaining that his army—or what remained of it—was in a hopeless state, and urging the emperor to take whatever measures he could to save himself.\(^90\) The following day, April 10, the Chongzhen Emperor finally issued orders for the recall. All of his major military commanders were promoted one full rank; and Wu Sangui, Liu Zeqing, and Tang Tong were commanded to bring their armies to the rescue of the throne. Of the three, only Tang Tong actually came to Beijing in time.\(^91\)

Li Jiantai’s despatch raised one final time the issue of moving south because it explicitly suggested to the Chongzhen Emperor that he transfer his court to Nanjing, after sending the crown prince on ahead.\(^92\) Even though the emperor had insisted a week earlier that his mind was made up and that the subject was not to

\(^{90}\) Ji, Mingji beilüe, p. 414. Li Jiantai pushed on, nevertheless, but he and his men did not reach Baoding until after Beijing had fallen to the rebels. Besieged inside Baoding by Li Zicheng’s men, Li Jiantai surrendered after killing the prefect, Shao Zongyuan, who wanted to fight the rebels to the end. Wan, Chongzhen changbian, p. 113; Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 2595 (154:18b). For an earlier false rumor of Li Jiantai’s surrender, see Chongzhen shilu, 17:7b. Tan Qian mentions Li Jiantai’s despatch under an April 10 entry (Guo que, p. 6034).

\(^{91}\) Wen, Liehuang xiaozhi, pp. 228–229. There was an increase in the number of high coordinating military officials in the last years of the Chongzhen reign. By 1641 there were four zongdu within a thousand li of the capital, six xunfu (Ningyuan, Suiping, Shuntian, Miyun, Tianjin, and Baoding), and eight zongbing. Zhao Yi, Nianer shi zhaji, p. 751. Liu Zeqing received his orders to rescue Datong from the rebels on April 16. Instead of complying, he turned his men loose on the canal city of Linqing, which they looted, and led his army south toward Huai’an. Wen, Liehuang xiaozhi, p. 230; Gu Ling, Jinling ye chao, pp. 5–6.

\(^{92}\) Ji, Mingji beilüe, p. 414.
be discussed again, the southerners in favor of such a move in the first place had continued to make secret preparations for the departure of the heir apparent or the emperor.\(^{93}\) Now they dared once again to propose before the court that the crown prince be sent on to Nanjing to take nominal charge of military affairs in Jiangnan. And once again all debate was halted by another outburst from Guang Shiheng, who pointedly asked: “What do all of you intend by having the heir ordered south? Do you intend to repeat the history of Emperor Suzong at Lingwu?”\(^{94}\) Stunned by Guang’s implication that they were plotting to seat the crown prince on the throne and force the Chongzhen Emperor’s abdication, the southerners “dared not say a word,” and stood passively by, heads bowed, as they were verbally lashed by their infuriated sovereign. “It is not I, the ruler, who has lost his realm. It is all of you, my ministers, who appear to be trying so hard to lose the realm!”\(^{95}\) It was obvious to all present that any attempt to persuade the emperor to do other than sit “immobile with upright dignity in Beijing” was bound to be misinterpreted as a disloyal act. From this moment on, despair seized the inhabitants of the capital, and “all of the officials thought of fleeing south [by themselves].”\(^{96}\)

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93 An officer named Fang Kaizhang was secretly ordered to prepare one thousand men and several hundred boats which were to be kept day and night in the suburbs in case the emperor wished to leave by the Grand Canal for Nanjing. On April 13, Fang tried to reach the emperor, but he could not talk his way past the guard post at the palace gate. He waited until April 20, then left the capital. Bao Yangsheng, *Jiashen chaoshi xiaoji*, 4:5b.

94 In 756 A.D. the Tang emperor Xuanzong had abandoned Chang’an to An Lushan’s rebel army. After praetorians killed his favorite consort, Yang Guifei, enroute, Xuanzong fled to Sichuan, leaving the crown prince behind in western Shanxi to placate army officers who wished to retake Chang’an. The young prince wanted to join his father, but the officers persuaded him that it would be a greater act of filial piety to rally the army at Lingwu in Ningxia and recover the capital. After five requests, the prince agreed to “accord himself with their collective wishes and plan for the altars of the soil and the grain.” He subsequently named his father *shanghuang tiandi* (emperor-abdicate), adopted the imperial name Suzong, and established a temporary court at Lingwu from which he eventually reconquered Chang’an. Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, 118:6982.


96 Qian, *Jiashen chuanxin lu*, p. 10. The following day, the emperor’s son-in-law,
The emperor’s refusal either to send the heir apparent or to go himself to Nanjing had far reaching consequences when the Manchus later captured Beijing. Because the central government fell into their hands relatively intact, the Manchus would possess what the Jurchen largely lacked; an almost complete cadre of Chinese bureaucrats with which to take over the empire and eventually conquer south China. It also meant that the Southern Ming regimes were weakened by factional squabbling over the shaky succession rights of the various princely households. Moreover, the loyalist camp lacked a large group of irredentist northerners eager to take the offensive against the Qing and recover their homeland. The Chongzhen Emperor’s decision to sacrifice himself thus ultimately doomed many of the hopes that Ming restorationists were later to hold in the south.

The Emperor’s Last Days

In spite of the criticisms levelled against him by those who thought him too passive, the Chongzhen Emperor did continue to take measures—ineffectual though they may have been—to defend Beijing. After hesitating for so long, he finally gave the order to summon militia and had wood-block prints of his proclamation made for distribution throughout the empire: “Let each commander’s officers and soldiers, all loyal and brave literati, the righteous princes and the determined nobles advance together by land and water!”97 At the same time, detachments of the capital garrison were marched outside the main walls to set camp; extra guards were posted at all the gates, which were barricaded and flanked by Portuguese cannons; and armed eunuchs were placed in charge of the main approaches to the Forbidden City. The emperor even dug deep into the meagre reserves of his private treasury to enable the

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97 Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 12.
eunuch Du Xun to raise an army and—assisted by General Tang Tong—guard Juyong Pass.\textsuperscript{96}

But none of these preparations either daunted the enemy or inspired the people of Beijing.\textsuperscript{99} The militia proclamations got no farther than the suburbs of Beijing, and the units assigned to patrol the fifteen miles of walls around the capital were so undermanned that each soldier had to guard thirty feet all by himself.\textsuperscript{100} In the ministries clerks ceased obeying orders, and “commoners dared to oppose their superiors.”\textsuperscript{101} And, at the very pinnacle of government, the officials in the Directorate of Astronomy reported that on April 10—the day of the fateful decision not to leave the capital—the pole star, symbol of the emperor himself, had “slipped down” in the heavens.\textsuperscript{102}

The Chongzhen Emperor pointedly ignored this omen and, “commanding his officials to examine their moral character with a view to reformation, invited the high-ranking officials to drink wine at an exalted banquet just as if this were a time of Great Peace.”\textsuperscript{103} On April 22, in fact, the emperor held a regular morning audience, and turned the discussion to an evaluation of military logistics. Just as they were discussing means of increasing provisions

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p. 11.
\textsuperscript{99} Li Zicheng had an excellent intelligence system, using Shanxi merchants, shopkeepers, fortune-tellers, and yamen clerks as spies in the capital who reported back to him by mounted courier. Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, 1:250; Li, Sanyuan biji, zhong, 21b. The authorities were not entirely unaware of this, and frequently interrogated members of the cloth merchants’ guild and restaurant owners, many of whom were Shaanxi and Shanxi natives. Chen Jisheng, Zaisheng jilüe, ce 110, p. 3. According to the editor’s note in Li Wenzhi, Wan-Ming minbian, p. 3, Chen Jisheng is actually Grand Secretary Chen Yan.
\textsuperscript{100} The walls of what later became known as the “Tartar City” were accurately measured by French astronomers and found to be exactly 23.55 kilometers (41 li) long. E. Bretschneider, Recherches archéologiques et historiques sur Pékin et ses environs, p. 32; Osvald Siren, The Walls and Gates of Peking, p. 43. The inner city walls were 12 meters high, and at the top varied from 13 to 18 meters in width. Geiss, “Peking,” p. 25; Siren, Walls and Gates, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{101} Liu Shangyou, Dingsi xiaoji, 1b.
\textsuperscript{102} Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
The Guojie ta or "Tower that Bestrides the Road" at Juyong Pass. This magnificent vaulted gate, upon which a stupa was supposed to stand, was built by the Mongols in 1345. There are inscriptions inside the gateway in Sanskrit, Tibetan, Mongolian, Uighur, Tangut, and Chinese. Photograph by F. Wakeman.

for the garrisons guarding the capital at Juyong Pass, a courier rushed into the audience hall with an urgent despatch, sealed for the monarch's eyes only.

As [the emperor] read it, his expression changed. He arose and went into the inner palace. After a long time, he [sent out] an order for the officials to retire. This was the first they were to know of the fall of Changping's defenses.  

Du Xun and General Tang Tong had, on April 21, let the rebels through Juyong Pass. The Shun army was now at Changping, only sixty-five kilometers northwest of the Forbidden City. Con-

104 Wen, Liehuang xiaozhi, p. 231.
sternation seized the court. The ministers “looked at each other without expressing a single suggestion.” In spite of their general awareness of the rebels’ steady advance, none of the officials had known until this moment that Li Zicheng was so close to taking the capital. The next morning, April 23, the Chongzhen Emperor held his last formal audience. When he entered the hall and seated himself on the throne, the sight of his assembled ministers put him in tears; “all of the officials looked at each other and wept, too, wringing their hands at a loss for a plan.” All that the emperor could do was write out an imperial edict, announcing that “the civil officials can each commit suicide.” He was later persuaded to retract the edict because of its potential damage to public morale.

At that very same time, the vanguard of Li Zicheng’s vast army was riding into the western suburbs of Beijing, and by afternoon it had attacked the Xizhi Gate. The garrison units outside the city walls promptly surrendered to the Shun soldiers. The forces within the walls either fired blanks or aimed their artillery pieces over the rebels’ heads. Yet rather than order a full-scale assault upon the

105 Liu, Dingsi xiaoji, p. 3.
106 Ming intelligence was very poor. The Ministry of War had sent a reconnaissance patrol to Changping four days earlier, but the entire party was captured and killed. Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:249. See also Satô Fumitoshi, “Minmatsu Yenjichû no ran ni tsuite,” p. 222. Messages were also delayed or delivered haphazardly. When Li Zicheng formally declared war against the Ming court on February 16, 1644, the despatch failed to reach the emperor until April 7. The original messenger, struck down by the plague enroute, had paid a Ming soldier to carry on the message for him. When the soldier delivered it, the Ministry was aghast to discover that Li had given himself a reign title, and so killed the soldier to preserve secrecy, holding back the communique as long as it dared. Gu Yingtai, Mingshi jishi benmo, 79:1a; Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 8. See also Hsi, “Wu San-kuei in 1644,” p. 445.
107 Wen, Lieluang xiaozi, p. 232.
108 Ibid. The emperor did consider arousing the populace of Beijing against the rebels. But Wu Fuzhong, Minister of Finance, persuaded him that this would promote mass panic. Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, pp. 14–15.
109 For general accounts of the capture of Beijing, see Parsons, Peasant Revolutions, pp. 124–130; and Xie Guozen, Nanming shiliu, pp. 27–29.
110 Liu, Dingsi xiaoji, 3b; Zhang et al., Ming shi (Kaiming shuju), p. 966. When
capital, Li Zicheng—who feared being accused of regicide—decided to give the Chongzhen Emperor a last opportunity to surrender. Du Xun, the eunuch who had surrendered Juyong Pass to the rebels, was supplied with instructions and sent over the city wall and into the palace to negotiate on the “dashing prince’s” behalf.\footnote{Li Zicheng had earlier sent the former Ming commander, Wang Yongji, from Changping to Beijing to offer the emperor peace in exchange for the partitioning of north China and the appointment of Li as Administrator of the Realm. Whether Wang ever reached the emperor or not, is unknown. Parsons, \textit{Peasant Revolutions}, p. 130.}

The Chongzhen Emperor met with the eunuch, once a favorite of the throne, in the presence of his chief grand secretary, Wei Zaode. Du Xun was very frank with his former master, explaining that, in exchange for ennoblement, a reward of a million ounces of silver, and acknowledgement of his private kingdom in Shaanxi and Shanxi, Li Zicheng would destroy the other rebel groups in China and defend Liaodong against the Manchus on behalf of the Ming monarch. These were tempting terms, but as the Chongzhen Emperor listened to Du Xun’s enumeration, he knew that concession now would forever mark him as having been “expedient” (\textit{pian}) in later Confucian historians’ eyes. That accusation would be lightened, however, if he could find ministerial support for appeasement. Turning to Wei Zaode, the emperor asked: “What do you think of this plan? Matters are already critical now. They could be resolved with a single word.” Wei refused to speak, and the emperor arose in agitation, repeating his question: “What do you think of this plan?” Wei remained silent, refusing to share the onus of the decision. Trembling with anger, the emperor turned...
and dismissed Du Xun; and then, as the eunuch departed, the emperor suddenly lashed out at the throne, knocking it over in front of Wei Zaode. The grand secretary hurriedly left the audience room, and the matter of negotiations was never again raised.112

That night, Li Zicheng’s principal shaman, the dwarf Song Xiance, divined that if it rained the next day, the city would be theirs for the taking.113 The following morning, April 24, Li awoke to a slight drizzle and gave orders that his troops prepare to enter the capital. His own headquarters was moved to just outside Zhangyi Gate, which was opened to him by the eunuch Cao Hua-shun. By nightfall, Li’s men were filtering through the walled southern portion of the city.114 The Chongzhen Emperor knew that little time remained before the Shun rebels entered the Forbidden City.115

At the hour of the cock116 His Majesty sent a eunuch with secret imperial orders for the Marquis of Xinluo, Liu Wenbing [nephew of the empress dowager]; and for His Majesty's son-in-law, Gong Yonggu, to escort their households [and the royal princes] safely out of the city and on the way south. Liu and Gong both entered the inner palace to see His Majesty, and said, “The laws [against imperial relatives having arms in their households] are quite strict. How dare your ministers selfishly look after their own households? And since our household members together amount only to several hundred [including servants], how would we be [strong] enough to confront the bandits’ vanguard?” His Majesty nodded in assent.117 [His Majesty] then summoned his chief minister, Wei Zaode, to

112 Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 15. According to one contemporary source, Du Xun was only allowed to leave when he told the emperor that Li Zicheng held two Ming princes hostage in his absence. Zhang Dai, Shigui cangshu, p. 343.
113 Li, Sanyuan biji, fuzhong, 19b–20a.
114 Wen, Liehuang xiaozhi, p. 232.
115 Ji, Mingji beiliue, p. 432.
116 5 p.m.
117 This conversation is also repeated in Wen, Liehuang xiaozhi, p. 233. Before dismissing his relatives-in-law, Chongzhen said: “Our mind is made up. We are unable to defend the she and ji. All we can do is to die on the she and ji.” The men then wept together. Li, Sanyuan biji, 18:3a.
discuss matters. Their conversation was secret and not overheard. After a while, His Majesty, seeing that matters were critical, was about to leave the palace.\textsuperscript{118} He separately sent the heir and the two other princes to hide [with relatives outside the city].\textsuperscript{119} Then he had wine brought in and drank several cups, before saying to the empress, Madame Zhou, “The great enterprise is over. You have to die.” Consort Yuan hurriedly arose [from her knees] and left, but His Majesty seized a sword and pursued her, saying, “You have to die as well!” He thrust at her back and missed, then thrust again and struck. [He left] before her eyes had shut in death. [Meanwhile] the empress had returned to the Kunning Palace in agitation, and there hanged herself. By now the hour was two drums.\textsuperscript{120} His Majesty went on to the Shouning Palace, [the residence] of the imperial princess, who had just turned fifteen sui. His face enraged, he said, “How could you have been born to [such an unfortunate royal] household?” But though he wished to strike her, he could not raise his hand. After a long time, he suddenly brandished the sword and struck, severing the princess’ right arm. He also killed Princess Kunyi in the Zhaoren Palace. Then he sent palace attendants to Madame Li [his sister-in-law] and to the empress, ordering them to hang themselves as well. Raising his sword, His Majesty reached the Kunning Palace; and seeing that the empress consort had expired, said, “Death is best [for all of us].”\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{118} During the interim the emperor walked to Longevity Hill behind the palace and watched the fires burning in the suburbs occupied by Li Zicheng’s men. Ji, \textit{Mingji beiliüe}, p. 432.

\textsuperscript{119} When the heir apparent and his two brothers (Zhu Cican, Prince of Ding, and Zhu Cihuan, Prince of Yong) left the palace, the elephants, presented as tribute by Burma and Siam and housed in the zoo at the Xuanwu Gate, are said to have roared with grief. Hauer, “Li Tzi-ch‘eng,” p. 489. According to popular lore the elephants were supposed to sense the presence of anybody secretly intending to harm the monarch, and bar their entry into the palace with their trunks. M. L. C. Bogan, \textit{Manchu Customs and Superstitions}, pp. 35–36.

\textsuperscript{120} 9 p.m.

\textsuperscript{121} Ji Liuqi presents a version which is slightly more favorable to the emperor, showing him in a less demented and more sober state. After saying that “the great enterprise is over,” he tells his consorts that they must die. “The empress bowed her head and said, ‘Your concubine has served His Majesty for eighteen years and has never disobeyed a single command.’” Then she is said to have embraced the three princes, to have returned to her quarters, and to
Then, he summoned his chief eunuch, Wang Cheng’en, who was in charge of the nine gates and the inner and outer defenses of the city. They conversed a long time, and then [the emperor signed] a vermilion rescript to the Grand Secretariat: “It is ordered that Duke Chengguo, Zhu Chunchen, take military command in order to help [defend] the eastern palace. All prisoners should also be released from jail.” After this he ordered more wine and drank with [Wang] Cheng’en. By now the clepsydra had fallen to the third watch. His Majesty took Cheng’en by the hand and called him, “younger brother.” He removed his yellow robes, and put on the large hat, clothes, and boots of Cheng’en and [another eunuch] Han Denggui. Holding a gun in his hand, he followed several hundred eunuchs to the Qihua and Chongwen Gates, but they could not [open them] to get out. They went to the Zhengyang Gate and were about to open it and leave. But the soldiers on top of the wall thought they were spies and shot arrows down at them, while the eunuch in charge of guarding the gate fired a gun at them, [causing the emperor’s escort] to shout back in agitation, “It is His Imperial Majesty!” The gun had [only powder and] no bullet in it, so none were harmed. Filled with dread, His Majesty returned to the pal-

have hanged herself. When the emperor saw her body, he said, “Good, good.” Then he summoned the fifteen-year-old princess, saying, “How could you have been born to [such an unfortunate royal] household?” Then, “covering his face with his left sleeve, he wielded the sword in his right hand. The princess warded off [the blow] with her hand, and the left arm was severed.” She fell to the ground in a swoon, but did not die. The emperor then is reported to have gone to the western part of the palace where he ordered that Consort Yuan hang herself. She tried to do so, but the cord broke and she revived. Finding her alive, the emperor struck her three times with his sword until his hand weakened. Then he summoned “several” other concubines and personally killed them, while also ordering his mother, the empress dowager, to commit suicide. Ji, Mingji beilüe, p. 433. An account similar to this is given in Zhang Dai, Shigui cangshu, p. 43.

122 The order never reached the duke, who was later put to death by Liu Zongmin. Qian, Jia shen chuanxin lu, p. 56.

123 11 P.M.

124 According to Ji Liuqi’s account, the emperor’s party was fired upon by soldiers guarding the Qihua Gate. At Zhengyang Gate, on the other hand, the emperor is said to have found the guardpost completely deserted, with three white lanterns hanging as a signal for Li Zicheng’s men. The Kangxi Em-
ace, where he changed his robes and walked with [Wang] Cheng’en to Wanshou Hill. When he reached the [red pavilion on Meishan (Coal Hill) which housed the] Imperial Hat and Girdle Department, he hanged himself. In the early hours of the nineteenth day of the third month of jiaxen, in the seventeenth year of the Chongzhen reign, the emperor of the Great Ming ascended to heaven on a dragon.125

Unto the very end, the Chongzhen Emperor continued to blame his ministers for the fall of the dynasty. Many contemporary accounts stressed this state of abandonment. On the morning of April 25, when no officials appeared at the pre-dawn audience, he is reported to have said: “My ministers have failed me. As ruler of the country I [must] die for the altars of the soil and grain. An empire that [has lasted] 277 years: lost in one day. It’s all because of the mistakes of treacherous ministers that it has come to this, alas.”126

peror, who later interviewed some of the old eunuchs who had served in the palace during the Chongzhen reign, said that he had learned that the Ming emperor had “disguised himself as a commoner and went with some eunuchs to his uncle’s house, but the uncle had locked the gates in order to watch theatricals and the emperor couldn’t get in. And then, though the emperor wanted to flee, the eunuch Wang [Cheng’en] said that could only lead to further humiliations, and so the emperor committed suicide.” Spence, Emperor, p. 87. See also Harold L. Kahn, Monarchy in the Emperor’s Eyes, pp. 13–14.

125 Qian, Jiaxen chuanxin lu, p. 16. This appears to be the primary account from which most others are derived. It forms the basis of the narration given in E. Backhouse and J. O. P. Bland, Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking, pp. 101–103. In Tan Qian’s version, the emperor’s last acts are quite dignified. His drinking is also minimized. After writing a letter to the Duke of Chengguo, the emperor “ordered wine to be brought in. He drank several cups in succession, and sighed, ‘All over the city our people are suffering’.” Tan, Guo que, p. 6043. This same impression of a tragic and noble death was shared by many contemporaries. See Ibid., pp. 6052–6053. The solar date of the emperor’s death was April 25, 1644.

126 Bao Yangsheng, Jiaxen chaoshi xiaoj, 1:2a. The emperor especially blamed Wei Zhongxian. Five days before Beijing fell the emperor secretly ordered that Wei’s bones be gathered and burned, but the command was never executed. Chen Jisheng, Zaisheng jilüe, 6a.
Later, when he reached Coal Hill, he is said to have sighed again: “I await my literati but there are none assembled here. To come to this now! Why is there not a single one among all those ministers to accompany me?” And finally, moments before strangling himself with his sash, the emperor is supposed to have written a suicide note which read:

Seventeen years ago I ascended the throne, and now I meet with Heaven’s punishment above, sinking ignominiously below while the rebels seize my capital because my ministers have deceived me. I die unable to face my ancestors in the underworld, dejected and ashamed. May the bandits disembowel my corpse and slaughter my officials, but let them not despoil the imperial tombs nor harm a single one of our people.*

Actually, when the emperor’s body was found by a palace servant three days later under a pine tree on Coal Hill, there was no such note. Beside the disheveled corpse, clothed in a blue silk robe and red trousers, were written the two characters *Tian zi*—Son of Heaven—in the emperor’s calligraphy, but there were no other written remains. Yet that mattered little to the many contemporary annalists who recorded the emperor’s supposed words of bereavement. Though there were some skeptics then and later who doubted that the fall of the Ming was all the fault of the Chongzhen Emperor’s ministers, the overwhelming sentiment shared by most who had served the throne was that they, the monarch’s officials, were guilty of having lost the realm.

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128 Xiao, *Qingdai tongshi*, vol. 1, p. 65; Zhang, *Sou wen xu bi*, 1:3b. Palafox was told that the emperor had bitten his own finger to draw blood, with which he wrote his last testament. De Palafox, *Histoire de la conquête de la Chine par les Tartares*, pp. 28–30.
129 Zhao Shijin, *Jiashen jishi*, p. 11. The author was told this by the very servant who discovered the body.
130 A contemporary wrote: “When a ruler is of a certain sort, then so are his ministers. Can posterity believe him when he said, ‘I am not a ruler who lost his realm?’” Cited in Zhao Zongfu, “Li Zicheng,” p. 147. And the nineteenth-century bibliophile and poet Wu Qian commented: “Those who read history say that at the fall of the Ming, there was a ruler but no minis-
Subjects of Shun

This was certainly the version of events which Li Zicheng wanted to promote by way of justifying his own seizure of the capital. While the Chongzhen Emperor had been preparing to commit suicide, Li’s men were overrunning the defenses on the eastern side of the city wall. And by the time the emperor had taken his life, Ming soldiers within the walls had thrown down their arms and were opening wide the city gates to welcome the rebels. After an initial moment of panic when Shun soldiers first entered the city, the populace realized with relief that there would be no massacre and welcomed the rebels with alacrity. The poor were elated: for weeks now, Li Zicheng’s secret agents had been spreading the rumor that every pauper in the city would be given five taels of silver when the new ruler arrived. Householders were more cautious at first, but when they saw how disciplined the conquerors were, they wrote the characters Shun min (which meant both “people who submit” and “subjects of Shun”) on their compound gates, and offered the soldiers viands and wine. By noon, when Li Zicheng himself was escorted through the Chang’an Gate into the capital by three hundred palace eunuchs and Grand Secretary

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131 Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 17.
132 Feng Menglong, Jiashen jiwen, 5a; Xu Yingfen, Yubian jilüe, 5b–6a; Zhang Yi, Sou wen xu bi, 1:3b.
133 Liu, Dingsi xiaoji, 2a. As of the late sixteenth century, Beijing was characterized by having thousands of beggars who lived from hand to mouth, often gambling at dice for a living. Many of them failed to survive the capital’s cold winters, but in spite of the early deaths their number seemed undiminished each springtime. Geiss, “Peking,” p. 172.
134 Before Li entered the city, Niu Jinxing had warned him that because he was now taking over the empire, he must not allow his men to slaughter indiscriminately. Liu, Dingsi xiaoji, 2a. See also Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 17; Parsons, Peasant Rebellions, pp. 134–136. Looters were executed on the spot and nailed, hands and feet, to the wooden street posts west of the Zhengyang Gate. Zhao, Jiashen jishi, p. 9.
Wei Zaode, the streets were lined with adults and children holding lighted incense tapers to greet him.\(^{135}\) Behind the “dashing prince” came a retinue of his own Shun civilian officials, headed by Niu Jinxing. They carried specially prepared banners and placards comparing Li Zicheng to the sage emperors Yao and Shun, and attributing the downfall of the Ming dynasty not to the Chongzhen Emperor himself, but rather to his corrupt ministers, selfish officials, and faction-ridden bureaucrats.\(^{136}\)

Even before they could have felt the sting of that accusation, some of the deceased emperor’s officials were already preparing to take their own lives. The most deeply affected were the thirteen or more who committed suicide on April 25, the day Li Zicheng entered Beijing. These men were not mourning Chongzhen, for none of them knew the emperor was dead. His body was to remain undiscovered for three more days, and it was widely assumed at the time that he had left the capital to establish a xingzai (temporary court) elsewhere.\(^{137}\) Ni Yuanlu’s contrition was typical of most. Before taking his life, Ni faced north, symbolically regarding his ruler, and said, “Your minister was a high official. His fault was that he was a minister who could not save the realm.”\(^{138}\)

Others, like Shi Bangyao, vice censor-in-chief, expressed similar feelings of guilt for the fall of the dynasty. Before he hanged himself, Shi wrote a couplet which read:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{I am ashamed to lack even half a plan to relieve the present distress,} \\
\text{But I do have this body to offer in return for my ruler’s grace.}^{139}
\end{align*}
\]

135 Chen Hao and Chen Kejia, Ming ji, 57:600–601.
136 Peng Sunyi, Pingkou zhi, 10:1a. Many of these placards were prepared by Li Zhensheng. Li, a jinshi of 1634, was formerly a Shanxi director of studies. Li Zicheng put him in charge of examinations within the Hanlin Academy, which was renamed the Hongwen Guan in the Tang manner, and made him a grand secretary. At the time of his entry into the city, incidentally, Li Zicheng assumed that the Ming ruler was still alive, and he offered rewards for knowledge of his whereabouts. Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, pp. 18, 115–116.
137 Zhao, Jiashen jishi, p. 10; Zou Yi, Qi Zhen yecheng, p. 420 (11:9b).
139 Peng, Pingkou zhi, 9:10. Slightly different wording is given in Huang
So began a series of events made to order for the patient Manchus, waiting for the chaos that would trigger their next move.

Altogether, at least forty officials, many of them ranking ministers like Fan Jingwen, committed suicide in the first few days following the Chongzhen Emperor’s death.\(^{140}\) Proportionally, more

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\(^{140}\) For a partial list of these suicides, see Tan, *Guo que*, p. 6048; Gu, *Jingling ye chao*, pp. 23–25; and Peng, *Pingkou zhi*, 9:9–12. There is a more complete list in Xu Shipu, *Xunman sijie chenzhi xingming*, but I was only able to consult this rare work for a few moments in the Shanghai Municipal Library, without being given sufficient time to copy the list. Fan Jingwen, a native of Zhili who had passed his *jinshi* in 1614, had a long and illustrious career in the Ming civil service. Caught in the middle during the Donglin crisis, he had resigned, only to return in 1628 as Vice-Minister of the Court of Imperial
southerners than northerners took their lives. The provenance of twenty-one civil ministers who killed themselves can be ranked in the following descending order:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanzhili</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huguang</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beizhili</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus three quarters of these officials came from the Yangzi provinces or from south China, and only one-quarter came from the north. None, it might be noted, came from Shandong. At this time, of course, southerners on the average held higher posts in the bureaucracy, especially at the heads of ministries, and may thus have felt more burdened by imperial favor. The defeat of efforts to move the court to Nanjing may also have led a higher proportion of southerners to commit suicide. Three of the twenty-one loyalists had been proponents of the move, and now were left in a rebel-held capital without nearby economic interests to protect like their northern counterparts. Nevertheless, regional provenance may not have been a decisive variable so far as collaborating with the rebel regime was concerned. A list of 162 top officials who ended up serving Li Zicheng shows the following distribution:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nanzhili</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beizhili</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sacrifice. Many of his later years were spent in the Nanjing government. Then, after serving as Minister of Justice and Works, he became a grand secretary early in 1644. Ming shi, p. 2993; Xu Zi, Xiaotian jinian fukao, p. 34.

141 Ji, Mingji beiilüe, pp. 457–525.
142 Ibid., pp. 578–626. There are actually 167 names listed, but five lack provincial identifications.
If we consider Nanzhili, Sichuan, and Huguang as part of south China, then the spread was absolutely equal: 81 northerners and 81 southerners stayed on under the new Shun regime.

Age may have been a much more important variable, so far as accounting for collaboration is concerned. From one list of suicides which includes information about examination degrees, we discover the following distribution for the jinshi year: 143

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of jinshi</th>
<th>Number committing suicide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1604</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1613</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1619</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1622</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1625</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1628</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1631</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1634</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a slightly different distribution among those who served Li Zicheng: 144

143 Qian, *Jiashen chuanxin lu*, pp. 37–49.
144 Ibid.
Year of jinshi | Number serving Li Zicheng
--- | ---
1595 | 1
1619 | 1
1622 | 1
1628 | 8
1631 | 12
1634 | 15
1637 | 1
1640 | 7
1643 | 9

The group which committed suicide was on the average slightly older (or at least had received the jinshi degree earlier) than most of the men who ended up collaborating with the rebel regime. The median year for passing the final examinations was sixteen years before, in 1628, which was a year that saw the beginning of the Donglin triumphs and the rise of men like Ni Yuanlu to national prominence. The median jinshi year for those serving Li Zicheng, on the other hand, was six years later, in 1634; and nearly a third were men who had received their highest degrees in 1640 and 1643. Thus, whereas many of those who committed suicide were officials who had already fulfilled their vocations as civil servants, a large number of collaborators were younger officials whose bureaucratic careers either were just beginning, or had not yet risen to an apex.

To a very significant degree, then, the choice between loyalism and collaboration at this point was contingent upon the length of bureaucratic service. Although provincial families, then and later, frequently spoke of repaying the emperor’s grace in terms of their gratitude for having received an examination degree—and hence gentry status—from the throne, bureaucrats serving at the center in the capital itself tended to frame their commitment more readily in terms of office rather than rank. That is, recent degree-graduates who had not yet had an opportunity to hold office for very long were the most likely (in spite of their freshly conferred rank) to join the rebel regime.  

145 It is interesting to note that contemporary European observers identified the
Though it is not always possible to draw a sharp line between those collaborators who earnestly desired office and those who were impressed into the bureaucracy unwillingly, some literati surely did want to join the new regime, and tried to make their availability known to those fifteen literati (twelve of whom were northerners) already in Li Zicheng’s service. The Shun Minister of Personnel Song Qijiao (jinshi, 1628), the Vice-Minister of Rites Gong Yu (jinshi, 1631), and the Minister of Works Li Zhensheng (jinshi, 1634) had all surrendered to Li Zicheng before he entered the capital, and were known to be in the habit of selecting their friends and classmates (tongnian) for office in the new government.  

Although some literati were dismayed by the announcement on April 26 that officials jailed for political offenses would be released from jail in order to serve the regime, others actually welcomed Niu Jinxing’s statement that former Ming bureaucrats would be invited to serve “at their own convenience.” And while many literati frantically tried to replace the court robes they had earlier burned for fear they would be identified as officials and massacred by the rebels, the most blatantly opportunistic sent vulnerability of the Ming bureaucracy to collaboration with the absence of a nobility. Palafox, commenting on the way in which high officials betrayed the Ming to Li Zicheng, wrote: “We can see to what degree states are reduced which do not recognize a nobility, that is to say, where there exists no one inheriting the grandeur of his ancestors to receive with his own life the faithfulness which he owes to his own prince. There are certain things which men can never learn no matter how much they study. They if needs be must have received them from the rank and virtue of their forefathers, for otherwise all of these studied duties which are not come to them with their nature seldom last and are always very poorly assured.” De Palafox, Histoire de la conquête, p. 18. pp. 28–30.

146 Gong Yu, from Shaanxi, had served in Henan. Li Zhensheng, also from Shaanxi, had been a regional inspector in Huguang.

147 Wakeman, “Shun Interegnum,” pp. 57–59. On April 27, all officials jailed for factional crimes or for peculation were assembled at the gates to the palace, where they encountered former political enemies. Those who accosted the freed prisoners were themselves seized, and in some cases executed. Li Zicheng did not appoint the freed officials until May 6, and even then only automatically reinstated those who were of the fourth rank and below. Feng Menglong, Jiashen jiwen, pp. 5b–6a; Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, pp. 79, 91; Chen Jisheng, Zaisheng jiliè, 1:17b.
their calling cards in to former classmates among the Shun officials or tried to contact friends who could introduce them to Song Qijiao or Niu Jinxing.\textsuperscript{148}

In the contemporary chronicles describing these events, the collaborators who incurred the most scorn and opprobrium were the southerners who attempted to join Li Zicheng's government.\textsuperscript{149} One of the most infamous groups of southern collaborators was a contingent of Wuxi literati, led by Qin Xian, a bureau secretary in the Ministry of War, which included: his uncle Zhao Yusen, a graduate of the Hanlin; Zhang Qi, a bureau secretary in the Ministry of Rites; and Wang Sunhui, a former Ming magistrate who had been serving in the Ministry of Rites when Beijing fell. On April 22, three days before Li Zicheng's entry, Wang had tearfully promised the Chongzhen Emperor that he would be a loyal minister and commit suicide if the dynasty expired. But his resolve weakened the day that the Shun rebels actually entered the city, when his home was filled with the sound of weeping women. Distracted by their wails, Wang suddenly told members of his household that

\textsuperscript{148} Wakeman, "Shun Interregnum," p. 64; Qian, \textit{Jiaoshen chuanxin lu}, p. 76; Peng, \textit{Pingkou zhi}, 10:2; Guobian nanchen chao, p. 185. Niu Jinxing was especially likely to appoint former classmates and friends to high office. For example, one of the prestigious Hanlin bachelors of 1643 was both Henanese and a member of the provincial \textit{juren} class of 1615—traits he shared in common with Niu, who appointed him a censor in the Shun regime. Another man, He Ruizheng, had been a junior supervisor of instruction in the Ming government and was appointed to the Hongwen Guan because he came from Niu's hometown. Yet a third example was Wei Xuelian, whose friend and fellow Catholic, Han Lin, was a former crony of Niu Jinxing. Qian, \textit{Jiaoshen chuanxin lu}, p. 86; Peng, \textit{Pingkou zhi}, 9:16a.

\textsuperscript{149} These works were hardly impartial judgments. Examining a collection of miscellaneous works (\textit{zashi} or \textit{bieshi}) held in three major libraries, one historian has shown that one-third to two-fifths of these were written by leaders of \textit{wen she} (literary clubs) or other partisan groups, or by formal members of those groups. Another 20\% were written by persons who were the subjects of partisan controversy, and from 18–28\% were written by relatives or close associates of such persons. Thus, only about 10\% of the historical writings from that period were written by persons without apparent connection with those partisan groups. Lynn A. Struve, "The Hsü Brothers and Semi-official Patronage of Scholars in the K'ang-hsi Period," pp. 35–37.
they need not worry, that he would take care of everything. He then wrote “Long Live the Yongchang Emperor of the Great Shun Dynasty” upon a large bamboo slat which he hung outside his gates. By the time Li Zicheng was entering Beijing, Wang and the three others were lined up by the city gate to greet their new sovereign; and as the Prince of Shun’s retinue approached the four men, they bowed and announced their willingness to serve the new emperor. But even though their physical deference was visible, their words of submission were inaudible over the clatter of the horses’ hooves.\textsuperscript{150}

The next day, April 26, the Wuxi men heard that the new dynasty was going to register officials. Wang Sunhui believed that there was no time to be lost. “This very moment,” he told Zhao Yusen, “is the beginning of a new dynasty. Our group must strive to appear first [for office].”\textsuperscript{151} Consequently, Zhao Yusen, who was an old friend of Song Qijiao, agreed to take Wang and Qin Xian to the residence of the Shun Minister of Personnel; and as they were being shown in, Wang Sunhui suddenly pulled a piece of paper out of his pocket and stuck it on his forehead. The characters on the paper read: “Announcing the entry of Minister Wang Sunhui.” Since the word “entry” obviously indicated Wang’s desire to join the new government, Song Qijiao smiled and remarked, “Excellent words.” The four Wuxi men were thus included among the 92 scholar-officials who were appointed to the new government during the court audience with Li Zicheng on April 29.\textsuperscript{152}

The Wuxi group eventually proved to be an embarrassment to Song Qijiao. After Wang Sunhui was placed in a censorial position

\textsuperscript{150} This and the following information about the Wuxi group is drawn from Qian, \textit{jiashen chuanxin lu}, pp. 92–94, and 96–97; and Xu, \textit{Xiaotian jinian fukao}, pp. 117, 124.

\textsuperscript{151} Qian, \textit{jiashen chuanxin lu}, pp. 96–97. According to another account, Zhao was persuaded by Wang to collaborate on the grounds that his grandparents had to be cared for. Zhao in turn persuaded Zhang Qi and Qin Xian to register for office. Ji, \textit{Mingji beilüe}, p. 584.

\textsuperscript{152} Where and how Zhao and Song became close friends is not mentioned. Ji, \textit{Mingji beilüe}, p. 584; Xu, \textit{Xiaotian jinian fukao}, p. 117.
in the Ministry of Personnel where he was able to influence magistral appointments, word got back to Minister Song that Wang had managed to get seven Wuxi men named as magistrates. Later, after Song had privately chastized him, Wang betrayed him altogether by taking advantage of an assignment outside Beijing to flee south. Qin Xian was also a liability. Arrogant and sententious, he refused to turn over his official residence to one of Li Zicheng’s generals. The impatient rebel had him arrested and was about to execute him when his uncle, Zhao Yusen, reached Song in time to have the latter persuade Li Zicheng to rescind the order. Qin Xian’s life was thus spared, but Song Qijiao had expended a great deal of his own personal credibility in the process.

One of the reasons Song may have been willing to sponsor the Wuxi group in the first place was that the new regime needed a cadre of southerners to help extend Shun rule into Jiangnan.

153 Wang’s orders from Li Zicheng earned him safe passage until he left Li’s zone of influence. After he burned his Shun papers and tried to pass as a beggar, he was captured and killed by bandits.

154 Later, when Zhao Yusen approached Song with another request to aid Qin Xian, Song refused him, saying: “It is not that I do not want to be cordial to your Excellency, but because of that affair of your relative [which forced me] to change His Majesty’s mind, my ability to be of use is already exhausted.” Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 96.

155 When Qin Xian pleaded for a stay of his own execution, he pointedly reminded his captor that: “At this very moment, His Divine Majesty wants to pacify Jiangnan, and justly has compassion for talented men.” Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 96. It should be pointed out that there was no shortage of northerners seeking office in the new regime. Two of the compilers in the Hongwen Guan were Shaanxi juren, Yang Shenghua and Wang Qi, who had requested public office; and a number of other northern juren and even shengyuan flocked into Beijing on the heels of the Shun army in search of office. These office seekers presented themselves so frequently to Song Qijiao that he wondered aloud, “How are we going to employ such a mob?” Feng, Jiashen jiwen, 11a. Moreover, aspirants in the direct vicinity of the capital were also heartened, and “from then on, the lower degree holders competed among themselves, asking to take examinations.” Bao, Jiashen chaoshi xiaoji, 5:1b. After Li Zicheng ordered Song to hold exams for the xiucai degree in Shuntian and Datong prefectures, juren examinations were held in the capital on the theme of the passing of the Heavenly Mandate. Seventy sat for the provincial degree, and fifty were passed. Many of these were among the 58 zhou and xian magistrates. Of those 58 district officials,
That was certainly a major reason for Niu Jinxing, Li Zicheng's premier grand secretary, to lend his own support to leading southern literati like Zhou Zhong, the former Restoration Society member who had passed first in the palace examinations of 1643, and who came to see Niu in his official residence after the rebels had been billeted. For the Ming empire's last primus to pay a call on the rebel minister was, in itself, an extremely significant public gesture. In the past, Zhou Zhong had proudly refused gifts from powerful officials seeking their own reflection in his bright lustre. But now Zhou Zhong had decided that a new dynastic cycle had begun, and that it was his mission to help establish the new ruling house. Zhou acknowledged Li Zicheng's brutality as a rebel leader, but to him this was simply evidence that the Shun dynasty was going to be blessed with a dynamic monarch. "When [Ming] Taizu first arose," he told friends, "it was just like this." The historical comparison was not altogether farfetched, and Zhou Zhong must have sincerely believed that with such a strong ruler on the throne, the rest of the empire would easily come to heel. "Jiang-nan," he was heard to say, "is not hard to pacify." To Niu Jinxing, already deeply impressed by Zhou Zhong's leading role in the Restoration Society, the advent of such a supporter was extremely auspicious. Indeed, it was to be the appointment of

incidentally, many never actually left Beijing; and among those who did, a significant number tried to escape. Others were captured by bandits. Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, pp. 95–100; Peng, Pingkou zhi, 10:9b, 11a.

156 Liu Zeqing, the warlord of Shandong, had been attracted by Zhou Zhong's fame, and wished to have him become one of his protégés, sending a gift of 500 ounces of gold. However, Zhou refused the invitation to pay a call upon the general and sent back the precious metal instead. Xu Zi, Xiaotian jizhuan, pp. 207–208.

157 Ming Taizu himself had believed that his reign was an unusually cruel one because harsh measures were required to eradicate the evil practices of the previous dynastic era. Charles O. Hucker, The Ming Dynasty, p. 71. The Ming founder was an object of special interest and devotion during the 1640s. Patrick Hanan, The Chinese Vernacular Story, p. 162.

158 Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 76; Feng, Jiashen jüven, p. 8b.

159 Zhou Zhong, who was quite conceited, frequently bragged to his friends about how much Niu Jinxing valued him and his Restoration Society connections. Ji, Mingji beilüe, p. 585.
Zhou Zhong himself that would mark the transformation of the April 29th audience from an arraignment to a personnel placement proceedings.

For, even after the April 26th announcement that all regular Ming officials were expected to present themselves at court on the morning of the 27th, at which time they would be given the option of serving the Shun regime or of returning to their native places "at their own convenience," many officials feared that they would be threatened with punishment if they refused to accept office under the rebels. Those who did present themselves at the Donghua Gate just before dawn on the 27th—altogether about three thousand in number—were very shabbily treated by the Shun officers and troopers who herded them into the area in front of the Chengtian Gate, and by the palace eunuchs who insulted some among them who seemed most to bear the blame for the fall of the dynasty. Li Zicheng himself never even appeared to the officials, who were dismissed and told to report again on the 29th, two days later. Then, joined by some of the Ming officials who had been arrested by Liu Zongmin and other Shun generals, the literati were kept waiting for hours without food or drink until finally, at dusk, Li Zicheng came out of the Great Within to hear the roster of the names read aloud by the Henan gentryman Gu Jun’en. As each name was read off and the official responded, there was time enough for Niu Jinxing to recite the misdeeds of that officeholder in full detail. The tone and manner of the audience was that of a judicial hearing, and this continued unchanged until Gu Jun’en reached the name of Zhou Zhong.

Gu put down the list and said, "If your majesty is eager to acquire a worthy [official], then we ought to break our pattern and select some for employ." Then he said to Niu, "This is a famous scholar,"

160 Chen, Zaisheng jilüe, 1:17b; Xu Yingfeng, Yubian jilüe, pp. 6; Zhao Zongfu, "Li Zicheng," p. 148; Peng, Pingkou zhi, 9:12a. A copy of the proclamation is given in the last of these sources, on 9:7. Its content varies from source to source, depending—one suspects—upon whether or not the chronicler wished to stress the coercive nature of the proclamation, and in turn judge mildly or harshly those who complied with the order to come to court.
and [suggested they] appoint Zhou. Niu Jinxing looked at [Prince] Chuang and praised [Zhou] a great deal, saying, "He truly is a famous scholar." Chuang said, "In what way a famous scholar?" Niu answered, "He writes well." Then Chuang said, "Could he not write upon the theme, '[The scholar trained in public duty] seeing threatening danger, is prepared to sacrifice his life'?" 161

Having displayed his Confucian erudition with an ironically appropriate phrase from the Analects, Li Zicheng approved Zhou Zhong’s appointment as a Shun official. 162 Thereafter, as each name was read off, Niu Jinxing decided whether or not the person was to join the rebel administration. Out of the several thousands, only ninety-two were chosen for office and taken off to the Ministry of Personnel for appointment. The remaining literati were turned back over to the Shun generals for punishment and marched at swordpoint off to their encampments outside the walls of the Forbidden City. 163

Not all of those who served the Shun were recruited on the 29th of April during the court audience. Some joined later in order to avoid being tortured by Liu Zongmin or Li Guo, the rebel generals. Others, almost as if by happenstance, were recommended at the last moment for official positions. The most prominent example of this form of recommendation—and, like Zhou Zhong, a southerner later reviled for his service to the rebel regime—was Chen Mingxia, the Restoration Society member who had placed first among the four hundred jinshi who passed the metropolitan exams in 1643, and third on the palace list. In addition to being a

161 Xu, Xiaotian jinian jukao, pp. 115–116. The phrase is from the Analects, XIX.i.

162 Historians have mentioned Li Zicheng’s repair of an official temple in 1636 to prove his susceptibility to Confucian values. Liu, "World View," p. 298. These values were part of the peasant culture in which he was steeped; they were not acquired through study of the classics. Characteristically, Li Zicheng is supposed to have told his father, who had reprimanded him for boxing instead of reading: "Our kind needs to practice the martial arts in order to accomplish the great enterprise. What use is reading?" Ji, Mingji beiliie, juan 6 cited in Shimizu, "Ryūmin," p. 382.

Hanlin bachelor, Chen had been serving as a supervising secretary in the Ministry of War when the regime collapsed. On April 13, 1644, he had an audience with the Chongzhen Emperor at which he had suggested summoning the braves of Shandong to help save the capital. The day the city fell, Chen tried to hang himself, but he was cut down by relatives (his wife was a native of Beijing) and saved.\(^{164}\) When he heard of Niu Jinxing’s order to present himself at court, Chen Mingxia decided not to appear in public.\(^{165}\) However, Niu had also ordered former ministry clerks and lictors to report any officials who remained in hiding. After failing to come to the April 27 audience, Chen was seized by Shun troops and turned over to the Ministry of Justice for sentencing. However, the official in charge of the case—a Shanxi xiucai named Wang—had once been hosted by the Chen family while visiting Jiangnan. Wang urged Chen to join the new regime voluntarily, and although the latter first refused and even tried to escape, he eventually permitted Wang to recommend him to Niu Jinxing. Niu accepted the recommendation with alacrity and quickly restored Chen Mingxia to his membership in what had been the Hanlin academy and was now renamed the Hongwen Guan (Court of Vast Learning).\(^{166}\)

With the appointment of Chen Mingxia, Niu Jinxing brought his Hanlin roster to an astonishingly full completeness. Now, all of the top three palace examination candidates of 1643 were officials of the Shun. Niu’s Hongwen Guan even included Shi Kecheng, who was persuaded to write his cousin, Shi Kefa, the Minister of War in Nanjing, urging him to surrender to Li Zicheng.\(^{167}\) At the

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167 It was claimed by some contemporaries that Li Zicheng had earlier ordered several Shanxi merchants living in Beijing to subsidize and recruit promising candidates like Zhou Zhong and Chen Mingxia. Niu Jinxing is said to have exclaimed when Beijing fell that “new [members of the] Hanlin ought to register with special alacrity.” Zhao Zongfu, “Li Zicheng,” p. 140.
same time, the new Shun regime also inherited directly from the Ming many of the officials occupying the middle rungs of the government that had existed when Beijing fell. Retaining their previous positions were: three bureau directors in the Ministry of Personnel; two bureau secretaries in the Ministry of Finance; one bureau secretary, two bureau vice-directors, and one bureau director in the Ministry of Rites; seven censors; and the entire roster of chief clerks in the Hanlin Academy. And, though shifted from one ministerial responsibility to another, all of the supervising secretaries of the offices of scrutiny were kept in office.  

Confucian Collaborators

Apart from confusion and opportunism, a genuine Confucian persuasion motivated some of these collaborators. Men who truly believed that the Mandate of Heaven had passed on—sometimes because their own astrological divinations persuaded them that this was so—felt obliged to serve Li Zicheng in order to educate the rebel leader to a proper Confucian appreciation of imperial virtue and righteousness. However, the effort to persuade Li Zicheng that he was, indeed, a potential sage-king like other winners of the Mandate, required rhetorical flourishes that verged upon sycophancy. For example, Liang Zhaoyang, a Hanlin bachelor

168 There were a few key replacements at this intermediate level. Several bureau directors were transferred out of the Ministry of Justice and into crucial slots in the Ministry of Finance, and an impressive number of officials was brought into the Bureau of Equipment of the Ministry of War to serve as vice-directors under the watchful eye of Lü Bizhou (jinshi, 1628), a former circuit censor from Shandong, expert in logistics, who had joined Li’s retinue in Henan. Virtually all of the former government’s clerks and zaoli (black-jacketed runners) came over. There were more than one thousand of the latter formally serving as attendants in the halls of government: ministry porters, messengers, and huissiers. For the zaoli of Beijing, see Geiss, “Peking,” p. 176. For a more thorough discussion of the rebel government, see Wakeman, “Shun Interregnum,” pp. 53–56. This discussion of the personnel of the ministries is based upon information given in Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, pp. 74–88.

169 Ming shi, 2779; Peng, Pingkou zhi, 11:3b–4a.
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(jinshi 1628), addressed the rebel leader as “emperor” during a special audience in the Wenhua Palace, and after denouncing the dead Chongzhen Emperor for his “stubbornness and obstinacy,” praised his new ruler by saying:

You have rescued the people from the water and fire, coming from Qin (Shaanxi) into Jin (Shanxi, Hebei), passing across the borders and taking the capital without your troops’ slaughtering the people who welcomed them with offerings. In being so truly inspired as not to kill, you can be directly compared to Yao and Shun. I would not dare to speak with such intense integrity, in the expectation of your benevolence, had I not suddenly encountered [such] a sage lord this day!

Bachelor Liang’s expectations of benevolence were realized thanks to such obsequiousness: Li Zicheng promoted him to the rank of compiler, and later attached him to the Ministry of War.

Primus Zhou Zhong was not above this form of flattery either. In his “Proclamation Urging Entry [into the Imperial Quarters]” (Quan jin biao), Zhou wrote:

The evil last ruler accepts his punishment and the ten thousand surnames submit their hearts [to the new ruler]. With more martial merit than Yao or Shun, he surpasses both in civil virtue.

In this case, of course, Zhou Zhong could justify his hyperbole as a means of persuading Li Zicheng to assume the responsibilities of imperial rule by giving up his rough rebel ways and adopting the moralistic manner of a Confucian emperor. The “Proclamation” was, after all, part of a campaign carefully orchestrated by Zhou

170 Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 83. The analogy with the Qin was frequently made at this time, and acceded well with the notion of Li as a brutal but necessarily strong first emperor.

171 Ji, Mingji heilüe, p. 584; Xu, Xiaotian jinian fukao, p. 115. Liang had also given Minister of Personnel Song Qijiao 5,000 ounces of gold before his audience with Li Zicheng.

172 Xu Zi, Xiaotian jizhuan, p. 207.
Zhong to convince the “dashing prince” that there was sufficient support from the “ten thousand surnames” to occupy the throne legitimately. This campaign took the form of ministerial requests and petitions presented in *vox populi* by delegations of officials.  

There were seven such requests, beginning on April 29, four days after Li Zicheng entered Beijing, and ending on May 16, two days before he led his armies eastward to fight Wu Sangui. Yet even though Li did not discourage these petitions to ascend the dragon throne, he did not—until it was far too late to benefit his cause—act upon them. Perhaps this was because Li, despite the legitimizing effort of Niu Jinxing and Zhou Zhong, did not genuinely believe that he had a right to seize the Mandate. He had, after all, sent Du Xun to negotiate a settlement with the Chongzhen Emperor that would have acknowledged the suzerainty of the Ming. And later, when his men discovered the body of the emperor on Coal Hill and took Li Zicheng to see the remains, he seemed terribly shocked by the sight of the corpse, to which he said: “I came to enjoy the rivers and mountains together with you. How could you have committed suicide?”

Li Zicheng believed that he held a popular mandate to rule, but in his own eyes the Mandate of Heaven did not so readily yield itself to one who had committed regicide. Consequently, Li Zicheng tried to shift some of the guilt for the late emperor’s death upon the very ministers who were asking him to become their new ruler. When he met with the Ming heir apparent—an occa-

173 Like the documents in the *Xiandi zhuan*, which is the record of the abdication of the Han emperor and the accession of Cao Pei in A.D. 220, these proclamations were part of a process of nomination and ratification before a quasi-electorate—the officers and bureaucrats who made up Li Zicheng’s entourage. These followers were themselves trying to decide whether the *de facto* change of rule should be given *de jure* recognition. In a sense, the generals’ later response to Li’s plea that they curb their men represents their negative response to that implicit question. For Cao Pei, see Carl Leban, “Managing Heaven’s Mandate,” pp. 338–339.

174 Zhao Zongfu, “Li Zicheng,” p. 149. Officials were only ordered to stop submitting such petitions to the Shun government on May 23, the day after news reached Beijing that Wu Sangui was advancing upon the capital.

175 Zhao, “Li Zicheng,” p. 147.
sion that must have sorely tried both of them—Li asked the crown prince how his family had managed to lose the empire. "Because we made the mistake of employing treacherous ministers like Zhou Yanru," said the boy. "Ah, so you understand then," was Li’s response; and he went on to tell the heir that he was not going to kill him because the loss of the realm was not the prince’s fault, but rather that of his father’s ministers: "Most of the military officers, civil officials, and clerks are a disloyal and unfilial pack." 176 Not only did these former Ming officials become scapegoats for whatever regrets Li felt for the Chongzhen Emperor’s death; they also symbolized the moral rot and administrative corruption that his own regime was dedicated to attacking. 177

Feeling as he did about the corruption of Ming ministers, it was hard for Li Zicheng to take the collaborators’ historical allusions to the sage-rulers of yore altogether seriously. 178 The relationship

176 Zhang Dai, Shigui càngshu, p. 45.
177 Xie Guozhen, Namming shilüe, pp. 28–29; Peng, Pingkou zhi, 10:1a. Li Guozhen, embezzler of military funds, he called "a robber of his country"; and of the Chongzhen administration in general, he said: "The ministers only looked after their own selfish interests. They formed cliques and there were very few public spirited and loyal ones at all." Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 57; Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, 1:255. Some sources indicate that Li Guozhen was at first honored by Li Zicheng. Li Guozhen is said to have insisted that the conditions for his own surrender were that the Prince of Shun maintain the ancestral tombs of the Ming, allow the heir apparent to bury the former emperor, and not harm the crown prince nor his two brothers. Then, after seeing to the maintenance of the royal tombs, Li Guozhen is supposed to have hanged himself. Wu Weiye, Wushi jilan, 1 shang:14b. Most contemporaries claim that this was not so, and that he was tortured to death by Liu Zongmin at Li Zicheng’s command. See, for example, Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 58.
178 Li Zicheng was not personally majestic, nor did he enjoy the rituals of kingship. Niu Jinxing wanted Li to hold sacrifices to Heaven on May 20, 1644 (the 15th day of the 4th lunar month), and asked the rebel leader to set aside ten days for practice in the palace. Li Zicheng agreed, and when the time came rushed abruptly through the ceremonies, prostrating himself and getting up at the wrong time. The libationer told the "dashing prince" that he would have to take his timing from the rhythm of the ritual itself, and deliberately slowed down the pace of the ceremony while drilling Li Zicheng. The rebel quickly lost his temper. Stripping off his gown and hat, he gesticu-
which the “dashing prince” did, in fact, develop with his new officials was at best an amusing charade, at worst a cruel mockery, of the ideal Confucian relationship between jun (ruler) and chen (minister). On occasion, Li seemed casually to want to live up to the image of a sage-ruler. He once summoned the famous li xue scholar Yang Guanguang from Dengzhou (Shandong), now serving as the Minister of Rites, to a private audience and asked the moralist how Yang could possibly enjoy life if he abstained from both alcohol and sex. Yang’s lugubrious insistence that his major goal in life was to “keep his heart and will pure and clean” delighted Li, who made the philosopher his palace lecturer. Yang never did persuade the Prince of Shun to give up wine and women, but he continued to the very end to believe that Confucian proprieties would transform the usurper into an emperor.179

The fact was that a stubborn insistence upon preserving the dignity and integrity of the ruler-minister relationship tended to drive Li Zicheng into a rage, and those who wanted to have the opportunity to mold the new leader along Confucian lines had to accept the dictator on his own terms.180 Zhang Jiayu, for instance, made a public show of scholarly righteousness when he posted a banner on his townhouse gate which read: “The Humble Dwelling of Master Zhang, Bachelor of the Ming Hanlin Academy.” Privately,

179 On May 16, just two days before Li Zicheng left the capital for Shanhaiguan, Yang Guanguang was engaged in making appropriate ritual preparations for the imperial accession to the throne. Zhao, “Li Zicheng,” p. 149. Yang was spared the embarrassment of later justifying this behavior when he fled Beijing shortly after this, was captured by rural bandits, and was killed. Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, pp. 81–82; Ji, Mingji beilüe, pp. 578–579.

180 Adam Schall had a perfectly cordial meeting with Li in the palace where the Catholic Father was offered food and wine. Li Zicheng himself hardly drank alcohol. Shimizu, “Ryūmin,” p. 383; Jonathan D. Spence, To Change China, p. 16.
however, he wrote to Li Zicheng, admitting his willingness to be employed by the Prince of Shun if his transferred loyalties were reciprocated.

Since his majesty has established a dynasty in the under-Heaven, he must base its foundation upon honoring the worthy and revering the virtuous. Thus, he must not destroy people’s loyalties so that he may have loyal ministers; and not destroy people’s filial piety so that he may have filial sons.\(^1\)

Even though Li had occupied the Forbidden City—Zhang Jiayu warned—“he should observe the rules of hospitality or ministers will not serve him.”\(^2\) Zhang Jiayu even refused to bow before Li when he was finally summoned to an audience, but the former bandit would have none of these Mencian airs. Li simply had Zhang tied in front of the palace for three days, and then curtly threatened to kill his parents unless he submitted. Zhang gave in, and agreed to serve the Prince of Shun on Li’s own terms. Zhang Jiayu’s willingness to sacrifice his loyalty to his former ruler in order to be filial to his parents might have been acceptable to some Confucian commentators; but because he continued to serve Li Zicheng long after his parents had escaped to freedom in Shandong, Zhang became an object of scorn in the eyes of many Beijing literati.\(^3\)

On the other hand, it was just as easy for Li Zicheng to regard the collaborators’ praiseful pleas that he become emperor as slavish and self-serving ploys to advance their own cause. The very act of collaboration damned many of these officials in his eyes, for as he was candidly told by his Minister of Personnel, Song Qijiao: “Your minister feels that since these men were unable to sacrifice themselves with complete loyalty and filial piety for their dynasty, then they are just as incapable of serving their new ruler with a pure and undivided heart.”\(^4\) Outraged by turncoats, Li at times

181 Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, pp. 77–78.
182 Ibid., p. 78.
183 Ibid.; Peng, Pingkou zhi, 10:2.
184 Bao, Jiashen chaoshi xiaoji, 5:1b; Qian Bangyi, Jiashen jibian lu, p. 15; Xu, Xiaotian jinian fukao, p. 126.
could barely conceal his disdain and loathing. When he first stepped out of the Wenhua Palace on April 29, for example, he looked over the thousands of expectant bureaucrats, ostensibly there to collaborate with him, and muttered to one of his aides, “How could the empire not be in a state of rebellion with such a bunch of unscrupulous [officials] as these?”¹⁸⁵ Then, on later occasions, he repeatedly ordered the Minister of Justice to punish the most egregiously disloyal, a policy which resulted in the legal execution of forty-six former Ming bureaucrats.¹⁸⁶

Li Zicheng’s moral indignation coincided with the regime’s need for funds to pay its soldiers. Because the public and privy treasuries contained only 170,000 ounces of gold and 130,000 ounces of silver when the rebels took the city, Li’s advisors suggested that he raise additional money from former Ming officials through a system of selective fines.¹⁸⁷ The notoriously corrupt should be tortured until they turned over their private fortunes. Those who refused to serve the Shun should have their property confiscated. And the relatively blameless should be asked to volunteer contributions to the regime.¹⁸⁸

On May 1, Li Zicheng approved this policy, which at first glance resembled some of the Chongzhen Emperor’s own fund-raising procedures. In principle, officials of the first rank could redeem themselves by paying 10,000 taels of silver; and those of the lower ranks, by paying 1,000. In fact, the reputed “schedule of pay-

¹⁸⁵ Qian, Jiashen jibian lu, p. 14. The Shun rank-and-file also held the collaborators in great contempt. Seeing them in the streets, they would try to ride them down and jeered when they ran in fright. Beishi buyi, p. 5a.

¹⁸⁶ Bao, Jiashen chaoshi xiaoji, 5:1b; Peng, Pingkou zhi, 10:3.

¹⁸⁷ Credit for this scheme is usually given to the Henan gentryman Li Yan. See, for example, Guo Moruo, Jiashen sanbai nian ji, p. 21. Guo claimed that Li Yan was a moderating influence and that his own troops got on well with the populace. Xie Guozhen, on the other hand, has argued that it was the literati element—Niu Jinxing—that was corrupted by the wealth of Beijing. He viewed Li Yan’s suggestion of a three-fold division of officialdom as an effort to systematize the Shun armies’ method of levying fines, in preference to random looting and torture. Xie, Namming shilüe, p. 29. Li Yan also figures prominently in the authoritative account by Li Wenzhi of the late Ming rebellions (Li, Wan-Ming minbian).

¹⁸⁸ Guo, Jiashen sanbai nian ji, p. 22; Parsons, Peasant Rebellions, p. 136.
ments” ran much higher, with grand secretaries expected to pay as much as 100,000 taels and ministers 70,000. But fines soon became confused with ransoms: once given the order to “kill the guilty and punish the greedy and covetous,” General Liu Zongmin inaugurated a reign of terror, torturing with vises and then butchering as many as one thousand literati. Enormous sums were said to have been collected through these means. Before being beaten to death, former Grand Secretary Wei Zaode tried to bribe his way free with 13,000 ounces of gold; Chen Yan gave 40,000 taels for his release; and Zhou Kui, the late empress’s father, was supposed to have handed over 700,000 ounces of silver before he finally died.

Soon the depredations began to affect commoners as well. This was partly because Liu Zongmin could not control his own troops, who would probably have mutinied if he had tried to discipline them. As early as April 27, Shun soldiers began searching peo-

189 Parsons, Peasant Rebellions, p. 137.
190 Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 56. Liu Zongmin was not the only rebel general who carried out these atrocities. Li Guo’s barracks were also turned into torture chambers. For a grisly account of the imprisonments and executions, see the journal kept by one of the inmates at Liu’s encampment: Zhao Shijin, Jiashen jishi, pp. 6 ff. The figure of 1,600 killed is given in Tan Qian, Zaolin zazu, ren: 2b. A contemporary’s diary gives the figure of 1,000 tortured to death: Xu Yingfen, Yubian jilüe, p. 7a. For a more detailed account of the way in which punishments and torture were confused, see Wakeman, “Shun Interregnum,” pp. 69–70; and for Liu Zongmin’s reputation for cruelty, see Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:4a.

191 Tan, Guo que, p. 6062; Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 13; Peng, Pingkou zhi, 10:3b. One of Chen Yan’s servants later told Liu Zongmin that Chen had buried a fortune in the garden of his Beijing residence. Supposedly, Liu’s soldiers dug up 360,000 ounces of gold. Qian, Jiashen chuanxin lu, pp. 60–61. This figure is probably a mistake for 360 ounces. See Peng, Pingkou zhi, 10:4a. It should be noted, however, that it was very common during this period for wealthy families to bury large amounts of bullion underground for safekeeping. Joseph Needham and Ray Huang, “The Nature of Chinese Society,” p. 10; Ray Huang, Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth Century Ming China, p. 81.

192 Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 31; Parsons, Peasant Rebellions, p. 134. During the first few days of the occupation, military order was strictly maintained. Rebels who looted were publicly crucified. Zhao, Jiashen jishi, p. 2.
people's compounds for livestock. Then they began abusing the homeowners with whom they were billeted. In the streets, they casually rode down pedestrians or whipped laggards out of their way. First teahouse servants and singing girls, then the daughters of respectable households, were seized and sexually abused. The citizens of Beijing quickly coined a phrase for the looting that followed: *tao wu*, "scouring things." Soldiers entered homes at random in small bands, each successive group "scouring" off whatever previous gangs had overlooked: money, jewels, then clothing, and finally food.

As disorder spread, the "dashing prince's" diviner, the dwarf named Song Xiance, asked in despair: "Was not the prophecy of the eighteen sons to be fulfilled for the commonweal?" Yet even though Li Zicheng himself quickly learned of Liu Zongmin's torture chambers and was dismayed by the growing disaffection of the populace, he seemed helpless—without the overweening ideological authority of a ritually mandated emperor already seated on the dragon throne—to curb his lieutenants and win back the hearts and minds of the people. Li Zicheng did summon his generals to a special audience and asked them: "Why can you not help me to be a good emperor?" Their blunt response was: "The authority of the emperor was granted to you. But we have the power to plunder as well. There's no argument about that."

194 Qian, *Jiashen chuanxin lu*, pp. 30, 54–55; *Beishi buyi*, p. 4a. One contemporary source claimed that Li Zicheng's men extorted 70,000,000 taels from the capital's residents. Li Wenzhi, "*Shuihu zhuan* yu wan Ming shchui," p. 30.
197 Qian, *Jiashen chuanxin lu*, p. 56. Close to his men, Li Zicheng ate the same food as the rank-and-file, and like the other Shun rebels commonly wore a wide-brimmed hat and sky-blue archer's jacket. He never put any distance between himself and his followers; and with lieutenants like Liu Zongmin (whom he called "big brother") he was physically affectionate, often walking together with him arm-in-arm. This camaraderie undoubtedly made it more difficult for Li to exert authority as a monarchical figure. Hong
Thus, even though Li thought that he was taking over the imperial capital in the spirit of the Tang founding emperors, he actually had as little control over his commanders as the rebel Huang Chao had in 880 A.D. when he captured Chang’an. In both instances, brutal aides cruelly alienated the city’s inhabitants, and the rebel regimes proved to be very short-lived. Song Xiance was soon heard to sigh, “My master is only a horseback king.”

Wu Sangui

Popular resentment did not amount to public resistance. Unarmed civilians were impotent to oppose their military overlords. But the disaffection of the “ten thousand surnames” did constitute a powerful appeal for other military leaders to intervene. Of all the Ming generals north of the Huai River, the most powerful at this time was Wu Sangui, commander of the 40,000 regular Ming frontier troops garrisoned at Ningyuan, facing the Manchus. Wu Sangui had reluctantly responded to the Chongzhen Emperor’s call for help on April 10 by abandoning Ningyuan to ride slowly for Shanhaiguan, passing through the fortified gates at the eastern terminus of the Great Wall on April 26. His army had gotten as far as Fengrun, nearly halfway to the capital, when news reached Wu of the fall of Beijing. He had then ordered his soldiers to return to Shanhaiguan, which they subsequently occupied.

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198 The similarities between the Shun interregnum and Huang Chao’s occupation of Chang’an are striking. Thirty to forty percent of the Tang officials accepted office in Huang’s Da Qi regime, including all those below the third rank. But while the rebel soldiers quickly got out of hand and looted, Huang Chao’s adviser Shang Rang reacted to a dissident satirical poem written on a ministry gate by having the eyes of all the members of that office plucked out. Then, after stringing up their bodies, he ordered killed everyone in the capital who could compose poetry. More than 3,000 died in that massacre alone. Robert Milton Somers, “The Collapse of the T’ang Order,” p. 144.

199 Chen, Zaisheng jilüe, p. 20a.

200 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:252; Tsao Kai-fu, “The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories against the Manchu Throne in China,” pp. 22–24. But see also
In the meantime, Li Zicheng had taken immediate steps to secure Wu Sangui’s support. In addition to having the former Ming commander Tang Tong write to Wu Sangui explaining how decorous and honorable the “dashing prince” was, Li Zicheng also arranged to have a letter sent in the name of Wu Sangui’s father, Wu Xiang, whom he now held hostage along with other members of Wu’s family in Beijing.\(^\text{201}\) The letter, which may have been actually drafted by Niu Jinxing, explicitly posed a contradiction between loyalty and filial piety. In it, Wu Xiang told his son that it would be a mistake to regard bao en (requiting the emperor’s favor) as his primary obligation. Instead, the son should surrender in order to save his father’s life, thus earning eternal fame for his filial devotion. Moreover, Wu Xiang supposedly added, Li Zicheng’s soldiers had already taken Beijing; and, as everyone knew, once the Mandate of Heaven was lost, it was not easily recovered. Wu Sangui might as well face military reality and, in so doing, retain his noble title and official rank under the new Shun regime. The letter, brought to Wu Sangui’s camp by military envoy, was accompanied with 10,000 ounces of silver and 1,000 ounces of gold, promises of payments for Wu Sangui’s troops, and a patent of nobility promoting him from earl (bo) to count (hou).\(^\text{202}\) According to Wu Sangui’s official biography, this offer was spurned. Instead of surrendering as Tang Tong had done, Wu Sangui wrote back to his father, condemning him for so ignobly serving Li Zicheng’s rebellious ends and arguing that true filial piety demanded that he reject his father’s plea. “If,” he concluded, “my father cannot be a loyal minister, then how can I be a filial son?”\(^\text{203}\)

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\(^{201}\) Peng, *Pingkou zhi*, 3.10:76.

\(^{202}\) According to the biography of Tang Tong in *Er chen zhuan*, Li Zicheng sent 40,000 taels of silver in gifts. Gao, “Ming-Qing zhi ji Shanhaiguan zhanyi,” p. 78.

\(^{203}\) Ibid., 3.10:76. See also Xiao, *Qingdai tongshi*, 1:252.
Popular lore later provided a much more romantic reason for Wu Sangui’s supposed refusal to surrender to Li Zicheng. According to historical romances of the Kangxi period, Li Zicheng had also seized Wu Sangui’s concubine, the fabulously beautiful Chen Yuan, also known as Yuanyuan. This was the famous courtesan who had so tempted the poet Mao Xiang when he set eyes upon her in Suzhou. Chen Yuan had also attracted the attention of a Ming imperial kinsman who had abducted her and had taken her north to Beijing, where she somehow came into the possession of General Wu, who made her his concubine. A famous qu about Miss Yuanyuan, written by Wu Weiye, celebrated her sensuality and Wu Sangui’s infatuation for her.

With the slightest tapping of fragrant heels,
The one inch of scarlet is not stained by spring mud.
Silk socks curving and curving,
Rhythms light and balanced at the top of shoes.
Returning, wet with dew,
Drunkenly, she takes off her undersocks with a charming smile.
Awakening her love, she says: “Look at them; aren’t they whiter than frost?”

Now, Chen Yuan was in the hands of Li Zicheng, and word supposedly came to Wu Sangui that Chuang Wang, the “dashing prince,” had violated her, taking her into his quarters and making her his own concubine. Wu Sangui was thus said to be so inflamed with jealousy that he not only rejected Li’s gifts and promises; he also decided to avenge his honor by turning to any allies at hand to help slay the rebel—even if that meant inviting the Manchus across the Great Wall into the Central Plain.

The loss of an empire for the white, curving silken stockings of a courtesan was a metaphor that repeatedly captured the imaginations of later generations of Chinese. More reliable accounts of Wu

206 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:251–252; Peng, Pingkou zhi, 3.11:1a.
This delicate print, which is called “Writing a Book,” conveys a sense of remarkable serenity considering the time it was drawn. Attributed to Li Yujian, it was printed in color by the famous Shizhuzhai (Ten bamboo studio) in the summer of 1644, when the Chongzhen Emperor already lay dead. Shizhuzhai jianpu [Fancy notepapers from the Ten bamboo studio], 1644, in Zheng Zhenduo, comp., Zhongguo banhua shi tulu [Pictorial record of the history of Chinese prints] (Shanghai, 1940–1942), vol. 9.
Sangui's activities are somewhat less poetic, and certainly less popular. The chronicler Peng Sunyi heard the following tale from one of Wu Sangui's former secretaries (muyou). When Li Zicheng's envoy reached Wu's camp with the letters from Tang Tong and Wu Xiang, Wu Sangui had the rebel messenger taken away and hidden by his personal guards. In this way, he kept both the fall of the capital and Li Zicheng's offer a secret from his own men. Several days passed while he mulled over his decision. Finally, he decided to see how far he could trust his own lieutenants to follow him if he were to collaborate with Li. Summoning a council of his officers, he told them that Beijing was now in the rebel's hands and that the Chongzhen Emperor was dead. Now he faced an extremely difficult choice. He knew that it was his duty to sacrifice himself for the fallen dynasty, but he also realized that their forces alone were insufficient to defeat the enemy. What did his lieutenants think that he should do? Thrice he asked the question, and three times the officers refused to answer. Finally, Wu Sangui broke the silence himself to say: "The strength of Chuang Wang is great. Tang Tong and Jiang Xiang have already surrendered. Now, an envoy has come from Chuang Wang. Should I behead him or welcome him respectfully?" Realizing that their general was already in touch with Li Zicheng through a secret messenger, his officers assured Wu Sangui of their undying personal loyalty. They would follow him wherever he chose to go and obey whatever orders he gave.

Satisfied now that his own army would stand firmly behind him, Wu Sangui ordered a retinue formed to escort him to Beijing where he would tender his respects to the sovereign of the Shun. He had thus left the main body of his forces at Shanhaiguan and was already enroute to the capital to surrender to Li, when he and his guards met at Yongping one of his father's concubines and a

207 The great historian Huang Zongxi recommended Peng Sunyi's Pingkou zhi to the compilers of the Ming History as being one of the most reliable works of the period. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 615.
208 Peng, Pingkou zhi, 3.10:6a. Brigade-General Jiang Xiang had surrendered Xuanhua to Li Zicheng.
trusted manservant from the family mansion in Beijing. The concubine told him that the two of them had just managed to escape with their lives from a horrible bloodbath. Because Li Zicheng had received no response from Wu Sangui, Chuang Wang had concluded that his magnanimous offer had been rejected. Enraged by what he took to be such a sign of contempt, Li had ordered the entire Wu household slaughtered. Thirty-eight people had been butchered, and Wu Xiang’s severed head had been hung from the Beijing city wall, a bloody warning to one and all. After he had heard the concubine’s dreadful news, Wu Sangui gathered his guards and turned back toward Shanhaiguan to prepare his men for the battles he now knew had to come.

209 The mungkin suspected that the two had illicitly run away together. The Wu family mansion in Beijing, incidentally, was outside the city in the western suburbs near what would later be the summer palace of the Kangxi Emperor. More than three centuries later the deserted mansion was used to house Marshal Peng Dehuai after he was ousted from power in 1959. New York Times, April 1, 1979, p. 15.

210 Some historians think that Wu Xiang was killed later, after Li Zicheng lost the battle of Shanhaiguan. According to one version, after his defeat Li ordered Wu Xiang to mount the city wall and demand that Wu Sangui, camped below, surrender. When Wu Sangui responded by firing arrows close to the right and left of his father, Li Zicheng had the old general decapitated and hung his head from the wall. Yao Jiaji, “Ming ji yiwen kao bu,” p. 91.

211 Peng, Pingkou zhi, 3.10:6. This tallies with most historians’ current understanding of Wu’s activities then. Some also think the servant or concubine gave him a letter from his father urging him not to join Li Zicheng. Zhao Kai, “Qing bing ru guan yu Wu Sangui xiang Qing wenti.” See also Parsons, Peasant Rebellions, pp. 134–142; and Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:260–261. These excellent historical studies have Li Zicheng killing Wu Xiang after the defeat at Shanhaiguan on May 27, 1644, when all hope of compromise had ended. I have been unable to verify the exact date of Wu Xiang’s death myself, although the official Qing account of the conquest claims that Li Zicheng actually had Wu Xiang along with the Ming crown prince in his camp during the battle of Shanhaiguan. Erich Hauer, trans., Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo fang-liieh, p. 583 (hereafter cited as Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo). According to one contemporary report, Wu Sangui was still at Ningyuan when he learned of the fall of Beijing, and he thereupon sent men to the capital to
On May 3, 1644, Li Zicheng despatched Tang Tong to take over Shanhaiguan. Two days later, Wu Sangui met Tang in battle and routed his forces, which fell back upon Yongping. Tang reported his defeat, and was reinforced with fresh troops led by Bai Guang’
en, the mercenary who had refused to guard Sun Chuanting’s rear in 1643, leading to such consequential Ming defeats in Henan. On May 10 this combined force attacked Shanhaiguan, and again Wu Sangui’s men carried the day, driving back Tang and Bai’s armies and looting Yongping. Holding a temporary advantage, Wu Sangui decided to try for a negotiated settlement with Li before forces could be sent against his army, the regular members of which numbered about 40,000. After taking Yongping, therefore, he sent a message to Li Zicheng, offering to cease hostilities in exchange for the Ming heir apparent, who was still in Li Zicheng’s custody. However, Wu soon learned from his own scouts that Chuang Wang himself was confidently leading more than 60,000 troops out of Beijing to attack his army. There would be no more negotiations; Wu Sangui’s officers would soon be facing as many battle-hardened troops as their own.

His father dead in the Ming capital, Wu Sangui’s thoughts were investigate the situation. His agents reported that his father had been tortured to contribute 5,000 taels to the government. In the meantime, Wu Xiang had sent an agent of his own to Wu with the same news. Enraged, Wu Sangui abandoned Ningyuan, leading most of its residents to Shanhaiguan where he organized a force of 20,000 soldiers from among the populace in both places. On May 18, the force set off for Beijing, stopping to camp about ten li from Shanhaiguan. Six days later, Li Zicheng at the head of his troops reached the same spot, and a battle took place. Li was defeated, and at that point killed Wu Xiang and retreated. Wu Sangui then pursued Li Zicheng to Beijing and beyond. Hsi, “Wu San-kuei in 1644,” pp. 447–448.

212 Gao Hongkui, “Ming-Qing zhi ji Shanhaiguan zhanyi,” p. 77. Li left the capital on May 18. Ibid., p. 81.

213 Peng, Pingkou zhi, 3.10:5a, 11a. Early Qing writers, eager to underscore the Manchus’ military skill against the Shun rebels, exaggerated the number of Li Zicheng’s men, claiming there were 200,000 of them on this campaign. Actually, there were about 60,000 men in Li’s army, and these were not his best troops either. Wu Sangui had 50,000 troops of his own and had mustered another 50,000 men from local militia units. Hauer, “Li Tze-ch’eng,” p. 493; Gao, “Ming-Qing zhi ji Shanhaiguan zhanyi,” pp. 76, 79–80.
now free to turn to his uncle and cousins serving the Manchus in Shengjing (Shenyang). They and their masters, at any rate, seemed to offer the only recourse available to him. In the early morning hours of May 20, only two days after Li Zicheng had begun to lead his army out of Beijing, two of Wu Sangui’s lieutenants—Colonel Yang Shen and Major Guo Yunlong—arrived in front of the Manchus’ camp on the Liao River, bearing a letter to be delivered to Dorgon (Prince Rui), who was one of the two regents of the newly enthroned six-year-old Shunzhi Emperor.214

Dorgon, then thirty-two years old, was the fourteenth son of Nurhaci, and at the time of his father’s death, there were rumors that he was intended to be the heir to his father’s throne. Instead, Hung Taiji became the new khan and emperor, while Dorgon (who was named a hosoi beile at the age of fourteen) went on to become an outstanding military leader, serving in major campaigns as an adolescent, and earning the title of “wise warrior” (mergen daicing) at the age of twenty-three after subduing the Chahar Mongols.215 By the time he was twenty-six, he was a prince of the first degree and commander of one of the two main armies that invaded China in 1638 and 1639, successfully attacking more than forty cities and returning to Liaoyang laden with booty and captives.216

In the fall of 1643 Hung Taiji had fallen ill. He died in his own bed in Shengjing on September 21. Hung Taiji’s eldest son, Hao Ge, then thirty-two years old, appeared to be the natural heir, and he enjoyed the support of many of his father’s former generals. On the other hand, a number of powerful princes and beile also sup-

214 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, vol. 1, p. 257; Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, p. 580. Six members of the local gentry and elders of Shanhaiguan, led by the shengyuan Li Yousong, had met Li Zicheng at Sanhe, hoping to forestall his attack on their city. Li killed them and continued marching eastward. Gao, “Ming-Qing zhi ji Shanhaiguan zhanyi,” pp. 78–79.


216 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 215–216. Dorgon was also noted for his tactfulness, which made him an excellent diplomatic representative. In 1637, for example, he so impressed King Yi Chong, with whom he exchanged pleasantries, that thereafter the Korean monarch sent him a gift every year. Zheng Kecheng, “Duoergun,” p. 2.
ported Dorgon, even though he was Hung Taiji’s half-brother. The succession crisis was resolved at a meeting of all the major princes which was also attended by Yi Cho, a Korean who had earlier joined the Qing court in Shengjing and who enjoyed the privileges of a Manchu noble. The Korean adherent has left an account of that meeting, which reads as follows:

All of the princes met in the Great Yamen. Great Prince\(^\text{217}\) spoke, saying, “Tiger Mouth,\(^\text{218}\) the emperor’s eldest son, should not succeed to the great rule.” Tiger Mouth said, “My blessings are small and my virtue is lacking. I am not fit to rule.” He thus took his leave and went away. The discussions to decide on the government had not yet reached a point of agreement. The group of leaders under the hand of the emperor\(^\text{219}\) came forward, wearing swords, and said: “We were all given food by the emperor, and clothes by the emperor, who had the benevolence to nurture us. Together we have sworn a great oath before Heaven. If you do not support a son of the emperor, then we simply prefer to die and follow the emperor into the underworld.” Great Prince said, “I treated the emperor as an elder brother. When there were political matters at court I never knew beforehand. How can I take part in this discussion?” And he stood up and left. Eighth Prince\(^\text{220}\) also followed him out. Tenth Prince\(^\text{221}\) was silent, and had nothing to say. Ninth Prince\(^\text{222}\) responded to them, saying, “Your words are correct. Prince Tiger Mouth has yielded and left. He has no wish to succeed to the rule. We should support the emperor’s Third Son,\(^\text{223}\) but he is young and immature. The soldiers of the Army of the Eight High Mountains (\textit{Ba gao shan jun})\(^\text{224}\) will be divided in half between me and Right True (\textit{You zhen}) Prince,\(^\text{225}\) and we will assist in governing to the left and right [of the throne]. After [the emperor] grows up, we will

\(^{217}\) This refers to Daisan, second son of Nurhaci.
\(^{218}\) This refers to Haoge, Hung Taiji’s eldest son.
\(^{219}\) This refers to the generals leading the emperor’s yellow banners.
\(^{220}\) This refers to Ajige.
\(^{221}\) This refers to Dodo.
\(^{222}\) This refers to Dorgon.
\(^{223}\) This refers to Fulin.
\(^{224}\) This refers to the yellow banners.
\(^{225}\) This refers to Jirgalang.
return the government to him.” They swore before Heaven and left. The one they call the Third Son is 6 sui old.\(^{226}\)

Consequently, when Fulin was enthroned as the Shunzhi Emperor on October 8, 1643, he ruled under the supervision of his two co-regents, Dorgon and the famous general Jirgalang, Prince Zheng.\(^{227}\)

If Haoge and the other princes expected that Jirgalang, who had long commanded the central Manchu garrison in Shengjing, would be an effective counter-balance to Dorgon, then they certainly underestimated Dorgon. Jirgalang was senior in age to Dorgon, though he was not a direct descendant of Nurhaci—having been raised by the Manchu founder when Jirgalang’s own father, Surhaci, died around 1611.\(^{228}\) Yet while Jirgalang was a highly skilled and respected military leader, he was simply not interested in the kind of day-to-day civil administration which Dorgon now rapidly mastered. On February 17, 1644, Jirgalang had assembled the officials of the Three Inner Courts, of the Six Boards, of the Censorate, and of the Court of Colonial Affairs, and announced to them:

From now on all the management of affairs for each office on matters which ought to be explained to us two princes, or documents to be recorded, should all be first reported and made known to Prince Rui. Documents which have to be signed should be given to Prince Rui first for his signature. However, in matters of precedence and protocol, and in the conducting of rites and ceremonies, we will all proceed according to the previous regulations [which hold the two prince-regents as equals].\(^{229}\)

Actually, even “in matters of precedence and protocol” Dorgon was rapidly gaining the upper hand over Jirgalang. Judging from

\(^{226}\) *Shen guan lu, juan 6*, cited in Li Ge, “Guanyu Duogun yongli Fulin wenti de kaocha,” p. 271. The meeting took place on September 26, 1643.


\(^{229}\) *Da-Qing Shizhu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu*, 3:4b. See also Zhang Qiyun, ed., *Qing shi*, p. 32.
the accounts of the reception of tribute from the Korean envoy at the New Year’s audience of 1644 in Shengjing, Prince Rui was already assuming a paramount ritual position.\textsuperscript{230} And by the time Wu Sangui’s letter reached Shengjing, Dorgon had also considerably extended his power over the other imperial princes by purging Haoge and his faction.\textsuperscript{231}

Wu Sangui’s letter was addressed to the Qing emperor, to whom he wrote:

I have long deeply admired Your Highness’s majestic authority, but according to the obligations of the \textit{Spring and Autumn Annals}, borders are not to be crossed, and I have therefore not communicated directly with you before now. I trust that Your Highness also knows the duty of a man to serve [his monarch]. Now, because of the isolated position of Ningyuan, my country (guo) has ordered me to abandon Ningyuan and garrison Shanhaiguan, desiring to strengthen the defense of the eastern frontier and bolster the capital. Unexpectedly, roving bandits revolted against Heaven and other-threw the emperor. How could such a disorderly mob of petty thieves be capable of carrying out such a matter? The former emperor was unfortunate in that the loyalties of the capital’s populace were not fixed, and a clique of traitors opened the gates and welcomed in [the bandits]. The temples of the imperial ancestors are in ashes!\textsuperscript{232}

But in spite of their initial success, the bandits—Wu went on to explain—had now lost the support of the populace altogether.

\textsuperscript{230} \textit{Huang-Ts'ing k'ai-kuo}, p. 577.

\textsuperscript{231} On May 6, 1644, Dorgon had Haoge accused of “seditious and reckless” (beiwang) crimes. All the members of his faction were killed and he was reduced to the status of a commoner. Zhang, \textit{Qing shi}, p. 32. According to the \textit{Veritable Records}, Haoge had tried to turn Holhoi, one of Dorgon’s close advisers, against the prince-regent. Holhoi instead reported the conspiracy to Dorgon and testified against Haoge in front of the Assembly of Princes and High Officials. (It is likely, of course, that Holhoi was put up to this testimony by Dorgon himself.) \textit{Shizu shilu}, 4:1–4.

Even though the rebels had assumed imperial titles, they were behaving just like the Red Eyebrows or Yellow Turbans by raping, murdering, and robbing. Without mass support, they were certain to be defeated by the "righteous armies" which would soon rise throughout the empire to restore the Ming, just as Guangwudi (r. A.D. 25–57) had restored the Han. Wu Sangui intended to lead just such an army himself, but the area east of the capital was not sufficiently extensive to permit him to raise a force large enough for success, and this had caused him to "weep tears of blood in search of help." That was why he was now writing the Qing regime. Wu Sangui's country (guo) of the Ming and Dorgon's dynasty (chao) of the Qing had developed good relations for over two centuries. Wu Sangui thus hoped that the Qing would realize, like any good ally, that it was its responsibility to eradicate the evil doings of the rebels, and obey Heaven's Mandate to "rescue the people from the fire and water." Not only would this be recognized as an act of great merit; it would also bring the Manchus "great profits" (da li). In addition to being given more territory north of the Great Wall for their Qing chao to occupy, the Manchus would also share in the booty of the rebels once the latter were defeated. "In addition, the gold and silks, the boys and girls, which the roving bandits have amassed is beyond calculation. Once the righteous troops arrive," Wu Sangui promised, "that will be theirs."  

**Dorgon's Decision to Intervene**

Wu Sangui's appeal to the Manchus' interest in "great profits" made perfect sense in light of what he knew about their military system. The 45,000 regular soldiers and officers, and the roughly equal number of reservists (zhuangding), in the Manchu banners in 1644 received no stipend whatsoever, but rather depended upon the spoils of war gathered on military expeditions like the one Abatai had led in the winter of 1642–1643.  

233 Xiao, *Qingdai tongshi*, 1:258.  
234 Counting reservists and regular bannermen together, there were probably no more than 120,000 Manchu soldiers in 278 companies available for the conquest of China in 1644. Added to that were 120 Mongol companies, con-
the Great Wall were very much a part of the Manchus’ tribal tradition of military aristocratism, vested in the beile who thought of the Central Plain as a place to plunder rather than a zone to occupy. Wu Sangui was thus envisioning a Tartar raid across the border in support of his campaign, and then—after being rewarded with vast amounts of booty and slaves—a Manchu return to their homeland, which might have to be expanded to include all of Liaoxi. He in turn would be like one of the powerful magnates who restored the Latter Han dynasty, suppressing peasant rebellions with other “righteous” leaders who would bring order to the realm once more.

This was not at all the plan envisaged by Dorgon’s Chinese advisers, who had quite a different historical model in mind. Well before Beijing fell, Fan Wencheng had likened the Shun rebels to the autocratic Qin who had swept out of the Shaanxi mountains, briefly unified the empire, and then lost the Mandate. The Qing forces, thus, were like the former Han: they would sweep out the rebels and establish a long-lived empire after occupying the Central Plain. 235 This plan for the establishment of a new Qing empire, replacing the Ming, had been a hope long shared by many of the Chinese collaborators. Fan Wencheng, in particular, had continually urged Dorgon to realize Nurhaci’s “great enterprise” by setting his mind upon the conquest of China. 236

Prior to Li Zicheng’s occupation of Beijing, then, Dorgon and Jirgalang, the two regents governing in the name of the six-year-old Shunzhi Emperor, hesitated between two strategic alternatives—alternatives that had constituted the major motifs of Hung Taiji’s foreign policy before them. 237 There was, on the one hand,

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235 Lin Tiejun, “Qingchu de kāng Qing douzheng he nongmin jun de lian Ming kang Qing celüe,” p. 40.
236 Zhaolian, Xiaoting zalu, 2:8b; Huang-Ts’i’ng k’ai-kuo, pp. 577–578.
237 Even before the fall of Beijing to Li Zicheng, then, the Manchus were considering occupying the Central Plain. However, they appear to have thought initially of partitioning north China between themselves and the Shun rebels. On March 6, 1644, only 27 days after Li Zicheng proclaimed the inau-
the tribal tradition of military aristocratism, incorporated in the beile and heiße who were disinclined to occupy north China and who preferred earning merit and wealth by hit-and-run raids across the Great Wall.\textsuperscript{238} And on the other hand, there was the Jin tradition of imperial rule, symbolized by the imperial institution itself and in the legacy of the khanate bequeathed to all later Manchu rulers by Nurhaci. This second motif did not necessarily entail occupation of the Central Plain; for many years the Qing could take pride in its dealings with the Ming as though both were simply several among many guo competing for wealth and power in northeastern Asia. But embedded within the Manchus’ own particular imperial tradition was the much more universal concept of a divine mandate to rule. Once the Ming guo ceased being a plausible rival to the Qing, then the lure of ultimate paramountcy—possession of the Mandate of Heaven and all the empire under its span—would eventually prove irresistible.

With the demise of the Ming government in Beijing, therefore, guration of the Shun regime, the Qing court sent a mission to the western part of China with a letter addressed to “the military leaders occupying the western part of the Ming territories.” The letter suggested forming an alliance between the Qing armies and the military confederation there in order to create “righteous troops” to attack the Ming. The proposal was put in terms of “cooperating together to plan joint action in order to take together the Central Plain.” This letter was returned later with a note from the Shun general Wang Liangzhi, who stated that he had communicated its contents to his superiors. Gu Cheng, “Lun Qingchu shehui maodun,” p. 140. See also Zhao Kai “Qing bing ru guan yu Wu Sangui xiang Qing wenti.”

\textsuperscript{238} By May, 1643, however, several of the princes were beginning to change their minds about the eventual conquest of China. Dodo, Jirgalang, and Ajige all believed that the time had come to transform the banners from an army of marauders into an occupation force that could live off of the revenue provided by a captive population of Chinese cultivators. In November, Ajige and Jirgalang led 60,000 men, including an artillery unit, toward Shanhai-guan. The behavior of the Qing troops was erratic; they appeared to want to take the pass, and yet in the end they returned to Shengjing. One conclusion that can be drawn is that while Jirgalang and Ajige had conquest in mind, other Manchu aristocrats held them back and eventually forced them to return to the Qing capital. Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 4.
a fresh opportunity presented itself for Chinese collaborators like Fan Wencheng and Hong Chengchou to persuade the Manchu leaders to prepare to invade China. Now that Wu Sangui had abandoned Ningyuan, "the lands outside Shanhaiguan were completely ours": the moment for the "great enterprise" had finally arrived. Dorgon, eager to consolidate his own individual authority over the other beile, was particularly prone to accept such advice because it naturally strengthened the imperial throne which he now was beginning to dominate. Thus, the combination of Dorgon's ambitions for increased monarchical power, and the presence of so many Chinese turncoats in the Qing court, decisively caused the Manchus to shift from the era of aristocratic tribal warfare to a new age of imperial domination. On May 13, word reached Shengjing of the depredations of Li Zicheng and his Shun rebels in Beijing. Grand Secretary Fan Wencheng greeted the news with great enthusiasm, saying that the time had now come for the Manchus to intervene in China. Even though Li Zicheng's troops were said to number almost one million men, Fan had no doubt that the Qing forces could readily defeat the enemy. The reason for his optimism was not only confidence in the skill and discipline of the Qing's soldiers; it was also because of Fan's belief that Li Zicheng had lost all political support. Initially, by overthrowing the Chongzhen Emperor, he had incurred Heaven's displeasure. Then, by abusing the gentry and officials, he had aroused the literati's opposition. Now, in looting the capital, raping commoner's wives, and burning people's homes, Li's soldiers had earned the masses' hatred.

My country[men], high and low, are of the same mind. Soldiers and weapons will be readied. We will make certain that [our inten-

239 Shizu shilu, 4:42a. At that point Dorgon assumed that north China would be partitioned between the Manchus and Li Zicheng's forces. On March 5, 1644, he had sent a polite letter to Li and his lieutenants, suggesting that they "devise a plan in common to unite their forces." Zheng, "Duoergun," p. 5, and see also p. 10; Gao Hongkui, "Ming-Qing zhi ji Shanhaiguan zhanyi," p. 79.
tion] to punish them for their crimes is known. Since we will be motivated by righteousness, how can we fail?

Dorgon agreed with Fan Wencheng: the justification for Qing conquest was to be punishment of the rebels who had brought about the Ming emperor’s fall. That same day, in an imperial ceremony, Prince Rui accepted the command of an expedition to occupy the Central Plain; and the following day, May 14, the Grand Army so formed left Shengjing under his leadership.

On May 20, the same day Wu Sanguis’s letter arrived, the Manchus also learned of the Chongzhen Emperor’s demise. This awesome event—the violent death of the Son of Heaven—dictated slightly different plans; the Shun rebels were no longer potential allies but were now their principal opponent. Hong Chengchou explained the strategy to be followed:

Our military strength is not a threat to [the inhabitants of] the empire. This should first be promulgated as an order, so as to show that we are going to continue to wipe out remnant rebel elements; and will not butcher the people, nor burn their dwellings, nor plunder their valuables. Thus, they will open their gates to us and surrender, or become fifth columnists [within the cities which resist]. Moreover, it is very important that we break our [traditional] rules, and establish new laws, executed in such a way that individuals of great merit [will be encouraged to join us and] be enfeoffed as nobles. As for the bandits themselves, we must realize that if they are treated tenderly, then they will attack us. But if they are treated

240 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:258. See also Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, pp. 577–580; Li Yuandu, Guochao xianzheng, 1:2–3a.
242 Wu Han, comp., Chaoxian Li chao shilu zhong de Zhongguo shiliao, p. 3726; Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 6.
243 As Fan Wencheng put it then: “Although our country may be struggling with the Ming for the empire (tianxia), actually we are in contest with the wandering bandits (liukou).” Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 6.
forcefully, they will flee. Now that they hear our armies are approaching they will inevitably flee to the west. . . . And if they do thus go, swift cavalry must pursue them. And if they should choose to stay and defend the capital, they will be even easier to crush. 244

In Hong's view, then, successful intervention depended both upon the unconditional defeat of Li's armies, and upon changing the Sino-Manchu forces' conventional strategy of raiding for loot, bounty, slaves, and livestock. So advised, Dorgon assembled his generals and beile. On the three previous campaigns into China, he said, their soldiers had been expected to loot and pillage. This time there would be none of that, because "we want to settle the country and pacify the people in order to carry out our great enterprise." Together they pledged a covenant (yue) to "save the people" through imperial pacification (zheng) by not plundering, burning, or killing needlessly. All surrendering prisoners would be spared, and outside of having their heads shaved, they would be physically untouched. Bannermen who killed camp followers, raped, looted, or rustled livestock would be killed, their dependents made into slaves, and their property confiscated. 245

In the meantime, Fan Wencheng began preparing special proclamations to the Chinese people, announcements which were to be distributed well in advance of the Manchus' westward march.

The righteous army comes to avenge your ruler-father for you. It is not an enemy of the people. The only ones to be killed now are the Chuang bandits. Officials who surrender can resume their former posts. People who surrender can resume their former occupations. We will by no means harm you. 246

244 Shizu shilu, 4:44.  
245 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:259–260. Fan Wencheng and Hong Chengchou both proposed these stiff penalties. Plundering was to be punished with 80 lashes with a whip. In 1649, this was changed into the death penalty. Wu, "Eight Banners," pp. 49–53.  
246 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:258. This phrase, dai bao jun fu zhi chou (to avenge your ruler-father for you), became a stock slogan of Qing propaganda.
Supplied with these proclamations—reassurances which were to open the gates of cities all along the route to Beijing—the first Qing military units began slipping across the Great Wall on May 20, at the very time Wu Sangui’s letter arrived offering the Manchus “great profits” and the territory they already dominated in Liaoxi in exchange for their help.247

Dorgon’s answer to Wu Sangui consequently made it very clear that, while he welcomed the idea of an alliance against Li Zicheng, it was to be on Qing terms alone; there would be no plan to restore the Ming state, with which the Manchus had already been virtually at war. Prince Rui’s letter (which was drafted by Fan Wencheng) pointed out that the Qing had always pursued good diplomatic relations with the Ming guo, yet the Qing guo had thrice invaded the Central Plain: “in order to make manifest our intentions to the officials of the Ming state, wanting the ruler of the Ming state to ponder this well and thus be on good terms with us.” Indeed, the Qing would have invaded yet a fourth time if it were not for the terrible disorders in China and the misery of its populace. Now, they had received the news of the “outrage” of the Ming emperor’s death, and they had therefore already decided to assemble their righteous armies to “exterminate the bandits and rescue the people from the fire and water.”

Dorgon thus expressed his delight at receiving Wu Sangui’s letter, and he wished to declare his admiration for the Ming general’s effort “to repay the benevolence of his lord” by remaining a loyal minister. Although he and Wu had once been adversaries because of the general’s assignment in Liaodong, Prince Rui was willing to forget this past enmity and employ the former Ming official as his own minister. An historical precedent for such dual service could be found in the story of Guan Zhong, who in the 7th century B.C. loyally served the Marquis of Lu. During a battle between his master and the future Duke Huan of Qi, Guan Zhong had fired an arrow at Duke Huan, striking him on the belt buckle. Later, when Duke Huan was looking for someone to become his prime minister, his advisors recommended Guan Zhong, saying that just as he had served his former master loyally, so would he now be equally devoted to his new lord. Duke Huan appointed Guan Zhong, who went on to become one of China’s most famous statesmen, devising policies that elevated Duke Huan to hegemony over all of China. Dorgon’s letter thus urged Wu Sangui to set aside his doubts and remember the example of Guan Zhong.

248 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:259.
Once Guan Zhong shot at Duke Huan and struck his belt buckle. Later, Duke Huan employed him as a minister in order to establish his hegemony. Now, if the earl [of Pingxi, i.e., Wu Sangui] were to lead his army and surrender to us, we would by all means enfeoff him with his former territory and bestow a princedom [upon him]. On the one hand, your state will have revenge upon its enemy. On the other hand, you and your family will be protected. Generation after generation of your sons and grandsons will perpetually enjoy wealth and nobility for as long as the mountains and rivers last.249

Dorgon's army had already reached Ningyuan, the letter concluded, and together with Wu Sangui's elite troops at Shanhai-guan, the combined force would easily be able to crush the rebel forces when they attacked.250

By May 25, Li Zicheng's main force had already reached the outskirts of Shanhaiguan, and Wu Sangui had decided to accept Dorgon's terms. After sending off a courier with a letter for the Manchu prince-regent, Wu Sangui posted trusted lieutenants to defend the western and northern walls of the city, leaving responsibility for the eastern wall in the hands of gentry-led militia.251 Then he arrayed his own troops several kilometers west of the garrison by the Sha River where Li Zicheng waited on a hill above the battlefield, with the two young Ming royal princes at his side.252

249 Ibid.
250 Ibid. In the eyes of onlookers, including Korean adherents, the Qing forces altogether clearly outnumbered the Shun soldiers. Wu Sangui's 100,000 men combined with the Manchu bannermen to total over 200,000 troops. Nevertheless, Dorgon heeded Hong Chenghou's warning against depreciating the Shun army and told his men that the rebels "cannot be attacked recklessly." That was why Dorgon asked Wu Sangui to lead the vanguard. Gao, "Ming-Qing zhi ji Shanhaiguan zhanyi," p. 81; Wu Han, Chaoxian Li chao shilu, p. 3734.
251 The southern wall of the garrison, facing on the sea, was unassailable.
252 Gao, "Ming-Qing zhi ji Shanhaiguan zhanyi," p. 80.
The Grand Army Invades

The courier delivered Wu Sangui’s capitulation to Dorgon at Lianshan, about one hundred and sixty kilometers up the coast from Shanhaiguan. Dorgon immediately ordered his bannermen to break camp and ride or march at forced pace to the south. In twenty-four hours the Qing soldiers covered over one hundred kilometers, and when night fell on the 26th they found themselves only eight kilometers away from Shanhaiguan. Too exhausted to continue, they quickly set up temporary camp and slept in their armor with their weapons at their side. At midnight of that same day their officers awoke them. Sending out two wings of ten thousand men each under Ajige and Dodo to guard his flanks, Dorgon led the main body of soldiers through the night toward the strategic pass, from which they could already hear the distant thunder of cannons. By sunrise on May 27, the bannermen were before the gates of Shanhaiguan. Wu Sangui rode out in person to welcome them and, after formally surrendering to Dorgon, had his own men attach pieces of white cloth to the back of their armor so that they could be distinguished from the rebels when the Manchu-Mongol-Han forces attacked. This was most important because,

253 Ibid., p. 81.
254 During the march south they fought one battle with General Tang Tong, who had been sent along with several hundred men beyond the wall to attack Wu Sangui from the rear. Tang Tong’s soldiers stumbled into the main Qing force at a place called Stone Strip (Yipian shi) northwest of Funing, and were virtually annihilated. Tang Tong escaped, and later surrendered to the Qing. Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, p. 583; Hauer, “Li Tze-ch’eng,” p. 486. But see also Gao, “Ming-Qing zhi ji Shanhaiguan zhanyi,” p. 82.
256 In Wu Sangui’s own account of the battle of Shanhaiguan, which he wrote later in a letter to the Kangxi Emperor, a special sacrifice was held by Dorgon. A white horse and black cow were sacrificed while Wu swore that after the Chuang rebels were defeated all of the Central Kingdom (Zhongguo) would belong to Dorgon’s country (gui guo). Dorgon then ordered Wu Sangui to cut his hair in the Manchu style. Letter copied from a document in the Qing archives and cited in Wang Chongwu, “Wu Sangui yu Shanhaiguan zhi zhan,” p. 155.
as it turned out, Wu Sangui’s forces were subsequently placed in the vanguard of the Qing army.\textsuperscript{257} They would attack first and bear the brunt of the enemy’s initial repulse.\textsuperscript{258}

By the Sha River, Li Zicheng’s army had spread out to fill the littoral in a broad line, and there was some disorder in the ranks. Nevertheless, when Wu’s elite Ningyuan troops moved forward and charged into the rebel lines, the Shun army refused to yield. It broke the back of Wu Sangui’s repeated charges and inflicted numerous casualties—casualties so severe that Wu Sangui’s army would have been defeated had it been fighting entirely alone.\textsuperscript{259} But before Li’s men could claim a victory, a violent sandstorm blew down from the hills to the west.\textsuperscript{260} Under the cover of the blinding sand, Qing bannermen galloped around Wu’s right wing and fell upon Li Zicheng’s left flank. When the Shun troops turned to face this cavalry riding at them out of the dust, they suddenly saw horsemen with shaved foreheads. A cry went up, “It’s Tartar troops,” and the rebel lines broke. The retreat turned into a rout,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{257} Altogether, more than a thousand military and civil officials, including local officials from Liaoxi and Shanhaiguan, surrendered with Wu Sangui. Also, in addition to Wu Sangui’s own men, over 30,000 local village braves (xiang yong) joined the Qing forces. Memorial from Zang Guozhao to Dorgon in the fall of 1644, now in the collection of Beijing University Library; Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, p. 130, dated December 23, 1645, cited in Wang, “Wu Sangui,” pp. 156–157.
  \item \textsuperscript{258} Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo, pp. 582–583; Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:259–260.
  \item \textsuperscript{259} According to Lu Jian’s Ting wen lu (Record of things heard at court), the Shun rebels knew that Wu Sangui’s frontier troops were good fighters and they therefore decided to be as fierce as possible themselves. General Wu’s own men were also determined to fight to the death. The Manchus’ tactics were, on the other hand, to hang back and hold themselves in reserve until both sides were weakened by attrition. After the initial sally, Wu’s men returned to the fray again and again, and the bitter battle stretched on nearly until sunset before the Manchus decided to intervene. This delay had the effect of making Wu Sangui all the more dependent on them because he had lost so many of his own men. Ting wen lu, juan 1, cited in Gao, “Ming-Qing zhi ji Shanhaiguan zhanyi,” p. 81.
  \item \textsuperscript{260} The storm was so intense that the Manchus did not even know that the enemy had been defeated until after the wind died down and the dust settled. Gao, “Ming-Qing zhi ji Shanhaiguan zhanyi,” p. 82.
\end{itemize}
and stragglers were cut down as the Shun army turned and fled toward the walls of Yongping.\textsuperscript{261} There Li Zicheng halted to re-group, but many of his men refused to stop rushing on down the road westward toward Beijing. Li soon followed his men, leaving the field of battle in the victorious hands of Dorgon and Wu Sangui.\textsuperscript{262}

As the defeated Shun rebels filtered back into Beijing, they vented their frustrations upon the capital itself, setting fire to parts of the city and completely destroying all of the residences around the Zhangyi Gate.\textsuperscript{263} News of Wu Sangui’s victory spread rapidly, and many residents of Beijing wept with relief upon hearing rumors that the Ming crown prince was about to be returned to the throne.\textsuperscript{264} In the marketplaces vendors jibed:

\begin{quote}
Zicheng hacked his way to power—
But he’s not the Son of Heaven.
He mounted the throne on horseback—
But not for very long.\textsuperscript{265}
\end{quote}

Yet even though the Mandate seemed to be passing to another, the people’s ordeal was not yet over. Rebel survivors of the battle of Shanhaiguan, mean with fatigue and drink, reoccupied their for-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[261] According to the local gazetteer, tens of thousands of corpses, including the bodies of local peasant sympathizers who had joined the rebels, littered the battlefield at Shahe. Ibid.
\item[262] On this day, after the battle, Wu Sangui was named Prince Pingxi and given a jade girdle along with the other gifts of honor. His Ningyuan men shaved their heads and joined the main Qing forces. \textit{Huang-Ts’ing k’ai-kuo}, p. 584. See also Xiao, \textit{Qingdai tongshi}, 1:260–261; Parsons, \textit{Peasant Rebellions}, pp. 139–142.
\item[263] Xu Yingfen, \textit{Yubian jilüe}, p. 12. During Li’s absence, some of the troops left behind under Niu Jinxing’s command had already begun to drift out of the city, heading back toward the west, and plundering homes and shops along the way. At the time of his departure, many people felt that the “dashing prince” would not return victorious. Xu Yingfen cast the changes that day and threw a \textit{kun}, which convinced him that a new ruler was on his way. Ibid., pp. 10b–12a.
\item[265] Chen, \textit{Zaisheng jilüe}, p. 20b.
\end{footnotes}
mer billets; and on May 31, Li Zicheng reentered the city with the main body of his soldiers, who proceeded to sack the capital’s yamens and officials’ residences. Now, as a final gesture of defiance once the empire was truly lost to him, Li Zicheng decided to enthrone himself. A formal but hasty coronation ceremony was held on June 3 as his men prepared to abandon the capital.266 The next day the Yongchang Emperor of Shun set the palace ablaze and rode out of the city gates toward the west.267 Behind him “smoke and flames filled the sky,” and fires burned in almost every district of the city. The “dashing prince” had occupied Beijing for forty-two days, only the last of which had been as emperor.268

The departure of the main body of Li’s army, laden with loot and reinforced with conscripted townfolk, gave the inhabitants of Beijing an opportunity to wreak revenge upon the stragglers.269

266 Li may also have been seeking the added legitimation of enthronement, however momentary, in the imperial capital in order to improve his monarchical claims later on. Certainly, the fact that he had once been emperor in Beijing was important to his followers after his death. Shun remnants in southern China allied with the Ming loyalist Yongli regime continued to speak of Li Zicheng as their “former emperor” (xiandi), and referred to his widow as the empress dowager. Gu Cheng, “Lun Qingchu shehui maodun,” p. 154.

267 The Manchus made every effort to capture Li Zicheng as he rode west. Normally, it took 7 days to ride from Beijing to Baoding. Ajige and his horsemen made the trip in 3 days, but by the time they reached Baoding, the rebels had moved on. By then his men and horses were so tired that they could not pursue them any farther. Wu, Chaoxian Li chao shilu, p. 3735.

268 Xu, Yubian jilüe, pp. 12–14a; Parsons, Peasant Rebellions, pp. 139–142; Liu, Dingsi xiaoji, p. 8a. According to one source, Li Yan was killed during the flight by Li Zicheng himself, who had been persuaded by Niu Jinxing that Li Yan wanted to become emperor in his place. Zhao Zongfu, “Li Zicheng,” p. 150; Hauer, “Li Tze-ch’eng,” p. 495.

269 The Shun rebels must have fled in considerable disarray. Bian Dashou, the magistrate who destroyed Li Zicheng’s ancestors’ graves and who wrote the famous Hukou yusheng ji (Record of a survivor from the tiger’s mouth), was an anonymous prisoner of the rebels at Zhending when the Beijing occupation troops arrived. “I saw the bandit soldiers from north to south [raising] dust which obscured the sky. But all were [either] old or young, and were mingling helplessly and sadly. Among every ten bandits there were three or four women. They were completely without military discipline. When I saw
Growing more emboldened by the hour, mobs formed to seize stray Shun soldiers and throw them into burning buildings. Other rebels were decapitated in the streets—“and the people’s hearts were gladdened.”

In the streets, pedestrians ordered that the bandits be seized, and residents of the city who happened to be from the west were killed, their entire families slaughtered. In the same fashion, there were instances of people taking advantage of the occasion to settle old scores. For, they could not be questioned [if they killed out of revenge].

All in all, nearly two thousand were slaughtered before the killing stopped. The traumatized city slowly settled into quiet, tensely awaiting its new occupier. “Those who were full of regret [for having collaborated] lost their sense of purpose and had no alternative but to wait for Wu [Sangui] to judge them.”

No one expected anybody other than Wu Sangui to take over the city. None even considered the possibility of a Manchu occupation at this point, even though there were rumors of a “grand army” coming from the east, and a few people claimed that they had seen a proclamation posted outside the Qihua Gate headed by the phrase, “Great Qing Country” (Da Qing guo). Thus, the gentry and officials who were struggling on the night of June 4 to

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270 Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:8.
271 Liu, Dingsi xiaoji, p. 8a.
272 Ibid.
274 Ibid., p. 20b.
275 Liu, Dingsi xiaoji, p. 8b. The Qing army averaged about 40 kilometers a day on the march, passing by Funing on May 30, Changli on May 31, and Yutian on June 3. According to one contemporary source, when the Qing rulers arrived most people knew in their hearts that the Mandate of Heaven had changed hands. Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:8b.
find appropriately formal clothing to receive their rescuers assumed that they would be greeting the Ming crown prince and his protector, the Earl of Pingxi.\textsuperscript{276} This may explain why they were shocked into such ready acquiescence when they met Dorgon instead:

Early on the morning of the first day of the fifth lunar month (June 5, 1644), the [city] elders and ministers all went outside the city for a distance of twenty or more \textit{li} to welcome [their new ruler]. When they saw the great army they pushed one of their number forward as a guide to escort [the army in]. The official in charge of the Donghua Gate had prepared the imperial regalia. One of the [barbarian] men dismounted and climbed upon the [imperial] chariot. He spoke to the people, saying, “I am the Prince-Regent. The Ming heir apparent will reach all of you in due course. He has assented to my being your ruler.” Everyone in the crowd was startled and stared, unable to comprehend. Meanwhile, he continued to speak to the crowd. Someone said that he was the descendant of [the Ming emperor] Yingzong [who had been abducted by the Mongols]. The people were too frightened to act and had no means [of opposing him]. Thereupon the regent proceeded to enter [the palace].\textsuperscript{277}

Escorted by the former Ming imperial bodyguards, Dorgon slowly ascended the steps of the smoldering Wuying Palace, which he would for a while occupy as his own.\textsuperscript{278} When he reached the top,
he turned and addressed the assembled officials, asking them to bring forward the most noble (gui) in their ranks. Li Mingrui was hesitantly led up to Dorgon, who graciously asked him to become vice-president of the Qing Board of Rites. Li quickly demurred: he was old and ill. But Dorgon interrupted before Li could continue:

The emperor of your dynasty has not yet been [properly] buried. Tomorrow I intend to order all of the officials and people of the capital to observe public mourning. But how can there be [proper] public mourning if there exists no ancestral tablet? And how can there be an ancestral tablet if no posthumous name has been conferred [by the Board of Rites]?²⁷⁹

Moved to the point of tears, Li Mingrui bowed and accepted the appointment, promising to assume responsibility for the imperial sacrifices.

Having paid his respect to the dead Ming emperor, Dorgon immediately issued the following public proclamation composed in his name by Fan Wencheng:²⁸⁰

The Prince-Regent of the Great Qing Dynasty orders by decree that the officials, gentry, soldiers, and people of the southern dynasty (nan chao) know that: In earlier days our dynasty wished to have good and harmonious relations with your Ming, [hoping] for perpetual peace. We repeatedly sent letters which were not answered, causing us to invade deeply [into China] four times, until your dynasty had cause for regret. How stubborn it was not to comply! Now it has been extinguished by the roving bandits, and its service [to Heaven] belongs to the past. But we need say no more. The em-

²⁷⁹ Ji, Mingji bei lüe, pp. 33–34.
²⁸⁰ Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:379–380. See also Li Yuandu, Guochao xianzheng shilüe, 1:3a.
pire (tianxia) is not an individual’s private empire. Whosoever possesses virtue holds it. The army and people are not an individual’s private army and people. Whosoever possesses virtue commands them. We now hold it. We took revenge upon the enemy of your ruler-father in place of your dynasty. We burned our bridges behind us, and we have pledged not to return until every bandit is destroyed. In the counties, districts, and locales that we pass through, all those who are able to shave their heads and surrender, opening their gates to welcome us, will be given rank and reward, retaining their wealth and nobility for generations. But if there are those who resist us disobediently, then when our Grand Army arrives, the stones themselves will be set ablaze and everyone will be massacred. [On the other hand], scholars of resolve will reap upright administration, meritorious fame, and pursuit of their vocation. If there are those who lack faith [in us] then how can the empire be served?  

Of course, far more than a single proclamation was needed to convince the capital’s inhabitants that the Manchus were there to stay. For several days after Dorgon’s entry, people continued to believe in the imminent appearance of Wu Sangui and the Ming crown prince. But “gradually more and more [soldiers] of the Grand Army entered the city,” and the residents of Beijing learned that Dorgon had despatched Wu Sangui to the west to destroy Li Zicheng’s remnant forces.  

281 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:262. Some of these themes were repeated in an edict from Dorgon on June 8, addressed to former Ming officials, elders, soldiers, and commoners, which described how Li Zicheng, a Ming peasant (baixing), had assembled a band of rogues (choulet) who had destroyed the capital, killed their ruler, and by looting willfully, incurred the people’s hatred. “Even though we were an enemy state (guo), we are filled with the deepest sympathy, and now we order the officials and people to observe three days of mourning for the Chongzhen Emperor.” Shizu shilu, 5:52.  

282 Liu, Dingxi xiaoji, p. 9a. The Grand Army, a few days after occupying Beijing, was joined by 3,000 Mongol bannermen. When these fierce troops rode in to assume guard duties on the city walls, they put their bows in their cases and tied down their arrows, saying, “We’re afraid we’ll alarm the peasants.” The Qing troops were also heard to say: “China (Zhonghua) is a Buddhist country. Our bunch has come in and put a Buddhist land under heel. Such a sin! Such a sin!” Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:8b. See also Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 7.
announced that his bannermen were going to “release their hunting nets and unstring their bows,” a vast sense of relief overcame the populace. Addressing his diary, one scholar who had lived through the past weeks of terror wrote: “My alarmed spirit has begun to settle. Within the last ten days officials high and low are once again in the Chang’an market. It is just like old times.” In Beijing, at least, the interregnum was finally over and the new cycle had fully begun.

283 Xu, Yubian jiliü, p. 18a. Qing official sources hyperbolically claimed that the new imperial edicts had altogether laid the minds of the people to rest. “The officials and soldiers are greatly delighted. All praised our dynasty as being humane and righteous. Its reputation would resound for ten thousand generations.” Shizu shilu, 5:52b.

284 Xu, Yubian jiliü, p. 18b. The marketplace, incidentally, was filled with imperial brocades stolen from the palace by hoodlums (“sticks” or gun) who sold the colorful robes to Manchu soldiers. The excited bannermen paid up to two months of their rations for the clothing. Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:9b.

285 A few days after they entered Beijing, the Manchus had several officials station themselves at the Chengtian Gate to take down the names of all former Ming officials and invite them to resume their posts. “At that all of the renowned dukes and great ministers began to destroy the bandits’ registers; moreover, they tumultuously danced with joy.” Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:8b.
The Nanjing Loyalist Regime

The glory of Ming moved south for a space,
And the heirs of disaster flourished like flame.
In courts of idleness patterned on Jin’s last ruler,
Little did they heed the threatening northern bows.
Beauties with eyebrows like moth antennae
Were chosen to sing *The Swallow Letter*.
Leading musicians and dancing-masters
Plied their skills for the royal delectation.
Verses in voluptuous late-Tang styles,
Robes and coronets of the early southern courts.
In a hundred boudoirs, jewelled mirrors
Reflected the fondness of regal amours.
Warning beacons beyond the walls
Burned unseen by the revellers
On gilden barges off the Isles of Egrets.


During the last days of the Chongzhen Emperor’s reign in Beijing, the one remaining hope of many officials was to shift the seat of dynastic authority to the ancillary capital (*pei jing*) of Nanjing and perpetuate the Ming there. Acting as a kind of shadow govern-

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1 This is strongly stressed by chroniclers like Wen Bing. Kunshan yimin ningren Gu Yanwu (Wen Bing), *Sheng’an benji (Jiayi shian)*, p. 33 (hereafter cited as
ment, the administration in Nanjing ostensibly stood ready to support Ming remnants in the north should the rebels succeed in taking Beijing.\(^2\) Chen Zilong, who had been transferred to the Bureau of Appointments in the Nanjing Ministry of Personnel after a tour of duty in Shaoxing, had already managed to persuade the governor of Nanjing, Zheng Xuan, to send a secret memorial to Beijing with a plan to bring the heir apparent to Nanjing to prepare for a Southern Ming regime.\(^3\) And other Jiangnan literati, coordinated by Qi Biaojia, had begun to build up naval forces along the lower Yangzi in preparation for the defense of the south.\(^4\)

The efforts to get the heir apparent to Nanjing came, of course,

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\(^1\) Wen Bing, *Jiayi shian*. According to Lynn Struve (personal communication), Wen Bing’s chronicle is colorful but opinionated, and not always fully reliable.

\(^2\) Nanjing functionally served as a military base to defend the Jiangnan area and as the provincial capital of Nanzhili, which fed the northern metropolitan area. Although a skeleton bureaucracy duplicated most of the capital structure in Beijing, it lacked the capital guard system as well as the energetic vitality of the northern seat of state. The most important officials in the Nanjing government were the Minister of Finance, the Minister of War, the Grand Commandant, and the Commissioner-in-Chief for River Control. Lynn Struve, "The Southern Ming," p. 5; Christian Murck, "Chu Yun-ming and Cultural Commitment in Su-chou," p. 72.

\(^3\) In his new capacity Chen was to have returned to Zhejiang, where he had been organizing the construction of fortifications and the stockpiling of ammunition. However, before he could do that, communications were cut between Beijing and Nanjing. Unaware that Beijing had fallen to Li Zicheng on April 25, 1644, he returned to Songjiang to care for his sick grandmother and make plans with his friends to prevent the capture of the crown prince. William S. Atwell, "Ch'en Tzu-lung," pp. 112–114, 125–127. Chen proposed to organize a special naval force of 10,000 men to sail north to Tianjin and there meet the heir apparent, who would then be ferried back to central China, avoiding the difficult and dangerous overland trip. Chu Hua, *Hucheng beikao*, 4:11; Wang Yunwu, ed., *Da Qing yitongzhi*, p. 958 (84:11b).

\(^4\) Jerry Paul Dennerline, "The Mandarins and the Massacre of Chia-ting," pp. 237–240; idem, *The Chia-ting Loyalists*, 256–261. According to Lynn Struve (personal communication), Qi Biaojia was informed of these plans but at the time did not have the ability or official position to coordinate the activities effectively. Even after becoming Suzhou *xunfu*, he did not really succeed in integrating volunteer auxiliary forces with regulars.
to naught. The preparations for a southern loyalist regime, however, were not wasted. On May 18, three weeks after Li Zicheng had captured Beijing, the shocking news of the Shun victory and the Chongzhen Emperor’s death reached the southern capital. At the time, there appeared to be only two alternatives available to the officials serving in the south: the “hairknot” of the Taoist eremite versus the “tassel” of an official in service. The leading ministers in Nanjing lost no time in choosing to remain in office. Indeed, sixteen major officials pledged themselves to “call for a righteous uprising in the empire to succor the king” (qin wang).

Shi Kefa and the Warlords

The most important member of this group was the Nanjing Minister of War, Shi Kefa. Shi, who came originally from Henan, was one of those rare civil officials who also had a demonstrated talent for military organization and strategy. Although little is known of

5 Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 1–3. Farther south, the news reached Fuzhou on June 25. “In the countryside among young and old, male and female, there was not a single person who did not cry.” Haiwai sanren, Rongcheng jiwen, p 3.

6 Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 33.

7 Peng Sunyi, Pingkou zhi, 10:8a. These officials were: Shi Kefa, Minister of War; Gao Hongtu, Minister of Finance; Cheng Zhu, Minister of Works; Zhang Shenyuan, Censor-in-Chief; Lü Daqi, Vice-Minister of War; Jiang Yueguang, Chancellor of the Hanlin Academy; He Yingrui, Chief Minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifice; Liu Shizhen, Prefectural Governor of Yingtian; Zhu Zhichen, Chief Minister of the Court of State Ceremonial; Yao Sixiao, Assistant Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud; Li Zhan, Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny of the Ministry of Personnel; Luo Wanxiang, Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny of the Ministry of Finance; Guo Weijin, Censor; Chen Liangbi, Censor; Mi Shoutu, Censor; Zhou Yuantai, Censor; and Zhu Guochang, Imperial Family. These names constitute a well-known list, collected in several sources, and given in identical form in Ibid., 10:8a; and Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 33.

8 By the end of the Ming period, the most important officials in Nanjing were the Minister of War, the Grand Commandant, the Commissioner-in-Chief for River Control, and the Minister of Finance. Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 4.
Shi's father, the family itself had members belonging to the Embroidered Uniform Guard. As a young student, Shi Kefa was patronized by the Donglin martyr Zuo Guangdou. He himself passed his aspirant's examination in 1620, the juren in 1626, and the jinshi in 1628. Described in the Ming shi as a short man "with dark features and brilliant sparkling eyes," Shi Kefa's first post was criminal magistrate of Xi'an. His forthright and honest distribution of special relief funds to famine-suffering inhabitants of Yan'an in 1631 earned him an excellent reputation in Beijing, where he was selected to serve from 1632 to 1634 as a financial expert and bureau director in the Ministry of Finance.

In 1635, as rebellions spread into central China, the Chongzhen Emperor appointed Lu Xiangsheng grand coordinator of the provinces of Henan, Shandong, Huguang, and Sichuan. Lu, who was mainly concerned with containing Zhang Xianzhong's rebels, had Shi Kefa named his assistant delegate (fushi) to oversee the towns of Zezhou and Anqing, and to prevent the rebels from

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9 Shi Kefa's grandfather, Yingyuan, had held the juren degree and served as a magistrate. Kefa's father, Congzhi, held a xiuce degree. A grand-uncle, an uncle, and two cousins were all enrolled in the Embroidered Uniform Guard. Zhu Wenzhang, Shi Kefa zhuan, pp. 97–98. Shi Kefa was born either in 1601 (as is argued in Joseph Liu, "Shi Ke-fa et le contexte politique et social de la Chine au moment de l'invasion mandchoue") or in 1602 (as is more convincingly argued in Shi Kefa zhuan, pp. 99–106).

10 For a well researched though sometimes overly imaginative account of Shi's relationship with Zuo Guangdou, see Zhu, Shi Kefa zhuan, pp. 1–7. According to some accounts, Shi secretly visited the famous Donglin martyr in jail just before his death, and received Zuo Guangdou's instructions to carry on the mission of the Donglin. Xie Guozhen, Ming-Qing zhi ji dangshe yundong kao, pp. 67–68.

11 Zhang Tingyu et al., comps., Ming shi (Guofang yanjiuyuan), p. 3076 (hereafter cited as Ming shi). His portrait in the shrine to his honor in Yangzhou shows an almost simian face: broad nostrils, protruding ears, thick lips, and deeply furrowed cheeks. Hardly a handsome face, it is a brooding and commanding one. Zhu, Shi Kefa zhuan, frontispiece.

12 This and the following biographical information on Shi Kefa is drawn mainly from Zhang et al., Ming shi (Guofang yanjiuyuan), p. 3076; Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, pp. 651–652; Zhu, Shi Kefa zhuan, pp. 8–79; and Joseph Liu, "Shi Ke-fa," pp. 1–40.
crossing the Yangzi River. Thus, Shi Kefa’s first major military assignment was directed against the entry of northern troops into the central river valleys of China. This concern with defensiveness soon became something of an obsession. Commanding only eight hundred troops, Shi was in the autumn and winter of 1635 placed in the position of repelling three major rebel attacks on Liuan in Anhui. The following year, he fought two more defensive battles near Taihu in Anhui, still holding rebels from crossing the river. But the real test of his military skills came the following year as he increasingly came under almost irresistible pressure from the major rebel armies, first of Ma Shouying, and then later of the Muslim Lao Huihui. Early in 1637, Ma Shouying and two other major rebel leaders attacked Tongcheng, and met Shi in battle about 10 li outside that city. Shi, by ruse, carried the day. But the pressure on Tongcheng was not relieved. Appointed governor of Anqing in the summer of 1637, Shi was charged with protecting what is now central Anhui from the Huguang rebels of Lao Huihui. Reinforced with ten thousand troops from General Zuo Liangyu, Shi Kefa managed to drive back the first major attack; but his defenses failed to hold in late November and early December when Lao Huihui launched an assault upon Shi Kefa’s headquarters at Qianshan. Many of Shi’s men were lost while he himself was almost killed in battle; and after the news of this defeat reached the capital, the Minister of War, Yang Sichang, called for the commander’s punishment.\(^\text{13}\)

However, Shi Kefa had already amassed a considerable reputation. Known especially for his willingness to endure the same hardships on the march as his own foot soldiers, Shi was said to have won the loyalty of his men and the respect of his officers. The emperor therefore chastized Shi verbally but gave him the opportunity to recover merit by future military victories. Shi was subsequently, in 1639, assigned to defend the province of Shandong against Manchu raiders from the north. Before he could repel these invaders, however, he first had to secure the western frontier of Shandong from rebels also trying to enter the province. Thrice he

\(^{13}\) On Shi’s regional command at Anqing, see Dennerline, “Chia-ting,” p. 189.
defeated major rebel contingents before being able to turn and attack the Manchus. As he approached Ji’nan, the Manchus withdrew, slaughtering the hapless inhabitants but giving Shi enough of a victory to ensure his reinstatement.

Shi Kefa’s treatment at the hands of the Chongzhen Emperor was unusually clement. The emperor was notorious for the quickness with which he threw defeated commanders into political prison. In this case, his bounteousness appears to have aroused profound gratitude in Shi Kefa. This feeling was intensified by Shi
Kefa's own extreme sorrow at the passing away of his father, who had died of illness in 1639. The son, it is said, tried to starve himself to death and nearly went mad with grief; and he may well have transferred some of the intensity of his feelings for his father to his father-ruler, the emperor.\(^\text{14}\)

After observing nearly three years of mourning, Shi was in 1641 made Vice-Minister of Finance and named to replace Zhu Dadian as supreme commander in charge of grain transport from Nanjing to Beijing and as grand coordinator of the Huai'an area. Then, in 1643, Shi Kefa was named Minister of War in Nanjing. In this post he had tried to make preparations for the relief of Beijing as military affairs worsened in the winter of that year.\(^\text{15}\) On January 16, 1644, for instance, a memorial from Shi to the Chongzhen Emperor explained that the Southern Army under his command contained only eight thousand soldiers. He proposed to improve their training and then bring the grand total (which included both land and naval forces) up to a muster of twelve thousand.\(^\text{16}\) At the same time he urged that other tidu in the empire recruit and maintain their own troops in the same manner, proposing in effect the creation of gubernatorial armies under the command of a civil elite and devoted to the protection of the emperor.\(^\text{17}\) This was precisely what Shi Kefa himself did when the call went forth from Beijing to come to the rescue of the Chongzhen Emperor. Shi rallied his troops, swearing an oath with them to "sucor the king," and proceeded to head north, actually crossing the Yangzi River at Pukou before receiving word that the capital had fallen and that it was too late to save his ruler. He thereupon changed into mourning dress and returned with his men to Nanjing, where he convoked the meeting of ministers who now pledged their fealty to the Ming dynasty.\(^\text{18}\)

15 Shi reorganized Nanjing's military forces in December, impeaching sinecurists and initiating plans for new units. Wan Yan, Chongzhen changbian, p. 23.
16 Ibid., p. 43.
17 Ibid., pp. 56-57. In his new capacity, Shi also recommended several officials to court as military leaders, notably Wu Sheng and Zhang Haoran. He considered the former, now that Hong Chengchou was supposed dead, one of the best commanders in the empire. Yang De'en, Shi Ke-fa nianpu, p. 33.
18 Yang, Shi Ke-fa nianpu, p. 34; Zhu, Shi Ke-fa zhuan, p. 28.
Shi and the others realized that they themselves did not possess enough military strength to hold out alone against the northern rebels. The assembled officials therefore drafted a despatch which read:

The southern capital joins with the commanders from the four quarters. The *sima* (military commanders) possess the standard of the nine chastisements. Righteousness will not let us share the same sky [with those who killed the emperor]. Array the troops and set a day to carry out this great enterprise, genuinely repudiating our common enemy.\(^\text{19}\)

The announcement was carefully designed to appeal to those military leaders in the empire who could identify themselves with the ancient term *sima*, which evoked the idealized military commanders of classical antiquity.\(^\text{20}\) The appeal was therefore quite generalized, being broadly addressed to all of the commanders (*shuai*) of the four quarters (*si fang*).\(^\text{21}\) This included both local military magnates and regional warlords. As soon as the despatch was issued, the Nanjing signatories sent emissaries into the Huai River valley in search of “righteous braves” under the command of the magnates (*hao*) north of the Yangzi. At the same time they also sought the allegiance of the Ming generals whose armies lay between them and the Shun regime in the north.\(^\text{22}\)

Of the latter there were four warlords whose armies—each numbering about 150,000 fearsome men-at-arms who were often a scourge to the peasant population they were supposed to pro-

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19 Cited in Xie Guozhen, *Nannming shilüe*. Later, however, leaders of volunteer forces were told that irregulars were not to be mobilized (Struve, personal communication, citing *Mingji nanlüe*, j. 4 [1:115–118]). p. 48.

20 The term is taken from the section on the Xia dynasty’s *da sima*, “chief military commander,” in the *Rites of Zhou*. The *sima* were those who both controlled armed forces and held to the proper standards (*jing*) of conduct. It was they who understood the nine rules of chastisement (*fa*), and especially the last which stated that, “If [there are those who create] disorder within and without and carry on like beasts, then they must be exterminated.”

21 The term “four quarters” is used in the *Book of Songs* to mean “all the people of Xia.”

tect—were already in or just about to enter the central Huai River region.23 One was Liu Zeqing, the quick-tempered and politically ambitious general who had served as regional commander of the major Ming garrison in Shandong. When Chongzhen asked Liu to join his other major generals in a march upon Beijing to rescue the court from Li Zicheng, Liu had ignored the order and instead had turned south, plundering his way through Linqing and reaching Fengyang, where his men were reported to be killing many of the local population.24

Huang Degong, the second major military figure in Jiangbei, had much better control over his army than did Liu. A superb swordsman raised in Liaoning, he had enrolled as a youth in the Liaoyang garrison and risen steadily through the officers’ ranks, winning victories in central China during the 1630s. In 1641 he was made regional commander of Fengyang. When Zhang Xianzhong’s army attacked Tongcheng, Huang drove off the rebel, after a great victory at Qianshan in 1642. Shortly after this, Huang Degong was transferred to garrison Luzhou (Hefei) in central Anhui.25

The third commander was Liu Liangzuo. A former bandit from Beizhili, Liu had joined the imperial army and fought against the rebel Luo Rucai in 1637. In 1642 he served under Huang Degong against Zhang Xianzhong, and was now also in the Fengyang area with his own army, said to number 100,000 troops.26

23 For a moving description of the devastation wrought in the Huai River area in 1643 by Ming troops, see Jin Sheng’s correspondence in Jin Sheng, Jin Zhongjie gong wenji, pp. 12–14.
24 Yao Guangxiao et al., eds., Ming shilu, 17:9a, 13b (hereafter Ming shilu); Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 41; Huaicheng jishi, p. 133; Ying Tingji, Qing lin xie, p. 3a; Xia Yunyi, Xu xing cuan lu, p. 68. Liu Zeqing, while a young student attending the local examinations, killed a lictor with his bare fists during a brawl.
26 Er chen zhan, 7:26–27; Ming shi, pp. 3022, 3066. Liu Liangzuo was regarded as a very able commander. Called “Dappled Horse Liu” (Hua ma Liu) because he rode to battle on a piebald mount, he was illiterate and avaricious. Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:13a.
Gao Jie was the fourth, and in some ways most capable, of the military commanders north of the Yangzi. A former lieutenant of Li Zicheng, he had stolen his chief’s wife and so had surrendered to the Ming in 1635 to avoid retribution. Becoming an assistant brigade-general, he and his men had composed the vanguard of Sun Chuanting’s forces fighting against Li, and when Sun was killed at Tongguan in 1643, Gao Jie had increased the size of his personal army even more. In 1644, however, he had—like Liu Zeqing—proved a fickle ally when Beijing began to fall. Instead of moving his army forward to check Li Zicheng’s advance, Gao Jie had turned his own men loose to plunder Zezhou in southeastern Shanxi, and then moved south toward Xuzhou in the end of May and beginning of June, 1644.  

The approach of Gao Jie’s soldiers filled the inhabitants of the cities of Xuzhou and Huai’an with terror. In Xuzhou itself, there had been considerable turmoil since the fall of Beijing. The official in charge of Xuzhou, Huang Xixian, had in fact abandoned the city to a Shun appointee, Wu Su. Wu, a jinshi, had been accepted with deference by the local officials and gentry when he arrived on June 3, 1644, although one local poet had lamented, “How can the empire have upright men and scholars who still pay courtesy calls on bandits?” One reason was the gentry’s fear of disorder. To the west of Xuzhou, at Dangshan on the border with

27 Ming shilu, Chongzhen, 17:1b; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 34; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 410–411; Huaicheng jishi, p. 133.
28 Ying, Qing lin xie, p. 3a. They were also fearful of Shun officers who threatened to return with Chuang troops if cities did not submit to them. (Struve, personal communication.)
29 Xuzhou was repeatedly attacked by rebels in the last years of the Ming. In the autumn of 1637, an army of 100,000 peasant rebels from Suzhou, 70 kms. to the south, had attacked the city. In 1640, the city was briefly captured and members of the gentry killed. Luo Zhenyu, Wan Nianshao xiansheng nianpu, wanpu 6a, 7a, and wanpu 2b–3a.
30 Yan Ermei, Baichun shan ren ji, 10:41b. Although Xuzhou was turned over by Huang, the nearby river garrison of Fangcun refused to surrender; and its assistant prefect, the famous writer and poet Ling Mengchu, died heroically at the hands of the rebels after mounting a spirited defense. L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, pp. 930–933.
Henan, local gentrymen like Wang Tingdui had organized their own militia against "deranged fanatics" (kuang tu) and would later welcome Qing troops. In Xuzhou city itself, Wu Su tried to calm the populace and made several trips into the countryside, seeking support from the local gentry, until news reached him that the Shun regime in Beijing had fallen too. By June 28, Wu Su himself had evacuated the city with his own troops, leaving it nearly completely exposed to condottieri like Gao Jie.

With Xuzhou undefended, the rich cities farther to the south—Huai'an and Yangzhou—were all the more exposed to the many armies milling around the Huai River region. But their local leaders already had become vigorously engaged in local defense measures. Credit for this rested mainly with the governor at Huai'an, Lu Zhenfei. Governor Lu was a prominent civil official, noted for his integrity and courage, who had become expert in military affairs. From his earliest post as a magistrate, he had led local defense units against rebels, and in 1632 he had despatched Zheng Zhi long against the pirate Liu Xiang, defeating him. An outspoken man, Lu Zhenfei had been one of those who impeached Zhou Yanru in 1631; and he later had disagreed with Wen Tiren, angering the emperor who ordered him transferred to Henan. In the autumn of 1643, however, he had been named viceroy in charge of the Grand Canal grain shipments, as well as governor of the Huaiyang area.

When Beijing fell, Lu Zhenfei resolved to transform Huai'an into a major Ming stronghold. He promptly declared martial law, rallied the populace, and assigned officials under his charge individual responsibility for the defense of different parts of the city. At the same time he encouraged the recruitment of local militia (tuanlian xiangbing). East of Huai'an, in Haizhou, where there had been pirate raids since the years 1511–1512, local militia were quite common. But this was not so in the Huai'an area, and Lu

32 Yan, Baichun shan ren ji, 10:41b–42.
33 Ming shi, p. 3103.
34 Peng, Pingkou zhi, 10:8a; Huaicheng jishi, pp. 133–135.
35 Xu Zhaochun, ed., Jiaqing Haizhou Zhili zhouzhi, p. 44. Later in Chinese his-
Zhenfei had to devise militia training programs. Under his authority, each of the seventy-two wards (fang) of Huai’an was ordered to “assemble righteous troops” to be drilled by two shengyuan, one of whom was to be given the title of ward chief (fang zhang). These yi bing (righteous troops) were to be used for night patrols in the city, and kept in a state of readiness for urban defense.\(^{36}\) Their fighting spirit was to be maintained by a firm opposition to any who had weakened and supported the Shun regime. The notables of Xuzhou may have accepted a Shun appointment, but Lu Zhenfei would have none of that in Huai’an. During the weeks after the fall of Beijing, he rallied the local gentry while his “righteous troops,” said to number twenty thousand, beheaded “spurious officials” (wei guan) in the Huai area.\(^{37}\)

Under Lu Zhenfei, Huai’an was thus turned into a haven for Ming loyalists, and especially for officials and nobles fleeing from the north. Lu greeted these refugees warmly, but neither he nor the residents of Huai’an had any intention of accepting the armies

\(^{36}\) Wen Bing, *Jiayi shian*, p. 34.

\(^{37}\) Ji Liuqi, *Mingji nanlue*, pp. 4, 78–80; Wen Bing, *Jiayi shian*, p. 53. Lu Zhenfei’s determination to punish officials who served the Shun was matched by an equal conviction on the part of the regional inspector Wang Xie, also stationed at Huai’an. On May 6, Wang Xie unhesitatingly put to death the “spurious” prefect sent from Beijing to take over Huai’an, and thereafter “gentry and commoners lost their fear,” and fully trusted Wang and Lu Zhenfei to protect them from the rebels. Shortly after this, an even more important Shun official came to Huai’an to assume control. This was Lü Bizhou (*jinshi*, 1628) who had joined Li Zicheng in Henan, and was one of the key figures in the Shun Ministry of War. Lü came bearing an edict which ordered the local officials to recognize his authority. Instead, he was seized and interrogated by Wang, who accused him of being a “rebellious minister and unfilial son.” When Lü refused to answer Wang Xie’s questions about Li Zicheng, Wang—who had once been a student of his prisoner—turned Lü Bizhou over to Lu Zhenfei. On May 20, Lu had a firing squad shoot arrows one by one into Lü—each hit being rewarded with a piece of silver—and then ordered the corpse hacked to pieces. This kind of public execution was an extremely popular spectacle in Huai’an, consolidating Lu Zhenfei’s hold over the city. Wen Bing, *Jiayi shian*, pp. 34–35.
of Liu Zeqing, Liu Liangzuo, or especially Gao Jie. On June 10, when word came that Gao Jie had begun to move southward to take Yangzhou, Lu Zhenfei immediately despatched his regional vice-commanders to defend key points in the area around Huai’an. Zhou Shifeng was sent to garrison Sizhou, Shi Erjing to Qingkou, and Jin Shenghuan to Xuzhou.

Yet just as Lu Zhenfei was stabilizing the Huai’an area by arming it against these peripatetic armies, the invading regional commanders were themselves becoming viewed both as a necessary support for a Southern Ming restoration, and as important allies in the struggle then developing in Nanjing over succession to the Ming throne. For, immediately after issuing the initial despatch summoning the support of the commanders of the four quarters, the high officials led by Shi Kefa found themselves involved in a confused competition for control of the Southern Ming capital. This political conflict took place between May 17 and June 2 over the issue of succession to the vacant Ming throne. Like the succession struggle which had sparked the initial Donglin struggles, it was to create a fatal cleavage within the loyalist court.

The Ming Imperial Nobility

The succession struggle occurred both because the sixteen sui Ming heir apparent (Zhu Cilang) was presumed dead in Beijing and there was no knowledge of what had happened to his two younger brothers; and because—even though there was an estab-
lished bloodline for the succession—there were a number of Ming princes who legitimately could have been called upon to assume the throne under exigent circumstances on the principle of worthiness. The designation of imperial kinsmen was not at this time a very select title, if only because of the geometric proliferation of the imperial Zhu family. The Hongwu Emperor had engendered 26 sons and 16 daughters; by the 1550s, his descendants numbered 19,611 people; by 1594, there were at least 62,000 imperial kinsmen registered throughout the empire; and during the 1600s, more than 80,000 people were on the imperial clan rolls. Because the Ming founder had forbidden his descendants to take examinations for public office or to engage in trade, their only legal source of livelihood was prebends. These stipends varied, both according to rank and over time. A prince of the blood (whose title was inherited by his eldest son) received 50,000 piculs of rice in the early years of the Ming. By the beginning of the 15th century, however, the proliferation had placed such a burden on the public fisc that this had to be reduced to 10,000 piculs. By the 16th century more money was being spent on the throne’s kinsmen than on regular officials’ salaries. Gradually, this item alone amounted to more than the government’s total tax revenue. In 1562, for example, Shanxi province had a total of 1.52 million piculs of grain in its granaries while the pensions of kinsmen in that province added up to 2.13 million piculs. In that same year a censor pointed out that while the empire could supply the capital with 4 million piculs of

42 A distinction should be made between the imperial nobility (huangshi guizu) and the meritorious nobility (xunghui). The former were imperial kinsmen, and the latter were meritorious officials and relatives-in-law of the emperor. The aristocracy was only titularly enfeoffed. Wang Yuquan, “Mingdai xunghui dizhu de dianzhu,” p. 91; Ray Huang, Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China, p. 31.
43 Gu Cheng, “Mingdai de zongshi,” p. 5. Crawford gives a much higher figure. In 1594 there were said to be 160,000 imperial kinsmen. Robert Bruce Crawford, “The Life and Thought of Chang Chü-cheng,” p. 35.
grain, the princely establishment required 8.5 million piculs of allowances for regular subsistence.\textsuperscript{45} Not only did this add a steadily increasing burden upon taxpayers, but the increase in the number of heirs made it impossible to pay the lower ranks a sum high enough to subsist, so that clansmen tended to draw loans upon their pensions in advance and sink deeply into debt.\textsuperscript{46} Even higher-ranking kinsmen lived in a state of genteel poverty, letting their palaces run down, or frittering away their lives in debauchery and drink.\textsuperscript{47}

The Catholic fathers who visited China in the 16th century were especially struck by the size of this often degenerate aristocracy.\textsuperscript{46} Fr. Gaspar da Cruz, for example, noted the presence in Guilin (where a number of Ming princes had been exiled after rebelling against the emperor) of thousands of imperial clan households behind red gates.\textsuperscript{49} From the point of view of the European onlooker standing outside those pretentious doorways, seeing the towers and streets within the compound, these grand palaces were actually lacquered and gilded prisons for their inhabitants.

\textsuperscript{45} In Linfen county in Shanxi, the largest share of revenue in 1591 went to princes and imperial kinsmen (48.5\% of the land-tax revenue in grain and 39.2\% of the land tax revenue in silver). The second largest cost was subsidies to army frontier posts (37.1\% in grain and 36.2\% in silver). Huang, \textit{Taxation}, p. 178.

\textsuperscript{46} Winston Lo, "K'ai-feng," pp. 26–27.

\textsuperscript{47} Albert Chan, "The Decline and Fall of the Ming Dynasty," pp. 40–48; Crawford, "Chang Chü-cheng," p. 37. By the Chongzhen period, many imperial kinsmen were so poor that they could not afford to get married. He, \textit{Anhui tongzhi}, p. 2049 (179:5).

\textsuperscript{48} Matteo Ricci, \textit{China in the Sixteenth Century}, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{49} "A standing procedure established in the very early years of the dynasty had demanded that all imperial princes including the emperor's uncles, cousins, younger brothers, and sons, except for the heir apparent, be permanently removed from the capital upon reaching maturity. They were given territorial titles, palatial mansions, and annual stipends for life. But settled in the provinces, they could never enter into politics; and without the emperor's explicit approval they could not even travel. The fundamental idea was to free the monarch from interference by cadet branches of the imperial family." Ray Huang, \textit{1587, A Year of No Significance}, p. 18. See also Ricci, \textit{Sixteenth Century}, p. 59; Huang, \textit{Taxation}, p. 31.
In short, that he has pastimes of every kind within his gates, for he can never leave his estate, both because of the greatness of his condition, as because this is a law of the kingdom, since the king wishes thereby to secure his kingdom by depriving those of the blood royal of any opportunity to revolt.\(^{50}\)

Galeote Pereira also noticed the number of large houses in Guilin behind red gates, and learned that the inhabitants lived off the emperor’s monthly allowances, and according to rumor grew fat from excessive food and drink.\(^{51}\) And later in the century, the Jesuit Father Trigault reported that the imperial kinsmen’s households numbered over sixty thousand, and emphasized both their public uselessness and their private threat to the monarch.

Removed, as they are, from all public office and administration, they have developed into a leisured class given to loose living and to insolence. The king guards himself against these people as he would against personal enemies, knowing full well that they have their own system of espionage. Everyone of them is obliged to live in a designated city which he is not permitted to leave without the king’s consent, under heaviest penalty, and no one of them is even allowed to live in the royal cities of Pekin or Nankin.\(^{52}\)

Efforts were made to provide the less noble kinsmen with an official career. After 1595, those surnamed Zhu were encouraged to participate in the examination system, though only a minuscule number of the ones who participated were actually successful.\(^{53}\) The rest continued to live mainly in poverty, while the few noble

\(^{50}\) C. R. Boxer, ed., *South China in the Sixteenth Century*, p. 108.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., pp. 40–41.

\(^{52}\) L. J. Gallagher, S. J., *The China that Was*, p. 146.

\(^{53}\) According to one study, only two imperial kinsmen actually passed the higher exams and became magistrates. James B. Parsons, “The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy,” pp. 397–398. Members of the bureaucracy vociferously opposed the policy of allowing imperial clansmen to assume civil official roles, fearing that they would quickly monopolize higher administration. That clansmen did not succeed in the exams even when permitted to take them was probably due to these bureaucrats’ sense of alarm. (Struve, personal communication.)
princes at the top remained under perennial imperial suspicion of conspiring against the throne.

The higher-ranking princes and their households (wáng fǔ) were originally intended to be both a counterweight to the gentry clans and wealthy households (fù hùi) of the early Ming, and a kind of military defense against the Mongols. The Ming founder had enfeoffed his own sons in areas considered outside of regular provincial administrative units. Nine of the princes were placed along the territory bordering what is now Mongolia, commanding anywhere from three to eighty thousand men. Within their territories, the princes could build their own palaces and appoint their own officials. However, their control over officials within their fiefs was eventually challenged by the Jianwen Emperor (r. 1399–1402), who was alarmed by the independent power of the princes. His concern was quite justified, for shortly after his enthronement the emperor was overthrown by his own uncle, the Prince of Yan, who became the Yongle Emperor (r. 1403–1424) and who transferred the main capital of the Ming to Beijing (Yanjing), which had originally been part of his private fief. Equally conscious of the danger of revolt, the Yongle Emperor proceeded to erect new rules to control his brothers and nephews, placing the imperial princes on pensions and stipends in an effort to diminish their individual financial powers. The size of their military forces was restricted, and the powers of the centrally-appointed administrators (chāngshì) within each princely establishment were increased.

Nevertheless, the most powerful princes in the realm continued to possess the capacity to revolt, and during the early 16th century there were two major uprisings—the Prince of Anhua’s conspiracy in 1510, and the Prince of Ning’s rebellion in 1519—that had to be suppressed by imperial forces. These rebellions led to increased strictures against the princely establishments’ possessing private guards and military retainers, and thus to the gilded imprisonment that foreign visitors observed during the late 1500s.

54 There were fifty princely households (wáng fǔ) established under the Ming. Twenty-eight of these lasted until the end of the dynasty. Li Longqian, “Míng-dài zhuangtian de fazhan he tedian,” p. 9.
55 Charles O. Hucker, The Ming Dynasty, p. 77.
Yet, rather paradoxically, the wealth of the princely households closest to the imperial throne gradually increased as, during this same period, there developed a consistent policy of confiscating the lands of political criminals (like the eunuch Cao Jixiang, who rebelled in 1561) and then transforming them into imperial estates (huang zhuang) for the emperor and his closest relatives.56

By the late 1500s, the policy of confiscation had been applied widely as well to commoners' lands. In fact, one might even argue that with the entrenchment of wealthy households in central and south China during the 16th century, the throne was beginning to lose its capacity or will to forcefully take over the lands of the gentry. Instead, late Ming emperors increasingly took the easier course of expropriating petty freeholders' lands. By the early 17th century, the holdings of imperial princes (as opposed to penurious lower-ranking imperial kinsmen starving in the capital) were enormous. In 1605 the governor of Sichuan reported that seventy percent of the arable land in his province was in the hands of princes,

56 Crawford, "Chang Chü-cheng," pp. 15, 37; Le P. Louis Gaillard, Nankin d'alors et d'aujourd'hui, pp. 204–205; Charles O. Hucker, The Censorial System of Ming China, p. 37. During the early Ming, after the Mongols were expelled, the lands around Beijing were either granted to farmers who were already cultivating them or else given to peasants as properties free forever from taxation. During the 15th century these lands were taken over by temples, members of the nobility, and military officers, but they continued to retain their tax-exempt status. In addition, eunuchs began to receive land grants early in the 1440s, often in conjunction with the restoration of taxes-free temples in the Western Hills. By 1489, according to one memorialist, almost one-sixth of the taxable land in the metropolitan region had been awarded as estate land. The creation of imperial estates also dated from the early Ming, but their extent widened vastly under the Zhengde Emperor (r. 1506–1521), whose extravagant tastes were met by the creation of estate holdings totalling 37,595 qing (568,812 acres) in the metropolitan area alone. During the reign of the Jiajing Emperor, the throne was persuaded to return 26,693 qing either to private individuals or to the state. But under Wanli, the expropriations began once again. The emperor awarded lands lavishly to his favorites, and Wanli's eunuch tax collectors and bailiffs considerably expanded the imperial estates. William S. Atwell, "The Transformation of Wen-she in Ming Times," pp. 6–7; James Peter Geiss, "Peking under the Ming," pp. 53–54, 94–96, 101, 195–197. For a description of the rather grand palace of the Prince of Zhou in Kaifeng during the late Ming, see Winston Lo, "K'ai-feng," pp. 28–29.
twenty percent was farmed by military colonies, and only ten per-
cent was tilled by commoners. 57

During the late Ming the nobility as a whole lacked the social
coherence even to pretend to be an aristocratic estate. 58 But while
those surnamed Zhu and merely registered as members of the im-
perial clan were as numerous as they often were poor, the few
closest relatives of the emperor could amass great wealth and influence.
The Wanli Emperor's (r. 1573–1619) favorite son was Zhu
Changxun, born of the emperor's most beloved concubine, Zheng
Guifei. For years, Madame Zheng intrigued to have her son named
crown prince even though he was a mere cadet. Most of the court
ministers (including many later associated with the Donglin Acad-
emy) opposed this, and the emperor in 1601 acceded to established
procedure and reluctantly named his first-born son (the future
Guangzong) his heir. 59 To recompense Zhu Changxun for his dis-
appointment, however, Wanli enfeoffed his favorite as the Prince
of Fu in the ancient capital of Luoyang. To support Zhu Chang-
xun, the emperor also commanded that 40,000 qing (over 600,000
acres) of farmlands be turned over to the new prince. 60 Since that

57 Chan, "Decline," pp. 150–154; Xu Daling, "Shilun Ming houqi de Donglin
dang ren," p. 3. See also Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, p. 236.
Wanli period sources report a total of 7,268,691 mu of land as belonging
to imperial, princely, or noble estates. Li Longqian, "Mingdai zhuangtian,"
p. 67. The peasants who cultivated the estates of the imperial and meritorious
nobility were: (1) tenants (dianhu) bestowed by the emperor—i.e., peasants
who were on the land at the time that it was turned over to the noble or
prince; (2) households occupying the appropriated land and informally made
permanent tenants of the new owner; (3) people who had commended them-
selves to the noble in exchange for protection; (4) tenants who were invited to
work for the nobility; and (5) people whose service obligations attached them
to the household of the noble, who often held military rank. Wang Yuquan,

58 In order to avoid the development of a kind of consort aristocracy, the em-
peror's heirs chose their wives from among commoners. Such consort fam-
ilies, lacking a sense of noblesse oblige, were especially prone to corruption.
Public ambition, so to speak, gave way to private desire. Miyazaki Ichisada,


amount constituted a considerable portion of the cultivated acreage of the entire province, lands had to be confiscated from petty holders elsewhere, as well. In the end, a total of about 20,000 qing (300,000 acres) of commoners' fields (min tian) were expropriated in Henan, Shandong, and Huguang provinces. The Prince of Fu received in addition the confiscated lands of the former grand secretary Zhang Juzheng and special tea and salt concessions in Sichuan.61

The Prince of Fu consequently lived on a lavish scale. His expenses for singing girls (chang), which were his passion, exceeded 300,000 taels; and the construction cost of his official residence in Luoyang came to 280,000 taels, which was ten times the regular allowance for a prince's palace.62 To feed his luxurious tastes, his eunuchs continued to seize land at their own will; and the estates which resulted were said to be among the most harshly administered lands in China.63 While the prince swilled wine in the palace, his tenants starved to death in the famine-ridden countryside around Luoyang, and in Henan people were heard to say that "the former emperor squandered the empire to fatten the prince." When troops were sent across the Luo River to reinforce the imperial forces fighting the rebels, some in their ranks shouted: "There are millions in gold in the prince's palace, yet they command empty bellies like us to die at the bandits' (zei) hands."64

Shortly after that, in 1640, Li Zicheng's army entered the city of Luoyang. While the palace burned for three days, Li had the prince butchered, drank his blood, and fed the cooked remains to his

61 Zhang Tingyu et al., Ming shi (Zhonghua shuju), pp. 3649–3650; Atwell, "Wen-she," p. 8; Chan, "Decline," pp. 50–53; Elvin, Pattern, p. 236.
62 When the Prince of Fu's household was moved from Beijing to Luoyang in 1614, 1,172 boats were used to transport his retinue and goods. R. V. Des Forges, "Rebellion in the Central Plain," pp. 2–3.
63 Numerous reports from local magistrates in Shandong, Huguang, and Henan during the Wanli period emphasized the harsh burden which princely rents placed upon the peasant population. Princely households' rent collectors and bailiffs were notorious for their cruelty and ruthlessness. Gu, "Mingdai de zongshi," p. 11.
64 Zhang et al., Ming shi (Zhonghua shuju), p. 3650.
troops.\textsuperscript{65} The household of the Prince of Fu was almost entirely killed. However, his wife and a surviving son did manage to escape across the Yellow River to safety; and in 1643 that son, Zhu Yousong, was in turn named Prince of Fu by his grandfather, the Chongzhen Emperor.\textsuperscript{66}

This second Prince of Fu, who was typified by later historians as being "ignorant and irresolute" (\textit{an ruo}), was reputed to be as fond of wine and singing girls as his father had been. In fact, his reputation was so scandalous that it eventually compromised his candidacy as an imperial heir after the news of the Chongzhen Emperor's death reached the Southern Ming government in Nanjing.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{65} Erich Hauer, "Li Tze-ch'eng und Chang Hsien-chung," p. 465. Such bestiality was not uncommon. Of Zhang Xianzhong it was said: "He also had a craving for human flesh. After each person was dismembered in front of him and roasted, he would lift up several slices of meat [and eat them]. Also, when he destroyed Huangzhou, he ripped open all the functionaries in the city, and the women's fingernails dripped blood which flowed across [the ground]. After the dissection was finished, they were all crushed." Li Qing, \textit{Sanyuan biji, fushang}, 15a. Cannibalism was a metaphor for the age, regardless of one's station. If rebel leaders like Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong liked to drink the blood and eat the flesh of their victims, so did gentry leaders time and again speak of how members of the lower orders who had revolted all deserved to be eaten. In the chronicle of the Pan Mao uprising at Liyang, for example, the author wrote: "As for the flesh of that gang of [Pan] Mao's, eating it would not suffice [to assuage one's hatred]!" And later, when describing the way in which Pan and his men extorted money from wealthy households, he added: "Thereupon, everyone thought of eating Pan [Mao's] flesh." Zhou Tingying, \textit{Lai jiand jishi benmo}, p. 142.

\textsuperscript{66} Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, pp. 195–196. When the Chongzhen Emperor received news of the elder Prince of Fu's death, he summoned an audience and wept openly before the court, bemoaning the tragic fate of his favorite nephew. Li, \textit{Sanyuan biji, fuzhong}, 2b–3a.

\textsuperscript{67} Zhang et al., \textit{Ming shi} (Zhonghua shuju), p. 3651. Although hostile contemporary chroniclers frequently caricatured the Prince of Fu's sexual extravagances, he does seem to have had profligate tastes. Urged by his foster-mother (who was said to have been only a few years older than him and perhaps the object of more than just filial feelings) to get married after becoming Emperor in Nanjing, the Prince of Fu insisted that only Hangzhou women
The Succession Crisis

The first consideration of the Nanjing ministers, once they had pledged their oath to combat the rebels, was to unite their forces behind an imperial heir. As far as they knew, the sons of Chongzhen were either dead or in the enemy's hands. In the Huai River valley, however, a number of Ming princes, having abandoned their estates in Shandong and Henan, were seeking refuge with Governor Lu Zhenfei. Besides the Prince of Fu, the Princes of Zhou, Lu, and Chong had all arrived in Huai’an, fleeing the Shun rebels.68

Of these escaped princes, the most appealing to some influential officials in Nanjing was the Prince of Lu, who was thought to be the most respectable and conscientious of all the contenders.69 His candidacy especially drew the support of senior officials who were identified in the public's eye with the Donglin party: Vice-Minister of War Lü Daqi, Vice-Minister of Rites Qian Qianyi, Chief Censor Zhang Shenyan, and Hanlin Chancellor Jiang Yueguang.70

— noted for their beauty—would do. Imperial envoys to that fair city proceeded to abduct young girls, and when they failed to satisfy their ruler, the inhabitants of Suzhou, Jiaxing, and Shaoxing were ordered to select their finest young women for imperial consideration. Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng were said to have also presented the Prince of Fu with virgins bought by brothel owners in Nanjing to become prostitutes. According to one source, the Prince of Fu treated these young women sadistically, and one evening two died from his attentions during a drunken debauch. Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” pp. 104–105.

68 Ming shi, p. 3103.

69 He was a grandson of the Longqing Emperor, and a well known painter and calligrapher. During the 1630s, when rebels attacked the area in northwestern Henan where he was enfeoffed, he personally supervised local defenses there. Dennerline, “Chia-ting,” p. 236.

70 Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 7a. The candidacy of the Prince of Lu was also strongly supported by Zhou Biao, who was one of the primary instigators of the 1639 proclamation in Nanjing against Ruan Dacheng. In fact, Zhou Biao was one of the intermediaries directly in touch with the Prince of Lu. Later, Zhou was accused of being a member of Jiang Yueguang’s dang (party). Xu Zi, Xiaotian jizhuan, p. 206. The identification of Lu supporters with Donglin and Fushe members also seemed natural because it was believed that many “righteous” literati feared that the Prince of Fu would take revenge upon them for the
However, the Prince of Lu, who was an imperial nephew, had a weaker claim upon the throne than the Prince of Fu, who was the Wanli Emperor's immediate descendant. Thus, even though the Prince of Fu was said to be illiterate, avaricious, drunken, cruel, meddlesome, lustful, and unfilial, his line of descent was the most direct of any of the princes at hand.⁷¹ A conflict was bound to develop between those who wished to “use merit” and those who wanted to “use propinquity” to determine who would be the next emperor.⁷²

The leading advocate of propinquity was the supreme coordinator of Fengyang, Ma Shiying (jinshi 1619).⁷³ In 1632, while serving as governor of Xuanfù in the north, he was convicted of bribery and exiled to the frontier. Intercession by his classmate, Ruan

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Donglin partisans' opposition to his father's appointment as heir apparent. Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 3. The warlord Liu Zeqing later claimed that he had supported the Prince of Lu precisely because he was fearful of the criticism of the Donglin group if he did not. Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 2b.

⁷¹ Many thoughtful men argued that the Prince of Fu's claim was so strong that to deny it was to provoke a crisis which would provide the warlords with an opportunity to intervene in civil government and destroy them all. Ibid., 1a. For the inheritance rules of the Ming dynasty, laid out in the Hongwu Emperor's ancestral instructions, see David Harrison Shore, “Last Court of Ming China,” p. 15.

⁷² Ming shi, p. 3494; Xie, Nanning shilüe, p. 49; Li Jie, Ming shi, p. 196. The Prince of Fu was half-nephew to Chongzhen. There were three other princes nowhere near Nanjing following him in the royal line, and then the Prince of Lu in fifth place. Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 3. Proponents of propinquity could easily remind the Prince of Lu's supporters of the political and ideological issues raised when one ignored correct hereditary succession. The great ritual controversy of the Jiajing period (when the Ming emperor Shizong, nephew of his predecessor, replaced the dead emperor's spirit tablets with his father's), when so many officials had been purged, was only a little more than a century in the past. Carney T. Fisher, “The Great Ritual Controversy in the Age of Ming Shi-tsung,” passim. The Prince of Fu's proximity to Nanjing was also a primary consideration.

⁷³ At first, Ma Shiying did not really care which prince was selected and is said to have leaned toward Lu. When it became clear that the sentiment in Nanjing was beginning to favor Fu, Ma moved quickly to take advantage of the latter prince's physical “propinquity” and became his champion. (Struve, personal communication.)
Dacheng, later freed him from exile; and in 1642 he was appointed by Grand Secretary Zhou Yanru to the post at Fengyang, where he soon won great military merit for defeating rebel forces in Henan. As a major civil-military leader in the Huai River valley, he competed with Governor Lu Zhenfei for control of that zone. Learning on May 8 that the Prince of Fu had reached his rival’s refuge at Huai’an, Supreme Coordinator Ma invited the possible heir to the throne to join him in Fengyang, where he would attempt to champion his cause.

By late May, 1644, there were therefore two different contenders for the throne in Nanjing: the Prince of Lu, favored by Lü Daqi and most of the higher civil servants in Nanjing; and the Prince of Fu, supported by the Fengyang viceroy, Ma Shiyi. Military strength tilted the balance in favor of the latter. Ma Shiyi alone did not possess sufficient forces to decide the matter, but in the days after sending men and boats to take the Prince of Fu down to the Yangzi River, Ma had carefully cultivated the support of the warlords who had entered the Huai River valley from the north when Beijing fell. In short order, Gao Jie, Huang Degong, Liu Zeqing, and Liu Liangzuo all made it clear that they, too, favored

74 At this time, troops under Ma Shiyi’s command but out of his control raided territory occupied by Lu Zhenfei’s forces. Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 36; Struve, personal communication.
76 According to some contemporary observers, most of the gentry in Jiangbei and Jiangnan supported Shi Kefa and Jiang Yueguang, who in turn backed the Prince of Lu’s cause. Zhang Yi, Sou wen xu bi, 1:11a. Struve argues, however, that most of the gentry at that time had no idea what was going on, mainly hearing wild rumors and not receiving hard news until long after the events had occurred. Moreover, those who “supported Fu” actually were supporting the stability of adhering to objective criteria whereas, among those who later were charged with having “supported Lu,” many simply had dragged their feet about the Fu enthronement for fear that one of Chongzhen’s sons would show up. The number of men who actually pushed for Lu was really much smaller than later chroniclers would have their readers believe. (Struve, personal communication.) For a Marxist interpretation of the gentry’s position at this point, see Guo Songyi, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji yu Qing chu zhongyang jiquan de maodun ji qi fazhan he bianhua,” p. 123.
the Prince of Fu. Baldly speaking, then, the victory of the Prince of Fu in this competition between merit and propinquity can almost be seen as a military coup; and it is in this way that the Ming dynastic history tends to present the matter.

[In Nanjing] the court officials gathered to deliberate. The Supervising Secretary of the Ministry of Personnel, Li Zhan, detected [Ma] Shiying’s intention and argued directly with [Lü] Daqi. Shiying as well massed his troops from Luzhou and Fengyang to welcome the Prince of Fu and to proceed on to the river above [Nanjing]. None of the great officials dared speak. The prince’s accession was Shiying’s [act of] force (wang zhi li Shiying li ye). Of course, more than brute military strength was required for Ma to succeed in his plans to make Fu emperor without the actual use of force. He also had to cultivate allies within the Southern Ming government and to persuade the Nanjing Minister of War that Fu was the best choice under the circumstances.

There were allies enough to be found among the hereditary military nobles (xunchen) of the dynasty, of whom the most important were Earl Liu Kongzhao, Commissioner-in-Chief for River Control, and Earl Zhao Zhilong, Supreme Commander of

77 According to another, quite plausible version of these famous events by Chen Zhenhui, Ma Shiying and Shi Kefa initially broke the deadlock by agreeing upon the Prince of Gui, the uncle of the Chongzhen Emperor, as a compromise candidate. However, the prince was then in Guangxi, quite far from court; and, more important, when Ma Shiying returned to Fengyang he discovered that Gao Jie, Huang Degong, and Liu Liangzuo had been brought together by the eunuch Lu Jiude (who had formerly served the elder Prince of Fu) in support of the Prince of Fu. Realizing that he didn’t have the forces to oppose theirs, Ma therefore concealed his former commitment to Shi Kefa and agreed to join the covenant. Chen Zhenhui, Guojian qishi, pp. 53–54. See also Yang, Shi Kefa nianpu, p. 38; Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” pp. 56–58. For further details of Ma Shiying’s alliance with the regional military commanders, see Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 1; and Li, Ming shi, p. 197.

78 Ming shi, p. 3496. Crawford translates li as “effort,” but I prefer the sense of “force” which that word carries in classical Chinese. See Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” p. 40.
Capital Garrisons. These military aristocrats, descended from generals who had helped Zhu Yuanzhang found the Ming, represented the power of civilian bureaucrats. They saw in the Prince of Fu a patron, and in Ma Shiying a powerful ally to restore to them some of the power that had fallen from these families’ hands since the early years of the dynasty. While Liu Kongzhao and Zhao Zhilong drummed up support for the Prince of Fu at court, Ma Shiying wrote directly to the Minister of War Shi Kefa, arguing that Fu’s propinquity to the blood royal made him the best candidate. Shi rejoined by passing along a letter candidly describing some of Fu’s reputed faults, but at the same time the Minister of War also realized that without the support of Ma Shiying’s forces, plus his warlord allies, a loyalist regime in Nanjing would not survive for long. Shi Kefa was actually across the river in Pukou when the officials in Nanjing decided to stabilize the situation by choosing the Prince of Fu, but Shi’s acquiescence in the selection finally brought the succession crisis to an end. By the time the Ming prince reached the southern capital on June 4, the court ministers had already begun to repair the Wuying Palace for his habitation.

79 The hereditary military nobles controlled most of the guards around the southern capital. Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 10.
80 Ibid., p. 19; Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 1; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 36; Ming shi, p. 3081. For example, Liu Kongzhao was the descendant of Liu Ji (1311–1375), who had been one of Zhu Yuanzhang’s closest advisers. The earldom had been abolished for most of the 15th century, and then was restored to the Liu heirs in 1532. Li Wenzhi, Wan-Ming minbian, p. 936. Another aristocrat who supported Fu and Ma was Marquis Zhu Guobi. Xie Guozhen also makes much of the role of the eunuch director, Han Zanzhou. Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 49. These major supporters were later rewarded by Ma Shiying. Li Zhan was named Left Censor-in-Chief and Vice-Minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifice; Liu Kongzhao almost became a grand secretary; Zhao Zhilong was given the lucrative assignment of purchasing military supplies for the capital; and Zhu Guobi was elevated to a dukedom. Ming shi, pp. 3092, 3131; Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 4; Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 59. By this time, noble status was no more than a titular honor, carrying a special monetary stipend. Hucker, Ming Dynasty, pp. 52–53.
81 Tan, Guo que, pp. 6077–6078; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 36.
82 The latter decision was made on May 31. Ji, Mingji nanliüe, p. 48; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 36. See also Liu Xianting, Guangyang zaji, p. 49; Yao Jiaji,
Once Fu reached the walls of Nanjing, a procession of officials came, group by group, out the Guanyin Gate to greet the prince and invite him into the city. Fu, who was humbly dressed in coarse robes and seated on an old quilt thrown over his camp bed, was initially abashed, blushingly insisting that he was reluctant to accept this august responsibility.\(^3\) On June 5, however, Shi Kefa came in person, and he told the prince that he was most welcome to the southern capital, where the palace of the former military governor of Nanjing, the Nanjing shoubei fu, was ready for his immediate residence.\(^4\) Reassured, the prince subsequently rode on horseback to the tomb of Hongwu, on the other side of the city. After worshipping at the tomb, he proceeded to the imperial quarter of the city, where some officials urged him to enter by the eastern gate, reserved for monarchical processions. The prince hesitated and finally demurred. He entered instead by the west gate and occupied the military governor’s residence. The next day, June 6, he was urged several times to assume the imperial throne, but he agreed only to accept the title of Jianguo (Administrator of the Realm); thus, on June 7 he received the paraphernalia of this station and moved into the imperial palace.\(^5\)

The prince’s hesitation before the east gate forecast the moves soon to come. Almost as soon as he became regent, Fu began to entertain suggestions that he immediately adopt a reign title and

\(^{\text{“Ming ji yiwen kao bu,” p. 91. The chronicler Wen Bing was later to write that the selection of the Prince of Fu over the Prince of Lu meant the choice of a basically defensive policy and the abandonment of the Ming tombs of the north, whereas “the ancestral altars [should have been] considered most important, and royal propinquity less so.” Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 37.}}\)

\(^{\text{83 Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:1a.}}\)

\(^{\text{84 Gu, Sheng’an benji, pp. 1–2; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 36; Tan, Guo que, p. 6081; Ji, Mingji nianlu, p. 2; Yang, Shi Kefa nianpu, p. 37.}}\)

\(^{\text{85 Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 2; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 37; Gu Ling, Jinling ye chao, p. 4; Gaillard, Nankan, pp. 222–223; Struve, “Uses,” p. 6; Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 4; Yao, “Ming ji yiwen,” p. 92. In his inaugural address, the new regent declared that his ancestors had carried out the “great enterprise” for three centuries. Expressing grief for the she and ji left behind, he promised to take revenge upon the rebels who had killed his parents. Zhou Shiyong, Xing chao zhi lüe, 1:1.}}\)
become emperor of China. Lü Daqi and Zhang Shenyan were strongly opposed to such hasty enthronement, but Shi Kefa felt that, by asking Fu to become regent, they had already committed themselves to his cause. Furthermore, he argued, even though Ma Shiying was still in Fengyang, the Anhui armies and the northern warlords might try to impose Fu’s enthronement upon them by force, and such internecine conflict could destroy any hope at all of a loyalist restoration. Shi’s argument carried the rest of the court with him, and preparations were begun for the ascension ceremony.

Shi Kefa was absolutely right. If the former supporters of the Prince of Lu’s candidacy had tried to block or delay Fu’s hurried enthronement, there would have been a military showdown. On June 17, without having waited for permission to come to the capital, Ma Shiying arrived aboard his flagship, amidst a fleet of 1,200 war junks. Two days later, only ten days after being named regent and in spite of ignorance about the fate of the former crown prince, the Prince of Fu ascended the throne in Nanjing, and declared that the following year would be the first of the Hongguang reign.

86 The very same day of his appointment as Jianguo, in fact, the prince was asked by Liu Kongzhao and the assembled officials to ascend the throne.
88 Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 3; Ji, Mingji nanliü, p. 80; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 42. Ma Shiying had been rewarded by the Prince of Fu with titular offices as grand secretary and minister of war. He was supposed to remain substantively, however, viceroy at Fengyang. This of course he refused to do, and by descending with his forces ostensibly to urge the regent Fu to become emperor, he was in effect forcing the court to make him an actual minister of war and grand secretary in Nanjing. Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 7. It took three full days for the entire fleet to pass by Huai’an en route to Nanjing. Lu Zhenfei’s soldiers refused to permit a single boat to moor or a single person to step ashore. Huaicheng jishi, p. 141.
89 Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, pp. 37–42; Yao, “Ming ji yiwen,” p. 92. The declaration of the new reign was accompanied by the promotions of all officials by one grade. Each bureaucrat over sixty years old who served in one of the six ministries or in the secretariat was personally wished good health by the new emperor. Officials were pardoned if they had been accused of crimes and dismissed from office. Literati from the north who had not collaborated with the
The Four Guardian Generals

One of the first acts of the new emperor was to reward his military backers. Ousting Ma Shiyings rival, Lu Zhenfei, from the governorship of Huai’ an, the Hongguang Emperor promoted or ennobled the four northern warlords and named them “four guardian generals” (si zhen), each in charge of his own “feudatory” (fan). The plan to enfeoff “four guardian generals” was approved by Ma Shiying, Gao Hongtu, and Jiang Yueguang on June 21. However, as Minister of War, Shi Ke-fa not only initiated the policy five days earlier, he actually articulated its rationale when the plan was submitted to the emperor:

Let each one collect horses, money and rations and raise troops. Since the four feudatories will be employing [Huang] Degong,

rebels were invited to join the government. Exams were scheduled, and a general amnesty was declared. The onerous lian xiang (training ration) taxes, imposed since 1629, were abolished. Hebei, Shanxi, and Shaanxi were all given 5 years exemption from taxes; Shandong and Henan were exempted for 3 years. Other areas north of the Yangzi River and in Huguang had their taxes cut by one-half, while Sichuan and certain parts of Jiangxi devastated by the rebels were granted a 30% reduction. None of these areas did the Southern Ming regime completely control. Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 4; Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 100.

90 Huang Degong, for example, was paid 10,000 taels of silver. Commanders of walled towns were given hereditary grants of nobility. Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 2.

91 The pretext for dismissing Lu Zhenfei was that he and Wang Xie had exceeded their authority by inviting more than 8,000 local militia leaders and members of the gentry from throughout Jiangbei to attend an awards-giving ceremony. The Huai’an gentry petitioned in Lu’s defense after the decision was taken on June 21 to replace him as governor with Tian Yang, a former governor of Sichuan, close friend of Liu Kongzhao, and relative of Ma Shiyig. Lu himself requested a three-year leave to mourn his dead parents, and left the government. Nevertheless, he remained in the area through early July, continuing to defend against Shun remnants. He later served several of the Southern Ming regimes and died as a loyalist. Ming shi, pp. 2844, 3103–3104; Gu, Sheng’an benji, pp. 4–5; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 44; Ji, Mingji nanliüe, p. 80; Tan, Guo que, p. 6103. Fan zhen also means “frontier screen.” For the Tang usage of this term, see Liu Tsung-yuan, “Discourse on Enfeoffment,” pp. 36–40.

[Gao] Jie, [Liu] Zeqing and [Liu] Liangzuo as a frontier screen (fan bing) to consolidate defenses in Jiangbei, then the emotions of the people of Jiangnan will be settled. Since Degong is already earl, he should be elevated to marquis. Jie, Zeqing, and Liangzuo should be invested as earls.93

As a result, each of the four generals was ordered to garrison particular key cities and to command forces fixed at thirty thousand troops. Liu Zeqing was appointed to take charge of the eleven zhou and xian of the Huai’an and Haizhou region, with responsibility for recovering Shandong; he would be garrisoned at Huai’an. Gao Jie was garrisoned at Xuzhou, and placed in command of the fourteen districts of the Sizhou and Xuzhou regions—his duty being to recover Kaifeng. Liu Liangzuo, garrisoned at Fengyang, would be given jurisdiction over the nine zhou and xian of the Fengyang and Shouzhou regions, with orders to recover Huaiyang in Henan. And Huang Degong, in command of the eleven districts of Hezhou and Chuzhou, would be stationed at Luzhou and ordered to recover districts in southeastern Henan.94

Each of these armies was supposed to be kept under control by a surveillance official and to answer directly to a commander-in-chief headquartered at Yangzhou. The scheme was primarily a defensive strategy, perhaps reflecting Shi Kefa’s obsession with defending the Huai’an area and Nanjing rather than preparing for a realistically mounted invasion of the north. At this point, in short, the rebels rather than the Manchu invaders were clearly uppermost in the mind of Shi, who had spent the previous sixteen years fighting internal rebellion rather than external invasion.95 In theory, then, the “frontier screen” of defense would be responsive to Nanjing’s needs, and would be coordinated by a central government official in Yangzhou. In fact, the Nanjing regime was so little prepared to fund these armies directly, and so dependent upon their voluntary support, that tremendous concessions were made

93 Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, pp. 44–45.
94 Li, Ming shi, pp. 198–199; Gu Ling, Jinling ye chao, pp. 7–8.
95 This is a point strongly emphasized by Marxist historians analyzing the class character of Shi Kefa. See, e.g., Zong Zhihuang’s remarks in Yangkai shubao gongying she, comp., Shi Kefa pingjia wenti huibian, p. 59.
to their local independence, both fiscal and military, making their commanders virtual satraps. The Nanjing government was pledged to provide the 2.4 million liang of silver needed to pay for the armies each year, but supplies and weapons were to come from local taxes. The individual generals were to be given authorization to impose taxes at their own will, without forwarding the receipts to Nanjing, as well as to exploit abandoned land, engage in mining, and assess commercial tariffs. If one of them were to recover a city from rebel hands, then he would be given control of that city under those same rules. And once the empire was again unified, each of the four guardian generals would be given a dukedom to be held "for eternity" and passed on to his heirs.

The enfeoffment of the four guardian generals was harshly criticized at the time. Professional Ming soldiers, and especially officers who had served on the frontier, remarked bitterly that former rebels were being rewarded for murder and pillage while they got nothing. Opposition was also voiced by civilians. Liu Zongzhou, the prominent philosopher, actually memorialized the court from Hangzhou on July 12, 1644, petitioning against the frontier screen.

On the one hand, the frontier screen is emphasized. Liu Zeqing and Gao Jie see this as a way of ensconcing themselves in Jiangnan, and [others] imitate them in their misdeeds. How can [the latter] be punished [if the former are named as generals]? On the other hand, weight is attached to patents of nobility and rewards. Generals, fleeing from defeat, are ennobled. Who then is not worthy of a fief?

Indeed, most contemporary observers clearly viewed the entire arrangement as a thinly concealed bribe: a military reward (shang)

96 Ming shi, p. 3070. Several of the four guardian generals dealt privately in salt, controlling the merchants who manufactured and distributed the staple. They also established customs barriers in order to levy tariffs on goods passing through their zones. Ying Tingji, Qing lin xie, 2:8b.
98 Ibid., pp. 81–82; Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 1.
99 Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 54. See also Ji, Mingji nanlūe, p. 71. Gu Yanwu lists this memorial under a July 25th rubric, which was probably the date it was received in Nanjing. Gu, Sheng'an benji, p. 7.
offered for allegiance rather than for service.\textsuperscript{100} Yet Shi Kefa himself obviously believed that unless the four guardian generals were formally appointed and their loyalty—however contingent—secured, the Nanjing regime would have no hope of reconquering north China. He laid the most store in Gao Jie’s forty thousand robust Shanxi and Shaanxi men, whom he recognized as undisciplined and disorderly, but also as the best fighters among the Jiangbei forces. He also valued Huang Degong’s regular Ming force very highly, mainly because of Huang’s skill as a strategist, which had been proved in the 1642 campaign against Zhang Xianzhong. With these armies under his overall command, Shi Kefa believed that their enemies could be defeated.\textsuperscript{101}

Shi Kefa also seems to have believed that there were ways of bringing the four guardians under the control of the central government by means of a rotational assignment in Nanjing. He suggested, for instance, that the Ministry of War reinstitute the capital garrison scheme of the Yongle Emperor, whereby troops from among the 300,000 or 400,000 soldiers actually in the Huaiyang area could be brought into Nanjing on a rotation basis in order to keep their commanders under control and in order to prevent men like Gao Jie and Liu Zeqing from becoming independent regional satraps.\textsuperscript{102} But this system was never really put into effect. In fact, the authorities in Nanjing soon would grow frightened to let armies such as these near their capital for fear of being plundered. Living off the countryside, the warlords and their men-at-arms were endemically parasitic: prone to loot cities rather than defend them. When Huai’an—the one city in the area to organize a vigorous local defense against rebel attack—was told that it had to receive Liu Zeqing’s unruly troops, the local gentry pleaded that Liu be recalled (“the rebel general assaults us everywhere; the people live in mire and cinders”).\textsuperscript{103} But with Lu Zhenfei gone, Governor

\textsuperscript{100} “[Those who were] above thought they were using it as a restraining device. [Those who were] below received [investiture] without in any way showing a will to fight. Each was at fault!” Wen Bing, \textit{jiayi shian}, p. 45. See also Ji, \textit{Mingji nanliē}, p. 71.

\textsuperscript{101} Xie, \textit{Nanming shiliē}, p. 66. See also Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” p. 62.

\textsuperscript{102} Xie, \textit{Nanming shiliē}, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{103} Wen Bing, \textit{jiayi shian}, p. 54.
Tian Yang had to watch helplessly as General Liu’s men took over the city on June 30, plundering as they entered.  

Farther south, other warlord armies clashed with the civilian population. A censor reported that:

At places like Yangzhou, Linhuai and Liuhe, the people and the soldiers are at total odds with each other. Military discipline is almost non-existent, and recently [the soldiers] have become even more perverse. They are separated by a wall: the people regarding the troops as bandits, the troops regarding the people as rebels; and there is fighting on all sides for no reason at all.

Especially threatening were Gao Jie and his men, “whose mouths watered for Yangzhou.” On June 2, Gao Jie had garrisoned his soldiers outside Yangzhou’s walls; and, despite large sums of money bestowed upon Gao by the concerned residents of that wealthy city, he had refused to stir, placing the city under siege and permitting his men to plunder the suburbs at will. Once the Prince of Fu became regent with Gao Jie’s support, the situation became even more critical, especially for the governor of Yangzhou, Huang Jiarui, who was caught between General Gao’s right as a Southern Ming officer to enter the city and the townsfolk’s determination that he not be admitted. When Governor Huang sent a member of the local gentry to Gao’s camp to mediate the crisis, and when that person reported back with the suggestion that Gao be allowed to enter, the envoy was beaten to death by a mob and the Yangzhou garrison mutinied, forcing Huang Jiarui to flee for his life.

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104 Ibid., p. 48. Lu Zhenfei’s men had engaged Liu Zeqing’s troops, trying to keep them from looting the area, as late as June 16. Once Lu Zhenfei’s army left Huai’an, Liu Zeqing moved in. Ji, *Mingji nanliüe*, p. 64.


106 Wen Bing, *Jiayi shian*, p. 35.


108 The gentryman was a *jinshi* named Zheng Yuanxun, whose brother Yuanhua was a wealthy merchant. The mutineers were led by Captain Ma Minglu. Tan, *Guo que*, p. 6104; He, *Anhui tongzhi*, p. 2335 (204:13a); Wen Bing, *Jiayi shian*, p. 43; Zha Jizuo, *Guo shou lu*, p. 138.
As Minister of War, Shi Kefa had the responsibility of bringing the armies at Yangzhou back under control. His first reaction was to have the court send out one of his censorial commissioners, Wan Yuanji, provided with funds to lure Gao Jie away. But Wan was unable to make the warlord budge. "Although I sincerely love the people," he reported back to Shi Kefa, "there is absolutely no way at all for me to dispel the military."109 Meanwhile, desperate pleas for help came from Yangzhou's urban gentry, who claimed that Gao Jie's men were "amassing [enough] corpses to glut the wastelands, and raping and foully defiling our young women."110

Clearly, the situation demanded the immediate attention of a government official senior enough to assert the emperor's authority over Gao Jie. Shi Kefa therefore asked the Prince of Fu—who had not yet taken the throne—to assign Ma Shiyong to this critical task, which also involved bringing the other Huaiyang warlords into a coordinated defense command.111 However, Ma deftly outwitted Shi. While the prince pondered the matter, Ma Shiyong secretly contacted Gao Jie, prompting the warlord to send a request to Nanjing that Shi Kefa himself come to Yangzhou and take charge of military affairs in the Huaiyang area.112 Although a gentry petition pleaded that he stay, Shi Kefa now saw no alternative to going in person to Yangzhou.113 Not only did the crisis

109 Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 39. Wan (jinshi 1625), from Nanchang, was a protégé of Yang Sichang. Later, he was named Vice-Minister of War under the Prince of Tang and placed in charge of military affairs for the provinces of Huguang and Jiangxi. Although his army surrendered Jianan to the Qing forces without a fight, Wan Yuanji died nobly at the battle of Ganzhou. Ming shi, pp. 3121–3122.
110 Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 39.
111 Zhou Shiyong, Xing chao zhi lüe, 2:8b. Shi's memorial was also signed by Gao Hongtu. Ma Shiyong seemed the logical choice to go to Jiangbei, because it was he who had invited Gao Jie into the region in the first place. When Zhao Zhilong and Yuan Jixian memorialized in favor of sending Ma, the Hongguang Emperor responded: "He does not appear to be willing to go. Why not then Master Shi, who is willing to go?" Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, p. 1b; Yuan Jixian, Xunyang jishi, p. 6a.
112 Ming shi, p. 3494.
113 The petition from some of the degree-holders acknowledged that Huaiyang was the doorway to the south, but also argued that the court was the founda-
there have to be resolved as soon as possible; the success of the strategic plan then being formulated absolutely demanded a supreme commander in the field to keep the four guardian generals in line. Consequently, Shi requested on his own to be given authority over the military forces in that region, and on June 16, 1644, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Huaiyang area. On June 20, the day after Hongguang’s coronation, Shi bid goodbye to his new emperor; four days later he reached Yangzhou.  

114 Gu, Sheng’an benji, pp. 3–5; Ji, Mingji nanliü, p. 58; Tan, Guo que, pp. 6095, 6106. Shi actually left Nanjing on June 22, though some sources mention June 23–24. Yao, “Ming ji yiwen,” p. 92. Before he departed, Shi told Qi Biaojia with tears in his eyes that he was going north because of the bounty (en) that he owed to the dead Chongzhen emperor. Qi Biaojia, Jiayi rili, p. 29. The Ming History makes it seem as though Ma Shiyin forced Shi Kefa to leave Nanjing. This reflects the view of the “righteous literati” at the time, who believed that Ma had engineered a kind of palace coup by driving Shi Kefa away from the court. Ming shi, p. 3494. The most extreme version of this interpretation is that Shi Kefa left because he was blackmailed by Ma Shiyin, who threatened to show the Prince of Fu the letter from Shi detailing the prince’s bad character traits. According to some accounts, Shi Kefa had requested the letter back from Ma. Ma Shiyin did return the letter, but had it recopied before he sent it back. Suspecting this, and fearful of accusations of lèse majesté, Shi Kefa supposedly decided to leave the court for his own safety. Yuan, Xunyang jishi, p. 5b; Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” pp. 62–63. (But see also Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 7a, where the Prince of Fu is shown to be quite magnanimous toward ministers who supported the Prince of Lu.) Tan Qian presents a more plausible interpretation, which is the one mainly adopted above, viz., Shi Kefa volunteered for the task because he believed that his presence in Huai’an would further the Southern Ming’s military plans. Tan, Guo que, p. 6100. See also: Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 45; and Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 74. Shi Kefa may also have wanted to leave the court, which had only just passed through the succession crisis, because he
As soon as Gao Jie received word that Shi Kefa was approaching Yangzhou, he had his men hurriedly bury the corpses that they had exposed outside the walls of the city to frighten the inhabitants within into surrendering. Face-to-face with Shi, however, he adopted a haughty posture, and insisted that he was pressing his siege of the city because of the murder of the gentry’s envoy. To dispel that claim, Shi Kefa asked the Hongguang Emperor to punish Governor Huang Jiarui and the local military commander for their parts in the affair. Yet even when Gao Jie reduced his own demands to enter the city in full force, agreeing that a personal entourage of only two or three hundred guards need accompany him into Yangzhou, the inhabitants still refused to agree. Meanwhile, Shi Kefa went to Gao Jie’s encampment, seeking to inspire the former rebel with a sense of loyalty to the Nanjing regime. Although Shi was temporarily constrained and unable to leave, he finally managed to persuade Gao Jie to release him and to send some of his own units for duty elsewhere (Li Chengdong to Xuzhou, Wang Zhigang to Kaifeng, and so on), and by July 20 even to move his own main force to Guazhou, opposite Zhenjiang, 40 li south of Yangzhou. The situation was not altogether stabilized at this point, however, partly because of the mutual rivalry between Gao Jie and Huang Degong, who had brought his own men north from Luzhou that summer with an eye towards taking Yangzhou for himself. Unfortunately, Huang Degong had been encouraged in this action by Censor Wan Yuanji, who had hoped to play off one guardian general against the other. The result was to

feared that his rivalry with Ma Shiyong would incite divisive factional struggles. When he left for Yangzhou, he wrote to Hongguang, praising Ma Shiyong and pointedly reminding the emperor how important a role Ma had played in bringing him to power. Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 67.

115 Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 67. Ming shi, p. 3058; and Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 53. According to one source, Shi had to escape Gao Jie’s captivity disguised as a Taoist priest. Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” p. 63.

116 Huang Degong was also planning to escort his kinsman Huang Fei, who had been transferred southward to the Yangzi from Huai’an and who was afraid that Gao Jie might seize some of his boats en route. Gu, Jinling ye chao, p. 7; Struve, personal communication.
arouse Gao’s suspicion during the early autumn of 1644 that he had been persuaded to decamp from Yangzhou only to have the city turned over to another warlord. To discourage Huang’s advance, Gao therefore attacked his opponent’s army without warning on October 1, 1644, at Tuqiao, just southeast of Nanjing. Huang, who was almost killed and lost three hundred men in this encounter, was so outraged by what he regarded as outright treachery that he planned to launch full-scale war against Gao Jie. It took all of Shi Kefa’s persuasiveness, and a solatium payment that some say came out of his own funds (though it was formally tendered by Gao Jie), to appease Marquis Huang. By the late fall of 1644, therefore, a temporary lull had set in among the generals ostensibly guarding the approaches to Nanjing.¹¹⁷

**Factionalism Revived**

Shi Kefa’s personal presence in Yangzhou had stabilized the loyalists’ military conditions; but his early departure from court precipitated a political crisis because in his absence the so-called “righteous literati” lacked a figure strong enough to withstand Ma Shiying and the military aristocrats.¹¹⁸ Since the southern capital was often staffed by high officials under a cloud in Beijing, a number of Donglin and Fushe partisans were clustered in Nanjing when the northern capital fell.¹¹⁹ Many of these, including former officials who had been kept out of government under Chongzhen, were now welcomed back into high office.¹²⁰ Thus, of Hong-

¹¹⁷ Wen Bing, *jiayi shian*, p. 43; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 348. Shi Kefa was considerably aided in his attempt to restore order to the Yangzhou area by the peace-keeping efforts of Qi Biaojia (1602–1646), scion of the well-known book-collecting family of Shaoxing. Qi was made governor of Suzhou and Songjiang. Later, after the fall of Nanjing, he drowned himself and was canonized as a martyr in 1776. Two of his sons were loyalists also. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 126.

¹¹⁸ In Wen Bing’s words, “There now remained nothing for Liu Kongzhao to fear.” Wen Bing, *jiayi shian*, p. 45.

¹¹⁹ For Nanjing as a second capital, see Gaillard, *Nankin*, p. 206.

¹²⁰ In an effort to gain immediate support from the literati assembled in Nan-
guang's five grand secretaries, at least two—Zhang Shenyan and Jiang Yueguang—were identified in the public's eyes with the Donglin movement. And of his censors-in-chief, both were prominently identified with the "righteous" clique: Xu Shiqi, who had been arraigned by Wei Zhongxian for supporting Huang Daozhou; and Liu Zongzhou, whose very name symbolized the personal integrity and intransigent courage to which Donglin and Fushe activists aspired. In fact, Liu's acceptance of a position in

jing, the Hongguang Emperor had restored to regular rank all banished or forcibly retired officials, and announced that among those, men holding less than Rank Three would be considered for office in his regime. Gu, Sheng'an benji, p. 4.

121 Zhang Shenyan had originally recommended Zhao Nanxing for appointment and had impeached Feng Quan, who impeached him in turn in 1625, driving him into temporary exile. Zhang was restored to his original post in 1628 when the Chongzhen Emperor took the throne. He became Vice-Minister of Works, and then transferred to Nanjing as Minister of Finance before becoming Minister of Personnel. Ming shi, pp. 3089–3090. Gao Hongtu had also been forced out of office after insulting Wei Zhongxian, and, like Zhang, he was restored to his position during the Chongzhen period. He was not an extreme Donglin partisan—having been attacked by such in the past—but was still regarded as holding views favorable to the movement. Ibid., p. 3080. Jiang Yueguang had also been removed from office by Wei Zhongxian because of his affiliation with the Donglin movement. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 143.

122 Ming shi, p. 3090. One reason for Liu Zongzhou's (1578–1645) reputation was his fame as a philosopher. However, Liu, who was from Shaoxing (Zhejiang), had also earned great admiration among Donglin literati for attacking Wei Zhongxian and the infamous Madame Ke only days after being appointed secretary in the Ministry of Rites in 1621. His fame was so great, in fact, that he was almost immune from prosecution for this act, and in spite of his known opposition to the powerful eunuch, Liu was made Vice-Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud in 1623. Shortly after that he retired because of illness to his retreat at Jishan near Shaoxing, where he lectured on philosophy. His students then and later included many famous figures, most notably Huang Zongxi. Liu Zongzhou resumed his bureaucratic career in 1629, becoming governor of Shuntian prefecture. He returned briefly to Shaoxing, lecturing at the Shigui Academy in Shanyin, and then rejoined the Chongzhen court in 1636, serving as Vice-Minister of Works and becoming Censor-in-Chief at the time of the great Fushe triumph in 1642. However, he was dismissed that same year for opposing Father
the new government would have constituted an endorsement of its probity, further legitimizing its authority. After the Hongguang Emperor was crowned, however, the philosopher decided to withhold his personal approval. On June 23, Liu turned down the emperor’s invitation to become Censor-in-Chief and returned to his home in Shaoxing.\(^{123}\) Probably after receiving notice that the emperor had not permitted his refusal, he left from home on July 11. From Hangzhou he sent off three memorials which implicitly condemned some of the men around the new emperor, and then went to Danyang, east of Nanjing, to await the throne’s response to his proposals.\(^{124}\) At the same time he selected a new sobriquet for himself—caomang guchen (orphaned minister in the wilds)—that explicitly fixed his loyalty upon the dead monarch instead of on the living emperor now claiming the Southern Ming throne.\(^{125}\) This behavior made Liu Zongzhou vulnerable to charges—frequently voiced by Ma Shiying—of arrogant conceit, and even of lèse majesté for his obvious reluctance to come to Hongguang’s court. However presumptuous that may have seemed to Ma Shiying or to Hongguang himself, Liu’s unwillingness to join the

Adam Schall’s appointment, and he was thus back in Zhejiang in 1644 when Li Zicheng attacked Beijing. The governor of his province ignored Liu’s urgings to raise troops “to succor the king”; so Liu, who by then was 67 sui, called a meeting of the leading gentry of Hangzhou province, and they pledged to recruit an army themselves. Shortly after that, news arrived of the Chongzhen Emperor’s suicide. Although it was too late to save Beijing, there was still a need for soldiers to guard the south, and Liu went back to Hangzhou where he continued to devote himself to military preparations. Yao Mingda, *Liu Zongzhou nianpu*, pp. 318–319; Wen Ruilin, *Nanjiang yishi*, pp. 155–158; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 532–533.

123 On June 14, Fu, as Administrator of the Realm, summoned Liu to resume his former post. Liu received this command, probably in Hangzhou, on June 22. He demurred and returned to Shaoxing on June 24. Yao, *Liu Zongzhou nianpu*, p. 319; Struve, personal communication.


125 In the letters which he circulated among friends, Liu spelled out the four policies which had led to the downfall of the dynasty: legalistic punishments, which had destroyed the true art of governance; partisanship, which had dissipated human talent; over-refinement, which had compromised military excellence; and corruption, which had ruined the fate of the people.
government in person unless his policies were endorsed by the
throne was of great symbolic significance to the “righteous cir-
cles” that looked to him for ethical guidance.  

In addition to such grand old men as Liu Zongzhou and Xu 
Shiqi, who symbolized the Donglin movement, there were 
younger wenren (men of culture) who represented Fushe circles. 
Members of the next generation, these literati looked up to Liu 
Zongzhou respectfully, although they were more aesthetically in-
clined themselves than that somewhat austere figure. Many of 
them, like the famous writer Hou Fangyu, later the romantic hero 
of Peach Blossom Fan, had come to Nanjing a year or two before 
the fall of the northern capital, fleeing turmoil in their home pro-
vinces. In Hou’s own case, his native province of Henan had been 
invaded by Li Zicheng in 1642, and his father, Hou Xun, had been 
given authority to suppress the rebels. He had failed to do so.

127 Regarded as the leading essayist of his day, and often described as a great 
literary genius who had revived the style of Han Yu, Hou Fangyu had been 
ionized as a young man in Beijing when his father served as Minister of Fi-
nance in 1633. A pupil of Ni Yuanlu, Hou had not followed a conventional 
oficial career; in fact, he had not even passed the civil service examinations 
because he had used taboo characters in his answer. Nevertheless, he con-
sorted with other young literary luminaries of the empire in the northern 
capital. In 1640, Hou Fangyu returned to his native town of Shangqiu, 
where he organized the Snow Garden Society (Xueyuan she), which was 
widely regarded as a branch of the Fushe. Hou Fangyu, *Zhuanghui tang ji, 
Zhuanghui tang wenji*, 2:6a. The club was also known as the Snow Park So-
ciety (Xueyuan she).
128 Hou Xun had been a member of the Donglin movement and had resigned 
from the government during Wei Zhongxian’s ascendance. Hou Fangyu, 
*Zhuanghui tang ji, Zhuanghui tang wenji*, second biography, p. 1a; Liu Dechang 
et al., comps., *Shangqiu xianzhi*, 8:30a; Xie, *Nanning shilüe*, pp. 64–65.
129 After being defeated, Hou Xun took his troops first down into southern 
Henan, and then north into Caozhou in Shandong, where he sought the pro-
tection of Liu Zeqing. His men, however, clashed with the natives of that 
battle-scarred area, and Hou Xun was impeached and jailed in 1643. When 
Li Zicheng took Beijing, he released Hou Xun from jail and ordered him to 
become Minister of War. Under threat of torture, Hou Xun accepted. Tan, 
*Guo que*, p. 6060; Des Forges, “Rebellion,” p. 22; Hummel, *Eminent Chi-
The Hou family had then moved out of the rebel zone, and Hou Fangyu himself had decided to follow other exiles and seek refuge in the southern capital, where he had hoped once again to find gathered together some of the literary luminaries he had known in Beijing.  

Hou Fangyu’s hopes were realized. Once in Nanjing, he reunited the group known as the “Four Lords” (Si gongzi)—which consisted of Hou himself, Fang Yizhi, Mao Xiang, and Chen Zhenhui. He also momentarily relived the shimmering sensuality of the gay quarter of Qinhuai, where the flickering play lights and glowing courtesans’ quarters still promised sanctuary from the social chaos outside Nanjing.  

130 Hou, Zhuanghui tang ji, Zhuanghui tang wenji, preface, p. 2a.  
131 “During the Ming period, between the [Tian]qi and [Chong]zhen reigns, both the partisans of the perverse eunuch Wei Zhongxian and the cultivated gentlemen of moral rectitude formed coteries (menhu). When all at once there were no longer scholars of inspired refinement and intrepid heroism in office, there were the Four Lords who fervently upheld righteousness for the empire.” Hou, Zhuanghui tang ji, Zhuanghui tang wenji, second biography, p. 1a. After passing the 1639 juren examinations, Fang Yizhi had gone to Beijing to take the 1640 jinshi tests. At that time his father was in prison after being impeached for military defeats that occurred while he was governor of Huguang province. Fang Yizhi had passed the jinshi tests (which he took covertly after pretending disinterest), and then had returned south. When the Southern Ming regime was established, he wanted to serve, but found himself under suspicion because of his Fushe connections, which proved to be a liability once Ruan Dacheng was appointed. Peterson, Bitter Gourd, pp. 61–62; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 323. Chen Zhenhui also tried to join the loyalist regime in Nanjing. Because of his close personal association with Zhou Biao and his involvement in the drafting of the Nanjing manifesto against Ruan Dacheng, he was jailed on October 14, 1644. Later he was freed. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 83. Mao Xiang had been at home in Rugao when news came in late May, 1644, of the fall of Beijing. Although many members of the local gentry left Rugao (which is on the north bank of the Yangzi opposite Jiangyin, about 35 kilometers inland), Mao Xiang and his family, including his concubine Dong Xiaowan, stayed behind until they heard rumors of an imminent mutiny by the local garrison. Heading south for the Yangzi, they were nearly caught by local bandits, then almost attacked in a friend’s house when they sought refuge. They barely made it back to Rugao alive after losing or spending most of their valuables. Mao Pi-chiang, The Reminiscences of Tung Hsiao-wan, pp. 66–74.
Scholars and courtesans together over wine. While attendants serve food to the three men, one of the women sings, accompanied by the flute and clappers of the other two entertainers. Anon., *Hai nei qi guan* [Strange sights within the seas], Wanli period, in Zheng Zhenduo, comp., *Zhongguo banhua shi tulu* [Pictorial record of the history of Chinese prints], (Shanghai 1940–1942), vol. 8.
nal aesthetic moment so brilliantly captured later by the playwright Kong Shangren, who imagines Hou Fangyu singing:

In the company of famous flowers and willows,
Daily I write of love in jewelled rhymes,
Like Du Mu of Yangzhou, clad in silken robes,
Entirely given to painting my beauty's eyebrows
And teaching her perfection on the flute.
This very moment spring begins anew;
My fevered thirst will soon be quenched.
But oh, how slowly sinks the setting sun!
Meantime I'll drink another cup of wine.\(^{132}\)

But the moment was shattered by the news of the fall of Beijing, and suddenly—as the struggle over the imperial succession broke out and as Ma Shiying descended upon the southern capital with his fleet—the political struggles of the past seemed alive once more. In fact, with Shi Kefa gone from the court, members of the “righteous literati” looked to Hou Fangyu for help because of his father's close connection with the only other potential military protector they had: General Zuo Liangyu.\(^{133}\)

Zuo Liangyu was one of the most powerful warlords in China.\(^{134}\)

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\(^{132}\) K'ung Shang-jen, The Peach Blossom Fan, p. 51. One reason why Peach Blossom Fan recaptures the “heartache” (xiaohun) of the romantic strains within the more sustained tragic lament of Southern Ming loyalism, is because Kong Shangren was able, while serving as an official in the Yellow River Conservancy in the later 1680s, to talk with Mao Xiang and other contemporaries of Hou Fangyu like Gong Xian and Fei Mi. Peach Blossom Fan was completed in 1699. Chun-shu Chang and Hsueh-lun Chang, “K'ung Shang-jen and his T'ao-Hua Shan,” p. 309.

\(^{133}\) Hou Xun had defended Zuo Liangyu when he was accused of embezzling military rations, and was regarded as one of the few civil officials who could handle the crusty general. Liu Dechang et al., Shangqiu xianzhi, 8:30b–31a.

\(^{134}\) Zuo, a professional soldier without any formal education, came from Shandong and had served in Liaodong before earning a formidable military reputation during his campaigns in Henan and Anhui against the main rebel forces gathered there during the 1630s. By 1644 he and Zhang Xianzhong had traded blows on several occasions, often with Zuo getting the best of his opponent, and the Ming general was consequently ennobled as the Earl of Ningnan (Earl who Pacifies the South). Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 761.
His army of fifty thousand regular soldiers, with attached irregular units of former rebels who had surrendered, dominated Huguang province. Although the army was notoriously ill-disciplined, it provided an effective barrier against Zhang Xianzhong, who was even then overrunning Sichuan and could at any moment decide to descend the Yangzi and attack Jiangnan. Thus, one of the first actions Hongguang took as emperor was to try to win Zuo Liangyu’s allegiance—both by elevating his title to a marquisate, and by appointing as viceroy of the Huguang a civil official whom the general trusted. The emperor’s choice was Yuan Jixian, a man with Donglin connections who had already won Zuo’s confidence. Letters from Yuan persuaded General Zuo to tender his

135 Xie Guozhen claims that as many as 800,000 men served under him, but it is hard to take this figure seriously. Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 65. See, for a more realistic estimate, Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 8. One of the best known rebels in Zuo’s command was Ma Jinzhong, who first appears in the chronicles in 1637 in Nanyang in north-central Henan. Temporarily allied with Zhang Xianzhong, he devastated portions of the north China plains, and then in 1639 surrendered to the Ming. In 1643 he was placed under Zuo Liangyu’s command. Ming shi, pp. 2950, 2955, 2957, 3064–3065, 3145.

136 The Hongguang Emperor did appoint officials to fight Zhang Xianzhong in Sichuan proper. Former Minister of Rites Wang Yingxiong, who had been living at home in Sichuan when Zhang attacked, was appointed supreme coordinator. He shared his responsibilities with Fan Yiheng, who had been governor of Ningxia and was also at home after being impeached. Neither of these men was actually doing much to defend the province. Rather, a magistrate named Ma Qian had rallied the local gentry, and had named himself deputy governor. When Wang Yingxiong and Fan Yiheng censured him, they were forced to flee to Zunyi and thence to the mountains where they died. The Nanjing regime then recognized Ma Qian as governor. Ma later retook Chengdu and Chongqing, but only after Zhang Xianzhong was killed by Qing soldiers. Ma himself died at Chongqing, defending the city against Manchu forces. Ming shi, pp. 2865, 3132–3133, 3319.

137 A native of Jiangxi, Yuan Jixian had served with distinction in the civil service until an adherent of Wei Zhongxian accused him of bribery in 1636. Jailed, he was only released when a large number of official students petitioned on his behalf. Governor of Hubei in 1640, he was exiled for failing to hold Xiangyang against Zhang Xianzhong, but on the recommendation of Wu Sheng, he was recalled and appointed to the newly created post of viceroy of Jiangxi, Hubei, Yingtian, and Anqing. It was then, while located in Jiujiang, that Yuan won the friendship of Zuo Liangyu. Yuan, Xunyang jishi, pp. 1–4a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 948–949.
allegiance to the new regime, and to keep his army poised as a line of defense against Zhang Xianzhong to the west.\footnote{Zuo initially refused to join the Hongguang regime, despite a personal appeal from the emperor. Yuan Jixian thereupon wrote General Zuo, persuading him otherwise. Li, 《三元秘记》，新编，2b.}

For the time being, then, Zuo Liangyu was content to remain in Huguang and not interfere in court politics. Consequently, without a military protector at hand, Donglin and Fushe partisans had no choice but to resort to the political tactics they knew best: domination of the civil bureaucracy through personnel selection and review. Grand Secretary Zhang Shenyan, a Donglin man, was already Minister of Personnel; and another Donglin member, Vice-Minister of War Xie Xuelong, now recommended that Huang Daozhou be made Zhang's vice-minister.\footnote{Xie, from Yangzhou, had been impeached in 1625 for being a member of the Donglin movement. He was recalled when Chongzhen took the throne, but the new emperor soon had him thrown in jail for supporting Huang Daozhou. He was invited back into government, along with so many other former political prisoners, by Hongguang when he took the throne. Subsequently, he was dismissed by Ma Shiying, and his name was expunged from the official registers. He returned home and died during the Yangzhou massacre. Ming shi, pp. 3090-3092.} With this appointment, Donglin men now dominated the personnel apparatus, and they immediately began to try to get their supporters into key ministerial positions. For example, Xie Xuelong next nominated one of Huang Daozhou's most prominent political allies, Ye Tingxiu, for the post of supervising secretary in the Office of Scrutiny of the Minister of Finance.\footnote{Ye (进士 1625), while serving in that same position in Beijing, had memorialized in Huang Daozhou's favor during earlier party struggles, and for this had been banished to Fujian, not to be recalled until just before the fall of Beijing. Ye later became Vice-Minister of War for the Prince of Tang, and took the tonsure after that loyalist regime fell. Ming shi, pp. 2892-2893.}

Ma Shiying moved swiftly to counter the Donglin faction's effort to pack top ministry posts with their supporters. Blocking the appointment of Ye Tingxiu, Ma decided to try to shift the balance of power at the very top of the government by adding a sixth member to the Grand Secretariat in the person of the military aristocrat Earl Liu Kongzhao. Because the earl did not have a regular examination degree, and because there was no precedent for \textit{xun-}
chen (meritorious nobility) to serve as grand secretaries, Minister of Personnel Zhang Shenyan was easily able to thwart the appointment. \(^{141}\) Liu Kongzhao was furious. His initial response was to nominate Ma Shiying in his place—an appointment that was approved by the emperor at once. \(^{142}\) Then, during the regular morning audience on June 27, 1644, Liu Kongzhao—with the verbal support of Earl Zhao Zhilong—abruptly attacked Zhang Shenyan in front of the emperor. He accused Zhang of refusing to appoint worthy military men to office and of plotting treason by recommending the appointments of Wu Sheng and Zheng Sanjun, both of whom were guilty of collaboration with Li Zicheng. Liu also said that Zhang was taking advantage of his control over personnel evaluation to introduce members of his own clique, men associated with the Donglin faction, into government. Then, physically assaulting Zhang, the earl shouted: “To dare to censure a military official and form a clique for private purposes—such an old traitor has to be killed!” \(^{143}\)

The altercation on June 27 led immediately to the tendering of Zhang Shenyan’s resignation, as well as those of two of the original five grand secretaries, Gao Hongtu and Jiang Yueguang. Zhang’s resignation was accepted, and he left the government. \(^{144}\) The other two were not immediately granted leave by the emperor, who tried to persuade Gao Hongtu and Jiang Yueguang to stay on, stressing the dangers facing the country (guojia) and the importance of their service to the government. Gao respectfully insisted that he would certainly not consider resigning over trifles, but that he strenuously objected to the unfairness of the attack upon Zhang Shenyan. After all, it was Zhang who had advocated

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143 Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 60. The shocked emperor and his attendants cancelled the rest of the day’s audience. Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 46; Gu, Jinling ye chao, p. 8.
144 Zhang’s resignation was accepted on July 13. Zhang Shenyan could not return to his home in Shanxi because the area was overrun by bandits. He therefore travelled in Anhui and later died there of illness. Tan, Guo que, pp. 6113–6114; Ming shi, p. 3090; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 53.
the appointment of such upright men as Liu Zongzhou and Huang Daozhou. Gao also protested against the disorderly personnel procedures at court. Appointments to high government positions, and especially to the Grand Secretariat—he argued—should be decided by the Assembly of Court Ministers (Jiu qing huixi), as used to be the case under former emperors, and should not be the arbitrary decision of one or two people.145

What Gao Hongtu was advocating was a return to the consultative personnel procedures which had prevailed before the Chongzhen Emperor—precisely because of factionalism—had given up the practice of assembling his court ministers to debate the merits and demerits of the candidate under consideration before deciding to appoint him.146 Now that there was a new monarch on the throne, Gao and other “righteous” leaders hoped to restore the former procedures and thereby reinvigorate bureaucratic power, moving away from the throne-grand secretory axis of appointment that favored powerful senior ministers and the emperor, and weakened the collective influence of ministry spokesmen and even the secretariat as a whole. Ma Shiying, on the other hand, preferred the more singular alliance of chief minister and monarch, and in his own discussions with Gao stressed the inappropriateness of submitting individual officials’ cases to the harsh opinions of the entire court, which might then behave unfairly. In response, Gao argued for the probity of open evaluation: “Is it not more conscientious to make appointments after the assembled ministers have discussed them?”147 The ostensible issue was fairness, but both men were actually talking about the procedural controversy behind the question of public rectitude.148

Ma Shiying had an ulterior reason for advocating that high

145 Ji, Mingji nanlue, p. 85; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 47. Zhang was also protesting against the invitation by Ma Shiying of Ruan Dacheng to come to court in his official robes.
147 Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 60.
148 Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, pp. 50, 54. Struve has also pointed out that the “righteous” group was using procedural objections to keep its enemies out of government for partisan reasons. (Struve, personal communication.)
government positions be filled without holding a court debate on the candidates’ merits. He wished to bring his old friend and supporter Ruan Dacheng into the Southern Ming government; and he knew that the only way that he could push through such an unpopular, even outrageous, appointment was to bypass a court review and obtain a direct edict from the emperor.¹⁴⁹

Ruan Dacheng had gone into seclusion after the Nanjing proclamation was issued against him. Living behind “closed doors,” he had bitterly nursed his hatred for those who had so scornfully spurned him.¹⁵⁰ The rebel occupation of Beijing and the establishment of a loyalist regime in Nanjing appeared politically opportune to him—both because the collaboration of many of his opponents with the Shun regime compromised the Restoration Society, and because his good friend Ma Shiying was in a paramount position at the Southern Ming court. Consequently, Ruan offered his services to the Hongguang Emperor after writing a long, self-serving *apologia pro vita sua* called *Gu zhong bei xian zhi you shu* (“Statement from a solitary loyalist who has been betrayed”). In this tract he claimed that he had only cooperated with the *ni dang* (rebel party) of Wei Zhongxian for a brief time in 1624, after secretly trying to persuade others to withdraw their support from the eunuch.¹⁵¹ Subsequently he had, to be sure, received a government appointment; but he had only served seventy days before retiring into the seclusion of his home. There, in the noble solitude of his exile, he had been wildly and viciously slandered by Donglin and Fushe partisans. Yet (and in some ways this was the most important tactical point made by Ruan in his self-seeking appeal to the Prince of Fu) some of the very same people who had attacked him for his passing association with an imperial favorite had themselves later worked for the rebels who had, effectively, killed a Ming emperor. Many of the former Donglin and Fushe partisans,

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¹⁴⁹ Li, *Ming shi*, p. 199; Gu, *Jinling ye chao*, p. 10; Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 12. Ma Shiying mainly wanted to nominate Ruan Dacheng because the latter had interceded with Zhou Yanru to have Ma made military governor of Fengyang. Li, *Sanyuan biji, xia*, 1b–2a.


¹⁵¹ Li, *Sanyuan biji, xia*, 2a.
in other words, had become *wei guan* or “spurious officials” who served Li Zicheng. Who was the truly loyal minister now, Ruan queried: he who stood by Hongguang’s side, or those who served twice? 

This argument initially had little effect on those of his opponents who had all along been attached to the Nanjing government and thus had never had to make the sorts of choices forced upon their colleagues in Beijing. When Ma Shiyi, on July 9, 1644, put forth Ruan’s name for a position as Vice-Minister of War, Lü Daqi angrily said:

> The former emperor's blood and flesh are not yet cold. His writings are as lasting as the sun and stars. But Shiyi ruthlessly disregards this and requests the appointment of Dacheng. He not only regards the Ministry of Personnel as a “rubber stamp” but furthermore regards Your Majesty as useless.  

And from July 12 to July 20, a steady stream of memorials came in from other officials vociferously attacking Ruan and criticizing the proposed appointment. 

Chen Zilong, whose father had passed the metropolitan examinations along with Ma Shiyi in 1619, even went to see Ma in person to try to get him to withdraw the nomination, arguing that Ruan’s presence in the government would

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153 *Nan Ming yeshi*, cited in Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” p. 65. Several different dates are given for Ma’s nomination of Ruan: July 9, 10, 12, 13, and so forth. Yao, “*Ming ji yiwen*,” p. 93. Ruan actually appeared for an audience on July 11. Tan, *Guo que*, p. 6113.

154 Ji, *Mingji nanliü*, pp. 86–88; Gu Yanwu, *Sheng’an benji*, p. 6; Tan, *Guo que*, pp. 6116–6117. The most outspoken officials were Luo Wanxiang, Yin Minxing, and Zuo Guangxian. Zuo—the younger brother of the Donglin martyr Zuo Guangdou—was later arrested and briefly jailed by Ruan. *Ming shi*, p. 2777. A typical protest of the time read (in the words of Censor Zhan Zhaoheng): “To appoint [Ruan] Dacheng is to wound our former emperor’s soul in Heaven above and to cut short the spirits of the loyal and righteous below.” Cited in Li Jie, *Ming shi*, p. 200. For other examples of opposition to the appointment, see *Ming shi*, pp. 960, 3087, 3318–3319.
revive the factional struggles of the 1620s.\(^{155}\) Jiang Yueguang and Gao Hongtu also protested vigorously.\(^{156}\) But Ma Shiying and his allies were not to be deterred. From the field, Liu Zeqing impeached Lü Daqi for “bizarre schemes,” thereby inducing his resignation.\(^{157}\) And at court, Jiang Yueguang and Gao Hongtu absent themselves from Grand Secretariat deliberations and were soon to resign from office altogether.\(^{158}\) With them out of the way, and with certain other important officials suborned, Ma Shiying on September 30 succeeded in getting from the emperor an edict directly appointing Ruan Dacheng Additional Junior Vice-Minister of War.\(^{159}\)

**Irredentism and Statecraft**

One of the reasons for such bitter opposition to Ruan Dacheng was the fear of the fundamentalists that his appointment to the Ministry of War—especially after Lü Daqi had left his post there—

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157 Ji, *Mingji nanliü*, p. 7. Lü (who was now openly accused of not being in favor of enthroning the Prince of Fu) resigned on July 30. He was later invited by the Prince of Tang to serve as Minister of War and grand secretary, but the Tang regime collapsed before he could take office. Lü then went to Guangdong where he helped establish Yongli as regent. He died there of illness. *Ming shi*, p. 3132; Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 14.
158 Jiang remained in office until October 9. Tan, *Guo que*, p. 6146. See also Wen Bing, *Jiayi shian*, p. 48. Jiang Yueguang later served Jin Shenghuan, and committed suicide in 1649 when that loyalist cause failed. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 144. Gao Hongtu asked to be detached to supervise grain transport, but he was ordered to return to work at the Grand Secretariat. He finally resigned from the government on November 4, 1644, but he could not return home to Shandong and was obliged to remain in the Nanjing area. When the city surrendered, he hanged himself in a deserted temple. Tan, *Guo que*, pp. 6110–6111; Ji, *Mingji nanliü*, p. 144; *Ming shi*, p. 3081.
159 Ji, *Mingji nanliü*, p. 12; Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” pp. 41–42; Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 13. Qian Qianyi was accused of supporting Ruan Dacheng’s appointment in exchange for Ma Shiying’s agreement that he continue to serve as Minister of Rites. Dennerline, “Chia-ting,” p. 251.
would mean abandoning the strategy of reconquering north China in favor of a “partial peace” (pian an) in the south.¹⁶⁰ For, Ma Shiyling and Ruan Dacheng were both identified with a policy of peaceful coexistence with a hostile regime in the north, settling in effect for the same kind of solution the Southern Song dynasty had chosen when the Jurchen invaded the Central Plain and divided China.¹⁶¹

Ma Shiyling certainly hoped to extend the Southern Ming’s authority well beyond the Yangzi River region. In a secret memorial submitted to Hongguang shortly after his enthronement, Ma had proposed a “major plan to found a state” (kai guo da ji) which called for an extensive system of alliances with the local magnates of north China.¹⁶² But this really only meant reconfirming the titles of officials like Zhao Guangyuan at Hanzhong (Shaanxi), where a Ming bastion had long been established; or recognizing the authority of a gentryman like Zhang Jinyan, the former Minister of War who had returned home to Henan to suppress local rebels with landlord-led “righteous braves” (yi yong).¹⁶³ This did not

¹⁶⁰ For Liu Zongzhou’s thoughts on this matter, see Ming shi, p. 2882.
¹⁶¹ Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 50. The irredentists frequently compared their situation to that of patriotic scholars under the Southern Song. By analogy, Shi Kefa was Li Gang, and Ma Shiyling was like the traitor Qin Gui, who was perfectly willing to give up the north. The irredentists thus opposed liang li (dual establishment): the notion that there could be in China states of roughly equal military strength and political virtue both laying claim to the right to rule. The fundamentalists thereby ruled out any serious possibility of coexistence between a Northern Qing and Southern Ming, like the Former Jin and Southern Song. For liang li, see Robert Cremer, “Chou Mi and Hsiu Tuan,” p. 17.
¹⁶² Zhou Shiyong, Xing chao zhi lüe, 2:1b.
¹⁶³ Zhao Guangyuan had been placed in command of Hanzhong in 1635 by Hong Chengchou. He defended the area around Yangping against Zhang Xianzhong, and was named intendant for Sichuan and Shaanxi by the Southern Ming regime. Ming shi, pp. 2724, 2981, 3511, 3513. Commanders of walled towns were also given hereditary grants of nobility. Gu, Sheng’an benji, pp. 2–3. Zhang Jinyan had welcomed Li Zicheng to Beijing and then had served him, fleeing back to Henan when the Shun regime fell. Even though Zhang bore the stigma of having served the rebels, the Hongguang Emperor recognized his authority in that war-torn province by naming him supreme coordinator of Hebei, Shandong, and Henan. It was a controversial
signify Ma’s intention to mobilize local militia as part of a plan to retake the north from the Shun remnants or the Manchus. In fact, as the case of Henan plainly showed, Ma Shiyi was even reluctant to confirm the appointment of magnates who advocated irre- dentism too shrilly from their fortified blockhouses (zhai) in the northern districts of that province.\footnote{164}

The most powerful magnate in Henan then was Liu Hongqi, who, with his four brothers, had initially controlled the salt wells of Runing prefecture in southeastern Henan. Allying with Zuo Liangyu, he had expanded his influence into the northern part of the province, and in 1643 the Ming government recognized his authority by giving him the rank of a colonel and appointing him regional vice-commander.

The colonel at the Stockade of the Western Peace (Xiping) was as righteous as he was bold, frequently being recognized for his merit appointment. Later, when the list of names of Shun collaborators was drawn up, Zhang’s name was included. However, Ma Shiyi (who may have been bribed) refused to indict Zhang formally, and the supreme coordinator was thus left free to join the Qing later, at the recommendation of Hong Cheng-chou. In 1660, after collaborating self-servingly, Zhang was impeached for having written the phrase “an immortal hero” about himself when he was an official in Zhejiang. He died an exile in Ningguta. Gu, Jìníng yě chāo, p. 31; Sun Zhentao, Qìng shì shǔlùn, pp. 34–35; Míng shì, p. 3497; Desorges, “Rebellion,” p. 31.

\footnote{164} There are some excellent 19th-century descriptions of zhai in northern Henan which depict them as having earthen walls forming an enclosed compound 3–5 li square. Within the square there was usually a high tile building and a square tower or fort built of stone and commanding the approaches to the zhai. On the average about thirty families, often tenants of the owner of the zhai, lived within the walls. In some instances, families of the same surname inhabited the compound, and then the town was likely to be named such-and-such jiazhuang (family estate). The zhai leaders trained their own troops. Fu Yiling, “Guanyu Nian bian de xin jieshi,” p. 33. In 1640, the grand coordinator of Henan reported that some wealthy gentry families (with as many as 1,000 qing of landholdings) had formed private armies that ruthlessly killed people, raped women, and seized land. Occasionally, they even attacked local magistrates. Desorges, “Rebellion,” pp. 6–7. In addition to being large landowners, some magnates were salt merchants or failed government students; and their followers were petty traders, urban vagrants, and bankrupt farmers. Ibid., p. 24; Xie, Nánmíng shìlìe, p. 104.
in killing bandits. Of all the zhai armies in Henan, Liu [Hongqi] alone evinced his loyalty to the Ming. He massed together several tens of thousands [of troops] and each of the smaller stockades submitted to Liu. He was appointed regional vice-commander.\textsuperscript{165}

Left to his own devices, Liu Hongqi probably would not have committed himself to an irredentist campaign, but he became closely involved with a Zhejiang adventurer named Chen Qianfu (juren 1636) who had appeared in Kaifeng after the city was flooded during the siege by Li Zicheng and had begun trying to restore some security to the area. Setting up headquarters at Qixian, he had attracted to him many of the clerks who had fled Kaifeng earlier; and had built up a kind of prefectural-level administration of his own. In the meantime, however, Li Zicheng had appointed a “spurious” governor, Liang Qilong, who took over the ruined city of Kaifeng to administer Henan for the rebels. His administration seemed mainly to consist of a lackadaisical control over unruly troops who frequently pillaged the countryside, forcing Chen Qianfu to move his three thousand followers and staff to the Stockade of the Western Peace, where he formed an alliance with Liu Hongqi and his ten thousand men. When news reached Western Peace that Beijing had fallen to the Shun rebels, these two men mustered their forces and expelled Liang Qilong from Kaifeng, pursuing his rebel units across the Yellow River into the north. They only returned to their area after Li Zicheng had been driven from Beijing by the Manchus. Now, hearing of the establishment of a new Ming regime in Nanjing, Chen Qianfu promptly sent word that he and Liu were loyal supporters who would fight for the Ming from their base area at Western Peace. In a memorial to the Hongguang Emperor, Chen argued passionately that the Southern Ming forces should not abandon a single inch of territory in Shandong and Henan. Enumerating the hundreds of zhai in Henan, he assured the emperor that the haojia (magnates) could link their camps together and guide imperial troops through their region against the enemy to the north.\textsuperscript{166}

Ma Shiyi was extremely reluctant to support these plans, and

\textsuperscript{165} Ming shi, p. 3116. See also p. 3066; and DesForges, “Rebellion,” p. 24.
\textsuperscript{166} Ming shi, pp. 3069, 3116.
it was against his advice that Hongguang named Chen Qianfu regional inspector of Henan, and promoted Liu Hongqi to the rank of regional commander. To the “righteous literati,” on the other hand, Chen Qianfu and Liu Hongqi were heroes; and their hope was to mobilize more of these local magnates in a wave of popular enthusiasm to reconquer the north. As Shi Kefa had said at the first planning meeting in Nanjing, the loyalists could not afford to rest content “in dignified satisfaction with that sliver of earth, Jiangnan.” Rather, a bolder strategy was needed “to summon speedily the renowned elements of the empire in order to capture the people’s hearts.” Constantly recalling the mistakes of the Southern Song, Shi had asserted that “you must first be able to attack before you can defend.” Like Zuo Maodi, then governor of Nanjing, Shi believed that “from now on, the defense of Jiangnan will be carried out in Jiangbei.”

Even Shi—who was, after all, looking to the protection of Nanjing rather than recovery of the north when he told Hongguang that history proved Jiangnan could only be held if Jiangbei were defended—did not go far enough for men like Liu Zongzhou and Chen Zilong. Liu Zongzhou placed his influential public presence behind the suggestion that the imperial army move out of Nanjing in two great wings: one to the east into the Huai River valley toward Xuzhou, and another west into Anhui and toward Xiangyang. And Chen Zilong, who was by that time already

168 Cited in Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 50.
169 Ibid., p. 52. See also Xie Guozhen, Danshe yundong kao, p. 100.
170 Zhou, Xing chao zhi lüe, 2:6a. The opposition of the “righteous literati” to “partial peace” (pian an), and the belief that a Ming counterattack would inspire waves of local uprisings were, according to J. Wills, one of “the most striking legacies of the Ming political culture of the transition period, transfers into a brutal military world of the intense moralism and faith in the efficacy of the uncoordinated actions of righteous men characteristic of the Tung-lin (Donglin) movement.” John E. Wills, Jr., “The Abortiveness of Plural Politics in 17th Century China,” p. 3.
171 Chen Zilong, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, zhong, p. 22. Liu also wanted Ma Shiying to return to Fengyang just as Shi Kefa had gone to Yangzhou. Yao Mingda, Liu Zongzhou nianpu, pp. 31–32.
serving in the Ministry of War with some responsibilities for the defense of Nanjing, pleaded with the emperor to grant an audience to Liu Zongzhou in order to prove his intention to seek the services of "the very best worthies of the empire" as part of the campaign to "recover the Mandate." 172

Chen Zilong himself had a number of suggestions to make directly to Hongguang concerning the "deployment [of troops] in the Lianghuai area in order to fix a basis for the south's submission [to the emperor's rule]." 173 These included the formation of crack "banner" troops within the Nanjing garrison, and the recruitment of more armies by first selecting generals who would themselves enroll stouthearted villagers from the areas under their command. 174 Like Qi Jiguang before him and Zeng Guofan much later,

172 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, memorials, 26–27b, and see also 46–47a, and nianpu, zhong, pp. 18–21a.
173 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, zhong, 18–21a; Ji, Mingji nanlüe, pp. 185–186.
174 Chen Zilong had been promoting an empire-wide militia movement for several years now. During his tenure as prefecutal judge in Shaoxing and then later while he served as acting county magistrate in northern Zhejiang, Chen and other members of the Jishe sought to persuade the Chongzhen Emperor to sanction the formation of local militia under the leadership of gentry throughout China. Although this program was nearly jeopardized by a Zhejiang community leader named Xu Du, whose militia rebelled against local authorities, permission was eventually given on the eve of the fall of the dynasty, too late to be of use. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "Localism and Loyalty during the Ch'ing Conquest of Kiangnan," pp. 52–53; Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, 22:17–18; Dennerline, "Massacre," pp. 164–167; Dennerline, Chia-ting, pp. 225, 254–255; Atwell, "Ch'en Tzu-lung," pp. 108–110; Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 244–248. Later, after agreeing to continue in his position in the Ministry of War under the Hongguang Emperor, one of Chen's first acts was to request permission to recruit naval militia to retake the capital via Tianjin. He claimed that 33 shachuan (large junks) had already been purchased while more than a thousand courageous and experienced sailors stood ready. More weapons could easily be made within a month while the people of Jiangnan—many of whom were accustomed to the sea—could be easily assembled for defense. Chen, Chen Zhongyu quanji, memorials, 1–2a. (But for Chen's lack of naval expertise, see John E. Wills, Jr., "Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang," p. 220.) Nearly within living memory was the alliance forged in the 1550s and 1560s by the gentry of this area against the wakō pirates. Drawing upon the financial wealth of
Chen Zilong wished to create an “army of sons and brothers” animated by Confucian moral spirit (jing) and organized into the individuated platoons (dui) made famous by Zhuge Liang.\textsuperscript{175} This plan was intended to stabilize central and south China; but the truly crucial step was for the prince to listen to the opinions of the many “worthies” gathered in Jiangnan who were pressing for a campaign to the north. Chen maintained that the Hongguang Emperor had become cut off from this opinion by “traitors,” and warned his ruler of history’s lesson that dynasties fell “because of mutual suspicion between superior and inferior and because of the clash of cliques.” If, on the other hand, the emperor broke out of the isolation of his inner court and consulted public opinion, he would see that the time had come to arouse “the brave knights” of the empire by personally leading a campaign into the north.\textsuperscript{176}

There is no doubt that during the summer months of 1644, Chen Zilong and his circle earnestly believed that a bold stroke against the north would turn the tide of history.\textsuperscript{177} If Hongguang

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\textsuperscript{175} Chen, \textit{Chen Zhongyu quan ji}, memorials, 54–58a. According to Chen’s memorial, dated September 11, 1644, the Nanjing garrison then consisted of 20,000 troops. He suggested taking the best 10,000 of these and organizing them into three banners of 3,000 each plus a reconnaissance company of 1,000. He then proposed recruiting an additional 40,000 men (for a sum of 60,000) by establishing military colonies and household registers. Some of the new recruits might be Jiangnan menials (pu), yamen policemen, or petty merchants. Some also might be recruited in the villages of eastern Zhejiang—which area Chen still favored in spite of his difficulties earlier with Xu Du. The troops thus recruited would be formed into two large armies, organized in units of 100 men each and fitted into a pyramidal structure under the overall command of a generalissimo. This closely resembles the plan, on paper at least, of the Xiang army in the 19th century, which of course was also partly inspired by Zhuge Liang and Qi Jiguang.

\textsuperscript{176} Chen, \textit{Chen Zhongyu quan ji}, nianpu, zhong, 20b–21a.

\textsuperscript{177} See his memorial to the Hongguang Emperor in Zhou, \textit{Xing chao zhi lüe}, 2:53–55. Struve believes that Chen and his group were seen by many as po-
could, like Guangwu of the Latter Han or Suzong of the Tang, give up the pleasures of the palace to sally forth and personally lead his men against the enemy, then all would be won. History—Chen insisted—rested upon the pivot of public emotion. At this crucial and decisive moment, people's feelings were in turmoil: they could veer either way.

Today, the people's feelings may be confused but they are not estranged. Since there is no peace at all, there are those who weep for the land of the sacred zhou now engulfed, and ponder the brambles overrunning the Central Plain. This minister reveres and worships all of the imperial tombs, and gazes with longing northward, not knowing whether the twelve tombs can still be saved or if the sacred sarchophagi of former emperors and empresses still remain.178

The moment must be seized, argued Chen. Already the "righteous banners" of Shandong and Beizhili "had gathered like clouds," and were looking toward the Southern Ming throne for guidance. The opportunity must not be lost. "This minister fears that the empire

178 This quotation is taken from a commentary to Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, zhong, 21a. It may not have actually been submitted as a memorial. "Sacred zhou" is a phrase that goes back to the Warring States period and is usually taken to mean the area of China encompassed at that time. A ci by the poet Cao Tang, for example, has the lines: "The distant ridges link with the divine throne. / The level earth supports the sacred zhou." The zhou are thus territorial divisions, associated with clans of divine ancestry. The image unites land and ruler, earthly territory and the divine. As the Cao Tang poem suggests, with its image of level land, stretching out in the distance, supporting the zhou, the throne's legitimacy in this instance is not so much from Heaven above and the Mandate, but from the historical earth below. This is a heavy, soil-laden image of legitimacy. Whereas the Manchus so often refer to "sky," "above," and "Heaven," loyalist symbolism like this is concerned with the "altars of the earth gods" and imperial tombs below. That reference to tombs is also, of course, carried by the language which Chen uses. "Twelve tombs" refers to the Ming tombs in the north outside of Beijing.
will realize the court is a weak reed, and will go over to the enemy. In that case, the brave knights [of the empire] will all have thoughts of making themselves kings.”

Privately, Chen Zilong had certain doubts about the ability of the people of Jiangnan to organize a strong local defense movement. Arguing on the basis of a kind of geo-political determinism, which anticipated the theories developed later and much more fully by Wang Fuzhi, Chen Zilong believed that because of the commercialization of the Yangzi delta, people mingled mainly in market towns, and failed to develop ties of solidarity with their immediate neighbors. Moreover, because agriculture was so labor-intensive in the south, people did not have the time to practice the martial arts, nor did they, in fact, possess either horses and weapons or the strength to use them. He conceded that the times might force the gentry to raise militia in Jiangnan, but he feared that these would easily degenerate into vigilante groups—as often was to be the case. “Thus, anyone who says that they wish to arouse xiangbing (village troops) in Jiangnan,” Chen concluded, “is indeed misguided.” But north China was altogether a different sort of place. It was characterized both by a much more contiguous landscape, and by a stronger tradition of village community. People clustered in villages which were not congruent with kinship units, and so had developed a much stronger tradition of self-help and village defense. Moreover, they were much more accustomed to handling weapons and horses, and could easily be led to form xiangbing in defense of their locales. It was thus Chen’s hope that the local magnates who did lead those self-defending villages in the north would be inspired to support the Nanjing regime once the Hongguang Emperor had been persuaded to sally forth and fight.

This was also the hope of some of the other leading proponents of an invasion of the north. Zhang Zhengchen, who had studied with Liu Zongzhou and was an outspoken Hunanese official, eloquently memorialized the Hongguang Emperor on the same

179 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, zhong, 21a.
180 Ibid., 22:17–18.
181 Ibid., memorials, 51–53. See also memorials, 26–27b, 46–47a, 54–58a.
theme, insisting that once the ruler left Nanjing to subjugate the north, the many magnates, "whose stockades and encampments are interconnected," would respond with fervor there, helping to recapture the Central Plain.\textsuperscript{182} Great hope was therefore placed in mobilizing the support and active engagement of the many different local leaders who had, during the last years of the Ming, expanded their own power as the central government had gradually lost its strength. For He Gang, the \textit{juren} whose memorial proposing empire-wide militia mobilization had been placed before Chongzhen in 1643, the arousal of local leaders provided the way for the Southern Ming loyalists to take best advantage of the militarization that had already spread throughout China.\textsuperscript{183} Now eager to join the Hongguang regime, He Gang called for spartan economies so that the government could afford to recognize the self-interest of local magnates by providing livelihood and rewards for their followers, and thus ultimately enlist these bravos in their cause.

From day to day we must seek the rarest talents of the empire, so that the strategically minded can plan tactics, the pure and incorruptible handle our finances, the brave and courageous confront the enemy. The throne must not select its officers [for their skill in composing] frivolous literature; it should rather examine them according to genuine accomplishments. Then, indeed, actual skills will all be put to the use of the country while we will be spared discussion and debate. Let envoys be despatched to gather in the brave and noble who dwell in the wilds. If most of those with high talent receive imperial rewards, then the heroic will all sacrifice their lives on the field of battle, while the robber barons grow fewer.\textsuperscript{184}

If the throne would be willing to recognize these local magnates and reward them accordingly, then their capacity for evil deeds would be directed toward a politically more useful course of ac-

\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Ming shi}, p. 2917. Zhang later served the Prince of Lu and became a monk when that cause was defeated.
\textsuperscript{183} Wakenian, "Localism and Loyalism," pp. 52–53.
\textsuperscript{184} Ying Baoshi, ed., \textit{Shanghai xianzhi}, Tongzhi, 19:39.
tion. Redefined as noble knights, they would cease being robber barons—and perhaps even, by dint of dying in battle, reduce the ranks of the rowdy. In this way, the loyalists would actually be taking advantage of disorderly local conditions, by turning local militarists to their own advantage rather than the enemy’s.185

He Gang’s militia proposals reflected the same conception of guided self-interest that informed the statecraft writings of Chen Zilong and others in the Jishe group. A theory of rational self-interest also characterized Shi Kefa’s strategy for resettling the Jiangbei area as a staging zone for the campaigns into the north. The deserted lands in Jiangbei, he argued, should be resettled as military colonies (tuntian) under the supervision of magnates who would become heads of defense units one hundred to a thousand households in size. Defending the actual land they tilled, these colonists would provide a solid line of defense against invasion, and help make reconquest possible.186

The argument that the best allies of the government were local elites devoted to protecting their own lands was, however, brushed aside by more ardent irredentists like Liu Zongzhou who had a more impetuous vision of the people spontaneously thronging to support the emperor whenever he “personally led forth an expedition” (qin zheng) to recover the north. In fact, Liu contrasted the potential generosity and grandeur of such an imperial expedition with the actual opportunism and self-interest of warlords like Gao Jie and Liu Zeqing.187 Tactically, this was not a wise comparison to

185 He Gang’s advice was rejected, partly because he was too closely associated with Shi Kefa. “[Ma] Shiying despised [Shi] Kefa, and hence also despised [He] Gang, posting him out to Zunyi as prefect.” He Gang never reached his post. Instead, hearing of the siege of Yangzhou, he joined Shi Kefa there and took his own life when the city fell. Ying, Shanghai xianzhi, Tongzhi, 19:40a.

186 Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 50.

187 Zhou, Xing chao zhi liüe, 2:5b. Liu also implied that Shi Kefa’s assignment to Huai’an meant sending away from court the person best suited to execute a forward policy. “There is no one to express the emperor’s desire to cross the river, no one to decide intrepidly on an imperial expedition, and no one to realize the zealousness of the empire’s loyal ministers and righteous scholars.” Ibid., 2:5b. For Liu Zongzhou’s attack on Ma and Ruan at this time, see also Yuan, Xunyang jishi, p. 7; Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 52.
make at the time, because it both jeopardized the irredentists’ cause at court and nearly cost Liu Zongzhou his life. Infuriated by the philosopher’s self-righteousness, Liu Zeqing denounced Liu Zongzhou to the throne, and when there was no immediate response to that, he impeached him a second time, warning that he would resign from the government’s service if Liu Zongzhou were not formally dismissed from his post as chief censor.\textsuperscript{188} When Gao Jie and Liu Liangzuo joined the attack, Ma Shiyang as well impeached Liu Zongzhou, saying that the philosopher wished to put the emperor’s life in jeopardy by having him lead an army into battle.\textsuperscript{189} The guardian generals’ target broadened to include “the whole gang of ministers” associated with Jiang Yueguang, whom they accused of “plotting to endanger the altars of the soil and the grain.”\textsuperscript{190} On October 9, Jiang Yueguang resigned and returned to his native district. The following day, October 10, Liu Zongzhou himself left office, this time not entirely of his own volition.\textsuperscript{191}

The departure of Liu Zongzhou, coming on the heels of the appointment of Ruan Dacheng, coincided with a rash of resignations and denunciations. Chen Zilong gave up his post in the Ministry of War and returned home to Songjiang; and the Huguang censor Huang Shu intrepidly called for Ma Shiyang’s execution, listing

\textsuperscript{188} Liu Zongzhou dismissed the impeachment as “clique (pengdang) talk.” He also said that in all the history of the Ming there had never been a case of a military official impeaching a civil official, and certainly never one in which the military official threatened to kill the civilian without cause as well. Li, \textit{Sanyuan biji, xia buyi}, 2b.

\textsuperscript{189} \textit{Ming shi}, p. 3070. On September 11, 1644, an anonymous placard appeared on Chang’an Street, slandering Wu Sheng and Liu Zongzhou. Six days later, Gao Jie, Liu Zeqing, and Liu Liangzuo each impeached Liu, saying that he had aroused the generals’ ire.

\textsuperscript{190} Gu, \textit{Sheng’an benji}, p. 11. See also Ji, \textit{Mingji nanlùe}, p. 11. Huang Degong joined this attack, as did some of the military aristocrats. Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 14.

\textsuperscript{191} Liu’s request to leave office was granted, and he was given an escort to return home. Ji, \textit{Mingji nanlùe}, p. 14. Gu, \textit{Sheng’an benji}, p. 12; Struve, personal communication. According to the \textit{Ming History}, Gao Jie and Liu Zeqing sent assassins to murder Liu, but the killers allegedly lost their nerve when confronted by the venerable mien of the philosopher. \textit{Ming shi}, p. 2882.
ten different crimes the minister supposedly had committed. By this time both sets of opponents were beginning to re-cast the conflict in terms most favorable to themselves. The literati who looked to Liu Zongzhou now openly referred to themselves as heirs of the “righteous scholars” of the Chongzhen period, and claimed that their prosecutors were attacking them for their Donglin or Restoration Society connections. The arrest of Gu Gao, nephew of one of the founders of the Donglin Academy, lent credence to this claim. The faction around Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng, on the other hand, began to present the struggle as one between loyal servants of the Hongguang Emperor—defending his interests against fanatical Donglin partisans who wanted to take revenge upon him for his father’s political opposition—and self-seeking opportunists who spoke grandly of loyalty but were really disloyal, many of them having served the rebel Li Zicheng after Beijing fell. Shortly after Ruan Dacheng took office, in fact, he told some of the people who had opposed his appointment: “Having been opposed with the ni’an (indiction of traitors), I will now establish a shun’an (indiction of collaborators) in order to retaliate.”

The Shun Case

The impetus for an “indiction of collaborators” had been building since late June. On June 22, officials fleeing the north were

193 Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 388–389; Zha Jizuo, Guo shou lu, p. 70. Gu Gao had also signed the Nanjing proclamation against Ruan Dacheng. His life was spared because the assistant censor-in-chief was related to him by marriage and managed to delay his trial.
194 Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 61; Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 15–16.
195 Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 2b; Xu, Xiaotian jizhuan, p. 208. The ni’an was the list of those who had served Wei Zhongxian. The precedent cited for the compiling of a list of collaborators with the Shun, which also means “surrender” or “accommodate,” was the compilation of a list of Tang officials who had served the 8th-century rebel An Lushan. Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 62.
196 At the inception of the regime, Ma Shiying expressed to the emperor his
denied entry into Nanjing—an order really directed against those who had served the Shun and now sought refuge to the south.\textsuperscript{197} And by July 4, Ma Shiyeng had pointedly recommended the appointment of his friend Li Yutian as Minister of War in reward for his having killed so many “spurious officials” in the north.\textsuperscript{198} Hearing of these developments at his camp outside Yangzhou, where he was then trying to soothe Gao Jie, Shi Kefa wrote to the court in alarm. Instead of denying refuge to former northern officials, Shi suggested that:

All officials originally registered in the north should be ordered to present themselves to the Ministries of Personnel and War to register their names to be selected for appointment. Otherwise, we will destroy their hopes of returning to the south.\textsuperscript{199}

Shi Kefa did not wish to recommend general amnesty for officials who had actually served the Shun.\textsuperscript{200} In fact, he advised that his own cousin, Shi Kecheng, a Hanlin bachelor who had joined Li Zicheng’s government and had written Kefa urging him to join the Shun, be punished for collaboration.\textsuperscript{201} But at the same time, he

\textsuperscript{197} Ghing chao zhi lüe, 2:2b–3. On October 3, 1644, Hongguang conferred posthumous honors on Fan Jingwen, Ni Yuanlu, and nineteen other martyrs. Yao, “Ming ji yiwen,” p. 96; Gu, Jinling ye chao, pp. 31–32.

\textsuperscript{198} Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 4; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, pp. 46–47.

\textsuperscript{199} Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 109. Shi believed that the only way for the loyalists to have enough personnel to regain power in the north was to attract refugee scholars, who would be recommended for office by local officials and invited to join the Nanjing regime after their records as bureaucrats had been verified. Yang, Shi Kefa nianpu, pp. 52–53.

\textsuperscript{200} In a memorial to the throne, Shi Kefa argued that it would be necessary to “mark out discriminations” (jing xu) by executing “spurious” (wei) Shun officials and destroying their seals of rank. He routinely beheaded former Shun officials who crossed the river into his territory. Zhou, Xing chao zhi lüe, 3:3a.

\textsuperscript{201} Shi Kecheng, who got his jinshi degree with Chen Mingxia in the class of ’43, is usually identified as Kefa’s younger brother. However a careful study of the clan genealogy shows him to have been Kefa’s second cousin. Shi
urged that the collaborators be treated with discrimination, pointing out somewhat sardonically that the very people now clamoring for their punishment might have behaved exactly the same way had they also been in the north when Beijing fell. After all, it was an irony of history that many of those who had been serving in the south were there as a form of punishment, yet it was they who were spared imprisonment. Suggesting that any number of southern officials had failed to stand by the northern court, he pointed out that Gao Jie and Liu Zeqing had both fled their posts in north China, while he himself and Ma Shiying had both been unable to rescue the emperor in Beijing. In a certain sense, too, their own mortal survival had been enabled by the moral laxity of the northern officials, because if they had acted as righteous men should by committing suicide, then their example would have to have been followed by southern officials like himself, who were deeply obliged to the late Chongzhen Emperor.

That our former [father-]emperor tragically died for the dynasty is the fault of all officials. Those in the north should have gone to their deaths in the first place. How can those in the south alone [be excused from this obligation of the] son-officials? 202

But even as Shi Kefa wrote, recommending that only the most notorious collaborators be punished, public sentiment in Jiangnan was being stirred up against leniency. 203 A petition from the gentry

Kecheng’s brother, Kejian, was a member of the Embroidered Uniform Guard. Zhu Wenzhang, *Shi Kefa zhuang*, pp. 97–98. After serving in the Shun government, Shi Kecheng fled to the south. Although Shi Kefa requested his punishment, the Hongguang Emperor was lenient, ordering Kecheng to take care of his mother. He lived in Yixing for a number of years after the fall of Nanjing, became a friend of Gu Yanwu, and died a natural death. *Ming shi*, p. 3079; Zhu Wenzhang, “Shi Kefa furen xingshi kao,” p. 88. Shi Kecheng and Gu Yanwu exchanged letters and dedications to each other’s works. See Gu Yanwu, *Tinglin xiansheng yishu huiji*, 1888 ed., *Tongzhi* zmgyan [Letters presented by Comrades], 40:21–22. I am grateful to Mr. Ch‘eng I-fan for pointing out this correspondence to me. See also Xie Guozhen, *Gu Ningren xuepu*, p. 176.

203 Wen Bing, *Jiayi shian*, p. 54.
of Wu decried “officials like Chen Mingxia and Xiang Yu, who surrendered to the bandits and then escaped, to now arrive pell-mell in the south.” 204 Feelings ran high on the issue of collaboration, and Ruan Dacheng—who was personally outraged by such apparent betrayal of the Ming—found it easy to direct popular fervor against some of the “pure elements” who opposed him. 205

After initial indictments were issued by the Nanjing government against erstwhile traitors like Yang Rucheng, Xiang Yu, Chen Mingxia, and Xu Qian, mobs—often led by students—attacked them or their homes, forcing some of these hapless Shun collaborators to flee back to the north where they joined the Qing government. 206

At the time of the “indictment of collaborators,” the single figure who did more to compromise the Restoration Society in the loyalists’ eyes than anyone else was Zhou Zhong, the 1643 secun-

204 Zhu, Shi Kefu zhuan, p. 34. For a representative example of the Jiangnan gentry’s denunciation of the collaborators, see Songjiang fu hejun shimin tao nizei Yang Rucheng xi [A proclamation by the gentry and commoners of all the districts of Songjiang prefecture rebuking the rebel bandit Yang Rucheng], in Zheng Zhenduo, Xuanlan tang, ce 113.

205 At a meeting commemorating the dead Chongzhen Emperor, Ruan said: “The ones who caused the former emperor to sacrifice himself for the altars of the soil and grain were the Donglin. If we do not kill all of the Donglin, there will be no way to face the former emperor in the world below.” Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 715.

206 Ming shi, pp. 1546, 3091, 3095; Bao Yangsheng, Jiashen chaoshi xiaojì, 2:10–11; Qian Xiang, Jiashen chuanxin lu, pp. 64–65; Er chen zhuan, 11.1:1–6a; Yao, “Ming ji yiwen,” p. 104. Yang Rucheng and Xiang Yu’s homes in Suzhou were sacked and destroyed by rioters. Chen Mingxia fled in disguise. Xu Qian was also a Fushe associate. Like Yang Tingshu (a close friend), Xu was from Changzhou in Jiangnan. Both men had contributed money to help Zhou Shunchang when he was arrested in Suzhou during the famous incident in 1626 that mobilized the Fushe in the first place. Xu was also a close friend of Huang Daozhou, and actively promoted Fushe affairs. His son, Xu Fang, was a well known Suzhou painter. Ming shi, p. 3015. Although Xu Qian never actually served Li Zicheng, Ruan and other members of the Nanjing court appear to have believed that Xu had betrayed their cause, providing yet one more example of a Fushe figure who had collaborated with the enemy. “Now, Chen Mingxia and Xu Qian have both gone north,” Ruan noted with pleasure. Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 715. Actually, Xu Qian had jumped off a bridge and taken his own life. Ming shi, p. 3016.
The Nanjing Loyalist Regime
dus and Fushe leader who had served as Li Zicheng’s adviser and who had promised to help him conquer Jiangnan. Both he and his half-brother, Zhou Biao, were already hated by Ruan Dacheng, who blamed them for the Nanjing proclamation against him. Yet, curiously enough, it was precisely Zhou Biao himself—estranged from and jealous of Zhou Zhong—who publicized the news of his brother’s treasonable collaboration in the north. One of Zhou Biao’s disciples made known the words that Zhou Zhong had written in his infamous “Proclamation Urging Entry,” which compared Li Zicheng to the sage rulers Yao and Shun; and Zhou Biao himself privately printed two of the accounts of the fall of Beijing (Guoshou lu and Yan zhong jishi) which detailed his half-brother’s iniquity and sycophancy, including his slavishness toward Niu Jin-xing, the Shun regime’s grand secretary.

It is hard to appreciate just how great a shock the news of Zhou Zhong’s treachery was to the literati of Nanzhili, who “near and far gnashed their teeth in hatred.” Huang Chunyao, the Jiading philosopher who had been a close friend of Zhou Zhong, was sickened when he heard the news.

Alas! Can it be that Zhou Zhong is so singularly inhuman? How can he bear to have done this! We have been associates for twenty years, but I will not forgive him this profane act. I hope that my choice of friends serves as a warning for others in their choice of friends, and that Zhong’s conduct as a minister will be a lesson for those who would be ministers.

One reason for the outrage was sheer astonishment that a man who had received the highest marks on the palace examinations

207 In spite of the prominence of the Zhou family in Jintan, the lineage was a divided clan: “The Zhou lineage was a noble clan (guizu) of Jintan, but father, son, older brother, and younger brother were all disaffected. Biao had been especially jealous of Zhong’s talent, and each incited his own pupils to form a group of supporters. When disciples of the two houses (jia) met in the street, they did not exchange bows.” Xu, Xiaotian jizhuang, p. 207.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
could betray the emperor who had so honored him. Traditionally, a top-ranking examination candidate was expected, almost as a matter of course, to give up his life for his emperor. Had not the great Song patriot Wen Tianxiang been a zhongyuan also? Zhou Zhong's transfer of allegiance was not only seen as a betrayal of the Ming cause; it was also in many scholars' eyes a betrayal of the literati's Confucian vocation. To those who detested the self-righteousness of Donglin and Fushe partisans, therefore, Zhou Zhong presented a perfect means of exposing what they took to be the political hypocrisy of the fundamentalists.

Furthermore, because Zhou Zhong's uncles had been denounced as henchmen of the eunuch Wei Zhongxian, his own treachery offered Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng a ready opportunity to draw neatly together the "traitors" (ni) of both "cases" (an). Calling for Zhou Zhong's death on July 13, 1644, Ma Shiying told the Hongguang Emperor:

As for Hanlin Bachelor Zhou Zhong, even before his advice to take the throne [had been heeded], he was also urging the bandit to

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211 Ichisada Miyazaki, China's Examination Hell, p. 91.

212 Wen Tianxiang (1236–1283), from Jiangxi, was graduated as primus in 1256. In 1275, at Ganzhou, he had tried to stop the Mongols' southern advance, but his army of Guizhou aborigines was decimated. Sent as an envoy to Bayan, he was made a prisoner by the Mongol general; but he managed to escape and raised another army in Jiangxi. Defeated once again, he fled to Guangdong where he was ennobled as a duke and raised yet another army, only to see most of his men succumb to the plague then sweeping across China. Nevertheless, he led the remnants into battle and even though he was defeated and captured, still refused to acknowledge the superiority of the Mongols. Taken to Beijing, Wen Tianxiang was imprisoned for three years. His will never wavered. Finally he was taken before Khubilai Khan, to whom he declared: "By the grace of the Song Emperor, I became his majesty's minister. I cannot serve two masters. I only ask to die." When he was about to be executed, he bowed to the south as though his former emperor were still reigning in the Southern Song capital. Giles, Biographical Dictionary, pp. 874–875. Throughout the period of the Manchu conquest, Wen Tianxiang was the primary paragon of Ming loyalists who often erected local shrines in his memory. See, for example, the account of the shrine built in 1645 in Quanjiao county, 50 kilometers west of Nanjing. Zhang Qijun et al., eds., Quanjiao xianzhi, p. 192.
pacify Jiangnan as soon as possible. It is said that he rode a horse in front of the former emperor’s coffin. When I heard this I could not keep my hair from standing on end! Both his uncles, Yingqiu and Weichi, were the falcons and dogs of Wei Zhongxian. Now, Zhong repeats [this iniquity] by becoming the loyal minister of the Chuang bandit. The owl [which eats its mother] and the muntjac-tiger [which eats its father] have gathered together in the same doorway; the party of traitors (ni dang) is brought together (zhong)\(^\text{213}\) in two generations. The lineage should be exterminated. His brother Quan is still placed among the gentry, and his half-brother Biao holds a dignified and revered post. They all should be tried in turn in order to clean up this party of traitors.\(^\text{214}\)

Shortly afterwards, Zhou Zhong, and then Zhou Biao, were arrested and thrown into prison.\(^\text{215}\) Both men were soon sentenced to death.\(^\text{216}\)

The arrest of Zhou Zhong precipitated a major purge as other Shun collaborators were singled out.\(^\text{217}\) On October 14, 1644, the government’s higher law courts even issued stipulations for punishment.\(^\text{218}\) Death by slicing was decreed for some, beheading for others, strangulation or banishment for lesser offenders.\(^\text{219}\) As the

\(^{213}\) This expression, of course, is a play on Zhou Zhong’s name.

\(^{214}\) Xu, Xiaotian jizhuan, p. 208.

\(^{215}\) Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 714; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 54; Ma Qichang, Tongcheng qi jiu zhuhan, 5:27b–28a.

\(^{216}\) Ming shi, p. 4112. The death sentences were handed down on May 3, 1645, although the names listed under six categories of punishments were submitted to the throne in late January. The official who composed the list was criticized for being too lenient and was impeached. His replacement ordered that Zhou Zhong be severely flogged. Xu, Xiaotian jizhuan, p. 208.

\(^{217}\) For instance, Hou Xun (Hou Fangyu’s father), who had been forced to serve Li Zicheng and then had fled to Nanjing, was arrested—supposedly at the order of Ruan Dacheng, who was said to be planning to execute him. Hou Xun managed to escape and returned to his home in Shangqiu. DesForges, “Rebellion,” p. 34.

\(^{218}\) The Ministry of Punishments issued formal regulations on this case on January 20, 1645. Yao, “Ming ji yiwen,” p. 103.

\(^{219}\) Five categories of collaborators were to be given the “lingering death”: those who had joined the bandits and attacked the capital, those who had invited them into Beijing and had drafted proclamations for them, all officials above
search for collaborators went on, the secret police powers of the eunuchs were restored, and the dreaded torturers of the Eastern Depot, now removed to Nanjing, resumed their infamous activities.\textsuperscript{220}

The fundamentalists reacted reflexively. This was, or at least appeared to be, the factionalism of the worst years of the Chongzhen reign repeated all over again. Calling Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng members of “the eunuch party” (yan dang), “patriotic statesmen” like Gu Xichou (who became Minister of Rites after Gao Hongtu resigned) resorted to the political rhetoric of the 1630s, uncovering old issues by way of self-defense. Gu, who had personally been victimized by Wei Zhongxian, insisted, for example, that the Hongguang Emperor withdraw Wen Tiren’s posthumous title because of official malfeasance.\textsuperscript{221} Although this issue diverted the court momentarily from the “Shun case,” it also seemed to confirm Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng’s insistence that the fundamentalists were reviving the most pernicious kind of factionalism. Ruan Dacheng even felt justified in compiling a new set of blacklists directed against the “righteous” clique.\textsuperscript{222}

\textsuperscript{220} Xie, Nanming shilüe, pp. 61–62.

\textsuperscript{221} Gu Xichou was from Kunshan, and probably was related to Gu Yanwu. His name had been expunged from the official roster by Wei Zhongxian; and, after it was restored, it was expunged yet again by Yang Sichang. The Hongguang Emperor granted his request and withdrew Wen Tiren’s title; but later he changed his mind, after one of Gu’s opponents requested otherwise, and restored Wen’s honors. Gu Xichou resigned. Later he went to Fujian, where he declined an invitation to serve the Prince of Tang. Settling down in southeastern Zhejiang, he was murdered by a hired assassin after he warned General He Junyao not to flog local shengyuan. Ming shi, pp. 2512–2513.

\textsuperscript{222} One was called the Zheng xu huang nan lu (Principal and supplementary record of locusts and unfledged locusts)—locusts or huang referring to the
Political Persecution

As Ruan began to put together these lists, the persecution of his opponents reached a new stage. Because of the pronounced anti-Donglin bias of Ruan and Ma, they began to attract supporters who were primarily inspired by the fear that if the fundamentalists ever attained power again, they themselves would suffer because of their affiliations with Wei Zhongxian years earlier. New adherents like Guo Rudu, Zhou Changjin, and especially Yang Weiyuan were all associated in the public’s eye with the earlier “treason party,” and now they took office under Ma, introducing an even stronger virulence into the conflict. Yang Weiyuan, who had been a close friend of Ruan during the Ministry of Personnel controversy in 1624, in particular tried to persuade Ruan to use any weapon at hand to attack these opponents. One such weapon appeared early in 1645 in the person of a mad monk known as Dabei.

On January 12, 1645, the police authorities in Nanjing received reports that a Buddhist monk staying outside of the west gate was calling himself a prince of the blood (qin wang). An official was sent to investigate, and he arrested the monk, who was taken back to Nanjing and interrogated by officials headed by Earl Zhao Zhilong, commander of the capital garrison. The monk seemed unquestionably insane to his interrogators. He gave his Buddhist name as Dabei, but claimed that he was really the Prince of Ding, and that the former emperor had sent him south in 1642 in the

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Donglin group, and nan referring to the Fushe—and another the Ying rui lu (Record of flies and gnats)—flies again being Donglin members, and gnats associates of the Fushe. Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 714. According to Struve (personal communication), there is no mention of these lists in the earliest versions of Wen’s work, and they may be a fabrication of 19th-century editors.

223 Guo became a supervising secretary (Ming shi, pp. 3436, 3453); Zhou became a censor (Ibid., pp. 3453, 3496); and Yang became Transmission Commissioner (Ibid., pp. 2667, 2749, 3092, 3495).


225 Gu, Sheng’an benji, pp. 17–18; Ji, Mingji nanliüe, p. 24; Gu, Jinling ye chao, p. 44.
event of an invasion. During the course of his interrogation, Dabei changed his princely title several times, and also claimed rather wildly to be in touch with the Prince of Lu. Finally, he mentioned to his questioners the names of a couple of Nanjing officials, including Qian Qianyi.

Even though to most Dabei seemed to be merely a demented creature whose pathetic claims to royalty should be dismissed, Ruan Dacheng and Yang Weiyuan seized upon the mention of Qian Qianyi (who was associated in their minds with both the Donglin and the Fushe) to try to concoct a case for conspiracy on behalf of the Prince of Lu against the reigning monarch. Consequently, they had one of their supporters involved in the interrogation proceed to stretch Dabei's allegations to include the names of 143 people supposedly involved in the plot. The names included Shi Kefa, Gao Hongtu, Jiang Yueguang, and men of similar stature and importance. Before Ruan could order these men arrested, however, Qian Qianyi memorialized, protesting the flimsy case against his own name. This brought the matter into the open, and forced Ruan to seek Ma Shiying's support in the case. Ma, looking over the allegations, realized the accusation could never pass muster in public and would only make his supporters look ridiculous. Knowing that the poor monk could not serve as the pretext for a purge, he ordered Dabei executed on March 27, and refused to press charges against the 143 men.

226 The most detailed accounts of Dabei present him as having come from Xiuning (Anhui) at the age of 15, when he became a monk in Suzhou. His father was surnamed Zhu, and may have been a distant royal relative. Yao, "Ming ji yiwén," p. 108.

227 Ji, Mingji nanlue, pp. 171, 181–183. Zhou Biao's name may also have been mentioned. A censor later suggested that he was behind the plot—an allegation which Ruan Dacheng apparently believed. Xu, Xiaotian jizhuan, p. 207.

228 Dabei did, however, have a popular following. Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 16a.

229 For Jiang Yueguang's opposition to Ruan's appointment, see Ibid., 7a.

230 Ma also probably realized that he could make use of Qian, who had already tried to ingratiate himself with both Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng. (Struve, personal communication.)

231 Xie, Dangshe yundong, p. 103; Ming shi, pp. 3494, 4111; Struve, "Southern Ming," p. 22. Li Qing credits the Hongguang Emperor with the wisdom
Nevertheless, Ruan continued to pursue his vendetta against Fushe members, and especially against those who had signed the proclamation of Nanjing or who were known to have opposed his appointment. In the lines from Peach Blossom Fan:

Hawks swoop down on innocent citizens;
The Restoration Society is an unprotected babe.
Ma and Ruan are now omnipotent.
Woe to the world
When the savage Prime Minister of a foolish Emperor
Gives public pretexts for private revenge!

Some had to change their names and go into hiding. Others fled the city altogether, taking refuge in the military headquarters of Zuo Liangyu, or joining Shi Kefa’s secretariat in Yangzhou. Hou Fangyu, who was the ostensible cause of much of Ruan’s wrath, was warned by a friendly general (with whom he often attended drinking parties) that Ruan planned to arrest him. Other possible objects of Ruan’s anger simply left the government before being dismissed or, if offered a post, refused to serve altogether.

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232 Adapted from K’ung Shang-jen, The Peach Blossom Fan, p. 219.
233 He, Anhui tongzhi, p. 2490 (220:7).
234 Xie, Nanming shilüé, p. 62.
235 Hou, Zhuanghui tang ji, Zhuanghui tang wenji, 1st biography, p. 1b; 2nd biography, p. 2.
236 Xu Shiqi, for example, had been one of the Censors-in-Chief in the first ministerial cabinet appointed under the Prince of Fu. He succeeded Zhang Shenyan as Minister of Personnel before retiring at the time of the purge to his home in Jiaxing, where he hanged himself when the city fell. Ming shi, pp. 2513, 3090; Hilary J. Beattie, Land and Lineage in China, pp. 39–41. For an instance of the second case, one might mention Fang Kongzhao of the Tongcheng Fangs, who had been forced out of metropolitan office by Yang Sichang, and returned home to quell popular uprisings in his native district. Toward the end of the Chongzhen reign, he was placed in charge of anti-bandit activities in the Daming and Guangping areas. He escaped south when Beijing fell. Although he ostensibly refused to serve because of Ruan Dacheng, there is a very strong likelihood that he was using Ruan as an ex-
And just as there were those of talent who refused to serve, there were equally those who were not able to serve because of friction with either Ma or Ruan. The former governor of Guangxi, Fang Zhenru, for example, had a superb background in civil and military administration and was especially experienced in mobilizing local gentry and rural militia into self-defense organizations. But perhaps because he had once been recommended for office by Shi Kefa, or perhaps because of his having suffered at the hands of Wei Zhongxian, who had him nearly tortured to death, Fang Zhenru fell under suspicion. Even though he offered his talents “to succor the king,” he was rejected by Ma Shiyiing and Ruan Dacheng, who lost the benefit of his experience in provincial administration.237

Still, it would be a distortion to suggest that after January, 1645, all of the officials of the Nanjing regime were either relatives of Ma Shiyiing or cronies of Ruan Dacheng. There also remained a reasonably competent core of officials who later took charge of the government in its last days after Ma Shiyiing abandoned his post. The three leading officials were Zhao Zhilong, Wang Duo, and Qian Qianyi. Zhao was not just a henchman of Ma Shiyiing. Powerful in his own right, he was looked up to by men in the government who feared either extreme and who wished a moderate leader, perhaps even a compromising one.238 Wang Duo (jinshi 1622), a noted calligrapher, had been a compiler in the Hanlin. In

237 Fang, who was also originally from Tongcheng, but who had moved his family to Shouzhou in north-central Anhui, had served in the north as well. It was he who had persuaded Zu Dashou to serve the Ming. Imprisoned by Wei Zhongxian’s men, he was being tortured when the Chongzhen Emperor took the throne, and was released just in time to survive. Ming shi, pp. 2819–2820.

238 Er chen zhu, 7:24–25a. Also, as a “meritorious noble,” Zhao controlled the police forces of Nanjing. (Struve, personal communication.)
1640 he had been named Minister of Rites in Nanjing, and after mourning leave for a dead parent, was about to take the same post in Beijing when Li Zicheng took the capital. In June of 1644 he became Minister of Rites, and then shortly after that, grand secretary in the Nanjing regime.239 When Wang Duo had gone on to become Minister of Personnel, Qian Qianyi had become Minister of Rites.240 Qian, of course, had been a prominent Donglin associate.241 It is thus important to note that in spite of Ruan and Ma’s attack on fundamentalist circles, there were a number of officials with Donglin associations who remained with the regime.242 At the same time there were also many capable neutrals who occupied important central positions. These included: Yang E, Ding Qijun, Gao Zhuo, Zhu Dadian, and Lian Guoshi.243

239 Erchen zhuang, 8: 29–30; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, pp. 1434–1436. 240 His appointment is dated July 11, 1644, in Wen Bing, fj^yi shian, p. 53. 241 Nevertheless, when Ruan Dacheng invited Qian Qianyi to enter the Inner Secretariat, Qian had to agree in turn to impeach Hou Tongzeng and Xia Yunyi. Although he may never have actually sent in the impeachment, he did draw up the draft for one. Li, Sanyuan biji, fuxia, 3a. 242 These included Yi Yingchang, Vice-Minister of Works (Ming shi, pp. 967, 2347, 2874); and Wang Xigun, a grand secretary (Ibid., pp. 2879, 3132, and especially 3134). 243 Yang E (jinshi 1631) had great talents as an administrator, having served as governor of Shuntian. After escaping south, he became Vice-Minister of War in charge of military affairs for Sichuan and Huguang. Later, he was sent to Huguang. (Ming shi, p. 2497.) Ding Qijun (jinshi 1619), Ding Kuichu’s nephew, was Minister of War in 1641. He was dismissed, and then served as Minister of War in Nanjing under the Hongguang Emperor. (Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 723.) Gao Zhuo (jinshi 1625) had become expert in local military mobilization and had served as Assistant Censor-in-Chief in Nanjing. He became Minister of Works, and then Minister of Justice in the Hongguang regime. In the latter capacity, however, Gao was a pliant tool in Ma Shiying’s hands. (Ming shi, pp. 3092–3093.) Zhu Dadian (jinshi 1616) was a former governor of Shandong, where he had won notable victories against rebels and had gone on to become regional commander of the canal zone and of Fengyang in 1635. By 1641, he was also in charge of military affairs in Huguang and Henan. Toward the very end of the Chongzhen reign, however, Zhu’s son organized local defense groups that became outlaws, thus disgracing his father. Zhu Dadian was restored to favor under the Prince of Fu. Becoming an ally of Ma Shiying, he served as Vice-Minister of War, and
Weaknesses of the Nanjing Regime

However competent these various officials may have been, they were considerably hampered by the continuing fiscal weakness of the Nanjing regime. The government naturally had to support, as best it could, a large military force. During the winter of 1644–1645, when its armies were most numerous, over one million soldiers were ostensibly under Southern Ming command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander or garrison</th>
<th>Number of soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gao Jie</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Degong</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Zeqing</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuo Liangyu</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anqing garrison (Fengyang command)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fengyang garrison</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huai’an garrison</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Binqing</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Chengdong (Shi Kefa’s command)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu-Cai garrison (marines)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anqing garrison</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,002,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

then took charge of military affairs along the upper reaches of the Yangzi River. Later, after trying to resist Zuo Liangyu, Zu Dadian served the Prince of Tang as a grand secretary and died in the loyalist cause. (Ibid., pp. 156, 910, 2857, 3097.) Lian Guoshi (jinshi 1616) had an exemplary career as a magistrate. After the debacle at Guangning in 1622, Lian had proposed that special troops be locally trained in north China for use against the Manchus. Impeached by Wei Zhongxian’s followers and stripped of office, he was reinstated in 1628. As an assistant censor-in-chief, he led military campaigns in Shaanxi, but was disgraced after suffering defeat and, like many of Chongzhen’s military supervisors, ended up in jail. Under the Prince of Fu, he became Vice-Minister of Finance, and eventually Minister of War. (Ibid., pp. 903, 2724, 2951.)

This horde included numerous bandit units that surrendered to Zuo after Li Zicheng’s armies split up in the Wuchang area.
To be sure, these were the reported number of soldiers in each command; in actuality, there may have been many fewer on each roster.\textsuperscript{245} Furthermore, the first five armies were largely self-supporting.\textsuperscript{246} Consequently these generals, like Zuo Liangyu, taxed their own occupation zones and simply did not forward receipts to Nanjing. But the remaining armies were largely dependent upon the Nanjing government for logistical support and soldiers' salaries, and the combined military and civil expenses amounted to about 10,000,000 taels per year.\textsuperscript{247}

Shi Kefa was supposed to provide some of this money. But by that winter his own troops were not getting enough to eat, and communications were so disrupted through the Huaiyang area that his tax collectors were only able to gather a small proportion of the regular quota.\textsuperscript{248} Of this only 5,000 taels reached Nanjing.\textsuperscript{249} The government was therefore forced to find receipts elsewhere. Despite the earlier tax remissions and exemptions, regular tax quotas were raised; and in areas where receipts were actually being collected, supernumerary charges were imposed. In the early win-

\textsuperscript{245} These figures are compiled in Joseph Liu, "Shi Ke-fa," p. 112. There are generals' names mentioned in the chronicles and records, not featured here, for which there are no soldiers listed. That might tend to balance out the deficit—if there was one—in padded garrison rolls. Struve gives a roster for the Southern Ming armies which includes 50,000 men for Zuo Liangyu, special riverine guards divisions of 40,000 men, a capital guards division of 60,000, and Shi Kefa's army of 30,000. Struve, "Southern Ming," p. 8.

\textsuperscript{246} Nanjing was supposed to provide 200,000 taels for the first four "guardian generals," but some contemporaries—ignoring the huge deficits of the Nanjing regime—believed that the money was never sent forth by Ma Shiying because he deliberately wished to make the four generals unhappy with Shi Kefa, thus reducing the latter's popularity with the armies and his chances of becoming a praetorian candidate for chief minister. Joseph Liu, "Shi Ke-fa," p. 91.

\textsuperscript{247} Liu, "Shi Ke-fa," p. 102. Struve estimates that military expenses alone were seven million taels, which was one million more than the revenue anticipated without levying additional taxes. Struve, "Southern Ming," p. 8.

\textsuperscript{248} Qi Biaojia withheld supplies from Shi and all the other generals north of the river who demanded portions of the revenues of the Suzhou-Songjiang area. (Struve, personal communication.)

\textsuperscript{249} Liu, "Shi Ke-fa," p. 91.
ter, for instance, the Huai region’s rice tax was increased by twelve percent—supposedly because of the poor quality of tribute grain forwarded; and a few months later, one of the emperor’s eunuchs suggested that 200,000 taels be levied ad hoc upon Zhejiang and Fujian because the treasury was growing empty. Miscellaneous taxes on real estate transactions, fish, and shoreline reeds were also levied. By the spring of 1645, Ma Shiying was even proposing that the prefectures be assessed a special tax to train soldiers, thus effectively restoring the hated lian xiang (training rations) abolished when the Prince of Fu took the throne. To these were added special taxes on wine, and increased excises from the salt monopoly. Predictably, the regime relied heavily upon the sale of offices and of degrees, but it also placed special assessments upon the households of local gentry, who were forced to pay fees according to the amount of property which they held. Yet despite all of these efforts, justified as short-term emergency measures, the government was—at the very most—only able to acquire eight of the ten million taels required to remain solvent.

The difficulty was obviously a systemic failure. The Nanjing government simply did not control enough territory to provide the necessary revenue to support its defense efforts. Lacking sources of credit or private bankers (which the Qing government did have in the form of Shanxi merchants), the Southern Ming regime could only pay a few of its generals, while it had to allow its major military supporters local fiscal autonomy. This attenuated the court’s authority over its field armies, who presently squabbled with each other for spoils, and later welcomed the opportunities to collect loot when invited to join the Qing campaigns in south China.

250 Li Jie, Ming shi, pp. 200–201.
251 An “upper” household paid 6, a “middle” one 4, and a “lower” one 2 taels of silver. Ji, Mingji nanlüe, p. 146. See also: Gu, Sheng’an benji, pp. 2–3; Xie, Nanming shiliue, p. 61; Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” p. 62; Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 17.
253 This point is emphatically underlined in Henri Maspéro, “Comment tombe une dynastie chinoise,” p. 224.
Yet even though the financial weakness of the regime was a structural defect, public opinion—both at the time and later—attributed the Nanjing regime’s economic failure to the moral corruption of the monarch and the avariciousness of Ma Shiyeng himself. Perhaps a personal scapegoat made what was about to happen emotionally more tolerable; perhaps conventional historiography dictated individual blame.\(^{254}\) In either case, the responsibility for this fiscal disability was shifted to the extravagant tastes of the Hongguang Emperor, and to the greediness of Ma Shiyeng and his cronies.\(^{255}\) A passionate fan of theatre and opera, the Hongguang Emperor was supposed to have utterly neglected affairs of state in order to spend his days and nights attending performances and watching plays like Ruan Dacheng’s own drama, *The Swallow Letter* (*Yanzi jian*).\(^{256}\) As the emperor is made to sing in *The Peach Blossom Fan*:

> The old palace of Wu reopens its gates to music,  
> The finest talents are trained for our performance.

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254 The typification of the Hongguang Emperor as an unfit ruler perfectly suited the conventional historiography of the last monarch of a falling dynasty; it also accorded well with Qing historical claims. The Qianlong Emperor was very wise to designate the Hongguang reign, instead of the Chongzhen era, as the last stage of Ming rule precisely because of this stereotyping of the Prince of Fu as a pernicious last ruler. In the same way, Ma Shiyeng made a much more credible villainous minister than did Wen Tiren. Struve, “Uses of History,” pp. 228–229.


256 Although most contemporaries found it convenient to blame the defeat of the Southern Ming on the drinking habits of the Hongguang Emperor, a far more important factor was the Nanjing court’s unwillingness to explore the possibility of an alliance with rebel forces against the Qing. Instead, Hongguang and his advisers preferred to stand aside and have the Qing defeat the Shun remnants. This gave the Manchus an important propaganda advantage and, especially in strategic areas like the Grand Canal zone and northern Henan, helped bring the landowners and magnates over to the side of the Qing. The policy of *jie lu ping kou* (using the caitiffs to pacify the bandits) made short-term tactical sense, but was not a good long-term strategy for the Southern Ming regime. Gu Cheng, “Lun Qingchu shehui maodun,” pp. 142–144. But see also Hong Huanchun, “Qingchu nongmin jun de lian Ming kang Qing wenti,” p. 84.
The spring breeze thrills to the rhythmic Huaiyang drum,
To strings of Kunshan and melodious Wuxi song.
The sleeves of the dancers whirl like colored smoke,
The palace ladies sway like graceful willows.
Vermilion towers and green-tiled palaces
Provide the noblest setting to their art.
All contribute with laughter and with song
To the delight of a carefree emperor.\(^{257}\)

The seraglio overshadowed the sword, and ostentatious self-indulgence in Nanjing seemed to preclude ascetic self-sacrifice at the front. And while the emperor, content so long as his gardens were kept trimmed and his opera company supplied with costumes, turned over more and more authority to his palace eunuchs, public offices were sold, and private pockets were lined.\(^{258}\)

A popular song of the time went:

A functionary comes cheap as a hound,
And viceroy in the streets abound.\(^{259}\)

Ma and Ruan Dacheng competed between themselves for the control of certain posts.\(^{260}\) Ma, for instance, wished to have Zhang Guowei named Minister of Personnel. Ruan preferred that his friend Zhang Jie get the post. Ruan won.\(^{261}\) Ma, on the other hand, was able to get his brother-in-law, Yang Wencong, placed in charge of Nanjing’s river defenses.\(^{262}\)

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\(^{257}\) K’ung, *Peach Blossom Fan*, p. 190.

\(^{258}\) Chen Zhenhui, *Guojiang qishi*, p. 61; Ho, *Ladder of Success*, pp. 46–47. So many office-seekers went to Ruan Dacheng for help—which they paid for, of course—that his house was like an employment bureau. One day Li Qing went to call, and asked the doorkeeper if Ruan was at home. “If my master was in,” the doorman responded, “the horses and carts would be crowding around the gate.” Li, *Sanyuan biji*, xia, 18a.


\(^{260}\) Li, *Sanyuan biji*, xia, 11a.

\(^{261}\) Zhang Jie was also a former associate of Zhou Yanru and Wen Tiren. *Ming shi*, p. 3501; Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” pp. 73, 95.

\(^{262}\) *Ming shi*, p. 13. Yang did have qualifications of his own in spite of having once been impeached by Censor Zhan Zhaoheng for corruption. Probably
A puppet show during the late Ming. Wang Qi, *Sancai tuhui* [Illustrated compendium on the three powers] (1609), *ren shi* (human matters) 10:40a.
They’ve swept up the money of all Jiangnan
To stuff the mouths of the Ma clan.263

Ruan Dacheng’s patronage and Ma Shiying’s nepotism were thus linked by some with their “selfish” (si) refusal to give up their control over the wealth of Jiangnan in order to launch an all-out campaign against the enemy in the north. Shi Kefa, on the other hand, had no personal reason not to support a northern expedition: he was already in Jiangbei and had no interests of his own to protect south of the river. In the simplified moral categorizations of the time, therefore, the corrupt and selfish atmosphere of the court in Nanjing was contrasted with the virtuous and dedicated spirit of Shi Kefa’s headquarters in the field.264

The Yangzhou Loyalists

Shi Kefa’s headquarters at Yangzhou had attracted the most ardent loyalists among the gentry of Jiangnan. From all over the province, but especially from the Huai River valley, came prospective muyou (aides) eager to offer their services to the Southern Ming cause. Shi had left Nanjing in the first place with a loyal staff, assembled over his years of campaigning against rebels. Some, like Zhang Yichong, had joined Shi Kefa when he had campaigned against bandits in 1635 in Taihu;265 some were military experts like Li Biao from Zhejiang.266 Most of his personal staff, however, had been recruited later when he fought in Anhui in the early 1640s.267

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263 Ji, Mingji nanliü, p. 146.
264 Xie, Namning shiüie, p. 57.
265 He, Anhui tongzhi, p. 2596 (230:3).
266 Shen Yiji, ed., Zhejiang tongzhi, p. 2993 (179:13a).
267 Huang Zhijun, Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 1837 (112:30b).
Acting as *xundao*, or circuit intendant of the Anqing and Guichi areas, Shi had appointed a number of men from these districts, like Zhou Zixin and Meng Zhenbang from Anqing; and Cheng Zongxi and Wang Sicheng from Guichi.268 Now, reaching Yangzhou, Shi Kefa announced the formation of a special secretariat, the *Li xian guan* or “Bureau Which Is Courteous to the Worthy,” and “sent out summons to the scholars of the four quarters.”269 Through the efforts of Shi’s private secretary and personal manager, Ying Tingji, twenty new aides were recruited, including the young Li Sheng, who had developed an almost legendary prowess with the bow; and Lu Jingcai, the famous strategist.270 Some, like the 1643 *jinshi* Wu Xuan, now helped organize *baojia*, and were specially recommended by Shi for higher office. Others entered Shi Kefa’s own *mufu* directly to serve as private aides.271 Of all these, one of the best known was the popular Xuzhou poet Yan Ermei, who became ardently committed to a Ming restoration in north China.

Yan Ermei (1603–1679) had been raised in a well-to-do gentry household known for its devotion to music. He and his two brothers had been encouraged by their father to compose melodies from an early age, and all were respectable poets, Ermei being the best of all. Though not of the same renown as his fellow-townsman

268 He, *Anhui tongzhi*, pp. 2307 (202:5b), 2374 (208:8b), 2932 (260:7); Huang, *Jiangnan tongzhi*, p. 2557 (152:9a). Shi Kefa had a specially strong feeling—which was reciprocated in that area—for the gentry and people of Anqing, Lian, and Luzhou. For his own encomium to the gentry and commoners of Luzhou who were killed by rebels in 1642, see Shi Kefa, *Shi Zhongzheng gong ji*, 390:4b–6. And for an example of a shrine erected in Anhui to him for his achievements as a local administrator, see He, *Anhui tongzhi*, p. 575 (56:10a).

269 He, *Anhui tongzhi*, p. 2310 (202:11). Unlike Zeng Guofan much later, Shi Kefa was not terribly discriminating about the criteria for entry into his secretariat. He accepted recruits very casually, in hopes of discovering a few great talents among the many mediocre ones. Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” pp. 140–141.


Wan Shouqi, Yan Ermei had published a book of poems by the time he was twenty-four years old and had found himself accepted among the group of nomadic poets who wandered from town to country and back again throughout central and north China. In Nanjing, where he dwelled in 1627, and then later in the Huaiyang area, Yan consorted with poets like Yang Tingshu, Shen Minglun, Yuan Zheng, and Li Daiwen. And after a brief stay in Jiangyin in 1628 (where he had published the Shu ying ju shi), Yan Ermei had also developed close friends in the north, and had visited Beijing. Together with poets like Wu Shengzao, Li Wuceng, Dai Wutian, and the Shanxi poet Fu Shan, Yan spent long evenings with wine and song composing poetry to the others, contesting his skill with theirs, toasting well wishers, drinking to the autumn moon.

He also had the honor of being invited along with the other famous Xuzhou poet, Wan Shouqi, to a special banquet held at the Altar of Heaven in 1628 to present eminent literati of the south to the newly enthroned Chongzhen Emperor. Two years later, still in Beijing, Yan Ermei published an anthology of poems. Then, in 1632, after producing another book, he moved back to Huaiyang, and thence to West Lake (Xi hu) at Hangzhou, publishing two more books along the way. From northern Zhejiang, Yan Ermei made his way back to the north, settling briefly in Shandong, but the growing social turmoil there drove him back in 1641 to the relatively secure haven of Huai’an.

His travels had carried him back and forth across the Yellow River many times, and like so many sensitive to the tremors of a dying empire, he saw in the river’s constant flux a promise of eventual continuity with China’s past:

Ten thousand li the Yellow River comes,
Source returning to the vast ancestral sea.

272 Yan Ermei, Baichun shan ren ji, 5:11b, 7:9a.
273 For examples of these activities, plus collective visits of respect to tombs of masters past, see Yan, Baichun shan ren ji, 5:46b, 57a, 58a; 6:11b, 12a, 14b, 15a, 19b, 20a, 24b, 28a; 7:35b.
274 Luo Zhenyu, Wan Nianshao xiansheng nianpu, wanpu, 3b.
275 Yan, Baichun shan ren ji, 9:24, 28b–29b.
And all those brooks and springs it passes by
Stream dutifully behind its overwhelming flow,
Though clear and turbid, large and small,
Bicker like spouses and do not merge at all.
Waxing and waning, placid then roiled:
It all depends on wind and season.
Sometimes even the traveler dares not cross
And the boatmen’s songs are cadenced into war chants.
On other days, laughter carries easily to the sandspits
Or old men fish away in mist-soft rain.
Yet here divine Yu knew he held the Mandate
Once he’d seen the dragon’s undulating coils.276

But even as the river swept so strongly by, gathering minor rivulets in its wake like history itself, so was its even flow sometimes interrupted. This, if the metaphor is apt, was just such a time for Yan. As the Ming capital fell to Li Zicheng, his own life took a sudden turn away from scholarly jaunts and poetic revels. Momentarily back in Xuzhou, Yan Ermei had fled to some nearby mountains when Shun officials arrived to take over the city. Several times, Wu Su sent envoys after Yan Ermei, inviting him to return to Xuzhou and surrender to the new administration. But Yan Ermei wrote back and just as insistently maintained his loyalty to the Ming.277 Returning to Huai’an, he resolved to retain his integrity while protecting his family as best he could against the difficult conditions of the times. It was under these circumstances, then, that Yan began to look toward Shi Kefa’s encampment at Yangzhou, one hundred and sixty kilometers to the south. Hearing of the Li xian guan, Yan entertained thoughts of traveling once again downriver by boat, but this time with a much different purpose in mind than when he had first joined the poetic circles of Nanjing while in his twenties. To many such literati as Yan Ermei, employment in Shi Kefa’s secretariat promised a momentary end to aimlessness and a chance to recover lost opportunities. Yan Ermei would not actually join Shi Kefa until personally invited to become a private secretary on February 12, 1645. But when he did

276 Ibid., 5:3a. The poem is called “Cherishing Thoughts of the Past.”
277 Yan, Baichun shan ren ji, 10:25b–27.
enroll in the *Li xian guan*, it was in hopes of arousing the Nanjing troops to engage in a northern expedition.\(^{278}\)

In the meantime, Shi Kefa and the Nanjing court had begun to explore the possibility of negotiating an alliance with the new government in Beijing against the Shun remnants and other rebel forces still controlling large parts of western China. It was Shi Kefa, long obsessed with defending the lower Yangzi region against rebel incursions, who first requested that they explore the possibility of an alliance with Wu Sangui against the rebels.\(^{279}\) A Southern Ming colonel named He was subsequently sent on a secret mission north to contact Wu Sangui and offer him a ducal title on behalf of the Hongguang Emperor. While he was on his mission, the Nanjing court learned that the Manchus had driven Li Zicheng from Beijing and had set up their own dynasty there. The intentions of the new dynasty were not altogether clear, however.\(^{280}\) On July 18, 1644, the Nanjing court had received a letter from Dorgon addressed to the people of Jiangnan and bearing an ambiguous message. The first part of the letter justified the Qing intervention in the north in terms of the Manchus’ wish to benefit the ecumene (*tianxia*) and “rescue China” (*jiu Zhongguo*) from the rebels. Evidence of their good intentions was to be found in the rapidity with which the Han officials, officers, and magnates of the north, who “cherished loyalty and longed for righteousness,” had welcomed the Qing and were now cooperating with the new government. All of these collaborators—Dorgon continued—had been well rewarded with ranks and offices, and the same sort of generosity would characterize their dealings with the Jiangnan people supporting the Southern Ming regime.

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278 Ibid., 10:19.

279 Shi Kefa, *Shi Zhongzheng gong ji*, 387:6a–7a. Shi Kefa and Ma Shiying both praised Wu Sangui to the emperor for having killed so many bandits, and suggested that he be enfeoffed. Yao, “Ming ji yiwen,” p. 93.

280 When Colonel He reached Beijing, he discovered that Wu Sangui had absolutely no interest at all in this arrangement, having already shaved his forehead and having accepted a princely title from the Manchus. However, Colonel He was allowed to meet with Dorgon in the southern part of Beijing, and it was clear from their conversation that the Manchu leader was thinking of the possibility of a north-south partition. Gu Cheng, “Lun Qingchu shehui maodun,” p. 141.
As for those who do not forget the Ming house (shi) and support the virtuous prince [of Fu], putting forth all strength with the same spirit, jointly protecting the north side of the Long River, they have reasons which are quite justifiable, and I would not stop them. But they should communicate with us, holding amicable discussions, and not do wrong by my dynasty (ben chao). They should feel gratitude for [our having] continued what was cut off [i.e., imperial rule in the north,] and thus lend dignity to neighborly friendship. \(^{281}\)

This part of the letter, then, held out the lure of liang li or “dual establishment,” whereby the Qing and Southern Ming might co-exist peacefully.

The second portion of the letter, however, made quite a different point. It said that it was not good for a country to have different rulers, because then the people were of two minds which could result in discord. Therefore, after settling the north, the Qing might find it necessary to move their Grand Army south to bring about unification. Otherwise, there would be too much likelihood of rebellion in the future, and the loyalty of the people and of the officials would be troubled. \(^{282}\)

But even though a southern expedition was threatened for the future, the possibility of a détente was offered for the present. The response of the Nanjing court, which began at this point to consider making the Huai River the boundary between north and south, was therefore quite positive. \(^{283}\) Shi Kefa also was quite sanguine. He argued that it was perfectly legitimate to use the power of the Manchus to fight the primary enemy, which was the Shun army; the bandits who had killed their former emperor were a much greater danger than the barbarians who had so recently entered the passes and occupied the Central Plain. \(^{284}\) Plans were therefore made, with the full consultation and consent of Shi Kefa, to prepare to send a peace mission to the north. \(^{285}\)

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281 Tan, Guo que, p. 6118. See also Gu, “Lun Qingchu shehui maodun,” p. 141.
282 Tan, Guo que, p. 6119.
283 Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 3b.
285 Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 109. Gu Cheng argues that the leaders of the Southern Ming were so blinded by their class hatred of the Shun rebels that
Peace Talks

The man chosen to head the peace mission was Zuo Maodi, formerly a minor official in the Ministry of Finance and now governor of Nanjing under the Hongguang Emperor.²⁸⁶ Zuo’s mother had recently died in Tianjin, and Zuo, who was from Shandong, wished to return to the north to arrange for her funeral.²⁸⁷ He therefore asked to lead a delegation to Beijing ostensibly to see to the proper sacrifices and burial arrangements for the late Chongzhen Emperor.²⁸⁸ In truth, however, the mission was actually bent upon persuading Wu Sangui to ally with them, and the Manchus to retire back beyond the Great Wall after they were given lavish gifts, as well as the promise of more territory in areas they already controlled and annual payments of 100,000 taels.²⁸⁹ The mission was well equipped and outfitted. In addition to having two deputies, Ma Shaoyu, Vice-Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud, and Chen Hongfan, Military Commissioner-in-Chief, Zuo Maodi was also accompanied by a retinue of 10 officers, 20 clerks, 50 horsemen, and 200 grooms, along with 3,000 soldiers detailed as guards for the envoys’ own persons, plus the gold, silver, and silks which they intended to use as gifts and bribes in the north.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁶ Gu Ling, Jinling ye chao, p. 13.
²⁸⁷ Ji, Mingji nanliü, p. 221. Zuo Maodi’s mother, who was an avid reader of history, instilled a tremendous respect for loyalists in her son. Li, Sanyuan biji, shang, 15a.
²⁸⁸ His request was made on July 24, 1644. Ji, Mingji nanliü, p. 7.
²⁸⁹ In discussions before the peace mission left, Hongguang was pointedly reminded by Ma Shaoyu that Chen Xinqu had secretly been trying to negotiate with the Manchus when he was denounced by the censors and killed. The emperor suggested that formal condolences be paid to Chen because they were now fulfilling his policy themselves. Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 3b.
²⁹⁰ 10,000 taels and 2,000 bolts of cloth were intended for Wu Sangui; 1,000 in gold, 100,000 in silver, and 10,000 bolts of brocade were for the Manchus; 30,000 ounces of gold were for various gifts; and another 30,000 ounces of
The envoys took formal leave of the Southern Ming court on August 7.\textsuperscript{291} Their plan was to thank the Manchus for having helped deliver the Ming empire from the scourge of rebels and bandits—some of whom, in fact, attacked the party after it left the safety of Huai’an.\textsuperscript{292} However, when the convoy reached Beizhili in October, Zuo Maodi and his men were detained by Governor Luo Yangxing, told to reduce their escort to one hundred soldiers, and then were taken to the Residence for Envoys of the Four Tributary States (Hui tong si yi guan), as though they were foreign ambassadors bringing tribute to the guo of the Qing.\textsuperscript{293} When Zuo

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\textsuperscript{291} Gu, \textit{Sheng’an benji}, p. 9; Tan, \textit{Guo que}, pp. 6127–6128, 6131–6132; Ji, \textit{Mingji nianli}, p. 8. The embassy actually left Nanjing proper on August 22, 1644, initially traveling by grain transport boats. Later, because they could not buy or requisition mounts and had to travel by smaller riverboats, they were forced to leave some of the bolts of cloth behind and reduce the size of their military escort. Chen, \textit{Bei shi jiliè}, pp. 117–118.

\textsuperscript{292} Proceeding north into the Huabei area, the mission found towns raided by bandits, communications severed, and troops roaming the countryside. Since cities refused to admit them, even when they identified themselves as imperial envoys, they either slept outside or had to force their way inside. Turned away at Jining, they were not greeted formally until they reached Wenshang county in western Shandong and met the Qing commander, Yang Fangxing, there. Yang boasted of “our country’s military strength,” and said that representatives of the Qing would be perfectly willing to talk about peace negotiations as long as the southern officials realized that they would have to accept the unified rule of Dorgon. He also emphasized the “joint heart” with which both the northern and southern officials were fighting the bandits. Chen, \textit{Bei shi jiliè}, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{293} The envoys were actually met at Linqing by a convoy of troops sent by Luo Yangxing, who formerly commanded the Embroidered Uniform Guard. At Dezhou, which they reached on September 18, the Southern Ming ambassadors were informed by the governor of Shandong that they would have to leave all but one hundred men behind them and proceed to the capital under military guard. Nine days later, at Jinghai, Luo Yangxing personally took them under his charge. Escorted by “barbarian troops,” the Southern Ming envoys and one hundred of their soldiers went on to Beijing, leaving the rest of their troops behind under guard in a temple in Jinghai. They reached the
wished to hand over a letter from the Hongguang Emperor to the Manchus, he was told that it would be sent to the Board of Rites, and not delivered directly to the court. Zuo protested: "How can an Imperial letter from the Heavenly Court be treated as though it were a document from another country?" The Qing officials, however, simply refused to accept the letter under those conditions, and kept the men in the Court of State Ceremonial (Honglu si), where they were shunned by Wu Sangui and other high-ranking Chinese officials.294

The reason for this high-handed treatment was quite simple. During the interval between the departure of Zuo's mission from Nanjing and its arrival in Beijing, Dorgon had made up his mind

outskirts of the capital on October 5, and there they received a peremptory order from Dorgon to send their gifts on ahead with an envoy. Refusing to be treated like tributaries, the ambassadors sent a representative to meet with Grand Secretaries Hong Chengchou, Xie Sheng, Feng Quan, and Ganglin. According to their delegate, the former two were disturbed by the discussion with the loyalists' deputy. "Hong Chengchou acted as though he were quite troubled. He held back tears that were about to fall. Xie Sheng at times wore a barbarian hat, and at other times he wore a southern hat. He blushed silently." Feng Quan, on the other hand, was quite curt and outspoken. Ganglin, the main spokesman for the Qing, demanded that the ambassadors enter the capital at once, and refused to arrange for ceremonies befitting their status as imperial envoys. The loyalists' deputy insisted, however, that the ambassadors would not enter the capital unless the Qing government sent forth a high official to greet them; they would prefer to die rather than be treated unceremoniously. After five days the Qing government relented, to the extent of sending a Manchu official from the Board of Rites, accompanied by Zu Zepu (who had surrendered at Dalinghe), to greet them. On October 12, then, the mission finally entered Beijing under imperial escort, coming into the city through the Zhengyang Gate. Therein, it soon became clear that they were virtually to be treated as prisoners. Chen, Bei shi jilüe, pp. 119–121.

294 Conditions in the Honglu Si, where they were not allowed to burn cooking fires, were extremely uncomfortable; the southerners felt the autumn cold keenly. Zuo Maodi did manage to send a representative to confer with Wu Sangui, but the former Ming general sent word that: "The laws of the Qing dynasty are extremely strict. I am afraid that they will harbor suspicion. I dare not come forth to see you." Shortly after this he was reported to have gone to the west to exterminate bandits. Chen, Bei shi jilüe, p. 119. See also Gu, Jinling ye chao, pp. 35–37.
to move to the stage announced in the second part of his letter—the stage of unification (yitong). In the last ten days of the tenth lunar month, Dorgon and the Qing court had approved a plan submitted by Liu Yindong, a former Ming censor, to defeat the Shun rebels in the west and then strike down through Sichuan into the southeast. Already, even as Zuo was demanding to speak with Wu Sangui, the Qing armies were being marshalled for this new campaign.

Eventually, on October 14 and 26, Zuo Maodi was granted interviews with Grand Secretary Ganglin, and—although by now the die was cast—Zuo carefully explained the Southern Ming’s offer to him. He also requested permission to perform funeral rites for the Chongzhen Emperor. Ganglin flatly rejected Zuo’s request, and made it very clear that the Manchus, who now claimed the Mandate in their own right, were hardly likely to accept consignment to the northeast in exchange for ransom. He also conveyed

295 Dorgon probably made his own personal decision to press on and conquer the south in the seventh lunar month of 1644 when he had Li Wen write Shi Kefa, asking that he surrender. In that letter he spoke of the opportunistic way in which the Hongguang court had taken advantage of the chaotic political situation to seize control of Jiangnan. As Gu Cheng has pointed out, this denied the possibility of cooperation raised in his earlier letter to the Southern Ming court. Gu, “Lun Qingchu shehui maodun,” p. 142.

296 Ibid., pp. 142–143. It was later, on November 22, that Dorgon issued his edict addressed to the officials and gentry of Henan, Nanjing, Jiangxi, and Huguang, detailing the crimes of the Southern Ming.

297 The interview on October 14 was formal, even tense. Ganglin initially wanted Zuo Maodi to sit on a rug at his feet like his Manchu and Mongol aides, but Zuo said that Chinese people did not like to sit on the ground and demanded that three chairs be brought for the envoys. Then, after the chairs had been carried in, Ganglin demanded through his brother, who interpreted for him, that Zuo tell him why the southerners had dared to put the Prince of Fu on the throne when they had not even bothered to come to the rescue of the Chongzhen Emperor. Zuo Maodi in turn defended his personal loyalty to the Ming and its perished former emperor, but Ganglin harshly interrupted: “Say no more. We have already sent our Grand Army down into Jiangnan!” Chen, Bei shi jilüe, p. 122.

298 Ganglin’s response to Zuo’s request to conduct ceremonies at Changping, where most of the Ming tombs were located, was cutting: “On your behalf our dynasty has already wept, made sacrifices, and conducted the burial.
to Zuo Maodi Dorgon’s personal invitation to take office under the Qing. Recognizing that no compromise was possible, Zuo Maodi politely rejected the invitation and called off the negotiations.\(^{299}\) Impressed by reports of the diplomat’s dignity, Dorgon granted permission for Zuo Maodi to leave the capital under guard on October 25, free to proceed south if he and his contingent so wished.\(^{300}\)

General Chen Hongfan did not so wish. Learning of the failure of the negotiations, he secretly sent a messenger to the Qing court, offering to surrender with his military forces and to turn Zuo Maodi and Ma Shaoyu over to the Manchus.\(^{301}\) The offer reached the Qing court on November 29, 1644, and Dorgon promptly sent Manchu cavalrymen after the peace mission, which they overtook at Cangzhou. Protesting, Zuo Maodi was forcibly returned to

\(^{299}\) Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 762. Chen Mingxia was one of the collaborators brought in to see Zuo Maodi at the time Dorgon’s invitation was tendered. When Zuo saw Chen, he said: “You placed first in the former dynasty’s examinations. How can you be here like this?” Chen had no answer. Instead, another collaborator, Jin Zhijun, said to Zuo Maodi: “Sir, how can you be so stubborn? Don’t you know about the rise and fall [of dynasties]?” Zuo’s answer was: “And don’t you have a proper sense of shame?” Xiao hengxiang shi zhuren, *Qing ren yishi*, p. 5.

\(^{300}\) The captives (for, after October 17, the envoys were locked in the Honglu Si) heard a more suspenseful tale of what happened. From a secret agent they learned that Dorgon had asked his Inner Courts what to do about the southerners. One Manchu noble said, “Kill them and be done with it.” Feng Quan wanted to force them to shave their heads and to keep them as prisoners in Beijing. Hong Chengchou, however, argued that if they killed the envoys, there would be no ambassadors exchanged in the future between their two countries, which might hinder negotiations yet to come. Dorgon reportedly agreed: “What old Hong said is right.” The prince-regent then ordered them released. Chen, *Bei shi jilüe*, p. 123.

\(^{301}\) Chen had already been coopted by the Qing, perhaps when the group reached Jining. Ibid., p. 1a; *Da-Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilü*, 5:17a and 23b (hereafter *Shizu shilü*).
Beijing. This time he was ordered, not asked, to join the Qing government. He again refused, and received the death sentence with a martyr’s words on his lips.\footnote{Qian Surun, *Nan zhong ji*, p. 112; *Ming shi*, p. 3093; *Shizu shilu*, 11:3b; Qian, *Jiashen chuanxin lu*, p. 155; Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 21. The words were *bi xue*, “jade blood,” referring to the Zhou period hero Zhang Hong. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 762. According to hearsay, when Nanjing fell, Dorgon had a banquet prepared for Zuo. Zuo came, and in the course of the meal, discovered the feast was being held to celebrate “peace”: the fall of Nanjing. This is what allegedly provoked Zuo to commit suicide. He left a note that read: “Alive, I was a loyal minister of the great Ming. Dead, I am a loyal spirit of the great Ming.” Tan Qian, *Beiyou lu*, p. 346. In reality, he was executed, along with five other officers. See Li, *Sanyuan biji*, *xia*, 26b; Yao, “Ming ji yiwen,” pp. 118–119.} Ma Shaoyu accepted Dorgon’s offer, pledging his allegiance to the Qing.\footnote{*Ming shi*, p. 4111.} And Chen Hongfan, pretending to have been released in order to convey the Manchus’ reply to Nanjing, returned in January, 1645, to Nanjing where he became a secret agent for the Manchus, passing on information to them about the poor state of the Southern Ming defenses, and at the same time quietly encouraging appeasement and fatalism among his acquaintances.\footnote{Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 111. For Chen’s military career, see *Ming shi*, pp. 156, 157, 3097, 3662.}

Although, as we have seen, the Zuo Maodi mission was encouraged by Shi Kefa, it became in the public’s eye associated almost solely with Ma Shiying. Because history was being replayed in Nanjing, onlookers thought constantly in terms of previous southern dynasties and thus of the familiar argument between those who wished to recover enemy-held territory in the north and those who wished to appease barbarian conquerors and hold on to what they had secured for themselves in the south. As this obsession with irredentism/appeasement claimed most of the literati’s minds, the Zuo Maodi mission became yet one more symbol of Ma Shiying’s craveness, and one more proof of his unwillingness to press for decisive military advantage. Later, when the facts about Chen Hongfan’s role became known, the Zuo Maodi affair seemed to encapsulate the betrayal of so many Southern Ming commanders and was widely held to be one of the causes for Dor-
gon's rather sudden decision to invade the south. Learning of the
genuine state of Nanjing's defenses from Chen Hongfan, Dorgon
is said to have been encouraged to order an all-out attack sooner
than originally planned. Whether or not this is true, the Qing's
first explicit orders to prepare to proceed against the Southern
Ming forces did coincide with the failure of the peace mission.

The Manchu offensive began in November, when Dorgon's
brother, Dodo, was appointed "Generalissimo to Pacify the Em-

305 Xie, Nanning shilüe, p. 64; Qian Surun, Nan zhong ji, p. 112; Hummel,
Eminent Chinese, p. 762.
307 Xie, Nanning shilüe, pp. 67–68. Haoge was explicitly ordered not to cross
the river at this time. Shizu shilü, 13:9, 14:7b.
308 Wu Weiye, Wushi jilan, juan 8, shang, 13b. For an example of one of Shi's
despatches, requesting reinforcements, see Ji, Mingji nanzhiüe, pp. 209–210.
309 Xie, Nanning shilüe, p. 68.
The other, western, wing personally commanded by Dodo himself, was also momentarily halted. In its initial stages, the vanguard of the expedition had spread rapidly across northern Henan. Leaving Zheng, Dodo’s army had marched south toward Mengjin, the important crossing west of Kaifeng along the Yellow River. From Mengjin, Dodo had sent Tulai and his small but dreaded contingent of crack cavalry (jingbing) along the southern bank of the Yellow River through that part of northern Henan contested by various zhai leaders, by Shun rebels like Huang Shixin and Zhang Yousheng, and by Ming loyalist commanders like Chen Qianfu, the Zhejiang adventurer. The Shun rebel positions and a good number of the zhai armies simply collapsed in the face of the rapid Manchu advance. As soon as Tulai’s men appeared, Huang and Zhang fled. Fifteen of the major zhai, along with all their soldiers and civilians, surrendered to Tulai, directly acknowledging Qing authority along a hundred kilometers of the Yellow River.\(^{310}\)

In December, however, the Manchu offensive, already overextended on two fronts, halted. To the west, near Huaiqing in Henan, Shun remnants counterattacked, defeating the Qing commander Jin Yuhe and overrunning many of the districts north of the Yellow River. To prevent the Shun forces from breaking through the Qing lines there, Dorgon and the court had to order Dodo’s main force back to the Yellow River.\(^{311}\) Meanwhile Dodo’s

\(^{310}\) *Shizu shilu*, 12:140a.

\(^{311}\) Gu, “Lun Qingchu shehui maodun,” p. 143. Gu Cheng believes that this would have been the best time for the Southern Ming to have launched a northern expedition. According to a Qing despatch from the Qing governor of Shandong, Wang Yongji, his garrisons were stripped so bare of troops because of the transfer of reinforcements westward that if the Southern Ming attacked, the towns of southern Shandong would fall like “stiff bamboo” before the enemy. A few Southern Ming officials realized this, and recognized as well that the real enemy to fear were Qing forces, not the Shun remnants. Yuan Jixian, Grand Coordinator of Jiangxi wrote: “If the Chuang are defeated by the caitiffs, even though we might be delighted, we ought to be grief-stricken. Not so long ago the caitiffs were conspiring against us and the Chuang were set to the side. Now if the Chuang are exterminated, does that not mean trouble for Jiangnan?” Ibid., p. 143.
vanguard to the east, Tulai’s army, began to encounter heavier resistance from the Southern Ming: the zhai led by Liu Hongqi; Chen Qianfu’s regular Ming troops, now commanded by Zhang Jinyan and mustering to re-occupy Kaifeng; and behind Zhang, garrisoning Suizhou, the forty to fifty thousand troops of Regional Commander Xu Dingguo and an equal number of men from the “Jade Stockade” (Yu zhai), commanded by the local hegemon Li Jiyu.312 Dodo’s main army, which only numbered ten thousand men, was no match for these troops.313 The crucial Lianghuai defense zone—and beyond that the lower Yangzi itself—would remain secure just as long as the Southern Ming forces held the line at Suizhou. Only two events could change that: the release of more regular Qing troops from the northwest once the Shun rebels were completely driven out of Shaanxi, and the defection of Southern Ming forces along the Suizhou salient should one of their major commanders lose heart and falter. Both of these would come to pass during the early months of 1645 as a direct result of the Qing government’s surprisingly effective pacification of Beizhili and Shandong, and of its astonishingly rapid occupation of Shanxi and Shaanxi.

312 Xu Dingguo was a professional soldier from Taikang in Henan. He had earned considerable merit during the campaigns against White Lotus sectarians in Shandong, being promoted from major to colonel. During the Chongzhen reign, he continued his successful career as a counter-insurgent in Shandong, finally being named Regional Commander and assigned to Shanxi just before the Ming regime fell in Beijing. The Nanjing regime had ordered him to garrison Suizhou. Hu Shanyuan, Jiading yimin biezhuan, v. 4, 7:30–31. Li Jiyu, a literate farmer, led a corps of miners, local sectarians, and vagrants fleeing famine-stricken areas. He had cooperated with Liu Hongqi in defending Nanyang from Li Zicheng. Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 104; Des Forges, “Rebellion,” pp. 25–26. At this time Xu was already secretly in touch with Haoge, seeking to arrange his own defection.

313 Dodo was under orders to neutralize northwestern Henan so that his rear would be secure for a drive on Xi’an. Li Zicheng’s army had been the main military target. The order to turn from there southeastward came after the contact with the Zuo mission. Shizu shilu, 10:12, 12:1b–21, 7.
Establishing Qing Rule

The laws of the Ming dynasty were high-handed, corrupt, and evil, so that the people’s hearts were like loosened tiles, to such an extent that the roving bandits saw their chance and oppressed [the people]. Our ruling house harbored deep sympathy, and at once raised a humane and righteous army to exterminate your hostile enemies, to pull you out of the fire and the water, to return peace to your towns and cities, and to recover the hearts of the myriad surnames. But lately we have heard the local bandits burgeon and rise, assembling like crows to foment disorder. We remember that you are our children, and we cannot bear to put on our armor once again. Let it be proclaimed, therefore, that all should shave their heads and return to their peaceful employments. Let none presume on former ills. If there are willful offenders, then we shall surely exterminate them!


The new government in Beijing faced three immediately pressing tasks: to restore military order to the capital and get the civil administration operating again; to pacify the unsettled countryside of Beizhili and neighboring Shandong; and to pursue and destroy the Shun armies now fleeing to the west beyond the Taihang Mountains. It also had a longer-term priority: reformation of the bureaucracy and amelioration of the plight of the populace.¹

¹ As Dorgon put it in instructions to the Board of Rites on July 20, 1644: “Since
Local Collaborators

The Manchus could not have conquered the Central Plain without the help of Chinese military collaborators. That conquest in turn restored power to Chinese civil adherents. The late Ming had witnessed the rise of the military elite, and especially of warlords like Zuo Liangyu and Liu Zeqing, who did much to render the civil bureaucracy impotent. Whether as Shun rebels occupying the capital, or as “Guardian Generals” dictating terms to the Nanjing regime, the new militarists had increasingly come to occupy a paramount position in the empire. The Qing victories in the north and in central China neither removed the need for these militarists’ support nor destroyed their power. That final disposition would have to await the confrontation between central imperial authority and provincial military might during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories in the 1670s. But with the conquest of Beijing, the new Manchu martial elite began at once to support the revival of the old mandarinate, eclipsed by the militarization of late Ming so-

antiquity those who would settle the empire must make the netting of prominent talent their most important goal, and enriching the impoverished people their prime duty.” Da-Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu, 5:59a (hereafter cited as Shizu shilu). Although Dorgon’s rhetoric was clearly inspired by collaborators like Fan Wencheng and Song Quan (who, as the governor of Shuntian, constantly stressed the importance of recruiting men of talent), his policy made perfect sense in that situation. For Song Quan, who presented himself to the prince-regent as “an old horse who knows the road,” see Qinquan jushi, Huang Qing mingchen zouyi, 1:1a. Over two centuries later, when the U.S. Army occupied parts of Beijing in 1900–1901 after the Boxers’ siege of the legations, President McKinley instructed his commanders “to cultivate the elite and thereby minimize the possibility of resistance. . . . At the same time, the Americans should win the affection of the masses—by attending to their sufferings, by encouraging municipal reform, and by restraining the troops as well as incoming American carpetbaggers.” Michael H. Hunt, “The Forgotten Occupation,” pp. 502–503.

2 When the Manchus entered the capital—with about 250,000 troops at their disposal—they faced in the west up to 350,000 Shun remnants, in the southwest up to 250,000 of Zhang Xianzhong’s soldiers, and around Nanjing approximately 500,000 troops. They were militarily outnumbered by over four to one. Lin Tiejun, “Qingchu de kang Qing douzheng he nongmin jun de lian Ming kang Qing celüe,” p. 40.
ciety. One of the prime paradoxes of the Qing foundation of dynastic power, then, was the way in which Manchu, Mongol, and Han military bannermen from the northeast helped restore civil power in China proper.3

The occupation of Beijing and its surrounding towns was initially so successful because, from the moment he entered the capital, Dorgon made it plain that he intended to welcome former Ming officials into the new regime. On June 7, 1644, Dorgon instructed the Board of War to observe a policy of amnesty toward surrendering areas because the subjects of the empire were now “all our children.”4 Local officials were to be assured, through special proclamations, that if their wards cut their hair and surrendered, the administrators would not only be kept in office, they would also be raised one degree in rank.5 Three days later, Dorgon formally invited Ming metropolitan officials to remain in their posts once they had shaved their heads and registered in their ministry rosters. “The personnel of each yamen,” Dorgon promised, “will be hired according to their old salaries as soon as the bureaucratic roster is reported.”6 Because so many officials had already

3 In a limited way, this military restoration of civil power was similar to the Selchukid Turks’ support of the Khurasanian bureaucracy in their empire. The comparison is vitiated, however, by the fundamental differences between an army of slaves and a military elite composed of Manchu and Chinese freemen; and between the way in which the Manchus rose to power in China through control of the cities of the empire, whereas the Turks occupied Armenia and Cappadocia by expelling the Byzantine administration from the countryside. The cities were allowed to govern themselves, but lost all contact with the Byzantine government, becoming urban enclaves within a system of Turkish pastoral control. Claude Cahen, “The Turkish Invasion”; Halil Inalcik, “The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey.”

4 For a list of amnesties granted by Dorgon, see Mujagawa Hisashi, “Shin no sembu kyūshin kōsaku,” p. 989.

5 Shizu shilu, 5:51b. Each locale, depending upon its distance from Beijing, was given a deadline to accept this offer. Once the deadline was over, if people had not surrendered they were to be treated as resisters, and an army would be sent to extirpate (jiao) them. Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, 1:262–263.

compromised themselves by serving Li Zicheng, most bureaucrats accepted this offer at once. The government thus surrendered as an entity, and there were no loyalist suicides.8

In addition to officials already occupying civil service posts, other members of the scholarly elite were recommended for positions in the Qing administration.9 There were certain key figures, in this regard, who brought prominent would-be collaborators to the government’s attention. Jin Zhijun (jinshi 1619, Jiangsu), who had been the Chongzhen Emperor’s last Vice-Minister of War, was one such person. Tortured by Li Zicheng’s men, he had promptly surrendered to Dorgon. He resumed his former post immediately and carried out a policy of offering amnesties and registering all former Ming army officers, many of whom Jin recommended for office under the new regime.10 Other important officials who fre-

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7 Individual consciences were also alleviated by the practice of fellow office workers or co-provincials making the collective decision to accept a civil service position under the new regime. Xu Yingfen, for instance, met with his father and five other officials, all from Jinxian, in the Jiangxi provincial lodge, and they agreed together to serve the Qing. Xu, Yubian jilüe, p. 18a.

8 The Qing also employed men who were primarily Shun officials. The best example of this is Niu Jinxing. After he surrendered he was given a minor post in Dorgon’s government. R. V. DesForges, “Rebellion in the Central Plain,” p. 29.

9 Adam Yuen-chung Lui, The Hanlin Academy, p. 59. Although the Manchus recognized all shengyuan, juren, and jinshi, they made it very clear that they would only grant gentry privileges to those who were publicly loyal to the new dynasty. Joshua A. Fogel, trans., “Shantung in the Shun-chih Reign, Part 1,” pp. 25–26.

10 Qinchuan jushi, Huang Qing zouyi, 1:11–12; Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:368–382. Jin’s later career was illustrious. He reformed the examination system in 1646; in 1648 he was made President of the Board of Works, and five years later he became President of the Censorate. In March, 1654, he was promoted to Grand Secretary, and four years later, while concurrently acting as President of Civil Appointments, he helped fix the new Qing law code. Huang Zhijun, comp., Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 2358 (140:40a); Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, pp. 160–161; Er chen zhuan, 8:1–5. Although deserters “living in the woods and hills” were offered amnesty in return for reporting to their former unit, it was evidently not altogether easy to bring unruly Ming military units under central control. An edict from the prince-regent dated September 17, 1644, reads: “Many of the local military
quently recommended local officials and former bureaucrats for posts included: Wei Zhouyun (jinshi 1634, Shanxi), who had served as a censor under the Chongzhen Emperor; Shen Weibing, Vice-President of Personnel; and Wang Aoyong (Shandong), who was given the charge of “securing Henan and Shandong.”

Another who chose collaboration was the last Ming governor for the Shuntian (Beijing) area, the prominent Henanese official Song Quan (jinshi 1625). Like Hou Xun (Hou Fangyu’s father), Song Quan was a distinguished member of the landed gentry of Shangqiu district, where the local elite was so powerful it dared personnel who surrendered are like rats suspiciously looking two ways at once. Seeing the shape of things, they pretend to tender their allegiance, but still harbor misgivings. These kinds of people are merely seeking [an opportunity] to commit crimes. Even though they have obvious merits, it is still hard for them to redeem themselves. From now on, only those who are truly able to painfully correct their former faults and who can keep their word will have the same rank as before. As for ignorant and mean people, whether they took advantage of disorder to commit rape, or in fear of punishment turned into outlaws, they too will be forgiven their former crimes. They are permitted to renew themselves, return to their native places, and enjoy their occupations. But if they are obdurate and irreclaimable, then we must decisively kill and exterminate them, and not be lenient.” Shizu shilu, 7:87b.

Zhu Xizu et al., comps., Shunzhi yuannian neiwai guanshu zousu, 32a. Wei was placed in charge of the four prefectures of Daming, Guangping, Zhending, and Shunde as censor of the Zhili circuit. (At that time each circuit censor was given a province as his particular area of jurisdiction, but he remained in the capital. The office of provincial censor was abolished later in 1661. Adam Y. C. Lui, Corruption in China during the Early Ch’ing Period, 1644–1660, pp. 49, 63.) His nominees included the former Ming Minister of Personnel, Fu Yongchun, and the former Governor of Huguang, Wang Mengyin. Er chen zhuang, 5:25–28a; Zhang Qiyun, ed., Qing shi, benji, 1:34. Wei’s younger brother, Zhouzuo (jinshi 1637, Shanxi), also collaborated with the Manchus. A department director during the last years of the Ming, he agreed to join the Shun government, and became a department director in the Board of Civil Appointments under the Qing. In 1653 he was named Vice-President of Punishments on the recommendation of Hong Chengchou. The following year he became President of Works, and in 1658 he became both President of Civil Appointments and Grand Secretary. It was Wei Zhouzuo who together with Bahana revised the law code (lù lì) in 1660. Robert B. Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback, p. 210.
openly to challenge the authority of the county magistrate. In the spring of 1644, he had taken the post of Shuntian Grand Coordinator with headquarters at Miyun, about sixty-five kilometers northeast of the capital. When Li Zicheng entered Beijing, Song Quan (who had been in office only three days) decided that he had no choice but to collaborate with the Shun regime and bide his time. Then, when the “dashing prince” was driven out of the capital, Song turned upon the local rebel general and killed him. Announcing his allegiance to the Qing on June 6, Song Quan spoke on behalf of many other local defense leaders in north China when he said: “I am a minister of the Ming but the Ming has perished, and there is nothing to belong to. Whoever has the ability to take revenge upon the enemies of the Ming, those murdering bandits, is there upon my ruler.”

12 Song Quan had actually been jailed for a brief time in 1643 by the magistrate for supposedly leaving his local defense post without authorization. Des Forges, “Rebellion,” p. 17.
14 Gu Cheng, “Lun Qingchu shehui maodun,” pp. 141–142. See also Er chen zhu, 5:29–31; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 688–689; Des Forges, “Rebellion,” pp. 35–36. Some of these local defense organizations had been formed to protect towns from Manchu invaders. For instance, Sun Qifeng (1585–1675), the well known philosopher, had led the defense of Rongcheng (Baoding prefecture) during a seven-day siege by the Manchus in the winter of 1635–1636. Realizing that the city walls were an inadequate defense against the more heavily armed rebel groups in the west, Sun had taken his relatives and friends into the mountains southwest of Yizhou in 1638 to establish a heavily guarded community capable of surviving the waning years of the dynasty. In 1643 the group held off Manchu troops returning from the attack on Shandong. Perhaps because of his experiences fighting Manchus, Sun never did serve the Qing. Four times in 1644 he refused office under the new dynasty, and in 1646 during the “land encirclement” expropriations (when so much of Baoding’s good farm-land ended up in Manchu hands), Sun lost his farms and properties. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 671. Other prominent gentry militia leaders included the former Ming Minister of Personnel, Tian Weijia, who had defended the city of Raoyang (southwest of Tianjin), against Shun contingents. Tian sent his son to Beijing to turn control of the city over to Dorgon, who named the former minister President of Punishments. Er chen zhu, 8:8–9a. For another example of eminent Hebei gentrymen welcoming the Qing occupation as a resumption of lawful order under a new
It may have been a trifle more difficult for former officials not actually in Beijing to square their acceptance of a position under the Qing with their Confucian sense of loyalty, but at least the choice was made a little easier for them when the Manchus momentarily dropped their insistence that the Chinese shave their foreheads in tribal style. Dorgon had initially resisted this change, preferring to keep in force the haircutting policy announced the day after he entered Beijing. When the Vice-President of Punishment advised him that forcing this custom upon the Chinese risked "losing the hearts of the people," Dorgon testily replied: "I am the head (shou) of all your people. You had better take care of your hair!" But after peasant rebellions broke out at Sanhe (fifty kilo-
meters east of Beijing) and at Baoding (one hundred kilometers southwest of the capital) in protest against the haircutting order, Dorgon relented.\(^\text{18}\) On June 25, an edict from the prince-regent announced:

Formerly, because there was no way of distinguishing people who had surrendered, I ordered them to cut their hair in order to separate the yielding from the rebellious. Now I hear that this is directly contrary to the people's wishes, which contradicts my own [desire] to settle the people's minds with civil persuasion. Let each of the ministers and commoners from now on arrange their hair in the old [style], completely according to their convenience. Not wanting to augment our military force, I fear that the people would surely be

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Ninth Prince (Dorgon) was capable of carrying out “the great enterprise.” The ambassador answered that the Manchus had earned popular favor by forbidding killing and looting, and the literati (shi) supported their efforts to restore public law and order. However, the haircutting order was causing great grief and shame, and the people were extremely upset. If that policy was enforced, he concluded, then the Ninth Prince would find it very difficult to win the hearts of the people. Wu Han, comp., \textit{Chaoxian Li chao shilu zhong de Zhongguo shiliao}, p. 3734.

\(^\text{18}\) News of the Sanhe revolt, where the peasants were attacking the xian capital reached Beijing on June 9, 1644. This was a particularly impoverished area where most of the land was engrossed by the Ming imperial estate (huang zhuang). Many had fled the land, and there were few actual tillers in the area, which was excessively taxed. There were two especially alarming factors about the Sanhe uprising. First, the district lay athwart the route between Beijing and Shengjing. Second, the district capital was only partially walled, and therefore particularly prone to infiltration. The government therefore laid special emphasis on pacifying the district, and bestowed ceremonial robes on Kong Xigui, the former commander of Fengtian who had surrendered to the resisters. \textit{Shizu shilu}, 5:4 and 5:7, in Xie Guozhen, ed., \textit{Qingchu nongmin qiyi ziliao jilu}, p. 50. The revolt at Baoding was even more of a shock because the central government thought it had a solid outpost there, where the former Ming prefect, Zhang Huaguo, had been kept in office and urged to use the support of the “peaceful people” in his region for the new government. The haircutting order, however, was resisted in the countryside, and west and south of Baoding there was considerable turmoil. \textit{Baoding fuzhi}, Kangxi edition, \textit{juan} 37 in Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, pp. 61–62.
unable to bear increased military conditions. Some would die and some would flee, losing their source of livelihood. Now we shall especially despatch officials to proclaim this edict. Let the elders who shepherd the people and the leaders who command the soldiers in the yamens and garrisons of every prefecture, district, and county that surrenders prepare population registers.¹⁹

This was a begrudging concession—one that obviously rankled Dorgon—but it was made nevertheless in the spirit of Manchu paternalism that stressed the “covenant” (yue) between ruler and ruled.²⁰ And as long as the new policy prevailed, it made collaboration that much easier.²¹

One of the best-known literati to accept office under this new agreement was the famous Shanghai poet Li Wen. His father, Li Fengshan, had died during the Shun occupation of Beijing. The bereaved poet had been so grief-stricken that he was unable for days to move from the side of his father’s coffin even to take food. This display of filial sorrow impressed the officials around Dorgon, who was advised to appoint Li his private secretary.

On June 5 the prince’s army entered the capital. All of the great officials of the Inner Court felt compassion for [Li] Wen’s filial piety and also marveled at his talent, recommending that he be appointed

¹⁹ Shizu shilu, 5:55. See also Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:265; and Tan Qian, Beiyou lu, p. 354. According to some contemporaries, when Dorgon initially issued the haircutting order he was told by some of his Chinese officials that it would be resisted by southerners and might thus impede unification of the empire. “Why speak of unification (yitong)?” Dorgon is supposed to have responded. “If you take an inch, then it’s an inch; if you take a foot, then it’s a foot.” Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:9a. See also Gu, “Lun Qingchu shehui maodun,” pp. 140–141; Li Guangtao, “Hong Chengchou bei Ming shimo,” p. 253. In that case, to rescind the order may have represented a decision to proceed toward unification.

²⁰ For an example of the notion of a covenant, see the edict quoted in Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:262. On Manchu paternalism, especially in the Shunzhi and Kangxi reigns, see Guo Yunjing, “Qingchu ‘xiuyang cangli’ de sixiang,” passim.

²¹ Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:9b.
to the Hongwen Yuan to compose drafts and to serve as a private secretary.  

Was collaboration with the Qing one way for Li Wen to take revenge upon the Shun rebels for bringing about his father's death? Or was it a way of fulfilling his ambition, voiced earlier to Chen Zilong, of leaving a mark upon the empire?  

Li Wen, however, was somewhat of an exception. The majority of collaborators at that time were neither unemployed poets nor southern wenren (men of culture).  

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22 Li Wen, Chen Zilong, and Song Zhengyu, Yunxian sanzi xin shi hegao, zhuan, 2a. See also Wu Shanjia, Fushe xingshi zhuanlue, 3:2a. It is said that Chen Mingxia first brought Li Wen to Dorgon's attention. See pp. 867–868.

23 Hou Fangyu, Zhuanghui tang ji, Siyi tang shiji, 5:21a.

24 Ibid. "All major texts and documents came from his hand." Li et al., Yunxian sanzi xin shi hegao, zhuan, 2a. Li Wen was also appointed an examiner for the Shuntian examinations of 1645 (Ibid.). The Shuntian examinations that year were supervised by Zhu Zhijun (Shuntian) and Luo Xianwen (Shanxi). They selected two particularly appropriate passages. The first, from the Record of Rites (Dazhuan 2), contains the phrase: Ci qi suo de yu min bian ge zhe ye (This is what he gets from the people having changed and reformed). The second, from Analects XIII.4.iii, reads: Shang hao xin ze. . . (If the superior loves good faith, then . . .). The full passage goes: "If a superior love propriety, the people will not dare not to be reverent. If he love righteousness, the people will not dare not to submit [to his example]. If he love good faith, the people will not dare not to be sincere. Now, when these things obtain, the people from all quarters will come to him, bearing their children on their backs; what need has he of a knowledge of husbandry?" The theme sentences are given in Fashi-shan, Qing mi shuwen, 1:1a. The translation of the Analects is from James Legge, trans., Confucius, p. 265.

25 Among high level local officials in Shandong during the Shunzhi reign, about 2% were Manchus and 48.5% were Chinese collaborators from Liaodong. Among prefects and department magistrates, 6% were Manchus and about 40% were from Liaodong. Of a total number of 308 local magistrates serving in all districts, 66 (21%) were from Liaodong. Fogel, "Shantung, Part 2," pp. 4–5, 25.
ficials who joined the Qing government in 1644 and whose biographies are recorded in the 18th-century compilation Er chen zhuan (Biographies of twice-serving ministers) were administrators in the capital.26 (See Table 3 and Appendix B.) And whereas during the Chongzhen reign roughly three-quarters of the ministerial officials came from the south, two-thirds of the 1644 adherents were from the north.27 This reversal in the ratio between northerners and southerners mainly resulted from the large number of Shandong adherents: of all the er chen surrendering in 1644, one-quarter were from Shandong. If the northeast provided most of the military cadre for the Manchu conquest of north China, then it was Shandong that led by far in offering civilian support to staff the new Qing government in Beijing. The sudden prominence of Shandong men in the early Qing was owing partly to the early pacification of their province, and partly to the ready identification of local elites with dynastic law and order in rebellious areas.28

Surrender of Shandong

Perhaps more than any other province, Shandong demonstrated how quickly an alliance could develop between local elites and the Manchu conquerors against peasant dissidents, bandit loyalists,

26 Luther Carrington Goodrich, The Literary Inquisition of Ch’ien-lung, p. 155.
27 During the first year of rule in Beijing, memorialists were solely recommending men from Zhili, Shandong, Henan, and Shanxi for office. Lawrence D. Kessler, K’ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule, p. 180.
28 Initially, the new government could not decide how to deal with the village militia—some of which, like the Jining militia of Yang Jiu, were more rapacious than bandits—led by these local elites. Wang Aoyong pointed out how difficult they were to disperse, and some officials advocated collecting their weapons and dismantling the units. Dorgon finally rejected this suggestion because he felt it was impossible to maintain order with Manchu official troops alone. However, local magistrates were encouraged to buy war-horses and train militiamen on their own as an official counterbalance to landlord-led “braves.” Fogel, “Shantung, Part 2,” pp. 9–10, 16.
Table 3.  
Civil Adherents to the Qing During and After 1644

Ming civil officials who had surrendered to Li Zicheng, then to Qing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ming Office</th>
<th>Provenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chen Mingxia</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dang Chongya</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (Finance)</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liang Qingbiao</td>
<td>Hanlin bachelor</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Zhouzuo</td>
<td>Bureau Director</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai Mingshuo</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Chang</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary</td>
<td>Henan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Yindong</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Zhilong</td>
<td>Circuit Intendant</td>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Ruoqi</td>
<td>Vice-Minister</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fang Daxian</td>
<td>Circuit Intendant</td>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao Eryan</td>
<td>Hanlin bachelor</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Xin</td>
<td>Minister (Punishments)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Duan</td>
<td>Hanlin bachelor</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Jinyan</td>
<td>Minister (War)</td>
<td>Henan</td>
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<td>Liu Yuyou</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (War)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gong Dingzi</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
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<td>Sun Chengze</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
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<td>Xue Suoyun</td>
<td>Director of Studies (National University)</td>
<td>Henan</td>
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<td>Fu Jingxing</td>
<td>Censor (National University)</td>
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<td>Court Vice-Minister</td>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
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<td>Xiong Wenju</td>
<td>Bureau Director (Personnel)</td>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ye Chuchun</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (Works)</td>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 (continued)

<p>|Ming civil officials who surrendered to Dorgon individually in Beijing|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ming Office</th>
<th>Provenance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wang Zhengzhi</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (Finance)</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu Yifan</td>
<td>Bureau Director (Personnel)</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Hongzuo</td>
<td>Bureau Director (Finance)</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Zhouyun</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cao Rong</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Shian</td>
<td>Junior Supervisor of Instruction</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Weihua</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ruolin</td>
<td>Hanlin bachelor</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Aoyong(^1)</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (Finance)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin Zhijun(^1)</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (War)</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shen Weibing(^1)</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (Personnel)</td>
<td>Hubei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feng Quan(^2)</td>
<td>Grand Secretary</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
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<p>|Ming civil officials who surrendered locally, accepted amnesty, or were recommended after Shunzhi came to Beijing|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ming Office</th>
<th>Provenance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Li Huaxi</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (War)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Quan</td>
<td>Grand Coordinator (Shuntian)</td>
<td>Henan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ren Jun</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (War)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Xuan</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Jian</td>
<td>Grand Coordinator (Xuanhua)</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xie Sheng</td>
<td>Minister (Personnel)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tian Weijia</td>
<td>Minister (Personnel)</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
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<tr>
<td>Huang Tu’an</td>
<td>Circuit Intendant</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fang Kezhuang</td>
<td>Asst. Censor-in-Chief</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Hanru</td>
<td>Grand Coordinator (Sichuan)</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
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Table 3 (continued)

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Miao Zuotu</td>
<td>Grand Coordinator (Yunyang)</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Zhilin</td>
<td>Secretary of the Directory of Instruction</td>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Zhengzong</td>
<td>Hanlin bachelor</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xie Qiguang</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (War)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Zhixie</td>
<td>Hanlin bachelor</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Lusheng</td>
<td>Vice-Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Guan</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Shiliang</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (Punishments)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huo Da</td>
<td>Grand Coordinator of Jiangsu</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Weiye</td>
<td>Junior Supervisor of Instruction</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
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</table>

Ming civil officials who surrendered during and after the fall of Nanjing, or when territory was occupied after Nanjing fell

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Provenance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhou Lianggong</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>Henan (resident of Nanjing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Yingbin</td>
<td>Bureau Director (Personnel)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Fengxiang</td>
<td>Minister (Works)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qian Qianyi</td>
<td>Minister (Rites)</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
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Sources: Dates of surrender taken from Sun Zhentao, Qing shi shulun, pp. 21–25. Primary data from Er chen zhuan.

\(^1\) Tortured by Li Zicheng’s men; paid to be released.
\(^2\) In retirement. Invited by letter from Dorgon to serve.
\(^3\) Tortured by Li Zicheng’s men.
and urban rebels. Although there certainly were prominent instances of Ming loyalism among people from this province, collaboration in defense of common social interests was far more typical of the Shandong gentry’s response to the Manchu invasion. This in turn accounts for the high number of that province’s literati among the “twice-serving ministers.” The alliance may also have been eased by the mutual proximity of the two peninsulas of Liaodong and Shandong and because many of the frontiersmen from the northeast had strong ties, often through maritime trade or naval service, with Shandong families. But the key to understanding the reaction of the Shandong gentry to the new Qing government was the high degree of violent class conflict in the province well before the Manchus arrived.

During the late Ming, Shandong was a province of social and economic extremes. Cities like Jining prospered during the late 16th century, and Linqing especially flourished as a regional entrepot—lying as it did along the Grand Canal. There were also some well-to-do rural districts, like Zichuan which was dominated by large landlords. But the central part of the province, around the massif of the Tai and Meng mountains, and the southwest were very poor areas, often struck by famine in the 1620s and ’30s. In the southwest the landlords were not rich, but they were

29 Xie Guozhen especially singled out eastern Shandong as an example of the way in which the local landlords’ animus against the peasantry made the Manchus appear to be natural allies. Xie oversimplifies the case, especially when he argues for the natural “nationalism” of the peasants, the Volk. But there is certainly more than a germ of truth to his argument, even though it has been criticized by other Chinese historians in recent years. See Frederic Wakeman Jr., ed., Ming and Qing Historical Studies in the People’s Republic of China, p. 93.

30 One of the best-known exemplars of loyalism was Liu Yunhao, whose tough Shandong xiang yong (village braves) fought to the death during the siege of Jianchang (Jiangxi). Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, p. 344.

31 Susan Naquin, Shantung Rebellion, p. 35.

32 Jing Su and Luo Lun, Landlord and Laborer in Late Imperial China, pp. 46–48.

33 In the county of Zou in the early 1600s, 80–90% of the rural population consisted of “poor peasants” who only owned from 3 to 30 mu of land. Taniguchi Kikuo, “Peasant Rebellions in the Late Ming,” p. 62. There was a terrible famine in 1616, followed by a period of dearth in the 1620s. P. Alvarez
deeply entrenched, living in moated and high-storied manors (*jia-zhuang*) defended by private retainers.\(^34\) Banditry was a way of life.\(^35\) The main eastern road from Beijing to Xuzhou passed through western Shandong, and whole families—even entire villages—turned to robbery as their main source of livelihood.\(^36\) Travellers reaching the dreaded stretch of post road between Teng and the prefectural capital of Yanzhou thought themselves blessed if they escaped highwaymen (*xiangma*), and fortunate if their carts did not mire down, putting them at the mercy of local peasants who would rent their mules to them at outrageous rates to pull them out of the mud.\(^37\)

Shandong was also one of the major centers of sectarian Buddhism. During 1622, a White Lotus rebellion led by Xu Hongru lasted for six months and involved 2 million people before it was finally put down with 47,000 official troops.\(^38\) One of the reasons

Semedo, *Histoire universelle de la Chine*, p. 31. The registered adult male population (ding) of Shouzhang county (about 80 kilometers south of Linqing) declined from 37,773 in the late 16th century to 2,200 by the early Qing. Naquin, *Shantung*, pp. 8–9.

> Fogel, “Shantung, Part 1,” p. 30. The social conditions there have been described as “feudal,” insofar as the local landlords lived like military warlords. In the 19th century, a typical local magnate of the Shandong-Jiangsu-Henan border region lived in what was virtually a castle: a stockade surrounded by deep ditches and good walls, with two square towers four stories high above the brick dwellings. Enclosed there, in addition to dwelling and arsenal, were flower gardens and pavilions. The magnate might own as many as 6,000 acres of land, and hundreds of neighbors would get a daily pittance from him.


> Later in the Qing, Caizhou was famous throughout China as being “the land where bandits grow.” Banditry was often seasonal, becoming most common in late summer, when the sorghum grew 2 to 3 meters tall and offered convenient cover for ambushes, and in the winter, which was the agricultural off-season. Esherick, “Boxer,” pp. 7–8.

> This area remained impoverished. In 1979, 73% of the production teams in Caoxian were unable to distribute any cash at all to their members at the end of the year. *China Daily*, Dec. 18, 1981, p. 4.

> Zhao Jishi, *Ji yuan ji suo ji, juan 1*, cited in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, pp. 81–82.

> Xu was a pupil of Wang Sen, who founded the popular Incense-Smelling Sect
for this popular explosion was the Manchu conquest of Liaodong: thousands of refugees from the war zone poured back into Shandong, seeking escape from the Manchu raiders. In 1642 and 1643, however, the Manchus forayed deep into Shandong proper. The result was administrative and social chaos. Cities like Linqing were severely damaged, and rural areas were even more devastated. By 1643 the local magistrates were collecting no taxes, and reportedly had stopped holding any trials whatsoever. Formal government ceased to exist, and power was wielded either by leagues of local magnates or by powerful robber gangs. South of Yanzhou, in Teng and Yi counties, the district capitals were re-

(Wenxiang jiao) in the late 16th century. Xu declared that an era of "great completion and renewed victory" (dacheng xingsheng) had arrived when he launched the rebellion in June, 1622. He and his followers initially occupied Zou and Teng districts, and blocked the Grand Canal. However, Xu was unable to defeat the militia in Qufu (where the Confucian family estate is), and eventually the main rebel force was surrounded by local militia and supplementary troops in Teng and defeated. Xu was executed in Beijing. Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, pp. 587–589; Susan Naquin, “The Connectedness behind Rebellion,” pp. 4–6; J. J. M. de Groot, Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China, pp. 167–168; Cheng Tingheng, ed., Daming xianzhi, 12: 16a; Wan Shouqi, Xi xi cao tang jì, pp. 166–169 (3: 7b–9a); Semedo, Histoire universelle, pp. 133–135; He Zhiji, ed., Anhui tongzhi, p. 2608 (331: 4a).

39 Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, zhong, 23a.

40 According to a 1686 inscription, after the Manchu attacks, Linqing was reduced to one-fifth its former glory. Jining was also badly affected. In the early 1600s, the ding quota for Jining and three neighboring districts was 49,554. In 1644, it had dropped to 17,590. Jining’s population did not reach Wanli period levels until the late eighteenth century, by which time Linqing had also recovered much of its former commercial glory. Jing and Luo, Landlord and Laborer, pp. 48, 56. As for the rural areas, a 1645 report claimed that in many districts only one or two were left alive in each household, and only one or two of each 10 mu of land was being cultivated. Guo Songyi, “Qingchu fengjian guojia kenhuan zhengce fenxi,” p. 112.

41 Ray Huang, “The Grand Canal during the Ming Dynasty,” p. 132; Wu Ruohao, ed., Zouxian xu zhi, pp. 419–420. The largest of these local bandit groups in 1641–1642 was a confederation recruited from among grain transport workers, post-horse grooms, and petty merchants. Its leader was named Li Qingshan, and the headquarters of the bandit army was located in Liangshan, where the heroes of Water Margin had stayed. Satō Fumitoshi, “Dozoku Riseizan no ran ni tsuite,” p. 118.
peatedly attacked and the local magistrates had no authority at all. Contemporary accounts claimed that seven out of every ten households were engaged in criminal activities. Rural society was starkly divided into dao hu (robber households) and liang min (good people), and the latter were by and large the landowners, whose interests in pacification coincided with the government’s.\(^{42}\)

Alongside the “robber households” there existed permanent encampments of outlaws in the area known as Nine Mountains (Jiu shan), to the east of Teng county. The largest of these “lairs” was commanded by Wang Jun, a martial arts expert and local landlord who had turned to robbery after he lost all of his property during the disastrous harvest of 1640.\(^{43}\) West of his redoubt, along the north-south highway in Yanzhou prefecture and alongside the Grand Canal in Jiaxiang, was a region known locally as Manjiadong—“Caves Filled with Households.” This area was a moderately hilly section comprising four districts with a circumference of three hundred li, and was dotted with thousands of caves and many concentrations of fortified two-storey stone forts. During the uprisings and invasions of the last years of the Ming, the peasants of Manjiadong had taken refuge in these grottoes, using cloth to screen off the entrances. The entire area was completely out of the control of local authorities, and xiangbing (village troops) sent into the cave zone to enforce the law were more than once completely exterminated. Some of the outlaw gangs had become large

42 Bi xian zhi, Guangxu edition, juan 8, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 80. Throughout the late Ming the counties around Yanzhou were noted both for their poverty and the harshness of their gentry. Fujita Keiichi, “Shinsho Santô ni okeru fucki sei ni tsuite,” p. 4. Yanzhou was also known for its repeated peasant uprisings during the Ming: the rebellions of Liu Liu and Liu Qi during the Zhengde period (1506–1521), of Xu Hongru in the Tianqi reign (1621–1627), and of other White Lotus sectarians during the Chongzhen era (1628–1644). Satô, “Dozoku Riskeian,” p. 120.

43 According to local lore, Wang had grown wealthy by reclaiming land which he then rented out. His goal was to buy an official rank. However, he overextended his credit, and when a bad year struck, he lost all he owned. Going into the mountains, Wang built a walled stockade, and in 1643 he and his former tenants attacked the xian capital. Bi xian zhi, Guangxu ed., juan 8, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 80–81.
agglomerations; and confederations of the gangs, loosely allied under leaders who often claimed dynastic titles, ruled the countryside as they wished. "The villages," one official reported, "are utterly devastated, without survivors."

Opposed to these enclaves of outlaws and rebel rulers were the gentry and their allies, who probably differed little in ferocity and cruelty from the bandits they fought. The armies of the landlords were almost like feudal bands: well trained in many cases, often fiercely loyal, and generally led by a core of "housemen" or liege-men personally subordinate to the gentry leaders they served. The army of Yu Weixin, a local magnate of Zou county, amounted to 800 infantrymen, well disciplined and ready to battle alongside regular military units. And Liu Junxue, a notable from Jiaxiang itself, assembled and trained a force of over 30,000 "righteous braves" (yi yong) at the time of the Manchu conquest.

The key to the eventual consolidation of Qing control over Shandong was the interlocking of this system of personally-led militia with officially supplied and appointed regular troops under the command of the central government. At the lowest xian level, local gentry (xiangshen) formed village militia (xiangbing). These militiamen were organized into individual brigades (ying), and further assembled into "families" (jia) of eighty to one hundred soldiers under their own militia commander (lianzong). As "house-

44 Report dated October 1, 1644, in Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, vol. 1, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 74. The main leader in 1644 was named Li Wensheng, and he styled himself "The Prince Who Holds up Heaven" (Qing tian wang). See also Shizu shilu, 17:200b, report dated July 12, 1645; Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 74, 78.

45 Some of these, like the gentry-led militia of Jining before the time of the Xu Hongru rebellion, also were interlocked with local relief offices and charitable granaries. The militia groups also distributed medicine and buried corpses during epidemics. As a result, Jining was an island of stability in a surrounding sea of rural disorder. Fogel, "Shantung, Part 1," pp. 6–7.

46 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 5, report dated September 23, 1644, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 79.

47 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 6, report dated November 21, 1644, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 77. Laizhou, Anqiu, and Jinan all had such gentry-led militia groups. Zhao Lisheng, "Li Zicheng difang zhengquan suo zao dizhu wuzhuang de pohuai," pp. 45–47.
men” (jiading) they were personally loyal to the local lords and magnates who fed and clothed them. This semi-feudal relationship was actually nurtured by the civil authorities: the governor himself provided funds to pay the personal troops “under the banner” (biao xia) of each commander. The same principle of personal loyalty as well as the official recognition of individual units of “housemen under the banner” of a commander was extended to higher-level military units. At the prefectural level there were assemblages of troops known generally as guards units (zhen). And, in addition to the large contingent of personally-commanded housemen under the local gentry, there were also housemen under regular Qing officials. Moreover, the personal forces of local gentry could be transferred from one district to another as the occasion demanded. What came to be called “skilled braves” (ji yong) by the governor in his reports to Beijing thus became a major force behind Qing rule.

48 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 78. As Governor Fang Daxian explained in a memorial: “Each brigade officer commands a column, as well as leading eight head-shaven housemen sent in advance of the column as scouts.” Ibid., p. 79.

49 Throughout the empire, during the first decade of rule by the new dynasty, local officials were told by the government that they must employ guards whose salaries they had to pay and who had to be provided with weapons. These escorts were supposed to get the local official to his post in safety. In 1653 the personal bodyguard system was no longer made compulsory, but many officials continued to employ these men-at-arms. Lui, Corruption, p. 3.

50 We read, for instance, in an account of the defense of Zhangqiu against rebels in 1647 that the government forces consisted of: (1) regular garrison troops under army captains; (2) yamen police commanded by a constable (bu), who also led a contingent of “housemen” (jiading); (3) the personal housemen of the prefect (“At that moment Prefect Chen led his personal housemen to block off the street entrance”); (4) the personal housemen of a former Ming soldier and local magnate (“The Ming Captain Yu Dahai and others commanded their housemen”); (5) village militia (xiangbing) specially assembled to defend the city, and led by local gentry (xiangshen). Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 87. In another instance of local defense in Shandong in 1647, the circuit intendant, in addition to commanding regular garrison troops, also led his personal housemen. Ibid., pp. 83–84. One of the main reasons why local gentrymen were willing to turn over their tax records to the new government was that Governor Fang Daxian and his aides had the ability during emergencies to send local militia from one department to another (e.g., from Qufu to Zou district in Yanzhou). Fogel, “Shantung, Part 1,” p. 17.
Many of these local landlord militia units, especially in northwestern Shandong, had already been mobilized against the short-lived Shun regime. After Li Zicheng occupied Beijing, he sent military officials and magistrates to take over district and prefec-
tural capitals in Shandong. There they had applied the same policy of torturing for ransom as prevailed in the capital, and the local gentry were the first to be rounded up. In Yanzhou (which was the seat of the Ming Prince of Lu), for example, Shun leaders attracted the support of the so-called “unreliable” (wulai) lower classes and attacked the local gentry; and in Jining, where General Guo Zhiwei took over for the Shun, officials, degree-holders, and wealthy householders were held and tortured for more than 480,000 ounces of silver ransom. Particularly cruel and rapacious were the officials occupying Dezhou, at the junction of the Grand Canal and the imperial post road on the Shandong–Beizhili border. On June 1, 1644, the local gentry there, led by the eminent scholar-official Xie Sheng (jinshi 1607), rose in revolt. As Xie Sheng himself later explained in a letter to the Qing government:

On June 1, your minister and others encouraged the commoners and gentry of the entire district to slice open the spurious Magis-
trate Wu Huiwen and the spurious Captain Yan Jie. We vowed to

51 Huaicheng jishi, p. 133. The Ming governor of the province, Qiu Zude, killed the Shun representative sent to demand his surrender, and fled south. Zhang Tingyu, et al., comps., Ming shi (Guofang yanjuyuan), p. 3111 (hereafter Ming shi). Most gentry in Shandong, however, at first surrendered to Li Zicheng without resistance. It was only when Shun officials seized land to turn over to the peasants and began torturing landlords in order to extort money that the gentry—which had been impressed by the righteousness of the peasants’ cause—decided to resist Li Zicheng’s men. Hong Huanchun, “Lun Mingmo nongmin zhengquan de gemingxing he fengjianxing,” p. 72; Fogel, “Shantung, Part 1,” pp. 8–13.

52 Luo Chenglie, “Cong Da Shun ‘Chuangjian xinnü qiao’ bei kan Li Zicheng qiyi jun zai Shandong diqu de yixie huodong,” p. 39. The ninth Prince of Lu, Zhu Yihai, escaped south to Jingkou (modern Zhenjiang). The Jining gentry, after expelling the Shun officials, contacted the Southern Ming regime for help. All that they got back from Shi Kefa was a calling card. Hence, they had no alternative but to turn to the Qing for support against the rebels and their local allies. Fogel, “Shantung, Part 1,” pp. 15–16.
assemble and advance into battle, arousing far and near. Together we killed the spurious officials in the Chuang bandits’ government. The bandit General Guo Sheng lost his courage and fled west.\(^\text{53}\)

Having expelled the Shun officers, Xie Sheng and the local gentry invited a Ming imperial kinsman named Zhu Shiqin to rule over the area as the Prince of Ji.\(^\text{54}\) Under his banner they encouraged gentrymen in other districts to form militia and attack Shun garrisons. Just northwest of Ji’nan, at Zhangqiu, another such militia group formed. Led by Xie Sheng’s classmate and former Vice-Minister of War, Xie Qiguang, two thousand residents of the city liberated the area from rebel rule.\(^\text{55}\) And in prosperous Zichuan, former Hanlin Academy member Sun Zhixie (jinshi 1622) contributed much of his family’s wealth to form and train a local militia force that defended his kinsmen and neighbors’ property, and drove the Shun forces out of the district.\(^\text{56}\)

News of the Dezhou uprising soon reached Shi Kefa and the Southern Ming headquarters at Yangzhou. Shi was elated to hear that so important an official as Xie Sheng—though well known for his support of the appeasement policies of Chen Xinjia while he was a grand secretary and junior tutor of the heir apparent—appeared to be swinging the gentry of northern Shandong in the direction of a Ming restoration. He therefore sent an envoy north with copies of the announcement of the Prince of Fu’s succession

\(^{53}\) Er chen zhuan, 7:34a.

\(^{54}\) Zhu had been a magistrate at Xianghe, south of Sanhe in Beizhili. He fled his post when Li Zicheng took Beijing, and was captured and held prisoner by the Shun Captain Yan Jie.

\(^{55}\) Er chen zhuan, 9:21–23a. Sometimes, commoners led the resistance against rebels and outlaws. Cao Anzuo, a local Zou county bravo known for his skill and courage in an area famous for masters of the martial arts, barred his door against bandits and threw down burning charcoal upon them from the second storey of his fortified house. He was rewarded later by the Qing for his work in “pacifying” bandits. Du Chengmei, another commoner, saved his village from a bandit siege and allied with prefectural troops against the outlaws. Wu Ruohao, Zouxian xu shi, p. 420.

\(^{56}\) Er chen zhuan, 9:24a–27a. One of the wealthiest men in China then, Bi Ziyan, was from Zichuan. Xie, Qinghu nongmin, p. 13.
to the throne in Nanjing. However, Shi Kefa’s hopes for creating a loyalist outpost along the Beizhili border were quickly disappointed. Forced into retirement by the very same “righteous” literati now supporting Shi Kefa, Xie Sheng was not favorably disposed toward the Nanjing regime. Appalled by Li Zicheng’s depredations and impressed by the Manchus’ transformation into a host of virtuous avengers, Xie Sheng joined with more than forty other leading members of the Shandong gentry and sent a representative to Beijing with a letter to the Qing government. The letter explained quite frankly how he and his fellow townsmen had come to revolt, and even how they had used the Ming prince to gather support. But the intent of their revolt was, ultimately, “to sweep our local earth respectfully to await the blessings of Heaven” just as one sweeps off a couch to greet an honored guest. In his own heart, added Xie Sheng, he reverently wished to render his allegiance (guishun) to the new Qing dynasty.

Northerners and Southerners

The arrival of Xie Sheng’s letter in Beijing coincided with the court’s consciously coined policy to place more emphasis upon securing the immediate allegiance of northerners. As early as June 16, 1644, Dorgon had been advised of the necessity of this by the Liaodong frontiersmen Zu Kefa and Zhang Cunren, who pointed out to the prince-regent that the financial health of the regime depended upon clearing the roads through Shandong so that grain

57 Kunshan yimin ningren Gu Yanwu (Wen Bing), Sheng'an benji (Jiayi shian), pp. 48–49 (hereafter cited as Wen Bing, Jiayi shian). Wen Bing maintains that the Ming prince was actually supported by a Dezhou gongsheng named Xie Bi, and that the character was confused by Shi’s informant with the name of Xie Sheng for obvious reasons. This is an implausible story. First, it is unlikely that a literatus would use “Bi” (throne steps) in his name, since it might be mistaken as lèse majesté. Second, Xie Sheng himself admitted his support of the Ming ruler to the Manchus in a tone of embarrassment. Er chen zhuang, 7:34a.

58 Er chen zhuang, 7:34a.
could be transported along them, and securing the communications through Shanxi so that the merchants from there who were providing vital funds for the government could travel safely.\(^{59}\) If the dynasty adopted a policy of “soothing” (zhao\(f\)i) the populace by awarding amnesties, then its financial needs would be met. Otherwise, they would soon face a fiscal crisis. “You are right,” Dorgon told the two men, and thus strongly encouraged proponents of a policy of moderate pacification like Jin Zhijun and Cao Rong, who assured him that the granting of selective amnesties and the avoidance of harsh extermination measures would win the support of local populaces and solve the bandit problem.\(^{60}\) The prince-regent soon issued an order that civil officials should “quickly make known the names of those of unusual talent and magnanimous virtue who have sunk into retirement, so that provision may be made for their recruitment.”\(^{61}\)

One of the first to respond to Dorgon’s invitation for the names of local collaborators was the new governor of Shandong, Wang Aoyong, who also held the honorary post of Vice-President of Revenue.\(^{62}\) Wang, who was from Shandong himself, was even then encouraging local literati to accept the new dynasty; and on August 13, 1644, he submitted an initial list of thirty-nine names of Shandong notables, including Xie Sheng, Xie Qiguang, and some of the other leaders of the gentry militia forces.\(^{63}\) A few days

\(^{59}\) As soon as the Manchus entered Beijing. Dorgon appointed Shanxi merchants the official merchants (zheng shang) of the Imperial Household Bureau. Wei Qingyuan and Wu Qiyan, “Qingdai zhuming huang shang Fan shi de xing shuai,” p. 2; Sacki Tomi, “Qingdai de Shanxi shangren,” p. 282.

\(^{60}\) Er chen zhuan, 6:17–21a. For the conversation between Dorgon and the two ministers, see Sacki, “Shanxi shangren,” p. 282.

\(^{61}\) Zhu et al., Shunzhi yuanmian nei\(w\)ai, p. 32a. Similar orders were issued in 1649. Lui, Hanlin Academy, p. 59.

\(^{62}\) When the Zuo Maodi mission passed through Shandong, its members found that the province was completely dominated by Wang Aoyong and Fang Daxian, who controlled all of the yamen. According to them, Wang and Fang were hated by the common people: “the masses spit on their faces.” Chen Hongfan, Bei shi jili\(e\), p. 120.

\(^{63}\) The 39 names are given on the Neige copy of Wang’s memorial, which can be
later, on August 21, Wang's recommendations were seconded to a degree by Shen Weibing, the Beizhili official who had accepted office under Li Zicheng and was now serving as Vice-President of Civil Appointments. Like Zhang Cunren and Zu Kefa, Shen Weibing stressed the importance of rapidly pacifying the northern provinces. He therefore suggested that the government make special efforts to appoint former officials from the four provinces of Beizhili, Shandong, Henan, and Shanxi, where local pacification would be much easier if local notables took provincial leadership.

To help that effort, Shen therefore submitted a list of thirty-six names of his own, arranged by province. (See Table 4.) Altogether, his list contained the names of sixteen Shandong men, six Beizhili men, nine Shanxi men, and five Henan men. Of the Shandong officials, seven had also been recommended by Wang Aoyong. Other nominations were also sent forward at this time by yet other officials. Vice-President Liu Yuyou of the Board of War submitted his own list of names which included three men from Shandong, three from Beizhili, and one each from Shaanxi, Henan, and Shanxi.65 General Bahana (d. 1666) and General Shi Tingzhu (1599–1661) both recommended the former Vice-Minister of War, Li Huaxi (jinshi 1634), who had returned to Shandong with his

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64 Zhu et al., Shunzhi yuannian neiwai, (19a).
65 Ibid., (1).
### Table 4.
**Officials Recommended by Shen Weibing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ming Office</th>
<th>Native Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Fengxiang</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (War)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fang Kezhuang</td>
<td>Asst. Censor-in-Chief</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Xin</td>
<td>Minister (Punishments)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuo Maodi</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary (Personnel)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheng Yong</td>
<td>Nanjing Censor</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ye Tingxiu</td>
<td>Secretary, Minister (War)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao Youwen</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (Seal Office)</td>
<td>Shandong(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuo Maotai</td>
<td>Vice-Director (Personnel)</td>
<td>Shandong(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Huaxi</td>
<td>Governor-General</td>
<td>Shandong(^1,4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shen Xin</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary (War)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mao Jiuhua</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Zongchang</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hao Gang</td>
<td>Circuit Intendant</td>
<td>Shandong(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ren Jun</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Shandong(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Shicong</td>
<td>Imperial Tutor</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geng Zhangguang</td>
<td>Vice-Director (War)</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Changling</td>
<td>Director (Personnel)</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feng Jie</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Siwei</td>
<td>Imperial Tutor</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai Mingshuo</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Jiazhen</td>
<td>Vice-Minister (War)</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Chunzhen</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>Beizhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Sanmo</td>
<td>Chief Minister of the Grand Court of Revision</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Shoulü</td>
<td>Director (Works)</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Xuan</td>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Huanyun</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yin Run</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary (Personnel)</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ming Office</th>
<th>Native Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Xixia</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary (Rites)</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Hualong</td>
<td>Supervising Secretary (Revenue)</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Diyuan</td>
<td>Vice-Minister of the Court</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Imperial Sacrifices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Qiyu</td>
<td>Governor-General</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lian Guoshi</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Henan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zheng Eryang</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Henan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Zhengxiu</td>
<td>Surveillance Vice-Commissioner</td>
<td>Henan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ding Qijun</td>
<td>Governor-General</td>
<td>Henan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ding Kuichu</td>
<td>Governor-General</td>
<td>Henan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** This table is compiled from the photographic reprint of the Neige copy of the memorial reproduced in Zhu Xizu et al., comps., *Shunzhi yuanmian neiwai guanshu zoushu*, on folios no. 19b–21a.

1 These names also appear on Wang Aoyong's list of recommendations. (See pp. 437–438.)

2 Ming civil officials who had surrendered to Li Zicheng, then to the Qing.

3 Ming civil officials who surrendered to Dorgon individually in Beijing.

4 Ming civil officials who surrendered locally, accepted amnesty, or were recommended after Shunzhi came to Beijing.

5 Ming civil officials who surrendered when territory was occupied after Beijing fell.

Army when Li Zicheng took Beijing and who now handed over his military rosters to these Qing officers.66

Dorgon accepted most of these recommendations. Li Huaxi was made Vice-President of War, and then later in 1647 became

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66 *Er chen zhuan*, 5:21–24a. Li Huaxi (*jinshi* 1634) was a prominent member of the Shandong gentry who had served as a military defense intendant for the Tianjin circuit, as governor of Sichuan, and as viceroy of Shaanxi. In the early part of 1644, Li was acting as viceroy of the three frontier zones. After Pingyang fell to Li Zicheng, Li Huaxi realized that the capital was doomed.
President of Punishments. Sun Zhixie became Vice-President of Rites. Xie Qiguang was asked to serve as Vice-President of Revenue. Ren Jun became Vice-President of Revenue, and shortly after occupying that post, President of the Board of Punishments. And on August 24, Xie Sheng was ordered to present himself at court, where he was invited to enter the Three Inner Courts as

He therefore took the troops under his command back to Shandong where they were supported and fed locally. In September, 1644, once it was clear that the Manchus intended to remain in Beijing, Li sent a major under his command to announce his allegiance to the Qing. In addition to being recommended by Bahana and Shi Tingzhu, he was also strongly supported by the Qing viceroy of Tianjin, Luo Yangxing. Ibid., 5:21–24a. Bahana’s recommendation, dated August 18, 1644, is given in Shizu shilu, 6:70. Shi Tingzhu joined the Manchus in 1622, and ended up commanding a wing of Tong Yangxing’s army, which in 1639 became one of the first Chinese banners. Both he and Bahana were assigned to “pacify” (pingding) Shandong. Shi bore the title of an imperial son-in-law: gusa ejen. See Shizu shilu, 11:127b.

67 Er chen zhuan, 9:24–271.
69 Ibid., 7:32–33.
70 Ren Jun (jinshi 1624, Shandong) had been a military censor under the Ming. Liu Yuyou brought his name to the attention of Dorgon. As Vice-President of Revenue, Ren Jun made several important suggestions for improving fiscal regulations. As President of Punishments, Ren Jun supervised a major review of the law code. In 1644 Dorgon had decreed that the Board of Punishments should follow the Ming code in deciding punishments. However, there were items in the Ming code which were at considerable variance with Manchu regulations. It was therefore ordered that the appropriate ministries each enumerate the laws for Manchu and Han populations independently, and forward their lists to the Board of Punishments for the reconciliation of disparities. Criminal jurisdictions were also specified, as well as appeal procedures. Ren Jun additionally suggested revisions in the Administrative Regulations (Hui dian), thus adapting Ming administrative sanctions to Qing practices by a continuing process of adjustment. In 1646, during the fifth lunar month, a Manchu-language version of the Da Qing lü (Great Qing Code) was also completed. Er chen zhuan, 5:33–34a. For the order to reconcile the Manchu and Han regulations, see the edict dated March 11, 1645, in Shizu shilu, 14:160b; and for jurisdiction and appeal procedures, see the edict dated February 12, 1646, in Ibid., 22:270b. See also Xu Daolin, Zhongguo fazhi shi lunli, p. 106; Fu-mei Chang Chen, “The Influence of Shen Chih-chi’s Chichu Commentary upon Ch’ing Judicial Decisions,” p. 170.
Grand Secretary of the Hongwen Yuan, and where he was once again appointed President of Civil Appointments. Dorgon also rewarded the Shandong landlords as an entire group by accepting Wang Aoyong’s recommendation that the province’s taxes be momentarily “forgiven”; and during the following year, 1645, the prince-regent granted Sun Zhixie’s request that the tax burden be lightened for a longer period of time.

Within about three months of Dorgon’s entry into Beijing, then, both the Chinese President and Vice-President of the Board of Civil Appointments were from Shandong. Recommended by fellow Shandong men, they in turn brought other Shandong leaders to the attention of the central government, and the influence of that province’s notables became even more evident in the capital. Moreover, Shandong men did quite well in the civil service examinations, as did northerners in general during these early years. The quotas for jinshi were enlarged in 1644 and 1645, and while this had the momentary effect of widening the access to higher office, the distribution was mainly restricted to uncontested areas, which then meant Beizhili, Shandong, and Shanxi. Given the legitimate success of southerners in the regular civil service exam-

71 Dorgon’s order is attached to the Neige copy of Wang Aoyong’s memorial in Zhu et al., Shunzhi yuannian neiwei (34b). Xie Sheng took his new posts on September 27, 1644. Zheng Qiyun, ed., Qing shi, 1:34.

72 Shizu shilu, 6:71b, edict dated August 20, 1644; Er chen zhuan, 9:26.

73 Exams were announced almost as soon as the Manchus entered Beijing. At the same time, the education commissioner of the metropolitan prefecture of Shuntian (Beijing) recommended a number of scholars already holding the highest degree for immediate appointment. This had the effect of emptying the reservoir of higher degree-holders already awaiting appointment to office. It should be noted, however, that soon the funnel narrowed. On September 10, 1644, it was recommended that Liaodong be incorporated in the regular examination system; and early in 1645, a member of the Board of Rites strongly advocated that sons of both Chinese and Manchu officials be routinely enrolled in the National University. These measures were approved, and as special provincial examination quotas were set aside for Manchu, Mongol, and Han bannermen, the slightly increased number of jinshi degrees had to be shared among a proportionally larger cohort of candidates. Shizu shilu, 7:82a; Qing shi liezhuan, 79:236–246; Ping-ti Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China, pp. 111–115, 344; Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 9.
Establishing Qing Rule during the last two centuries, there must have appeared to many a disproportionate favoring of northerners who had succeeded for what seemed to be contingent factors, including perhaps even a deliberate policy to favor men from north China at the expense of southern literati. Suspicions of such a policy were confirmed in many people's eyes by Dorgon's decision, shortly after entering Beijing, to appoint to the presidency of the Board of Rites the former Wei Zhongxian partisan Feng Quan, who was one of the most controversial figures of the time.  

Feng Quan had been forced into retirement by the fundamentalists in 1629, and—as we have seen—efforts to restore his offices and honors to him during the Chongzhen reign were continually frustrated. There was a considerable stir, therefore, when he became President of Rites on June 18, 1644. Although Dorgon was undoubtedly eager to secure the services of an important member of the Hebei gentry who had led local defense efforts in his native town, his reasons for appointing such a controversial figure—one who was bound to raise the hackles of "righteous" literati—remain something of a mystery. To be sure, Feng Quan was a specialist in imperial ritual, and he was subsequently asked by Dorgon to select the music to be used in Qing court ceremonies and sacrifices. But it is quite possible that by naming him President of Rites, Dorgon may have been emphasizing the point often made by members of his court that the factional struggles of the late Ming were over: the past had to be buried. By even-handedly appointing a man identified as an enemy of the Donglin, the prince-regent may have been deliberately broadening the constituency of the government.

Unfortunately, this was not the way Feng Quan's appointment was viewed by most literati, both inside and outside the govern-

74 Dorgon personally invited Feng Quan to join the new government. Zhang, Qing shi, 246:3786; Zhang Yi, Sou wen xu bi, 1:8b.
76 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:33.
ment. Donglin or Restoration Society members and their partisans could not forget that Feng Quan was one of the compilers of the infamous *Sanchao yaodian.* And if they were southerners, they could not but associate the appointment of a man well known for his antipathy to Jiangnan literati with a deliberate policy to exclude people of that region from high metropolitan office. Moreover, as President of Rites, Feng Quan was likely to play a prominent role in supervising the metropolitan examinations, the first of which was to be held in 1646. Indeed, Dorgon did give him charge of the *jinshi* examinations of that year, and of the 373 *jinshi* 365, or 98 percent, came from the north, a Shandong scholar winning first place, and Beizhili men placing second and third. (See Table 5.) These candidates may well have deserved such high placement because troubled conditions in the Yangzi valley prevented the most qualified southerners from sitting for the exams, but most people probably believed that Feng Quan’s supervision had disqualified many southerners from the highest degree.

78 Feng Quan was extremely conscious of his vulnerability to accusations of having acted as Wei Zhongxian’s henchman. Once having joined the Manchus’ Inner Three Courts, he gained access to the Historiography Office, and is said to have secretly removed parts of the Ming *Veritable Records* that presented him in a bad light. Wolfgang Franke, *An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History,* p. 18.

79 Although it is not known exactly when the order was given, after 1645, natives of Suzhou, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Songjiang, Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou were not supposed to hold high metropolitan offices. That order was not formally rescinded until June, 1660. Oxnam, *Horseback,* p. 103.

80 Zhu et al., *Shunzhi yuannian neiwai,* preface, 1a.

81 Provincial examinations were held for Jiangnan candidates in 1645, the examiners being Liu Zhaoguo (Huguang) and Cheng Kegong (Beizhili). The topic sentences were appropriately chosen. The first was *qi yang min ye* (his nourishing of the people) from *Analects* V.18.xv: “The Master said of Zichan [chief minister of the state of Zheng and the greatest statesman among Confucius’s contemporaries] that he had four of the characteristics of a superior man: in his conduct of himself, he was humble; in serving his superiors, he was respectful; in nourishing the people, he was kind; in ordering the people, he was just.” (English translation from Legge, *Confucius,* p. 178.) The second sentence was *junzi er shi* (the superior man always) from *The Doctrine of the Mean*
Table 5.
Provincial Registration of 1646 Jinshi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhili</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangnan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huguang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaodong</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>373</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Precisely because of this overwhelming geographical shift in the upper ranks of the bureaucracy and in the lists of successful civil service candidates, the first few years of Dorgon’s regency saw an intensification of broad regional identification. North-south labels substituted for provincial ones, and north-south rivalries replaced the “pure” and “impure” factional struggles of the late Ming as a major source of bureaucratic conflict. As Chen Zhilin, scion of the famed Chen family of Haining in Zhejiang and a noted collaborator himself, put it at the time: “Northerners and southerners stay close to their own; they befriend their friends.”

II.2: “The superior man’s embodying the course of the Mean is because he is a superior man, and so always maintains the Mean. The mean man’s acting contrary to the course of the Mean is because he is a mean man, and has no caution.” (English translation from Legge, *Confucius*, p. 386.) Fashishan, *Qing mi shuwen*, 1:1b. Circumspection and practical service—the ethics of responsibility—were clearly the order of the day.

82 Zhu et al., *Shunzhi yeannian neiwei*, preface, p. 1b. The Haining Chens produced, between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, 208 higher degree
Most of the collaborators in the central government were clustered in the three boards of revenue, civil appointments, and war, suggesting that functionaries with specialized competencies in fiscal, personnel, and military affairs were much more willing to accept the new dynasty than literati skilled in rites, music, and literature. Of the entire group, including both civil and military officials, about half of the collaborators were given a higher post than they had held before, and half were kept at the same rank. However, only one quarter of the civil adherents were given higher office, and these were mainly bureaucrats in the Board of War. Officials in the other two key ministries, personnel and finance, were kept on at equal and lower rank.

Dorgon was able to employ these officials without compromising his own control over the middle and higher reaches of the bureaucracy because he had brought such a large staff of experienced and capable Chinese with him from the northeast. This group of Liaodong adherents was collectively known as the “old men” (jiu holders and three grand secretaries. See p. 906. The Manchu invasion itself may have contributed to this broad regional distinction, insofar as conquest dynasties were known historically to favor northerners over southerners. After the reign of the Toba Wei, for instance, invidious distinctions between north and south became more pronounced on either side. From that time on during the medieval period, northerners habitually referred to southerners as “island dwelling barbarians” (dao yi), and southerners called northerners “servile” (suolu)—servile people with their hair tied in a braid. Arthur F. Wright, The Sui Dynasty, p. 28. More specifically, Chen Hongfan reported that in Beijing in October, 1644, officials from the north who had surrendered to the Manchus kept to themselves behind locked doors; they dared not have any contacts with southerners for fear of being accused of being Ming loyalists. Chen, Bei shi jilüe, p. 120.

83 The former group’s skills may also have been more valued by the dynasty. The distinction that is being drawn here between functionalists and ritualists roughly corresponds to a division of the six arts (liu yi) by the Zhou li (Rites of Zhou) into two separate groups: archery, riding, and mathematics on the one hand; and rites, music, and writing on the other.

84 For a breakdown of ranks, see Sun Zhentao, Qing shi shulun, pp. 16–21.
Establishing Qing Rule
en), and it was they, along with Manchu generals and lieutenant colonels, who staffed the presidencies and vice-presidencies of the boards at first. The core of the bureaucracy, however, and especially the directorships of departments (langzhong), were staffed by the “new men” (xin ren) recruited among collaborators after the Manchus entered Beijing. Beneath them, at the lowest level of central and local administration, the sub-bureaucracy of clerks and runners, almost to a man, came over to the Qing when it took power. This rapid transfer of allegiance by the operational administrative staff of the imperial bureaucracy vastly facilitated the Qing occupation during its early stages. In the long run, however, it threatened to prove an embarrassment to the new dynasty. Everyone knew that this same lower bureaucracy was guilty of many of the worst crimes of the ancien régime. Scratch a clerk and you would find a felon. Thus, from the very beginning of its reign, the Qing government directed a steady stream of edicts and proclamations against the abuses of rapacious “yamen worms” (yadu) and evil underlings.

85 The jiu ren are described in Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 375. In 1644 all of the canjiang (lieutenant—colonels) were automatically made shilang (vice-presidents) of boards. Most of these, however, were on campaign outside the capital and their titles were strictly honorary. However, an earlier corps of Chinese and Manchu canzheng (vice-presidents), appointed by Hung Taiji in 1638, actually held important board presidencies, as well as the presidencies of the Censorate and the Lifan Yuan. Thus the top of the new bureaucracy, with the exception of the Inner Three Courts where Chinese and Chinese bannermen held most of the grand secretaryships, was dominated by Manchu and Chinese bannermen. In the provincial bureaucracies, Chinese bannermen played a very important role. During 1644, 8 governors were appointed, of whom 3 were regular Chinese and 5 were Chinese bannermen; and in 1644–1645, 9 governors—general were named, of whom 3 were regular Chinese and 6 were Chinese bannermen. Oxnam, Horseback, pp. 32–33, 42–43, 93.

86 Shizu shilu, 6:69b–70a. Dorgon’s animus against “yamen worms” was comparable to, though not as cruel and fanatic as, Ming Taizu’s distrust of clerks. Shi Mo, “Zhu Yuanzhang fandui tan guan wu li douzheng de jingyan jiaoxun,” passim.
The Attack on Ming Abuses

The tone of these edicts was invariably stern and scolding, and the brunt of their attack was upon the "corrupt customs" and "vile practices" of the Ming bureaucracy.  

The destruction of the Ming dynasty was entirely owing to its corrupt (tandu) customs, its intolerance of virtue, and its refusal to distinguish merits from crimes. From now on, all of our officials and subjects must take hold and brace themselves to be loyal to the Qing.  

Each yamen was ordered to indict transgressors ruthlessly, and officials were commanded to observe the Qing custom of flogging miscreants with a whip rather than with bamboo in administering punishments. Servants of the Qing were not to take bribes, or nurse resentments, or look after their selfish interests. Henceforth, "let each official painfully reform the corrupt practices of the former Ming and behave virtuously in his new service."  

One reason for Dorgon's repeated insistence upon reforming the "corrupt customs" of the Ming was, paradoxically, his fear

88 Shizu shilu, 5:55b–56a. At the same time, Dorgon warned: "Every official ought thoroughly to reform the vile practices of the former Ming, collectively polishing his loyalty and incorruptibility, and not fleecing the people for his own profit. Officials laboring for our dynasty do not take bribes, are not self-interested, and do not nurse grievances." Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, 1:263. This injunction was followed by a strongly worded edict on June 28, 1644, which threatened severe punishments for officials convicted of taking bribes. This was made at the suggestion of Fan Wencheng, who was fond of saying: "All that it takes to govern the empire peacefully is to get worthy [officials]. If the officials have one bad element in their midst, they must be asked to purge themselves clean." Ibid., 1:380. There is a photographic reproduction of the June 28 edict in Li Guangtao, comp., Ming-Qing dang'an cunzhen xuanji, first series, plate 5, p. 6.  
89 Shizu shilu, 5:58a. It was said by contemporaries that flogging was much more commonly practiced at the Shunzhi court than in the Chongzhen court. Gu Cheng, "Lun Qingchu shehui maodun," p. 157. But see also Lui, Corruption, p. 69; and F. W. Mote, "The Growth of Chinese Despotism," p. 40.  
90 Shizu shilu, 5:52a. See also: Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:380.
that loyalists might restore the fallen dynasty. He pointedly warned his officials of this possibility on June 25, 1644, only a few weeks after entering Beijing.

At present we are grateful for the protection of Heaven, and have settled the Central Plain. Let each forever guard our wealth and honor with the utmost loyalty and sincerity. If there are those whose covetousness is not restrained or who disregard their own violations, even if they have merit, they will not be ranked [as nobles or officials]. You must not permit a moment's carelessness [to cause you to forget] the long-term plans of the sons and grandsons of the Zhu [family].

The immediate task of the new government, then, was to relieve the plight of the people in order to prove it deserved the Mandate of Heaven. On the one hand, this meant instituting prompt public welfare measures.

Within the capital, after the bestial depredations of the wandering bandits, there are undoubtedly widowers, widows, orphans, and the childless who have no means of livelihood and are even begging in the streets. Let this be ascertained, and then distribute money and rations in charitable relief.

On the other, it meant granting some relief from the heavy taxes imposed by the Ming government. At the urging of some of his Chinese collaborators, including Song Quan who was most inter-

91 *Shizu shilu*, 5:55. The Zhu family, of course, was the Ming ruling house.
92 According to reports from a Korean observer, the countryside around Beijing was nearly devastated by the 1644 invasion. All of the fields, for several hundred li all around the city, had been trampled on by horses, and not a single blade of grass could be seen. Within the city, looting, robbery, and murder were common occurrences. Because he knew that the Manchus were likely to ask the Koreans for grain, the Korean made a special point of reporting to his government that the capital's granaries were either empty or filled with rotten cereals. Wu, *Chaoxian Li chao shilu*, pp. 3734–3735. Very soon, however, the new government was able to restock the granaries, and thus restored the welfare system. Lui, *Corruption*, p. 23.
93 *Shizu shilu*, 5:59a.
ested in settling the Shuntian area around the capital itself, Dorgon ordered on July 13 that taxes be reduced that year by one-half in rural areas where the Qing armies had camped, or over which they had marched, destroying the fields. Furthermore, every prefecture, zhou, and xian in Beizhili universally received a reduction of one-third of its tax quota.  

Even so, there was still a certain tentativeness about the Manchus’ presence in Beijing that stirred up public rumors of their plans to return to the northeast.  

Shortly after the tax reduction, the populace of Beijing began to speak of the conquerors going back to Liaodong in the seventh or eighth lunar month, and thought they saw confirmation of this surmise in the numbers of Manchu soldiers who had left the capital to return to Shengjing. On July 21, Dorgon—angered and mortified by these statements that the Manchus were only temporary rulers of the Central Plain—issued a public announcement.

We have exterminated the bandits and pacified the disorder, establishing our capital at Yanjing. We are profoundly aware that the people are the root of the country (bang zhi ben), and all that can be done to settle the people’s livelihood will be sincerely carried out by all our officials high and low. . . . Our state does not rely on military force. It solely tries to transform through virtue, imperially ruling the myriad locales. From now on, Yanjing [i.e., Beijing] will . . .

94 Ibid., 5:58a. For Song Quan’s tax reform recommendations, see Qinquan jushi, Huang Qing mingchen zouyi, 1:1b–4a; Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 9. Wei Zhouyun (whose name is here incorrectly written as Zhouyin) also strongly advocated tax cuts. Qinquan jushi, Huang Qing mingchen zouyi, 1:16–18.

95 The rumor that the Manchus were going to move back to Liaodong may have been started by banner leaders who wished to return to their native territory. Ajige represented this point of view when he told Dorgon that they faced the same sort of racial antagonism in the north China plain that they had encountered, to their mortal rue, in Liaodong when they took over Chinese inhabited areas. He feared a time when the Chinese would turn upon the Manchus and kill them all. It would be better for them to return to Shanhaiguan or Shengjing (Shenyang) than to remain in Yanjing (Beijing). Dorgon disagreed fundamentally, saying that the people’s hearts were not yet settled and that they could not at this important juncture simply abandon Beijing and return to the east. Zheng, “Duoergun,” pp. 4, 11; Wu, Chaoxian Li chao shilu, p. 3735.
be the place where we have established our dynasty (ding ding). How, then, could we return once more to the east and not establish a capital here?96

The soldiers leaving for the east, he went on to explain, were merely returning to Liaodong to bring their dependents back into the Central Plain with them. Persons rumoring to the contrary were obviously scoundrels and bandits seeking to make trouble, and they would be severely punished if they continued to speak in this fashion.97 Yet Dorgon himself did not seem utterly confident that his government firmly held the Mandate. When Grand Secretary Ganglin told him during a court audience how much better his government was than that of the Ming because of tax remissions and attacks on corruption, Dorgon’s cautious response was: “Only Heaven can show whether it is good or bad.”98

During this same period, preparations were being made for the six year-old Shunzhi Emperor to move his capital from Shengjing (Mukden) to Yanjing (Beijing). Upon Dorgon’s recommendation, the emperor had named Beijing the new Qing capital on August 9. On September 2, the emperor had appointed officials to take charge of Shengjing; and on September 20, he had left for Beijing.99 Yet all the while rumors continued to circulate through the avenues and hutongs of Beijing either that the Manchus were going to leave, or that they secretly planned to fall upon the Han population and slaughter them. On October 1, 1644, Dorgon felt obliged to issue an extraordinary edict:

During the last four months I have spent every day in conference with my ministers, as we exerted ourselves planning a national policy for the peace of the people. But when gangsters and robbers began to cause disorder, the masses were nonetheless filled with apprehension and dread. Hence, rumors began to circulate in the sixth month (July 4–August 2, 1644), and we had to make a public proc-

96 Shizu shilu, 5:59b.
97 Ibid.
98 Duoergun shezheng riji, p. 5.
99 John Gilbert Reid, “Peking’s First Manchu Emperor,” passim.
lamination to assuage the people’s fears. But then further rumors started, claiming we would slaughter the people sometime during the eighth month (September). Now the eighth month is over. Obviously, there was no cause at all for such misgivings and fears. The rumors are therefore impossible to believe. Yet even now I hear of another slander, to wit: “During the ninth month (October 1–29) the Imperial Coach will reach the capital, and then all of those troops from the east will burst in to plunder for three full days, killing all of the adults and leaving only children to survive.” And yet, after all, the people are the foundation of the country! Since your soldiers and people, old and young alike, have already sincerely submitted, for what possible sins could we injure you once again? Just think: why would the Emperor have just brought all of his generals, officials, and their families with him [to Beijing]? Why did we just a short while ago bring all of our functionaries from the east, and order these officials to serve in the offices of the governors-general, governors, prefects, and magistrates? Simply in order to rule the empire (tianxia)! Why did we bring one million pieces of silver from the treasuries of Shengjing overland? Simply to put it to the use of the soldiers and people inside and outside the walls of Beijing. Moreover, I cannot endure that the peasants of the hills and the dales suffer at the hands of these bandits. Since we have already brought out soldiers here to punish [the rebels] (alas that we have been unable to bring peace quickly to the land!) and to rescue the people from the water and flames, then how could it possibly be said that we do not love the soldiers and people of the capital, and that we plan to return to the policies of murder and extermination? The masses can attest to all this. What more need I say? Those who irrationally continue to spread such rumors must therefore either be bandits (who draw near to the capital, intending to frighten the people into flight and make it possible for them to plunder the city) or spies of the bandits (hiding their faces in order better to agitate and mislead, fomenting local disaster). Hence, we make the follow-ing known by public edict to quiet the people: let each government office arrest the spies. If there are rumormongers who would delude the peasants, let others inform us of them, to make it easy for us to punish their crimes harshly. For, if we discover that some of you knew but did not inform us, then you shall be punished right along with the rumormongers themselves!  

100 Shizu shilu, 9:2; cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 55–56. Though Dorgon
The promulgation of this edict alone probably would not have been enough to calm the residents of Beijing. After October 19, however, when the Shunzhi Emperor finally entered Beijing and the first of many ceremonies were held to initiate his accession to the dragon throne, rumors of impending departure or massacre seem to have ceased. Nevertheless, Dorgon continued to concern himself about the transitoriness of fledgling regimes like his, and consequently with the importance of rapidly reforming the institutions which the Qing had acquired from the fallen Ming.

The prince-regent’s fear of betraying Heaven’s trust and the instructive example of the fallen Ming house thus made Dorgon very eager to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Wanli, Tianqi, and Chongzhen Emperors. The most visible symbol of the corruption and incompetence of their rule was the palace directorate, with its vast assortment of eunuchs handling everything from imperial purveying to secret police work. When Dorgon entered the Wuying Palace, he was greeted by the leading members of the directorate, and these eunuchs instantly transferred their loyalties to the Forbidden City’s new occupant. However, Dorgon was made very much aware by his Chinese collaborators of the abuses with which the castrates were associated in the eyes of most civil officials, not to speak of the populace at large. That awareness, and the fact that he resided outside the palace precincts in a mansion called the Southern Pool (Nan chizi) where he did not come under himself may not have been aware of the concept, his advisers certainly must have known about the historiographical notions of zheng run (legitimacy and intercalation) and wei ding (bogus stabilization). The former was coined by Han historians to describe royal houses like the Qin which had unified the empire but had reigned for too short a period to possess a legitimate claim upon the Mandate of Heaven. The second was invented by the Song writer Zhou Mi (1232–1298) to refer to kingdoms like the Sui which brought an end to fragmentation but lacked the morality to rule for an extended period. Such regimes held—in the words of Fang Xiaoru—only “aberrant hegemony” (bian tong), and had no legitimate basis for continued rule. Robert Cremer, “Chou Mi and Hsiu Tuan,” pp. 11–16.

101 The following year, the residents of Shuntian were further reassured the Qing meant to stay after the government ordered each zhou and xian in the prefecture to send 100 artisans to construct palace buildings. Ji Huang, Huangchao wenxian tongkao, 21:6a.
the influence of the chief eunuchs, meant that eunuch power was severely curtailed during his administration. A metal sign placed on the wall of the Jiaotai Palace ominously warned inner court officials that they would be harshly punished if they meddled in court politics; eunuchs were enjoined from handling the income from royal estates; a number of positions connected with the privy purse and palace construction were abolished; and, in 1646, people who voluntarily castrated themselves in order to become palace eunuchs were ordered decapitated.

Piecemeal Reforms

In addition to suppressing eunuch power, Dorgon was also very receptive to proposals that were forwarded to him by Chinese collaborators whose efforts for reforms during the Chongzhen reign had been frustrated. Cao Rong (jinshi 1637, Zhejiang), the compiler of the Xue hai leibian (Classified anthology from the ocean of learning), had served as a metropolitan censor under the last Ming emperor; after he surrendered to the Manchus, he was reappointed to the same position he had held earlier in the Surveillance Office in charge of the western side of Beijing. He now made a number of vital suggestions that did much to bring order to the capital and its environs. These included: (1) promptly re-establishing the official personnel system so that people were appointed to posts on

102 Zheng Tianting, Qing shi tan wei, p. 66.
103 Zhaolian, Xiaoting zalu, 2:11a. Eunuchs had been employed by the Manchus during the 1620s, especially in the households of beile. In 1621, Nurhaci ordered the beile to castrate their house-slaves when they were young lest they have sexual relationships with palace women. Zheng Tianting, Tan wei ji, pp. 94–95; Preston M. Torbert, The Ch’ing Imperial Household Department, p. 22.
104 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 740. The Qing retained the Ming censorial system and completed the trend toward the coalescence of surveillance and remonstrance functions by moving the supervising secretaries into the Metropolitan Censorate. Every Chinese censor had to be paired with a Manchu counterpart. Charles O. Hucker, The Censorial System of Ming China, pp. 28–29.
the basis of merit, rather than relying solely upon personal recommendation; (2) reforming the military colony system by revising the salt and currency regulations, thus making sure that military rations would be delivered to those supposed to receive them; (3) prohibiting military authorities from selling horses, rations, or land; (4) strengthening measures to have surveillance officials discover local bandit leaders, and then killing them while extending amnesties to their followers; (5) using treasury specie to buy grain for famine relief in Beizhili; and (6) using troops to open communications with the mountains west of Beijing in order to get coal supplies for the capital. Other officials echoed Song Quan and called for the repeal of the three supernumerary taxes imposed by the Ming to cover frontier military costs. On August 18, 1644, the government abolished those taxes, the so-called san xiang, and also prohibited informal legal fees (officials had been accepting payments in lieu of imposing sentences), ordered an audit of prefec-

tural and district treasuries, and called for the exposure and punish-

ishment of “yamen worms.”

105 Er chen zhuan, 6:17; Qinchuan jushi, Huang Qing zouyi, 1:5–8. Throughout 1644 and 1645 bandits in the Western Hills prevented coal shipments from Shanxi from reaching the capital. The leading outlaw, Liu Zisheng, was executed and order restored when the government sent 1,300 troops into the area and contacted local village headmen (changbaozheng) to ensure security. Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, vol. 2, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 52.

106 Shizu shilu, 6:69b–70a. See also Gugong bowuyuan Ming-Qing dang'an bu, comp., Qingdai dang'an shiliao congbian, series 1, p. 152. The repeal of the extra taxes, to the extent that it was actually carried out, may have depended upon the income which the government was getting from salt taxes. During the early years of its rule, the Qing government received about half of its income from salt taxes contributed by Shanxi salt merchants who held official posts in the Imperial Household Bureau. The most important of these Shanxi merchants, who played such a vital role in financing the early Qing conquest, was Fan Yongdou, whose family had been trading with Manchus and Mongols for eight generations. After being asked to become the “king’s merchant” (huang shang) in the Imperial Household Bureau, Fan Yongdu and his family were allowed to establish a princely residence at Kalgan (Zhangjiakou), where they were given property. In addition to the salt trade, the Fans also engaged in foreign commerce. Wei and Wu, “Qingdai zhuming huang shang Fan shi,” pp. 1–2; SaeKI, “Shanxi shangren,” p. 282. The supernumerary Ming taxes may have been abolished in theory, but they were
Such edicts, which repeatedly described the “evil habits” of Ming civil servants and clerks, mainly dealt with personnel abuses. They did not come to grips with the structural deficiencies which were also an administrative legacy of the Ming government. The tangled legal system, the complicated water conservancy administration, the depleted famine relief program, and above all the cumbersome revenue organization had to be restored to working order. Building on Yuan organizations, the Ming, three centuries earlier, had created a system of local government in which there was a critical discrepancy between imperial ends and administrative means. This critical gap, which could also be defined as a contradiction between a Legalist wish to control and dominate society and a Confucian reluctance to disturb its natural workings, might have called for grandiose, even drastic, solutions. Yet grand solutions were not forthcoming. Instead, in a spirit of cautious and conservative compromise with the real workings of the empire, the civil servants of the Qing sought mainly to remedy given aspects of the government.

What is most surprising, in fact, is how little was actually required in the end to bring the bureaucratic administration up to a reasonable level of efficiency. Adjustments, not replacements; over-

still collected in many areas in fact. It is clear from a memorial dated August 11, 1654, from Zu Zeyuan, Governor-General of the Huguang, that the san xiang were still being levied in Hunan. Gugong Ming-Qing dang’an bu, Qingdai dang’an shiliao, series 1, p. 155. It should be noted how unrealistic were the new government’s expectations about informal yamen fees. Most government clerks and servants working in Beijing received salaries that were set in the late 15th century. There had been some salary increases granted in the last quarter of the 16th century, but these were rarely given and when they were conferred, the increase only matched rising costs. In almost every case, government clerks and servants had to find other sources of income. James Peter Geiss, “Peking under the Ming,” pp. 175–176.

107 “Governmental finance under the Ming represented an attempt to impose an extremely ambitious centralized system on an enormous empire before its level of technology had made such a degree of centralization practical.” Ray Huang, Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China, p. 313.

108 Huang, Taxation, p. 322.
haul, not wholesale substitution, were the characteristics of this reform effort. Moreover, the reforms—legal, hydrological, fiscal—were mainly the work of men who had seen service under the Ming, and were now given the opportunities denied them earlier to carry out the kinds of adjustment that would make the system with which they were already familiar work best. (See Table 6.) The overhaul, in sum, was the work of insiders who had stayed on to collaborate with the invaders, perhaps even in part because they recognized that a new regime would afford them a chance for change that the Ming had not.  

Legal reform, for instance, was at this time very much the concern of Sun Xiang (jinshi 1634, Anhui), who served as a supervising secretary in the Board of Punishments in 1644 and 1645. At that time, partly because of the military hostilities, local officials had great latitude in administering the law. Sun Xiang discovered that for years the scale of punishments had been extremely arbitrary, and that under the Ming operating guidelines, there was no rational guide for differentiating one sentence from another. Hence, he requested, and received, permission to draw up a scale of sentences which were then distributed to officials by way of

109 For example, the entire procedure of reclaiming abandoned land and getting the people to perform labor services was suggested by former Ming officials, very familiar with Ming institutions and local conditions, who were sent out to rural districts. It was a policy that came from the collaborators, and from the bottom up. Guo Songyi, "Qingchu fengjian guojia," p. 115. See also Fogel, "Shantung, Part 2," pp. 11-12.

Table 6.
Reforms Proposed during the Early Dorgon Regency, 1644–1646, by Former Ming Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Memorialist</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jin Zhijun (Jiangnan)</td>
<td>Civil Appointments</td>
<td>Requested reduction of land tax in Zhili; Suggested improvements in tribute grain transportation; Proposed formalizing the metropolitan examinations.</td>
<td>1644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punishments</td>
<td>Proposed a general amnesty for bandit-ravaged areas; advised that more care be taken in the selection of provincial and local officials.</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dang Chongya (Shaanxi)</td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Advised that a clear distinction should be made between serious crimes and petty offenses; suggested that the Ming code be retained until a new code could be promulgated.</td>
<td>1644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punishments</td>
<td>Sentences in criminal cases should be reviewed by the Court of Judicature and Revision, as was the case in the past; there should be an early</td>
<td>1646</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Zhao Erxun, ed., *Qing shi gao*, 244:6b–7; *Qing shi liezhuan*, 79:4–6a.
2Zhao, *Qing shi gao*, 244:8b–9; *Qing shi liezhuan*, 79:40b–41.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Memorialist</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Du Lide (Zhili)</td>
<td></td>
<td>promulgation of the Qing code.</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proposed that the tenure of local officials be extended.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiong Wenju (Jiangxi)</td>
<td>Civil Appointments</td>
<td>Proposed that taxes in Jiangnan, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong be reduced; former subjects of the Prince of Fu should not be appointed as Qing officials; hidden talent should be sought; people who joined the Qing early and had accumulated merit should be rewarded.</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xue Suoyun (Henan)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Proposed relief for Henan province; agriculture should be promoted for Henan; education of Manchu youngsters should be summarily inaugurated; the system of bureaucratic recommendation (yin) for Chinese officials should be reevaluated.</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) Qing shi liezhuan, 79:8–9b.  
\(^4\) Zhao, Qing shi gao, 256:2b–4a.  
\(^6\) Ibid., 79:48–49b.
### Table 6 (continued)

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<th>Memorialist</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fu Jingxing</td>
<td>Board</td>
<td>Suggested tax reductions; proposed improvements in plans for Manchu settlement in north China. (^7)</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Henan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Zhixie</td>
<td>Rites</td>
<td>Advised reduction and standardization of taxes, and elimination of arbitrary surcharges imposed by local officials; proposed four major measures to buttress good government: (1) define the proper order of society; (2) prohibit extravagance among officials; (3) admonish civil service examiners to prevent students from dominating and bullying local people; and (4) collect books lost during the years of strife and disorder. (^8)</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Shandong)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xie Qiguang</td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Urged speedy resumption of control over collection and transportation of tribute grain in Jiangnan. (^9)</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Shandong)</td>
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<th>Memorialist</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shen Weibing</td>
<td>Civil Appointments</td>
<td>Advised caution in employing officials from the previous dynasty; advocated reform of Ming administrative abuses.</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Huguang)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ruolin</td>
<td>Rites</td>
<td>Advised that the Guozijian (National University) should educate the sons of both Chinese and Manchu officials;</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Shandong)</td>
<td></td>
<td>the complete honorary title of Confucius should be corrected.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai Mingshuo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Proposed measures to suppress bandits.</td>
<td>1644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Zhili)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Yuanding</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Urged speedy appointment of high officials to take charge of administration in Jiangxi.</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jiangxi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Zhouyun</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Proposed appointment of governor and magistrates in Zhili; encouraged lowering taxes in many districts in Zhili in order to speed resettlement.</td>
<td>1644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Shanxi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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unifying the judicial system, and rendering it consistent.\textsuperscript{111} Later, under Li Huaxi, who became President of Punishments in 1647, these piecemeal reforms were continued. New criminal regulations were promulgated, and the civil code was brought up to date.\textsuperscript{112} Li Huaxi’s successor, Zhang Bingzhen (\textit{jinshi} 1631, Anhui), cleared away the long clogged docket of the ministry, reversing a number of judgments which upon inquiry had turned out to be unjust, and releasing a number of framed prisoners.\textsuperscript{113} The cumulative effect of these reforms was to restore the entire legal system to the working order which it must have enjoyed a century earlier, and to lay the foundation for the impressive police and judicial system of the 18th century.

Another set of piecemeal reforms was instituted in the Board of Revenue. As we have seen, one of Dorgon’s first acts after entering Beijing was to proclaim that the supernumerary taxes—and especially the \textit{san xiang} (three rations)—levied during the last half-century of Ming rule would be abolished. This was confirmed as formal state policy on November 8, 1644, shortly after the emperor’s enthronement. Subsequent edicts reduced commodity and customs taxes, promulgated new salt laws, loosened customs controls, and sought to reduce the irregularities in tax collection procedures.\textsuperscript{114} The intention was, as repeatedly stated, to collect taxes

\textsuperscript{111} Sun demonstrated the same talent for rationalization when he was in the following year transferred to an identical post in the Board of Civil Appointments. There he recommended that disparate administrative statutes be rendered regular so as to encourage people to hold office. He also memorialized that garrison troops should be punished for evicting people from their homes and seizing them for their own property. He Zhiji, ed., \textit{Anhui tongzhi}, 190:1a; Huang Zhijun, \textit{Jiangnan tongzhi}, 148:8b.

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Er chen zhuan}, 5:23–24a.

\textsuperscript{113} Huang, \textit{Jiangnan tongzhi}, 146:16b.

\textsuperscript{114} Qing policy at the Lianghuai saltyards after 1644 was characterized by a mixture of flexible innovation and conservative preservation. The new government used the Ming regulations as its main authority in determining salt laws. At the same time it rationalized the monopoly by abolishing the system of delivering silver to the frontier—a practice which was not working to anyone’s satisfaction. The Qing authorities also encouraged merchant investment and adopted more favorable policies toward the shippers, even though government levies and exactions were a heavy burden for the salt
strictly according to the quotas originally established by the Ming dynasty, before all of the additional levies that were imposed during the Wanli period. According to an imperial proclamation (ban zhao) issued on July 21, 1645:

As of June 24, 1645, taxes will be collected entirely according to the original quota recorded in the accounts of the former dynasty. Officials and clerks who add wastage fees to the levy, or who require an extra amount of taxes [for transportation outside the province], will be severely punished. All added allotments for Liao[dong] rations, for [bandit] extermination rations, and for [military] training rations or for procurements are remitted forever; and all regular tax amounts still in arrears among the people are also cancelled. Areas traversed by the Grand Army will have their regular taxes reduced by one-half. Areas which have surrendered but which have not been traversed by the Grand Army will have theirs reduced by one-third.

The difficulty with implementing this policy lay in the terrible state of the Ming fiscal records. After the Manchus took over the Ming Ministry of Finance, they found that the tax registers were in complete disorder. There were no registers at all for the last two reigns of the dynasty, so their quotas had to be based upon the fu (land tax) records dating from the Wanli period. On June 9, 1646, Dorgon decided that this chaotic fiscal situation had to be corrected. An imperial edict issued that day commanded Grand Secretary Feng Quan “to carry out a thorough audit in each yamen merchants until the Three Feudatories were defeated. Eventually, in 1667, the new regime combined its desire to please and support the salt merchants with the need to control the system of deliveries by appointing 24 wealthy merchants to act as head merchants (zong shang) in shipping the salt from the yards to wholesaling centers like Hankou. Thomas A. Metzger, “The Organizational Capabilities of the Ch’ing State in the Field of Commerce,” pp. 24–25; Wang Sizhi and Jin Chengji, “Qingchao qianqi Lianghuai yanshang de shengshuai,” pp. 2–3. For the Shandong salt zone, see Naquin, Shantung, p. 20.

115 Ji Huang, Huangchao wenxian tongkao, 26:3b, and 28:1.
116 Shizu shilu, 17:202b.
of the capital of the amount of money and grain.” He was also told to find out how much land was really being cultivated in the empire at present; how many of the taxes actually collected were being forwarded to Beijing, and how many were retained locally; and how much revenue was allocated to each yamen, and retained by each governor.

Investigate strictly and examine in detail. Decide on comprehensive registers for the land and service taxes (fuyi quanshu). Bring them to us for personal examination. Proclaim them to the empire.118

Thus was ordered the first empire-wide cadastral survey since the tax-reform measures of Grand Secretary Zhang Juzheng in the 1580s.119

Although such measures were not always carried out completely to the throne’s satisfaction, they did permit the government to begin to tighten up its fiscal machinery.120 As we shall see, it would be decades before the government was financially stable again, but the first steps had been taken to remedy the matter.121

118 *Shizu shilu*, 25:302. In 1644 an order had been issued that the registration of households and their property take place every three years instead of once a decade. Since there was very little evidence of compliance, after 1647 the compilation of registers was made quinquennial. Hilary J. Beattie, *Land and Lineage in China*, p. 73.

119 As it was finally carried out, the fixing of the *fuyi quanshu* really amounted to a reevaluation of quotas rather than a thorough national land survey. Unfortunately, historians have not yet discovered statistics on government income in the archives for any year before 1651. Ray Huang, “Fiscal Administration during the Ming Dynasty,” pp. 121–122.


121 Because the government’s budget was in deficit, it was not unusual during these early years of the dynasty for Dorgon to write personally to the king of Korea, requesting aid. In the fall of 1644, for example, he wrote: “Because of the extraordinary needs of our armies, send what you can of your grain harvest this autumn to Yanjing to help our country (guo).” *Shizu shilu*, 7:79b. The entry is dated September 5, 1644.
Here, as in most other instances of administrative reform, the Qing government retained the original Ming institution nearly intact. Yet because it was free to tamper with the "ancestral structure" of a bureaucracy not originally its own, the new dynasty was able to introduce minor changes that invested these institutions with new vigor and efficiency.

In the long run, these administrative improvements led to increased social welfare and eventually to an economic revival in China. In the short run, there were not enough immediate benefits to allay the massive social discontent that had created acute class conflict in many parts of China. Indeed, other policies initiated by the Qing government even intensified social disorder, and produced continuous uprisings against Manchu rule.122

**Manchu Abuses**

In spite of the excellent discipline of the army of occupation in Beijing itself, there was considerable social dislocation after June 14, 1644, when a special Manchu garrison quarter was created, affecting sixty percent of the city.123 Chinese residents were removed from the garrison districts and forced to seek dwellings in the southern part of the city. Because the Manchus believed that whenever they first came into contact with Chinese they were likely to develop smallpox, and because the disease had assumed epidemic proportions by 1644, many Chinese were also forced to move into the countryside and live in a kind of permanent quarantine.124

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123 The Qing troops presented a striking contrast to the capital's previous occupiers. Rape was severely prohibited, and if the bannermen pilfered goods or killed someone in a brawl, they were immediately punished. "They ruled their army with the greatest strictness. If one person was killed, ten soldiers were forfeited. If one dog was killed, one soldier was forfeited." Chen Jisheng, *Zaisheng jilüe*, 2:33b–34a.
124 Though smallpox was extremely contagious, it often took some time for infection to "cross" a main road, river, or canal because those geographical features were often boundaries of similar social groups having the same occupations or going to the same schools. Racial segregation, as practiced by the
Even though some of the capital’s wealthy grain merchants contributed to the refugees’ upkeep, this mass ethnic relocation caused great hardship and resentment.\(^{125}\)

There was also a major disruption of trade within the city, as well as in the surrounding towns, when the Manchus moved into north China. Partly this was an effect of warfare as such. But it was also a matter of new patron-client ties being established, and of the frequency with which the conquerors took advantage of their privileged positions. As early as September 18, 1644, Dorgon noted that “people coming from the east” to sell ginseng to the Chinese were “disturbing locales,” and trading unfairly.\(^{126}\) Indeed, the Manchus had begun to mulct commerce as soon as they entered China. Their Chinese adherents were ordered to take over commercial establishments, or banded together to extort fees from traveling merchants.\(^{127}\) At a high level, nobles controlled the trade in lumber, and offered their protection to Chinese salt smug-

\(^{125}\) After Dorgon’s death this kind of extreme quarantine was relaxed. Instead, when a family contracted smallpox, officials cordoned the household off for eighty paces all around and let no one into the zone of contagion. There was another major epidemic in 1655, but the authorities managed to restrict it to the Nanhai district of the city, letting no one out of the neighborhood until the disease had run its course. Tan, *Beiyou lu*, p. 355. For a discussion of the effect of creating a special garrison quarter, see Ma Feng-ch’en, “Manchu-Chinese Social and Economic Conflicts in Early Ch’ing,” p. 348.

\(^{126}\) *Shizu shilu*, 7:88a.

\(^{127}\) Ji, *Huangchao wenxian tongkao*, 21:14–15. The agents of Manchu imperial princes continued the practice of collecting tolls at the city gates of Beijing just as eunuchs had done before them. Even peasants coming into the city with only a sack of grain had to pay for the privilege of entry. Geiss, “Peking under the Ming,” p. 28.
glers. And at the same time, Chinese racketeers sought to join Chinese banners, even wearing Manchu clothes and speaking with foreign accents. For, during those early first years, few Han officials dared challenge bannermen.\textsuperscript{128} In the fall of 1645, Dorgon again, therefore, repeated his warning about ginseng peddlers, and declared that local officials had the right to arrest anyone—Manchu or Han—who did not trade fairly and remand them to Beijing for punishment.\textsuperscript{129}

But the abuses continued in spite of Dorgon's orders.\textsuperscript{130} Indigent Chinese continued to sell themselves into banners, and took advantage of their enhanced position to interfere illegally in markets or smuggle goods like salt, tea, and ginseng. In the summer of 1647, the Board of Revenue was ordered to strengthen its measures against this kind of illegal salt smuggling, which had resulted in the brazen public opening of unofficial salt shops operating un-

\textsuperscript{128} Ma, "Social and Economic Conflicts," pp. 347–349. Han Chinese attempted to pass themselves off as Manchus so long as the bannermen dominated society. This was especially true in the northeast, where transfrontiersmen continued to try to be assimilated with the Manchus. Lattimore described such a person in the 20th century. He knew a Henanese who had gone to Manchuria as a young man and had adopted all of the manners and gestures of the Manchus themselves. When his son, a military officer, was asked why his father spoke like a Manchu, he told Lattimore: "When my father was a young man it was difficult for a min-jen (non-banner Chinese, a civilian, one of the people) to get on in the world up in the northern regions. The Manchus dominated everything, and they harassed the min Chinese. In Tsitsihar, where he settled down, they had a custom of 'chasing out the min' twice a year. All the Chinese who had filtered in were liable to be driven out, and often beaten and robbed. Of course, many of them came back; but the only way to become secure was to 'follow' the Manchus and become so like them as to be undetectable. So my father, when he had learned their ways, 'entered the Banners' and married a Manchu and has always remained like them. When I was growing up it was no longer of any use to be a bannerman and therefore I became like all the other young men of my generation." Lattimore, \textit{Manchuria}, pp. 62–63.

\textsuperscript{129} Shizu shilu, 19:241, edict dated October 11, 1645. Shortly before this, Dorgon also condemned those seizing private tea stocks in Shaanxi. Edict dated September 12, 1645, in Ibid., 19:232a–233a. See also Ji, \textit{Huangchao wenxian tongkao}, 32:3a.

\textsuperscript{130} Shizu shilu, 21:250b, edict dated November 27, 1645.
der the auspices of certain officials. These edicts seemed to have little effect. In fact, on February 19, 1649, the Board of Revenue was once again informed, in wording almost identical to that of the original 1644 complaint, that ginseng dealers were "disturbing locales." Originally, ginseng markets had been allowed to operate legally in a few key cities like Linqing, Ji'nan, and Yangzhou. Now it was ordered that those rules be changed, and that the trade be brought under control by being confined solely to the official brokerage in the capital, with the harshest of punishments to be reserved for private dealers breaking the new law.

Finally, steps were taken both to prevent the involvement of high-ranking Manchus in trade and to stop the abuses of Chinese adherents dealing in commerce under Manchu auspices. On June 3, 1648, all merchants attached to princely households, and all members of bannermen's families, were flatly forbidden to engage in outside trade. Three years later, Dorgon warned that Chinese officials were not to let themselves be corrupted by imperial clansmen. And in 1651 the court ordered local officials to prosecute severely banner slaves and adherents guilty of crimes such as these. It is clear, however, that as long as the banners remained such a powerful force in Chinese society, these kinds of abuses would continue. Indeed, the 1651 order was soon rescinded at the behest of influential bannermen, and the prevalence of the "king's merchant" in foreign trading shows that princely influence continued to be peddled to Chinese brokers well into the eighteenth century. In 1679, in fact, adherents were still being threatened with immediate execution for breaking the ginseng and salt monopoly laws.

The economic privileges of the Manchus and their adherents contributed to the tensions between the two races as thousands of

131 Ibid., 32:384b, edict dated July 18, 1647.
132 Ibid., 42:491a, edict dated February 19, 1649.
133 Ibid., 38:448a. See also Wei-ping Wu, "The Development and Decline of the Eight Banners," p. 103.
135 For the rescinding of the edict, see Ma, "Social and Economic Conflicts," p. 342.
136 Ibid., p. 349.
carpetbaggers moved into north China from Liaodong after the conquest began. Efforts were made to encourage these Liaodong immigrants to register in the banners after "leaving their ancestral tombs and departing their native villages," or to return to Liaodong, but the inflow continued. Those that did register with the banners were allotted land by the government, and this practice provided yet another source of tension and social dislocation for the Chinese originally tilling the soil.

**Banner Lands and Slaves**

When the Manchus had first entered Beijing they confiscated the lands of the Ming imperial family and other lavishly gifted officials all over Beizhili. They also appropriated large tracts of private

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137 The stream of migrants from Liaoyang to Beijing was continuous. According to Korean observers, "The men and women lead each other by the hand, and the hubs of the carts strike each other." Wu Han, *Chaoxian Li chao shilu*, p. 3756. See also Zheng, "Duoergun," p. 11.


139 Han people who entered service under the banners also commended their land to their Manchu masters in order to escape taxation. In 1644 local officials were ordered to prevent this. Ji, *Huangchao wenxian tongkao*, 20:1b.

140 Most of the land in the 8 prefectures around the capital belonged to the Ming emperor or his relatives. In 1502, one-seventh of all private land in the empire—or 64 million acres—was in the emperor’s hands. His royal estates (*huang zhuang*) were managed by eunuch overseers. Robert B. Crawford, "Eunuch Power in the Ming Dynasty," pp. 141–142. In Shanxi, too, there were many Ming royal and aristocratic estates; around Datong alone there were more than 4,000 imperial relatives. Most of these royal kinsmen, however, had been hunted down and killed when the Shun armies rode through. Memorial from Jiang Xiang, dated September 6, 1644, in Gugong bowuyuan Ming-Qing dang’an shiliao congbian, fascicle 4, pp. 141–150. After Dorgon took power in Beijing, he ordered that fields belonging to meritorious nobles of the Ming dynasty not be expropriated by magnates or officials of the new dynasty. This edict to the Board of Revenue created a great stir and engendered considerable temporary support for Manchus among the Ming aristocrats, who began reporting their landholdings around the capital. The bulk of these estates were seized for banner lands a year or so later, and by 1649, Ming relatives in areas like the Huguang were
land whose owners either had died during the war or were Ming loyalists. These confiscated lands, which had been manors before the conquest, were then redistributed to Manchu princes or to members of the imperial family. Early in 1645 it was decided that in place of food rations, each able-bodied Manchu from the rank of prince on down was to be given six shang (approximately 42 mu or 6 ⅔ acres) of land.\(^1\) On January 20, the Board of Revenue was ordered to survey the lands neighboring Beijing, including land occupied by the owners. In some of these areas, Manchu banner-men had already occupied ownerless land. Unreclaimed land, plus reassigned land, was now distributed among the more than forty thousand Manchu banner-men.\(^2\) The existing owners were also supposed to be given a share of the expropriated land, which was reassigned to them according to the number of persons in each household. In addition, the Manchus were supposed to be segregated from the Han Chinese living in these areas. What this effectively meant was a policy of relocation, which resulted in widespread discontent. Some people simply became vagabonds; others became bandits.\(^3\) The latter was especially true for military garrison colonists who did not want to be sent to some far distant

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\(^1\) The lands were not granted in a “feudal” sense; that is, the banner-men were not expected to muster troops in exchange for the land grants nor did the land revert by escheat upon the death of the holder. See, by way of contrast, the Mughal land-grant system described in M. Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb,* pp. 64–67.

\(^2\) Not counting zhuangding, there were about 56,825 Manchu banner-men in 1683, and around 89,735 in 1735. By the late 18th century there were about 60,000 soldiers in the Eight Manchu Banners, 17,000 in the Eight Mongol Banners, and 24,000 in the Eight Chinese Banners, adding up to a total of approximately 100,000 banner soldiers and their families. Wu, “Eight Banners,” p. 61.

\(^3\) On June 8, 1645, having received reports of numerous incidents of banditry, Dorgon asked his officials to explain why so many good people were becoming outlaws. Ten days later, he received a memorial from Supervising Secretary Li Shihun, who told him that most of the lands for 300 li around the capital had been seized by the banner armies, and the original inhabitants were thus forced into banditry. Gugong Ming-Qing dang’anbu, *Qingdai
place, with no guarantee of either farm implements or shelter on the new lands assigned to them. At the same time a kind of land-grabbing began to take place. Local Han landlords claimed some of the dispossessed land was theirs, or tried to get evicted tenants assigned to their plots. This same kind of dislocation occurred in the two major expropriations that were ordained by law: one in early 1646, and one in the second lunar month of 1647. After that, the enclosure was legally supposed to end, but in fact it continued because of the continuing flow of immigrants from Liaodong. Whenever new land was needed the Board of Revenue would send a few low-ranking officers with horses and rope to "encircle the land" (quan di). The horses would be ridden around an area, forming circles with the ropes. The land and houses within the circles were then termed government property, and the original owners were immediately forced out and all their possessions (including their houses) were simply taken over by the bannermen.  

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*dang'an*, fascicle 4, pp. 48–49. For government relief measures, see Ibid., pp. 54–55. Some of these dispossessed families were eventually resettled in Liaodong. In regulations which were enacted in 1653 to settle liumin (wandering people), people who were able to get together a quota of vagabonds to become farmers and settle in the Shengjing area were rewarded with magistracies or captaincies. Liu Xianting, *Guangyang zaji*, pp. 123–124.

144 This and the following information on land expropriation is based upon Ma, "Social and Economic Conflicts," pp. 335–340; Han Liang Huang, *The Land Tax in China*, pp. 65–71; Henri Maspéro, "Les Régimes fonciers en Chine, des origines aux temps modernes," pp. 189–191; Tsao Kai-fu, "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories against the Manchu Throne in China," p. 46; Huang Zongxi, *Nanlei wending, hou ji*, 4:10a. The prefectures most affected were Shuntian, Tianjin, Baoding, Hejian, Cangzhou, Yongping, Xuanhua, Zhending, and Dezhou—all areas where major bandit movements operated in subsequent years. In theory, the lands were either to be farmed as manorial estates for imperial clansmen or Manchu bannermen; or to be given as grants of 6 shang each in lieu of food to prebendaries under the banners. In 1647 the holdings were legally frozen, but extra grants of 60 shang were given to company commanders. In 1649, the legal award per man was adjusted to 5 shang to accommodate new arrivals from Liaodong; and in 1650 this rate was extended to earlier holders as well. The enclosure of land did not actually stop until the summer of 1669, when Kangxi personally issued orders to cease permitting it. Gu Cheng, "Lun Qingchu shehui maodun," pp. 148, 157.
One immediate difficulty encountered by the authorities was the varying cultivability of the land. The grantees soon found that some of them had been given arid or barren tracts, or that they themselves were not capable of investing the amount of labor required to provide a subsistence income. It was therefore decided that lands allotted to units of less than four men (ding) could be returned to the government in exchange for monthly allowances of cash and food. Furthermore, the practice developed of ousting Han Chinese from good land—which was distributed to Manchus—and relocating them on the poorer soil that the bannermen could not till. This still proved unsatisfactory, primarily because the Manchu bannermen by and large were not capable of making a living off even this land. Two different arrangements were then worked out, reflecting two different types of tenure. Han tillers occupying land that was not directly attached to a Manchu household were told that they owed corvée and taxes to the government in addition to rent. These freeholders then became virtual proprietors of the land they owned, except that they had to pay a slightly higher tax than was normal because the rent for these lands was thought to have been added on to the regular public tax. This, of course, was very much like the guan tian (official field) system adopted by the Ming in Jiangnan in the 14th century.

Tillers occupying land that had been assigned to a Manchu bannerman or was considered part of a prince’s estate were also allowed to stay on the soil once all of the relocation had taken place. These households were regarded as tenants of the Manchu owners; although actual cultivation reverted to the Chinese, the tillers were viewed as something approaching serfs. In practice, many of these tenants were poor peasants lacking tools or oxen, who, after the system was finally legally recognized in 1648, were considered to have “offered their services” (touchong). Though not properly

145 At first, Chinese whose lands had been enclosed by the Manchus were supposedly compensated with land elsewhere and exempted from taxes for one to two years. They were also told that they would be allowed to visit tombs situated in the enclosed areas during the two annual tomb-sweeping festivals, qingming and chongyang. Lui, Corruption, p. 46.
146 For several years after the Manchus’ entry into Beijing, the supply of live-
slaves like the peasants who had tilled the Manchus’ estates in the northeast, these tenants were supposedly volunteers, exempt from labor service, who worked as the Manchus’ servants. The system was fully developed between 1648 and 1650, and at first all of the touchong were usually either extremely poor peasants, fugitive criminals seeking immunity under the banner to which they were attached, or farmers already on the expropriated land who did not want to move. Occasionally, a landless person who had seized someone else’s land, occupying it as a squatter, also joined because he believed he could in this way avoid having to return the land he had stolen—an expectation which was usually met.\textsuperscript{147} Supposedly the tenants were only to act as tenants tilling the land and herding livestock. But within their ranks a new figure emerged: the zhuangtou or estate head. This was a touchong who was selected by the Manchu owner or the banner to act as a bailiff, and given the same status as a “retainer” in the banner administration. Obviously, such figures had considerable power, not only over tenants, but over neighboring freeholders who feared the power behind the bailiff, and thus felt unable to oppose arbitrary land seizures. The zhuangtou was a title that went back to the Ming manors, though in this case it ostensibly designated a rent collector rather than an estate manager. It was he who every autumn collected the contracted amount of rent which was then forwarded to the Manchu banner, prince, or bannerman owning the property.

stock among the people was virtually depleted. One ox cost 20 taels of silver, and a big ox went for as much as 30 taels. Human labor was therefore used, and 6 or 7 men would attach themselves to a plow and turn a bare 3–4 mu of field a day. The work was exhausting, and plowing was quite shallow. Xie Guozhen, \textit{Mingdai shehui jingji shiliao xuanbian}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{147} The practice of commendation—which was also known as daidi touchong (bringing land when you commend yourself)—was legally prohibited, as well as the acquisition of slaves, on May 2, 1647, by Dorgon, at the recommendation of the Board of Revenue. \textit{Shizu shila}, 31:367b–368a. See also Ji, \textit{Huangchao wenxian tongkao}, 20:1b. However, the practice continued and was not ultimately curbed until the Shunzhi Emperor took personal control of the government. Sudō Yoshiyuki, “Shinhō shoki ni okeru tōjū to sono kigen,” pp. 32–3; Torbert, \textit{Household Department}, pp. 18, 84–89; Tsao, “Three Feudatories,” p. 46.
In the short run, the Manchu banner land system had a strongly disrupting effect on Chinese rural society around the capital. In addition to the kinds of dislocation described earlier, there were frequent exchanges of land which further drove Chinese off the soil or saddled them with the poorest of holdings. An additional 132,250 shang of land (140,265 acres) in Shuntian, Baoding, Hejian, and Yongping, for example, were exchanged for poor land in the territories of the Bordered Yellow, White, Red, and Border Blue Banners. And in 1666, after an extensive survey of banner land, a practice developed that allowed a banner with over fifty percent of its land not suitable for cultivation to trade it for land elsewhere. Another 214,805 shang (227,823 acres) were similarly exchanged by the Bordered Yellow and White Banners in 1666. It has been estimated, in fact, that during the first twenty-five years of Qing rule, at least 270,000 qing (over 4 million acres) of land were encircled by the government, and that an additional 70,000 qing (over 1 million acres) fell into Manchu hands through commendation. Soon, virtually all of the good land within a 250 kilometer radius around Beijing was engrossed in this way. The practice was finally outlawed in 1706, but the issuing of edicts prohibiting private expropriation in 1647, 1653, and 1685 show that this practice had continued well into the late 17th century. In Sanhe, where the first riots against haircutting occurred, the Manchu land enclosure further depressed an already suffering rural economy. Unable to farm, young men lazily engaged in cross-roads, and the bolder among them charged tolls for civilians wishing to pass through the district enroute to Liaodong. Even during

148 Dorgon gave the best land in the extreme northeast of Zhili to his own Solid White Banner even though it should have been reserved for the Imperial Border Yellow and Solid Yellow Banners. Making Yongping prefecture his personal residence, Dorgon planned in this way to control access in and out of the northeast through Shanhai Pass. The two Yellow Banners were settled north of Beijing, the two Red Banners in the west, and the two Blue Banners in the south. The exchange of land in 1666 between the Solid White Banner and the Bordered Yellow Banner was carried out at Oboi’s instigation. He wanted the better lands of the northeast for his own Solid Yellow Banner. Wu, “Eight Banners,” pp. 55–56; Oxnam, Horseback, pp. 170–175; Kessler, K’ang-hsi, pp. 46–48; Harold Lyman Miller, “Factional Conflict and the Integration of Ch’ing Politics,” p. 31.
the 1680s when Peng Peng—the famous investigating magistrate—administered the district, lawlessness among Chinese and banner-men continued to plague the area; and rebellion broke out there long after Kong Xigui’s soldiers had forcibly pacified the district in 1644.149

In the long run, however, the practice of distributing banner lands probably had an equitable effect on land tenure, although it ultimately helped prevent the development of large-scale manorial farming in north China later in the Qing. The land granted to the Manchus was legally inalienable. Yet within a short period of time, the Manchu bannermen began losing their ownership rights. Not cultivating the lands themselves, and even assigning the collection of rents to zhuangtou, the Manchus quickly allowed virtual freeholding to develop in these expropriated areas.150 What had begun as labor services became chaiyin (commuted corvée), and then rents. The zhuangtou in turn became first intermediary landlords and then, through mortgage, ultimate owners of the lands. This was prohibited by imperial decree, but by 1745 at least half of the banner land was in Chinese hands.151

Just as the Manchu land system was in the end overcome by traditional rural society, so did the original Manchu system of slavery collapse when introduced into China. As we have seen, it was formally abolished in 1647, and replaced in 1648 by the short-lived touchong system.152 But while that system was in effect, it too cre-

149 Peng Peng, Zhong cang ji, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 50.
150 When floods hit Yongping and Baoding in 1653, for instance, many Manchu bannermen simply abandoned them, preferring to live off relief grain from the government rather than cultivate the land themselves. Zha Shenxing, Renhai ji, 1:2b. See also Wu, “Eight Banners,” p. 97.
151 Yüji Muramatsu, “Manchu Banner-lands in North China,” passim. Even Westerners took mortgages on Manchu lands in exchange for lending money to bannermen. On January 7, 1751, the Board of Revenue memorialized that some Westerners, and especially Castiglione, had secretly become mortgagees of bannerlands. Lo-shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, pp. 188–189.
152 The Qing code continued, until the early 20th century, to prescribe enslavement as punishment for a few serious offenses, including living with people found guilty of treason. Marinus J. Meijer, “Slavery at the End of the Ch’ing Dynasty,” pp. 328–329.
ated difficulties for the Han populace. The transplantation of the banner system from Liaodong to north China provided many opportunities for Chinese slaves attached to the banners to flee. Consequently, the dynasty in 1644 increased the punishments for both flight and shelter of fugitives—a policy which created much unrest. In 1646, 1649, and 1652, the penalties were somewhat lessened, but—under the administration of the Board of War rather than the Board of Punishments—the law continued to be enforced harshly. And even though efforts were made to lighten the status of slaves within the banners (their families were allowed to join them in 1646, and in 1661 the banners were ordered to grant their slaves leaves to visit their relatives), the general effect of the slave laws hampered stable civil rule. Because concealers of fugitives were either beheaded (under the earlier laws) or made slaves themselves in punishment, thousands died or were delivered into bound status. And since local officials were also held responsible for fugitives, they tended not to implement famine relief measures for fear that the families they helped were concealing fugitives from justice. Eventually, the system died out. As early as 1649, relatives of fugitives were permitted to ransom them; and by 1652 any Chinese was granted the right to redeem war captives. But even then, the pursuit and capture of runaway slaves still constituted a major source of abrasion in Manchu-Chinese relations.

Manchu Apartheid and Social Control

Dorgon was quite sensitive to the danger of letting these conflicts develop between his Manchu and Han subjects. As we have seen,
he repeatedly ordered an end to the depredations of bannermen and imperial kinsmen who took advantage of their privileged position in Chinese society. This solution, which involved strengthening the legal apparatus against abuses and in which Dorgon was helped by reformist officials like the legal expert Sun Xiang, at least manifested the dynasty’s good intent to its Han officials.\footnote{For Sun Xiang’s biography, see He Zhijji, Anhui tongzhi, p. 2169 (190:1a).} The prince-regent’s other solution to ethnic conflict harkened back to Hung Taiji’s way of resolving similar tensions between Chinese and Manchus in Liaodong after Liaoxi had been absorbed by the conquerors. At that time, when Manchus living together with Chinese had abused their positions to the point of driving the Han to murdering them, Hung Taiji decreed that the two races should live apart, thus setting the social background for the banner system. The same sort of wholesale segregation was adopted by Dorgon in Beijing when he learned in October, 1648, that in spite of the relocation four years earlier “recently there have arisen daily incidents of strife” between Han and Manchus still living together in the capital.

This is actually because they live together in mixed confusion. I have repeatedly turned this over in my mind. Even though relocation [of the Chinese populace] would entail momentary suffering, Manchus and Han would each [live] in peace, without mutual annoyance. [This would] actually be for [their] eternal convenience. With the exception of Han people who have offered their services \textit{(touchong)} to the eight banners and will not be relocated, every Han official, merchant and commoner will be moved to the southern [part of the] city to reside permanently.\footnote{Shizu shilu, 40:465, edict dated October 5, 1648. Although this provoked momentary resentment, over time the Manchus’ system of apartheid may have reduced inter-ethnic friction. The original property in the “inner city” was demolished or sold, and despite a three-year tax remission for those whose homes were appropriated, there was considerable hardship. However, the groups in the population that would have been most affected were the eunuchs (who controlled the state-built commercial arcades that were rented out to merchants), and noble members of the Embroidered Uniform Guard (who owned most of the shops in Beijing according to an early 16th century investigation). The evacuation of the imperial city probably provided some new investment opportunities for Han Chinese who had hith-}
From Dorgon's point of view this was a humane act, humanely planned. Each householder was to be given 4 ounces of silver for each room in his former house, and the relocation was to be carried out over a reasonable length of time. Moreover, Manchu and Han couples who wished to intermarry would be permitted to do so. In this way, the segregation of the two races would not mean the separation of fiancés, who could now legally marry and live together as a single household. Thus, what seemed to many an arrogant act of imperial despotism—segregation by fiat of the two peoples in the capital—was viewed by Dorgon as the most logical of solutions to restore harmony to Beijing: "Now the empire is one family. Manchu and Han officials and commoners are all my ministers and progeny. I want them to keep on good terms with each other."
The inner tower of the Hada Gate segregated the Tartar city from the Chinese quarter of Beijing. Osvald Siren, *The Walls and Gates of Peking* (London, 1924), plate 69, reproduced through the courtesy of the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Nevertheless, the relocation of the Han population caused massive hardship, especially in cities outside of Beijing where the establishment of Manchu garrisons required the expropriation of private land, and the expulsion of long-standing residents. Each of the garrisons that were established to suppress “bandit activity” in troubled regions was supposed to receive land that had belonged to the Ming nobility, and the Board of Revenue was ordered to survey the properties carefully, returning portions initially taken
by the Ming nobility from landowners in the region, turning the rest over to Manchu bannermen. Yet, in Linqing, for instance, large amounts of land were indiscriminately seized, provoking local conflict between Manchus and Chinese. Eventually, a total of 34 “Tartar Cities”—separate walled garrison quarters either within the existing city walls or in a twin city just outside the walls—were built across north China, and their initial effect was to incite the very kinds of disturbances they were intended to dispel.

The military pacification of north China did not depend on banner forces alone. While the Qing army of occupation was gradually settled into garrison towns, remnants of the Ming forces that had surrendered to the Qing in Beizhili and Shandong were mainly incorporated into new military units called green standard troops (lù yìng). When a local commander surrendered—like Colonel Lu Guonan, commander of the Ming army camp at Changping, northeast of Beijing—the officers and their men were reconstituted as green standard forces. These new armies participated in the conquest, being mainly charged with the task of rural pacification from their bases in major garrison towns and prefectural capitals. As one Qing official noted, the green standard troops “were originally [responsible for] suppressing insurrection, and gradually became [involved in] capturing bandits.”

By the end of the 17th century there were about 594,000 green

161 Ibid., 20:21, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 67. Garrisons were initially established at Shunde in Northern Zhili; at Ji’nan, Dezhou, and Linqing in Shandong; at Xuzhou in the Jiangbei area; and at Lu’an, Pingyang, and Puzhou in Shanxi.

162 He, Anhui tongzhi, p. 2124 (186:4b–5a).


164 Zheng, Tān wei ji, pp. 175–176; Naquin, Shantung, pp. 22, 149.

165 Lu was quickly promoted to general, and after helping recover Yan’an, Shaanxi, was put in charge of the Qing garrisons at Zhengding in Northern Zhili, which was his native province. Er chen zhuan, 10:7–8. Shanxi, Jiangnan, Shaanxi, and Gansu green standards were formed in 1645; Fujian in 1650; the Liangguang in 1651; Guizhou in 1658; and Yunnan in 1659. Tsao, “Three Feudatories,” pp. 36–42; Wu, “Eight Banners,” p. 182.

166 Wen Juntian, Zhongguo baojia zhidu, p. 212.
standard soldiers in China. As local occupation forces, they fell under the formal authority of the provincial governor. They were assigned to local zhen or xian as fenfang (guard divisions) to police the area and, by collecting the local tax and population registers (shui hu ji) which were kept in the military yamen along with details of the baojia system, to establish a flexible control system. Thus, during the early stages of Qing government, local administration was really military rule by forces that were mainly Chinese. The Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese banner forces stood ready to intervene if a particular locale tenaciously refused to accept Qing rule, but as heavy infantry and cavalry, their function was blitzkrieg, not police surveillance.  

The commander of the occupation forces was the governor or intendant (xunfu) in charge of a particular circuit, which in some cases was equivalent to a province. As the Qing widened its sway outside of Beijing, the regime sent these governors to take over areas which had already surrendered or been pacified, and to assume command over the local military units now listed as green standard units. Shen Wenkui was sent to govern Baoding; Wang Aoyong, Ding Wensheng, and Yang Fangxing were appointed to garrison Shandong. Each of them was assigned a definite sphere of jurisdiction, and if something occurred outside of their circuit of responsibility, the governors (most of whom were trusted “old men” from Liaodong) had to get special permission to move out of their bailiwick. Until 1648, every time an official was sent out

168 The title xunfu is usually translated as “grand coordinator” when it is a Ming title, and as “governor” when used for the Qing position. Hucker, Censorial System, pp. 38–39.
169 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 72. During the first year of Qing rule, there were slightly more Manchus than Chinese appointed as xunfu; but between 1645 and 1651, 63% of the governors, on the average, each year were Han. Then, after 1652, there was a growing percentage of Manchus, rising to 70% by 1658. By 1669, 80% of the governors were Manchus; and in 1674, 90% were Manchus. After the 1690s, there was a gradual decline in the numbers of Manchus serving as governors until parity was reached in the late 18th century. These figures are taken from Narakino Shimesu, “Shindai tokubu Man-Kan hiritsu no hendō ni tsuite.”
on a particular pacification campaign, Dorgon recalled the man to Beijing or sent him back to the northeast for a time first. Clearly, the new dynasty feared a repetition of the freewheeling maneuvers of late Ming warlords like Zuo Liangyu, and preferred to keep their military governors on much tighter leashes.\footnote{During the conquest of south China, however, the government would be forced to give up this type of control over its pacification cadre. The need for greater mobility at greater distances from the capital loosened the leash, and of course laid the groundwork for the Three Feudatories. Tsao, “Three Feudatories,” pp. 39–40.}

At the same time, the Qing government depended heavily upon the military governors and their forces to extend Qing rule over north China. Without their help it would have been impossible for the regime to rule more than the core of the Central Plain just around Beijing. The far west would have been left to Li Zicheng and his men, and the Grand Canal zone to the generals guarding Nanjing. But most military units in north China readily surrendered, and with their aid the Manchus gradually established a local foundation upon which to construct their empire.

### Securing the Capital

The first major task of the surrendered military units and their governors was to secure the western flank of the capital by clearing Shanxi of Shun remnants. On June 4, 1644, Li Zicheng, having abandoned Beijing, fled down the highway towards the Shanxi border, fighting rearguard actions against Wu Sangui’s men all the way. At Dingzhou, where the huge straggling army of two to three hundred thousand men tried to regroup, a confused melee broke out. Many leaders were killed in the rout, and more than ten thousand surrendered to the pursuing Qing forces. Pushing on to Zhending, Li Zicheng himself was wounded by an arrow and fell from his horse. In the town proper, before it was partly set on fire, Li tried to seek refuge in a house but was driven out by the flames. The Shun remnants, however, managed to outdistance their pur-
suers, and Li crossed through Gu Pass in Shanxi. As Wu Sanguui abandoned the chase and turned back to Beijing, Li regrouped his forces at Taiyuan. Leaving a garrison there under the command of a former Ming officer, Chen Yongfu, Li Zicheng pushed on to reestablish his base in Shaanxi. While some of his soldiers headed directly across the Lüliang Mountains, the bulk of Li’s army marched south through Shanxi, down past Pingyang, and thence across the Yellow River to enter Shaanxi via the town of Hancheng north of the Wei River valley. From there Li Zicheng rode on to Xi’an where he had proclaimed the Shun reign four months earlier. While a large body of men, well equipped with firearms, was posted to defend Tong Pass, Li’s nephew, Li Guo, was sent north to reassert Shun control over the rebels’ native districts in north Shaanxi. A Shun force under Gao Yigong also began to entrench itself at Suide in northern Shaanxi, and a confederation of forty stockades commanded by Gao Jiuying in Lan xian would soon hold the Luya Mountains northwest of Taiyuan. By mid-summer, there would be a long and almost impenetrable belt of rebel installations stretching from Jiaocheng southwest of

171 When the Shun forces had come through Gu Pass earlier on their way to Beijing, they had stopped up—inadvertently or not—the wells of the inhabitants. Now, retreating westward, stragglers who fell into the clutches of peasants had their left hands chopped off by way of revenge. Uta Mikami Rouse, “Hu-k’ou yü-sheng chi,” p. 99.

172 Chen Yongfu is usually identified as the man who shot out Li Zicheng’s eye, though it was actually his son (Chen De) who fired the arrow on March 27, 1641, during the siege of Kaifeng. When Kaifeng was flooded in October, 1642, Chen was one of a handful who managed to escape by boat, and he went on to lead a contingent in Sun Chuanting’s ranks when the Ming imperial forces had their last great battle with Li Zicheng’s peasant army over control of Tong Pass in 1643. After Li Zicheng defeated Sun and entered Shaanxi, Chen Yongfu fled to the mountains with several thousands of his most loyal troops. Although he was sure that Li Zicheng would kill him for having blinded him in one eye, Chen was finally persuaded by Bai Guang’en to surrender to the rebel. During his first audience with Li, Chen was told that he was forgiven because both sides were expending their all that day in battle. This act impressed many other Ming officers, who also surrendered to Li Zicheng at the same time. Zhang Shouchang, “Chen Yongfu,” pp. 64–69.
Taiyuan all the way up to Hequ in the far northwest near Pian Pass.\footnote{173}

As Li Zicheng had fled westward through Shanxi, some of the local military leaders in that heavily garrisoned province who had initially surrendered to him turned once more against the rebel. In the northern part of the province, around Xuanfu and Datong, where thousands of square walled fortresses, called bao, dotted the bleak, eroded landscape, General Jiang Xiang's army exercised control.\footnote{174} Jiang, who was originally the Ming commander of the Xuanhua garrison, guarding the approaches from Kalgan to Beijing, had once pledged allegiance to the Shun. Like so many field-grade officers, Jiang had forged a largely personal force during the 1630s and early '40s, attracting freebooters and soldiers of fortune hardly different from the Chuang rebels themselves. Now his men turned on the forces of Li Zicheng as they passed through, and beheaded the Shun commander of Datong, Ke Tianxiang, while General Jiang sent word to Beijing that he had pledged to exterminate the "wandering bandits" and would be loyal to the Qing. Dorgon accepted his surrender on July 9, 1644, and appointed him military administrator of the Datong area.\footnote{175} The following month, the prince-regent also appointed a governor-general for Datong, but that man, Wu Zichang, left military affairs in Jiang Xiang's experienced hands.\footnote{176}


174 In Datong alone there were 918 such bao and about 100 roadblock points where guards would carefully check the dialects of travellers to make sure that dangerous elements were kept under control. As a result of the Tumu incident of 1449, when Essen captured Emperor Yingzong, a kind of Magi-not line mentality set in, and a tremendous amount of effort was devoted to strengthening military fortifications in Xuanfu and Datong. "One gains the clear impression that in the northern portion of the provinces lying next to the Great Wall an armed society developed; it spent much of its resources on defense, and lived in an atmosphere of tension." Frederick W. Mote, "The T'u-mu Incident of 1449," pp. 270–271. Even today the walled forts and watchtowers still remain, dominating the plain and crowning the hills beyond.

175 Shizu shilu, 5:57; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 138.

176 Fu Zongmao, Qingdai dufuzhidu, pp. 9–10.
The government’s plans for pacification of Shanxi initially rested upon the support of warlords like Jiang Xiang. Although Manchu military commanders (Generals Yecen and Bahana) were invested with overall responsibility for the conquest of the province, a Chinese collaborator, Wu Weihua, was put in charge of the administrative cadre to implement a policy of “soothing” local garrison officers and former Ming officials into surrender.\(^{177}\) Appointed to his post on August 20, Wu managed in the first two weeks of September to win the collaboration of several important local officials: Wang Hongzuo, formerly a bureau director in the Ministry of Finance; Geng Yingheng, the military defense circuit surveillance commissioner in Taiyuan prefecture; Li Rijin, magistrate of Changping; Tong Kexuan, former assistant prefect of Baoding prefecture; and Wu Songyun, a Ming circuit intendant.\(^{178}\) All of these men were appointed assistant surveillance commissioners under the new regime.\(^{179}\) In addition, several leading military officers also surrendered to the Qing. On September 3, Colonels Wang Shiming and Ma Shirong turned over the garrison at Pian Pass in northwestern Shanxi to the new government and swore allegiance to the Qing; and one week later, Ming Brigade-General Wang Yue joined the Manchus as well.\(^{180}\) In response to Governor Wu’s urgent requests for reinforcements led by Wu Sangui or Hong Chengchou, the government did appoint an experienced and capable officer, General Ma Guozhu, as military governor to help

\(^{177}\) Wu Weihua, who was descended from a sinified Mongol who had fought under Zhu Yuanzhang and had become an earl, surrendered to Dorgon in Beijing and asked to be named head of the Chinese forces sent to bring Shanxi under Qing control. Eventually Wu became a brigade-general and was ennobled as a marquis by the Manchus. *Er chen zhuan*, 9:7–9. For the orders to Yecen and Bahana, see the entries for July 17 and August 4, 1644 in *Shizu shilu*, 5:58b and 6:65b.

\(^{178}\) *Shizu shilu*, 6:72a.

\(^{179}\) Ibid., 7:81a, 83a.

\(^{180}\) Ibid., 7:79b, 82. However, even though nearly every major Ming military unit had acknowledged Qing authority, there were still not enough soldiers available for Wu Weihua (whose own troops only numbered 1,200 cavalry plus 200 officers and retainers) to dare to attack Chen Yongfu and the Shun rebels in the provincial capital of Taiyuan, *Ming-Qing shiliao, bing*, 5, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 247.
Wu Weihua bring Shanxi province under control. But even General Ma’s superbly disciplined troops were unable to budge the Shun defenses when they attacked Taiyuan in September. It was clear that Qing commanders in Shanxi would have to be significantly bolstered if there was to be any hope of launching a victorious offensive against Li Zicheng’s armies.

The request for reinforcements to pacify Shanxi did not come at a propitious time. By the early autumn of 1644 it was becoming apparent to the Qing government that the policy of “soothing” Beizhili and Shandong had not been altogether successful. To be sure, Cao Rong (now provincial literary chancellor—xue zheng—of Shuntian) was continuing to call for civil measures in a spirit of Confucian transformation through learning and cultural attainment, rather than through harsher methods of political and social control. But even the proponents of “soothing” were divided among themselves as to the best methods to use. One camp, identified with War Vice-Minister Jin Zhijun, advocated “soothing by receiving” (shoufu): granting amnesty to bandits who handed over their weapons and mounts. Another group, led by Liu Yuyou, pro-

181 Shizu shilu, 7:2, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 248. Ma Guozhu was the early adherent who had in 1632 presented Hung Taiji with a plan for the conquest of China. Qing shi gao, biography of Ma Guozhu, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 249; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 592.

182 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 249; Zeng Guoquan, Shanxi tongzhui, 27b.

183 In order to show a proper veneration for learning, the government should hold exams in each area as it was pacified, he proposed. At the same time, the examination quota should be enlarged by accepting additional tribute students, and provision should be made for the recommendation of local leaders skilled in rural administration and defense, so that practical skills as well as booklearning were recognized as vital to the health of the empire. Teachers, who were usually old men who had failed in life, should be drawn from the young and vigorous, and paid official salaries. People who had committed loyal, filial, or chaste acts of an exemplary nature should be given special recognition. Indigent scholars should receive stipends, and metropolitan examination candidates should be given travel expenses and provided with special lodgings in the capital. Qinquan jushi, Huang Qing mingchen zouyi 1:5–8a. This memorial is dated Shunzhi 1, but no month or day is given. On September 2, 1644, Cao also called for educational reform in Liaodong. Shizu shilu, 7:79a. See also Er chen zhu, 6:17.
posed a policy of "soothing by potential" (\textit{nengfu}): the killing of bandit leaders, the forcible splitting up of their followers, and the resettling of these individuals in peaceful employment. The trouble was—in the view of Supervising Secretary of Personnel Sun Chengze—the government was spending far too much time arguing over the merits of \textit{shoufu} versus \textit{nengfu}, and not enough effort actually carrying out pacification measures. Urging the government to execute both policies simultaneously by killing gang leaders, recovering weapons and mounts, and returning the followers to civil life, Sun Chengze claimed that the problem was not policy but its correct implementation. The government should first recognize that local magistrates alone did not usually possess the power or backing to initiate a thorough policy of pacification. Then it should charge officials with the special and sole task of "soothing," and require them to send in bi-monthly reports on the extent and progress of their plans. Only by evaluating pacification officials' actual accomplishments could the government encourage programs that worked. For example, the pacification effort by Zheng Hui, the circuit intendant of Tongzhou (just east of Beijing), demonstrated the dangers of being too lax and easygoing: old rebel bands were not eradicated, and new gangs festered and grew. Magistrate Liu Fangzhi of Bazhou, on the other hand, showed how one could, through sheer benevolence and proper "soothing," attract a great following for the government by offering the people a clear choice between civil amnesty and martial persecution. Magistrate Liu's program worked so well—Sun concluded—that he had transformed the area southwest of Beijing into another Great Wall, defending the capital from harm.\footnote{Ming-Qing shiliao, \textit{bing}, 5, in Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, pp. 56–57. Sun's memorial was submitted on August 30, 1644.}

Unfortunately, just as Secretary Sun was making a paragon out of Liu Fangzhi, word reached the court that "forest bandits" were preying upon travellers passing through that same district.\footnote{Ming-Qing shiliao, \textit{bing}, 5, cited in Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, p. 54.} With a major communication route to the south now virtually cut, repeating the isolation of the capital that had so paralyzed the Ming
government during its last days, the court feared losing touch with those forces that were then pacifying Tianjin and Shandong. Perhaps that is why Dorgon responded so scathingly to Sun’s memorial:

According to this memorial, Liu Fangzhi has “made the southwestern side into a Great Wall,” and seemingly should be raised in rank. [The memorialist] however has not taken the trouble to note that, in spite of this, the local bandits of the Bazhou region have been creating an uproar ever since our righteous armies reached the capital. This disorder does not appear to be abating. Earlier this month I also heard that local robbers of that region were growing even greater in number. In fact, we are about to send an army there to administer Imperial correction. In short, Sun Chengze seems to have fallen victim to favoritism. The court originally created censorial officials in order to air publicly correct words. If, in this case, public duty [conceals] favoritism, then how do we differ from the corrupt government of the Ming dynasty? If [officials] continue to follow these rotten practices in the future, such a serious crime will not be forgiven. Let the appropriate boards take note!

186 The Qing government was acutely conscious of the importance of rebuilding the post-horse communications system that linked the network of cities from which the elite ruled the empire. By late Ming times, the post-horse system had virtually been taken over by private traders. (By 1629 only 20% of the traffic was official.) In 1647 Dorgon denounced those who utilized the state postal system for private ends, and at the same time allotted part of the local service quotas to subsidize the system. But that was only the beginning of what was to be a laborious process of reviving the defunct communications administration and its complex local tax structure. For documents detailing that procedure, see Gugong Ming-Qing dang’an shiliao congbian, fascicle 7, pp. 1–60. On the disintegration of the Ming system, see Hoshi Ayao, “Transportation in the Ming Dynasty,” p. 28.

187 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 5, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 57. Both Hung Taiji and Dorgon paid great lip-service to the responsibilities of censors, but also flew into rages when jishizhong or surveillance officials implicitly criticized imperial oversights. Oxnam, Horseback, p. 33; Gertraude Roth Li, “The Rise of the Early Manchu State,” p. 135. Between 1644 and 1647, censors submitted 31 memorials suggesting ways to improve the administration. Dorgon, whatever the state of his temper, only rejected three of these suggestions. However, he rejected many of their impeachments, often because of lack of evidence. Adam Yuen-chung Lui, “Censor, Regent and Emperor in the
Disposed now to more extreme solutions, Dorgon encouraged sterner policies of bandit suppression. He also read with interest a memorial on September 13, 1644, from the Sichuanese censor Liu Yindong, who reported that one of the reasons for the difficulty in extirpating the outlaws threatening traffic around the capital was the ready refuge offered them by the thick woods between Beijing and Tianjin. Liu, who was charged along with Song Quan and Zhang Ruoqi with the responsibility of pacifying Shuntian, proposed an "immense" solution: cutting down all of the heavy forests bordering on highways and canals in that zone.188 Dorgon approved the proposal, and landowners there were given three days to comply. The nearly treeless plain that now lies between Tianjin and the capital is the result of the prince-regent’s drastic decision.189

The adoption of a harsher policy toward outlaws, rebels, and loyalists coincided with, and was partially a response to, a wave of military activity that swept across north China during September and October of 1644. Faced by recrudescences of resistance to Qing rule in the region around Tianjin, in western Shandong, and in southern Hebei, Dorgon simply adopted a holding action in Shanxi. As we have seen, Wu Weihua, the man he had put in charge of pacification there, had reported that it would be impossible to retake Taiyuan from the Shun rebels without the aid of "heavy troops" led by Wu Sangui or Hong Chengchou. Dorgon’s

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early Manchu Period,” pp. 82–83. Sun Chengze was not in this case punished. In fact, in 1647 he was promoted to become Vice-President of War. *Er chen zhuan*, 12:28–29a.

188 Zhang Ruoqi (*jinsi* 1631, Shandong) had been impeached and jailed by the Chongzhen Emperor for sending back false reports of victories in the campaigns against the Manchus in 1642. He was released from jail by Li Zicheng and served him as a censor responsible for the Shanhaiguan military district. He then surrendered to Dorgon and was made assistant prefect of Shuntian. *Er chen zhuan*, 12:6–8.

189 *Ming-Qing shiliao, bing*, 5, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 54. The Bazhou county seat, however, continued to experience bandit attacks in 1647 and 1649. *Er chen zhuan, juan* 8, and *Shizu shilu* in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, pp. 54–55. Since the early 1960s, trees have been planted along highways and canals but the thick woods have utterly disappeared, at least along the railway line between Tianjin and Beijing. There are still forests around the Eastern Tombs of the Qing dynasty.
response to that appeal was an effort to get more former Ming troops in Shanxi to come over to the new government’s side. Besides Jiang Xiang, who had already joined the Qing, the leading warlord in Shanxi was Tang Tong, whose army was then occupying the northwestern corner of the province, and was garrisoned at Baode. Tang Tong had turned Datong over to Li Zicheng and had fought alongside the rebel against Wu Sangui and the Manchus at Shanhaiguan. As Li Zicheng abandoned Beijing and fled westward, so did Tang Tong, who realized that much of the Shun armies’ strength had been shattered. He therefore refused to accompany the general exodus into Shaanxi, and instead turned back to seize Baode. After Dorgon received Wu Weihua’s pessimistic report, the prince-regent wrote to Tang Tong, offering him amnesty and office in exchange for collaboration against the Shun.

When the letter was delivered by General Gao Xun, Tang told the general, who in turn reported to the court, that he was ready to render allegiance to Dorgon and help the government forces exterminate bandits in his region. But it quickly became evident to General Gao that one of the warlord's main motives in joining the Qing was to get imperial help to control his own region. On October 17, 1644, Gao received military despatches from Tang Tong that reported Shun remnants were just across the border at Fugu in Shaanxi attacking the Baode fortifications. Tang urgently requested help, and General Gao subsequently wrote to Dorgon, informing him of this new emergency and requesting an extra seven to eight thousand light cavalry as reinforcements. Evidently, the crisis in Shanxi would not be overcome without extra help from outside. From his vantage point in Beijing, Dorgon realized external support would not be forthcoming until his armies settled the much more dangerous emergencies to the east and south of the capital.

190 Er chen zhuang, 10:29–31a. Before accepting the Qing offer of amnesty, Tang Tong was defeated at Yipianshi by Tulai, hero of the fall of Songshan. "Notices of Eminent Statesmen of the Present Dynasty," p. 98.
191 Shizu shilu, 7:81a. The letter was sent on September 6, 1644.
192 Ibid., 8:96b. News of Tang Tong's surrender reached Beijing on October 15, 1644.
193 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 5, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 249.
Revival of Resistance

In October, 1644, a major uprising broke out near Tianjin, which had initially been “pacified” by Jin Li the previous June. The regional commander and governor now was Lei Xing. When a loyalist named Li Lianfang rebelled, Lei Xing resolved to adopt a stern and ruthless posture vis-à-vis the resisters. Yet although Li was soon cornered and killed, the rebellion continued to rage in the coastal districts south of Tianjin, where a man nicknamed Zhang San Ligua (Three Pear-Melon Zhang) led—as the official reports put it—“bandits who had gone raving mad.” The first Red Banner units sent in to this “seething cauldron” were massacred. But then Lei Xing called for reinforcements from Baoding, and when they arrived, he used those “heavy troops” to occupy the districts in force, arresting suspects and employing torture to learn the names of the leaders of various bandit groups. Once the hapless captives (who usually died during the interrogation) revealed the location of the bandit camps, troops were sent in to slaughter the rebels, capture their women, and seize their livestock. No quarter was given. Lei Xing’s “pacification” was so harsh, in fact, that the hands of the “soothers” at court were inadvertently strengthened, and the Tianjin authorities were eventually ordered to curb their soldiers’ depredations. The rebels by then were mainly exterminated. 194

Farther south, in Shandong, the initial stage of gentry-led pacification also was followed by a revival of resistance to Qing rule. After serving in Beijing, the Zichuan notable Sun Zhixie returned home only to be killed by peasant rebels who plundered the wealthy district. 195 And Governor Wang Aoyong, the man who had secured the surrender of Sun Zhixie and other important gentrymen, was himself killed at Qingzhou in central Shandong when one of Li Zicheng’s former lieutenants, Zhao Yingyuan, took the city and put to death Qing collaborators. 196 As Qing authority

194 Biographies of Jin Li and Lei Xing in Qing shi gao and Wenxian congbian, 13, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 52–53.
195 Er chen zhuoan, 9:27a.
196 Ibid., 1:16b.
wavered in Yanzhou, the new governor, Fang Daxian, discovered that even the elaborate paramilitary system of militia and braves commanded by local magnates was failing to suppress local dissidents. When Governor Fang began to use the militiamen against the outlaws entrenched in the Manjiadong caves alongside the Grand Canal in Jiaxiang, he discovered that the rebels' fortifications were so numerous and so strong that he could not wipe out the bands without more help from the central government, which seemed, at least to him, to be ignoring his pleas. "I have no provisions, no horses, no troops," he complained. "My repeated requests have not been answered. The will is there, but where's the way?" He was quick to point out to the court that, "even though I had no soldiers at hand, I exerted all my efforts to recruit skilled braves." But the local military units were infantry, not cavalry; and, as everyone knew, the bandits most of all feared cavalry. It was essential, therefore, that the court order the transfer of a contingent of Shandong cavalrymen from the command of Li Huaxi, who was now at Tong Pass, acting as governor-general of Shaanxi.

Because the twenty thousand Manjiadong rebels under Li Wensheng, known as the "Prince Who Holds Up Heaven," posed a threat to the nearby Grand Canal, Fang Daxian also appealed di-

197 Fang Daxian (jinshi 1637, Zhejiang) was one of those Ming officials who had served Li Zicheng, and then was sentenced in absentia by the Southern Ming government for treason. Unable to return to his native province, therefore, Fang remained in Beijing and joined Dorgon's government. He was appointed a circuit intendant for the salt gabelle, then was seconded to Wang Aoyong to pacify Shandong, and in August named governor of that province. Er chen zhuan, 12:9–11a.

198 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 79. As Fang explained to his superiors, there was such a high potential for dissidence in Shandong that the moment a military unit was moved from one "pacified" locale to another area, the district just left was bound to burst into revolt. Unless more troops were transferred to the province, it would be impossible to keep the situation under control.

199 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 5, report dated October 1, 1644, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 74.

200 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 5, dated September 23, 1644, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 78.
rectly to the Director-General of the Grand Canal, Yang Fangxing. Yang was duly alarmed by Fang's report of the rebels, and he clearly felt that the governor's estimates of the danger they posed were not exaggerated. In fact, he thought the threat so serious as to argue to the court that the only safe policy was to proceed immediately with a policy of jiao (extermination) and only later implement fu (soothing) by offering amnesty. Calling upon his own authority as director-general, Yang Fangxing thereupon went ahead and requisitioned seven hundred Chinese cavalrymen from a guards unit in Beizhili. While he awaited their arrival, he had scouts sent out to report on the Manjiadong rebels' defenses.201

It took Yang Fangxing a little over a week to assemble his soldiers, and around October 10, the combined force of cavalrymen and foot soldiers moved north from Yi, the garrison town between the imperial highway and the Grand Canal, under the command of Yang's deputies. As they marched, they gathered more reinforcements from among local xiangbing, so that a sizable army had been assembled by the time they reached Manjiadong and began engaging the rebels. The Qing soldiers were armed with bows and arrows, which were more than a match for the outlaws' long spears. Governor Fang had been right: many of the rebels fled at the very sight of the imperial cavalry, and were ridden down by detachments that pursued them back up into the hills and shot them, thousands in all. Occasionally, a larger confederation would stand and fight, but usually the rebels simply split up to return to the individual band's "lair," so that the government troops had to move from cave to cave, "washing them out" (xi). The outlaws themselves tried to escape deeper into the mountains, and many in fact did get away with horses and provisions. Others were am-

201 In order to avoid the appearance of high-handedness vis-à-vis the "soothers" in Beijing, Yang promised to offer the bandits amnesty if they handed over horses and weapons immediately and destroyed their fortifications. Although the Qing soldiers did try to spread news of this offer through captured peddlers who were released and sent back into the area, it was a policy only halfheartedly pursued. Yang Fangxing clearly believed that none of the rebels should be spared. Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 1, dated October 1, 1644, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 75.
bushed. In fact, that was how the “Prince Who Holds Up Heaven” died, shot and killed with three arrows as he abandoned his lair. Others made their way to one of the “concentrations” (ji) of fortified redoubts. Two of these—Dayi ji and Heyi ji—were discovered by questioning local xiangyue (village covenant) leaders, and then surrounded. Fighting house to house, Yang Fangxing’s troops thus captured a total of twenty-eight ji, killing tens of thousands of rebels. Those who surrendered and turned over their weapons and horses were reported to have “reformed their heterodoxy and returned to orthodoxy, each resuming his former profession.” There were still perhaps as many as ten thousand rebels at large, but brigades of village braves were helping pacify the districts, and Yang by November 21 ordered his men to stop burning villages. 202

Meanwhile, rebellion spread to the north and east, where loyalists raised the banner of the Hongguang Emperor at Qingzhou. Finally, in spite of Li Huaxi’s reluctance to allow his men to be transferred away from the front against the Shun, the court decided to heed Governor Fang’s advice and provide reinforcements. 203 On October 16, 1644, crack Manchu cavalry under Hetuo and Chinese Solid Blue bannermen commanded by Li Yongfang’s son, Li Shuaitai, were ordered to leave their garrison at Ningyuan and ride to the relief of Shandong. 204 In December, major victories were being reported against Yang Wei and Qin Shangxing at Qingzhou, against Zhang Yu at Gaomi, and against Ding Weiyue at Zhangqiu. 205 And by February, 1645, these new permanent garrison troops had either destroyed or scattered most of the rebel groups north of Yanzhou, driving them underground or across the provincial border into southern Hebei (Beizhili). 206

202 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 6, dated November 21, 1644, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 75–77.
203 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 80.
204 Shizu shilu, 8:96b. Li Shuaitai was the second son of Li Yongfang, married to an imperial agnate of the Qing. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 484–485.
205 Shizu shilu, 11:136a. See also Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 12.
206 Shizu shilu, 13:148b. The Manchu and Chinese bannermen sent from Ningyuan to garrison Shandong and Henan marked the beginning of the banner occupation system described earlier. Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 14. Dorgon relied heavily on Chinese bannermen to staff the civil administration of
Southern Hebei was not yet considered a pacified zone. The leg of the province itself lay between Henan and Shandong and nearly reached the Yellow River. Economically, it formed a part of the trading systems of those two neighboring provinces, rather than of Beizhili. Situated in the heartland of the Yellow River plain, Daming was close enough to the loyalist zhai of Henan to be linked at times with the Southern Ming regime, and close enough to the borders of Shanxi to be occupied periodically by Shun armies. During the summer of 1644, a Ming loyalist group, led by Zhao Erliang (who in turn was supported by the Henanese leader Su Zixing), occupied Daming; and in August, after it was brought under Qing control, the city was threatened by thousands of Shun rebels, who momentarily seized it. As the Qing general in charge

Shandong. Between 1644 and 1649 there were 14 men appointed to the posts of financial commissioner and judicial commissioner of the province. Of these, 9 were Chinese bannermen. In Ji’nan prefecture, where there were 5 prefects between 1644 and 1648, 3 of these were bannermen. And in the 6 xian in that same prefecture, at least 6 of the 24 magistrates were Chinese bannermen. Oxnam, *Horseback*, p. 93.

207 This may have been the result of “high level gerrymandering.” According to Skinner: “One effect of extending a leg of Zhili deep into the southern portion of the regional core was to split the metropolitan and the regional-city trading systems of both Kaifeng and Tung-ch’ang-fu between two provinces and to tie the interests of the powerful gentry of Ta-ming fu (the prefecture forming the southern leg of Zhili) to the metropolitan province rather than to Honan or Shantung, the province on which the interests of Ta-ming merchants were focused.” G. William Skinner, “Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems,” p. 343.

208 It was in this salient that the “local bandits” (tuzei) of Yuan Shizong arose among starving refugees in 1640. Yuan himself was from Daming, but the bandits raided throughout northern Henan and eventually joined Li Zicheng, who had Yuan killed. Satō Fumitoshi, “Mimatsu Yenjichū no ran nitsuite,” pp. 209–220.

209 Cheng Tingheng, ed., *Daming xianzhi*, 12:16. See also Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 65. Zhao Erliang was a bandit for whom Ming loyalty appears to have been an afterthought. Shortly after he raised the banner of the Hongguang Emperor, the district magistrate at Qingfeng mobilized militia against Zhao’s forces, who killed one of the gentry leaders and over a hundred of the magistrate’s men. The rebel regime was suppressed by General Tu Guobao. For the Shun attack, see Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 67.
of retaking the area remarked at the time, there were not enough reliable local officials to manage defenses there; nor were there horses and supplies; nor were the people’s hearts yet sufficiently pacified to hold the area without strong reinforcements from Zhen-ding to the north.\(^{210}\)

To the north, in the counties of Zhending prefecture, where the Taihang Mountains “interlock like dog’s teeth,” piled layer upon layer, the “people’s hearts” were also quite restless during the late summer and autumn of the first year of the conquest. Officials reported from the district capitals of Zanhuang, Jingxing, Huolu, and Lingshou that bands of up to a thousand outlaws roamed the hills, rustling livestock, seizing women, murdering travellers, and occasionally attacking county seats.\(^{211}\) Jingxing, through which ran the road over the Gu Pass to Taiyuan, was secured on August 3, when a contingent of one thousand troops was sent into the mountains. However, on September 4, intelligence reports reached the military headquarters at Baoding describing peasants’ claims that they had seen Shun remnants and “wandering bandits” riding through Pingding district across the Shanxi border. These reports were confirmed: there were two thousand rebels under a Shun official named Liu at Pingding.\(^{212}\) Evidently, the Baoding authorities failed to give proper warning to the magistrate at Jingxing (where many members of the gentry from mountainous districts like Pingshan had already taken shelter), because on September 21, when a contingent of soldiers rode up to the city gate claiming to be from the imperial garrison at Gu Pass, he let them into the town. Once drawn up before the district yamen, the soldiers suddenly turned on the magistrate, seizing him and killing the district warden and an army major. These were none other than the Shun troopers from Pingding who now controlled not only that city, but Gu Pass and the district capital of Jingxing as well.\(^{213}\)

\(^{210}\) Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 5, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 68.

\(^{211}\) Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 5, dated October 1, 1644, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 65–66.

\(^{212}\) Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, dated September 9, 1644, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 69.

\(^{213}\) Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 1, dated September 23, 1644, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 69–70.
two weeks after learning that rebels now occupied the main road between Beijing and the capital of Shanxi, the court received word that rebels from Shandong had linked up with the Henanese bandit-loyalists of Su Zixing. Calling themselves the Da yuan (Great Origin) Army, these “wandering bandits,” led by a “so-called General Wang Dingxuan,” had captured Neihuang and were sweeping over the prefectures of Shunde, Guangping and Daming like “a great prairie fire.” Now both western and southern Hebei were threatened zones, and the time had obviously come for emergency measures.

Dorgon gave Shen Wenkui overall responsibility for pacifying the rebellion and named him governor of Baoding. From the very beginning, Governor Shen made it clear that he disagreed with the policy of zhaofu: inviting the rebels to surrender in exchange for amnesty and rewards. In November, 1644, he called for jiaofu (extermination), arguing that the situation had gotten so out of hand in the west and south that local xian officials were completely at the mercy of local outlaws (many of whom had already been given amnesty). They were so bullied and frightened, in fact, that they did not even dare to send to Baoding for support. Only a firm and consistent policy of outright suppression of such thugs would gain the local officials’ support; otherwise, the insurgents would continue to control the countryside.

Liu Yuyou, author of the nengfu policy of killing only bandit leaders and resettling their followers, bridled at Shen’s insistence. On December 3, Liu sent in a querulous and sycophantish memorial, complaining to Dorgon that certain officials were “maliciously misleading their Superior’s regard.” He himself—he assured the prince-regent—had been mulling over the pacification problem incessantly, discussing it “from dawn till dark” with his colleagues. The most important thing was not to panic. By now, central Hebei was being pacified; and Daming, district by district, was being restored to law and order. Parts of Zhending were occupied by rebels, to be sure; but matters were not nearly as desperate as some would pretend. Rashly to order local officials to change their ef-

214 Shizu shilu, 8:95, dated October 8, 1644.
215 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 5, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 66.
SHANXI in the Early Qing

Map 5
forts at zhaofu into a hard-line policy of extermination would only play into the bandits’ hands by turning more of the people into their supporters; the liang min (good people) would be forced to enter into the bandit gangs (dang). The only sensible policy was the one that had already been followed with great success: exhorting rebel leaders by name, as individuals, to resume civil life. Not that the memorialist would deny that for certain outlaws, banditry was their only calling. It was crucial that such diehards be weeded out; but many of those who had been branded as rebels were still redeemable, “not yet ruined,” and they could be rehabilitated. Only this would truly make the foundations of the state secure.216

Liu Yuyou was certainly correct when he described the situation as improving and warned against panic. Yet the remedies that were being applied were actually both hard-line extermination and more moderate “soothing.” Shen Wenkui, for example, was quite willing “softly” to persuade a local gang leader named Zhao Chongyang to join the Qing, and Zhao’s army was a great help to him in capturing or killing other bandit leaders, discovering arms caches, and “weeding out” the irredeemable from those who could be returned to their villages with safe-conduct passes.217 On the other hand, genuine political rebels met with severe repression. The two Baoding men, Zhao Jianying and Qian Lou, who selected a king and appointed “spurious” officials, were hunted down and ruthlessly wiped out along with their followers.218

In Zhending, however, the strategic nature of the problem dictated a more intransigent posture. Because the Shun rebels there commanded the Gu Pass, the soldiers sent to Zanhuang to recover that district were given permission to mount a full-scale extermination campaign through the area. Their commander, Ding Chenglong, did get several gang leaders to surrender; but it was believed that the only long-term solution to controlling these fractious mountain villages was by striking hard at the enemy, and by constructing tamped-earth barricades and guardhouses along the major roads to check the comings and goings of travellers. Neverthe-

216 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 5, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 67.
217 Shen Wenkui’s biography, Qing shi gao, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 61.
218 Shizu shilu, 20:8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 61.
less, the imperial forces only controlled the highways by daylight. A contemporary poem by Zhao Hengfu read:

The highwaymen’s steeds are blocked off by hundreds of leagues of walls,
But the watchmen’s posts are hemmed by the green wood whenever nighttime falls.  

Zhending long remained an unsettled prefecture, and there would be other military expeditions in many years to come to suppress rebels in those hills.  

In the far south of the province, too, harsh policies prevailed. After an army was mustered under General Wang Jing and Circuit Intendant Qiu Maohua, an offer of amnesty was extended; but their officers were still ordered to jiao (exterminate) all resisters, and a great number were killed. The area was already badly devastated—"What struck the eye in the regions which we traversed was that huts and hovels were all burned, with almost no survivors left"—and the army’s march through Daming must not have left many dwellings standing.  

Wang’s forces struck decisively. Rebel officers bearing seals and banners with the reign title Tian-ding (Heaven Decides) were captured and beheaded. However, many of the rebels, including Su Zixing himself, slipped over into Henan ready to return again some other day. For the moment, however, the southern and western prefectures of Hebei were back under the central government’s control, and communications were reopened with Kaifeng and Taiyuan. More important yet was the opportunity for the government—now that Shandong and Beizhili were temporarily pacified in November—December, 1644—to muster its forces for a decisive thrust against Li Zicheng in Xi’an.

219 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 63–64. “Green wood” means bandit or outlaw.
220 See, for example, Lu Guoran’s campaign in the fall of 1648 to exterminate a rebel army using Ming reign titles. Shizu shilu, 40:461b, report dated September 23, 1648. See also Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 67.
221 Shizu shilu, 8:95.
222 The Shunde area was not completely brought under control until 1656 when the military authorities constructed seven li of embankments to constrict the movements of men and horses. Shunde fuzhi, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 65.
The Ultimate Defeat of Li Zicheng

Dorgon planned to attack the Shun with three different armies. To the north would be Ajige, accompanied by Wu Sangui and Shang Kexi, sweeping down upon Xi’an through the Ningwu Pass. Simultaneously, from the south Dodo would detach one wing of the army facing Xu Dingguo across the Yellow River, and, accompanied by Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming, move up through Henan to enter Shaanxi via the Tong Pass. And in the center, driving across Shanxi to protect both flanks would be Yecen together with Shi Tingzhu.

Yecen’s Mongol and Manchu troops were partly drawn from Dodo’s forces, and they were not, at this point, very well provisioned. Their greatest difficulty was securing remounts, which they had expected to get from Ming military posts. Because the Shun Soldiers had already made off with those horses, however, the Qing cavalry units only had half as many horses as men.223 The Mongol horsemen of Aisonggu, to be sure, were a formidable force, as they demonstrated during the slaughter along the Yellow River at Pingyang.224 But Yecen’s real tactical advantage, which more than made up for the lack of mounts, was the artillery which his Chinese banner units deployed under skilled gunners like Zhang Cunren.225 From Yecen’s own account of the campaign, the Sino-Manchu forces only encountered light resistance as they moved out of the Gu Pass down the road to Taiyuan. District capitals surrendered readily, and when his army reached Taiyuan, the Portuguese artillery quickly drove Chen Yongfu and his men out of the provincial capital.226

The task of pursuing the fleeing Shun forces back down the Fen

223 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 5, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 70.
224 Biography of Aisonggu in Qing shi gao, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 246.
225 Er chen zhuan, 2:12b–14.
226 Shizu shilu, 8:97b, report received in Beijing on October 20, 1644; and 10:118a, report received in Beijing on November 11, 1644. In the latter dispatch, Yecen said that the local inhabitants of the environs of Taiyuan had been pacified, and that a total of five zhou and 20 xian were now under Qing rule. Chen Yongfu died defending Li Zicheng’s line of retreat. Zhang, “Chen Yongfu,” p. 65.
River through a much more mountainous landscape than the rolling terrain between the Gu Pass and Taiyuan was not so easy. This duty was assigned to General Shi Tingzhu, who together with General Bahana proceeded to clear the area along the Fen River from Fenzhou to Pingyang, killing over 4,000 people, capturing about 1,000 mounts, and accepting the surrender of three Shun leaders (including Kang Yuanxun) and more than 3,000 of their men.\textsuperscript{227} As Governor Ma Guozhu tersely explained to the court:

Our army encountered the bandits at Fenzhou. There were over 2,000 decapitated heads, and over 1,000 horses and mules. They were pursued into the region of Qinglong and Yongning along the Yellow River. Panicked and harried, they threw themselves into the river. The number of drowned corpses was countless. We also captured over 500 horses. We went on and entered Pingyang. The bandits had abandoned the city and fled.\textsuperscript{228}

On January 3, 1645, Dorgon received a detailed account from Yecen of the accomplishments of the Grand Army since it had crossed Zhili and Shanxi. Altogether, 9 prefectures, 27 zhou, and 141 xian had been pacified and staffed with commissioned officials and clerks; and farther on, in Shaanxi, the entire prefecture of Hanzhong had sent the army in advance of its arrival a letter of surrender, tendering allegiance. Furthermore, numerous important officials had come over to the side of the new dynasty, just as the court had wished.

 Along the way we have accepted the surrender of the former Ming Hanlin Academician Zhu Zhijun, Bureau Vice-Director Dong Zhiyu, Bureau Secretary Hu Quancai, Police Magistrate Li Sheng, and Major Hei Youde. There were as well former Ming officials who had joined the bandits [and have now joined us]: Minister of War Zhang Jinyan, Magistrate Li Ruoxing, Colonel Dong Xueli, Colo-

\textsuperscript{227} Shizu shilu, 11:127b, report received in Beijing on December 6, 1644. Shi also accepted the allegiance of several Ming garrison commanders, and 3,000 of their men.

\textsuperscript{228} Shizu shilu, 11:128b–129a, received in Beijing on December 12, 1644.
nel Kang Yuanxun, Colonel Hui Yingzhao, Lieutenant-Colonel Ma Yuan, and Major Liu Yong.  

Ma Guozhu, a trifle optimistically, thus claimed in his report: “The entire province of Shanxi is at peace.”

While Yecen destroyed Li Zicheng’s positions in Shanxi, Ajige and his army prepared to begin the northern portion of the pincer operation. After meeting up with Tang Tong at the Ningwu Pass and enlisting some of the warlord’s men in his own expeditionary force, Ajige pushed on down into Shaanxi. Coordinated by Tu-lai, the imperial army’s Yellow, Red, Bordered White, Bordered

229 *Shizu shilu*, 12:138b–139a, report received in Beijing on January 3, 1645. The court’s instructions to the army had read: “You should win them over verbally by recounting the disastrous Ming policies which incited revolts.” Xie, *Namming shilüe*, p. 41. As in Liao-dong, the adherence of one former Ming officer usually meant the recommendation of that soldier’s former lieutenants and friends. Dong Xueli, for instance, had surrendered to Li Zicheng while holding the rank of a Ming colonel. The Shun leader ordered Dong to garrison Huaiqing prefecture, in Henan on the southern Shanxi border. When Dodo’s army marched through Shanxi into northern Henan, Dong’s defenses failed to hold, and he retreated rapidly to the Tong Pass in late October, 1644. Before rejoining the Shun headquarters, however, he received a letter from the Qing authorities, inviting him to surrender. He accepted the offer. Once he joined the Manchus, his presence on the Qing side encouraged other former Ming officers to surrender. One of Dong’s old acquaintances, for example, was Chen Zhi-long—a Jiangxi *juren* who held a censorial commission under Dong Xueli’s command. Chen had surrendered to Li Zicheng, like so many others, when the rebel took Shaanxi province, and held a command of his own along the Ningxia border. After Dong Xueli’s surrender, Chen received a letter from his former superior explaining the circumstances of his capitulation and asking that Chen join the new dynasty. Chen agreed, declaring his own change of allegiance to Ajige and accepting a Qing commission as governor-general of the Sanbian (the three frontier areas: Yansui or Yulin in northern Shaanxi; Guyuan in central and western Shaanxi; and Ningxia and Gansu.) The following year Chen Zhi-long was invited to the capital, formally named censor, and given the governorship of Fengyang (Anhui). *Er chen zhuan*, 12:1–2a. For Dong Xueli’s surrender, see *Shizu shilu*, 8:97b.


231 *Er chen zhuan*, 10:32. Later, Tang Tong was called to Beijing, attached to the Plain Yellow Banner, and enfeoffed as a marquis.
Red, and Bordered Blue Manchu bannermen fought a series of engagements with Shun defenders in early January, 1645. The most important was a battle on January 31, 1645, in which Tulai's vanguard routed the troops of the rebel general Liu Fangliang.\(^232\) Ajige was now free to move relatively unimpeded on Yan'an, which was put under siege before the city was abandoned by Li Guo to the Manchus.\(^233\)

Meanwhile Dodo had moved his army through Henan toward the well defended fortress at the Tong Pass, which had played such an important function in Chinese military history for so many centuries. Dodo's scouts had informed him of the strength of the Shun forces—some claiming that as many as thirty thousand troops were waiting for the Qing army when it reached them. Consequently, Dodo tarried for nearly a month in Henan, camping outside Lingbaoxian to wait for heavy artillery units ("red cloth cannon"), even though he had received several complaints from the court for delaying his attack.\(^234\) As it turned out, the artillery proved

\(^232\) Ajige's rapid progress was also aided by the speedy adherence of several northwestern military commanders. Their readiness to join the Manchus was not surprising, given the polyglot and ethnically mixed population of these parts, where Muslim, Tibetan, and Mongol influences were so strong. Nan Yikui, for example, was originally a Ming officer and native of Shaanxi who pledged allegiance to Li Zicheng and was made a lieutenant-colonel in the Shun forces. After he realized that Li was not going to become emperor, Nan abandoned the Shun cause and joined Mongol tribesmen in the Ordos desert. When Ajige marched through northern Shaanxi enroute to Yan'an, Nan Yikui offered his services to the Qing; and along with another former Ming general, Yan Zhenbang, fought with the Manchu, Mongol, and Han banners as they moved south against Xi'an. Eventually, Nan was made a member of the Han Bordered Red Banner. *Er chen zhuhan*, 10:10–12.

\(^233\) Shizu shilu, 14:155b. Li Guo was one of the few major Shun figures to survive the Shaanxi attacks; he went on to offer his services to the Southern Ming. According to some contemporary writers, Li Zicheng's adviser, the shaman Song Xiance, was taken prisoner at Yan'an. Prized by one of his Manchu captors for his divining skills, the dwarf became attached to a banner, dying in 1662. Tan, *Beiyu lu*, p. 386; Zha, *Renhai ji*, 1:4b.

\(^234\) Shizu shilu, 14:155; Xie, *Nanming shilüe*, p. 42. By January 19, 1645, however, Dodo's advance units had already been in more than one skirmish with the Tong Pass defenders, who were being reinforced by Li Zicheng from Xi'an.
The approach to Tong Pass. Photograph by F. Wakeman.

decisive to the Qing victory, which was one of the hardest battles yet fought in the conquest of China. The initial assault on Tong Pass on February 7 failed; the defenders simply fought too fiercely, and even managed to separate the Manchu-Han vanguards from the main body of the Qing army, inflicting heavy casualties on Dodo’s men. But the “red cloth cannon” turned the tide. As the
artillery barrages hit the rebel ranks, many of the Shun soldiers fled in panic. "Countless numbers" were killed. General Ma Shi-yao, the head of the Shun army, did send his elite cavalry force of 300 against the Qing army’s flank, and another unit against the rearguard of the enemy. However, both were defeated: the first by Geng Zhongming’s men, and the second by Mongol troops fighting alongside the other bannermen. The following day, February 8, General Ma surrendered with his immediate followers; and unimpeded, the Qing forces marched west through the pass and on up the green Wei River valley toward Xi’an.\(^\text{235}\)

News of his soldiers’ defeat quickly reached Li Zicheng in Xi’an, and he personally led some of his own guards out of the city to stop the Qing invasion of his provincial headquarters. However, his men failed to stop the invading Bordered Yellow, Bordered Blue, and White Manchu Bannermen. In fact, Li was only able to save his swiftly mounted cavalry. The foot soldiers he had brought with him were quickly surrounded and massacred.\(^\text{236}\) With the main Qing army only days—if not hours—behind him, Li and his cavalrymen entered Xi’an’s gates one last time. His departure from the provincial capital—the former capital of the Shun regime—was almost identical to his flight from Beijing eight months earlier. The familiar orgy of destruction was repeated. Once again he allowed his men to loot the city treasuries; once again he set his former palace on fire; and once again he tried to put the city to the torch.\(^\text{237}\)

According to official Qing sources, Li Zicheng did not flee Xi’an with a mere handful of followers. Though his intelligence may have been faulty, Ajige reported to the court that Li commanded as many as two hundred thousand men, and that there was a strong likelihood that he intended to attack Nanjing. He moved southeast through Lantian to Shangluo and on through the

\(^{235}\) *Shizu shilu*, 14:155b–156a.
\(^{236}\) Ibid., 14:155b.
\(^{237}\) Li ordered the commander he had left behind, Tian Jianxiu, to destroy the city when he left with the rearguard. Fortunately for the inhabitants of Xi’an, Tian disobeyed that order. Parsons, *Peasant Rebellions*, p. 165.
Wu Pass into Henan.\textsuperscript{238} From Henan, the Shun remnants passed into Huguang, moving down the Han River valley past Xiangyang and stopping for a brief period in Wuchang in July, 1645.\textsuperscript{239} Ajige's own troops maintained a steady harassment of Li's men.\textsuperscript{240} Individual units which surrendered were sometimes offered amnesty, though by then the Qing government had decided that all bandit leaders should be beheaded on the spot, that "wandering elements" should be flogged, and that only old men who could not bend a bow or wield a sword should be spared.\textsuperscript{241} On eight different occasions there were pitched battles, and these always ended up with the rebels moving on in defeat.\textsuperscript{242} Late that summer, Li Zicheng reached Tongcheng in southern Huguang, and then apparently fled eastward to the Jiugong Mountains on the eastern border of the province. There, in September, 1645, he was attacked by militiamen—landlord-led vigilantes according to one account, peasant-organized braves according to another. Whether killed by them or by his own hand, Li Zicheng was seen alive no more. When the Qing soldiers finally saw the corpse said to be his, it had decomposed beyond identification.\textsuperscript{243}

On March 12, 1645—six months before the "dashing prince" died in defeat—the Qing government had already announced its victory over the Shun rebels.\textsuperscript{244} The magnitude of the Grand

\textsuperscript{238} According to a careful estimate, there were 130,000 remaining troops. Lynn Struve, "The Southern Ming," p. 27.

\textsuperscript{239} Gu Shanzhen, \textit{Kedian shu}, p. 92.

\textsuperscript{240} Tulai was an especially sedulous pursuer, driving his men and horses hard. "Notices of Eminent Statesmen," pp. 98–99. Ming officials in Hunan, like Xu Qiyuan who had been combating Zhang Xianzhong's army and fighting local bandits for years, accepted Qing rule with alacrity, helping outfit boats for the imperial forces to use on the Yangzi. However, Changsha itself did not come under Qing control until May 12, 1647, when 31 of its officials and 3,500 soldiers surrendered to the Huguang governor, Gao Shijun. \textit{Er chen zhuan}, 6:1–2; \textit{Shizu shilu}, 370b.

\textsuperscript{241} This decision was taken on May 30, 1645. Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{242} \textit{Shizu shilu}, 18:210b.


\textsuperscript{244} \textit{Shizu shilu}, 14:157b.
Army's triumph was impressive: 8 major battles won; 3,290 horses and 460 camels captured; 4 cities besieged and taken; 38 cities surrendered. Although the northern provinces were far from peaceful, the new Qing regime now controlled them securely. Furthermore, it had already begun the task of reconstructing a sound foundation for an imperial administration bent upon reunifying China. With Li Zicheng's forces finally driven from the northwest, Dorgon and his commanders were free at last to devote their entire attention to defeating the Southern Ming.

245 Ibid., 14:161b.
CHAPTER SEVEN

The Fall of Nanjing

Fisherman and woodcutter
Chatting to the past,
Each to each recalling
Dreams that did not last:
Scorn for the swallow letter,
Praise for the painted fan,
Sighs for old companions
Ere grief befell Jiangnan.
Parting words of sorrow
To sky's rim will resound,
As in the turning of the years
The Feast of the Dead comes round.


In December, 1644, Dodo sent Tulai and his far-ranging cavalry soldiers to probe the Southern Ming defenses at Suizhou. The commander of the forty to fifty thousand loyalist troops there, General Xu Dingguo, had initially earned his fame as a campaigner against White Lotus sectarians in Shandong in 1622. Now, hearing that so many officials and gentry members in that province had joined the Manchus, and knowing that former Ming officers were treated with respect by the Qing government when they did surrender, General Xu secretly contacted Dodo, offering to surrender along
with Li Jiyu, the Suizhou warlord, in exchange for amnesty.\textsuperscript{1} Dodo responded cautiously, insisting that Xu Dingguo send his own son as a hostage before proceeding further in the negotiations. This Xu Dingguo had done just as Shi Kefa was deciding to move onto the offensive in that same war zone against the Manchus.\textsuperscript{2}

In early January, 1645, after losing the north bank of the Yellow River at Suqian, Shi Kefa ordered Gao Jie to recover the area around Guide and Kaifeng, and to guard the Hulao Pass between Kaifeng and Luoyang. From there, Gao Jie might be able not only to hold back the Manchus, but also to push on across the Yellow River and realize the irredentists’ hope of retaking the Central Plain.\textsuperscript{3} In accordance with this plan, Gao Jie rode north, crossing the Huai River, and turned toward Suizhou. As he drew near Xu Dingguo’s headquarters, however, rumors reached him that Xu’s son had been sent as a hostage to Dodo’s camp. Suspicious, Gao Jie sent messengers demanding that Xu present himself immediately to explain matters in person.\textsuperscript{4}

There was no love lost between Gao Jie and Xu Dingguo. While Gao Jie was still a rebel, his band had attacked Taikang and killed all the members of Xu’s family. Later, when the “four guardian generals” had been announced, Xu had furiously denounced Gao Jie, writing to the Hongguang Emperor that Gao was still no more than a bandit. Now, as Gao Jie’s army approached Suizhou, Xu feared the consequences of that earlier denunciation. He therefore greeted the former rebel general ten li outside of the city on his knees. Claiming that he could not read, he told Gao Jie that his letter to the Hongguang Emperor had actually been composed by a secretary, who since had fled his employ. Gao Jie was appeased,

\textsuperscript{1} Dodo reported the offer of surrender to Beijing on January 11, 1645. \textit{Da-Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu}, 12:140a (hereafter cited as \textit{Shizu shilu}). For Li Jiyu, see Zhang Tingyu et al., comps., \textit{Ming shi} (Guofang yanjiuyuan), p. 2859 (hereafter cited as \textit{Ming shi}).

\textsuperscript{2} Hu Shanyuan, \textit{Jiading yimin liezhuan}, 7:30–31; \textit{Qing shi liezhuan}, 79:15a.

\textsuperscript{3} Shi Kefa knew that the Shun armies had withdrawn entirely into Shanxi, and thus hoped to establish military colonies as far north as possible to prepare for the northern expedition. Lynn Ann Struve, “Uses of History in Traditional Chinese Society,” p. 10.

and hence accepted Xu Dingguo’s invitation to come to his encampment and be entertained lavishly—as befit such a grand general and noble of the Ming. On January 8, 1645, Gao Jie arrived at Xu Dingguo’s headquarters with his bodyguards and was warmly welcomed.\(^5\) Seemingly without suspicion, he accepted General Xu’s invitation to dine. Once at the banquet table, however, he and his bodyguards were suddenly set upon by Xu Dingguo’s soldiers and slain to the last man. By the time news of the assassination had reached the main body of Gao Jie’s army and a punitive force, bloody-eyed for revenge, had descended upon Xu Dingguo’s camp, the Ming general had fled toward the Manchu lines.\(^6\)

**Loyalist Alternatives**

It is said that when Shi Kefa was told of Gao Jie’s death, he wept and exclaimed, “The Central Plain cannot be taken!”\(^7\) But he still hoped to keep Gao Jie’s force of forty thousand men, which was the best of all the armies north of the Yangzi River, together as a unified command. Gao Jie’s widow, the former wife of Li Zicheng, was also eager to retain the army for the Southern Ming cause and may have proposed to Shi Kefa that Gao’s son-in-law, Li Benshen, be named to succeed the command of the dead Guardian General.

\(^5\) There is some doubt as to whether Xu Dingguo surrendered to the Manchus just at the same time as he killed Gao Jie or later. All the chronicles more or less agree that Gao Jie was killed on the night of January 8. However, it seems likely that Xu Dingguo surrendered to the Manchus some time between January 28 and February 6, 1645. Yao Jiaji, “Ming ji yiwen kao bu,” p. 107.

\(^6\) Ying Tingji, _Qing lin xie_, 2:11b–12a; He Zhiji, ed., _Anhui tongzhi_, p. 2413 (212:13a); Arthur W. Hummel, _Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period_, p. 411; Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa et le contexte politique et social de la Chine au moment de l’invasion mandchoue,” pp. 87–88. Gao Jie’s army attacked on February 8. Gu Yanwu, _Sheng’an benji_, p. 21. Xu Dingguo later helped take over Jiangnan. He returned to the north in the fall of 1645 because his wife was ill. Before his death in 1646, he was enrolled in the Bordered White Han Banner. _Er chen zhuan_, 7:32; _Qing shi liezhuan_, 79:15b. Dodo’s army, which only consisted of about 10,000 men, was swelled fourfold by the defection of Xu and his men. Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 146.

\(^7\) Xie Guozhen, _Nanning shiliue_, p. 70.
This, at least, was Shi Kefa’s recommendation to the Hongguang Emperor. The court refused this request. According to some accounts, Ma Shiying feared that the appointment would increase Shi Kefa’s control over the Gao remnants, and thus his own personal power. Ma is therefore said to have prompted the three remaining Guardian Generals to memorialize against this recommendation. In any event, the Nanjing government selected a regular Vice-Minister of War, Wei Yinwen, to be Regional Commander over Gao Jie’s forces. The result was that most of Gao Jie’s units simply failed to remain together as an integral disciplined force. Denied the leadership of their general’s heir, they deserted, and from then until the fall of the Southern Ming capital, remnants of the onetime rebel army streamed haphazardly toward Yangzhou and Nanjing. Shi Kefa had cause to mourn indeed: his first line of defense along the Yellow River had been breached. 8

At such an important juncture in the war some still believed that a forward policy would save Nanjing. Indeed, they thought that only an aggressive effort to recover the north would guarantee the continuing support of local hegemons and magnates whose forces might turn the tide. True, Li Jiyu had joined Xu Dingguo in going over to the Manchus. But there were still other local magnates, like Liu Hongqi in Henan and Liu Konghe at Changshan county in Shandong, who seemed ready to resist the new rulers. Now the ardent secretaries and military experts who had originally joined Shi Kefa because they wished to lead the recovery of the Cen-

8 Zhu Wenzhang, Shi Kefa zhuan, pp. 118–120; Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 90. The defection of Xu Dingguo vitally affected Qing policy, causing Dorgon to decide to invade the South. “Prince Yu [i.e., Dodo] crossed the river, and his soldiers were not quite ten thousand; he joined up with Xu Dingguo’s army and their power shook the earth. Before this Dingguo had killed Gao Jie, and Jie’s widow, Madame Xing, had requested Minister Shi to take the necessary revenge. Dingguo was terrified and paid tribute (characters missing); he asked the [Qing] army to come down to the south while he himself acted as their guide (xiangdao). When the prince-regent first settled the northern capital he had not yet made up his mind to go on down south. It was only after he acquired Dingguo that he decided on a policy of going south. The reason Prince Yu took his light troops and campaigned one thousand li straight ahead to Yangzhou was because of one man, [Xu] Dingguo.” Li Jiel, Tianxiang ge suibi, 2, cited in Li Guangtao, “Hong Chengchou bei Ming shimo,” p. 253.
entral Plain placed their greatest hopes in the possibility that local gentry-led militia (like the group commanded by Yang Wei at Dengzhou) would rise in response to positive military action in Huaiyang.9

It was about this time, in fact, that the Xuzhou poet Yan Ermei was invited to enter Shi Kefa’s encampment as a private secretary. During his interview with Shi on February 15, 1645, Yan agreed to join the secretariat, but only after boldly insisting that Shi Kefa should move a portion of his army into Henan to keep his flank protected and to encourage resistance movements there. What Yan Ermei had in mind, on the one hand, was persuading those local magnates who were undecided to remain loyal to the Southern Ming; and, on the other, linking up with a famous confederation of bandit-loyalists in Shandong known as the “Elm Garden Army” (Yu yuan jun). This gang of desperadoes that had been founded in the Chongzhen period by two men known simply as “Seven Ren” (Ren Qi) and “Seven Zhang” (Zhang Qi) had come to control the alkaline hills and elm forests of Caozhou in the extreme southwestern corner of the province. That district was also the home of the warlord Liu Zeqing, who had actually been charged with the suppression of banditry there after the famine of 1640. Now, Liu was one of the Guardian Generals of the Southern Ming; and a number of loyalists, including Liu Zongzhou’s pupil Ye Tingxiu and Yan Ermei himself, were hoping to link up with the Elm Garden Army, foment a popular uprising across the Yellow River, and then together with these “righteous soldiers” recover the Central Plain.10 Yan did not describe all of these plans in detail during his meeting with Shi, who politely rejected his new secretary’s demands, but he did spell out both his own strategy for a northern expedition and the strong feeling which compelled him to advocate such a policy in a very revealing letter which he later sent to Shi Kefa.11

9 Xie, Nanming shilüe, pp. 57–58.
10 Information on the origins of the Elm Garden Army is given in the Caozhou fuzhi, Qianlong edition, in Xie Guozhen, ed., Qingchu nongmin qiyi ziliao jilu, p. 90.
11 Yan Ermei, Baichun shan ren ji, 10:19–25a.
In that letter, which presented both a military plan and the heroic ethic behind it, Yan Ermei repeatedly referred to the previous summer when the campaign to petition for a recovery of the north had been at its height.

When the bandit armies seized the capital, there was no ruler left in the Central Plain and spurious officials occupied local posts. All that I could do then was bide my time, being overcome with the sorrow of the clod and mat and aware that I myself was too weak to strike back alone. Therefore, I petitioned my superiors, each and every office, asking that a punitive expedition be sent north and that at the same time we mobilize the tens of thousands of loyal and daring gentlemen of the area north of the river to form an imperial vanguard ahead of the main force pledged to wreak vengeance on the enemies of our former emperor and to recover our ancestral territories.12

Now, as much as ever before, Yan remained “convinced that the sense of loyalty and righteousness of all the dynasty’s progeny has not been extirpated in the area north of the river.”13 A bold stroke, a decisive act, he argued, could still mobilize this sentiment.

The people’s emotions can be aroused. I do not agree with those who hold back on the grounds that the people long [for peace]. The martial heroes of the empire may be few indeed, but the common mass is numerous. First there must be people to lead them. Only then will those who are easily swayed by outside influences rise in response to what they see and feel.14

What would most likely arouse such a response, Yan claimed in his letter to Shi Kefa, would be the arrival of Shi’s own army from Yangzhou. Unlike the other forces in the Huaiyang area, Shi’s was not an “army of camp followers and bandits”; it was filled with

12 Ibid., 10:20a. The “sorrow of the clod and the mat” is a metaphor for grief at the death of a parent.
13 Yan, Baichun shan ren ji, 10:21b. The phrase, “north of the river,” is hebei, and refers to the Yellow River.
14 Yan, Baichun shan ren ji, 10:21b.
"gentlemen" welcome to the people of Xuzhou. At this moment, the citizens of that city faced a foreign occupation. In order not to accept the inevitability of that outcome, they had to retain hope that Shi Kefa would come to their rescue. "If they once begin to fear that your army is not moving toward them day and night, then how can they retain any zeal?" In fact, Yan Ermei suggested, the very presence of Shi's forces to the south had already prompted a putative resistance movement. It was therefore all the more his obligation to come to the loyalists' aid and not abandon them.

Let me make a simile: it is as though a man were struggling to ford a river but lost his footing and fell in. Now he is half sinking and half floating. If a passerby were to stretch out his hand to save him, the man would obviously have to grab on and pull himself out. But what if he should notice his rescuer hesitating? He would then give up and could not be rescued. This is the state of affairs in the empire at present.

In short, if Shi Kefa failed to act, he would be abandoning a drowning person, and all hope for the survival of the country would be lost.

**Commitment Versus Compromise**

Yan Ermei's letter to Shi Kefa not only spelled out the reasons for advocating a forward strategy. It also explained why Yan himself felt obliged to act, and no doubt reflected a similar impetuosity on the part of many other Southern Ming loyalists. Noting that his own tutor had thought him a particularly pugnacious and obstinate student, Yan Ermei told Shi Kefa that he might be more outspoken than most but that his feelings were still broadly shared, especially by all those who had become increasingly frustrated by the Nanjing regime's refusal to seize the military initiative.

15 Ibid., 10:20b–21a.
16 Ibid.
Gradually, even the mighty found themselves unable to pay back the country (guojia) for three centuries of benevolent enrichment, not to speak of the average individual who could not even hope to protect the mulberry and linden trees of his ancestors’ ten *mu.*

For patriotic loyalists like himself, the obligation to repay the country was even more compelling than the responsibilities of looking after one’s immediate relatives or friends, even though observing this higher duty might mean “turning against the lineage” (*ni zu*), “allowing one’s wife to starve,” and “seeing one’s family members turn their backs on you.”

Even though relatives advise you to retire [from the service of the loyalists], you remain unwilling to retire. Even though friends invite you to hide, you remain unwilling to hide.

Yan Ermei also placed loyalist commitment above compromise, and the individual’s conscience above social consensus.

The worthy scholars of earlier times felt that knowing the self was most important. They did not emphasize kindness to others as

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17 Ibid., 10:20. Yan’s use of the term *guojia* is undoubtedly derived from the Mencian phrase: “There is a popular saying that all of the under-Heaven (*tianxia*) is a country (*guojia*). The foundation of the under-Heaven is the realm (*guo*) and the foundation of the realm is the family (*jia*).” (Mencius, *Li lou.*) The usual gloss for this phrase explains that *guo* refers to the states of the feudal lords or *zhuhou,* while *jia* were the households of the noble *shidaifu.* The image is properly familistic, suggesting a hierarchy of households stretching up to the father of all, the ruler of the entire empire. But while it is important to keep the distinction between this notion of *guojia,* and its modern usage as the rough equivalent of the English word “nation,” there are still some similarities in Yan’s use of the word and the modern use, which indicate a slow evolution towards a more universal and general form of loyalty, such as that which characterizes modern nationalism.

18 Ibid., 10:20b. Usually, obligation to one’s ruler—expressed in terms of *zhong* or loyalty—was merged with duty to one’s family. The latter was defined in terms of *yi* or obligation. Yan so suggested at first in his letter, but soon went on to say to Shi Kefa that for loyalists like himself, duty to the more abstract *guojia* or “country,” where both particular and general duties nearly coincided, far outweighed simply familistic obligations to one’s own private kin.
much as [the integrity] of their own feelings. Common men, on the other hand, emphasize kindness while worthies emphasize feelings (xin); and though common men emphasize feelings of love, worthies value feelings of respect and confidence. A bold and heroic scholar can endure not being loved by others, but he cannot tolerate not being trusted by others. Thus we say, “Know Thyself.”

The epitome of such absolute sincerity was the traditional knight errant, whose integrity represented the ultimate form of li (propriety). Most contemporaries, declared Yan, took li merely to be ritual, but that conception really signified the obligation of one’s self to the sincerity of one’s motives. The knight errant’s scrupulous adherence to “sincerity” (cheng)—his personal sense of right and wrong—ideally took precedence over all other sentiments. And for Yan, too, such supreme self-dedication, cast in terms of cheng, summed up the ancient and noble meaning of li far better than contemporary and vulgar definitions of social deference and conformance. “The central notions of li are respect and confidence. If pushed to the extreme, it even means killing [for the sake of one’s belief].”

19 Ibid., 10:22b.
20 In the classics, this kind of intense obligation was usually described by the notion of righteousness (yi), which expressed one’s duty to carry out strictly the proper rites and status distinctions in society. There was thus, on the one hand, a sense that righteousness meant conformancy to li and to the social realities of the times. But on the other hand, the notion of yi contained as well a strongly idealistic implication, describing the everlasting commitment of Confucius or Mencius to ethical principles in the face of social or political authority. Han Yu, whom Yan Ermei cited in his letter (“The common men of the world hate those who cannot be bought and would rather die for their beliefs”), also embodied this self-dedication, as did Zhu Xi and (though his name was not mentioned in this context) Wang Yangming. That kind of commitment, incidentally, was also associated with the literati’s duty to protect the country from invasion, and—in Zhu Xi’s case—to struggle for the reconquest of the Central Plain. “According to Chu Hsi, war against the Chin and the reconquest of the Central Plain was a moral necessity, and, conversely, to forget one’s grievances and to advocate a peace settlement was to disobey principle.” Conrad M. Schirokauer, “The Political Thought and Behavior of Chu Hsi,” p. 87.
21 Yan, Baichun shan ren ji, 10:23a.
Yan Ermei’s letter to Shi Kefa ended defiantly. A “heroic scholar” (haojie zhi shi), Yan wrote, may not assume that others will agree with him, but he does at least expect to be respected. To be sure, so implacable a person is not easily tolerated in times of peace and plenty. But in extraordinary times like these, extraordinary men are needed. If one wishes to employ such heroes, then one should either take their advice seriously, or do away with them altogether.

Employ some if you must and kill others if you will. For, at least in killing them you bear witness to your respect and confidence [in their sincerity]. If the latter were in question, then it would not have been worth killing them in the first place at all.22

A more flamboyant challenge would be hard to imagine.

Nevertheless, Yan Ermei’s sense of personal righteousness was not indisputable. Quixotic and even romantic, his heroic attachment to action in the face of adversity constituted a self-aggrandizing ethic of ends that was shared by many young “scholars of resolve” (you zhi zhi shi) during the Manchu conquest. But there also existed another equally strong ethic of responsibility, and even of expediency, which could be justified, if necessary, in the words of Confucius himself.

The Master said, “I would not have him to act with me, who will unarmed attack a tiger, or cross a river without a boat, dying without any regret. My associate must be the man who proceeds to action full of solicitude (lin shi er ju), who is fond of adjusting his plans, and then carries them into execution.”23

Shi Kefa was such a man, “solicitous” (ju) rather than “impetuous” (hao). Given the responsibility of defending a dynasty, he could not afford to ignore the strategic alternatives facing him at that moment, nor the tactical means at his command to achieve them. However stirring Yan Ermei’s appeal for the salvation of Xuzhou may have been, Shi’s own hands were not altogether free. To Yan Ermei, then, he sent a deftly worded answer, equivocating

22 Ibid., 10:24a.
23 Analects VII.10.iii.
over the wisdom of moving immediately to Xuzhou, acknowledging Yan’s unimpeachable “sincerity,” and hinting gently that he, Shi, knew well of Yan Ermei’s reputation for impetuousness. Shortly after this, Yan was ordered to move west into Henan and there join the remnants of Gao Jie’s army, forming a light defensive line against Dodo’s army in case the Manchus decided to turn south. Yan did set off to the west, but on March 6, before reaching the front, he decided that the mission was hopeless and turned back. He was thus safely at Luzhou in central Anhui when the Manchus finally launched their attack upon Shi Kefa’s headquarters in Yangzhou.

The Manchus Cross the River

In the meantime, however, Shi Kefa continued to shoulder the responsibility of directing the overall defenses of the Huaiyang area against Dodo and Haoge’s persistent thrusts at his perimeter. While there are some suggestions that he may have wanted to re-

24 Yan, Baichun shan ren ji, 10:25. It was Shi Kefa’s quality as a mediator, and his tragic dilemma—posed as he was between ardent partisans like Yan Ermei and the emperor—that made Shi such an attractive figure to the historian Wen Ruilin, who admired those who were aloof from partisanship. Struve, “Uses of History,” p. 164.
25 Yan, Baichun shan ren ji, 8:18b.
26 Haoge had been momentarily distracted in February by a resurgence of the Manjiadong rebels, who revolted once again after being quelled by Yang Fangxing. Haoge’s troops, operating along with Yang’s Shandong guardsmen, moved into the area and ruthlessly attacked the rebels, killing “countless numbers of bandits.” Survivors retreated into the caves, but found no lasting resort there. Haoge’s men, who shared captured chattel and livestock among themselves, simply used wet earth and rock to plug up some 251 caves, suffocating those within. Haoge’s men were then released for the campaign against the Southern Ming, though he himself would soon be transferred to Shaanxi for operations there. His successor in Shandong, Abatai, would continue to keep control over that salient in the summer of 1645. See the documents cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 78; and Shandong daxue, lishi xi, comp., Shandong difang shi jiangshou tigang, p. 36. For later rebellions in 1646 and 1647 in Xin county, adjacent to the Manjiadong area, see Shizu shilu, 29:344b; and Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 82.
frain from attacking the north long enough for Manchu troops to defeat Shun remnants for him, Shi Kefa also believed that once the Qing troops secured the right bank of the Yellow River by destroying or incorporating rebel bands there, they would turn south and attack the Southern Ming defenses along the Grand Canal. In that event, he believed along with Yan Ermei and the irredentists that the best defensive strategy was an offensive one.  

He therefore memorialized the throne, saying that:

Since the third month the primary enemy has been in front of us, yet not a single arrow has been loosed. At the end of the Eastern Jin [which reigned A.D. 265–317] rulers and ministers daily made plans to restore [the dynasty’s control over the north] and superbly defended the left bank of the river. Under the Song dynasty, rulers and ministers exhausted themselves for Chu [which is modern Hubei, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Jiangxi] and Shu [which is modern Sichuan], and superbly defended Jian’an. Therefore, to wish for peace now is to give up recovery [of our territories in the future]. One cannot be bent upon peace no matter what, and still rashly expect to preserve one’s independence.

The Zuo Maodi mission had nevertheless been commissioned, the court had chosen to follow a more strictly defensive policy, and in the meantime, the Manchus had crossed the Yellow River in Henan and were on its northern bank in Jiangsu. To Shi Kefa, defense and offense coincided. Before it was too late he hoped to launch a Southern Ming counteroffensive both to reinforce the loyalists’ armies at Xuzhou, which Li Chengdong was now supposed to defend, and to keep alive the hope of an ultimate recovery farther to the north. Shi Kefa therefore marched out of Yangzhou, moving his army up to Sizhou at the foot of Lake Hongze. Before he could move on to Xuzhou, however, he received word that, in his absence, Huang Degong had also learned of the murder of Gao Jie and was even now preparing to descend upon Yangzhou, plunder the city, and absorb whatever remnants of Gao Jie’s army had

27 Xie, Nanming shilüe, pp. 54–55.
28 Cited in Ibid., p. 68.
retreated down the Grand Canal. In order to save Yangzhou, then, Shi Kefa was forced, in the last days of February, 1645, to break off his counteroffensive and return quickly to his headquarters in the south. To save Xuzhou, Yan Ermei's simple plan of mobilizing "the tens of thousands of loyal and daring gentlemen of the area north of the river" would clearly be inadequate.29

Although Shi Kefa was not able to reach Xuzhou himself, reinforcements under General Hou Fangyan had been sent to the city, and one contingent of Southern Ming troops actually crossed the Yellow River to engage the Manchus directly. The main body of Qing banner troops was commanded by Junta of the Tunggiya clan, whose father had been one of Nurhaci's bodyguards.30 Junta struck back forcefully. According to the Manchu battle report:

On February 28, 1645, we heard that the southern troops had crossed the river, encircling Lijialou in Pei county, Xuzhou. Thereupon we despatched gusa ejen Junta to lead his troops forward by starlight. A little over two thousand bandit cavalry and infantry were camped fifteen li outside of Xuzhou. Our soldiers assaulted the bandit encampment. Countless bandit soldiers drowned crossing the river. Six major leaders were seized and beheaded. We have pacified the hundred surnames, and there is not the slightest bit of rebellion. We have captured a great many people, cattle and horses.31

On March 11, the headquarters of Dodo’s army was formally transferred from Xi’an to northern Henan; and on April 1, Dodo received the imperial command to conduct a southern expedition (nan zheng) in order to pacify Jiangnan.32 While Haoge pressed his attack from the east, Dodo was to lead his army in three columns toward Guide, and from there send one group down the Fei River towards Linhuai, another along the right bank of the Yellow River.

30 Junta's father Hurhan was also a chief councilor of the Manchus in 1615. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 532.
31 Shizhu shilu, 14:162a.
32 Ibid., 15:167b.
River to Xuyi, and a third along the northern side of the Yellow River through Xuzhou toward Huai’an.\(^\text{33}\) This last group was commanded by Junta, who took advantage of his victory at Lijialou to attack Xuzhou. There he encountered some resistance, but before it stiffened into significant opposition, the Xuzhou garrison commander, Li Chengdong, announced his allegiance to the Qing and agreed to betray the Nanjing regime.\(^\text{34}\) Meanwhile, to the west, where the other wings of Dodo’s army were moving on Haozhou, the other defender of the Xuzhou area, Liu Liangzuo, also betrayed the Southern Ming and surrendered to the Manchus.\(^\text{35}\)

The defection of Liu Liangzuo and Li Chengdong represented a critical turning point in the Manchu invasion of central China.\(^\text{36}\) The two generals virtually turned over the entire northwestern front of the Southern Ming to the enemy, making it possible for Dodo to link up with Haoge further to the east. To prevent that eastern front from collapsing, it was therefore imperative that Shi Kefa bolster Liu Zeqing’s defense by mustering all available Southern Ming units along the still stationary line of defense running


\(^{34}\) Huang Zhijun, comp., \textit{Jiangnan tongzhi}, p. 2550 (151:24b). I do not know exactly when Li surrendered. He was still fighting the Qing on May 4. Ji, \textit{Mingji nanliü}, p. 42.


\(^{36}\) Li Chengdong’s army was soon to act as the spearhead of the main Qing force about to descend on Yangzhou. It would later carry out the infamous massacre of Jiading, crushing loyalist resistance there. Liu Liangzuo’s soldiers, who were said to number 100,000 or more, would be given the leading role in the occupation of all of Jiangnan in 1645, and it was they who would later destroy the city of Jiangyin. Liu himself, after becoming a member of the Chinese Bordered Yellow Banner, was ennobled for this service, and after further helping the Manchu conquest at Tantai’s side in south China, would be honored by appointment to the Imperial Bodyguard. These high dignities, as well as his post as general-in-chief of Jiangnan in 1661, attested to the great confidence placed in him by both Dorgon and the Shunzhi Emperor, and their appreciation for his important contribution to the conquest. Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, pp. 524–525.
from Sizhou along the shore of Lake Hongze and up the southern bank of the Yellow River. During the next month, therefore, Shi Kefa began preparations for the defense of Huai’an and all that lay below it by concentrating his troops at Qingjiangpu where the Grand Canal entered Lake Hongze. Yet at this crucial time, when he needed all the support that the Nanjing regime could afford to provide, the court itself began to experience a severe political and military crisis of its own.37

The Case of Madame Tong

To the west of Shi Kefa’s command, in Ming-held territory in northern Henan, the regional inspector of that province, Chen Qianfu, had reported the arrival of a refugee who claimed to be the former concubine of the Prince of Fu. The woman told him that her name was Tong and that she had borne Fu a son before they were separated during the rebellion in the north. Chen promptly informed the Southern Ming court that the imperial concubine had survived, and, expecting jubilation, had her escorted to Nanjing on April 5, 1645.38

The emperor was not pleased to hear of Mme. Tong’s arrival. Instead of welcoming her to the court, he ordered her turned over to the Embroidered Uniform Guard to be interrogated by one of his agents, a man named Feng Kezong. Feng questioned her carefully, and was persuaded by what he heard that she was indeed

37 Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, p. 113; Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 70.
38 Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 24; Ji, Mingji nanlue, p. 38. After learning of Madame Tong’s existence, Liu Liangzuo sent his own wife to greet her. The woman told Mrs. Liu that she was 36 sui old and had entered palace service as a maid 19 years earlier. She had given birth to a boy named Jinge, who was now staying at a place called Ningjiazhuang. Her tale was plausible to Mrs. Liu, who convinced her husband that Madame Tong was not an imposter. Thereafter, believing that she was going to become empress, Madame Tong grew arrogant. Entertained royally by the officials through whose cities she passed, she would rant and rave if she felt the food was not good enough, sometimes knocking the table to the ground. Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, xia, 18b.
what she pretended to be: the third concubine of the Prince of Fu, now the Hongguang Emperor.\footnote{Even before inheriting his father's title, he had been married to a woman named Huang who died childless. His second wife, Li, was said to have died in Luoyang. Mme. Tong said that her mother had sold "feminine articles" to the palace women of the former Prince of Fu, the Hongguang Emperor's father. Her mother had brought her to the palace, and the daughter had had an affair with the young heir, bearing him a son. Although she had not raised the son herself, she wished to assert a claim to succeed Madame Huang and Madame Li as his legitimate wife. Ji, \textit{Mingji nanl"ue}, pp. 167–168; Joseph Liu, "Shi Ke-fa," p. 106.} Being literate, Mme. Tong wrote out for Feng a detailed account of her entry into the Prince of Fu's palace, giving precise dates, and describing as well their separation and flight after the rebels took Beijing. Feng Kezong consequently prepared a memorial to the emperor in which he presented this evidence of her identity, including many of the details which she had given him. However, when he gave Hongguang the document, the emperor glanced at it, then flushed and threw the memorial on the ground. "I won't acknowledge that witch," he is supposed to have said. "Hasten to conduct a severe investigation!"\footnote{Fu used the phrase \textit{yaofu}, a "bewitched (and bewitching) woman." Ji, \textit{Mingji nanl"ue}, p. 168.} He then formally ordered that this "severe investigation" be carried out by a eunuch named Qu Shangzhong, who was probably a member of the Eastern Depot secret police.\footnote{Ibid.; Li, \textit{Sanyuan biji}, \textit{xia}, 18b.}

This order, which sanctioned the cruelest torture, caused considerable consternation at court. A number of high officials, including Ma Shiying, believed that Mme. Tong was indeed a former concubine, if only because no one but a lunatic or a fool would pretend to be the emperor's own wife when he could obviously identify the woman himself.\footnote{Almost all of the chronicles stated that Madame Tong was what she claimed to be. Yao, \textit{"Mingji yiwen}," p. 111. However, some sources say that she eventually claimed her mate was the Prince of Zhou, whom she mistakenly thought to be on the throne. Struve, "Southern Ming," pp. 24–25.} In fact, Ma could not understand why the emperor should so adamantly refuse to acknowledge her.\footnote{Wen, \textit{Nanjiang yishi}, pp. 31, 710.} According to one account, Ma is supposed to have said...
to Ruan Dacheng, “Madame Tong was his former concubine. Yet his majesty is unwilling to recognize her. Why?”

Ruan answered, “Our only concern is his majesty’s desire. Since he is unwilling to acknowledge her, we should sentence her to death.”

Zhang Jie, standing by, interjected, “That’s too severe!”

“True or false, it doesn’t matter,” said Ruan. “What use are natural sympathies nowadays?”

But Ma insisted that, “We haven’t yet determined what’s true and what’s false. We should take our time before passing sentence.”

Ma was especially impressed by Mme. Tong’s announcement that she had borne the Prince of Fu a son. In his opinion, any execution of punishment should be delayed until the son could be searched for in Henan and brought to Nanjing in order to calm down the populace, which was also mainly convinced by her story.

But there was to be no delay. After the emperor ordered her delivered over to his eunuch torturers on May 1, 1645, she was savagely abused. “Her bloody flesh was so viciously mutilated,” one contemporary reported, “that no one could bear to look upon her.” After losing consciousness, she was taken back down to the dungeons where she died three days later.

There were two immediate consequences of the case of Mme. Tong. The first was the dashing of any hope of holding on to the loyalties of the tenuously controlled zhai (stockades) of Henan, where the Zhejiang adventurer Chen Qianfu was implicated in her “conspiracy.” For many months now Chen Qianfu had been striving to knit together the many zhai of the Henanese magnates into a loyalist defense line. However, he and his main ally, Liu

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44 This is from a yeshi cited in Ji, Ming ji nanliüe, p. 168. See also Le P. Louis Gaillard, Nankin d'alloi et d'aujourd'hui, pp. 224–225.
45 Robert B. Crawford, “The Biography of Juan Ta-ch'eng,” p. 68.
46 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 32. Some versions say that she starved herself to death, and that she aborted a fetus in prison. Ji, Ming ji nanliüe, p. 32. See also Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 24.
47 Ming shi, p. 3069. A few men were also arrested in Shi Kefa’s camp for their supposed connections with Mme. Tong, but her trial-by-torture did not lead to a major purge.
Hongqi (who commanded the largest force in the Kaifeng and Runing area), continued to have difficulties with Ma Shiying, who was intent upon bringing Henan under his own control. Ma had initially tried to get Ruan Dacheng appointed governor of Henan. When that failed he managed to get his brother-in-law, Yue Qijie, named to the post. Yue soon cost the Southern Ming the loyalty of one of Henan’s most powerful magnates, Xiao Yingxun, who dominated the area around Nanyang. Fighting against Shun remnants, Xiao had recovered several district capitals in the southwestern quarter of the province. However, when his son, Xiao Sanjie, reported these victories in person to Yue Qijie, the governor accused him and his father of being bandits. Xiao Yingxun and his cohorts reacted by closing off their zhai to Governor Yue, who was met with barred gates and hostile watchmen when he passed through the region. Chen Qianfu, on the other hand, was acclaimed by each of the zhai headmen and magnates when he travelled around Henan. Jealous, Yue Qijie had slandered Chen Qianfu to Ma Shiying, who had been biding his time to move against the man. Now that the Mme. Tong case had broken, Chen Qianfu was terribly compromised for having been the Southern Ming official who discovered her. It was thus possible for Ma Shiying easily to get rid of Chen, who was thrown in jail on charges of complicity in treason. This left the governance of Henan in the hands of his brother-in-law, the ineffective Yue Qijie. The loyalty of the magnates was subsequently altogether lost, and Henan was exposed to rapid Qing penetration.

48 Yue Qijie, from Guizhou, had been an assistant investigation commissioner before being banished for corruption. Returned to Nanjing, he married Ma Shiying’s younger sister. Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” p. 97. See also Ming shi, p. 3069.

49 Kong Xigui, Gao Di, and Wang Zhigang were the most prominent examples of Henan local commanders who surrendered to Dodo at the time. Kong had been assigned to Guide prefecture to fight the rebel army of Jin Gao. Gao Di became a Qing general and was given the job of destroying Shun remnants in Henan. Wang Zhigang, who had served under Shi Kefa, was garrisoning Kaifeng when the Qing armies moved south. Hard-pressed, he moved back to Jiangning, and then surrendered to Dodo. He was given the responsibility of
The second major consequence of the Tong case was a loss of confidence in the Hongguang Emperor himself. From the details that leaked out of her arrest and mistreatment, and especially of her own background, most people concluded that Mme. Tong had indeed been the Prince of Fu’s concubine. But why, then, would Fu, now emperor, refuse to admit her to his court? Could there be some reason for his not wanting to be seen by her? Did he fear something about her? As these questions were asked by officials and residents of Nanjing, it was remembered that the Prince of Fu had presented himself to Ma Shiying at the latter’s headquarters, identifying himself to the viceroy by means of a princely seal. What if someone had taken the real Prince of Fu’s place, and somehow had acquired his seal during the disorderly rebel occupation of the north, then pretended to Ma Shiying that he was an imperial heir? If that had actually occurred, then such a pretender would not be able to deceive his former wife. What, then, if Fu were a pretender, and Tong the legitimate spouse?50

The case of Mme. Tong thus provoked a wave of skepticism about the legitimacy of the Hongguang Emperor himself. However farfetched these rumors may have been, they were credible to many at the time.51 The Tong affair thus brought about a major crisis of confidence in the Nanjing regime—a crisis which was severely exacerbated by the third major “case” (an) of the period: that of the “false heir.”

pacificifying the Xuzhou area. See, respectively, Er chen zhuan, 6:10–11a, 12–13a, and 10:25–26a. For lists of surrendering Henanese officials at this time, see Shizu shilu, 15:170. As for Chen Qianfu, when Nanjing fell, he escaped from the city and went to Shaoxing to present himself to the Prince of Lu. He was made Vice-Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud and a military commissioner. Recruiting 300 men, he returned behind the Qing lines. In 1646 he and his small army were surrounded and defeated. He killed himself, dying at the age of 37 sui. Ming shi, p. 3116.

50 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 32.

51 Xie Guozhen, Ming-Qing zhi ji dangshe yundong kao, p. 104.
The False Heir

The fate of Cilang, the Chongzhen Emperor’s eldest son, had been a matter of public speculation ever since the fall of Beijing and his mysterious disappearance. In January, 1645, the Hongguang Emperor had even asked Shi Kefa officially to investigate the possibility that Cilang was alive, and—we can imagine—was undoubtedly relieved when Shi Kefa failed to report back evidence to substantiate such rumors. On March 27, however, the court was rocked by a report from the Vice-Minister of the Court of State Ceremonial that Cilang was alive. Not only that; the official, Gao Mengqi, knew where the sixteen-year-old heir apparent was to be found. According to Vice-Minister Gao, the prince had turned up at Gao’s home in the north months earlier, and a manservant had escorted the boy south. Once they reached Jiangnan, the servant had tried to persuade the prince to accompany him to Nanjing; but Cilang, if it was indeed he, preferred to go by himself to Hangzhou, perhaps fearing that a pretender would not fare well under Hongguang’s rule in the southern capital.52

As soon as Hongguang heard this news he despatched a trusted

52 Ji, Ming ji nanlüe, pp. 153–154. Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 23. According to one version of the story, the heir apparent had been sent by Wu Sangui to the house of Gao Qiqian, Mengqi’s father, for safekeeping. Gao Qiqian learned that the Southern Ming court wanted to have the heir apparent killed and was going to murder him, but his son, Mengqi, recoiled from this act and instead took the crown prince to the Suzhou/Hangzhou area. However, the prince was recognized by someone else, and Gao Mengqi subsequently felt that he had better memorialize about his presence in order to preserve his own life. Yao, “Ming ji yiwen,” p. 109. Another version has Gao Mengqi’s servant, Mu Hu, recognize the heir apparent enroute from the north to the south during the 12th lunar month (December 29, 1644–January 27, 1645). The servant brought the prince back to Gao Mengqi, who sent him secretly to Hangzhou to live with his nephew. However, the nephew could not prevent the heir apparent from behaving arrogantly, carousing and putting on imperial airs. Gao Mengqi was alarmed and therefore had him brought to a hideaway on the banks of the Yangzi River at Jinhua. Outsiders there soon learned of the heir apparent’s existence, and a popular uproar ensued. Gao Mengqi had no choice then but to memorialize about the young prince’s existence. Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 17a.
eunuch to Hangzhou to run down the supposed heir apparent. The pretender was eventually found at Jinhua, near Hangzhou, and brought back on the 28th under guard to Nanjing. However, he was not immediately escorted to the court. Instead, he was lodged in the Xingshan Temple within the city walls, where he remained for several days. The people of Nanjing were electrified by the news, and during that time he attracted a steady stream of curious visitors, to whom he proceeded to tell his story.

According to one of the most reliable versions of his account, the morning his father had died and Li Zicheng had entered the city, he—Cilang—had left Beijing by the city’s west gate. He had chosen that gate because it faced upon the direction from which the rebels had initially come and was therefore the most lightly guarded. Leaving the city, he had spent the first night sleeping in a ditch. Then, he had turned toward the south, and for the next seven days, hiding from other travellers, he had walked on in the same direction. During all this time, he was without food, he claimed, and thus in desperation had begged for shelter and help at a large household, which happened to belong to Gao Mengqi. From there he had eventually proceeded to Jiangnan.

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53 When he first heard the news about the soi-disant crown prince, Hongguang was deeply moved. He spoke of the former emperor dying for the she and ji, and then began to weep, unable to say more. Later, he said that if the heir apparent appeared genuine to all of the Southern Ming ministers, then he would be welcomed into the palace and named Hongguang’s own heir apparent. Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 17b.


55 Joseph Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 123. This is the story which the pretender later told his jailer, Guards Lieutenant Yang Shifu. However, according to other versions, the pretender told his questioners that he had been taken by Li Zicheng to Tong Pass after the Shun army abandoned Beijing. Hardpressed, Li had let the Ming heir slip out of his hands during the flight; and the prince had supposedly been found and taken to the camp of Wu Sangui. Wu had kept him for some time, but then had begun to fear that his holding the Ming royal heir might be misunderstood by Dorgon were he to find out. He therefore had the prince taken to a Buddhist monastery, and from there the young man had supposedly made his way south to Hangzhou. Lu Qi, Xianyan, pp. 34–35. Xu Zì in the Xiaotian jinian claimed that Wu Sangui had re-
The first officials to encounter Cilang and to hear this tale were impressed with its ring of authenticity. The young man's aplomb and self-possession also seemed imperial enough, and the two palace eunuchs sent to Xingshan Temple to look into the matter were so convinced of his genuineness that they offered to clothe him with royal robes. While they were preparing to take him to the palace to present him to Hongguang, yet more officials arrived at the temple, leaving their calling cards. And when the so-called prince appeared to recognize one of the eunuchs and called him by name, the crowd of onlookers took this as sure proof of his identity.

Reports of the interview at the Xingshan Temple threw the Hongguang Emperor into a rage. Furious that his own palace officials were so gullibly accepting the boy's claim to royal lineage, Hongguang ordered that the two eunuchs secretly be put to death and that the pretender be taken immediately to the central city prison. From then until Hongguang himself abandoned the palace, the heir was kept under guard in prison and away from any further contact with the public. Once in custody, the prince was carefully interrogated. One way of determining his identity was to call upon former palace tutors for help; and some of these preceptors, especially Liu Zhengzong, questioned him closely. According to them, he physically resembled the Ming prince and also knew generally about the palace curriculum. However, he was unable to recall, or did not know, specific details of the tutorial. His identity therefore remained somewhat ambiguous.
As news of the so-called heir apparent spread, advocates spoke heatedly for both sides of the case. Some earnestly believed that he was none other than the missing Cilang and that this had been proved during the Xingshan Temple interview. Obviously, they argued, the Hongguang Emperor intended to pretend otherwise to preserve his throne, but that only proved them right. Shi Kefa, on the other hand, believed that the boy was an imposter. Reading of his claims in the Nanjing Gazette (Dibao) delivered to him in Yangzhou, Shi Kefa immediately wrote to the Hongguang Emperor, denying the “false heir’s” claim. Shi pointed out that had the heir apparent really travelled south, he would have had to pass through Huai’an. There, Shi’s agents had already been prepared by the earlier investigation to keep a sharp ear for news of the prince, who would probably have reported to the authorities anyway. The fact that none of this had happened at Huai’an proved to Shi Kefa that the “heir” now in custody had been in the south all along. Furthermore, Shi had intelligence of his own that the heir apparent had already been discovered in Beijing. He had recently received a report sent by the Zuo Maodi mission which referred to a Qing proclamation in Beijing that Zuo had copied from a wall poster. In the proclamation, which was signed by Dorgon and dated March 2, the Manchu regent spoke of a “pretentious individual” who had presented himself as the heir apparent at the home of Zhou Kui, the Chongzhen Emperor’s father-in-law. At the sight of this young man, Princess Huaizong, his would-be sister, had burst into tears. Although the one-armed princess had apparently recognized him, Mme. Yuan, the former empress, had disavowed

Duanjing Dian (Hall of Grave Reverence) instead of the Wenhua Dian (Hall of Literary Glory). They inquired whether the readings or lectures came first; he incorrectly said that the readings came first. The tutors next wanted to know which text he copied after the readings; the young man answered, “The Classic of Filial Piety,” instead of the Book of Songs. Asked to show how many lines he wrote in actual exercise, he copied out ten big characters instead of many small characters by the side. Finally, he could not remember how many times they had met to clear up abstruse points after the readings and lectures were over, nor did he know how many objects were on the lecture table. Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 17. See also Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 23.
the young man; and, declaring him an imposter, Dorgon had had the pretender executed.\textsuperscript{60}

The wall poster to which Shi Kefa referred was genuine enough, but there were certain details that seemed anomalous.\textsuperscript{61} Why, for instance, should the announcement mention such strong evidence of the heir apparent's authenticity as Princess Huaizong's tears of recognition? And why say that evidence to the contrary was given by Mme. Yuan, when everyone knew she was dead?\textsuperscript{62} Certainly, the story that the heir apparent had sought shelter at his grandfather's house made sense, and corresponded with some rumors in the north that Cilang had been destitute after escaping from the Shun rebels.\textsuperscript{63} Shi Kefa thus found it easy to believe that the young man who had presented himself at Zhou Kui's house really was the heir apparent, and that his family—after recognizing him at first—had tried to protect him by pretending they did not know him.

As soon as Zhou Kui and the princess saw the prince, they embraced him and cried. It is said that once they were alerted to the risk, they dared not recognize him any longer. . . . Therefore, we


\textsuperscript{61} The proclamation is given in the \textit{Donghua lu}, but dated nearly two months earlier: Shunzhi 1, 12 \textit{yue}, 15 \textit{ri} (January 12, 1645). It is cited in Meng Sen, "Ming Liehuang xunguo houji," p. 3.

\textsuperscript{62} Meng Sen suggests that this may have been a simple error on the part of the Manchus, and that the evidence was actually given by Mme. Ren, another of Chongzhen's concubines. Meng, "Ming Liehuang," p. 5.

\textsuperscript{63} According to Zhang Dai, the heir apparent had been captured by Li Zicheng, then fled when Beijing fell. He was again captured by Shun rebels, but his true identity was not recognized. Forced to gather forage for their horses, he remained a prisoner of the rebels for two months before their guard was relaxed enough for him to escape and make his way to Zhou Kui's house. Zhang Dai, \textit{Shigui cangshu}, pp. 45–46. Dai Mingshi's \textit{Nan shan ji} explains that: "The heir apparent was captured by the bandits and was placed in the custody of Liu Zongmin. As Li Zicheng fled west, people saw the heir apparent in purple clothing, following him on horseback. When Zuo Maodi first had his mission north, he secretly wrote Shi Kefa, saying that the heir apparent was alive in Beijing. This is why Shi Kefa first doubted that Wang Zhi-ming was the true heir apparent, and so memorialized against him." Cited in Meng, "Ming Liehuang," p. 16.
see that the heir apparent was not killed by the bandits but rather by
the Manchus.  

Consequently, declared Shi Kefa, the young man in custody in
Nanjing was obviously a poseur and should be unmasked as a
fraud.

It was not difficult to encourage Hongguang in this manner to
think of the entire matter as an elaborate conspiracy, and conse-
quently to put the investigation in the hands of Ruan’s trusted
crony Yang Weiyuan, who “severely questioned” the young man.
Then, two months after he had been jailed, the supposed heir ap-
parent was brought before a special tribunal. This hearing, which
took place on April 11, 1645, was conducted by Ma Shiying and
attended by Hongguang. The emperor himself opened the pro-
cedings by announcing that according to eunuchs who had served
in the palace in Beijing, the pretender did not have the same facial
features as the real Cilang. After this announcement, three of the

64 Shi Kefa, cited in Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 130. Proponents of the view that the
young man who turned up in Nanjing was really the prince have had diffi-
culty with this particular incident. One of the most ingenious explanations is
that the Manchus deliberately laid a false trail. Liu argues that the Qing dy-
nasty’s greatest fear was that people would still believe in the possibility of a
genuine Ming restoration. Had they known that the heir apparent had escaped
south, these hopes would have persisted among many more people than actu-
ally did look forward to such a possibility. Consequently, the Manchus deliber-
ately rigged a flimsy case, mentioning the princess’ tears, but then going on
to suggest that the person was an imposter. They thereby saved themselves
from public accusations of regicide, and yet at the same time gave enough
away to make the public believe that the imposter really was the heir appar-
ent, and had thus died in Beijing. Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 129.


66 In a letter exchanged with his nephew, Gao Mengqi had mentioned taking the
heir apparent on to Min (Fujian). The Hongguang Emperor suspected, there-
fore, a plot to establish another loyalist regime farther south. And because
Gao Mengqi was one of Shi Kefa’s purchasing agents (buying saltpeter for his
arsenal), Shi seemed to be involved as well. Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 17b–18a.

67 Gu, Sheng’an benji, pp. 24–23; Ji, Mingji nanlūe, p. 159.

68 Also, according to a message from Zuo Maodi, one of the imperial consorts
Hanlin preceptors were called as witnesses, and they were followed by three other officials, all of whom said that he was not the heir apparent. Hanlin preceptors were called as witnesses, and they were followed by three other officials, all of whom said that he was not the heir apparent. The tribunal then produced a confession taken from the interrogation conducted by Yang Weiyuan. According to this confession, the young man had admitted to being named Wang Zhiming, and he was identified as a member of the Imperial Bodyguard in Beijing and the nephew of a wealthy relative of the royal family. Wang Zhiming had supposedly been fed information by palace eunuchs and put up to the fraud by Gao Mengqi, who was also arrested and jailed at this time.

The confession of Wang Zhiming did not satisfy those who believed he might really be the heir apparent. Many officials, like He Tengjiao or Huang Degong, were dubious about the procedure of the hearing itself, suspecting that the tribunal was packed and that the testimony had been rigged against the pretender. As for commoners outside the bureaucracy, the vast majority appeared to believe that the prisoner was the real Ming crown prince, and that even his name was a clue to his real identity: reversing the order of words, after all gave Ming zhi wang, “Prince of the Ming.” If Hongguang and Ma Shiying had hoped to lay rumor to rest, the result was at best inconclusive, and to this day historians continue to argue about the pretender’s authenticity.

had told him that the heir apparent had several birthmarks and a mole on his lower leg. This young man had no such identifying marks. Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 17a.

70 His supposed uncle, Wang Bing of Gaoyang, was the son-in-law of Muzong, who reigned during 1567–1572.
71 Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” p. 67; L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, p. 1435.
72 Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 17b–18a. See also Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” pp. 132–133.
73 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “Localism and Loyalism during the Ch’ing Conquest of Kiangnan,” p. 129; Xie, Namming shilüe, p. 64. The compilers of the dynastic history did not accept his authenticity. See Ming shi, p. 4112, as well as Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” p. 45. For a convincing explanation of why the southern heir apparent was false, see Zhang Yi, Sou wen xu bi, 1:15. I accept the authority of Meng Sen, who believed the northern pretender to be the real Ming Prince. Meng, “Ming Liehuang,” p. 10.
time, Wang Zhiming's popular standing was probably even enhanced by the hearing. "The court officials indicated that he was spurious. The people in the capital clamored that he was genuine." The public—who took the young man as their champion—obviously believed that Ma Shiying and the emperor were ultimately intent upon killing their prisoner and that the hearing had really been designed as a kind of showpiece trial to set the stage for the pretender's execution. "The case of the false heir" thus deeply damaged the Nanjing regime's reputation and further eroded popular confidence.

Even more threatening, however, was the effect which the case had upon generals in the field. Huang Degong, for instance, was deeply shocked by the inhuman way in which Hongguang had dealt with the young man, whose royal identity remained enough in doubt at least to guarantee that he not be tortured like a common criminal. He boldly wrote the emperor that:

> It is not certain that the heir apparent is false. In the name of what principle do some affirm that he is false in order to flatter Your Majesty? The son of the former Emperor is Your Majesty's son. Even before the truth be known of this matter, he was tortured and imprisoned. How can we continue to speak of filial relations between the Emperor and his subjects?

Far less politely, and much more ominously, came General Zuo Liangyu's denunciation of the hearing, which was blamed upon the noxious influence of Ruan Dacheng and Ma Shiying.

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74 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 710. See also Li, Sanyuan biji, Jiuxia, 3a.
76 Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 23; Ji, Mingji nanliüe, p. 160. Zuo vilified Ma, saying: "The evil official Ma Shiying originated from a red body and a species with a blue face. In the past he has defied the punishments of nine deaths, has already degraded himself to a slave, and has shaved his hair and become a Buddhist. As a recipient of the grace of three generations, he just [made a] fox den out of Nanjing and let the wolves devour the area above Xu[zhou]." Nan Ming yeshi, cited in Crawford, "Juan Ta-ch'eng," p. 69.
Zuo Liangyu’s Mutiny

General Zuo had long been looking for a pretext to move his huge army downstream from Wuchang in order to take over the Southern Ming court and purge his political enemies there. Relations between the warlord and Hongguang’s major advisers had been steadily worsening since the previous fall, when Ruan Dacheng, as Vice-Minister of War, had curtailed military supplies to Zuo Liangyu’s army because of Ruan’s bitter feud with Yuan Jixian, Viceroy of Jiangxi and Huguang. General Zuo was particularly incensed when he received word of the persecution that Ruan Dacheng was inflicting upon several of the scholars implicated in the Shun collaboration case, and especially his former sponsor, Hou Xun. Some of these scholars, including Zhou Biao and Wu Yingji, had signed the Nanjing manifesto and consequently feared death at Ruan Dacheng’s hands. Others, like Lei Yinzuo, had supported the Prince of Lu during the succession struggle, and were frightened of being killed by Ma Shiying. Both Zhou and Lei Yinzuo were already in jail, but Wu Yingji was still free to ask Hou Xun’s son, Hou Fangyu, to write to Zuo Liangyu, pleading with him to intervene on their behalf.

Though he was quite ill, Zuo Liangyu was already disposed for tactical reasons to move his army and naval fleet down the Yangzi. The recent defeat of Li Zicheng’s armies in Shaanxi, and the simultaneous collapse in Sichuan of Zhang Xianzhong’s bloody regime, the “Great Western Country” (Da xi guo), meant that General Zuo and his lieutenants faced the imminent possibility of rebel rem-

77 Yuan Jixian, Xunyang jishi, p. 7a, 10b–11a; Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 715.
78 Qian Xing, Jiashen chuanxin lu, p. 73; Liu Dechang et al., Shangqiu xianzhi, 8:31a; Ming shi, p. 3062.
79 Lei, from the Lake Tai area, had been given the metropolitan degree after a specially ordered imperial examination in 1640. The following year, Lei impeached Yang Sichang, and later censured Zhou Yanru, both of which acts bore witness to his alliance with the fundamentalists at that time. Ming shi, pp. 3082–3083.
80 Hou Fangyu, Zhuanghui tang ji, Siyi tang shiji, 5:8; and Hou, Zhuanghui tang ji, Zhuanghui tang wenji, 3:5, and 4:1–2.
nants from the north and west sweeping down upon them in Huguang.\textsuperscript{81} He therefore was contemplating mobilization when yet another plea for intervention came to him in the form of advice from the censor Huang Shu (who had just escaped from the clutches of Ma Shiyeng and the palace eunuchs) to “clear out [the ministers at] the side of the ruler” (qingchu jun ce).\textsuperscript{82} Huang Shu’s plea, plus news of the harsh treatment of the pretender, persuaded Zuo Liangyu on April 19, 1645, to begin to move his forces downriver toward the wealthy cities of Jiangnan.\textsuperscript{83}


82 Ming shi, p. 2926. Huang Shu was the censor whom Zuo Liangyu had sent to Nanjing to tender his support to the regime, and specifically to Ma Shiyeng, after the Prince of Fu had been chosen. Huang had remained in Nanjing, reporting regularly to Zuo on conditions at the court, and, perhaps because he had such a powerful military figure as his sponsor, boldly attacking Ma Shiyeng from time to time. Huang even went so far as to strike Ma in the face during an angry argument in front of the Prince of Fu, in which Huang had detailed Ma’s “eighteen crimes” (including accepting a bribe from Zhang Xianzhong), and had predicted the most dire consequences for the regime unless Ma were dismissed. Huang Shu’s behavior was so compelling that the Prince of Fu nearly did dismiss Ma Shiyeng, but was persuaded by his eunuchs that he owed his selection in the first place to Ma and could not dispense with his support. Subsequently, Huang Shu fled to Wuchang to avoid arrest, and there incited Zuo (whose mind was failing him) to intervene. After Nanjing fell, Huang Shu surrendered to the Qing. Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 2b–3a; Ming shi, pp. 3073, 3109, 3111; Xie, Nanning shilüe, p. 66; Tsao Kai-fu, “The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories against the Manchu Throne in China,” pp. 34–35; Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 15–16.

83 Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 26. Other sources date the beginning of Zuo Liangyu’s trip downstream between April 21 and April 24. Yao, “Ming ji yuwen,” p. 111. According to one account, Huang Shu and Zuo Menggeng (Liangyu’s son) were the chief culprits behind the mutiny. Initially, Zuo Liangyu was unwilling to heed Huang Shu’s request to attack Nanjing in order to punish Ma Shiyeng and to support the cause of the heir apparent. During these discussions, however, Zuo Menggeng managed to persuade his father to launch the expedition by pointing out that not only did Zhang Xianzhong pose a threat to them, but that the Shun remnants also were descending upon them in im-
In most people's eyes, Zuo Liangyu's decision to revolt was impelled, if not altogether justified, by the cases of Mme. Tong and the false heir.

Before long, there was the matter of Wang Zhiming, who pretended to be the heir apparent of Zhuangliedi. He was thrown in prison. There was also the woman named Tong, who called herself Yousong's concubine. She was also thrown in prison. This caused a great clamor inside and outside [of the court]. The following third lunar month, the Marquis of Nanning mutinied at Wuchang in the name of saving the heir apparent and of killing [Ma] Shiying.84

The denunciation of the Nanjing regime that Zuo Liangyu issued at the time of his mutiny clearly reflected the arguments of Fushe partisans, whose claims General Zuo seems to have accepted fully. In their eyes, and in the indictment itself, Ma Shiying was made the scapegoat for all of the failures of the Nanjing regime.85 By this distortion, Zuo Liangyu's threat to attack the Southern Ming capital carried to an extreme the shifting of blame upon Ma Shiying for the weaknesses of the Hongguang government. At the same time, by setting his own revolt in a context defined by Fushe-Donglin activists, Zuo was consciously adopting the role of a champion of rightousness. The banners his soldiers waved on the

pressive strength. Zuo also accepted as genuine a letter from the false heir, calling for aid. Gu, Jinling ye chao, p. 49; Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:17. See also Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 28–29.
84 Ming shi, p. 1543. Zuo personally accused the Hongguang Emperor of being reluctant to help other imperial kinsmen and of selfishly trying to hold onto the empire with the help of a few top officials.
85 “The loss of the empire by the Ming was actually due to none other than the single man [Ma] Shiying.” Kunshan yimin ningren Gu Yanwu (Wen Bing), Sheng’an benji (Jiayi shian), p. 37 (hereafter Wen Bing, Jiayi shian). Ma was specifically accused of having recompiled the San chao yaodian [Important documents of three reigns], of appointing rebels and eunuchs to high government posts, of enrolling hoodlums in the Embroidered Uniform Guards, of employing the villainous Ruan Dacheng, of concealing the heir apparent's true identity by throwing him in jail, and of corrupting the Hongguang Emperor by procuring actors and courtesans for him. Ji, Ming ji nanliue, pp. 192–197; Crawford, “Juan Tä-ch’eng,” p. 46.
march downstream carried the announcement that the Marquis of Nanning was on his way to Nanjing to rescue such hostages as the scholars Zhou Biao and Lei Yinzuo.\(^6\)

That particular objective was doomed from the start. When word reached Nanjing that Zuo Liangyu was coming to save Zhou Biao and Lei Yinzuo, Ruan Dacheng issued secret orders to their jailers that they be “allowed” to commit suicide. A little later, as Zuo Liangyu’s army drew even closer, Zhou Biao’s famous half-brother, Zhou Zhong—Restoration Society leader, primus of 1643, and traitor to the Ming—was also killed. His death was public. When the executioner drew near, Zhou Zhong mustered his last bit of bravado and declaimed sarcastically, “If you kill me, will that bring peace to the empire?” Guang Shiheng, the minister whose rhetorical skill had prevented the Chongzhen Emperor from going south, was decapitated at the same time.\(^7\)

But there still remained the task of revenge, as well as of purging the regime of Ma, Ruan, and their supporters. Zuo Liangyu evidently thought that he would gain wide support for his crusade on those grounds. He was therefore quite shocked on April 26 when he reached Jiujiang only to find that his old friend and ally Yuan Jixian was not persuaded of the righteousness of his cause.\(^8\) Yuan Jixian, like the governor of Hubei, He Tengjiao, viewed the descent upon Nanjing as a mortal blow to the Southern Ming cause.\(^9\) Yuan’s adamant opposition made Zuo Liangyu realize that

86 Xu Zi, Xiaotian jizhuan, p. 207. The main banner, however, read: “This feudatory has received a secret edict from the heir apparent, and leads an army to come to rescue [him].” Ji, Ming ji nanlue, p. 197.
87 Xu, Xiaotian jizhuan, p. 208.
88 Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 21b–22a; Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:17.
89 Yuan, Xunyang jishi, p. 13b. He Tengjiao (1592–1649) had been governor of Huguang in 1643 when he first met Zuo Liangyu. The Hongguang Emperor had named him viceroy of six central Chinese provinces, including Sichuan. On April 21 he was arrested by Zuo Liangyu and forced to accompany the army on its march down the river. He escaped when Zuo’s fleet was passing Hanyang, and made his way to Changsha. After Nanjing fell, he joined the Prince of Tang's regime, accepting the posts of Minister of War and grand secretary, along with the hereditary rank of earl. In this capacity, He Tengjiao later attracted Shun remnants to Hunan, where he established the famous
what he had styled a righteous intervention was being viewed by many as a rebellious invasion. However, the old warlord—his physical condition weakening by the day—was unable to control his own troops. When Yuan came to visit him aboard his flagship at Jiujiang on April 30, Zuo could not keep his men from plundering the city. As Tan Qian recounts the meeting:

Yuan Jixian came to see him on his boat. Suddenly he saw flames rising ashore. [Yuan] said, “My troops are burning the camp. They’re destroying their own city!” Liangyu heaved a great sigh. “Those are my troops. I am abusing your hospitality.”

Shortly after this, Zuo Liangyu began hemorrhaging internally, and a few days later he died, leaving his vast army of condottiere in the shaky hands of his son, Menggeng. Now even more in charge than before, Zuo Liangyu’s captains continued their march on down the Yangzi, plundering Anqing along the way to Chizhou in Anhui.

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“thirteen defense commands” (shisan zhen) that were to hold out for so long against Qing rule. Setting up headquarters at Ganzhou (Jiangxi), he invited the Prince of Tang to join him, but the prince was captured in Fujian. He Tengjiao continued to fight on the loyalist side, becoming Minister of War and grand secretary under the Yongli Emperor. After the shisan zhen were crushed, he fled to Guizhou; and later, in 1649, he was killed during the attack on Xiangtan (Hunan) by Qing imperial forces. Ji, Ming ji nanliè, pp. 280–281.

90 The looting began on April 29 when General Zhang Guozhu led his men into the city and set fires that night. Some of the defenders of the city, figuring that they would be blamed for the fires in any case, joined the pillagers. At this, the rest of Zuo Liangyu’s troops lost all restraint, killing and looting. As carnage reigned, Yuan Jixian decided to commit suicide, but his aides—invoking the example of Wang Yangming—persuaded him to bear the suffering with patience and do what he could by going to see Zuo Liangyu. Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 22a.

91 Tan Qian, Guo que, p. 6201. See also Yuan, Xunyang jishi, p. 13b.

92 “Half of Zuo Liangyu’s army was a collection of bandits who were extremely depraved and violent. They would enter people’s homes to extort money, squeezing and burning out their fat until the oil ran over the ground. They would also take the women they had seized and publicly violate them in the marketplace.” Li, Sanyuan biji, xia, 24b.

93 Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 29.
Shachuan or “sand boats” were coastal and riverine warships commonly found along the Shandong, Jiangnan, and Zhejiang littoral during the late Ming. With each batten of the sails controlled by a separate line manipulated by the sailmaster while two or more helmsmen handled the large steering oar, the shachuan were much more maneuverable than larger regular naval vessels or armored galleys. From the Chou hai tu bian [Planning for maritime defense], reproduced in Zheng Zhenduo, comp., Zhongguo banhua shi tu [Pictorial record of the history of Chinese prints] (Shanghai, 1940–1942), vol. 15.
The prospect of this large and unruly force of professional soldiers, brigands, and adventurers descending upon Jiangnan to feed itself threw the Nanjing court into a panic. In order to hold back Zuo’s army, forces would have to be withdrawn from the Huaiyang area, weakening the Southern Ming’s defenses against the Manchus. Already, the loyalist armies there were undermanned. Ma Shiying, however, feared the Qing far less than Zuo, who after all had launched the expedition primarily to punish Ma himself. “We together, ruler and minister,” declared Ma, “would rather die at the hands of the Qing than not die and fall into the hands of Zuo Liangyu.”

Ma Shiying therefore proceeded to order forces under Ruan Dacheng, Zhu Dadian, Huang Degong, and Liu Kongzhao to interpose themselves between the Huguang army and Nanjing. Shi Kefa, meanwhile, was pleading for reinforcements to bolster the defenses of Yangzhou, then protected by a mere 20,000 troops under Liu Zhaoji. Ma Shiying not only refused this request; he tried to order Liu Zeqing’s troops back from the Yellow River front where they were holding the line of defenses against Haoge, in order to strengthen the barrier between Zuo Liangyu and the Southern Ming court. Hongguang realized this would withdraw support from Shi Kefa’s flank, and even wanted to rescind the order. However, Ma Shiying persuaded the emperor that it was too late to make such changes, and that the situation was so critical Shi Kefa himself should be recalled as well.

Shi Kefa strongly objected:

[Zuo Liangyu and his army from] the upper reaches [of the Yangzi] intend no more than to rid [the government] of traitors to whom the ruler is partial. He does not intend to rebel against his lord and father. However, if the [Qing] armies from the north arrive, then the ancestral altars may encounter disaster.

94 Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 66.
95 Ming shi, p. 3097; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 762; Ji, Ming ji nanliüe, pp. 192–194; Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” pp. 46, 70.
96 Cited in Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 70. A longer version of this memorial exists in the edition of Shi Kefa’s work in the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Sorbonne used by J. Liu. It reads: “Your minister believes that the affair of
But the emperor insisted that Zuo was a dangerous rebel, and that "when the bandits come, defend against bandits. When bandits go, then defend against the enemy." On May 2, Shi was formally ordered to come back across the river, and the Ming general reluctantly complied. Dividing his army in two, he left one group defending Sizhou and led the other toward Nanjing, prepared to repel Zuo Liangyu.

The diversion of Shi Kefa proved in the end to be unnecessary. After plundering Chizhou, Zuo Menggeng and his officers had been halted by Huang Degong at Tongling and forced to fall back upon Jiujiang. Huang was not able to press his own attack because of the imminent descent of Dodo's army, but the Zuo forces were nonetheless held above Anqing while, from the other direction, Ajige descended upon them. When the Manchu general arrived at Jiujiang, virtually the entire army of Zuo Liangyu surrendered to the Qing, constituting a vital new cadre for the pacification of China in years to come.

Most of these former officers in Zuo Liangyu's army who now joined the Qing were what might be called "new" Liaodong men: officers who had at one time or another served in the Ming border command, and had then been assigned to central China (often Henan) during the turbulent 1630s. The most important of these figures was Jin Shenghuan, who had served in Liaodong, and actually escaped from the Manchus in 1633 (leaving his wife and son behind as hostages) to join Zuo Liangyu in Henan. During the next few years after surrendering at Jiujiang, Jin Shenghuan would earn the release of his family from custody by bringing all of truc-

the upper reaches has no serious basis and that the army stationed along the Yangzi is strong enough to resist the enemy [Zuo Liangyu]. On the other hand, it is certain that the Manchus are advancing toward the south. They are very strong and everyone, as soon as they learn of their arrival in the distance, is terrified. If they reach the Huai and arrive directly on the Yangzi without even encountering a solidly [defended] city the length of the river, who will be able to resist them?" Joseph Liu, "Shi Ke-fa," p. 143.

97 Cited in Xie, Namming shiliüe, p. 70.
98 Ji, Mingji nantie, pp. 41, 197–198; Gu, Sheng'an benji, pp. 26–27.
99 Xie, Namming shiliüe, pp. 76–77. See Appendix A for a comparative analysis of this group's importance vis-à-vis other groups of collaborators.
ulent Jiangxi province under control almost entirely by himself, without the help of regular Manchu military units. Other officers, less well known, would also make a great contribution to the Qing conquest. Zuo Menggeng himself was to be invited to court and enrolled in the Han Bordered Yellow Banner: in 1648 he would help Ajige subdue the mutineers during the Datong uprising. General Lu Guangzu, after joining the Han Bordered Blue Banner, would fight alongside Haoe in Sichuan in 1646 against Zhang Xianzhong's rebels and earn great merit for defeating "bandits" allied with the Southern Ming Yongli regime. General Li Guoying, who was to join the Han Solid Red Banner, also would fight with Haoe in Sichuan. In fact, it was General Li's detachment, operating with Manchu bannermen, that eventually would corner and kill Zhang Xianzhong at Mount Fenghuang near Pengzhou in January, 1647. Xu Yong, who had originally served under He Tengjiao before being attached to Zuo Liangyu's command, would clear the Jiujiang area of robbers and loyalists after surrendering to Ajige; later, he would serve as garrison commander in Changsha, lead the campaign against the Yongli general Zhang

100 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 166–167.
102 General Lu was from Haizhou (Liaodong). Er chen zhuan, 7:1a.
103 General Li was also from Liaodong. In 1648, he was named governor of Sichuan, and commanded the campaign against Zhang's remnants under Sun Kewang in the southern part of the province. Er chen zhuan, 3:25–28. Zhang Xianzhong was killed when he left Chengdu, planning to attack Shanxi, and was surprised by Qing forces at Mount Fenghuang after one of his officers defected to Haoe late in 1646. Haoe and Li Guoying's men, together a crack unit of 5,000 soldiers, moved south to Xichong. Zhang learned of their arrival in the area from a scout, but refused to believe the news. Going out to see the enemy for himself, he encountered the Manchus across a narrow creek. Li Guoying pointed Zhang out to a skilled Manchu archer who drew his bow and killed him. Parsons, "Culmination," pp. 398–399. See Gabrel de Magalhaez's eyewitness account. ("In his usual maddened way [Zhang] leaped on his steed and with a few followers, all unarmed, dashed out to meet them. He had not gone far when he was brought down by an arrow through the heart and died on the spot.") Cited in George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants, p. 326.
Jingchun, and be ennobled as a baron (nan) before dying in battle with the Southern Ming general Bai Wenxuan. Colonel Hao Xiaozhong, who was also from Liaodong, would be assigned to the Wuchang garrison after his surrender. Later, when Ajige returned to Beijing, Hao would return with him, join the Han Solid White Banner, and serve as a general in Hunan, where he was later captured and killed by Sun Kewang for refusing to abandon the Qing.

The defection of so many of Zuo Liangyu’s lieutenants to the Manchus was to pose a serious long-term threat to the Southern Ming. In years to come, as we have seen, Yongli generals would find some of these officers their ablest opponents. In the short run, however, the dissolution of Zuo’s army meant that Shi Kefa’s forces were not needed to save Nanjing. Shi received word of the end of the immediate threat to Nanjing only when he reached Pukou, just above the southern capital. His first impulse was to continue on to Nanjing and see the Hongguang Emperor, but his ruler ordered him to turn back towards Yangzhou. Shi appears to have hesitated: on the same day he issued three successive orders, finally deciding to take his army to Yutai, which was defended by Hou Fangyan. It was already too late. On April 18, Guide had fallen to Dodo. In the following days, even more Manchu and Mongol forces under Baiyintu, Handai, and Nikan converged upon the city, massing there for an attack across the Huai River. On April 30, 1645, this great army, swollen with new adherents from the Huaiyang warlords’ armies, began to move along the southern banks of the Yellow River, turning south toward the Huai; and by May 8, Mongol horsemen commanded by gusan ejen Ashan had seized the bridges across the Huai north of Sizhou.

104 Xu Yong was also from Liaodong. He defeated such famous local bandit groups as the “White Cloud Stockade” (Baiyun zhai) forces and the gangs of Kidnapper Huang (Huang Guaizi) and Rustler Li (Li Juma). Er chen zhu, 1:25–28.

105 Er chen zhu, 1:21–23.


107 Shizushilu, 15:170a.

108 Ibid., 16:192a. After leaving Guide, the Qing army divided into three columns: one went down the Fei River towards Linhuai, another down the
Meanwhile, backed by Haoge, Junta’s army had taken the south bank of the Yellow River east of Lake Hongze and was marching rapidly toward Huai’an.109

The Descent Upon Yangzhou

Shi Kefa still hoped that the Southern Ming defenses would hold at Huai’an, where Liu Zeqing’s army—back from the foray to repel Zuo Liangyu—was now stationed. Liu had prepared encampments that stretched for ten li beyond Huai’an at the junction of the Yellow, Huai, and Qing rivers, and had assembled there forty thousand men and one thousand boats. Junta’s forces had left Xuzhou and had travelled downriver, partly by land and partly by water, easily defeating an advance phalanx led by one of Liu Zeqing’s lieutenants before reaching the main body of the Southern Ming forces by Huai’an. There Junta divided his army into two parts. One smaller group was sent across the Qing River to attack from the side and behind Liu’s lines, while the main body attacked frontally. Both groups carried out their missions successfully, punching holes through Liu’s lines so that they were able to cut off the army from Huai’an itself, which they proceeded to enter. During the panic, Liu Zeqing and some of his jiading (retainers) tried to escape by boat. As he loaded his personal treasure aboard, however, his own lieutenants began to desert. Liu therefore sneaked back into Huai’an where he tried to hide. He was soon apprehended and brought before Junta, who accepted his surrender and named him a viscount of the third degree.110 The inhabitants of the city also cooperated with the new Qing authorities, and Junta was soon able to report that patrols had pacified the surround-

southwestern side of the Yellow River toward Xuyi, and a third under Junta branched off from the second at Xuzhou to move along the northeastern side of the Yellow River and take Huai’an. The various columns converged on Yangzhou on May 13. Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 29–30.

109 Ibid., 17:199.
110 Ming shi, pp. 3070, 3074; Wu Weiye, Wushi jilan, juan 6, xia, 11a.
ing districts and that both Fengyang and Luzhou had surrendered as well. 111

While Junta settled down in Huai’an, Dodo’s main force descended upon Yangzhou. Yutai had already fallen before Shi Kefa could get his army in place, and he now dropped back from the Baiyang River, withdrawing his 30,000 men to the defense of Yangzhou. 112 Their arrival placed a great burden upon the million or more citizens of Yangzhou. 113 Although Shi Kefa had addressed his troops, telling them that “each should shoulder the responsibility of himself and not trouble the citizens,” they were a surly lot, abusing the hospitality of the households where they were billeted, rifling goods, and abusing local women despite the prostitutes provided their officers by the townsfolk. 114 Nevertheless, they had to be crowded within the city—along with refugees from areas like Guazhou, where the inhabitants were being terrorized by deserters from Gao Jie’s army—in hopes of withstanding a siege. 115 In fact, Shi Kefa hoped to gather even more soldiers within Yangzhou’s narrow walls, and “hurriedly issued a call to arms to all the garrisons defending the river to come to their rescue.” 116

Hardly anyone responded. Liu Zeqing, of course, had already surrendered to Junta. His example was soon followed by two other leading commanders in the canal zone, Generals Li Xifeng and Zhang Tianlu, who were supposed to guard the approaches to

111 Shizu shilu, 17:199.
112 These were the soldiers directly under Shi’s command. He had other units commanded by Zhang Tianlu and Wang Yongji, but their number is not mentioned. J. Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 140.
113 Maurice Collis, The Great Within, pp. 61–62.
116 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 113. The city walls, which were erected in the early Ming and repaired during the Jiajing period, were 5.4 meters high. Yao Wentian, comp., Yangzhou fuzhi, pp. 1054–1055 (15:2b–3a).
Yangzhou. The most famous figure to respond to Shi’s call was the quixotic diehard Zhuang Zigu, who had as a twelve-year-old killed his first man. A professional soldier, Zhuang had recruited his own army in the Guide-Xuzhou region under the ensign Chi xin bao guo (Repay the country with a red heart). When he heard of Shi’s plight, Zhuang had brought his men at top speed to Yangzhou, arriving there in time to take part in the city’s last-ditch struggle. But his army consisted of only about seven hundred men, and functioned more as Shi Kefa’s bodyguard than as a really effective defensive force. Thus, even though a soldier like Zhuang colorfully symbolized devotion to Shi and his Southern Ming cause, his zeal alone could not really alter the balance of power. In the end, Shi Kefa had to depend upon the garrison commanded by Assistant Military Governor Liu Zhaoji plus the troops he had brought back himself, coming to a total of about 40,000 soldiers.

With the help of all the local officials at Yangzhou, Shi Kefa proceeded in the very short time remaining to direct work day and night on the city’s defenses, and especially to build wooden gun platforms on the city walls. But time soon ran out. On May 12, Dodo’s vanguard—commanded by Handai, Ajige, Nikan, and Duerde—had pitched its tents in a long line twenty li north of Yangzhou and had begun seizing boats to cut off the inhabitants’

117 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 113–114.
118 Ibid., p. 221.
119 Collis, Great Within, p. 62. Liu Zhaoji, a Liaodong soldier, had served in the north during the 1630s, and was transferred to Nanjing just before Li Zicheng invaded the capital. When Shi Kefa took charge of defenses in Huaiyang, Liu asked to be transferred there as well. Ming shi, pp. 3058–3059.
120 Wang, “Ten Days’ Massacre,” p. 518. The officials who assisted him included the prefect, Ren Minyu, the salt commissioner, Yang Zhenxi, and at least eight other regularly appointed scholar-officials. See Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 114. Ren Minyu, from Jining (Shandong), was a juren noted for his ability to ride and shoot who had been xunfu of Zhending before fleeing to the south. Under Hongguang he had been named magistrate of Haozhou, and on the basis of his merit, was promoted to become prefect of Yangzhou. He died when the city fell, refusing to flee with his troops but remaining in his hall, sitting in dignity until the Manchus slew him. Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 1906 (115:20b); Ming shi, p. 3079.
means of escape. The following day, May 23, the Qing armies, numbering hundreds of thousands of men, reached Yangzhou itself. A former Ming general, Li Yuchun, approached the city walls holding Prince Yu's (Dodo's) own pennant, and called out for Shi Kefa. When Shi appeared and began to berate Li Yuchun for his treachery, the collaborator shouted back up: "Your excellency's loyalty and righteousness is known throughout China (Huaxia). Only at [the Southern Ming] court are you not trusted. What's the point in dying?"  

Shi Kefa and Dorgon

This was hardly the first time that Shi Kefa had been asked to recognize the wisdom of allying himself with the new Qing dynasty, though earlier overtures were much less blatant and somewhat more eloquent. The most famous appeal to Shi Kefa had come directly from Dorgon, and had been delivered to Shi by a military

121 Shizu shilu, 16:192.
122 As Dodo moved on Yangzhou, 138,000 men—mainly troops of what had been Gao Jie's army—surrendered to him. Another 100,000 of Liu Liang-zuo's men also joined his forces. Altogether, at least 238,000 Han soldiers enlisted in his army alongside regular banner troops. Jerry Paul Dennerline, "The Mandarins and the Massacre of Chia-ting," p. 356; idem, The Chia-ting Loyalists, p. 66.
123 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 114. According to another, purportedly contemporary, account, Shi Dewei, Shi Kefa's adopted son, replied that they had received the bounty of the Ming dynasty and would therefore repay that benevolence by defending the city to the death. Later, after they had come down off of the city wall, Shi Kefa took his foster son aside and told him that he must live on for later generations. In this account, which may reflect the deep sense of guilt that Shi Dewei felt later after surviving his father's death, Shi Dewei prostrated himself on the ground in front of Shi Kefa and said, in tears, "Dewei is righteous and should die together [with you]." Shi Kefa responded: "I will die for the country. My son must survive for our family." Shi Dewei, Weiyang xunjie jiliie, pp. 1–2a. A descendant of Shi Kefa named Shi Jianru, from Panyu county, was an active revolutionary in Canton and Macao in the late 1890s and early 1900s as a member of the Xing zhong hui. Chai Degeng et al., eds., Xinhai geming, pp. 245–250.
officer named Tang Qilong the previous autumn, in October, 1644.124 The letter—which signalled Dorgon’s final decision to conquer the south—was a masterpiece of pro-Qing propaganda, playing upon the same theme of “righteousness” that Fan Wencheng had urged upon Dorgon when the Manchus first heard of the death of the Chongzhen Emperor and of Li Zicheng’s occupation of Beijing. In this instance, however, the collaborator who prepared the letter for Dorgon to sign was a southerner: the former Fushe member and poet Li Wen. The present appeal was consequently even more subtly directed towards Shi Kefa’s sensibilities than Fan Wencheng’s ghostwriting, which had mainly stressed the Manchus’ desire to avenge the death of the Ming emperor. Li Wen’s letter emphasized Dorgon’s own personal knowledge of Shi Kefa’s reputation.

Long ago, at Mukden, I had heard of your high reputation in Beijing as a scholar, and since our victories over the rebels I have taken occasion to find out all about you in the literary circles of the metropolis. Some little time ago I sent you a letter of kindly inquiry and sympathy by the hand of your brother, but I know not if you received it.125

The main point of the letter that followed was that the enthronement of a Ming monarch in Nanjing contravened the principles in the Spring and Autumn Annals which forbade accession to the throne as long as a ruler’s murderer was unpunished. Li Wen then went on to point out how divisive such an act was at a time when

124 Ji, Mingji nanlüe, p. 204; Ming shi, p. 3078. The letter was sent in August, 1644. See Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 21; and Hellmut Wilhelm, “Ein Briefwechsel zwischen Durgent und Shi Ko-Fa,” passim.

125 Dorgon’s letter and Shi Kefa’s reply can be found in Ji, Mingji nanlüe, pp. 204–209; Erich Hauer, “Prinz Dorgon,” pp. 27–36; Chen Hao and Chen Kejia, Ming ji, 58:606–607. I am following the English translation in Backhouse and Bland, Court of Peking, pp. 175–184, while making a few alterations of my own. The above quote is from p. 174. The brother referred to is doubtless his cousin Shi Kecheng, who greeted Dorgon when he entered Beijing. This is probably the letter referred to in the Shilu, August 28, 1644, as being sent by the hands of two former Ming officers, Chen Wanchun and Han Gongwei. Shizu shilu, 6:72b–73a.
the Qing dynasty was planning to send its own punitive expedition against Li Zicheng in Shaanxi.

When our dynasty captured Beijing it was not the Ming dynasty which was defeated by our armies, but the rebel prince Li Zicheng, who had violated your ancestral temple and desecrated your emperor’s remains. To avenge your disgrace we spared no expense, and even imposed heavy taxes on our own subjects. Surely it behooves all good men and true to be grateful and repay this our benevolence . . . But if to-day a rival emperor enthrones himself in Nanjing, there will be two suns in the firmament. This must not be. Do you not see, moreover, that you are playing into the “dash- ing prince’s” hands?126

This was not unfamiliar rhetoric; indeed, it was the main point that had been reiterated by all pro-Qing propaganda during the autumn of 1644. What distinguished this approach, however, was Li Wen’s habile appeal to Shi Kefa not to stand on the kind of extreme principle that, say, someone like Yan Ermei had advocated. Citing the examples of Wu Sangui and many other Ming officials honorably serving the Qing, Dorgon’s letter added:

Nowadays, many scholars and statesmen are apt to forget their duty to the people in their desire to win for themselves fame as men of unwavering principles. When a catastrophe occurs they are paralysed, and resemble the man who sought to build a house by asking the casual advice of unknown passers-by. Remember the example of the Song dynasty, whose rulers were busy arguing academic points even when the Mongol invaders had crossed the Yangzi and were knocking at the gates of their capital. You, sir, are the wisest of your contemporaries and must know full well in what direction the dictates of prudence should lead you. Rather than allow yourself to be carried away by the current, or influenced by those who trim their sails to the passing breeze, surely you will determine on a consistent and statesmanlike course, and then stick to it without swerving a hair’s breadth.127

126 Backhouse and Bland, Court of Peking, pp. 175–176, translation slightly modified.
127 Ibid., pp. 177–178, translation slightly modified.
These were the kinds of words which Shi Kefa himself might have uttered to extremists in his own camp. Political statesmanship and historical sagacity demanded that the wisest not merely follow the temptation of winning eternal fame for their single-minded, self-centered dedication to principled behavior; rather, service to the people and duty to the state dictated a more prudent course of accommodation for the morally farsighted and ethically astute. Yet, offered such avuncular advice by others, and especially by those who had already compromised themselves, Shi Kefa’s own back stiffened. Writing Dorgon back (in words probably drafted for him by Li Wen’s fellow literatus Hou Fangyu), Shi patiently refuted each of the points raised about improper succession and divisiveness, offering to treat the Qing as an ally and inviting their cooperation against the rebels.128 In fact, in this letter Shi even took advantage of the Zuo Maodi peace mission to promise negotiations with the Manchus as representatives of another nation with whom the Chinese could live in amity. But when it came to accepting the Manchus as his new rulers and betraying his attachment to the Ming, Shi Kefa thrust aside any second thoughts he may have had and, in words later familiar to generations of Chinese schoolchildren, he declaimed:

Looking northward towards the mausolea of our mighty ancestors my eyes can weep no more for lack of tears, and I feel that I deserve to die ten thousand deaths. My only reason for not following my late master to the underworld is that I still hope to render some service to the altars of the soil and grain. It is written: “Strain every energy while life lasts; be loyal and fear not.”129

128 Hou Fangyu is frequently mentioned as having written Shi Kefa’s answer to Dorgon, though other literati such as Wang Gang and Huang Yuefang are also credited with authorship. Deng Zhicheng, Gudong suoji quanbian, p. 19. See also Gao Yang, Mingmo si gongzi, p. 57. Li Tingxian asserts that while Shi Kefa turned the task of writing the letter over to his m supplemental copy, he made it very clear to them that he had no intention of surrendering. Thus, he told his secretaries that while he wanted the letter to be written in a respectful manner, he did not want to give any indication of indecisiveness or wavering. Li, “Shi Kefa de pingjia wenti,” p. 280. The letter was sent on October 15, 1644. Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 21.
129 Backhouse and Bland, Court of Peking, p. 183, translation slightly modified.
Shi Kefa’s adamant and stirring response early in the winter of 1644–1645 was all the more impressive because it represented his rejection of a position he himself could fully understand—a choice, in other words, rather than merely a reflexive gesture.

Since then, however, Shi Kefa’s own hopes for a counteroffensive had been dashed and the Manchus had proven themselves to be much more likely claimants for the throne than when Shi had first received Dorgon’s letter. By now, with the enemy before his gates, it was obvious that the struggle was lost, and that Shi had failed in his own mission. Yet, paradoxically, to have changed his mind now would have compromised his failure even more. To have selected a “statesmanlike course,” the expedient way, would have made a mockery of his previous outrage, and underscored the undemeaning helplessness of his defeat. It might even have been easier for Shi Kefa to come to terms with the enemy had he been better capable of meeting the Qing generals as equals. Now, to waver was to be abject. To accept one’s fate unswervingly was the only acceptable choice. Like Confucius, he would “give his best try even when he knew it was hopeless” (zhi qi bu ke er wei zhi).130

Against the momentary commitment of Yan Ermei, then, Shi Kefa seemingly chose a more enduring stance. Privately, however, he experienced a sharp sense of personal defeat as the end drew near. Choosing an entirely defensive policy to protect Yangzhou, he did not sally forth to meet the enemy.131 Instead, he remained within the city walls, resigning himself to accept death. He wrote to his family:

Respectful greetings to my mother, to Madame Yang, and to my [second] wife [née Li]: perpetual peace. The northern army sur-

130 Chun-shu Chang and Hsueh-lun Chang, “K’ung Shang-Jen and his T’ao-Hua Shan,” p. 328. The quotation is from the Gongyang zhuattj vol. 12, juan 15, p. 5b.

131 One of his muryou advised him to break the dikes at Lake Gaoyou in order to flood the Huai River valley. This he refused to do, perhaps because many
rounded Yangzhou's walls on May 13. Up to now they have not yet attacked, but the people's hopes have already fled and cannot be recovered. Sooner or later we must die. I do not know if my wife is willing to follow me into death. If we are born into this world to be of such little use, then all the better that we should hasten to end our lives. My mother in her distress must be entrusted to the care of si taiye, da ye, sange and the others, and let Zhao'er stop his evil ways. I have written up to here, but my guts are torn with grief and I cannot go on. Sent by [Shi Ke]fa on the 16th of May.132

It was thus in a mood of despair that Shi Kefa prepared almost passively for his own death. He wrote then that his failure may have compromised his moral integrity: "A general whose army has been defeated cannot be spoken of as courageous (yong). A minister who has failed his country (guo) cannot be spoken of as loyal (zhong)."133 Yet at the same time, stoic acceptance was a virtue in civilians would be killed. However, he also refused to heed Liu Zhaoji's suggestion that they attack the Manchus by surprise, saying that he did not want to provoke the enemy needlessly. J. Liu, "Shi Ke-fa," p. 148.

132 Shi, Shi Zhongzheng gong ji, 390:9b. Because these words are taken from the version of his letters published in the 19th century, they must be read with a measure of skepticism about their authenticity. In his will to his wife, Shi Kefa wrote: "I die now. By our long standing agreement, I will wait for you in Hades." Wen-djiang Chu, "Madame Shih K'e-fa," p. 96. And then in another letter which was written four days before his death, he wrote again to his wife: "I will die any moment now. I wonder whether you are willing to go with me? In a world as tumultuous as this one, life is really not worth living. It is better for you to make this decision early." Ibid., p. 96. According to the carefully researched section on Shi Kefa's wives in Zhu Wenzhang, Shi Kefa zhuhan, pp. 112–117, Shi was first married to Madame Li, and then married to Madame Yang. Because the latter was higher-ranking than his first wife, he addressed her as his first wife and with the honorific taitai. The family titles ("Number four excellency, venerable elder, third brother") later on in the letter have not been identified in Zhu's exhaustive study (see Ibid., p. 89), but probably designate his uncles and in-laws. Zhao'er may refer to Zhaoqing, the son of Shi Kefa's cousin Shi Kecheng. Zhaoqing, according to the family genealogy, had changed his name and could not therefore maintain the ancestral rites for his line. See Ibid., p. 89.

133 Shi, Shi Zhongzheng gong ji, 389:8b.
itself. "Bowed down, I give my life to public service," he privately told one of his secretaries, Ying Tingji, to whom Shi also quoted the words of Confucius' disciple Zengzi: "Only with death does the course end (si er hou yi)." 134

Publicly, standing on the ramparts of Yangzhou that day above the figure of Li Yuchun, the Manchus' emissary, Shi Kefa's impulsive response to the collaborator's appeal was much more outwardly aggressive than inwardly stoic. After asking why it was worthwhile dying for an emperor who did not trust him, Li Yuchun called up again, more placatingly: "How can it match resigning and selecting a righteous emperor in order to achieve fame?" 135 It was the classic invitation, of course: accept a new emperor voluntarily and you will have an opportunity to shape a new empire on your own. But Shi Kefa was only infuriated by this blatant appeal to his sense of personal advantage (yi). Drawing his bow, he struck down Li Yuchun with an arrow; and, from that moment on, when villagers were sent into Yangzhou with letters from Dodo courteously asking for Shi Kefa's surrender, the messengers were killed or the letters burned. 136 Already, Shi was fast becoming the heroic individual forged by ultimate historical adversity. In his public postures, we see in embryo the dramatic persona of Peach Blossom Fan, who tells the audience that "one who surrenders can never again arise from his knees; one who deserts can never again look behind him." Yangzhou would be his last great stand. In the playwright's words:

134 Cited in Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 56. Zengzi said: "The officer (shi) may not be without breadth of mind and vigorous endurance. His burden is heavy and his course is long. Perfect virtue is the burden which he considers it is his to sustain; is it not heavy? Only with death does the course end (si er hou yi); is it not long?" Analects, 8.7.
135 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 114.
136 Dodo had sent one letter from Yangzhou, containing an agreement of amnesty. Shi Kefa read both documents, and ordered his secretaries to throw them in the river. Later five more letters came from Dodo, and Shi burned each one unopened. Li Tingxian, "Shi Kefa de pingjia wenti," p. 286. At this time Gao Qifeng and several other commanders went over the wall and surrendered to Prince Yu. Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 114.
Dust of battle everywhere,
But here's a city will not yield.
Midnight tears from blurred old eyes
Against a host will hold the field.  

The Ten Days Massacre of Yangzhou

Shi Kefa's midnight tears failed to hold Yangzhou. The Manchus' own record of what happened next is strikingly stark.

May 13, 1645. The great army began its siege beneath Yangzhou's walls. A proclamation was issued to its defenders, Grand Secretary Shi Kefa, Hanlin Secretary Wei Yunwen, along with four brigade generals and two circuit officials. They did not obey. May 20, 1645. Baiyintu, Tulai and Ashan were ordered to assault Yangzhou's walls. 

The siege that began on May 13 and that culminated with the May 20th attack on Yangzhou's walls was certainly brief, by the standards of the time. As usual, artillery proved very important, though not necessarily decisive, in the battle. The Qing forces were well accustomed to the importance of using heavy Portuguese-style cannons in siege warfare since these weapons, plus Chinese artillerymen, had made their own earlier campaigns such successes. Indeed, when Dodo's avant garde had stopped at Banzhuyuan north of Yangzhou, it was tarrying only to await the artillery bringing up the rear. Shi Kefa himself was also very much aware of the importance of modern artillery. It was after all he, in 1643, who had recommended that the old-fashioned and awkwardly heavy shen qi (divine instruments) in the Nanjing armory be replaced with lighter sanyan qiang (three-barreled guns). During

137 K'ung Shang-jen, The Peach Blossom Fan, p. 258.
138 Shizu shilu, 16:192b.
140 According to Shi Kefa's memorial on military reform, each of the shen qi artillery practices took hundreds of men half-a-day each way hauling these enormous pieces from the armory to the parade ground. They were, as he
the months after the establishment of the Nanjing regime, Shi had therefore made an energetic effort to re-equip his artillery units. New Portuguese type of cannon had been cast for him by Xu Guangqi’s student Chen Yujie, who had learned the skills of the foundry from the Catholics who converted him to their religion. Consequently, by the time the actual assault on the city began on May 20, 1645, Shi Kefa held an initial advantage because of the foreign-style cannons mounted on wooden platforms along the stone ramparts.

As Dodo’s soldiers marched into range of those cannons, hundreds and then thousands were killed or wounded. But while the Manchu prince methodically directed his own artillery fire against the northwestern corner of the city wall, the Qing infantry pushed on and through the line of fire until the soldiers were directly under the city wall. There, Shi again had a momentary advantage as his archers fired directly down upon the attackers. By then it was clear that Dodo had ordered his men to take the northwestern corner whatever the cost, and as each Qing infantryman was struck down by an arrow, another one took his place. Soon the corpses were piled so high that some of the attackers did not even need ladders to scale the walls, and as the Qing soldiers clambered up and over, panic set in among the defenders. The guards along the ramparts tried to step out onto the extended wooden platforms to

put it, “a joke” compared to the new sanyan qiang, and really only for show. He recommended immediate reequipment. Zhu, Shi Kefa zhuan, pp. 25–26. The sanyan qiang—of which there are examples in the Liaoning Provincial Museum in Shenyang—consisted of three barrels, each about seven inches long, fused together onto a single set of firing chambers. The entire weapon was about eighteen inches long, plus wooden stock. The barrels, of approximately fifty caliber, were un rifled and could be fired each in turn without reloading the device.

141 Chen had also learned astronomy from the Westerners, and had earlier been recommended by Xu Guangqi and Shi Kefa for a post in the Board of Astronomy because of his calendrical skills. Joining the Nanjing regime, he was given a special commission in the Ministry of War and put in charge of artillery preparations. Song Rulin et al., comps., Songjiang fuzhi, p. 1011 (46: 35b); Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 218.

142 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 114.
reach the roofs of the nearest houses and escape. The overloaded platforms collapsed in many places and if the defenders were not crushed to death, then they were slain in the hand-to-hand fighting that followed.\textsuperscript{143}

Below, inside the city, panic also spread. Whether by treachery or error (some claimed that the guards thought the Manchus were reinforcements sent by General Huang Degong), the main gate was suddenly thrown upon from within. As the Qing soldiers streamed in, the Southern Ming troops discarded their helmets and spears, rushing helter-skelter for the southern gate, hoping to escape in that direction. Others, realizing that the city was entirely hemmed in, simply gave up all hope. Wang Xiuchu, whose journal documents the catastrophe that followed, remembered that, "Just then a horseman with slackened reins rode slowly from the south to the north, crying bitterly with face upturned. Two soldiers walked before his horse, unwilling to leave him under such circumstances. The picture is still vivid in my mind, but I regret that I do not know his name."\textsuperscript{144}

As the defenders stripped off their weapons, hurriedly looking for hiding places within the residences of the city, Shi Kefa left his station at the north gates to ride through the city to the southern entrance, hoping to get out and then attack the Manchus from their flank. But it was already too late; the Qing forces had reached the south gate of the city. Shi Kefa now realized that he had lost Yangzhou and that resistance was probably futile.\textsuperscript{145}

A day or two earlier, Shi had turned to Zhuang Zigu and had asked him if he would be prepared to do his duty to his lord if the city once fell. Zhuang had replied, without thinking, that he would. His commander-in-chief now made that request to be killed, but Zhuang could not bring himself to strike Shi Kefa, who suddenly unsheathed his own sword and drew its blade across his own throat. Yet though Shi bled profusely as he fell into Zhuang's arms, he was not mortally wounded. Shi Kefa then cried out to his


\textsuperscript{144} Wang, "Ten Days' Massacre," p. 517.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., p. 516.
son to administer the *coup de grace*, but Shi Dewei hesitated until it was too late. The routed troops fleeing from the northern part of the city swept over them, pursued by Manchus. In the turmoil Zhuang was killed and Shi Kefa was seized by Qing officers, to whom he identified himself, asking to be taken to their commander.  

Shi Kefa was promptly taken to Dodo, Prince Yu. The diarist Wang Xiuchu described Prince Yu a few days later in these words:

A young man of about thirty, wearing a Manchu hat, clad in red clothes and wearing black satin boots, came riding by. He had a breastplate of the finest mail; his steed was beautifully caparisoned and he was attended by a large suite. His features, though Tartar, were exceedingly handsome; he had a long protruding chin and a lofty forehead. Amongst his retinue there were many Yangzhou people. This was Prince Yu, the Manchu Commander-in-Chief, and uncle of their Emperor.

The sources do not tell us what Dodo wore on the 20th when he interviewed Shi Kefa, but one can easily imagine the contrast between the tall and handsomely dressed young Manchu prince, and the stocky, dark-complexioned Chinese commander, still in his bloodstained clothing. According to Wen Ruilin’s account of their meeting, Prince Yu greeted Shi affably, saying:

I have repeatedly written, inviting you [to join me], but you, sir, have not responded. Now that your loyalty and righteousness have been realized, you can help us put Jiangnan in order—which is no small task.

146 Wen, *Nanjiang yishi*, pp. 114, 221; Zhang Qiyun, ed., *Qing shi*, p. 94. In another account, which has the ring of truth, Shi Dewei and several other officers lowered Shi Kefa—who periodically lost consciousness—over the city wall to the ground at the small east gate of the city. Once outside the wall, the officers were one by one picked off by enemy arrows. Shi Kefa, supine, was then captured. Shi Dewei, *Weiyang xunjie jilüe*, p. 2. See also Yao, “Ming ji yiwen,” p. 112.

147 Backhouse and Bland, *Court of Peking*, p. 205.
Shi responded, “I am come here only to ask for death.”
“Does not my lord see Hong Chengchou?” Dodo asked. “Sur-
render means wealth and honor.”
“Chengchou has accepted our former emperor’s great gener-
osity, and yet he did not die. He is obviously disloyal to [the em-
peror’s] posterity. How,” asked Shi in turn, “could I allow myself
to be compared to him?”
Dodo thereupon ordered General Yierdun to “persuade” Shi
Kefa to serve, but after three days Shi Kefa continued to refuse to
submit, and he was ordered killed. In the curt commentary of the
Veritable Records it is written: “They captured Grand Secretary Shi
Kefa and beheaded him in front of the army. Those who held the
city and disobeyed our orders were killed at the same time.”

The impression given by the Veritable Records of a set of orderly
executions is, however, misleading. Most of Shi Kefa’s subordi-
nates—the commander Liu Zhaoji, the militia bravo Ma Yingkui,
the martial scholar He Gang, the Catholic artillery expert Chen
Yujie—died in street fighting or committed suicide. Altogether

148 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 115. According to another account, after Dodo asked
him to help with the important task of pacifying Jiangnan, Shi Kefa angrily
responded: “I am an important minister of the Heavenly Dynasty. How
could I willingly forsake my duty? If I were ignobly to save my life, I would
become a criminal for ten thousand generations. My head can be cut off, but
my self will not be forced to submit. I am willing to die quickly and follow
my former emperor to the underworld.” Prince Yu curtly replied: “Since
you are a loyal minister, you ought to be killed in order to preserve your
reputation intact.” Then he ordered him to be executed, and had his body
hung from the southern watchtower where the Qing soldiers could hack at
the corpse as they passed by. Shi Dewei, Weiyang xunjie jilüe, p. 3.

149 Shizu shilu, 16:192. Many officers surrendered. Among the most notable
was General Hu Maozhen (Shaanxi) who went on to become an important
military figure in Anhui in 1645 and 1646, imposing Qing rule upon districts
around Fengyang and Huizhou. In 1647 General Hu was transferred to the
command of the Jiangnan Governor-General, Ma Guozhu. His army, which
was composed of reputedly brutal Shanxi and Shaanxi men, was later de-
tached, at Hong Chengchou’s suggestion, to help pacify Huguang in 1655.
Er chen zhuan, 6:8–9.

150 Ma Yingkui, who bore Yue Fei’s motto, “Repay the Dynasty with All Your
Loyalty” (Jin zhong bao guo), on the back of his tunic, was killed, as was Liu
Zhaoji. He Gang, the Yunnan gentryman who had memorialized for the
nineteen of Shi Kefa's private secretaries died. But their deaths were hardly noticed in the carnage of the following hours and days during one of the most infamous massacres in Chinese history.

For, with the collapse of the city's defenses on the 20th of May, a numbing passivity settled over the inhabitants of Yangzhou. Though it was raining heavily, some inhabitants tried to prepare for the invaders by burning incense, while the wealthy hid their valuables or buried their silver. But having made these modest preparations, the townsfolk had no way of resisting the Manchus, Mongols, and Han renegades who now took over the city. "The people were standing in a row awaiting their fate," wrote Wang Xiuchu. "At first I thought I would offer no resistance as there was absolutely no way of escape."

Led by collaborators, who guided them from door to door of the wealthiest homes in this commercial city, the Qing soldiers first demanded silver and, satisfied with whatever they got, went on. While it was still daylight on the 20th, no one was hurt. But as night fell, the noise of smashing doors and the shrieks of the flogged and wounded were heard. That night fires spread, but they were partly contained by the rain. On the 21st of May, a proclamation promised that people in hiding would be spared if they gave themselves up, and many who had burrowed into their

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formation of militia just before Chongzhen died, threw himself in a well. Chen Yujie, who had been Xu Guangqi's assistant, hung himself in the Catholic church in Yangzhou. See, respectively, He, Anhui tongzhi, p. 2373 (208:6); Zha, Guo shou lu, p. 47; Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 218. Chen Yujie debated with himself before his death in a most revealing way: "I'm just a petty functionary (wei yuan). I don't have to die. But then when the time comes, how will I be able to face Lord Xu (Guangqi)?" Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 218. For a list of the officials and militiamen who died with Shi Kefa, see Shi, Weiyang xunjie jilüe, pp. 4b–5.

151 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 115; He, Anhui tongzhi, p. 2374 (208:8b).
152 The following is based on Wang, "Ten Days' Massacre," pp. 518–536. The massacre was ordered by Dodo as an example to other resisters. His soldiers killed for five days, and were ordered to "sheathe their swords" on the sixth. The last five days of the infamous "ten days' massacre," then, consisted of unauthorized atrocities by Manchus as well as Han Chinese. Zhang Defang, "Yangzhou shiri ji bianwu," p. 367.
houses came forth. Once out, they were herded into bands of fifty or sixty, chained under the guard of three or four soldiers, then prodded on with spears and killed in place if they stumbled or fell.

The women wore long chains around their necks, clumsy as a string of beads. They stumbled at every step. They were covered with mud. Here and there on the ground lay small babies who were either trodden under the hooves of horses or the feet of men. The ground was stained with blood and covered with mutilated members of bodies. The sound of sobbing was heard everywhere on the open fields. Every gutter and pond was filled with corpses, lying one upon another. The blood turned the water to a deep greenish-red color, and the ponds were filled to the brim.\(^\text{154}\)

As Yangzhou was transformed into a chamel house, reeking of blood and strewn with mutilated bodies, all social inhibitions were removed. The women of Yangzhou, noted for their beauty, first tried to buy their lives with their bodies, offering themselves to the Qing soldiers. Gradually, as a kind of frenzy seized the invaders, any woman was likely to be seized, willing or not, and raped by gangs of men.\(^\text{155}\) Some townsfolk offered their services to the Qing as work crews, cooking and cleaning for the invaders. Be-

\(^{154}\) Ibid., pp. 521–522.

\(^{155}\) Many of the women were seized as chattel. When the Manchus entered Nanjing a few weeks later, the residents of the southern capital were horrified to see the bannermen herding these captives along “like sows” with whips. That fall, when Dodo was replaced by Hong Chengchou and returned to Beijing with his men, the Manchus going with him sorted out all of the female slaves who were between the ages of 14 and 30 and who were “neither too fat nor too thin,” and took them with them. Knowing how harsh the north was, the women wept pitiably as they were driven out of the Xihua Gate. Many years later during the Kangxi period, travellers in Ningguta (Heilongjiang) or near Mongolia reported seeing these women much aged and abused. One Han, for example, met a woman dressed in animal skins in the northeast who spoke Chinese with a Yangzhou accent. He tried to find out how she had gotten there, but her Manchu companion led her away before she could answer. At the time, there were many more women than men living in the northeast. Gu Cheng, “Lun Qingchu shehui mao-dun,” pp. 145–146.
cause their lives were spared, others tried to join them and were turned away. Meanwhile the slaughter continued.

Whenever a soldier appeared, all the southerners, no matter how great their numbers, squatted down and dropped their heads. None dared flee, but each stretched out his neck expecting the stroke of the sword.  

Those who did try to escape by dropping from the walls either broke their legs or fell into the hands of vagabonds and foragers who seized them to torture them for their valuables. Within the city, people hid themselves in garbage dumps, and smeared their bodies with mud and dirt, hoping to escape attention, but the soldiers still prodded the refuse heaps with spears until they crawled out like animals, bleeding from their wounds. Fires spread, and the people who had remained alive by hiding in rafters or basements were either burned in the inferno or staggered out to be killed by the troops still plundering the city. And even if spared by regular Qing troops, the hapless citizens, often wandering the streets without clothing in a daze, were set upon by gangs of foragers ("We were unable to tell whether they were Manchu soldiers, city guards, or lawless ruffians") and beaten to death with clubs.

On May 25, the sixth day of rapine and slaughter, the massacre let up. The Qing soldiers were ordered by Prince Yu to put away their weapons. Monks were ordered to begin to collect and burn the corpses. By May 27, rice rations were being handed out, and the following day the rains—which had kept the fires from destroying the entire city—finally stopped and the sun came out. Contemporaries estimated that eight hundred thousand people had died in the slaughter.

157 Ibid., p. 536.
158 Ibid. This figure is accepted by Xie Guozhen. Xie, Nanming shilüe, pp. 72–73. Zhang Defang challenges that sum, which is the number reported by Wang Xiuchu. According to the gazetteers for the various rural counties around Yangzhou, the total population of the prefecture was 78,960 house-
Shi Kefa Praised and Blamed

It is hardly surprising that Shi Kefa’s corpse was never found among all these dead. Rumors that he was still alive even provided an occasion for some of the local militia groups that arose against the Manchus after the fall of the city to claim that they were led by him.\(^{159}\) But even though Shi Kefa’s surviving relatives swore to the authorities that the militia leader was an imposter, doubts continued to exist.\(^{160}\) Shi’s former secretary, Yan Ermei, expressed these doubts in a poem:

The general personally led the five lords,
Yet he was unwilling to strike west and seize the upper reaches.

\(^{159}\) Xie, *Nanning shilüe*, p. 73.

\(^{160}\) J. Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 150. Gu Yanwu stated that no one knew where Shi Kefa had gone, and some said that he had escaped and had gone into hiding. Ibid., p. 149; Xia Yunyi, *Xing cun lu*, p. 38. Later, an uprising occurred in the Jiangbei area which was led by a man named Feng Xiaolian who also pretended to be Shi Kefa. Feng attacked Chaozhou and Wuweizhou before being captured. The Manchu general who defeated him ordered that Shi Kefa’s mother be brought in to identify the man. Mrs. Shi was arrested along with her daughter-in-law, Madame Li, who was the widow of Shi Kemo, Kefa’s younger brother. The two women said that the rebel was not Shi Kefa. The beautiful Madame Li, however, was seen on this occasion by a high Manchu noble in the Qing headquarters. The noble wanted to marry her, and sent a messenger to their quarters bearing engagement gifts. Shi Kefa’s mother did not know what to do, but Madame Li insisted that there was no problem at all. She took a gold box from among the betrothal gifts and went into an inner room. Moments later her maid came out, weeping, to say that Madame Li wanted the Manchu’s messenger to “specially thank the nobleman for me.” The messenger opened the gold box and saw inside Madame Li’s nose and ears which she had sliced off herself. Zhu Wenzhang, “Shi Kefa furen xingshi kao,” pp. 88–89. See also Li, “Shi Kefa de pingjia wenti,” pp. 287–288.
Tonight Luzhou appears beneath my stirrups.  
I still have doubts he truly died at Yangzhou.\(^\text{161}\)

Yan’s somewhat churlish skepticism was understandable, given his disillusionment with Shi Kefa’s defensive strategy. Less comprehensible was the disbelief of the Qing Viceroy, Hong Chengchou, who a year later asked the Kunshan loyalist Gu Xianzheng if Shi Kefa was alive. Gu, under arrest for his participation in the Wu Shengzhao uprising, alluded to the rumors of Hong’s own falsely reported death when he responded with a sarcastic laugh: “Do you know if Hong Chengchou is dead or alive?”\(^\text{162}\) Nevertheless, there seems little reason to query the official Qing accounts of Shi’s execution, especially since eyewitness accounts of his death were later given by his adopted son and by a guardsman present at the time.\(^\text{163}\)

Lacking a corpse to honor, Shi Dewei still managed to make a tomb for his father. The following year, Dewei gathered the clothing of his father and buried it ceremonially under Meihua Peak outside the north gate of Yangzhou.\(^\text{164}\) And even before that sacral act of filial pity, Dodo himself had ordered that a shrine (cí) be erected within the shattered city of Yangzhou to honor the spirit of Shi Kefa, so that the dead Ming commander quickly became the object of a growing cult of hero worship.\(^\text{165}\) It is easy to see why this should have happened. For Dodo himself, the honoring of such a staunch loyalist laid to rest the dead, and helped transform a

\(^{162}\) Ji, *Ming ji nanlüe*, p. 279.  
\(^{163}\) J. Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 151. According to the 18th century historian Wen Ruilin, the reason why Shi’s body was not recovered after the execution was simply that General Yierdun had not had time to inscribe the hero’s name upon his coffin, which was misplaced in the turmoil of the time. Wen, *Nanjian yishi*, p. 115.  
\(^{164}\) Zhu, *Shi Kefa zhuang*, p. 86. One contemporary account, dated 1644 but probably written several years later, claimed that Dodo himself ordered that Shi Kefa’s body be buried at the foot of Meihua ling. Zheng Lian, *Yubian jili*, 7:14b.  
\(^{165}\) *Ming shi*, p. 4112. The grave was tended by local residents, who sacrificed to it in springtime and fall. Zheng, *Yubian jili*, 7:14b. See also Li, “Shi Kefa de pingjia wenti,” p. 289. This was, in addition, a way of appeasing Shi Kefa’s angry (and hungry) ghost.
frenzied sacking into a solemn and heroic saga. As an abstract value, Shi’s Confucian commitment to a dead monarch also transcended the Manchu–Chinese conflict, so that later by canonizing him as Zhong zheng (Loyal and Upright) and ranking him second only to Wen Tianxiang as a loyalist paragon, the Qianlong Emperor appropriated Shi’s ministerial devotion for the Qing dynasty itself. As this process of glorification continued, the historical image of Shi Ke-fa was greatly aggrandized. His letters—even personal ones to close relatives—were carefully culled and the most ringing phrases retained. By the end of the 18th century, when his glamorized features adorned popular portraits sold in Yangzhou, he had become more myth than man; and by the 20th century his death had made him a minzu yingxiong: a “racial hero” to be revered “with the most heartfelt sincerity.”

Yet even after Shi Ke-fa had become such a national hero to the Chinese people, opinions about his historical role were ambivalent. To contemporary Marxist historians, who in 1966 vigorously debated Shi’s status in the public press, his death at Yangzhou was only a single glorious incident in a lifetime otherwise marred by “feudal loyalty” and sixteen years of “reactionary oppression of peasant armies.” “Shi Ke-fa was first of all the executioner of the

166 The Southern Ming model loyalists selected by the Qianlong Emperor for special praise were people whose actual effectiveness was much less important than their resistance to pressure. In fact, the more futile their actions, the better examples they served. Struve, “Uses of History,” p. 238. It should be noted, however, that Qianlong did permit the record of Shi’s exploits to be entered into the archives of the Historiography Bureau under the Prince of Fu’s reign name on the grounds that the Nanjing regime was like the Southern Song after it “crossed the river.” Yao Wentian, comp., Yangzhou fuzhi, 25:29a.


168 Zhu, Shi Ke-fa zhu, p. 86.

169 The debate was opened by Liu Hui who criticized Wu Han’s description of Shi Ke-fa as a minzu yingxiong. Wu Han’s book, Shi Ke-fa, had been published in 1959. Liu argued that because Shi had actually spent most of his life killing peasant rebels, he was actually a reactionary; and that Wu Han should therefore be blamed for praising feudal moral values. Yangkai shubao gongying she, comp., Shi Ke-fa pingjia wenti huibian, p. 1. This opening salvo in the early days of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was deflected by Lin
peasant revolution and a villain of history,” some argued, while others maintained that his admirable self-sacrifice “objectively” redeemed his reputation and should therefore continue to inspire the Chinese people. A less doctrinaire contemporary Chinese historian, on the other hand, has wondered aloud “why someone so energetically devoted and so self-sacrificing should after all have been unable to avoid defeat.” For, if Shi’s sacrifice was self-redeeming, it certainly failed to make up for the strategic loss of Yangzhou. As a 17th-century writer put it not long after Shi Kefa’s death: “Shi Daolin possessed the talent (cai) but lacked the measure (liang) to save the age. Jiang-Huai was the key to the passageway between north and south. How therefore could his martyrdom be [worth losing Yangzhou and the Huai River valley]?”

Criticized for not delegating authority, Shi Kefa was also blamed by earlier Qing historians more generally for failing to stand up to men like Ma Shiying:

Shi Kefa’s loyalty was excessive while his talent was insufficient. Was any matter of greater importance than selecting a ruler and appointing ministers? Yet if others said, “Impossible,” then he yielded. And if others said, “Possible,” then he accepted it. Shiying entered in the morning and Kefa left that evening.

Regarded as naive by some of his contemporaries—“Shi is more virtuous than he is gifted with political sense”—Shi’s accom-

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Fu, who argued that Shi Kefa was still a minzu yingxiong whose sacrifice would continue to inspire the Chinese people. Ibid., p. 19. However Zong Zhihuang continued to press the attack. Ibid., p. 59. According to a post-Cultural Revolution account, which praises Shi Kefa, a meeting was convened by Wenyi bao (Literature and Art) in Shanghai, and the conclusion of the zuotanhui (symposium) condemned Shi Kefa out of hand. Li, “Shi Kefa de pingjia wenti,” p. 275.

170 For the former see Ding Jiatong’s remarks in Yangkai shubao, Shi Kefa pingjia wenti huibian, p. 58; and for the latter, Luo Xian’s comments in Ibid., p. 33.

171 Zhu, Shi Kefa zhuang, p. 86.

172 Zhang, Shigui cangshu, p. 170.

173 Li Tiangen, Juehuo lu, p. 6.

174 These were Xia Yunyi’s words, cited in Liu, “Shi Ke-fa,” p. 161.
plishment was inevitably compromised by the Southern Ming defeat at Yangzhou. Yet, the more sensitive of Qing historians realized that a facile praise-and-blame assessment of the man on the grounds of military success alone would fail to do him justice. Describing the fall of Yangzhou, Li Tiangen wrote:

All the generals fled south and in the Yellow River region there were ten li of empty camps, so that the imperial Qing troops braced their arms and entered the city, destroying Yangzhou and cutting off rescue. [Shi Kefa] died and the country died with him. How tragic! I have sometimes considered, in all of this, that of all the rulers since ancient times who have lost their countries, none was as benighted as Liu Chan (a.d. 207–267, son of Liu Bei). Even if he had possessed the talents of a Zhuge Wuhou, he would not have been able to keep himself from falling. How then could someone whose talents were not as great as Wuou’s, and who moreover served a ruler worse than Liu Chan, fail to realize that he could not succeed? Yet [Shi Kefa], knowing that he could not succeed, continued to serve. Is this not what is called: “His burden is heavy and his course is long; only with death does the course end”? If we assess these points cautiously, then we must take care not to judge Lord Shi by his success or failure.175

It was, then, in terms of stoic endurance in the face of adversity that Shi Kefa was most fairly judged by his contemporaries; whatever the direct political cost of his personal integrity, his death was respected—and even emulated—by many of his countrymen.

The death of Shi Kefa and the fall of Yangzhou precipitated a wave of suicides, both on the part of those actually serving the Southern Ming and those who were simply spectators of the debacle. For numerous loyalists, the Manchu conquest of the city prompted a crisis of intense self-examination. The experience of directly witnessing such suffering tested their personal integrity; the significance of their own lives, so to speak, was at stake. Han Mo, a zhusheng, said to his wife when he heard details of the tragedy, “I have read the writings of the sages and should die to preserve righteousness. One cannot live one’s life in carelessness,

175 Li, Juehuo lu, p. 6. Zhuge Wuhou is Zhuge Liang.
seeking only for the self.” He threw himself into a well, followed by his wife and eldest son—all later equally honored in the provincial gazetteer for their sense of duty. For many others, the fall of Yangzhou both dashed the hope of recovering the Central Plain and inspired a fervent intent to redeem their despair in continued resistance to Manchu rule. Later, almost always present in the minds of Songjiang loyalists, for example, was Shi Kefa’s death.

The Flight of the Hongguang Emperor

The fall of Yangzhou also sealed the fate of the Hongguang regime. As soon as news of the Qing victory reached Nanjing, the Hongguang Emperor summoned his senior ministers. Qian Qianyi, echoing the advice once proffered to the Chongzhen Emperor in his last days, recommended that the capital be moved farther south, perhaps to Guiyang (Guizhou). The emperor rejected that advice, just as he also refused to entertain Ma Shiying’s proposal that the court fall back upon a southern line of retreat, possibly hoping that his defenses would hold along the Yangzi.

The Southern Ming forces defending the lower reaches of the Yangzi were commanded by forty-seven-year-old Yang Wencong. Yang (juren 1618, Guizhou) had been director of studies at Huating where he had studied painting with Dong Qichang. A close friend of the Xuzhou painter and poet Wan Shouqi, Yang Wencong was also Ma Shiying’s brother-in-law. Though dismissed from his post as magistrate of Jiangning (Nanjing) in 1644 on charges of corruption, he had been named a secretary in the Ministry of War of the Southern Ming regime, and placed in charge of Nanjing’s river defenses. Until this moment he was perhaps best known for acting as an intermediary between Ruan Dacheng and Hou Fangyu, and it is really in that role, as a kind of political matchmaker, that he was later known to the Chinese.

176 Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 2592 (154:12a).
177 Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” p. 70; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 47.
179 As a dramatis persona, Yang Wencong was a more literal matchmaker as well,
By May 29, 1645, Dodo’s mixed Manchu and Chinese forces had reached the Yangzi crossing at Guazhou. The following day Prince Yu arrayed his forces along the north shore at the juncture of the Grand Canal, facing the marines of Yang Wencong and the Fujianese naval commander Zheng Hongkui (brother of the sea-lord Zheng Zhilong) on the opposite shore at the garrison of Zhenjiang. The Ming naval forces managed to kill some of Gao Jie’s remnants that were trying to escape across the Yangzi, but on the night of June 1, the Qing soldiers released crudely constructed rafts on the river, lighted by torches; and while the Ming marines were wasting their ammunition on this decoy, Qing vanguard forces commanded by Li Shuaitai crossed to the west under the cover of the dawn fog, outflanking the Ming defenders altogether.\(^*\) Abandoning Zhenjiang, Zheng Hongkui and his sailors fled in panic down the Yangzi and escaped by sea to Fuzhou, where he would later help enthrone the Prince of Tang as the Longwu Emperor. Yang Wencong made for Suzhou, where he would help spearhead the Jiangnan resistance movement; later he was to join the Tang regime as a vice-minister of war.\(^*\)

With Zhenjiang now securely in their hands, the main body of the Qing army began to march on Nanjing. Rumors of its advance reached the Southern Ming capital. A diarist wrote:

June 3, 1645: For several days now, alarming reports reach us, one after the other. . . . During the night, the wind came out of the north, extremely brisk. The northern troops had crossed the river and from Seven-League Harbor (Qili gang) pressed on toward the capital. By this time, late afternoon was drawing near and the Hongguang Emperor had run out of stratagems. He summoned his eunuch director Han Zanzhou and asked him for advice. Han said:

\[\text{arranging the meetings between Hou Fangyu and Li Xiangjun, the “fragrant princess,” in the boudoir world of } \text{Peach Blossom Fan}: \text{“Pearls and emeralds glow/And silken dresses flow,/And every precious toy/Is here for lover’s joy.”} \text{K’ung, } \text{Peach Blossom Fan,} \text{ p. 57.}
\]

\(180\) Zhang, \textit{Sou wen xu bi}, 1:19a.

"These barbarians come upon us like a raging torrent. Our armies are weak and there is no one to fight in our defense. It is impossible for you as emperor to ride forth and subjugate them in person. Were there help [from other quarters] then the sacrificial altars could be saved. Without aid, you can at least save yourself."

The familiar theme of abandonment was heard again. Like his uncle in the north, the Hongguang Emperor was being told that his person had been deserted. Unlike Chongzhen, however, Hongguang did not find his pathway blocked. The anonymous diarist describes the emperor’s departure:

The hour of two drums was approaching [on the night of June 3] as he rode out of the Tongji Gate, accompanied only by the empress, one concubine, a few household servants, and an extremely small number of officials. Some say he went to Wulin; other say he went to Yun-Gui or to Taiping—the rumors were confused and contradictory. For this act he was loudly criticized during the next ten days, though never for his guile.

In both chronicle and drama, history and parahistory, the fleeing Prince of Fu bemoaned his abandonment—when it was actually he who had abandoned the capital. In Peach Blossom Fan, he sings:

Alas for a forsaken ruler
Who mourns alone beside the river,
Begging for nourishment from village huts.

And he adds in dialogue: “On my headlong flight from Nanjing, I have been abandoned by one after another of my eunuchs and consorts. Now only the Grand Eunuch Han Zanzhou remains by my side.”

182 Jiangnan wenjian lu, p. 317. Not a single regular official—civil or military—knew that he was going to flee. Ji, Mingji nannüe, p. 231.
183 Jiangnan wenjian lu, p. 317. See also Ming shi, p. 1543; Shizu shilu, 16:193a. His retinue consisted of 40 or 50 people. Ji, Mingji nannüe, p. 44; Tan, Guo que, p. 6208.
184 K'ung, Peach Blossom Fan, p. 268.
According to some accounts, the emperor first fled to Taiping prefecture just southeast of Nanjing, but Liu Kongzhao closed the gates of the city to him. Rejected, he went on to Wuhu, the Yangzi port in Anhui, where he was supposed to have perished at the Bai-chuan Bridge. Some claim that a loyalist official, seeing that he was about to be captured, drowned him with his own hands lest he be taken by the enemy. Other accounts portray him committing suicide and, like Chongzhen, leaving a forlorn epitaph on the bridge: “For three hundred years this house of mine has nurtured literati. Why have all the officials now abandoned me so utterly?” But while these accounts may have reflected some officials’ guilty consciences or fulfilled the dramatic penchant of Hongguang’s contemporaries, they were not actually true. The emperor did go to Taiping after he had fled from the capital, and the gates did remain closed to him; but from there he sought refuge on June 5 in the encampment of General Huang Degong at Tongling, on the south bank of the Yangzi in central Anhui.

Huang Degong broke into tears when the emperor was ushered into his headquarters. He wanted at first to thrust away the historical burden now cast upon him. “If the Emperor had died defending the capital,” Huang said to him, “then his ministers would probably have exerted all their strength [against the Qing]. But what shall we do now that you have listened to traitors’ words and on the spur of the moment come here? How can my strength be enough to act as an imperial escort against the enemy?” The emperor bitterly responded that Huang was not a minister who could be relied upon, and the general was so stung that he finally agreed to undertake Hongguang’s protection. “I am willing,” he promised, “to devote my life to you.”

On June 15, the renegade General Liu Liangzuo arrived at Huang Degong’s encampment at Wuhu. He was accompanied by a detachment of Dodo’s bannermen, along with the former commander of the Guazhou garrison, Zhang Tianlu, and his men. They demanded the surrender of the Southern Ming emperor. Huang Degong refused. From behind Liu Liangzuo, Zhang Tianlu suddenly

185 Lu Qi, Xianyan, p. 24.
186 Ming shi, p. 3022. See also Xu Zi, Xiaotian jizhuan, pp. 231–232.
fired an arrow, striking Huang in the throat. Moments later, the loyalist commander was dead. Huang's chief lieutenants did not hesitate. His two brigade commanders, Ma Degong and Tian Xiong, quickly turned the Hongguang Emperor over to General Liu and tendered their own allegiance to the Qing.  

In the meantime, back in Nanjing, news of the emperor's flight had created pandemonium.

June 4 [the diarist records]: just before dawn, a clamor arose as people began to shout that Hongguang had already left the city. In the capital, the officials all at once secretly stole away. There were those who did not flee, but they sealed their doors and made it clear that they had washed their hands of it all. Men and women, like a swarm of insects, pushed and shoved to get out of the city gates. Impossible to count, they helped the elderly along and carried their children in their arms. Among them there were seductive and delicate young orchids, golden lotuses staggering, tottering along with difficulty. The onlookers' hearts went out to them. Then, eight or nine out of every ten who had managed to leave turned back because there were so many soldiers on the road; but, because the gates were soon closed again, two or three out of every ten who wanted to return could not get back in. No one knew of their whereabouts.  

187 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 179; Ji, Mingji nanlue, p. 45; Tan, Guo que, p. 6213; Du Naiji, Mingdai neige zhidu, p. 2391 (210:10b); Dennerline, "Massacre," p. 259; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 196. Both of the lieutenants went on to perform illustriously for the Manchus. Ma Degong was made a member of the Han Bordered Yellow Banner, and in 1647 he was posted to Fujian at the suggestion of Hong Chengchou. He occupied Jianning prefecture in the northern part of the province. During the 1650s he commanded forces in Fujian allied with Li Shuaiai against Zheng Chenggong, and was killed during a naval battle off Xiamen (Amoy) in 1663. Er chen zhuan, 1:17–20a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 559. (For Li Shuaiai's subjugation of Fujian, see Zhao Erxun, ed., Qing shi gao, 279:1–2.) Tian Xiong served as a brigade-general in Hangzhou, and in 1646 was named military commander of all the forces in Zhejiang, leading a successful campaign against Dinghai (Zhoushan). In 1658, he did lose control over the southern coast to Zheng Chenggong, for which he was impeached; but the Shunzhi Emperor pardoned him in 1659, and Tian Xiong went on to recover Ningbo for the Qing. Er chen zhuan, 6:22–24a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 718–719.

188 Jiangnan wenjian lu, p. 317.
A group of them—simply called “the people” (laobaixing) in the chronicles—did more than try to break out of the city. They decided to install the soi-disant heir apparent as emperor. Taking Grand Secretary Wang Duo with them as their prisoner, they broke into the city prison and ordered the minister to point out the crown prince to them. Terrified, he quickly complied, and even then was nearly killed by the mob, though he kept assuring them it was not he but Ma Shiy ing, the Chief Minister, who had put the young man in jail. After the heir apparent interceded, Wang Duo’s life was spared and the people took the false heir on horseback through the Xihua Gate into the Wuying Palace. There had been no time for preparations for the mob’s enthronement of the pretender, but theatrical costumes were found stored away in boxes and an operatic emperor’s robe was selected for the young man to wear. In this gaudy array he was seated on Hongguang’s former throne, while the audience milling around the platform called for his long life. For several days preceding this moment the sky had been dark and overcast; now it cleared, and the spectators thought the bright sun to be a good omen.  

The seating of the false heir upon the Wuying throne was a spontaneous act of the urban crowd. Wang Zhiming (if that was indeed his name) was a king more of plebeians and clerks than of literati and high officials. In the next few hours, almost all of the petty functionaries of Nanjing’s ministries came to bow to the man they believed would become emperor of the realm. Only a few high officials came, however. In fact, the false heir’s accession provoked a panic among those higher-ranking bureaucrats who had advised the Prince of Fu to throw the young man in jail. Zhang Jie hanged himself in a temple and Yang Weiyuan threw himself in a well when they heard the news.  

Li Zhan, the official who had first recommended Fu for the throne, ordered his sedan-chair carriers to rush him to Zhao Zhilong’s house, where he pleaded for help and was given Zhao’s official standard to get safely out of the city.

189 Ji, Ming ji nanliue, pp. 44, 181; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 177; Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 29; Tan, Guo que, pp. 6209–6210; Ming shi, p. 4112.
190 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 218–219.
191 Ji, Ming ji nanliue, p. 183.
The man who stood to lose the most by the false heir’s enthronement was, of course, Ma Shiying. But by the time Wang Zhiming had been arrayed in operatic regalia and was being crowned by the mob, Ma Shiying was safely outside the city gates, protected by a handpicked bodyguard of four hundred Guizhou soldiers who were escorting him to the south.\textsuperscript{192} Ma’s ostensible reason for fleeing Nanjing on June 4 was to preserve the security of the Hongguang Emperor’s mother, Madame Zou. Though some were to claim that the elderly woman who left the city with him that day was actually his own mother, disguised as the empress dowager, there is little reason to doubt her genuine identity.\textsuperscript{193} Although she died later by accident, the presence of the empress dowager in his train provided Ma with an excuse—though a barely plausible one—for abandoning his responsibilities in the capital.\textsuperscript{194} Nevertheless, Ma Shiying left the city with an ignominious reputation. Rejected nearly everywhere he went, he repeatedly tried to re-enlist in the Southern Ming cause, and even fought on the loyalist side in Fujian.\textsuperscript{195} But when he was finally captured and beheaded in

\textsuperscript{192} Wen Bing, \textit{jiyi shian}, p. 176.

\textsuperscript{193} The story that the empress dowager was really Ma Shiying’s mother in disguise may have been circulated because of Mme. Zou’s reticence when Ma and his party reached Zhejiang. There, a number of former officials quizzed the woman about events in Nanjing and she turned away, seeming unable to answer. Ma Shiying answered these questions for her, arousing the officials’ suspicion. Wen, \textit{Nanjiang yishi}, pp. 437–438. However, Ma Shiying had already shown his concern for the empress dowager earlier, when he sent a special mission into northern Henan to get her in the autumn of 1644, bringing her back to Nanjing on September 13, 1644. Ji, \textit{Ming ji nanl"{u}e}, pp. 152–153; \textit{Ming shi}, p. 4110.

\textsuperscript{194} She later joined the court of the regent Prince of Lu, and drowned in the Huai River after their court had surrendered to the Qing. Xu Zi, \textit{Xiaotian-jinian fukao}, p. 124.

\textsuperscript{195} After leaving Nanjing, Ma Shiying and his men had gone on to Guangde district in Anhui. There, the magistrate had refused them asylum, and Ma’s men had attacked and pillaged the city in retaliation. Moving on to Hangzhou, Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng (who had by now joined him) sought the protection of General Fang Guoan, whom they joined in Yanzhou when Hangzhou fell. Rejected by the Prince of Lu, whose officials threatened to execute him, Ma, in late December or early January, 1646, joined General Fang to engage Qing troops as they tried to attack Hangzhou. Defeated, they fell back south, but Ma was denied entry into Fujian by the Prince of
a Zhejiang marketplace in 1646, his name was unredeemed. Like Zhou Yanru, who was the conventional evil minister blamed for the fall of the Ming in Beijing, Ma was the villain held responsible for the demise of the Nanjing regime. In fact, in the public’s eye he was identified with Zhou Yanru, as a popular refrain of the time makes clear:

Zhou Yanru was named Jade Cord (*Yusheng*).
First bestow the Jade,
Then confer the Cord.
The cord encircles Yanru’s neck—
Strung up like a pariah dog.
Ma Shiyung was styled Jasper Grass (*Yaocao*).
His family heirlooms were Jasper,
His belly was stuffed with Grass.
The grass is strung through Shiyung’s skin—
Like a goat’s hide stripped of its hair.  

And as a minister who, at the time of Nanjing’s fall, cravenly made an undignified escape, Ma Shiyung continued to symbolize to many the ignominy of the Hongguang reign altogether. The philosopher Liu Zongzhou later remarked: “Of Shiyung’s guilt for destroying the country we need not speak. But how can a person who acts as prime minister abandon the Son of Heaven and flee, clutching the Empress Dowager at his side?” In fact, Ma’s action was so unseemly that it almost justified the decision taken by those left behind to surrender—as though his act was so base that their surrender by contrast was nearly acceptable.
The Surrender of Nanjing

Qian Qianyi had been the first high official to learn of Ma Shiyong’s flight. Passing by Ma’s residence, he saw the gateway open and the bodyguard departing. Subsequently, Qian Qianyi, Zhao Zhilong, and Wang Duo constituted a rump government which met formally on June 6 to discuss the regime’s plight. There seemed to be no doubt in anyone’s mind that they would have to surrender the city to the Qing. The only major matter of dispute concerned the false heir, whom several officials wanted formally to enthrone as their emperor. Zhao Zhilong (who had called in garrison troops from outside the city walls, presumably to offset the influence of the mob if necessary) flatly opposed this. He pointed out that if they crowned a new ruler at this juncture, then later diplomatic negotiations for their own surrender would be compromised. All agreed this would be undesirable. The false heir should be allowed to remain in the palace and each ministry would issue proclamations to calm the populace, but the real government—the council of officials now meeting—would continue to guide the people towards the surrender that they all agreed to perform.

There was surprisingly little dissent to this decision. To be sure, when Zhao Zhilong actually began making formal preparations to greet Dodo as the Qing armies drew nearer, a few were deeply dis-

200 Wang Duo, along with Gao Mengqi, had been ordered released from jail by the pretender. Gao Mengqi escaped from the city as soon as he was released from prison. Wang went on to join the provisional government. Ji, *Mingji nanliüe*, p. 182.
201 Zhao Zhilong, Wang Duo, Qian Qianyi, Ma Shiyong, and 12 other high officials had already met on May 31 in the Hall of Pure Discussion (Qingyi Tang) to discuss policy options. The suggestion that an expedient course of action be followed came simultaneously from several different anonymous officials. For example, one official remarked casually to another that, “Surrendering for the sake of expediency will cover us with shame. But what else is there to do?” No one had any reason to contest this position. Zhao Zhilong was thus empowered by the assembly to “tender tribute” to the Qing. Wen Bing, *jiayi shian*, p. 74.
turbed. The Vice-Minister of Finance, Liu Chengzhi, physically attacked Zhao, striking him when he went into the seal room of the Treasury and made his intention clear. But when Dodo reached the outskirts of Nanjing on June 8, virtually the entire Southern Ming government was there to greet him. Two imperial censors first welcomed him, and then—in a sudden drenching rainstorm—149 other Southern Ming civil officials, led by Zhao Zhilong, trooped out of the capital to meet the Qing prince camped directly in front of the main city gate.

Dodo’s reception paralleled Dorgon’s welcome in Beijing. The same kinds of remarks were exchanged, the same Manchu solicitude for the tombs of the dead Ming emperors was voiced, and the same concern for just government was declared. Zhao Zhilong, who presented Dodo with the registers (ce) of the city, was named Duke Xingguo ("Duke Who Revives the Realm"), and other senior officials who surrendered were offered gifts and rank. Wang Duo, for instance, was welcomed into the Qing bureaucracy, and later became President of the Board of Rites in Beijing, where he supervised the activities of the Hongwen Yuan, the editing of the Veritable Records for Qing Taizong’s reign, and the palace examinations of 1647. While Dodo feted the higher-ranking Southern

203 Ming shi, p. 3093.
204 Ji, Mingji nanlue, p. 234; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 29; Tan, Guo que, p. 6212; Sun Zhentao, Qing shi shulun, p. 14. Of these, only four men had their names eventually entered in the Er chen zhuan. In addition to Zhao Zhilong, Qian Qianyi, and Wang Duo, the Vice-Minister of War, Liang Yungou, was also listed. He accepted an appointment in the Qing Board of Revenue in 1648. Er chen zhuan, 8:32a. When Dodo first arrived outside Nanjing’s walls, he was reluctant to enter the city right away, not knowing how the people would react as the Manchus drew near. Before the formal greeting was extended, however, a procession of five officials, led by Qian Qianyi, came out first to assure him of their welcome. Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:19a; Li, Sanyuan biji, fuxia, 3b. For Qian Qianyi’s surrender, which was attributed to his ambition to be a leading Qing minister and to compile the Ming History, see Sun Kekuan, “Wu Meicun beixing qianhou shi,” p. 9.
205 Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 180. Zhao Zhilong was later appointed to the Qing Board of Revenue but soon retired. He remained a member of the Han Bordered Yellow Banner until his death in 1654. Er chen chuan, 7:25a.
206 Wang was appointed President of Rites in March, 1646. Demoted to Vice-
Ming officials in his military camp, the clerks and commoners of Nanjing were addressed in public edicts that spoke of the debauchery and drunkenness of the Prince of Fu, and of how his closest officials had taken bribes and “abused their positions to trample on the rights of others.” Now these wrongs would be righted and a new regime installed to look after the people’s proper interests.  

As in the north as well, the Manchu army could not but impress the Southern Ming officials who watched it take over the city. Before the army entered the city, Zhao Zhilong had ordered each household to prepare incense and to paste yellow placards with the characters “submissive people” (shun min) and “Long Live the Great Qing Emperor” (Da Qing huangdi wanwan sui) on their gates. With these preparations completed by June 16, the massive Hongwu Gate of Nanjing’s immense wall was swung open and, led by Prince Yu, who again was dressed in red silk, Manchu and Han troops marched in. There was some friction over bullets. A line had been drawn on the city’s map between the Tongji Gate and the Dazhong Bridge, dividing the city into a northeastern and southwestern sector. The Qing soldiers were to stay above the line, and the citizens of Nanjing below it. This caused great momentary inconvenience: families had to pack their belongings and move across the Qing sector into the Chinese zone, where the cost of housing soared. But, as in the case of Beijing,
this transfer of population did appear to reduce the frequency of criminal incidents, and especially of rapes, on the part of the Manchu troops. For, the troops' physical isolation was enforced by strict laws punishing looting; and, both to impose discipline and to impress the citizens of Nanjing, Dodo ordered on June 16 that eight bannermen who had been arrested for looting be publicly executed.  

After Dodo entered the city, one of his first questions to Zhao Zhilong concerned the false heir, whom the Manchu leader apparently took to be a genuine claimant to the throne. Zhao Zhilong, late that first night, had brought the man—whom he introduced to Prince Yu as Wang Zhiming—to Dodo's quarters. There is no record of the conversation that took place then, but later Dodo told Zhao Zhilong that, "We cannot distinguish true from false for the moment. All will become clear upon our return to the north." Even before then, however, Dodo seemed to have made up his own mind that Wang Zhiming was the genuine Ming heir apparent. At least, that was the way he behaved when the Prince of Fu was captured on June 15 and brought back to his former capital, Nanjing, three days later.

The Prince of Fu's return was ignominious:

On June 18, Hongguang entered the city in a small sedan-chair without curtains. His head was covered by a headband and he wore blue clothes; he concealed his face with a greasy fan. The empress and a concubine followed behind, riding on donkeys. From the side of the road the people reviled and spat on them, and threw tiles and rocks.  

As soon as he entered the city, Hongguang was taken to the residence of the Marquis of Lingbi, where a banquet was in progress. The host was Dodo, and the guests included the false heir and sev-

211 Wen Bing, *Jiayi shian*, p. 185.
213 Dodo had despatched a contingent of more than 1,000 soldiers to help bring back the heir apparent. Li, *Sanyuan biji, fuxia*, 3b-4a.
eral officials from the Ministry of Rites, including Zhao Zhilong. Dodo seated Hongguang beneath the pretender, and lest the former emperor overlook the insult, cuttlingly accused him of usurping the throne. Why—Dodo asked—had the Prince of Fu not ceded the throne to the rightful heir? Why had he not sent a single soldier to attack the Shun remnants? And why had he fled Nanjing the moment word came that the Manchus had taken Yangzhou?215

Even the false heir was taken aback by the barrage of questions, and he tried to defend the Prince of Fu, whom he said had initially been well intentioned but who had fallen under the domination of evil ministers. However, Dodo again verbally lashed Hongguang, remarking that if the Prince of Fu had ordered an attack on the Qing army before it crossed the Yellow River, the Southern Ming forces would have won. The Prince of Fu tried to defend himself in turn, but no words came; he could find no excuse. The back of his clothing saturated with sweat, he could only lower his head before the banqueters in shameful silence. Then he was taken away to be imprisoned in the countryside outside Nanjing. Although Dodo had a few Southern Ming officials taken to see Hongguang, who asked after the whereabouts of Ma Shiyi, the former emperor simply ceased to exist as a public figure. Transported later to Beijing, where he was kept hidden from view, Hongguang was quietly put to death the following year.216 Subsequently, the false heir also disappeared into the recesses of the Qing encampment; and after that he was never again seen by outsiders. It is said that he and some other Ming princes whose names had been used by loyalist rebels were executed en masse on May 23, 1646, at the command of the authorities in Beijing.217

217 Lu, Xianyan, p. 40; Gaillard, Nankin, p. 226; Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 64; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 81. Some sources say the Prince of Fu was executed in 1648. Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 33. The Qing government continued nevertheless to pay public honor to Ming imperial relatives. See, for example, Shizu shilü, 55a, 57–58a, and 25:297b; and also Zheng Kecheng, “Duoergun dui Manzu fengjianhua de gongxian,” p. 8; Wu Han, comp., Chaoxian Li chao shilü zhong de Zhongguo shiliao, p. 3735.
Amnesty

On June 19, Dodo ordered that a special edict from Dorgon be promulgated to the inhabitants of Jiangnan.\textsuperscript{218} The edict read:

Let the civilian and military officials, soldiers, and commoners of Henan, Nanjing, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Huguang know that when the Ming Chongzhen Emperor found himself in difficulty, when the tumuli and towers of the imperial city were ablaze, when the realm was shattered and the [reigning] house destroyed, all of your southern ministers did not send a single soldier, nor loose a single arrow, nor look a single bandit in the face. Instead, they hid in their holes like rats. That was the first crime.

Then, when our armies entered to exterminate the roving bandits who fled westward, even before you in the south had received definite news from the capital, and without a last [imperial] testament [to name an heir], you dared to set the Prince of Fu [upon the throne]. That was the second crime.

The roving bandits are your worst enemies. Yet you did not think to subdue and punish them. Rather, all your generals crowded together, jostling each other [to be the first] to ravage the good folk, to rebel capriciously and declare hostilities [upon each other]. That was the third crime.

It is these three crimes that have created universal anger in the empire, and that cannot be condoned by the law of the land. I have thus solemnly accepted the Mandate of Heaven, and so arrayed the six armies\textsuperscript{219} to subdue and punish the guilty. All civil and military officials in each locale who take the lead in surrendering their towns and territories will be meritoriously advanced one degree in rank. Those who obstinately [deny] the Mandate and do not submit will be massacred and their wives and children taken prisoner. If the Prince of Fu can repent his earlier faults and surrender before our army, then we should forgive his former crimes and treat him like all the other Ming dynastic princes. All those ministers in whom

\textsuperscript{218} The first part of the edict detailing the three great crimes of the Southern Ming loyalists actually formed part of an earlier manifesto, issued on November 23, when Dorgon appointed Dodo “Generalissimo to Pacify the Realm” (\textit{Ding guo dajiangjun}) and charged him with the conquest of the south. \textit{Shizu shilu}, 10:21b–22a.

\textsuperscript{219} This is an allusion to the Duke of Zhou’s campaign against the Shang.
the Prince of Fu personally confided but who soon realized that they must reform and tender allegiance [to the Qing] will also in turn be considered for promotion and employment.\textsuperscript{220}

In addition to the immediate promise of amnesty and the possibility of promotion and a bureaucratic rank, Dorgon’s edict—no doubt written by Li Wen—carried with it that unmistakable tone of resolve which seemed to convince so many during this period of the Manchus’ determination to rule the empire. Late Ming society was complex and ambiguous. Politics were confused and often treacherous. Alliances shifted and ideals were uncertain. The very tone of the Qing dynasty’s accession to power, expressed in edicts and rescripts like this, overcame much of the hesitation and vacillation that otherwise characterized this period. Despite the heavy-handed effort to play upon Ming officials’ guilt, the sheer self-confidence of the announcement persuaded many.

That same day, June 19, most of the officials of the Southern Ming court came to Prince Yu’s camp to register their names for posts in the new regime.\textsuperscript{221} Qian Qianyi and Wang Duo also prepared a public proclamation which was issued over Zhao Zhilong’s seal. It was primarily intended to justify their own collaboration and to encourage the peaceful surrender of others.

Since the Liao, Jin, and Yuan dynasties, [conquerors] have come in from the desert to rule China. Even though they have used the Way to punish those without the Way, none of them has failed to abandon the good by inciting disorder and by accusing [others of] crimes in order to wage war. But has there ever been one like the Great Qing which has raised armies to destroy the bandits and save us with righteousness, which has driven out of our central kingdom the outlaws who opposed heaven, which has taken revenge upon the mortal enemies of our former emperor, which has wiped away the disgrace and purged the evil, and which has an eminence surpassing [the great dynasties of] antiquity?\textsuperscript{222}

\textsuperscript{220} Wen Bing, \textit{Jiayi shian}, p. 181.
\textsuperscript{221} Ji, \textit{Mingji nanliu}, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{222} Wen Bing, \textit{Jiayi shian}, p. 185. See also Xu, \textit{Xiaotian jinian fukao}, p. 370; Ge Wanli, comp., \textit{Qian Muzhai xiansheng yishi ji nianpu}, pp. 27–28.
The obvious answer to that long rhetorical question was that none of the former conquest dynasties could be compared to the Qing. The Qing—the proclamation sycophantishly continued—had restored order to the capital, repaired the imperial tombs, appeased the emperor's spirit, assuaged his officials' grief, taken care of the royal family, brought peace to the masses, given work to civil servants, and continued the former system of government unchanged. When the Qing troops had entered the southern capital, the sun had suddenly shone forth in the heavens. The soldiers had been disciplined and restrained, and the people of the city were now free once more to gather together in the markets; "the armies of the san dai (three eras of classical antiquity) are to be seen here." Little wonder then that the officials of the southern capital had surrendered to this righteous force.

Jingnan (Huang Degong) has been overthrown, and our lord [the Prince of Fu] has been rescued and carried back to perform the ceremony of three reverences (san ke) [acknowledging his surrender to the Qing]. Of all our nobles and viceroys, who is not a loyal minister? Who is not a filial son? Know that the Mandate of Heaven has passed on. Know that the Great Enterprise [of the Ming] is over. Render allegiance and come over to the Mandate [of the Qing]. Preserve the lives of innumerable souls. This is what humane people and scholars of resolve have done, and this is what the truly great men will decide for themselves to do.  

Turning Coat

It was true, of course: almost all of the Southern Ming's officials had surrendered. In the disapproving words of the later Ming History:

The first year of Hongguang, second year of Shunzhi, fifth lunar month: In this month, when the southern capital fell, the multitude of civil and military officials welcomed [the enemy] and surren-

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223 Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 186. See also Xu, Xiaotian jinian fukao, p. 370; Ge, Qian Muzhai xiansheng, pp. 27–28.
dered in large numbers. Of all the senior officials, only the Minister of Justice, Gao Zhuo, died, killing himself by strangulation.\textsuperscript{224}

In addition to Gao Zhuo, there were six others (aside from some two or three anonymous suicides) known to have taken their lives.\textsuperscript{225} Those who did, like the National University student Wu Keji, did so out of shame over the degradation of defeat rather than because of their guilt over the betrayal of a living ruler (Fu, after all, had abandoned them). Wu, who hanged himself in the Guandi Temple in Nanjing, left a poem:

Disaster occurs as rulers and ministers flee.
When danger approaches they think only to save themselves.
I am committed to die for the state’s misfortune,
And ashamed to serve these northern barbarians.\textsuperscript{226}

Liu Chengzhi, the supervising secretary in the Ministry of Finance who had struck Zhao Zhilong with his fist when he saw him making preparations to surrender, was also dismayed by the iniquity of such cowardice in the face of danger. Bitterly observing the officials of the capital trooping out to Dodo’s encampment, he lamented to his wife that, “The country has been supporting scholars for three centuries. How can there not be a single person loyal and righteous enough to repay the bounty of those successive reigns?” Liu answered his own question by hanging himself in his home.\textsuperscript{227} Huang Duanbo, on the other hand, chose a more defiant martyr’s death. A protegé of Jiang Yueguang serving in the Ministry of Rites, Huang had sternly rejected one friend’s advice to dress up as an old monk and escape to the hills, and had ostentatiously refused to attend Prince Yu’s audience. The Manchu prince sent soldiers to bring Huang to him by force, but even then Huang refused to wear a hat or be politely obeisant in Dodo’s presence.

\textsuperscript{224} Ming shi, p. 4113. See also: Qian Surun, Nan zhong ji, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{225} Ji, Ming ji nanlue, p. 239; Gu, Sheng’an benji, p. 29; Gu Ling, Nan du sinan jilüe, passim; Qian, Nan zhong ji, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{226} Qian, Nan zhong ji, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{227} Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 215; Ming shi, p. 3093.
Dodo, who was said to have been impressed by Huang Duanbo's haughtiness, offered him a position. When Huang refused to accept it, Dodo asked him what kind of a ruler the Prince of Fu had been. "A sage ruler," responded Huang. On what basis had Huang decided this? "A son does not speak of a father's faults," Huang answered. Huang Duanbo even defended Ma Shiying to Dodo on the grounds that Ma, at least, had not surrendered to him: "Not to surrender is what it means to be worthy (xian)." In the end Huang was executed, but the tale of his stubborn independence was carefully preserved by historians eager to find some evidence of scholarly integrity when Nanjing fell.  

Loyalist historians also took pride in those Hongguang officials who continued to bear arms against the Manchus after Nanjing fell: men like Zhu Jizuo, who was killed in the service of the Prince of Lu, defending Xinghua (Fujian) against the Qing;  

like Jiang Ruolai, who later committed suicide when his military allies deserted to the Qing;  

like Shen Tingyang, who helped turn Chongming Island into a loyalist naval base and fought under the banners of Tang and Lu;  

like Guo Weijing, who was the Prince of Tang's

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228 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 215–216. Gong Tingxiang's death was another famous instance of suicide when Nanjing fell. A 1643 jinshi, he served as a bureau secretary in the Hongguang regime. In a letter to his son, who was asked to take care of Tingxiang's aged mother, the scholar mentioned that there was a lot of pressure on him to accept the Manchus, but that he could not do so and remain faithful to his loyalty to the "state's benevolence." Qian, Nan zhong ji, p. 110.  

229 Zhu was one of the men who helped compile the Sanchao yaoqian. Reinstated as a Hanlin compiler under the Chongzhen Emperor, he was put in charge of the Veritable Records. Serving as Minister of Rites in Nanjing before the fall of the northern capital, he was on his way to assume the same post under Hongguang when Dodo attacked. He became a grand secretary under the Prince of Tang and escaped to his home in Putian when Tang was captured. He mobilized soldiers for the Prince of Lu when the latter became Administrator of the Realm, and took over the city. He was killed when the Qing forces recaptured Putian. Ming shi, p. 3102.  

230 Jiang, from Jiangsu, escaped from Nanjing when it fell and organized naval resistance to the Manchus. He, Anhui tongzhi, p. 1556 (137:20b).  

231 A native of Chongming Island, Shen was a well known advocate of the maritime transport of grain who served as a bureau director in the Ministry of Finance. In 1643 he was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the National University. Under the Hongguang Emperor, Shen's maritime experience was put to
Minister of Personnel and War and who died defending Ganzhou; and like He Kai, who served as the Prince of Tang’s Minister of Finance and who died in disconsolation when Ganzhou fell in 1646. Yet in spite of such a panoply of loyalist heroes, the fact

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232 Guo Weijing, who was from Jiangxi, first attained fame in 1633 as a Nanjing censor when he attacked the appointment of Wen Tiren as Zhou Yanru’s successor. During the succession crisis after Chongzhen’s death, he had supported the Prince of Fu. After serving as an assistant censor-in-chief, Guo returned home when Nanjing fell and became a vice-minister of personnel under the Prince of Tang. When the Qing forces launched their attack on Ganzhou in June, 1646, the prince invested Guo Weijing as Regional Commander in Charge of Military Affairs for Huguang, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Fujian, and sent him to reinforce Yang Tinglin at the head of 8,000 troops. Guo Weijing hanged himself in a temple when Ganzhou fell. _Ming shi_, pp. 910, 3117.

233 The offspring of an hereditary military family in Ganzhou (Jiangxi), He Kai had passed his _jinshi_ examinations in 1625. Because he felt that Wei Zhongxian was disreputable, he refused to present himself as a candidate and returned home. During the Chongzhen reign he became a supervising secretary in the Office of Scrutiny of the Ministry of Justice, and impeached Yang Sichang. Transferred to Nanjing, he suffered a kind of exile there in the National University. However, after being repeatedly recommended by officials in Beijing, he was invited back to the northern capital, though not in time to reach there before its fall to Li Zicheng. The Prince of Fu placed He Kai in charge of currency regulations and named him a vice-minister of finance; however, he did not provide him with sufficient authority or information to function very effectively. After Nanjing fell, He Kai went to Hangzhou and then into Fujian where he became the Prince of Tang’s Minister of Finance. Because he did not get along with Zheng Zhilong, he requested permission to retire. On the way home, he was captured by bandits (perhaps sent by Zheng) who cut off one of his ears. When Ganzhou was taken by the Qing, He Kai fell into a profound depression and shortly after passed away. _Ming shi_, pp. 1012, 2865, 3104.
remained that almost all of the leading ministers then holding office in the Hongguang regime accepted the Qing occupation with alacrity when the city finally did fall.

One senses that the Manchus themselves privately held the Chinese in great contempt for turning coat. On the one hand, their conquest was served by willing collaboration; and men like Dodo were habile enough in the use of *ke hua* (polite talk) to persuade surrendering officials that their decisions would be respected and their persons honored. On the other, Manchu leaders displayed great admiration for the spirit of those who resisted their blandishments. Stories of men like Huang Duanbo soothed the feelings of Chinese, both then and later, who were embarrassed by the ease with which Nanjing was conquered, and the chronicles naturally emphasized the way in which the conquerors themselves paid deference to such bravery. But while some of these tales were, or may have been, concoctions—like the story of Shi Kefa’s interview with Dodo—there were examples enough of the Manchus’ grudging admiration for resisters and of their barely veiled contempt for those who too readily accepted their rule. Here, in a report from Dodo which briefly describes his rapid march south to capture Nanjing, we see in stark contrast to the richly detailed annals of loyalist martyrdom, a shockingly sparse account of the hopeless resistance at Yangzhou and an incisively curt enumeration of the humiliating surrenders at Nanjing.

Our army, on April 30, began its march from Guide prefecture, following the road from city to city. They saw the way the wind was blowing and surrendered. On the 8th we were 20 li from Sizhou. We crossed the Huai by night. On the 12th we set camp 20 li from Yangzhou’s walls. On the 13th we came right up to the city walls. We proclaimed an edict ordering the defenders of Yangzhou, Grand Secretary Shi Kefa and Hanlin Secretary Wei Yinwen, plus two tendants and four generals, to surrender. They refused. On the day of the 20th we seized their city. We captured Kefa and beheaded him. We also executed those who had held on to the city against our orders. On May 29 we reached the Yangzi River. We spread out across the north bank, and on the dawn of June 2nd crossed the river. On the 4th we heard that the spurious Prince of Fu had fled along with Ma Shiying and his chief eunuch. I ordered the *beile*
Hungba Tulu Nikan to pursue and seize him. On the 8th our army reached Nanjing. The Ming Earl of Xincheng, Zhao Zhilong, led the Duke of Weiguo, Xu Zhoujue; the Duke of Baoguo, Zhu Guobi; the Marquis of Longping, Zhang Gongri; the Marquis of Linhuai, Li Zushu; the Marquis of Huaining, Sun Weicheng; the Marquis of Lingbi, Tang Guozuo; the Marquis of Anyuan, Liu Zuochang; the Marquis of Yongkang, Xu Hongjue; the Marquis of Dingyuan, Deng Wenyou; the Earl of Xiancheng, Wei Yingjun; the Earl of Daxing, Zou Shunmeng; the Earl of Ningjin, Liu Yunji; the Earl of Nanhe, Fang Yiyuan; the Earl of Dongning, Jiao Mengxiong; the Earl of Ancheng, Zhang Guoai; the Earl of Luocheng, Huang Zhouding; the Earl of Cheng’an, Ke Yongzuo; the Imperial Son-in-Law Qi Zanyuan; Grand Secretary Wang Duo; Hanlin Members Cheng Zhengkui and Zhang Ju; Minister of Rites Qian Qianyi; Vice-Ministers of War Zhu Zhichen, Liang Yungou, and Li Chuo; Supervising Secretaries Du Youben, Lu Lang, Wang Zhijin, Xu Fanglai, and Zhuang Zejing; plus 16 officers of general rank, 1 officer of gubernatorial rank, and 55 officers of the rank of colonel; along with the officials and people from within the city to welcome us and to surrender. And lining our path also to welcome us and to surrender [before Nanjing fell] were Gao Yuanzhao, the son of the Earl of Xingping, Gao Jie; the Earl of Yongchong, Liu Liangzuo; Regional Commander Li Benshen; 23 generals including Hu Maozheng; Military Commissioners Zhang Jian and Ke Qifeng; 47 officers of the rank of colonel; and infantry and cavalry soldiers together numbering 238,000 men. Tea was served along with polite talk (ke hua).234

Listed in defeat, virtually the entire loyalist regime in Nanjing and most of its armies in the field thus surrendered to the enemy, providing their new overlords with the cadre and the troops for the further conquest of Jiangnan.

Outside the Southern Ming government, however, such ignominious defections so outraged literati who heard of the humiliating surrender that their own resolve to remain loyal to the memory of the previous dynasty was correspondingly strengthened. In a poem called “Ochre Mountain” (Zhe shan), the two loyalist martyrs Pan Chengzhang and Wu Yan wrote:

234 Dodo’s report is cited in Deng Zhicheng, Gudong suoji quanbian, p. 399.
Ruan and Ma shared the empire and all its lands in common. Bureaucrats filled the capital and flooded over its courts. But there was no place for the gold coaches and jade carriage. Yellow banners and purple canopies crossed the river, Going to Ochre Mountain, once so lofty and far away. Now it is bare rock, scorched by fierce flames. The dragon lantern lights the earth. Apes stand up to men, gibbering in rage. What use is it for us to indulge in talk of restoration? Yet though the ruler lost his realm, his grace we will return. Strangers have seized control, and sheep into tigers must turn.235

The craven spectacle of gentry collaboration, in short, stiffened gentry resistance.

235 Pan Chengzhang and Wu Yan, Jin Yue Fu, pp. 22b–33a. Pan and Wu were arrested and killed in July, 1663, in Hangzhou for being listed as assistant compilers of the Ming Shi Jilüe (Summary of Ming History) by Zhuang Tinglong. "Ochre Mountain" is a reference to the Shi ji where the defoliation of a mountain is described as making it zhe (Morohashi, Dai Kanwa Jiten, 37017.16). This poem was proscribed during the Qianlong literary inquisition and republished in 1912, after the Manchus were overthrown.
CHAPTER EIGHT

The Jiangnan Resistance Movement

Even before the armies of the Great Qing had arrived, the ruler and his ministers had each fled, and the military commanders had escaped or surrendered. The unification of the empire under the Great Qing was only a matter of time. At this point for one or two literati to lead village bumpkins against a force so ineluctable was like a lamb throwing its flesh before the tiger, or like a praying mantis trying to stop a chariot with its feelers. Though a million could thus be assembled like crows, what use was it? We may feel compassion for their courage, but let us not speak of their chances for success.

Ji Liuqi, Mingji nanlue, p. 252.

The Qing officials who took over the administration of Nanjing from the Southern Ming officials who had welcomed them found the city hardly able to support itself, let alone a huge military host of occupation. The new governor of Jiangning (Nanjing), Mao Jiuhua, reported to Beijing that:

When we changed the [southern] capital into a provincial [seat of administration] it was as if we were founding [an entirely new city]. Ninety percent of the houses were empty, the treasuries and granaries were cleaned out, and arrangements were nearly impossible.¹

¹ Memorial dated December, 1645, Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 6th ben, cited in Xie Guozhen, ed., Qingchu nongmin qi yi ziliao jilu, pp. 128–129. Although several Qing court officials thought that it would be a good idea to maintain a south-
The authorities were able to rent local dwellings to garrison their troops in the northern and eastern sections of the city, which were cordoned off; but it was extremely difficult to find forage for the army’s livestock, which grazed on fields outside of Nanjing. Within a short time, the herds of horses accompanying the Manchu and Han banner armies had eaten down nearly to bare ground for 60 li around the city, and the cavalry was threatened with a loss of mounts.²

At the same time, the Qing officials had to maintain the large number of soldiers formerly enrolled in the Southern Ming army who had now surrendered. The Southern Ming garrison amounted at the time to 72 wei, which represented several hundred officers and thousands of men. In addition, numerous other units had surrendered: a total of 23 brigade commanders, 47 lieutenant commanders, 86 battalion commanders, and 238,000 troops. Dodo thus had to find provisions for approximately one-quarter of a million northern soldiers.³ As Hong Chengchou reported, each of these Ming soldiers, barracked either outside the Zhaoyang or Taiping gate, had been enrolled as a regular Qing recruit and allotted one picul of grain per month. Yet these food supplies would soon run out, and at that point the new regime would have to consider whether or not the soldiers could be demobilized. In one sense, therefore, the surrendering Ming army constituted a liability. The
erm capital in Nanjing, like the Ming, Chen Mingxia argued vigorously to the contrary. Dorgon agreed with Chen, and Nanjing was made a provincial capital. Although its name changed thereafter to Jiangning, the city is still referred to by its original designation, “Southern Capital.” Zheng Kecheng, “Duoergun dui Manzu fengjianhua de gongxian,” p. 11. The imperial area of Nanzhili was officially changed into the province of Jiangnan. In 1647 there would be a governor-generalship for Jiangnan, Jiangxi, and Henan, with the viceroy’s headquarters situated at Nanjing. After 1649, Henan was detached from his control, and Nanjing was named a zhufang (garrison town). Le P. Louis Gaillard, Nankan d’alors et d’aujourd’hui, pp. 238–242.
2 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 128–129.
soldiers could not be released and sent home until sufficient order had been restored to guarantee that they would not return to arms. Yet, to keep them in uniform was to impose a major financial drain upon the resources of the new government. And, unlike the soldiers of the “Guardian Generals” who proved so important in the conquest of Jiangnan and the region farther south, many of these soldiers were of little worth to their Qing commanders. There was, first of all, a superfluity of officers, many of whom had padded their rosters: too many generals and not enough privates. Second, the soldiers who corresponded to the names on the roster were not disciplined fighters and seemed better prepared to swagger through a cowed civilian population than actually to fight on the battlefield: “they were unwilling to share defense duties while simply loving violence.”

Paradoxically, therefore, the Manchu conquerors had a plethora of soldiers on their hands, yet at the same time lacked sufficient disciplined troops to easily control the lower Yangzi region. The presence of professional soldiers, like Li Chengdong’s men, had turned the tide of victory in their direction; but now that battlefield troops had become an occupation force, the Qing officials responsible for governing Jiangnan were keenly aware of the danger of their warlord allies plundering and abusing the civilian population. Making allowance for the servile rhetoric of Mao Jiuhua (“The people were agitated and disturbed, never knowing if they would live through the day and so looked toward our Grand Army, as one watches a rainbow among the clouds”), we can still discern in his reports to Beijing the authorities’ concern over the

4 Of course, this was not true in every case. Colonel Gao Jinku, for example, proved to be a very valuable officer after he surrendered to Dodo. A native of Shaanxi, he was later to lead 3,000 men in the offensive against Ganzhou. Afterwards, under Hong Chengchou’s general command, Gao campaigned against Li Chengdong in Guangdong, where he was promoted to general and put in charge of military affairs for Gaozhou and Leizhou in 1652. Er chen zhuany, 7:3-4a.

5 Memorial dated October 8, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 2nd ben, p. 170.

6 For doubts about Dodo’s ability to control Jiangnan alone, see Li Guangtao, “Hong Chengchou bei Ming shimo,” p. 252.
way in which "local roughnecks have begun robbing and looting everywhere." If their occupation was to succeed, after such a stunning military victory, then the Qing overlords would have to avoid simple military responses, such as loosing scourges like Liu Liangzuo or Li Chengdong's army to wreak havoc upon the peasantry. They would have to rely instead upon peaceful measures, and especially upon the willingness of the local gentry to collaborate with them in order to avoid further mayhem. Such was the brunt of their propaganda, and consequently the main force of the Manchus' claim to legitimacy.

7 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 128–129. Memorial dated December, 1645.

8 There was an entirely different option, of course, which the Qing government contemplated briefly but did not employ. That was to take the very opposite course and side with the dispossessed in Jiangnan, instead of offering to support the local elite. There was thus some talk at court of the possibility of equalizing landholding (jun tian) by confiscation and reapportionment. Opponents of the scheme argued that this might be possible in the north, but that it would not work in the south where the population pressure on land was much greater. They claimed that their calculations showed that in Songjiang, for instance, equalization of landholding would only increase the individual agriculturalist's property by a minuscule amount. Liu Chongri, "Mingmo 'juntian' kouhao zhiyi de zhiyi," p. 120.

9 The Manchus originally made much of their mission to "take revenge upon the enemies of the ruler-father in place [of the son]" (dai bao jun fu zhi chou). This slogan was very effective in the north, but it did not seem plausible in the south, as one impetuous shengyuan told Dodo in Nanjing: "After the Chuang bandits attacked our northern capital, you claimed to be taking revenge on the enemy for us. The bandits never once attacked the southern capital, so what have you come here for? Before, the Chuang were our enemy. Now, you are the enemy." Gu Cheng, "Lun Qingchu shehui mao dun," p. 144. The Qing forces therefore had to devise new justifications for their presence. This task was carried out by one of Dorgon's Chinese secretaries, Peng Mingjiao, who stressed the harmful effects which the loyalists' military activities were having on the civil population. Peng wrote: "All of the generals of the Ming dynasty rushed together to prey upon the good people who spontaneously revolted. This being a cause to raise troops, we arrayed our six armies and condemned [the Ming generals] to mortal punishment." The term "six armies" refers to an
Ready at hand were the officials who had surrendered Nanjing to Dodo: above all, Qian Qianyi himself.\(^{10}\) Liu Rusi, Qian's wife, was strongly opposed to his serving the Qing government. She pleaded with him to reconsider his decision, to observe some sense of propriety and follow the path of righteousness by refusing to collaborate with the enemy.\(^{11}\) Although he was angered by this advice, Qian was clearly ambivalent about his own choice of a new master; when he saw the Hongguang Emperor captive in Dodo's tent, he burst into tears and threw himself upon the ground in front of his former monarch, barely able to rise again.\(^{12}\) But he could comfort himself with the thought that only if ministers like himself were willing to compromise by collaborating would other Chinese be protected. This meant on the one hand believing that his surrender enabled him to defend fellow literati suspected of loyalist activities; and on the other, thinking that the price of non-violent pacification was his own honor.\(^{13}\) Qian and many of the other southern literati who collaborated with their conquerors justified their expediency in such terms, arguing that under these circumstances, some of them had to incur the momentary moral opprobrium of their peers in order to protect them later on. Qian

earlier emperor's righteously punitive expedition. See *The Mencius, Gaozi*, 2.7.2.
10 Kunshan yimin ningren Gu Yanwu (Wen Bing), *Sheng'an benji (Jiayi shian)*, p. 184 (hereafter cited as Wen Bing, *Jiayi shian*).
12 Ge, *Qian Muzhai*, p. 21.
13 Qian Qianyi did later keep loyalists out of difficulties with the government. For instance, he helped Huang Zongxi secure the release of the Zhejiang loyalist General Wang Yi from prison. S. K. Lao, “The Split within the Tunglin Movement and Its Consequences,” p. 36; Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, p. 179. (This may be why there is a laudatory biography of Qian Qianyi in Huang's works, although the piece is mainly about Qian's Buddhist activities.) Moreover, in 1655, when Gu Yanwu was being tried for the murder of his family servant, Gu actually appealed through a friend for Qian Qianyi's aid. Qian did help get Gu Yanwu out of jail. See p. 879.
might be openly insulted by some self-righteous loyalists, but he could always console himself with the thought that, thanks to his own willingness to suffer shame, unnecessary bloodshed was avoided and many lives were spared. For Qian, this mixture of shame and pride translated itself into an obsession to make "the peaceful surrender of Jiangnan his personal responsibility." Sending his private secretary, Zhou Quan, to Dodo to tell him that the people of Wu were customarily compliant and could easily be pacified without recourse to arms, Qian Qianyi began giving the Manchu prince the names of literati who could be trusted to serve as pacification commissioners for Jiangnan.

14 Ge, Qian Muzhai, p. 28. This sense of personal martyrdom also characterized collaborators in Vichy France, and even Pétain himself. During his trial before the High Court, Pétain said: "I made France the gift of my person, and at this supreme moment, let no one doubt that I made a sacrifice." Paul Farmer, Vichy Political Dilemma, p. 347. Perhaps Lü Liuliang was alluding to the same sense of personal difficulty just before he formally forfeited his own Qing shengyuan degree in 1666 when he wrote: "I now know that keeping my life by moral compromise is difficult. And I now realize that starving to death is easy." T. S. Fisher, "Accommodation and Loyalism, Part Two, Lü Liu-liang's Early Years," p. 136. Collaboration—as the case of Vichy showed—is often morally and legally ambiguous, since the course of future development is almost always a matter of conjecture. Not only must one ponder whether Pétain and Laval's decisions were legally a crime rather than a mistake; the historian must also refrain from making moral judgments solely on the basis of the hindsight that dooms Vichy to eventual defeat. Furthermore, as Otto Kirchheimer points out for cases rather more like China at this time (i.e., Holland, Norway, and Belgium under German military occupation, where the relationship between foreign invaders and quislings was relatively straightforward), there can still be many borderline cases, especially among lower-ranking officials. "Where, for instance, is the line between merely keeping office in order to administer to the current needs of the population, and action which implicitly involves recognition of the invader's title? What is the form and style of obedience which reflects acknowledgment of the power of coercion but avoids any move toward helping to transform naked power into authority? Many a contemporary would be happy to know the answer." Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice, pp. 315-316.

15 Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 187.
Beginning on June 12, 1645, over three hundred former Ming officials were named to Jiangnan posts, and the lists of administrative officers were headed by men who belonged to the factions either of Zhao Zhilong or Qian Qianyi. Among them were Liu Guangdou, assistant minister of the Grand Court of Revision; Censor Wang Yang; and Huang Jiazi, vice-minister of the Court of State Ceremonial. They in turn contacted key gentry leaders in urban centers throughout Jiangnan. Armed with a slogan specially chosen by Qian Qianyi—"Heaven consents that the people belong to [the reigning dynasty]" (Tian yu ren gui)—they promised to prevent the deaths of tens of thousands of Han Chinese at the hands of Qing soldiers, provided the local gentry could guarantee that the population would cooperate by peacefully turning over the tax and population registers to representatives of the new government. As envoys were sent to key prefectural centers like Suzhou and Songjiang to collect the registers, a deliberate appeal was made by Qian Qianyi and his collaborators to the joint social responsibilities that they shared with the gentry of Jiangnan to preserve public order. In Shanghai, for instance, where the coastal villages were being pillaged by the pirate Pan Fu, the officials who took over administration for the Qing explicitly pointed out to the local elite of the region that the new order demanded cooperative self-policing. Assembling the elders and clan heads, the Qing collaborators bluntly insisted that their public duty was to turn over to the authorities those who would flourish and fester on disorder.

18 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "Localism and Loyalism during the Ch'ing Conquest of Kiangnan," p. 54; Xie Guozhen, Nanning shilū, pp. 76–77; Wen Bing, Jiayi shian, p. 185. A good example of the pride taken by collaborators in their ability to effect a peaceful takeover without harming civilians can be found in the biography of Ma Hongliang in the provincial gazetteer. Ma, from Hubei, had been a secretary on Hong Chengchou's staff before becoming prefect of Chizhou in Jiangnan. During his tenure as prefect, he managed to keep the Qing military commander, Yu Yongsui, from moving in forces to wipe out local resisters. Ma's "soothing" methods, the gazetteer states, helped save the lives of tens of thousands of people. Huang Zhijun, Jiangnan tongzhi, 117: 10b–11a.
“The good shepherd begins by cutting out the bad ones from the flock. The good administrator begins by excising infections among the people.”

Gentry Ambivalence

To a certain degree all members of the local elite shared the same interest in imposing public order. Yet, while there was a definite class concern in maintaining law and order through active cooperation with the new government, the gentry also preserved its own tradition of devout loyalism to the previous dynasty, which had granted the degrees conferring social status upon its members in the first place.

One way of expressing this loyalty, and at the same time of dissolving the contradiction between social interest and personal commitment, was by taking one’s life. As Jiangnan was the region par excellence of scholar-officials, so was it the area where an unusually large number of people committed suicide in 1644. Hundreds of

19 Ibid., 114:3a. Shanghai had surrendered to Wang Shizhuo, a former Ming official and native of the city. Chu Hua, Hucheng heikao, 3:2.
20 Miyazaki Ichisada, “Mindai So-Shō chihō no shidaifu to minshū,” p. 29. The credo of loyalty to one’s ruler was intensified by Ming fundamentalists like Shen Lian (1507–1557) who believed that the relationship between an emperor and an official was analogous to the natural hierarchy between Heaven and Earth. Shen Lian, Qingxia ji, 250:8–10. For eremitic loyalism in particular, especially after the Song philosophers exalted zhong, see Frederick W. Mote, “Confucian Eremits and the Yuan Period,” pp. 209–212, 234–235; Rolf Trauzettel, “Sung Patriotism as a First Step Toward Chinese Nationalism,” p. 202; Chang Chi-yun, “The Origin of Loyalists in Chinese History,” pp. 26–27.
21 If modern statistics are any guide, Chinese males on the whole were not likelier to commit suicide than males of most other countries. Male suicide rates in the 20th century in Taiwan were actually lower than male suicide rates in the United States, Germany, Japan, and Sweden. Women, on the other hand, committed suicide at roughly the same rate as men in Taiwan, which is contrary to the pattern in other countries where the male rate of suicide is usually three or four times as high as the female rate. (See the table in Margery Wolf, “Women and Suicide in China,” p. 117.) Judging from this qualitative evi-
local notables took their lives—by drowning, by starvation, by incineration, by hanging—when they heard of the death of the Chongzhen Emperor. A typical entry in the provincial gazetteer reads:

Xu Yan, zi Yuzhong, was a first-degree graduate from Changzhou. He was terribly grieved by the news in 1644 that the bandits had seized the capital. Then, when the announcement of the emperor’s death arrived, he threw himself into the Xu River. His relatives rushed to save him, but he subsequently committed suicide by refusing to eat. He left a poem, which read: “This loyal soul cries out an oath in front of Heaven’s gate: / Let the Spirit Armies drive out that bandit stench.”

Occasionally an entire family would commit suicide in this way. One relative would kill himself, and then the added grief over the death of a father, brother, or son would spread contagiously to the others, who then killed themselves for both private and public reasons at once. In one case, thirteen family members committed suicide in this fashion. Often, a strong-willed patriarch would ordain immolation, sometimes by locking the entire household inside its compound and setting the home on fire. In one incident at Huating, an obsessed scholar-official drove sixteen family members to take their lives by jumping, one after the other, into the household well. In the end, he threw himself upon the heap of corpses and died.

Collective suicides also occurred outside families. A particularly ardent scholar might decide to take his life, and his example would then inspire others. When a young Changzhou zhusheng named Xu Wangjia heard of the emperor’s death, he dressed himself in his
dence, the suicide rates of degree-holding Chinese, i.e., Ming and Qing gentrymen, must have been among the highest of any social group in the world.

22 See, e.g., Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 117:10b; 153:17a, 29, 30b; 154:19a, 24a; 158:21b; and Zhang Qijun et al., eds., Quanjiao xianzhi, p. 704; Huang Zongxi, Nanlei wending, qian, 5:4a.
23 Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 153:16b.
24 Ibid., 153:20b.
graduate's robes and threw himself into the river; others quickly followed suit.  

26 Sometimes, the gentleman’s death was quite measured. One well known literatus, hearing that Li Zicheng had seized the capital, put on his Confucian robes and refused to eat another bite of food. Friends and relatives, colleagues and students, dropped by during the days that followed, respectfully sitting around the solemn old scholar who said not a single word as he slowly died.

27 Others, in a more impulsive and grandiose way, rushed to the nearest Confucian temple, either to burn their scholar’s robes ceremoniously, or to write a line of verse, celebrating their loyalty, on the wall of the shrine before committing suicide.

28 The recorded deaths, with a few rare exceptions, were all of members of the gentry. Such determined duty to a fallen dynasty was, clearly, the burden of social rank and not just a matter of personal conscience.

Although individuals were sometimes kept from committing suicide because they were concerned about surviving parents who had to be cared for, self-inflicted death was not ethically ambiguous as such. To become a military loyalist and actually resist Qing rule with force, on the other hand, exposed members of the gentry to certain kinds of political and moral compromise. Inasmuch as loyalists resisted central authority, they were easily confused with rebels. At the same time, they attracted the very kinds of disorderly elements into their ranks that members of the gentry most feared. Time and again, loyalist literati found themselves in the

26 Ibid., 153:17a.
27 Ibid., 154:8.
28 Ibid., 153:17a; 154:5a.
29 For the example of the death of a woodcutter, see Ibid., 153:16a. One minor local clerk who decided to take his life when Li Zicheng captured Beijing told a friend, “I may not be a member of the gentry, but am I not at least an official of this dynasty?” Ibid., 155:20b.
30 Many more members of the Jiangnan gentry committed suicide when Beijing fell than when the Nanjing regime was defeated. For a few examples of the latter suicides, see Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 153:16, 10b–21a; 154:3. There were also numerous examples of eremitism in Jiangnan at the time. See, e.g., Ibid., 154:19a; 157:11a; 163:43a; 165:45b; 168:10b, 27a.
midst of a band of men whose social values they hardly shared, and whose choice of means they could not condone.\textsuperscript{31}

The Qing authorities obviously liked to emphasize the dubious social background of the loyalist rank-and-file, although officials were perfectly aware of the distinction between robbery and rebellion.\textsuperscript{32} Government documents routinely referred to loyalists as “bandits” or “robbers,” and Qing officials often accused gentry loyalist leaders of throwing in their lot with underworld hooligans. Loyalists sometimes had an answer to this. One Guangdong scholar born of an official family was asked by a Qing magistrate after his arrest: “If your father was a prefect and you are a licentiate, then how could you turn into a bandit?” The loyalist, Ma Yingfang—who had helped organize a cohort of bandits for the Cantonese loyalist leader Chen Bangyan—did not try to deny that he had been involved with a band of cutthroats.\textsuperscript{33} Rather, he responded: “Scholars have empty fists. Wen Tianxiang summoned together the Man barbarians of the mountains. Yue Fei joined magical legions under his banner. Do you not call them righteous leaders?”\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} “Nanyuan xiaoke,” \textit{Ping Wu shilüe}, p. 114; David Harrison Shore, “Last Court of Ming China,” pp. 61–62. For a thoughtful discussion of the conflict between the gentry’s (\textit{shidaifù}) wish to be the champion of the common people and its fear of class conflict, see Miyazaki, “Mindai So-Shō chihō,” pp. 27–28.
\item \textsuperscript{32} After 1646 the government insisted that local officials deliver full and detailed reports of their investigations after incidents of social disorder. One of the crucial points of such investigations was to determine whether or not there had been a \textit{jibian} (incitement to revolt), since that distinguished a loyalist conspiracy from mere banditry devoid of political content. See, for example, \textit{Ming-Qing shiliao, jia}, 2, cited in Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, p. 122.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Chen Bangyan had written up special militia regulations for the Canton delta. He wanted three-fifths of the guards and all the officers to be outsiders in order to prevent local residents from exploiting their positions in the militia force. Shore, “Last Court,” p. 63.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Qu Dajun, \textit{Huang Ming sichao chengren lu}, 10:359a. The Cantonese loyalist regime of Su Guansheng, who had served as the Prince of Tang’s Grand Secretary, employed the services of the infamous \textit{si xing} (four surnames): pirate clans whose amusement was to drape the intestines of hapless passersby over
\end{itemize}
The times did call for men like Ma Yingfang: zealous scholars who were knowledgeable enough about the martial arts to lead marketplace toughs and swords-for-hire.\(^{35}\) Sometimes, such leaders were on the margin of outlawry themselves. One of the leaders of the July, 1645, resistance to the Qing forces at Jiaxing in northeastern Zhejiang, for instance, was an unemployed zhusheng named Zhang Shu’an, who was fond of liquor, quick to take offense, and constantly at the head of the various xiang dang (village bands) that fought over crop and property rights on the eve of the conquest. Zhang’s life was offensive, nay threatening to those around him; but nevertheless he would be honored after his death for refusing to evade arrest after his local forces had been routed.\(^{36}\) Even at higher levels of rural resistance, where many different local contingents had to be brought together, there were needed individuals who had both the intellectual authority to harmoniously unite disparate coteries of scholars, and the physical presence to coolly approach underworld elements and recruit them as mercenaries.

\(^{35}\) As Yan Ermei’s letter to Shi Kefa demonstrated (see chapter 7), the 16th and 17th centuries saw a revival of the ideal of the xia (knight) who redresses wrong, not lacking the courage (yong) “to see what is right and do it.” (Analects 2.24.) This was accompanied by a growing interest in the martial arts. For example, Sun Lin (Fang Yizhi’s brother-in-law) was an expert archer and horseman who learned the martial arts, carried a crossbow, and wore a short robe instead of a long scholar’s gown. Willard J. Peterson, Bitter Gourd, pp. 85–88. The notion of unstinting righteousness was also associated with the Taizhou school of Wang Yangming Confucianism. The iconoclastic Li Zhi, praising the heroic deeds of the 108 warriors in Water Margin, wrote: “Fidelity and justice (zhong yi) are the prime desiderata in serving one’s sovereign and in intercourse with friends. Lacking these qualities, a man, though he breathes, is dead; his words, though elegant, will perish.” Richard Gregg Irwin, The Evolution of the Chinese Novel, p. 86.

\(^{36}\) Zha Jizuo, Guo shou lu, p. 73.
One of the key figures in the Guangdong resistance of 1646, for instance, was the Ming juren and former ministry secretary Li Sui-quiet. The annals of Cantonese loyalty are filled with references to one person after another recommended for service by Li, who himself belonged to four prestigious literary circles in the province: the Poetry Club of the Southern Garden (Nan yuan shishe), the Panyu district literary circle centered around Luo Binwang, the Literary Club (Wenshe), and the Poetry Club of White Cloud Mountains (Baiyun shan shishe). Just as Li Suiqiu brought many different circles of scholars together in defense of the Prince of Tang, so did he personally recruit reinforcements for Su Guansheng's defense of southern Jiangxi from among the Cantonese river pirates of Luo Mingshou, dying together with them when Ganzhou fell on October 6, 1646.

In fact, it was quite common for a loyalist scholar "leading" a resistance movement suddenly to become aware that the men he had gathered were really no more than outlaws, living off the people, looting because they had no other way of getting supplies. When Yang Tingshu was asked by the Lake Tai loyalists to join their uprising, he asked them how they would get their supplies. "From the people," they responded. "In that case," Yang said, "you are bandits. What has that to do with righteousness (yi)?" 

In these two different instances we see the ambivalence of the gentry toward the very elements most likely to join a loyalist movement. On the one hand, because "scholars have empty fists," the imperatives of fidelity and righteousness dictated a union with the lower orders. Yet on the other hand, literati soon ruefully realized that those very same kinds of outlaws and bandits "looked down upon learned scholars," and did not cherish the same social scruples which they held dear. Were it not for the imperatives of

37 Chen Botao, Sheng chao Yuedong yimin lu si yuan, 1:1a–b, 15–20b, 47.
38 Huang, Xing chao lu, 6:2; Chen Botao, comp., Dongguan xianzhi, 62:6b–7a.
40 Dennerline, "Massacre," pp. 34–35. Yang was Hou Tongzeng's cousin. For the readiness of the Suzhou shidaiju (gentry) to designate the Lake Tai loyalists "lake bandits" (hu kou) once they began to attract poor peasants by appealing to their egalitarianism, see Miyazaki, "Mindai So-Shō chihō," pp. 29–31.
41 Chen Zilong, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia, p. 4.
loyalism, then, the idealized responsibility of members of the gentry to serve as protectors of the peasants would in principle dispose them against an alliance with outlaws whom they usually identified as the predators of settled agrarian society. And because many local notables felt this responsibility keenly, they were quite vulnerable to the new government’s appeals to avoid putting themselves and their charges in a situation in which banditry could flourish. At the same time, of course, the gentry realized the peasants’ capacity for social violence, especially in an area like Jiangnan where there was such a high potential at this time for conflict between the upper and lower classes in an increasingly differentiated society.

Jiangnan’s Economic Differentiation

The commercialization of agriculture during the middle and late Ming had been accompanied by the creation of a correspondingly complex and restless social landscape. Economically, new kinds of farming opportunities presented themselves in Jiangnan, as landowners and tenants shifted from subsistence grain crops to cotton planting, fishpond cultivation, citrus groves, mulberry or-

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43 Nishimura Kazuyo, “Mindai no doboku,” p. 43. Guo Songyi has argued that in spite of experiencing the serf and tenant uprisings of 1644–1645, the landlords of Jiangnan were less willing to accept Manchu domination in exchange for class support because they had not directly faced the much more tempestuous peasant rebellions of the north. He also points out that the gentry of Jiangnan underestimated the power of the Qing forces, partly because it had come to believe the rhetoric of its own “righteous literati,” who blamed the fall of the Nanjing regime on Ma Shiying’s strategic shortsightedness rather than attributing it to the overwhelming strength of the enemy. Guo Songyi, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji yu Qing chu zhongyang jiquan de maodun ji qi fazhan he bianhua,” pp. 122–124. But see also Joshua A. Fogel, trans., “Shantung in the Shun-chih Reign,” part 1, p. 24; Miyazaki, “Mindai So-Shô chihô,” p. 28.
chards, and tea plantations. New farm management techniques developed, often involving the use of hired or servile labor. These new forms of managerial farming required more capital investment, especially for irrigation, and tended to concentrate the land

45 The development of finely lustered silk weaving in Puyuan (Tongxiang county) in the late 16th century, as well as the continuing spread of cotton cultivation in Jiaxing after 1583 when most of the inhabitants' grain taxes were commuted into silver payments, basically altered the rural economy of the Lake Tai area between Hangzhou and Suzhou. According to Chin Shih, a new form of peasant life emerged. "In the past, the livelihood of the poor in the village, including tenant farmers, hired laborers and serfs, depended mainly on the cultivation of land and landlords, particularly those of influential gentry landlords. The poor cultivated the land for the landlords. They spun and wove for the landlords. They also engaged in commercial activities for the landlords. The poor were neither the suppliers of market goods nor the main consumers of market goods. Commerce functioned primarily for marketing the goods owned by the landlords and supplying the material needs of the landlords. The new peasant lifestyle, however, was characterized by the direct participation of the villagers in the market economy. Their productive activities were no longer monopolized by the landlords. They also began to seek profits eagerly in order to improve their own standard of living. The products of their family by-employment became an indispensable source of market goods. At the same time, the source of their family incomes shifted from a complete dependence on agriculture and landlords to a shared reliance on landlords and family by-employment. This shift indicated a gradual emergence of economic independence of peasant livelihood from landlords and agriculture." Chin Shih, "Peasant Economy and Rural Society in the Lake Tai area, 1368–1840," ch. 5, p. 1; see also ch. 4, p. 16, and ch. 6, pp. 2–3. For the spread of cotton and tobacco cultivation in the late Ming (smoking was forbidden in 1639, and a literatus' servant was executed for ignoring the ban in the capital in 1640), see Xie Guozhen, Mingdai shehui jingji shiliao xuanbian, pp. 47, 66–67.

46 Fu Yiling, Mingdai Jiangnan shimin jingji shitan, pp. 63–65. Fu Yiling has discovered instances of some large landlords having orchards of as many as 100,000 mulberry trees in the Huzhou area. These plantations, which dated from the Wanli period, were divided into fields of 20 mu. Each field required the continuous labor of three people, at a total annual cost of 8 taels. The contracts that remain stipulate that the mulberry leaves had to be sold, i.e., the field hands could not engage in sericulture themselves. Fu Yiling, Ming-Qing nongquan shehui jingji, pp. 69–71. There appears to be a connection between the shortage of rural free labor, attracted to urban employment by its higher wages during the late 16th century, and the increased dependence of gentry
itself in the hands of managerial landlords. However, the cost of improved agricultural technology was by no means the sole, or even main, cause of land concentration. Once a farming family managed to become a “wealthy household” (and this was often by means of commerce or public office), it was much more capable of protecting its holdings from taxation than less influential lineages. This was especially important during the latter part of the Ming period when taxes in Jiangnan grew very burdensome. As the landlords upon male serfs to cultivate the fields and female servants to weave cloth. Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 2, pp. 9–12. For the effect of these agricultural changes on tenancy contracts, see Hilary J. Beattie, Land and Lineage in China, p. 14.

47 Koyama Masaki, “Minmatsu Shinsho no dai tochi shoyū,” part 1, pp. 5–9; Furushima Kazuo, “Minmatsu Chōkō deruta ni okeru jinushi keiei,” pp. 15–20. Jiangnan was especially noted during the Ming period for developing better irrigation devices. These pumps, and the irrigation ditches that fed them, were expensive to acquire and maintain. Therefore, as local sources for the late Ming point out, the farther one got from the riverside, where irrigation was cheaper, the more likely one was to find the large estates (zhuang) of the wealthy (fu hu). Fu Yiling, Ming-Qin Jindai changren ji shangye ziben, p. 15. Note, however, that during the early Ming wealthy middle-range landlords and landowners were likely to own the land along most creeks, the dikes (yu) of which they repaired themselves as resident liangzhang (tax chiefs). Hamashima Atsutoshi, “Gyōshoku tenriki kō,” pp. 118–125; Koyama Masaki, “Mindai no ryōchō ni tsuite,” pp. 26–27. Seventeenth-century contemporaries probably over-estimated the size of landholdings. Most large landowners owned about 2,000 mu of arable fields. The combined holdings of those who owned 500 mu or more could have exceeded 25% of the arable land, representing a small segment of the population, probably close to 500 households, in each county. Ray Huang, Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China, p. 158; Beattie, Land and Lineage, p. 13; Christian Murck, “Chu Yun-ming and Cultural Commitment in Su-chou,” p. 24.

48 One of the most common ways of avoiding paying taxes was enabled by the fact that the taxable fiscal mu was not tied to the standard mu. When the land changed hands, unscrupulous dealers changed the amount of fiscal acreage with which that piece of land was rated. If the seller were the stronger party then he would transfer much of the property’s tax liability onto the land that he was selling so that his remaining unsold acreage was very lightly assessed. Beattie, Land and Lineage, p. 64.

49 Of the empire’s total grain tribute (an average of 4,000,000 piculs per annum), Nanzhili provided 1,800,000 or about 45%. Within that region Suzhou pre-
area’s total tax burden increased, those households that had the local political influence to do so falsely registered their lands under gentry names or under different lijia (tithing) units. In 1567, the governor of Southern Zhili memorialized that in the four prefectures of Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, and Jinjiang, 1,995,470 mu of land were held in false custody, and 3,315,560 mu were divided artificially among different tithings. These tax-exempt farming enterprises were obviously much better equipped to cope with climatic fluctuations. During the 1589 drought in Jiaxìng, for instance, over half of the area’s farmers either left the land or else turned over their holdings to wealthy households and became their “guests” or tenant farmers. More and more land was becoming concentrated in the hands of wealthy landlord families.

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fecture provided 790,000 piculs, or 17% of the imperial total; and Songjiang was assessed 230,000 piculs or about 6%. Thus, as far as the quota of tribute grain was concerned, the two prefectures of Suzhou and Songjiang provided an average of 23%, or nearly one-quarter, of the taxes of that kind paid by the entire country of China. This extraordinarily heavy burden was initially alleviated by commutation. After 1436, the grain taxes had partly been converted into silver payments. Across the empire, in fact, 14% of the grain tax was paid in silver. In the Su-Song area, 37% of the tax—a much larger portion than elsewhere—was converted into silver payments, which were calculated at an exchange rate of grain into cash of one picul to 0.25 taels of fine silver. The actual market price of grain then was much higher than that, so the real tax burden of Su-Song landowners was relatively light. In the sixteenth century, partly because of the massive amounts of silver imported from Japan and New Spain, the currency deflated and the rate began to climb steeply in favor of grain, so that eventually it took an entire tael (ounce) of silver to pay taxes equivalent to one picul of grain. Ray Huang, “The Grand Canal during the Ming Dynasty,” pp. 72–78.

50 Taniguchi Kikuo, “Peasant Rebellions in the Late Ming,” p. 60. Officials on active service and in retirement were exempted from corvée, as were those persons who bought or acquired the status of Imperial University students. In principle the corvée (ding) exemption and the land tax (fu) exemption were not interchangeable. In practice they often were. Huang, Taxation, p. 123.


52 Fu, Shangren ji shangye, p. 16; Xu Daling, “Shilun Ming houqi de Donglin dang ren,” pp. 3–4; Linda Grove and Joseph W. Esherick, “From Feudalism
Many of these landowners were also members of the official elite, which used its corvée exemptions to protect its properties from taxation. In the competition for rural resources, this social stratum—which in the late 16th century was called xiangshen (local gentry)—displaced the old tax chiefs (liangzhang) who had in the early Ming been made responsible for collecting taxes, allocating corvée, administering justice, and supervising irrigation works. After the tax reforms of Zhou Chen, Grand Coordinator of Nanzhili in the 1430s, the tax chiefs lost some of their power and prestige to the district magistrate, but they continued to constitute a village-dwelling local elite (chushi), investing in land and engaging

to Capitalism," p. 404. In the Lake Tai area, the freeholders whose lands were taken over by the gentry often migrated to the new urban centers then burgeoning in Jiangnan. There are numerous examples of these families moving to the cities and engaging in commercial activities. If successful in business, they then tried to recover their rural roots by buying property in the areas from which they had come. For several examples of such migratory and investment patterns, see Shih, "Peasant Economy," ch. 3. For examples of gentry land expropriation in the Songjiang area, see Zheng Changgan, "Mingmo zhi Qingdai qianqi de fengjian zudian guanxi," p. 165; and for examples of the way gentry families used their position to engross land, see Saeki Yuichi, "Minmatsu no Töshi no hen," pp. 39–40. There is some reason to believe that the rapid growth of absentee landlordship around Nanjing in the late 16th century stemmed from the single-whip reform which combined labor services into a single silver payment added as a surcharge on the existing land tax assessment. This may have lightened the burden on local landowners and stimulated the demand for land. Beattie, land and Lineage, pp. 12–13; Joseph P. McDermott, "Bondservants in the T’ai-hu Basin During the Late Ming," p. 697; Kataoka, "Minmatsu Shinso no Kahoku," pp. 77–78.

53 Koyama, “Mindai no ryōchō,” pp. 25–32, 38–40, 56. The term xiangshen first appears in the Ming Veritable Records in 1588. It referred to officials and retired officials. Those who held examination-degree ranks but had not been appointed officials were generally called shiren or shizi. Mori Masao, “The Gentry in the Ming,” pp. 35, 47; Shigeta Atsushi, “Kyōshin no rekishiteki seikaku,” p. 85; Sakai Tadao, “Confucianism and Popular Educational Works,” p. 351; Hamashima, “Water Control,” pp. 76–77. The last half of the 16th century thus saw the displacement of old resident landlords by new “local gentry” (xiangshen) which were “official households” (huanshi) who could use their status as “presented sashes” (jianshen) and “caps and gowns” (yiguan) to buy land cheaply, evade taxes, and exploit the less advantaged. Mori, “Minmatsu no shakai-kankei,” pp. 156–157.
in usury. As local residents, deeply imbedded in village society, the *chushi* tax chiefs were ideally paternalistic and charitable. During the Jiajing reign, the duty of the tax chief, which had sometimes been a lifetime assignment passed down from father to son, became a rotational obligation, assigned to freeholders at large. When the *chushi* thus lost their semi-official local status, the official *xiangshen* were increasingly able to use their service exemptions to take their own lands off the tax rolls. Moreover, because they were often city dwellers, the *xiangshen* felt less of a paternalistic obligation toward their tenants and laborers than had the *chushi*, and this may have contributed to an intensification of class conflict later in the Ming. Nevertheless, many members of the local gentry, and especially retired officials, continued to live on their own estates and took very seriously their obligation as "civilian recluses" (*shiyin*) to help solve community problems.

The estates of the larger landowners of Jiangnan were often quite diversified enterprises, combining husbandry (fish, poultry, pigs) and horticulture (dye plants, vegetable produce, mulberry fields). By the end of the Ming one can almost speak of a new

55 Perhaps the most famous "good" tax chief was the great painter Shen Zhou (1427–1509). Mori, "Gentry," pp. 42–45; Murck, "Chu Yun-ming," pp. 8–9; Miyazaki, "Mindai So-Shô chihô," p. 5. Of course, tax chiefs were also capable of being very exploitative. For a thoughtful discussion of the ubiquity of exploitation and its relationship to economic underdevelopment in China, see Joseph Needham and Ray Huang, "The Nature of Chinese Society," p. 14.
56 Service as tax chief (*liangzhang*), dike administrator (*tangzhang*), and *lijia* head (*lizhang*) thus became a burden rather than a privilege, creating "corvée hardship" (*yikun*) which mainly afflicted medium and small commoner landowners. Hamashima Atsutoshi, "Rural Society in Jiangnan During the Ming Dynasty," pp. 9–10.
57 Mori, "Gentry," p. 46; Mori, "Minmatsu no shakai-kankei," p. 155; Mark Elvin, "On Water Control and Management during the Ming and Ch'ing Periods," pp. 95–97.
58 Miyazaki, "Mindai So-Shô chihô," p. 26; Mori, "Gentry," pp. 35–37, 48. But see also Murck, "Chu Yun-ming," *passim*; and Hamashima, "Gyôshoku tenriki kô," p. 143, which somewhat derides Miyazaki's image of the benevolent recluse, dwelling in the countryside as a member of the protective "gentry class" (*shidaifu kaikyû*).
59 The Tan family of Changshu provides a good example of this kind of diver-
métier: the scholar-official turned entrepreneurial estate manager. There is much contemporary evidence to show that officials returned home from their careers and threw themselves into managerial farming: experimenting with new crops, apportioning labor among different work forces in the fields, putting female shipu (household serfs) to work as weavers. Household servants came to be regarded as a form of investment, and we find numerous accounts of gentry fathers urging their sons to feed the hired and indentured help well in order to get the best work out of them. Former magistrates or prefects now found it quite respectable to

sification. Raised on the shores of Lake Tai, the Tan brothers in the late 16th century decided not to become fishermen. Instead, they created polder fields and with the income from these hired other local fishermen to turn the wettest marshes into fish ponds. Over the ponds, joists were flung and dormitories built that eventually housed hundreds of laborers who in turn transformed the higher portions of land into drained orchards. Fu, Shangren, p. 17.


61 One of the principles that was frequently expressed in official circles was the notion of “proprietors furnishing food and tenants furnishing labor” (ye shì dìān lì). L. S. Yang, Les Aspects économiques des travaux publics dans la Chine impériale, p. 75. The term ye shì dìān lì had been in use since Song times. However, its application in the late Ming was directly related to the irrigation crisis caused by the decline of the old lìjià system and the rise of absentee landlordism. As local landowners ceased taking responsibility for maintaining dikes and other waterworks, and as the new examination gentry (xiàngshèn) used its corvée exemptions to evade irrigation duties, local magistrates and prefects began to argue that the state would have to intervene lest the elaborate system of canals and polders in the lower Yangzi delta be neglected altogether. Government intervention was necessary, it would seem, because there were no community organizations—no Gemeinschaften or kyōdōtai, as some Japanese historians have argued—arising spontaneously among the peasants to take care of waterworks. In 1566 a new method of calculating corvée according to the amount of land owned (zhāo tiān pài yì) was ordered put in effect by the Ministry of Works. The flaw in this system was gentry exemption from corvée. To distribute the burden of labor service equitably therefore, officials in the early 17th century proposed that gentry landlords provide their own labor payments in the form of rice or silver (ye shì) to the tenants, who would in turn contribute their own labor (dìān lì) to rebuilding dikes. This system was actually instituted in some counties, and the gentry pledged to cooperate. In fact, however, the xiàngshèn used their metropolitan connections to ruin the
personally supervise household servants at harvest time, leading them in the construction of buildings and the repair of water-works. As one local lady remarked to her husband: “Your official governance is ending, and your governance of a single household now begins.” Although this sort of managerial farming tended toward a semi-manorial system, even including manufacturing on the property directly managed by large landlords, there were also opportunities for middle and rich peasants to specialize on their own freeholdings. Often a husband would devote himself to tilling while the wife took charge of sericulture. In fact, the growing emphasis on women’s privileges during the late Ming (which apparently accompanied their increasing literacy) may reflect a new and much more important economic role—especially when it is clear in some cases that sideline income for these families was greater than that from the regular farming of their land. Such a

career of the official (a magistrate named Geng Ju affiliated with the Donglin Academy) who had engineered the reform in 1600 in Changshu district. In 1611, Grand Coordinator Xu Minshi ordered the zhao tian pai yi system applied to Zhejiang province, but the reform failed there too. Hamashima, “Gyoshoku tenriki kō,” pp. 119, 128–129, 133, 142–143; idem, “Rural Society,” pp. 7–9, 11; idem, “Water Control,” pp. 80–91.

62 Officials were by Qing times quite used to the notion of having personal servants called changsui who were temporarily attached to mandarins, having commended themselves to their masters in the hopes of gaining an opportunity to connive with yamen staffs to extort money from commoners. Preston M. Torbert, The Ch’ing Imperial Household Department, p. 57.

63 Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, p. 33.

64 For examples of local landlords installing looms on their estates, see Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 143:16b, and 147:38b.

65 For later evidence pointing to the economic importance of the handicrafts-woman to the peasant household, see Marjorie Topley, “Marriage Resistance in Rural Kwangtung,” pp. 70–73. On some of the social and cultural effects of late Ming female literacy, see Joanna F. Handlin, “Lü K’un’s New Audience.” The irrigation crisis also encouraged cashcropping. As the dike system began to decline in the 1540s, peasants in the upland counties of eastern Jiangnan turned to cotton cultivation, which did not require the same kind of intensive irrigation as grain crops. Then, as textile spinning and weaving developed apace, the irrigation system declined all the more because peasants were unwilling to take time away from handicrafts to dredge creeks and repair dikes. The ecology of the area thus was tangibly transformed in less than half-a-century. Hamashima, “Water Control,” pp. 78, 88–89.
household could take advantage of the initially rising prices for silk and cotton goods to improve its lot, so that many middle peasant households became rich peasants—or even managerial farmers and landlords—during this period. Naturally, the expansion of small freeholdings into larger, managed farms depended upon a ready supply of labor, which also increased during the middle and late Ming. One reason for the growth of such a labor force was the rising price of land which was no longer within the reach of the rural poor, who often fell into servitude or migrated into the cities.

As more and more land in Jiangnan was turned over to cash crops such as cotton, and as absentee landlords replaced resident tax chiefs who had once assumed responsibility for waterworks maintenance, the irrigation system required for rice cultivation dried up from neglect. Though many literati towards the end of the Ming and the beginning of the Qing stressed the importance of reopening these waterworks, it became virtually impossible in some districts for peasants to return to the earlier rice-growing pattern of agriculture. Once devoted to cotton cultivation, the land could not be easily restored to rice. This was no problem at first for the inhabitants of the lower Yangzi. For, they simply used the greater profits of raw cotton sales to import rice from other

66 The incentive to shift from food production to production for the textile market was very high. In early 17th century Jiaxing, 5 mu of land planted in rice yielded only 11.25 taels of income after the crop was sold. The same amount of land planted in mulberry produced a crop worth 52 taels of silver—an increase by more than a factor of four. Mi Chu Wiens, “Lord and Peasant,” p. 8. Tobacco was even more lucrative, one mu of the plant bringing the equivalent in cash value of 10 mu of other crops. Xie, Mingdai shehui jingji, pp. 66–67.

67 Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, pp. 34–38. The price of land, however, rose unsteadily. Land rated as producing 1 shi (picul) of rent in the 1550s in Yongan county in Fujian sold for 4 taels. That same piece sold for 11 taels in 1782, but the price did not increase beyond that level until 1864. Fu, Ming-Qing nongguan, pp. 20–24.

68 Xie, Mingdai shehui jingji, p. 47; Hamashima, “Water Control,” pp. 77–78. The communication system—as opposed to the smaller irrigation system—was probably less likely to have declined, since canals linked most market towns. In modern times, 593 canals could be found between Nanjing and Shanghai. Huang, “Grand Canal,” p. 4.
provinces, like Hunan. Furthermore, the commutation of rents and taxes in kind to silver money increased the need of farmers and peasants for cash to keep their land and pay their rents. In the Wanli period (1573–1619), however, the price of raw cotton began to drop. Partly as a result of this, the peasants of Jiangnan turned more and more to handicrafts as a replacement—either through a

69 For the growing dependence of Jiangnan on the Huguang area for rice imports during the period from the late Ming to the eighteenth century, see
putting-out system or by producing goods themselves for the rapidly spreading urban markets.\textsuperscript{70}

By the very late Ming, Jiangnan was exporting cotton cloth north in exchange for raw cotton from that same area.\textsuperscript{71} Major cotton cloth centers like Songjiang were filled with the hustle and bustle of long-distance merchants from Huguang, Liangguang, and Jiangxi—many of them accompanied by their professional bodyguards and dealing in hundreds of thousands of taels worth of \textit{biao bu} (the highest quality cotton weave) every year.\textsuperscript{72} The cloth which they and their \textit{confrères} in the silk marts of Suzhou traded spread across China, setting new consumption patterns, creating new demands for fashion, and enriching the merchants who supplied them.\textsuperscript{73}

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Hanseng Chuan and Richard A. Kraus, \textit{Mid-Ch’ing Rice Markets and Trade}, pp. 40–71. In the late 16th century the government actually sponsored the interregional transport of grain. In 1596, the area of Xiushui, southeast of Lake Tai, had a system whereby the local government chose 20–30 local merchants and made them responsible for individually importing 3,000 \textit{shi} of rice. The local government also obtained special certificates from the provincial administration in order to permit the grain to be shipped by the guardhouses at mountain passes and river fords. Much the same system was put into effect in Huzhou prefecture in 1621, with the surveillance commissioners for grain transport being asked to explain to officials in grain-producing areas how important it was for them to let merchants buy enough cereal to feed the population of the Lake Tai region. Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 6, pp. 4–7.
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70 Fu, \textit{Mingdai Jiangnan}, p. 58.


72 Nishijima, “Shina shoki,” pp. 134, 138. During the late Ming, most of the thread for the Songjiang cotton industry was collected by merchants from cottage spinners in the countryside. The thread was then mainly woven into cotton socks and hose by the more than one hundred manufactories operating in the city during the late Wanli period. Fu, \textit{Shangren}, pp. 6–10.

73 Contemporary writers at the turn of the 17th century reported that finely embroidered gauze and fine silk of various colors were all the mode. Fu, \textit{Mingdai Jiangnan}, pp. 107. Suzhou had cotton manufactories, mainly located outside the Chang Gate. But these relatively small-scale \textit{tang} of twenty-odd working households were dwarfed by the large silk factories of the eastern quarter of
As the middle ranks of society filled out with the new commercial and landed wealth that arose during the 16th and early 17th centuries, there grew both a greater degree of envy for the wealthiest people (because such affluence did not seem so far out of reach in this relatively mobile society), and a greater need for separating those within the highest orders by economic display. Among contemporary observers, at least, there was certainly the growing sense that society was not merely divided between rich and poor; it was also divided between very rich and moderately rich. According to a report from the 1630s, families of gentry or magnate status (jinshen haoyou zhi jia) could be divided by wealth into various grades: the “great” (da) ones owned property worth more than 10 million taels of silver; the medium level, 1 million; and (as the Ming shi put it), “if you use a figure less than 10,000 [taels] to calculate, then the number [of wealthy families] is countless.”

the city. There, the brocade weavers gathered every morning at the famous Hua Bridge, while the silk spinners at Guanghua Temple were similarly mustered. “If work in the factory is reduced, these people have nothing for food and clothes,” reported a contemporary source, cited in Fu, Shangren, p. 12.

During this period, mercantile and landed wealth grew much less discrete than before. Rich rural gentry families ceased hoarding grain and cash, and invested their funds in usury or commerce. Merchants also became landlords, applying more rational calculations and better managerial techniques to their rental arrangements than landowners of the mid-Ming. Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 2, pp. 29–31, and ch. 5, pp. 35–37. According to the 1605 edition of the Jiading district gazetteer, status distinctions between the gentry and commoners, and the sense of hierarchical distance between the elderly and young, were becoming blurred and confused. Mori, “Minmatsu no shakai-kankan,” pp. 136–137.


Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, pp. 31–32. In a piece written in 1643, Fang Yizhi described the drive for wealth and status consuming the Chinese upper classes toward the end of the Ming. The literati, he complained, become officials and enrich themselves by ingratiating themselves with the powerful. As soon as they take their posts they begin to accumulate their fortunes. As the ordinary people witness the comfort of the wealthy, they want luxuries as well. He thought it important for literati to set a distance between themselves and wealthy commercial interests, whereas the generation just prior to his had championed the causes of merchants in their disputes with the state during the 1620s. Peterson, Bitter Gourd, pp. 72–74, 77.
Social Subordination

Beneath the upper and middle classes were the poor and menial, many of whom were legally and illegally subordinate to the rich and privileged. There were several different sorts of subordination during the late Ming period, and these varied according to region.

In the north, the “housemen” (jiading) were probably derived from hereditary occupational categories of the early Ming, which in turn were influenced by the Yuan system of registering the population. Enrolled in “iron registers” (tie ce), prisoners of war or criminals during the early Ming dynasty were turned over to victorious generals and either incorporated into their military units or used as laborers on their estates. The man’s status was then fixed in legal perpetuity, and he was supposedly forbidden to marry outside his caste. Though these categories loosened during the later years of the Hongwu reign, they were reconfirmed under the Yongle emperor, who sentenced resisters to his usurpation to the same menial status—a status which was to be inherited by the man’s children. Although these hereditary categories had lost their rigidity by the end of the Wanli period, the late Ming simultaneously saw the growth of private armies which along the northern borders came to resemble private military groups whose members took on the semi-servile status of retainers (jiading) attached by custom to their commanding officers. This system of retainers (which during the early Qing was known as yishi bingding) was reinforced when units of occupational soldiers from the regular army (theoretically composed of hereditary soldiers in the first place) were no longer transferred from one commander to another. By the mid-seventeenth century, in fact, the term jiading had been transferred as well to the private armies of powerful magnates in provinces like Shandong where the local gentry lived in guarded stockades and fortified blockhouses.

77 In parts of north China, and especially Huadong, the household servants (jiapu) of the early Ming evolved into freely hired labor called gugongzi or zuohuolu. Typically, these short-term laborers gathered at dawn in marketing places, hoes in hand, and waited to be hired by farmers needing temporary help. Kataoka, “Minmatsu Shinsho no Kahoku,” p. 82.
78 Xie Guozhen, Ming-Qing zhi ji dangshe yundong kao, pp. 261–265 passim.
The categories of subordinates in central and south China, on the other hand, were more complicated. Indeed, within a given category there might be marked differences from province to province, or even from county to county. Differences were also not absolute. Although there was obviously a major qualitative difference—at either end of the “free” versus “servile” spectrum—between a peasant freeholder who paid taxes to the state and a shipu or hereditary serf, there were degrees of freedom and servility within these extremes. There were many kinds of tenancy,


80 Fu, Ming-Qing nongce, pp. 124–125; Koyama, “Dai tochi shoyū,” part 2, p. 64. For example, in southern Anhui, especially Xin’an, the status of tenants (dianpu) and serfs (nupu) was often confused. Owing all kinds of extra service duties to one master or one lineage and being bound to the land, such subordinates still paid rent and could possess property of their own. Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 2, p. 26; Beattie, Land and Lineage, pp. 13–14. In modern Guangdong, on the other hand, the status of ximin (menials) has been described by one anthropologist as being analogous to North American Negro slavery. Servitude and hereditary tenancy were organized between elite and subordinate lineages: “The bond linking these hereditary tenants to elite landlords is best understood as an exchange between kin-based corporations. Transactions on both sides were handled through lineage intermediaries. . . . Socially, tenants were treated like servile dependents of the elite lineages. . . .” James L. Watson, “Hereditary Tenancy and Corporate Landlordism in Traditional China,” pp. 180–181. Attitudes toward serfs also varied from district to district. In Wujin county, during the 17th century, people regarded slavery as hereditary, whereas in nearby Wuxi the master-serf relationship was regarded as being quite flexible. People did not feel uncomfortable in Wuxi when serfs changed masters within a very short period of time. In fact, many Wuxi serfs were like a caste of professional household servants, serving throughout the empire. During late Ming times, it was said that most influential families in Beijing had at least one Wuxi servant on their staff. Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 5, pp. 5–6.

81 In Ming times legal statuses were not mutually exclusive. For example, a landlord might be a bondservant. Also, a bondservant might work for more than one master. Some even sat for the civil service tests. McDermott, “Bondservants,” p. 690; Sakai, “Confucianism,” p. 337.

82 Some scholars prefer the term “bondservant” to “serf” because they believe that using the latter word suggests that there is an identification of Ming
for example, varying considerably in permanency of tenure and in degree of contractual and monetized relationship. In the Song period, under the sui tian dianke system, the tenant “guest” literally “followed the field,” being sold along with the land as an occupant of the tilled area by one landowner to the next. By the late Ming, a tenant in the lower Yangzi region also stayed with the land when it was sold, but this often served his interests best. In the arrangement known as yi tian liang zhu (“one field, two owners”), the land was divided into two parts. The upper tillable surface was owned by the tenant, while the sub-soil rights belonged to the original owner of the land who paid the taxes. A new owner could thus buy the bottom soil, but the tenant already tilling that piece of land could not be evicted as long as he paid his rent on time. Thus, in theory, the tenant was a zuhu or “renting household” which had a contractual arrangement with the sub-soil owner to cultivate the property. In fact, the so-called “tenant” might often be a renter himself, sub-leasing his topsoil rights in turn to yet a third person who actually tilled the land. Furthermore, a tenant bound laborers with the servile laborers of the Song. That in turn seems to them to constitute an endorsement of the thesis of the Tokyo school that the Song-Yuan-Ming period represents a medieval era of manorial serfdom. See, for example, Wiens, “Lord and Peasant,” pp. 4, 36. Strictly speaking, in European feudalism a serf was bound to the land and owned by his lord. We may also more generally define a serf, however, as someone in servitude. Because the labor of the shipu or nupu—especially under landlords who were not absentee rentiers but rather managed their own estates—could be used by their masters without restriction of other than moral convention, the word “serf” is quite appropriate. However, de facto serfs remained de jure bondservants. For this point, see McDermott, “Bondservants,” pp. 677–678.


84 This system of “one field, three owners,” was widely practiced in Fujian. The subsoil owner or miaozhu (who might not even know where the piece of property was) leased to a renter or peizhu who rented to the tenant or dianhu. Fu, Ming-Qing nongcun, pp. 44–45. Fujian, and northern Fujian in particular, saw a growth during the late Ming in the kinds of market relationships that made the sale and re-sale of property rights very easy, and which abetted rentier investment. For example, duanqi (cut-off contracts), which represented a final sale, were gradually replaced by huoqi (lively contracts), which gave the seller an option to buy back the land—a right which then could be
might sign a contract which mixed cash payments with labor duties.\(^5\) There was thus a confusion between personal subordination to a landowner and a straight commercial and contractual payment of cash for the right to rent. Tenant contracts might specify that the renter owed both a cash rent and certain services at weddings and on ceremonial occasions.\(^6\)

The personal subordination of the tenant (jianhu) became even more pronounced under the system known as toukao (surrendering oneself in order to rely upon the protection of a gentry family). If a peasant could not pay his taxes, he could turn over his tax indemnity—and property rights—to a member of the newly ascendant local gentry (xiangshen) whose degree status exempted him from paying taxes.\(^7\) Someone with such official status could then remove that land from the tax rolls, and charge a rent which would be profitable to him while less onerous than the tax bill which the former freeholder (and now his tenant) would have earlier had to pay. The fundamental meaning of toukao, then, was to exchange one’s land or labor for the protection of an official.\(^8\) This was the way Gu Yanwu used the phrase when he described how poor peasants sought the gentry’s protection in Jiangnan: “The official gentry (shidaiju) of Jiangnan today have this custom: once they are registered as officials, this whole gang (beidang) comes to their gate saying they want to toukao. In many cases there are up to one thousand people.”\(^9\)
Toukao, because it meant seeking the protection of an officially registered gentry family, was somewhat different from simply selling oneself into servitude. The latter practice, which was sometimes called maishen (selling the self), meant subordinating oneself to another person in exchange for being fed and lodged. If toukao more often described the surrendering of property, maishen described the pledge of one’s labor.90

Along with these forms of servitude, there was also a free market in labor in the countryside. During harvesting season, peasants with small plots hired themselves out as mang gong (busy labor). Yet here too there was a gradual scale between servus and villein, running from freely hired labor to a kind of enslavement. Usually, the longer the term one agreed to work for an employer, the more the degree of servitude. Short-term help (duan gong) was paid according to the amount of time the person worked, by the day.91 According to a law promulgated in 1588, duan gong were to be classified as commoners, and therefore should be contracted with in a free manner on a piecemeal or part-time basis.92 Long-term

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90 Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, pp. 66–8. Some scholars make a distinction between handing over one’s land (touxian) and pledging one’s labor as a household retainer (toukao). See Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 246–247. In practice, toukao frequently covered both acts. Most hired laborers were considered bondservants, their hiring conditions constituting a kind of debt bondage, sometimes called “mortgage hiring” (diangu or dianyong) in which the head of a household mortgaged his own labor or one of his family members in return for grain or cash. McDermott, “Bondservants,” p. 683.

91 Some idea of the wages of such workers can be gleaned from the pages of a 1606 arithmetic primer in use in Jiangnan. One problem in the primer reads: “Now, 4 men have come and worked for 8 days. The cost of their labor was 9 qian. If 24 men worked for half a month, then what will their wages be? Answer 12 tael, 1 qian, 2 fen, and 5 li.” Cited in Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, p. 68. The wages of a worker for one day, therefore, were 2.8 fen. See also Lin Yong-cheng, “Lun Qingdai qianqi nongye guyong laodong de xingzi,” p. 92.

92 Wiens, “Lord and Peasant,” pp. 5–7. See also the Wujiang gazetteer cited in Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, p. 68.
help (chang gong), on the other hand, was paid a share of the harvest. Like serfs, they were legally classified as jianmin (menials) who could not marry commoners (fanren), could not take the civil service examinations, and suffered more severe punishments for the same crimes committed by a commoner.93

Thus, the legal distinction between chang gong or semi-permanent retainers, and shipu or permanent serfs was not altogether clear.94 The shipu, however, were more likely to be attached to families that first employed their labor as domestics. In fact, after 1397, when the law prohibited non-official families from having serfs, adoption became a fictive form of subordination; and many shipu were originally children sold by poor parents to wealthy lineages which adopted them.95 Such shipu took on the surname of the family to which they were attached, and were even listed sometimes as members of the lineage, being prohibited to marry others with the same surname as the lineage. Their masters were given the legal right to punish the shipu, who were often employed as domestics or as regular field workers, singers, and entertainers.96 The practice of selling oneself into servitude either by becoming an adopted son (yi nan) or a servant (pu) seems to have increased con-


94 J. McDermott proposes that “bond servitude in the Ming is best seen as a legal status for persons, rich and poor, with contractual obligations, specific or general, to another whose household register they entered. Men and women were purchased, adopted, hired, and coerced, or married and commenced themselves into a servitude whose duties, duration, and rewards varied widely. Of these bondservants one type, commonly called field servants (dianpu), accounted for at most one-fifth of the rural and urban populations; their servitude usually entailed only specific duties to a landlord, and bondage to the soil or total bondage to a master was rarely if ever imposed.” Ibid. See also James L. Watson, “Transactions in People,” pp. 237–239.

95 Meijer, “Slavery,” p. 330. For an example of such an agreement, see Xie, Danshe yundong, p. 255.

96 During the early 17th century, masters frequently took sexual liberties with the female members of enserfed families. Sometimes they killed their serfs and cremated them illegally. Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 2, p. 14.
siderably after the second quarter of the fifteenth century when the capital was moved from Jinling (Nanjing) to Beijing.97 Because tribute grain had to be transported up the Grand Canal, free-holders in Jiangnan were initially forced to contribute their labor service and then, after 1471, to pay for the cost of the army transport service. The increased labor duties, or their commutation, fell heavily upon the backs of Jiangnan freeholders, who consequently pledged themselves to powerful neighbors as menials in order to avoid paying this form of taxation. By the 17th century there were almost no free commoners left in some districts of Jiangnan, and the wealthy households of the region even used their household servants as singing boys, catamites, and musicians.98

The actual state of servitude of shipu seems to have varied widely.99 In some districts, like Xiuning (Anhui), they were almost a sub-caste, of darker skin and smaller stature than the aristocratic merchant clans of that area.100 Even there, reasons for servitude and the terms of service varied considerably. Some regulations stipulated the right of the person to get out of servitude or to cease being a tenant. Other Huizhou rules about pu (servants or slaves) enforced a kind of permanent servitude, virtually creating a hereditary labor force for the estate from which the menial could not be separated.101 And some even went so far as to allow the owner—

97 The appearance of serfs in the Xuande era (1426–1435) accompanied an increase in the number of vagabonds. Nishimura, “Doboku,” p. 25.
98 Ricci, Sixteenth Century, p. 86.
99 Nishimura distinguishes between at least 5 different sorts of bondservants or slaves: household servants, people evading state corvée, field workers, estate managers, and those who attached themselves to the wealthy in order to extort money from others. Nishimura, “Doboku,” pp. 28–29. See also McDermott, “Bondservants,” p. 688.
101 Many of the serfs used in cultivation in Huizhou were put to work reclaiming hard-to-work mountain soil by removing stones or terracing. Most peasants were unwilling to assume such onerous tasks on their own. In the process of terracing new arable, the serfs also cleared away lumber and planted tea for their owners. This created marketable goods which con-
which was often a lineage rather than an individual—to separate individuals from families and sell them as chattel. In other areas, *shipu* developed a semi-independent status, often by functioning as bailiffs and estate managers for their owners. Like junior versions of imperial eunuchs, these “brazen servants” (*haonu*) came to know the affairs of their masters so well that they were both indispensible and too powerful to attack. Such was the case with Wu Rong, the household serf of the wealthy She xian gentryman, Wu Yangchun. When Wu Rong was accused of embezzling estate funds, he fled to Beijing and presented himself to Wei Zhongxian who enrolled him in the emperor’s secret police, the Embroidered Uniform Guard. From this powerful position, and knowing the most intimate details of his master’s finances, Wu Rong extorted six hundred thousand taels from Wu Yangchun. Similar incidents, also famous during the late Ming, occurred with the household bailiffs of Zhang Pu’s (founder of the Restoration Society) uncle; and with a serf attached to the painter Dong Qichang’s son.

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103 McDermott, “Bondservants,” pp. 691–692. Serfs also ran commercial enterprises for their masters. In fact, gentry families frequently invested in business by selecting someone with a commercial background to be their manager. The manager—who often owned property of his own—in return agreed to *toukao*. While the manager’s voluntary serfdom provided a kind of security or collateral for the investor, commendation offered the manager an escape from labor service and the protection of a powerful patron. In the long run, this practice probably inhibited the formation of enlightened and calculating entrepreneurship because it encouraged a rentier mentality on the part of the investor and also left management to intermediaries who were kept in thrall to the gentry’s higher social status. Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 2, pp. 22–24.


105 Xie, *Dangshe yundong*, pp. 251–269; Saeki, “Tōshi no hen,” p. 50; Miyazaki, “Mindai So-So–Shō chihō,” pp. 19–20. Bondservant managers (*jigang pu*), it has been argued, developed psychological strains because of the contrast between their actual power and their demeaned social status. They expressed this anger both by exploiting others and by turning upon their masters.
Class Conflict

Wealthy or powerful household slaves were exceptional to the main body of estate dependents. Privy power, or using the name of one's masters to extort money from others, may, in any case, have been menial compensation for servile status. Yet, if contemporary 17th-century sources are to be believed, as much as twenty to thirty percent of the rural population of Jiangnan had become attached to wealthy families by means of maishen or toukao. Many other peasants had become tenants of the rich, and according to those same contemporary sources, there was a high degree of latent class conflict between upper and lower classes at the time of the Manchu conquest: "the great households in the county capital and the tenant laborers in the rural areas hated each other like enemies." This hostility had been developing steadily since at least the Wanli period. Many writers of the time frequently contrasted the halcyon years of the early 16th century with the economic struggle and competition of the 17th century when "strong and weak were divided from each other," and when "people began to plot to appropriate each other's possessions." The spread

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Wiens, "Masters and Bondservants," p. 57; idem, "Lord and Peasant," p. 17. It has also been noted that serf managers were more brutal bailiffs and crueler overseers than freemen. Shih, "Peasant Economy," ch. 2, p. 32.

106 Xie, Dangshe yundong, pp. 270–275; but see also McDermott, "Bondservants," pp. 690–691. Serfdom virtually aggregated upon itself. There were numerous instances of serfs remaining attached to their initial patrons, while in turn acquiring serfs themselves. The law stipulated that serfs were not allowed to earn or purchase gentry status, but serf managers in the Lake Tai region were often known to have acquired elite rank in that way. Shih, "Peasant Economy," ch. 1, passim.


108 Li Dabi, cited in Ibid., p. 244. According to writers from the Zhengde period (1506–1521), the customary practice in Songjiang was for the great households to contract the land to tenants in a paternalistic manner, based upon an understanding of mutual support and subsistence. Ideally, landlords were supposed to provide relief to their tenants during periods of grain shortage. The landlords often resided in the villages, collecting their rents in person, and being entertained by their tenants with food and drink while exchanging gifts in return. By the latter part of the 16th century, many writ-
of intermediate market towns presented the rural poor with a freer urban environment, where they could begin to acquire a new identity of their own as the “marketplace” (shijing) mobs of gentry texts. The towns—with their amenities and pastimes—also aroused envy of the luxuries of the middle and upper classes. Thus, the late Ming witnessed numerous instances, especially in

ers noted, there was a decline in these conventional cooperative patron-client relations. Commentaries described the growth of mutual suspicion and antagonism between absentee landlords and tenants, who conspired among themselves not to pay rents. Wiens, “Lord and Peasant,” pp. 12–15; Pierre-Etienne Will, “Un Cycle hydraulique en Chine,” p. 272; Saeki, “Tōshi no hen,” p. 28. For example, a 1583 text stated that until the Hongzhi and Zhengde reigns (1488–1521), the gentry were very frugal and the people flourished, while after the Jiajing and Longqing periods (1522–1572), the gentry grew wealthy and the people’s resources were exhausted. A 1599 report from Datong in northern Shanxi claimed that of late the upper classes had grown more cunning and oppressive; clerks in the yamen were entirely arbitrary, making exactions upon the people; and the relationship between parents and children had grown lacking in filiality and respect. The 1609 gazetteer for Taiyuan prefecture in Shanxi stated that since the Jiajing and Longqing periods (1522–1572), commoners had become extravagant and had ceased paying respect to the elderly; furthermore, the number of people worshipping “deviant religions” (zuodao) had grown greatly. Early 17th-century Fujian gazetteers stated that landlords extracted rents at a greater distance, relations were more impersonal, and tenants were increasingly likely to refuse to pay rents. The 1619 edition of the gazetteer of Zhanhua (169 kilometers south of Tianjin) noted that since the 1570s social relations in that region had worsened, with the poor and weak being oppressed by the wealthy and powerful; land engrossment was quite common. And according to the 1621 gazetteer for Weinan district, which is east of Xi’an on the south bank of the Wei River, there had been a steady worsening in social relationships since the 1560s and 1570s. Mori, “Minmatsu no shakai-kankei,” pp. 143–150.

109 Fu, Ming-Qing nongceun, p. 127; Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 143:16b, and 147:38b. Many texts noted the way in which “unreliables” (wulai) gathered in urban marketplaces, often to gamble at night together with the shipu of great households and yamen lictors. There seems to have been a discernible increase in the amount of gambling that was observed in marketing towns during the early 1600s. Mori, “Minmatsu no shakai-kankei,” p. 143; Nishimura, “Doboku,” p. 43. See also Fu, Shangren, passim. Obviously, the presence of large numbers of free peasants living nearby made poor bondservants feel all the more deprived. Wiens, “Lord and Peasant,” p. 17.
central and south China, of mobs of tenants gathering in market-places to invoke the memory of the 15th-century Fujianese rebel and popular hero Deng Maoqi (d. 1449), by adopting his title: Chanping wang (Pare-equal King).110

They all assumed the title, “Pare-Equal King,” meaning to pare down master and serf, noble and menial, poor and rich, to make them equal. The tenants put on their masters’ clothing, entered by the main gate, seized and divided their houses, handed out the storage grain, tied the masters to posts and whipped them with bamboo. Each mob drank, then commanded the master to kneel and pour out wine. They tugged him by the jaw and abused him, saying “[We’re all] equal people (jun ren). How can you make serfs of us? From now on, it is going to be turned upside down (fan zhi).”111

In other less intensely egalitarian instances, urban mobs would gather to protest rice hoarding, the export of grain, and unfair measuring practices.112 In Guangdong in 1624 such mobs attacked hoarders and seized their grain. In Wujiang in 1640, a Buddhist monk named Zhu initiated a movement called da mi (strike for grain) which spread to almost all the villages of that county, following increases in the price of grain. Crowds of a hundred or so people would join together and go from house to house of the wealthy families asking for grain. If they were given food the homes were spared; if they were refused, they attacked the estates of the rich and distributed their grain supplies.113 Riots also oc-

111 Yongxin district gazetteer, cited in Fu, Ming-Qing nongcun, p. 126. See also Elvin, Pattern, pp. 245–246; Mori, “Minmatsu no shakai-kankei,” p. 155. Yongxin is in the Jinggang Mountains of western Jiangxi.
112 Fu, Ming-Qing nongcun, p. 130. Mori, “Kosei to jinushi denko kankei,” p. 75.
113 Fu, Ming-Qing nongcun, p. 128. The similarity to European grain riots and
curred during times of famine when tenants protested tribute offerings (bridal gifts, New Year’s meat, winter sacrifice offerings, and so forth) and claimed that rents were too high.\textsuperscript{114} In 1638 in the district of Wu, during the winter after a locust plague, over thirty villages along Lake Tai formed a covenant, recording the participants’ names in registers, making sacrifices to their ancestors, and signing an oath that none of the tenants would pay the bailiffs when they arrived to collect rents on the behalf of absentee landlords.\textsuperscript{115}

In many of these instances, the protest movement was well organized. The covenants (\textit{yiyue}) which were formed in parts of south China were called \textit{gang} (net-rope), which was a word then used to describe craftsmen’s guilds. Forbidden by special imperial proclamations, many of these were like the secret societies of the 19th century in Guangdong insofar as they turned into paramilitary organizations there called \textit{du} and led by a hierarchy of officers. In north China, the same kind of primitive army was sometimes called a \textit{hui} and may even have been modeled on the \textit{huiguan} (\textit{Landsmannschaften} for fellow provincials) of well-to-do merchants.\textsuperscript{116} Though often these associations seem to have been easily confused with bandit gangs, some of them were clearly led by “good people” presenting demands which many members of the upper classes would have regarded as legitimate. For instance, in one late Ming revolt, the tenants went to local landlords’ houses and demanded that the granaries be opened in times of famine, that some of the landlords’ goods be distributed, that excessively large estates be divided into individual farms, that rents be lowered, that tenants be excused from onerous labor duties, and that farmers receive a small private plot to till for their own use.\textsuperscript{117} In another case, at Ruijin in Jiangxi, rioters demanded permanent tenancy rights: “If there is a tiller of a field and that field should change ownership

\textsuperscript{114} Mori, “Minmatsu no shakai-kankei,” p. 136.
\textsuperscript{115} Fu, \textit{Ming-Qing nongcun}, pp. 130, 137; Elvin, \textit{Pattern}, p. 245.
\textsuperscript{116} Fu, \textit{Ming-Qing nongcun}, pp. 137–141.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 124.
while the tiller does not change, then it should become his permanent means of livelihood."\textsuperscript{118}

During the 1620s there had been a great deal of cooperation between lower classes and "righteous gentry" who were united against the central government in the common defense of urban privileges. The 1626 Suzhou riot was the most famous instance of this kind of socially united front.\textsuperscript{119} Members of the gentry consciously sought to perpetuate this unity as tensions between upper and lower classes sharpened during the second quarter of the 17th century.\textsuperscript{120} Tightly knit elite families in Jiangnan were keenly aware of the need to maintain the solidarity of primary associations like kinship groups, as well as to draw together higher and lower orders by organizing villages and districts through public charities, defense organizations, and other gentry-led groups that provided welfare for social dependents.\textsuperscript{121} There are many examples of this warmly sanctioned paternalism in the provincial gazetteer of Jiangnan.\textsuperscript{122} For example, Zhang Qi of Shanghai "set out to imitate Fan Wenzheng by planning a charitable trust. He established one thou-

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 136. See also Xu Daling, "Shilun Ming houqi de Donglin dang ren," p. 3.

\textsuperscript{119} Mizoguchi Yūzō, "Iwayuru Tōrinha jinshi no shisō," pp. 187–188.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., pp. 176–178; Satō Fumitoshi, "Minmatsu Yenjichū no ran ni tsuite," p. 223.

\textsuperscript{121} Hamashima, "Rural Society," pp. 12–13. Chen Longzheng, an absentee landlord living in the district capital of Jiashan (Zhejiang), addressed other members of the gentry in 1630, detailing ways in which he loaned rice to poor peasants and suggesting similar philanthropic measures in order to serve the common interests of the county. He also founded the Society of Joint Benefit (Tongsan hui) to "promote good deeds" among the urban poor; at the same time, he urged the gentry to serve in corvée labor and not profit from exemptions. Mori, "Gentry," pp. 50–51. Mizoguchi, "Tōrinha," pp. 236–238.

\textsuperscript{122} Lineage leaders also provided welfare for poorer kinsmen because they were afraid of losing a supply of labor for their estates. To the extent that a lineage's poverty-level peasants were kept in their native place instead of emigrating to a city, managerial landlords were assured of a ready supply of farm laborers. This may have discouraged the adoption of labor-saving technology. Shih, "Peasant Economy," ch. 2, p. 42.
sand *mu* of charity fields to support his kinsmen."¹²³ Wei Lian, a metropolitan degree-holder from Huating, contributed a charitable estate "for the poor of his clan and village."¹²⁴ Wang Zhilin of Qingyang, son of an official, established charity fields in 1627 for his lineage, and then founded a charity school and a relief granary, "all for the use of the villagers."¹²⁵ One could cite hundreds more examples of gentrymen sponsoring charitable foundations, building bridges, repairing temples, or establishing ferry services across Jiangnan’s many waterways.¹²⁶ Recurrent in all of these efforts was the theme of drawing close to one’s neighbors by trying to narrow the gap between rich and poor. Local militia were sponsored in the same spirit of drawing all classes together in a collective effort to defend one’s home. For example, the same Wang Zhilin mentioned just above later organized militia, paid from his own family funds, and "summoned stout braves to protect the district capital, which came to depend upon this defense force entirely."¹²⁷

Of course, the gentry’s obsession with solidarity testified to its absence.¹²⁸ Reacting to impersonal economic exploitation, certain

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¹²³ Huang, *Jiangnan tongzhi*, 158:9b. Fan Wenzheng was Fan Zhongyan, the famous Song scholar and philanthropist who argued that public charity relief was the duty of the Confucian gentleman. Denis Twitchett, "The Fan Clan's Charitable Estate," *passim.*

¹²⁴ Huang, *Jiangnan tongzhi*, 158:1b.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 161:16b.


¹²⁷ Huang, *Jiangnan tongzhi*, 161:16b. When the magnates of one area tried to make inroads upon neighboring districts, local ties were also strengthened. For example, at Rugao, the home of Mao Xiang, across the Yangzi River from Jiangyin, poor fishing families lived on several natural islands deposited by the silt-ridden river. When local magnates (*haojia*) tried to sequester these alluvial lands, the Rugao local gentry, the magistrate, and the island dwellers all contributed part of the annual harvest to build boats and buy weapons in defense. Ibid., 115:41a.

¹²⁸ Thus, even though the local elite of Tongcheng (Anhui) cancelled some peasant debts and tried to organize relief measures during the last three decades of Ming rule, the gentry in that wealthy district continued to exploit its privileges. "Any previous concern for the wider interests of the locality as a
This late Ming woodblock print of a farming household's party, after a good harvest has been collected and the tax collectors have left a surplus behind, has a frenzied quality, in contrast to the more reverent and ritualized drawing of farmers worshipping the god of the grain in the Kangxi period (see plate 34). One person, perhaps a menial, plays clappers, another drinks wine out of a jar. A third person shows off by holding a bowl in his mouth, while yet a fourth participant plays finger games. In the foreground an old man throws up and a skinny dog rushes over to lap up the vomit. The celebratory song, written in Southern Mandarin at the top, ends: “Drinking to a stupor. / The old sot dumps his lunch. / Clap hands and sing at the side.” Kuang Fan, Shi min tu zuan [Employing people: a pictorial compendium] (1593), 1:18b.
segments of the metropolitan elite, perhaps affected by values indelibly present in Wang Yangming Confucianism (and especially that of the Taizhou school), continued to espouse popular causes and to attack the rich for exploiting the poor.\textsuperscript{129} The attack by Li Jin in 1636 upon the Jiangnan gentry, and his call for taxing the wealthy landlords of the lower Yangzi, may have been influenced by this ideological strain.\textsuperscript{130} But the defenders of gentry paternalism had their own intellectual champions as well. The main opponent of Li Jin in the court debate that followed was Grand Secretary Qian Shisheng, the wealthy leader of the Jiashan (Zhejiang) local elite. Qian, who argued that the gentry was the source of the people’s livelihood and the first line of defense against rebellion, was related by marriage to Yuan Huang (1533–1606), the official who had resuscitated the Taoist merit and demerit system and who had promoted the syncretism of the three teachings (Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism) as a way of “Confucianizing” the lower classes.\textsuperscript{131} Both the Yuan and Qian lineages laid great stress on the importance of carefully controlling one’s serfs and tenants by teaching them proper respect for their superiors and a sense of right and wrong. By the late 1630s, then, powerful segments of

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whole seems to have become submerged in narrow self and kin interest. This, coupled with an increasingly arrogant attitude towards the general population, was probably sufficient to set the elite families and their relatives apart and to create a gulf of dangerous antagonism between them and the rest of the society.” Beattie, \textit{Land and Lineage}, pp. 67–68.


\textsuperscript{130} Mizoguchi, “Törinha,” p. 181. Shen Dingping believed that the class conflict of the late Ming period caused an acute sense of social crisis on the part of statesmen like Hai Rui and Zhang Juzheng; he also asserts that small-scale peasant revolts provoked a gradual change in tenancy arrangements, so that rents were adjusted (i.e., became fixed) in a way that was more advantageous to the tillers. According to Shen, these gains were irreversible once the social crisis was confirmed by the great rebellions of the 1630s and ’40s. Kuang-ching Liu, “World View and Peasant Rebellion,” p. 316.

\textsuperscript{131} De Bary, “Individualism,” pp. 175–176.
the Chinese gentry were rejecting Confucian populism for a more austere and conservative ideology of Confucian paternalism.  

Top-ranking members of the Jiashan elite like Qian Shisheng who lived in the district capital were able to forge a stable alliance with lower-ranking gentrymen and village heads who remained behind in the countryside to collect their rents for them. But elsewhere in Jiangnan the gentry’s efforts to promote organic solidarity and patriarchal order were not quite so effective in the countryside. Their attempts were mainly undone by the side effects of the economic crisis then gripping China. The decline of foreign trade meant a drop in silver imports, and consequently a terrible deflation of copper currency vis-à-vis silver. In Jiangnan, copper lost 44 percent of its value between 1638 and 1640, and 6 percent of its value between 1640 and 1646. Simultaneously, the demand for textiles plummeted in Jiangnan, as that area was cut off from large portions of the interior, and as trade with Japan, Manila, and Malacca came to a virtual standstill. In Songjiang, between 1642 and 1644 the average price of cotton was only about one-eighth its regular price. Since half of the profits of trade in Songjiang came from weaving and spinning, the average person did not earn enough money to buy rice, which then sold for two taels per picul. No longer remotely self-sufficient in rice production, the


133 Okuzaki, Kyōshin jinushi, p. 578.

134 In 1638, 1,000 “pure” copper cash were worth about .9 taels; in 1640, they were worth .5 taels; and in 1646 in Suzhou the going rate was .17 taels for 1,000 copper cash. William S. Atwell, “Notes on Silver, Foreign Trade, and the Late Ming Economy,” p. 20.

135 The normal price of cotton bolls was 3 to 4 taels of silver per 100 catties. In this period the price of raw cotton fell to .5 to .6 taels. Atwell, “Silver,” p. 19.

136 The average trade price of rice during the Hongwu period (1368–1399) was 0.46 ounces of silver for one picul (dan) of grain. The price fell during the Yongle period, then returned to 0.44 ounces/picul between 1460 and 1490. During the last decade of the 15th century, at the time of the war in Korea, inflation set in. Rice prices steadily climbed, reaching 0.927 ounces/picul in the 1620s. By the 1630s the price had more than doubled, averaging 1.159
inhabitants of eastern Jiangnan desperately depended upon rice imports. As a Wanli period gazetteer put it:

Our country does not produce rice, but relies for its food upon other areas. When the summer wheat is reaching ripeness, and the autumn corps are already arising, the boats of the merchants which come loaded with rice form an unbroken line. . . . If by any chance there were to be an outbreak of hostilities . . . such that the city gates did not open for ten days, and the hungry people raised their voices in clamor, how could there fail to be riot and disorder?137

While Suzhou fell into temporary decline, with many of its private homes vacant or for sale, the Shanghai area—"little Suzhou," as it was then often called—witnessed terrible scenes of starvation.138 In 1641 a Shanghai scholar wrote that, "The people in our region had to exchange their children to eat, or break up corpses and steam them. Since the cotton cloth merchants failed to come, the inhabitants of Songjiang could only stand and wait for death."139

ounces of silver per dan of rice. James Peter Geiss, "Peking under the Ming," pp. 159–165. It has been estimated that the cost of shipping rice from Huguang to Jiangnan doubled its price. Dwight Perkins, "Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization," p. 482.


138 Atwell, "Silver," p. 21. The biography of Gu Daren, who had retired to Suzhou after service as provincial judge of Guangdong province, describes the situation in the city then. "In 1641 Suzhou had a great epidemic. Famine [victims] filled the streets. Gu emptied his purse to give relief and a great many lives depended [upon him]. In the end his own household began to fail and they only retained one house, green lichen filling the wall." Gu twice tried to commit suicide in 1644, but servants prevented him each time. Two years later, after a stroke, he began vomiting blood and died, saying, "Emperor, your minister comes." Qian Yong, Lü yuan cong hua, pp. 121–122. Shanghai was called "little Suzhou" because it was an important stopping place for traveling merchants, and because of its large population of several hundred thousand residents. Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, p. 106.

139 Peng Zeyi, "Qingdai qianqi shougongye de fazhan," p. 9. That spring white
The Serf Revolts

The situation was even more desperate in the fall and winter of 1643–1644 when Zhang Xianzhong’s armies in Huguang and Jiangxi impeded the shipment of rice down the Yangzi. The following spring and summer drought struck and all of Songjiang’s wells ran dry. The price of rice had nearly redoubled by the time news reached the lower Yangzi of the death of the Chongzhen Emperor and the fall of Beijing to Li Zicheng.

Father Antonio de Gouveia explained what happened next around Shanghai in his annual letter to the Father-General of the Society of Jesuits.

The farmers of the city are all or almost all slaves of the retired officials and literati of high standing and cultivate their lands with a share for their sustenance; there are many thousands of these in the city and out in the country. Now seeing that there was no king, since the one of Nanking was not yet acclaimed, they made a body of many thousands, and asked their lords for papers of bondage because [with the fall of] the Chinese government they already were free. And taking up arms they first turned on the lords in the countryside, killing, robbing and doing a thousand other insults without anyone taking up arms against them, for the Mandarin of the city had already finished his term and the new one had not arrived. Having risen up in the country, they sent to the Mandarins and Literati to say that they should give them papers of their freedom immediately, and if not, on a certain day, which was the 18th of July, they would enter the walls and kill all without mercy. Such is the

rice was sold for 5 taels per picul. Officials exhorted the local gentry to establish gruel kitchens, but many people fell dead by the roadside before being able to reach the food stands. Helen Dunstan, “The Late Ming Epidemics,” p. 14. Elizabeth Colson graphically depicts similar situations in other societies when people cannot revert to basic agriculture because they lack the means or knowledge to do so, or have grown too dependent on cash crops which will not feed them. Elizabeth Colson, “In Good Years and in Bad,” p. 11.

141 Mark Elvin, “Economic Aspects of the Technology of the Pre-Modern Chinese Textile Industries,” p. 41.
polity of China, that although there were thousands of men in the
city and most powerful retired Mandarins, no one offered himself
to put it in a posture of defense, but they simply awaited the blow.
On the day designated, the rebels entered the city through open
gates and attacked the houses of the great ones, broke doors, en-
tered, wounded, beat, took what they wished and those who spoke
to them or reasoned with them were beaten and insulted, among
whom was the second son of our Christian Colao Paulo, [that is,
Xu Guangqi,] of good memory.\footnote{142} The fall of the

The Shanghai serf revolt was typical of numerous uprisings in the
lower Yangzi area where household servants and tenants joined to-
gether to attack their masters’ houses, demand the return of their
contracts of indenture, and seize food supplies.\footnote{143} The fall of the

\footnote{142 Archivum Romanum Societatis Jesu, Jap. Sin. 122, Fol. 204–242, pp. 213–
214. (Reference supplied by John Wills.) Prior to this a local sect, led by a
Buddhist priest, had enrolled numerous followers in rural districts where
Christian converts were the most numerous around Shanghai. The district
magistrate interrogated both Christians and sectarians, and ordered the latter
flogged while the former were released. Ibid., pp. 212–213. In 1650 it was
reported that the Christian population of Shanghai totaled 18–20,000 per-
sons. George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants, p. 308.}

\footnote{143 Elvin, Pattern, p. 246. Perhaps because of these \textit{nubian} (slave revolts), which
also occurred in Hubei and Henan in the 1650s, it became increasingly easier
for serfs and household slaves (\textit{nubei}) to buy back their freedom. By the
early eighteenth century, and especially after 1685, most serfs indentured
themselves with unnotarized “white contracts” (\textit{bai qi}) instead of notarized
“red contracts” (\textit{hong qi} or \textit{yin qi}). The former were considered to involve
temporary indenture while the latter entailed permanent bondage. The legal
records of the early and mid-Qing show that impoverished people would
sign a “white contract,” and then if they could save up money later, would
“buy themselves back” (\textit{shu shen}) in the same way that a prostitute could re-
dem her freedom. By the Yongzheng period, “red contracts” were no
longer used. However, the so-called abolition of slavery during the Yong-
zheng period may have been overly emphasized by historians. Records show
not only that there were continuous sales of children to wealthy households
in places like Jiangsu in the 1740s and that people became serfs by marrying
someone who was already a bondservant (a procedure called \textit{zhaopei}) or by
\textit{toukao}; they also demonstrate that there was a ramified legal structure up-
holding masters when they punished serfs and prohibiting \textit{nubei} from dis-
pusting their masters’ authority. Nevertheless, there were many instances}
Ming emperor seemed to signal a change in the social order—or at least a momentary renewal of life, a fresh beginning, and therefore a time to wipe the social slate clean.\textsuperscript{144} As Song Qi’s followers said during the serf uprising in Yixian (Anhui) in 1645: “The emperor has changed, so the masters should be made into servants; master and servant should address each other as brothers.”\textsuperscript{145} Beginning as attacks on the homes of the wealthy to recover contracts of indenture (\textit{maishen wenyue}), serf uprisings combined with “tenant armies” (\textit{dianbing}) into a movement of violent destruction of gentry wealth and power. As the gentry retreated into their cities, the rural poor burned the villas of the wealthy and looted their storehouses. Many tenants fled the land or joined some of the ragtag military units operating throughout central and south China during this period.\textsuperscript{146}

As the revolt spread from village to village in eastern Jiangnan, the local gentry turned to the Southern Ming regime for aid against the rioters. Because a new government had been quickly set up in Nanjing, loyalist officials were momentarily able to hold during the 18th century of people being killed by their servants in household quarrels. Wei Qingyuan, Wu Qiyan, and Lu Su, “Qingdai nubei zhidu,” pp. 7, 23–27, 34, 45, 52–53. See also Torbert, \textit{Household Department}, p. 57; Mei- jer, “Slavery,” p. 330; Watson, “Transactions,” p. 223.

\textsuperscript{144} Mori Masao, “Sen roppyaku yonjū gonen Taisōshū Sakeichin ni okeru Uryūkai no hanran ni tsuite,” p. 200.

\textsuperscript{145} Song Qi, who commanded twelve companies of armed bondservants, had said: “When our grandfather was made a bondservant, his descendants were automatically categorized in that fashion. Now we are endowed by Heaven with a special opportunity, for our masters are all weak and feeble and are not able to take up arms. We can take advantage of their crisis. Even if they want to suppress us, they do not have time.” Wiens, “Masters and Bondservants,” p. 59.

\textsuperscript{146} The movement began in the lower Yangzi valley and culminated in the far south, in Guangdong. “In the second month of [Shunzhi] two, local bandits arose. These bandits were all slaves (\textit{mu}) who angrily killed their masters in order to rebel. They began at Chonghe hamlet in Shunde county, and extended to Xinhui, Kaiping, and Gaoyao where they continued to kill their masters—excavating their ancestral tombs and occupying their women’s quarters. Year after year the butchery and evil continued until finally in Shunzhi fifteen it ceased.” Gaoyao district gazetteer, cited in Fu, \textit{Ming-Qing nongcun}, pp. 1–2.
together the social fabric. The military affairs intendant of the Su-Song circuit executed a score or more of the rebels in a place called Nanxiang; and Governor Qi Biaojia ordered a vigorous implementation of the baojia system by village headmen, while replacing inefficient local officials and strengthening local defense measures. During the winter of 1644–1645 a restive peace settled over the area. The tenants and serfs ceased rioting, but the pirates under “Pockmark” Gu San on Chongming Island just above Shanghai increased in number, local gangs became bolder, and the gentry reinforced their bodyguards. The gentry’s watchdogs, however, threatened to bite their own masters. One anonymous member of the Taicang district gentry described the militia (xiangbing) of the coastal town of Shaqi as riffraff.

The local troops [assembled] in our town were actually the unreliable elements (wulaizi) of the Black Dragon Society (Wu long hui). Ever since there had been definite news of the Chongzhen Emperor’s death in the Northern Capital, a number of cruel and cunning people in the village had assembled their followers, calling themselves the Black Dragon Society. Although these were marketplace vendors, menials, serfs (nu) and other worthless sorts, there were some pugilists and brawlers whom they enlisted, giving them a roof over their heads, and feeding and clothing them. When they ran into someone who was feeble and frail, they bit to the bone. These xiangbing did have some of the trappings of a legitimate militia unit. Most of the actual soldiers, however, were of the poorest class of rural workers supplemented by tea-shop clerks from the district town. There were several leaders of the Black Dragon Society, which did not have a very wide membership but was an extreme example of the kind of disorderly paramilitary force many gentrymen feared. One leader, Yu Boxiang, was a hereditary serf attached to the Wang lineage. Another, Chen Mengdiao, was a

148 Dennerline, Chia-ting, p. 269; idem, “Massacre,” p. 264.
bondservant of the Xu family, and had joined the society with members of his own household because he was engaged in a feud with another family over a marriage dispute. A third leader was Gu Shenqing, a bondservant of the same Xu clan, who earned a living as a salt smuggler on the side. His own son was one of the military experts hired to train the local militiamen.\footnote{Yantang jianwen zaji, p. 3.}

These were hardly reassuring allies for the good burghers of Jiangnan. When news came of the collapse of the Southern Ming armies, the serfs of Taicang arose again, and the Black Dragon Society leader, Yu Boxiang, announced that he was going to have the legal inheritance of bondservant status abolished while serfdom itself would be limited only to those who had commended themselves.\footnote{Dennerline, "Massacre," p. 269; Dennerline, Chia-ting, pp. 272–273.} As looting and violence spread, and as mobs in the villages of eastern Taicang assembled in thousands to rob and murder their masters, disorder even spread to the cities.

The Grand Army crossed the river, uprisings occurring as its vanguard moved across the land. On June 7, several hundred men prepared to arm themselves. Their leaders dressed up like shamans, beating gongs and shouting triumphantly. Blunderbusses could be heard on all sides. They rushed down the roads and through the streets. The people hid in alarm and terror, while the disorder continued on into the night. The next day, at dawn, those men began to extort money from the great families. The great families in turn hesitated to concede, but could only excite each other into mutual panic. They insisted that on such-and-such a day, so-and-so would be robbed. Consequently, they hid their wives in boats moored along the river. This simply added to the panic. Then, at the hour of three drums on June 10, when the townsfolk were all asleep in their bedchambers, a shout suddenly rang out across the town. "There are hundreds of men moving on us from the east. Each of you seize a weapon. They plan to burn the city." Startled awake from their dreams, clutching their daughters and sons, leading their servants by the hands, weeping and screaming, the people bolted in all directions.\footnote{Yantang jianwen zaji, p. 3.}
The attack turned out to be a false alarm. But two days later a rival gang, several hundred strong, did attack Shaqi, killing some of the wealthier families and helping convince members of the gentry and the district’s wealthy linen merchants that any order at all was better than this kind of social chaos.\textsuperscript{153} When Qing officials arrived to request the county population and tax registers, those documents were turned over and the new district magistrate was welcomed.\textsuperscript{154} With his help, and the aid of a former censor named Shi Min who had been accused of treason by the Southern Ming government for having collaborated with Li Zicheng, the rich families in Shaqi were able to put down the Black Dragon Society by arresting and fining its leaders.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{153} On the Taicang textile industry and its merchants, see Nishijima, “Shina shoki mengyō shijō,” p. 123; and Fu, \textit{Mingdai Jiangnan}, p. 40. Influential local notables lost their normal protection against violent reprisal by commoners. Zhang Cai, co-founder of the Restoration Society, had been involved in an embezzlement case several years earlier. On June 12, 1645, a group of men entered his house, seized him, and literally dragged him down to the yamen where they forced him to sign his name to a criminal ledger before stoning him and dragging him face down through the streets to the primary school grounds where he was left for dead. He survived the beating and moved in with relatives. Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 265–266; Dennerline, \textit{Chia-ting}, p. 270.

\textsuperscript{154} Administration in Taicang had initially been assumed by Wang Jiefu, great grandson of the famous litterateur Wang Shizhen. Jiefu took advantage of his close friendship with Qian Qianyi to take over the yamen and extort money from wealthy residents. The official appointed by the Qing government was Zhou Quan, and when he reached Taicang he simply removed Wang’s authority. Dennerline, “Massacre,” p. 280.

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., pp. 266–267; Dennerline, \textit{Chia-ting}, pp. 271–272. Although it is impossible to make a direct correlation, there seems to have been more initial collaboration in districts where the landholding system was notoriously oppressive to the rural poor. In Changzhou, for instance, several local lower degree-holders led \textit{xiangbing} against Qing officials, but their men were quickly captured or killed, and there seems to have been little or no response from the rentiers within the city proper. Ji, \textit{Mingji nanliè}, p. 276. And at Yixing (west of Lake Tai), where there was such a high rate of gentry tax evasion and absentee landlordism that 50% of the land carried the entire tax quota, only a few commoners responded to the loyalist leader Ren Yuansui. Hou Fangyu, \textit{Zhuanghui tang ji, Zhuanghui tang wenji}, 5:12b–13a; Liang Fang-chung, “Local Tax Collectors in the Ming Dynasty,” p. 264. The major
Collaboration Against Disorder

The same collaboration between city leaders who “loved to do good deeds for everyone” and the Qing government also quickly developed in Wuxi and Suzhou. In Wuxi, Gu Gao, the nephew of the co-founder of the Donglin Academy, had just returned from his imprisonment in Nanjing after being arrested at Ruan Da-cheng’s orders. Although he wanted to mobilize village troops against the Qing, the elders and notables of the city went ahead and collected all the tax and population registers to present to the newly ensconced Qing authorities at Changzhou. When Gu Gao accosted the collaborators enroute, they told the ignorant village militiamen accompanying them that he was a bandit. The peasants killed the illustrious writer on the spot, and although they soon learned to their regret how august was the man they had murdered, the city by then was under firm Qing control.* In Suzhou, a lower degree-holder named Zhang Di did organize a loyalist “rebel party” (pan dang); but when there were rumors that bandits from Lake Tai were about to attack the city, the wealthy municipal leader and militia organizer Ye Maohua turned the city over to the representative of the new dynasty and earned official praise for “advocating that the people surrender.”^’

The Qing official to whom Ye Maohua surrendered was Huang Jiazi, Qian Qianyi’s friend, who was welcomed by all the great

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156 Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 388–389; Zha, Guo shou lu, p. 70.
157 “Nanyuan xiaoke,” Ping Wu shì lüe, pp. 113–114. For a description of tenant uprisings around Lake Tai at this time, see Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 5, p. 4. Such men as Ye Maohua often went on to become Qing officials in their own right, accompanying the Qing armies as they moved south, persuading the local gentry of other regions to accept the new rulers. Xuzhou, in northern Jiangsu, produced a number of these figures, who helped secure the surrender of the Lianghuai salt region. It is not known whether or not they were connected with the Shanxi merchants in Beijing who were acting as the bankers for the Qing government. Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 112:32b; 114:3a; 151:24b:25a; 154:19b.
families (da xing) with incense when he entered the city. Like other members of the Qing pacification cadre, Huang’s purpose was to work out a simple surrender of the local elite in situ, in exchange for their continued control of the district and the promise of military support instead of attack by the Manchu-Han troops of the new dynasty. This was exactly what happened farther south in Jiaxing when Dodo’s army passed through on the way to Hangzhou on July 2, 1645. Although the military intendant committed suicide, the prefect turned over his registers and the city elders led

159 Shen Tao, Jiangshang yiwen, p. 199; Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 117:10b–11a. Because he was afraid that Shanxi troops would cause conflict with the local residents, Dodo at first sent a contingent of 1,000 bannermen commanded by Li Yanling (Li Yongfang’s son), who was accompanied by Tu Guobao, the brigade commander from Datong who had surrendered earlier. They entered the city on June 27. Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 279–280; idem, Chiating, p. 279.
the residents to paint *shun min* (surrendering people) in large characters on the city gates and walls. Most of the districts around the prefectural capital followed suit.\(^\text{160}\)

Although the policy of peaceful surrender was initially approved by Dodo while he was still in Nanjing, it was left up to his nephew, Lekedehun (Prince Shuncheng, d. 1652), to implement the policy after he was named Generalissimo Who Pacifies the South (Ping nan da jiangjun). Lekedehun, who was Nurhaci’s great-grandson, was posted to Nanjing in the summer of 1645.\(^\text{161}\) His chief lieutenant—who bore the grandiose titles of Grand Secretary, Tutor to the Heir Apparent, President of the Board of War, Right Assistant Supervising Censor of the Metropolitan Censorate, and Grand Military Coordinator for the Pacification of the Province of Jiangnan and for the Regulation of Military Rations—was none other than the former Ming war hero Hong Chengchou.\(^\text{162}\) Ever since the Chongzhen Emperor had conducted obsequies on his behalf in Beijing, Hong had been presumed gloriously dead in battle on the northern frontier. His reappearance in Nanjing caused a tremendous public stir, and Hong was time and again reminded in the

\(^{160}\) “Nanyuan xiaoke,” *Ping Wu shi lüe*, p. 116. At this time Mao Xiang—one of the “Four Lords”—was about thirty kilometers south of Jiaxing. His father had accepted a post there as superintendent of military provisions for the Prince of Fu. When the city fell into the hands of the Manchus, the Mao household—with nearly one hundred male and female attendants, and boatloads of baggage—fled into the countryside, where they spent over three months trying to evade capture. At one point the entourage was robbed and more than twenty of the servants were killed. Eventually, Mao Xiang and eight family members, including his lovely concubine, Dong Xiaowan, managed to get back to their home in Rugao, north of the Yangzi River. Mao P’i-chiang, *The Reminiscences of Tung Hsiao-wan*, pp. 74–78; Zhang Lüxiang, *Chongding Yangyuan xiansheng quanji*, pp. 151–153. The policy of securing elite cooperation in Zhejiang was masterminded by Zhang Cunren, who as governor-general called for examinations and tax remissions to win over the local gentry. Guo, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji,” p. 129.


\(^{162}\) *Da-Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu*, 18:15a (hereafter cited as *Shizu shilu*). Hong was ordered on August 4, 1645, to assume responsibility for gaining the surrender of Jiangnan. Li Guangtao, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 253.
most insulting and shaming of ways that he had failed to die for his emperor and deserved no respect at all from other literati noble enough to express their Ming loyalty publicly.\(^{163}\)

One way of relieving his shame, while effectively carrying out his mission to pacify Jiangnan by “inviting and soothing” (zhaofu) the province into submission, was to widen the policy of admitting former Ming officials into the Qing government. After he reached Nanjing, Hong Chengchou repeatedly recommended former Ming officials for office under the Qing, explaining to the court that without their help he could not pacify the region.

My talents are wanting and my strength weak. I fear that if we only use one person’s services day in and day out to manage both petty and important administrative matters, then our enterprises will be dilatory and slipshod. When I first received this commission, the officials of the Inner Courts, Feng Quan and Ganglin, often urged me to use officers of the central army and of the banners as my staff. Furthermore, it was suggested that since there were many able men in the coastal areas and in Jiangnan, they too could be recommended for appointment.\(^{164}\)

Like Qian Qianyi, Hong Chengchou believed that the appointment of former Ming officials both to the central government and as magistrates in their native provinces would increase the density of administrative control, and prevent military incidents from occurring.\(^{165}\)

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163 Yantang jianwen zaji, p. 23; Zhang Yi, Sou wen xu bi, 1:20a. According to Palafox, Hong—who gestured with mouth and hands when he spoke—was demeaningly called “monkey” by the populace. De Palafox, Histoire de la conquête de la Chine par les Tartares, p. 84. Insults were personal as well as public. Hong’s former tutor, the loyalist Shen Baiwu, pretended not to recognize Hong when brought before him in custody. “Duke Hong received his country’s generous benevolence and died long ago in order to preserve his virtue. Who can you be, wanting to lead me astray into unrighteousness?” Qian Yong, Lü yuan cong hua, pp. 2–3.

164 Hong Chengchou, Hong Chengchou zhangzou wence huijü, 1:1. The memorial, which is dated September 5, 1645, contained a recommendation for Yang Tongting, formerly a Ming assistant surveillance commissioner.

165 Hong, Zhangzou wence, 1:3b–5a.
Despite Hong and Qian’s best efforts, however, members of the gentry did not in every case respond to this appeal. As we have seen, it was in the social interest of the gentry as a Stand to collaborate. All were aware of this, yet not all were willing to respond to blatant pleas for law and order which played up to that concern—even if couched in terms such as Qian’s which suggested that the greater good of the populace depended upon stabilizing the new dynasty’s mandate by surrendering to it. Within the gentry itself, there were some who felt bound to higher moral appeals. Often these gentrymen can be identified as members of the highest ranks of the gentry estate: elite families that produced metropolitan bureaucrats. More important, they identified themselves as belonging to a special and select group within the gentry: an aristocracy of the mind responsible for maintaining the high moral and cultural standards of the ancients. They were, in their own words, the “leading scholars” (lingshi) of the realm. Their fathers and uncles had perhaps participated in the early stages of the Donglin movement. They themselves were likely to be members of one of the literary clubs that coalesced to form the Restoration Society. They were passionately idealistic about government—even to the point of threatening to undermine political stability. When personal integrity and political expediency conflicted, the most ardent among them did not hesitate to choose the former.

166 Dennerline, “Massacre,” p. 47; idem, Chia-ting, p. 315. See also idem, “Fiscal Reform and Local Control,” passim.
167 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., History and Will, p. 250.
168 The phrase is Gao Panlong’s. See Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “The Price of Autonomy,” p. 41.
169 Being men of culture (wenren), many of these literati felt personally responsible for the fall of the Ming because of what later appeared to them to be their own dilettantism. The ideal man of culture in the late Ming was skillful in lyric poetry, metrics, prose writing, songs, music, calligraphy, painting, stone engraving, dice playing, staging theatricals, telling stories, playing the flute and drums, and so forth. As described for Fang Yizhi, the concept of wenren incorporated the notion that cultural pursuits were just as important as philosophy or government. When the Ming fell, some literati seem to have felt an “undercurrent of doubt” about their own amateur ideal, blaming the downfall of the dynasty on this aestheticism. In 1646 Gu Yanwu wrote:
Consequently, an appeal to the social conservatism of the gentry as an elite on the side of public order and civil rule had to be made in a muted and subtle way to avoid offense. The gentry had to be courted, not blatantly seduced. If the blandishments were too vulgar, men of honor were forced to reject the Qing offer of collaboration in order to avoid public compromise. Eventually, the elite families of Jiangnan would find ways of cooperating with Qing officials to protect their own social interest while meeting the government's need to control that area's considerable economic resources. But both sides had much to learn before that compromise would be possible in the 1660s and 1670s under the reign of the Kangxi Emperor. Now, in 1645, the new authorities were far too heavy-handed. In Jiading, for instance, the new Qing magistrate, Zhang Weixi, flatly ordered members of the local gentry to come “converse with him.” They refused. And in Songjiang, people who had already agreed to collaborate were told to point out “important personages” (renwu) to the new magistrate, who just as bluntly ordered these “leading scholars” (lingshi) to pay a public call of respect at the local yamen or be considered rebels. Xia Yunyi, the renowned essayist and a member of Chen Zilong’s Jishe in Songjiang, wrote shortly after this that:

It is just as though there were a virtuous widow whom someone wants to marry. The wife simply cannot. Thus the saying goes, “Follow you not the maiden who shows her face.” The wife can either lift her bedcurtain to show her face or kill herself to keep it hidden.

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“In the last twenty or thirty years, those in the local districts who were known as ‘men of culture’ (wenren) without exception devoted themselves to the attainment of empty reputation and unearned gain.” Peterson, *Bitter Gourd*, p. 155; see also pp. 31–34.

171 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *The Fall of Imperial China*, pp. 29–35.
175 Ibid., p. 242. See also Willard J. Peterson, “The Life of Ku Yen-wu, Part II,” p. 237. The historian Sima Guang said of Feng Dao, the 10th century official
As we shall see, Xia himself was eventually to choose moral chastity over political promiscuity.  

From the earliest days of the occupation of Jiangnan, then, there were elite young gentrymen adamantly opposed to collaboration. Mobilized partly by their own political involvement, which in some cases went back to the defense of Donglin heroes, they instinctively resisted pleas for compromise with their ideals. Yet as we have seen in the examples of Suzhou and Taicang, local urban leaders were often quick to agree to accommodation, turning over their tax registers to Qian Qianyi’s protégés, or surrendering to Qing military officials. And when local militants tried to mobilize opposition to the collaborators, they—like Zhang Di—were resisted and killed by their own municipal leaders. What altered the situation nearly overnight was a dramatic change in Qing policy.

**The Haircutting Command**

Initially, upon occupying Nanjing, the Qing authorities had followed the policy established in the north by decreeing that only military personnel had to follow Manchu customs and shave their heads. A decree issued by Dodo, Prince Yu, on June 19, 1645, read:

> Our country (guo) complies with your manners and customs with respect to the matter of shaving the head. As of now, in all of the places occupied by the Grand Army, we will shave the military and not shave civilians; we will shave soldiers and not shave the people.

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You all must not fail to observe regulations, and [if you are supposed to be shaved] go ahead and shave yourselves. Formerly, there were shameless [civil] officials who shaved themselves first in order to seek an interview. My country has already reviled them. Special proclamation.\textsuperscript{177}

But this concession to the sensibilities of southern \textit{ru} (literati) who held self-tonsured collaborators in contempt was fleeting because two such “shameless” officials at that very time were persuading the Qing court to change its stance on the issue. At the suggestion of sycophantish Chinese collaborators in Beijing, who were eager to enhance their own factional interests by appealing to Manchu nativism, Dorgon decided early in July, 1645, to rescind his decision to suspend the haircutting order. Wherever the Qing ruled, the word went out that from then on all Chinese—soldiers and civilians—would have to shave their foreheads and plait their hair in a tribal queue like the Manchus.\textsuperscript{178}

From the Manchus’ perspective, the command to cut one’s hair or lose one’s head not only brought rulers and subjects together into a single physical resemblance; it also provided them with a perfect loyalty test. Henceforth, as had been the case during the frontier wars, adherents would signal their collaboration by adopting tribal hair styles. “Those who obey are people of our country (\textit{wo guo zhi min}). Those who disobey are bandits under rebel command and must be severely punished.”\textsuperscript{179} Thus, when the central government formally approved the policy of extending amnesties to former Ming military units in Jiangnan on July 21, 1645, it agreed to “forgive” officers and men if they repented their earlier behavior, and signalled their recantation by shaving their heads.

\textsuperscript{177} Ji, \textit{Mingji nanl"ue}, pp. 237–238.
\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Shizu shil"u}, 17:7b–8. The Chinese authors of the policy of collaboration were well aware of the threat the haircutting order posed to peaceful cooperation. In September, 1645, Zhang Cunren warned that the effort to attract adherents through local examinations would be undermined by enforcement of the tonsorial regulations. Dorgon, however, did not waver. Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 10.
\textsuperscript{179} \textit{Donghua lu}, cited in: Xie, \textit{Nanming shil"ue}, p. 78.
Furthermore, officials will be sent to encourage those who wish to surrender peacefully; and, if the latter respect our regulations and cut their hair, they can forthwith return to the fold.¹⁸⁰

From the perspective of Han officials, however, this was a humiliating act of degradation.¹⁸¹ Ming men, once capped, let their hair grow long, and wore it in elaborate fashions, under horseshair caps.¹⁸² Long hair and careful attention to it were part of the scholar-official’s image and bearing. To cut that hair must have truly seemed a barbaric act, a desecration of civilized manners.¹⁸³ For the literati, moreover, cutting one’s hair was a degradation of one’s dignity as a ru (Confucian scholar). Partly, this was because it contravened Mencian injunctions to preserve one’s parents’ progeny intact.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁰ Shizu shilu, 17:20. This policy was first applied to the 67 Ming officers and officials manning the Yuntai Mountain garrison, on the coast just below the Shandong border.

¹⁸¹ To many, it must have recalled the infamous edict of 1129, when the Jin decided to shave the heads of the “southern people” (nan min) after the fall of Kaifeng. Trauzettel, “Sung Patriotism,” p. 206.

¹⁸² Ricci, Sixteenth Century, p. 78.

¹⁸³ Visitors to China during the late Ming noticed this fascination with coiffure. Father Martin de Rada wrote: “They are proud to have a great head of hair. They let it grow long and coil it up in a knot on the crown of the head. They then put it on a hairnet parted in the center to hold and fix the hair in position, wearing on top of it a bonnet made of horseshair. This is their ordinary headgear, although their captains’ bonnets are of another kind made of finest thread and underneath a hairnet of gold thread. They take a good time each morning in combing and dressing their hair.” C. R. Boxer, ed., South China in the Sixteenth Century, p. 282. Similar comments by Father Gaspar da Cruz can be found in ibid., p. 183; and see also Narakino Shimesu, “Shindai tokubu Man-Kan hiritsu no hendō ni tsuite,” p. 128. The identification of barbarism with strange dress and hair styles goes back at least to the Analects, where Confucius said, in praise of Guan Zhong for having kept out the barbarians: “But for Guan Zhong, we should now be wearing our hair unbound, and the lappets of our coats buttoning on the left side.” Analects, XIV.18.ii, English translation from James Legge, trans., Confucius, p. 282.

¹⁸⁴ Hua Yuncheng, for instance, immured himself in Wuxi in 1645, rather than cut his hair. Three years later, when he was 61 sui, he was betrayed to the authorities, who took him to Nanjing to be questioned. During the interrogation by both Manchu and Chinese officials, Hua (who was formerly a
To shave one's head was also a kind of tonsorial castration—almost a symbolic mutilation of one's integrity, far more damaging in some ways than physical death. When Gu Gao's friend Yang Tingshu, the famous teacher who had fled from Nanjing to Dongting during Ruan Dacheng's purge of the government, was arrested on suspicion of involvement in the 1647 Songjiang uprising, the prosecutor made it very clear that he would not be arraigned for political crimes and would be treated with deference once his hair was cut. Yang flatly refused. "To cut off my head is a small matter," he said. "To shave my head is a great matter." Yang was, of course, beheaded.  

185 Xie, Nanming shiliüe, p. 90. Yang was suspected of collusion with his student Dai Zhijun, who was a major leader of the 1647 Songjiang uprising at the time of Wu Shengzhao's mutiny. Ji, Mingji nanlue, p. 280; Gu, Tinglin shi wenji, Tinglin shiji, 1:10. Yang Tingshu is also quoted as saying to his prosecutor: "The Ming does not have ministers who have cut their hair. This means death, of course." Zha, Guo shou lu, p. 59. Before he died, he is supposed to have cut himself, and then to have used his blood to write on the walls of his cell: "When I, as a youth, read poetry and belles lettres, I wished to emulate the example of Wen Xinguo. Today I finally reached my goal." Wen Xinguo is the Song patriot Wen Tianxiang. Xie, Nanming shiliüe, p. 90. His actual execution took place in front of the Sizhou Pagoda in Wujiang. As the executioner's axe was raised, he called out in a loud voice, "I was born a man of the Great Ming"; the descending axe had, so bystanders said, already severed the head from the neck when the last words were heard: "and I shall die a spirit of the Great Ming." The executioner was duly impressed. Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 230. Yang's son, Zhongwen, managed to get the robe his father wore when he was killed and took the relic home. Many years later,
The command to shave the head not only offended literati—or the historically conscious who remembered that the Jurchen Jin dynasty had imposed the same barbarian practice upon the Chinese—it also enraged common folk, who viewed the loss of their hair as tantamount to the loss of their manhood. When the new policy was announced, time and again demagogues aroused peasant mobs by telling them that if they cut their hair they would lose their wives. Centuries later the queue and shaved forehead would be identified by the peasants with their native identity, but when the practice began throughout China in 1645 it represented a betrayal of Han masculinity, and this seemed especially galling to the peasants of the lower Yangzi. Thus, the haircutting order for the mass of commoners beneath the lingshi (leading scholars) was analogous to the order the literati received to demonstrate their allegiance publicly by visiting the magistrate’s yamen. The peasants could easily accept new rulers far away in a distant capital. But to have these barbarians, these “Tartars,” order them to change their Han customs was an affront that many swore they would not accept. Consequently, the rulers’ effort to make Manchus and Han one unified “body” initially had the effect of unifying upper- and lower-class natives in central and south China against the interlopers. The conflict between superior and inferior was momentarily overridden; and for once the aristocracy of the mind above, and the masses of Jiangnan below, stood together—even against the many elders, merchants, and retired officials in between who wished to accept the Qing offer of peace collaboration. And just as towns and cities had surrendered so amenable days and weeks before, so did their inhabitants now rise against the new government.

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qian, liuyuan conghua, pp. 3–4.

Local Resistance Movements

In many of the cities where local collaborators had taken power and were now ruling with the help of Qing magistrates, the urban leaders found themselves losing control of the countryside after they obeyed the humiliating order to shave their heads. In Taicang, where the Black Dragon Society had ceased its activities, the spectacle of the local merchants and gentry cutting off their hair first incited derision and then fury.

After those of us in the city cut our hair, it was only the country folk who continued as before. Those who had hair did not visit the city. Those who had shaved their hair did not go into the countryside. If they were seen, they were in either case killed. The countryside and the city were blocked off from each other.187

Villages where most of the inhabitants had complied with headmen’s orders to cut their hair turned against villages where hair was kept long. As disorder spread across the countryside, the Black Dragon Society revived and a lower degree-holder named Wang Zhan led rural militia against Taicang itself, laying siege to the city.188

Outside Jiaxing in the district capital of Xiushui, the Qing authorities had made the mistake of installing a local medicine salesman named Hu Zhichen as county magistrate.189 When Doctor Hu tried to encourage others to shave their heads by cutting off his own hair as an example, he only made himself appear all the more contemptible to local gentry leaders who already looked down upon him because of his mean social background. At the same time he earned the ridicule and resentment of peasants from surrounding villages. Resistance developed at the yamen of the district military commander, Chen Wu, who told the men who had assembled there: “Once you’ve cut your hair, it will be impossible

188 Yantang jianwen zaji, p. 11.
189 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 367; Zhu, Jiading xian yiyou jishi, p. 186.
to keep your wives.” Allying with local gentry led by Tu Xiangmei, Chen Wu and his men swore oaths together at the local examination hall, and killed Magistrate Hu. Militiamen were then conscripted from individual households and Xiushui was declared the new prefectural capital. But when the partisans attacked Jiaxing, the urban residents there managed to kill Ming loyalists inside the city walls and defended their own gates. Disorder spread rapidly through the villages of the prefecture.

All of the formerly arrogant elements who had viciously threatened the villages did everything in their power to wreak revenge on enemy households. People were killed, fires set—all through the countryside it was like this. For a full ten days this mutual slaughter continued, until the corpses were stretched all across the deserted fields.\(^\text{190}\)

Chen Wu was unable to take Jiaxing, but he continued to hold Xiushui which remained the headquarters of the loyalists.

Typical of this turnabout was the situation in Kunshan, the city famous throughout China for its fine linens.\(^\text{191}\) When Huang Jiazi had occupied nearby Suzhou, the assistant magistrate of Kunshan, Yan Maocai, had led a delegation of elders and degree-holders to present tribute to Huang and tender the city’s submission. In return, Yan Maocai was appointed magistrate. He did not rule over a united elite, however. During the Southern Ming reign in Nanjing, Kunshan had been administered by Yang Yongyan, a skilled horseman and archer from Henan.\(^\text{192}\) Magistrate Yang and General Wang Zuocai together trained loyalist militia units, and enrolled several local members of the gentry, including the famous poet Gui Zhuang and his friend Gu Yanwu, in the loyalist movement.\(^\text{193}\)

\(^{190}\) When Qing officials failed to gain the immediate support of the local gentry, they could try to win over the lumpen elements. However, to curry the favor of “cruel bullies” (xiong hao) was in the long run quite dangerous. See, for example Zhu, Jiading xian yiyou jishi, p. 189.


\(^{192}\) Fu, Mingdai Jiangnan, p. 40.

Together with another local scholar named Zhu Jihuang, who had a large following of students, these loyalists had done very little when the city was turned over, primarily because they lacked popular support. But when the haircutting order was announced, and Magistrate Yan shaved his head, a mob was easily gathered by Gui Zhuang, who led the people against the magistrate and killed him on August 6, 1645. Yang Yongyan, who had taken Buddhist orders in Huating when Nanjing fell, now emerged from his retirement, and together with General Wang organized a general resistance movement.194 Meanwhile, in Suzhou itself the former Ming military intendant, Yang Wencong, executed the two chief collaborators, Ye Maohua and Huang Jiazi, and displayed their corpses in the public marketplace of the city.195

When they received word that Yang Wencong had killed the pacification commissioners in Suzhou, many magistrates fled their posts. In Jiading, Kunshan, Taicang, Changshu, and Wujiang the district yamens were vacated.196 As rebellion spread throughout

194 Gu Yanwu was summoned by Yang Yongyan to raise a local army. In the course of this undertaking, Gu was given a position in the Hongguang Emperor’s Ministry of War. Zhang Tingtong, Qing chu si da shi shengming zhi xue, p. 46; Hellmut Wilhelm, “Gu Ting Lin, Der Ethiker,” pp. 11–13. For Wang Zuocai’s role in the Kunshan resistance movement, see Ming shi, p. 3115; and Wang Yunwu, ed., Da Qing yitongzhi, p. 916 (80:26a). Gui Zhuang was the great grandson of the well known writer Gui Youguang. A member of the Restoration Society, he was a fine painter and writer himself. His poem Wangu chou qu (Sorrows of the ages) traced Chinese history from the dawn of time to the fall of Nanjing in 1645. The Shunzhi Emperor is said to have requested that it be sung during his meals in the Forbidden City. Gui Zhuang’s younger brother was in Shi Kefa’s secretariat, and two of his servants had managed to escape the massacre at Yangzhou, bringing back news of the slaughter and the brother’s death. Gui Zhuang ji, p. 537; and Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 427.


196 Zhu, Jiading xian yiyou jishi, p. 183; Zhu Zisu, Jiading tu cheng jilüe, p. 203; Ji, Mingji nianli, p. 275. Yang, who had been attached to Zhang Hongkui at Jingkou under the Nanjing regime, had been planning resistance in Suzhou ever since the Manchus crossed the Yangzi. With a personal guard of 500 of his fellow Guizhou natives he entered the city of Suzhou and attacked Huang and his men on the street. Zhou Quan escaped to Nanjing, where he told the governor-general’s office about the putsch. Dennerline, “Massacre,”
the Su–Song–Tai circuit, Dodo turned back to Jiangnan, committing his own troops and many of the new military adherents like Li Chengdong to destroy those loyalists who had “arrogated titles and barred [our] troops” (jian hao zu bing). On August 4, Qing forces arrived in Jiaxing and posed themselves between Chen Wu’s forces and his rural militia allies under Tu Xiangmei. After several severe defeats, Tu’s peasant forces melted back into the villages. And when Dodo’s army turned its artillery against Xiushui’s walls, Chen Wu abandoned the city and fled. Resistance was equally ineffective in most other places. At Taicang, Wang Zhan’s poorly armed force was quickly dispelled by Qing troops. In Kunshan, where there was a more capably organized resistance, the loyalist defense only held out for three days once the Qing army arrived. On August 25, Qing troops stormed the city amid great slaughter. Gui Zhuang escaped death by fleeing in disguise as a monk; thereafter, his personal name was “Long Live the Ming” (Zuoming).

Gu Yanwu also escaped, but his two younger brothers were killed in the massacre, and his mother died a few days earlier of self-imposed starvation. Her last words to him were:

Though I am only a woman I personally received the country’s benevolence. To perish together with the dynasty is to be righteous. You must never become an official of another dynasty. You must

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197 Dennerline, “Massacre,” p. 275; idem, Chia-ting, p. 276.
198 Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 77. In late July, 1645, Dodo had divided up the old commands of the northern brigades that had surrendered to him. Ma Degong, who had been one of Huang Degong’s chief lieutenants, became brigade commander at Zhenjiang. Liu Liangzuo went to Changzhou. Li Chengdong was sent to Wusong. He took 5,000 troops to Jiading. His brigade and the 1,000 bannermen in Suzhou had the responsibility of pacifying both of the prefectures of Suzhou and Songjiang. Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 285–286; idem, Chia-ting, pp. 283–284.
199 “Nanyuan xiaoke,” Ping Wu shi liüe, pp. 115–117.
200 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 367.
never turn your back on the generations of this dynasty’s benevo-

cence. You must never forget the instructions bequeathed you by

the former ancestors. Then I can rest in peace under the ground.\footnote{201}

Some sources claim that more than forty thousand people died in

Kunshan on the day the city fell.\footnote{202}

In a few noted instances, loyalist strongholds militantly con-
tinued to defy intensive Qing sieges. One of these was the beauti-
ful river town of Jiangyin, located between Shanghai and Nan-
jing.\footnote{203} It resisted Qing armies for eighty days, and when it fell more

than seventy thousand people were killed in a bloody massacre or-
dered by the imperial commanders.\footnote{204} Another famous loyalist up-
rising centered on the city of Jiading, in central Jiangnan.\footnote{205}

\footnote{201}{Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, p. 427.}

\footnote{202}{Zhang, \textit{Qing chu si da shi}, p. 46. See also Peterson, \{}\textit{\textquotedblleft Ku Yen-wu Part I,\textquotedblright}\textit{ p. 64;} Gu, \textit{Tinglin shi wen ji, Tinglin yu yi}, pp. 15b–16; Peterson, \}\textit{\textquotedblleft Ku Yen-wu, Part II,\textquotedblright} p. 236.}

\footnote{203}{Xie, \textit{Nanming shilue}, p. 82. See also Peterson, \}\textit{\textquotedblleft Ku Yen-wu, Part I,\textquotedblright} pp. 60–66. This did not terminate all resistance in Kunshan, however. The brothers Gu Xianjian and Gu Xianzheng led sporadic resistance. Xianjian had passed fifth in the 1643 \textit{jinshi} examinations. Fighting in the defense of Hangzhou, he had fled when the Prince of Lu surrendered to Ajige. He then returned to Kunshan. Arrested, he refused to submit to the beile and was executed. Zha, \textit{Guo shou lu}, pp. 54–56; \textit{Ming shi}, p. 3098. His elder brother, Xianzheng, had earned fame fighting rebels in Yan’an in 1644. Returning to Kunshan after Beijing fell, he refused to cut his hair. He participated in the 1647 uprising led by Chen Zilong and Wu Shengzhao, and was captured and killed by Qing forces during their suppression. His five sons were also killed and only one grandson survived of the male members of this valiant family. Ji, \textit{Mingji nanliue}, pp. 278–279; Huang, \textit{Jiangnan tongzhi}, 153:17b; Su Xuelin, \textit{Nan Ming zhonglie zhuang}, p. 47.}

\footnote{204}{Wakeman, \textit{\textquotedblleft Localism and Loyalism\textquotedblright}.}

\footnote{205}{There is an excellent study of Jiading and its resistance movement in English: see Dennerline, \textit{\textquotedblleft Massacre\textquotedblright}. This has most recently been published in a re-

vised and fuller form: see Dennerline, \textit{Chia-ting}. See also Zhu, \textit{Jiading xian yiyou jishi}, which is available in identical form under the title, \textit{Dong lang ri zha}, [Daily record from the eastern embankment], in \textit{Ming Qing shiliao hui-

bian}, Vol. 16, pp. 1137–1172. Zhu Zisu, \textit{Jiading xian yiyou jishi} is also nearly

identical with the same author’s \textit{Jiading tu cheng jili}, which contains more

information on overall pacification. For general accounts of the Jiading re-

stance, see Xie, \textit{Nanming shilue}, pp. 9–11, 86–87; and \textit{Ming shi}, p. 3114.}
The Jiading Debacle

Like so many other cities in the area, Jiading initially accepted the appointment of a Qing magistrate when he arrived on July 17 to take over the city. The magistrate’s term was quite short-lived, however, because local militia movements were quickly rallied by the loyalist Wu Zhikui, who drove the Qing official from the city. Wu himself moved on with his men shortly afterwards, telling the people of Jiading to prepare the defenses of the city and await the signal for an uprising from Suzhou. His departure only provided an opportunity for other military adventurers—some of whom had already been actively seeking local power—to fight among themselves for control of the city.206 One contender was a confederation of gangs led by some gentry and yamen underlings under the overall leadership of a student of the Imperial Academy named Xu Mingzheng. Xu, who is described as a man of “dubious conduct,” had on June 8, 1645, occupied the magistrate’s office with his personal bodyguard of sixty retainers, and briefly declared himself the local military commander; but in the next two months, his men had continued to clash with other local militia units that refused to accept his authority. Moreover, important leaders of the local gentry like Hou Tongzeng and Huang Chunyao regarded Xu Mingzheng as having committed an act of insurrection.207 The other major armed force was a group of landlords’ troops, known as the “Wang militia,” and carefully trained by a military xiucai named Xu Long, who was also a member of a wealthy family. The force had been brought together initially to quell the tenant and serf uprisings of the previous year. Now, Xu Long stood for those who argued that political and social order were inseparable. Social insubordination, he declared, made a Ming restoration politically impossible.208

Opposed to these vigilantes were numerous other military groups and local defense corps formed in village after village in the

208 Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 87.
countryside around Jiading as the resistance to haircutting spread. “At this time,” one somewhat hostile source reported, “even though a market town might only contain five families, it still called [its armed men] village militiamen (xiangbing).” These units would assemble at one of the Buddhist temples around Jiading, elect a leader, and then present themselves to the gentry leaders in Jiading proper, demanding food and supplies. Often uncontrolled, they would turn against local gentry families and murder them.

It reached a point at which if a single discourteous word was spoken, naked weapons were suddenly raised; and before a person could argue in contradiction, his head was separated from his body. The numbers of people killed inside and outside the city were countless.

Frequently, the xiangbing argued among themselves over control of a traffic checkpoint where tolls were collected. Old feuds were renewed and losers were fed to the dogs. Rural Jiading county was virtually in a state of anarchy.

On July 29, 1645, the vanguards of Li Chengdong’s army of five thousand men, now enrolled under Dodo’s banner, crossed into Jiading. On July 30, after sacking Xinjing and raping and murdering some of its women, Li’s main body of troops reached the eastern gate of Jiading. The following day General Li moved forty kilometers away to the mouth of the Wusong River where he occupied the old Ming fort there and accepted the surrender of its garrison and military equipment. About three thousand men were assigned to the siege, which was not immediately pressed upon the city because a drought had dried up the canals, making it difficult to move heavy equipment like siege cannons.

Within the city, under the leadership of Huang Chunyao after August 8, the Jiading resistance leaders strengthened the walls with

209 Zhu, Jiading xian yiyou jishi, p. 191.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
new stone and earthworks, and sent an emissary to the Southern Ming loyalist Wu Zhikui, who was operating in the Suzhou-Songjiang area, asking for reinforcements immediately. Not everyone in the city agreed with these plans. The populace was divided between those who predicted total destruction and counseled moderation, if not surrender, and those who took a stronger stance and insisted, if necessary, upon a fight to the death. The struggle between these two groups produced the usual rash of fears about “fifth columnists” (neiyìng); and when word was passed around that Xu Mingsheng was in secret touch with the Qing forces, he was tried by a kangaroo court, drawn and quartered, and the remains were hung on all four of the city gates as a warning to others.²¹³ On August 16, the long-awaited relief column from Wu Zhikui finally arrived. Within a day, this poorly equipped group of three hundred soldiers, commanded by Cai Qiao, was routed by Li Chengdong’s men. The citizens of Jiading now realized that they were entirely on their own.²¹⁴

Of course, there was some support from the village militia groups outside the city. By setting up roadblocks and barriers, the xiangbing did impede Li Chengdong’s patrols. Yet even though the militiamen occasionally defeated isolated squads, and even though Li Chengdong’s brother was killed in an ambush, most of the militiamen’s energies were directed toward getting rations for themselves. On August 20, in any case, Li Chengdong decided to get rid of this nuisance for himself. Leading his entire army, he attacked Loutang Bridge north of the city, where most of these militia units were massed. Tens of thousands of peasants were killed.²¹⁵

Three days later, Li Chengdong brought forward his siege cannons and scaling ladders. On August 24, just before dawn, his men attacked under cover of artillery fire. Between 7 and 9 A.M.

²¹³ Dennerline, “Massacre,” p. 273; idem, Chia-tìng, p. 292; Zhu, Jiading xian yiyou jishi, p. 194. This happened on August 9.
they took the main gate. General Li ordered a massacre. As his men moved into the town, they accosted each person they saw and said: “Southern barbarian, hand over your valuables” (Manzi, xian bao). Those who refused to give money or jewelry or clothing were cut down on the spot. As more soldiers entered the city, the demand was repeated a second or third time. The stock of valuables was soon exhausted, but still the demands continued. More were killed. Then, as pedestrians thinned out, the soldiers began using long poles to poke under houses and find those in hiding. Just as in Yangzhou, women were seized, and if they resisted, their hands were nailed to boards while they were repeatedly raped. The leaders of the resistance tried to die nobly. Huang Chunyao hid himself in a Buddhist temple where he wrote a stirring inscription on the wall before hanging himself.\(^2\) Hou Tongzeng drowned himself with his sons and servants.\(^3\) For twelve hours the carnage continued, until the river was clogged with corpses. About twenty thousand people were killed.\(^4\)

In spite of these dreadful losses, the travail of Jiading continued. Three or four days after Li Chengdong’s butchery, survivors who had escaped began to drift back into the city. Regrouping there, they fell under the leadership of a soldier-adventurer named Zhu Ying who on September 12 presided over the wreckage of the city with two thousand troops of his own. Under his guise a kind of counter-terror began. When an official arrived from the prefectoral seat to administer the city, Zhu Ying denounced him publicly for having shaved his head and beheaded him in the marketplace. Outside the city, remnant militia units summarily decapitated anyone they found with a shaved head.\(^5\) The most active of these units operated out of the market town of Gelong and was led by two martial arts experts, Wang Xian and Liu Ao. Gelong sat astride the main road out of Jiading; and, in order to prevent the


\(^3\) Zhu, Jiading xian yiyou jishi, p. 196; Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 302–307; idem, Chia-ting, pp. 296–298.

\(^4\) Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 87.

\(^5\) Zhu, Jiading xian yiyou jishi, p. 198.
city from being attacked again, the Gelong militiamen formed a covenant with xiangbing from an adjoining market town named Waigang. Although they undoubtedly exaggerated their exploits (one bean-curd seller claimed to have killed a general), the Gelong-Waigang militia did score one major victory after setting an ambush that decimated one of Li Chengdong’s units. Enraged, Li Chengdong sent a large force into Gelong and Waigang on September 13 to slaughter all the inhabitants. The market towns were then razed. 220

On September 16, while Li Chengdong moved on to Songjiang to attack Wu Zhikui, Jiading was turned over to its new magistrate, Pu Zhang, personally appointed by General Li himself. Pu Zhang and his brother, Pu Qiao, were lower degree-holders and martial arts experts who commanded a group of one thousand vigilantes—mounted men who had caught and killed Yu Boxiang, the leader of the serf liberation movement. Li Chengdong had already used them to pacify their native district of Taicang. Now he turned them loose on Jiading. 221 Pu Zhang rode rapidly and easily through the meager defenses of Jiading and installed himself in the yamen in the heart of the ruined city. His occupation was harsh and violent. Raised nearby and speaking the same dialect, he on the one hand seemed intent upon proving his reliability to the Qing by rounding up all those who still had long hair and executing them. On the other hand, perhaps precisely because of local jealousy, he and his men (who were also from Loudong in Taicang) used the opportunity to loot whatever they could, seizing goods and women, and shipping them back to their homes forty li away. Patrols were daily sent into surrounding villages to demand taxes, and in the villages the peasantry would hide by covering their heads with grass and reeds and crouching underwater in the

220 Hu, Jiading yimin biezhan, pp. 27, 35; Zhu, Jiading xian yiyou jishi, pp. 198–199; Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 311–312; idem, Chia-ting, pp. 299–300.
221 Li had earlier sent Pu Qiao into Jiading, but he had proved unable to take over the city while the Gelong-Waigang militia league was still intact. Hu, Jiading yimin biezhan, pp. 126–127; Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 286, 310–312; idem, Chia-ting, pp. 300–301.
canals nearby. During this “second massacre” it is said that the distinctions between poor and rich were momentarily levelled off in Jiading. There was a “third massacre,” when loyalist remnants attacked Jiading on October 5 and were defeated, but it was really the combination of Li’s brutal attack earlier and Pan Zhang’s scouring later that left the city demolished and its survivors utterly demoralized. 222

Lake Tai Loyalists

In retrospect, the Jiading uprising seemed a desperately futile adventure, doomed to disaster from the start. At the time, however, there appeared to be a reasonable possibility of getting Ming naval reinforcements, as well as of linking up with ongoing resistance movements around nearby Lake Tai and at the city of Songjiang (Huating) close to Shanghai. The members of the Lake Tai resistance movement, which took place in that area “of old called the country of marshes—sea outside, lakes within,” came from three different sources: marsh bandits, gentry-led militiamen, and former Ming soldiers. 223 According to a contemporary’s diary:

222 Zhu, Jiading xian yiyou jishi, p. 200; Hu, Jiading yimin biezhuan, p. 129.
223 Ming-Qing shiliao, ding, 1, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 131–132. Feng Menglong, the famous short-story writer and publisher, described Lake Tai in this way at that time: “The great lake is some thirty miles to the southwest of Suzhou. What sort of size do you imagine it to be? It is 200 miles east-west, 120 miles north-south, and 500 miles in circumference. It embraces 72 mountain peaks and is surrounded by three subprefectures. Which three? No lesser regions than Suzhou, Hangzhou and Changzhou! And all the rivers of the southeast make their way into the lake. Another name for it is Thunder Lake, and it is also known as Spread of all Providence, Bamboo Rain Hat Lake and Five Lakes. . . . In Wu, people apply to all these lakes the collective name of Great Lake. Of the seventy-two mountain peaks in the Great Lake the biggest are the two Mount Dongtings. The eastern Dongting, known simply as Eastern Mountain, and the western Dongting known as Western Mountain Range surge some way apart from each other in the middle of the lake. Various other mountains far and near loom hazily through the misty blur of waves and billows.” Feng Menglong, The Perfect Lady by Mistake, pp. 16–17.
When the haircutting order arrived, Lu Zhiyu, the Vice Regional Commander of Fushan [north of Lake Tai near the Yangzi River] was the first to urge resistance. Village troops (xiangbing) arose on all sides, entwining white turbans around their heads. The Wujiang jinshi Wu Yi seized Changbai Pond, while the zhusheng Lu Shiyao assembled over one thousand into a group that camped east of the Cheng River [which runs into the southeastern corner of Lake Tai]. There was another group of over one thousand camped nearby under ten military officers who surrounded the city [of Wujiang] and clamored [for revolt]. The men’s axes were turned into weapons and the women’s skirts into banners as they ran amuck from the Way. There was also the outlaw of Lake Tai, Barefoot Zhang San, who joined with them.224

Of all these groups, the single most important source of ready recruits for the resistance movement was the bandit population of Lake Tai. Led by chieftains like Mao Er, Shen Pan, Bo Xiangfu, and the man known as Ba ping da wang (“Big King Strip-Down-and-Equal”), these bandits were mainly marsh dwellers and skillful lake fishermen who could convert their swift boats into a ragtag navy capable of attacking government outposts.225 Before the fall of the Ming, they were most notorious for kidnapping wealthy members of the gentry for ransom. Threatening to bury their victims alive in the mud or burn out their eyes with brands, they usu-

224 Gu Gongxie, Xiao xia xian ji zhe chao [Excerpts from an impromptu journal kept to while away the summer], cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 133. The area in question is at the southeastern corner of Lake Tai. Changbai Pond is outside of Chenmu. Lake Mao, the center of many bandit activities at this time, is halfway between the larger lake and Songjiang. Ming maps give it a clearer demarcation than modern ones, which show an interlocking series of canals and small lakes running all the way from Lake Tai to Songjiang.

225 Their sails trimmed like airfoils by bamboo battens, these highly maneuverable boats (later versions of which can be seen on the lake today) were capable of sailing 300 li in a single day. During the autumn months, their crews would go ashore at night and hide in the forests, emerging to pillage and rob. This was especially true in the southern part of Lake Tai on the Zhejiang side. In Changxing county (Huzhou prefecture), which was particularly hilly, the inhabitants lived entirely off of banditry. Wu Zhihe, “Mingdai de jianghu dao,” pp. 109–110.
ally managed to frighten the notable's family into paying tens of thousands of taels to gain his release. On other occasions, they simply appeared in force at a wealthy landlord's house to demand "military rations." If refused, they returned at night and set fire to the dwelling. Like social bandits everywhere, they earned the support of the poor peasants in this area known for its inequitable land tenure. Operating under the slogan of *da liang* (strike down taxes), they often distributed food and money to the poorest families of a village, and dispossessed peasants in turn joined them for refuge. At the time Nanjing fell, the most famous Lake Tai leaders were Barefoot Zhang San (Chijiao Zhang San) and his wife, both of whom were noted martial arts experts. Long after this couple died, their exploits would continue to be vaunted among the poor fishing villages of Lake Tai.\(^{226}\)

The second element in the Lake Tai resistance movement was normally quite opposed to Barefoot Zhang San and his lake bandits. This was the local gentry of the Wujiang area, and especially Lu Shiyao and Wu Yi. The former gentleman had used his own money to hire and equip two thousand militiamen to defend his native village at the eastern end of Lake Tai against pirates.\(^{227}\) The latter, from Wujiang city itself, had earlier served the Nanjing regime. In fact, Wu Yi (*jinshi* 1643) was a member of the Restoration Society who had joined Shi Kefa's secretariat at Yangzhou, and had been sent back to the Jiangnan area to raise funds for military rations, thus escaping death when Shi's headquarters was overrun north of the river.\(^{228}\) Perhaps inspired by Lu Shiyao, whose militia

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226 Gu, *Xiao xia xian ji zhe chao*, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, pp. 133–134; see also, Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 19; "Nanyuan xiaoke," *Ping Wu shilüe*, p. 112. An account in the Yixing district gazetteer, 6th *juan*, and dated 1659, reported that Zhang and his wife dared to rob in broad daylight because of their mastery over the secret fighting arts. When a local warden tried to capture them, the two of them "linked fiery spears" and struck him down. Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 134.

227 Wen, *Nanjiang yishi*, p. 398; Guo, "Jiangnan dizhu jieji," p. 127. Lu was assisted by another *xiucai* named Shen Zibing.

228 Wu Weiye, *Wushi jilan*, 2, *xia*, 13b. Wu Yi had been Shi Kefa's personal choice as Secretary of his Bureau of Discipline. His name is sometimes incorrectly written as Wu Yang. Gu Yuan et al., comps., *Wu jun wubai*
were mainly fisherman from Dongshan (the island in Lake Tai west of Wujiang), Wu Yi began contacting friends among the local gentry as soon as he had received news that the Qing armies, which were now headquartered at Suzhou, were preparing to take over Wujiang. Joining with a local juren named Sun Zhaokui and a xiucei called Wu Dan, Wu Yi (who was himself a devotee of the martial arts and noted for his strength and skill at swimming) had in a matter of days assembled a nucleus of over one thousand followers who set up a military camp by the side of Lake Tai at Changbai Pond. This force, which came to be known as the “White Headed Army” (Bai tou jun) from the color of the turbans that it wore, attracted Barefoot Zhang San’s bandits and grew to number three thousand soldiers. It was this combination of gentry-led militia and social bandits that responded as so-called xiangbing (village troops) when the third element—former Ming soldiers under Li Zhiyu—arose north of Lake Tai at Fushan. Together, the three forces allied to attack the Qing army based at Suzhou and to recover Wujiang from the hands of an acting Qing magistrate. 229

By itself, the capture of Wujiang would have not posed much of a threat to the Qing forces of the Suzhou military governor, Tu Guobao. 230 But the uprising at Lake Tai coincided with a much more ambitious plan then being hatched by the gentry of Songjiang to attack Suzhou as well and cut off Nanjing from Dodo’s


230 Tu Guobao was probably from Datong, although the later Qing historian Zhaolian claimed that he was a Lake Tai bandit who had surrendered to Hong Chengchou. Zhaolian also claimed that Tu later tried to get in touch with the Zheng family to rebel. However, the authorities got wind of this and deliberately cut off his soldiers’ rations. When Tu consequently tried to flee from Suzhou he was supposedly arrested, and his wife hanged herself from the belltower. Zhaolian, Xiaoting zalu, 10:18a. But see also Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia 9b. Tu Guobao, incidentally, turned the 16th-century villa and gardens of the Zhuozhengyuan (which is now just behind the Suzhou Municipal Museum) into the governor’s residence. Chun Tung, “Chinese Gardens,” pp. 234–238.
forces to the south at Hangzhou. This in turn formed part of a grander strategy, which was designed to form a second line of defense after the collapse of the Nanjing regime. This new Southern Ming line would be based upon four different loyalist strongholds: the court of the Prince of Lu in coastal Zhejiang, the regime of the Longwu Emperor in Fujian, the “Society of Loyalty and Perfect Sincerity” (Zhongcheng she) at Ganzhou in Jiangxi, and the “Thirteen Garrisons” (Shisan zhen) in Hunan. By holding the salient of that line in northern Zhejiang and southern Jiangnan, the Songjiang loyalists might make it possible to recover the lower Yangzi while loyalist forces from northeastern Jiangxi moved down the river from Poyang Lake.

The First Songjiang Uprising

The most prominent member of the Songjiang gentry resisters was Chen Zilong, who had been such a prominent advocate both of local defense and of a forward policy during the early months of the Nanjing regime. He was also a profound believer in the importance of regional articulation, and was especially proud of the cultural richness of his own native area of Wu. He did more, however, than merely point to the social eminence of Suzhou, Changzhou, and Songjiang prefectures, which together accounted for

232 John E. Wills, Jr., “The Abortiveness of Plural Politics in 17th Century China,” p. 4. The following account of the Songjiang resistance movement is based upon Chu, Hucheng heikao, 3:2; Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, zhong, pp. 30–32a; Wen, Nanjiangishi, pp. 240–244, 365–366; Ming shi, p. 3113; Wang, Da Qing yitongzhi, pp. 957–958 (84:10b–11b); He Zhiji, ed., Anhui tongzhi, p. 2355 (206:10b); Wan Shouqi, Xi xi caotang ji, p. 169 (3:9a); and Zha, Guo shou lu, p. 76.
233 After leaving the Nanjing government, Chen Zilong had arrived back in Songjiang in October–November, 1644, to oversee the construction of his family mausoleum. By early 1645 the tombs were completed. After his grandfather, father, mother, and stepmother were buried there, a few miles northwest of the prefectural capital in Jingpu county, Chen moved his family nearby. His family at that time consisted of his sick grandmother, his wife, his three concubines, and his sons. Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-lung,” pp. 133–134.
three-quarters of all the jinshi of Jiangnan during the Ming (Jiangnan itself producing more metropolitan degree-holders than any other province during the last half-century of the Ming). 234 He also ascribed a special significance to the antiquity of the great clans of Jiangnan, investing the area with a legitimacy of its own, and wrote of the area of Wu as a country (guo) in its own right, the seat of southern government during periods of barbarian attack, and the economic foundation of the imperial state in most other times. 235 Now, he and his fellow members of the Jishe, including Xia Yunyi, began to get in touch with other members of the gentry and with former Ming officials to try to initiate a resistance movement against the invading Qing forces. 236 Immediately within Songjiang itself, their two most important allies were Li Daiwen, the noted painter, and Shen Youlong, the venerable former viceroy who had secured the surrender of Zheng Zilong to the Ming. 237 On August 1, the loyalists together assembled a mob, and—holding up a portrait of Ming Taizu—Chen Zilong rallied his townsmen to attack and kill the local Qing official and take over the city. 238

234 Ho, Ladder of Success, pp. 232–234.
235 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, lun, 28:13b–24a. For the notion of the legitimacy and the migration of the clans of Jiangnan, see ibid., lun, 22:1b–15a. This was by no means a novel idea, Jiangnan having had a special geographical legitimacy since the Eastern Jin (317–419 A.D.). Michael C. Rogers, “The Myth of the Battle of the Fei River,” p. 55.
236 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 241–242, 247; Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, zhong, p. 30b. At the time there were rumors that Shi Kefa had escaped from Yangzhou and was also rallying an army at Lake Tai. Others said that Liu Zeqing had brought his armies south to the aid of Jiangnan. All of these rumors were false. Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 270–271.
237 Li, a jinshi of 1643, was a close friend of Dong Qichang. Zha, Guo shou lu, p. 57. Shen (jinshi 1616) had served as grand coordinator of Fujian and Jiangxi in the late 1630s, putting down the Zhang Puwei rebellion with the help of Huang Binqing. After Zheng Zilong surrendered to him, Shen was made Vice-Minister of War and regional commander of the Liangguang. He did not accept a post in the Hongguang regime, although he was offered one. Ming shi, p. 3113.
238 Ji, Mingji nanliüe, p. 29; Dennerline, “Massacre,” p. 289; idem, Chia-ting, pp. 287–288; Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 241; He, Anhui tongzhi, p. 2355 (206:10b). However, Chen Zilong’s biography does not credit him with such a leading role. See Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, zhong, p. 31a.
Military authority over the Songjiang loyalists was invested in Shen Youlong, who commanded several thousand partisans. However Chen Zilong, who accepted the post of censorial military commissioner under Shen, did not place much faith in the fighting ability of these hastily recruited troops, whom he described as "city folk without adequate military supplies and training." The key to victory, Chen believed, was simultaneously to use his network of gentry contacts throughout Jiangnan to coordinate a regional uprising while also requesting military help from the loyalist navies at Chongming Island. Accordingly, he and Xia Yunyi first mobilized the nucleus of friends around them who constituted the original Jishe circle, including men like Xu Fuyuan and Huang Jiarui. Then, through these friends, other fellow literati were contacted. Huang Jiarui, for instance, was both a good friend of Chen Zilong and a former comrade-in-studies of the Xuzhou poet Wan Shouqi. Wan at that time was staying in Suzhou with the former commander of Nanjing's riverine defenses and brother-in-law of Ma Shiying, Yang Wencong. Although Yang himself did not join the Songjiang group, Wan Shouqi did participate in the movement, joining Shen Zibing and Qian Bangfan at Lake Chen, northeast of Suzhou. Informal social contacts, predating the fall of the Ming, thus lent the Songjiang resistance movement social spontaneity (which was an advantage) as well as organizational diffuseness (which was, as it turned out, a disadvantage).

239 Ming shi, p. 3113.
240 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, zhong, p. 30a.
241 Ming shi, p. 3113; Gu Yanwu, Tinglin shi wen ji, Tinglin shiji, p. 12.
242 Huang had gotten his jinshi in 1634, and subsequently served as grand coordinator of the Huaiyang area. Wan Shouqi, Xi xi caotang ji, p. 169 (3:9a).
244 Whether or not the resistance movement that began in Songjiang on August 1 was a concerted conspiracy or simply a scattered reaction to events that quickly got out of hand is unclear. It has been pointed out that many of the resistance leaders had been civilian investigators of military affairs or coordinators of military supply for Shi Kefa under the Southern Ming regime. Some of these men stayed on as coordinators of military units after the retreat of the Southern Ming armies. They may even have been given instructions by the commanders of these armies. Yang Wencong, for example, may
While men like Wan Shouqi were recruited through coterie connections, others were approached directly by Chen Zilong or sent letters by him or Xia Yunyi inviting their participation in a jointly planned effort to mount a resistance effort, attack Suzhou, and thus cut the communications between the Qing headquarters there and the Manchu-Han forces in Hangzhou then threatening the Lu regime. Chen also tried to reach the Ming naval forces on Chongming Island, which were, and would for a while remain, one of the main hopes of all the resisters in Jiangnan at this time.245

Chongming Island, long known as a pirates’ lair, was now the refuge of the Southern Ming naval forces. Some of these were commanded by a former government official named Jing Benche (1634 jinshi), but the largest number of them were led by the Wu-song garrison commander, Wu Zhikui, who had sailed to Chongming when Nanjing fell.246 Wu Zhikui had already made an effort to get in touch with the court of the Prince of Lu and other loyalist centers in Zhejiang, thus announcing his willingness to attempt to restore the Ming to power by holding part of Jiangnan. Now, re-


246 Jing had been a strong proponent of a southern defense strategy in 1644 even before Beijing fell. He had argued against Shi Kefa’s going north to relieve the capital, proposing instead that the south be made a bastion for a Southern Ming restoration. At Chongming Island he was joined by a little-known Ming prince named Yiyang who was brought there by a court eunuch, Li Guofu, originally attached to Yang Wencong’s command in Suzhou. Jing also attracted the support of Shen Tingyang, a merchant marine expert. Zha, *Guo shou lu*, p. 91; Dennerline, “Massacre,” pp. 276–277.
sponding to the general situation in Jiangnan, he moved his naval forces closer to Shanghai, where his men challenged the authority of the newly appointed Qing magistrate there.\footnote{Chu, \textit{Hucheng heikao}, 3:2. Although Wu Zhikui never really took over Shanghai, Jing Benche pillaged the villages around that city.} The uprising at Lake Tai and the resistance efforts by Chen Zilong and Xia Yunyi (who had formerly been Wu Zhikui’s teacher), inspired Wu to move his sailors and marines through the waterways of Jiangnan to Lake Mao, where he was joined by the loyalist commander of the Suzhou naval forces, General Huang Fei.\footnote{Wen, \textit{Nanjiang yishi}, p. 370. Huang Fei was a frontiersman and professional soldier who had been adopted by his Liaoyang commander, the famed General Huang Long. When Huang Long was killed by the Manchus at Lushun in Liaodong, Huang Fei inherited his generalship. During the Southern Ming rule in Nanjing, Shi Kefa sent Huang Fei to Wuhu, south of Nanjing, and put him under Huang Degong’s command. The two men, sharing the same surname, addressed each other as brother. Chen, \textit{Chen Zhongyu quan ji}, \textit{niangpu, zhong}, p. 31b; \textit{Ming shi}, p. 3022; Dennerline, “Massacre,” p. 252.} The Wusong commander, General Wu Zhikui, entered the [Yangzi] river from the sea, assembling a palisade of boats at Lake Mao. Then General Huang Fei brought together one thousand war junks from Wuxi to join Wu.\footnote{\textit{Ming shi}, p. 3113. See also Wen, \textit{Nanjiang yishi}, pp. 365–366.}

Although Xia Yunyi actually went to Lake Mao and served on Wu Zhikui’s staff as a kind of liaison officer from Songjiang, Chen Zilong failed to get Wu Zhikui and Huang Fei to do his bidding. Partly this was because of disagreements over strategy. As Chen himself explained:

Huang Wenlu reached Songjiang with his mass of twenty thousand, but then wanted to move his camp to the Huangpu [River near Shanghai]. I argued vigorously that because of the narrow straits it would be disadvantageous. Because his vessels and armies would be all heading in a single direction and spread over more than twenty \textit{li}, the head and tail of the column could not respond to each other and they would necessarily be defeated. He did not heed my advice.\footnote{Chen, \textit{Chen Zhongyu quan ji}, \textit{niangpu, zhong}, p. 31.}
Meanwhile, the Qing forces had detached Li Chengdong’s fearsome army of twenty thousand infantry and cavalry troops, which moved towards Wu Zhikui’s vessels moored at Chunshenpu (Shi-fang’an). Using light craft, as well as fireboats, Li’s forces outmaneuvered Wu Zhikui’s heavier seagoing vessels, and as Chen Zilong had predicted, the column was in any case so far strung out that it could not respond effectively to the attack. To make matters worse, high winds also struck the fleet, and the result was overwhelming defeat for the loyalist navy.

The two generals were defeated at Chunshen. They were seized and taken beneath the walls of Jiangyin [then under siege and hoping for reinforcements from Huang Fei], and ordered to persuade the people in the city to surrender. Wu complied, but Huang did not. Later, both men were killed.  

At the same time, the Qing forces proceeded to quell other Southern Ming forces around Songjiang, further depriving the loyalists there of aid. At nearby Wusong, loyalists under the local militia leader Wu Zhifan were defeated and the inhabitants there “cut their hair and called themselves ‘obedient people of the great Qing (Da Qing shun min).’” In Shanghai city, where the adventurer Pan Fu had killed the Qing magistrate, the population turned against the loyalists as well. And at Wujiang the Lake Tai “White

251 Ming shi, p. 3113. According to one account, Huang Fei begged off by insisting that he had no personal contacts in the city of Jiangyin. Other sources confirm the story that Wu Zhikui was brought up under the walls in chains and called upon the resisters to surrender. Ji, Mingji nanlüe, pp. 252–254. However, some claim that Huang Fei was killed in the Chunshenpu battle itself. Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, zhong, p. 32a.

252 Zhu, Jiading xian yiyou jishi, p. 201. The people of Wusong had surrendered to Li Chengdong and, led by a local military juren named Feng Jiayou, had turned their weapons over to the occupation forces. Li had placed the city under the control of a bannerman named Xu Zhenfu. Soon, Xu’s rule was challenged by Wu Zhifan, a local militia leader who had fled to Chongming Island, then returned with 4,000 men on 100 boats. However, the people of Wusong had given no support at all to this freebooter, who was captured and killed after a public trial with the populace’s enthusiastic approval.

253 Pan Fu, a local adventurer, had been invested as the head of Shanghai by the
Headed Army" was also rapidly losing ground. Lu Zhiyu, taking advantage of surprise, had initially managed to take Wujiang and place the Suzhou garrison under siege, burning the prefect's yamen. Some of the lake fishermen had also by treachery led Qing troops into prepared ambushes. But Governor Tu Guobao's lieutenant, Wang Zuocai, had regrouped his forces, closed the gates of the city upon the rebels, and with cavalry and artillery defeated them.\(^{254}\) Lu himself was killed, and Sun Zhaokui was captured; Wu Yi and Barefoot Zhang San were driven back into the marshes where they found temporary refuge.\(^ {255}\)

These successive defeats threw the gentry loyalists at Songjiang entirely upon their own resources, and this meant, of course, relying altogether upon the meager force of "city folk" whom Shen Youlong had recruited. As Chen Zilong had suggested, these were far from being experienced soldiers. Indeed, as Wen Ruilin scornfully stated later:

> Because these people were all literary scholars and did not know anything at all about soldiers, the ones that they gathered were all marketplace riffraff. As soon as they saw the enemy, they were bound to stumble and fall, so that their venture could not succeed.\(^ {256}\)

This account unnecessarily deprecated Shen Youlong's experience as a regional commander, but there was no question that these "loafers from the marketplace" were likely, in the face of Li Chengdong's awesome soldiers, to "scatter like carrion eaters to their lairs when the war drums sounded."\(^ {257}\)

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Chongming leader Jing Benche under a Chu dynastic title with the reign era designation of Yuanshen. After killing the Qing magistrate, Tao Huan, he had looted the city. At this time he tried to get the inhabitants to join him in a campaign to support Songjiang and restore the Ming. They refused to support him. After the resisters at Songjiang were defeated, Pan Fu took to sea and joined the pirate "Pockmark" Gu San. He later surrendered to the Qing.


254 Nanming shiliao, pp. 4–6.


257 "Nanyuan xiaoke," *Ping Wu shi lüe*, p. 117.
Perhaps because they knew how hopeless their own chances were, the citizens of Songjiang continued to believe that Huang Fei's forces would come to their rescue. On September 22, that help seemed to have arrived. An army appeared beneath the walls of the city attired in red turbans and announced itself as being sent by General Huang. As soon as the citizens opened the gates and the soldiers filed in, however, they tore off their headgear to reveal shaved foreheads. Moments later they had thrown wide the gates to other Qing forces in hiding outside, and the city was theirs. In the fighting that ensued, Shen Youlong and Li Daiwen were both killed. Outside the city at Lake Mao, Huang Jiarui was killed, and his best friend, the poet Wan Shouqi, was captured and thrown in jail.258 Yet many gentry loyalists managed to escape death and evade arrest and, like Chen Zilong, fled the city as Li Chengdong's men entered. According to Chen's own account:

On September 22 the city fell. I was in the western suburbs then where I narrowly avoided running into [enemy] soldiers. I took the four members of my family to Kunshan [to stay] with Xia Xiaogong, from whom I was [later] to be separated forever. My grandmother stayed in Kunshan because of her illness and I went to Jinze. Before long I traveled on to Taozhuang.259

Other gentry loyalists managed to escape to the south to continue their struggle in the court of the Prince of Tang in Fujian.260 Xia

258 Luo, Wän Nianshao xiansheng nianpu, wanpu 3a, wanbu 5b.
259 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, zhong, p. 31. Chen Zilong fled the city disguised as a Buddhist priest. His grandmother was then 90 years old. Jinze is 36 li west of the county seat of Qingpu on the Jiangnan-Zhejiang border. Taozhuang is 36 li northwest of Jiaxing's county seat.
260 After the fall of Nanjing, the southern loyalists' major hope was to establish another regime around the person of the Henan Prince of Lu, who had been Shi Kefa's choice in the first place. By the time he became administrator of the realm on July 1, 1645, however, the prince was already beleaguered by Dodo's bannermen under Bolo's command. Knowing there was no hope of succeeding, the prince surrendered without a struggle, and Hangzhou fell to the Qing. The loyalists then turned to the Prince of Tang, who had been escorted by Zheng Hongkui from Hangzhou to Fujian. Dennerline, "Massacre," pp. 277–278.
Yunyi, on the other hand, felt that his own time had come to an end.

To go now to Fujian to help out the leaders there and to plan on rising again is indeed a good strategy, for we should not merely resist one time alone. But to flee there in order to save one’s life is no way of demonstrating [one’s integrity] to posterity. It is better to die [now].

Three days before Huang Daozhou arrived with an invitation from the Prince of Tang to join the loyalist government in Fuzhou, Xia Yunyi drowned himself.

After the subjugation of the Songjiang loyalist uprising, there remained scattered pockets of resistance in Jiangnan. The city of Jiangyin was still besieged, Guard Commander Hou Chengzu and his son were still leading a valiant struggle at Jinshan, and portions of the loyalist navy had regrouped at Chongming Island. But the ethnic alliance of upper and lower classes against the Manchus’ haircutting order was already sundered, and the gentry of Jiangnan was too socially alienated from its own subordinates to hold out for much longer alone. Before long, Jiangyin was to fall, thereby releasing enough Qing troops for Li Chengdong to take Jinshan by force. And while Jing Benche’s loyalist navy did win

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261 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 242; See also Ji, Mingji nanliue, p. 247.
262 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 244; Hou Fangyu, Zhuanghui tang ji, Siyi tang shiji, 5:8a. His son, Wanchun, became a bureau secretary in the Prince of Lu’s regime in 1646. He was to resign later because of his disagreement with those who wished to take the court to offshore islands. During the mass roundup of gentry loyalists in 1647, Wanchun (who was only 18) was arrested and executed.
263 For Jiangyin’s defense and then defeat, see Wakeman, “Localism and Loyalism.” Hou Chengzu and his son, Shilu, had arisen in response to the Songjiang resistance. Wu Zhikui had resented Hou, however, and had not cooperated with him. Nonetheless, Hou resolved to make a stand at Jinshan just south of Songjiang after the latter fell. Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 380; Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 2580 (153:20b).
264 Hou and his son were betrayed by residents of the city, who led Li’s men into Jinshan through the waterways. Hou and his son chose death rather than surrender. “Our family has consumed official rations for 280 years,” the heredi-
a major victory over Qing forces at Liuhe, his lieutenants quarreled with their pirate allies over spoils and were not long afterwards driven offshore to Dinghai (Zhoushan Island), well away from the mouth of the Yangzi. On December 17, 1645, therefore, Dodo was able to tell Dorgon in his annual military summary:

We captured the Prince of Fu, Zhu Yousong, and in succession defeated enemy naval and land forces, cavalry and infantry, in over one hundred and fifty engagements. Jiangnan and Zhejiang are completely pacified. We accepted the surrender of 244 civil and military officials, and 317,000 cavalrymen and infantrymen.

Except for the far south, active loyalist resistance appeared to have been entirely extirpated.

Eremitism

A large number of the most committed gentry loyalists were killed during the 1645 resistance. Others who escaped death or imprisonment had their former lives shattered. Withdrawal from the world, both to escape harassment by the Qing authorities and to signify a form of passive resistance to foreign domination, was then a common course of action. The poet Yan Ermei wrote:

When matters have reached this pass, there is really little more to say. All one can do is to take the tonsure and go into the mountains, preserving and nurturing a sense of one’s own mistakes. Some other day, perhaps, this sense of grief and drive for loyal effort can

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265 At Dinghai, Jing came into conflict with Huang Binqing, who eventually killed him and absorbed his force into his own navy. Zha, Guo shou lu, p. 91.
266 Shizu shilu, 21:252b. Dodo had earlier reported on August 14, 1645, that all of the prefectures of Jiangnan and Zhejiang had been pacified. Dennerline, "Massacre," p. 257.
be used to strike enthusiasm once again, and we shall rise up to eradicate the sins of others.267

The withdrawal quite often took the form, as Yan suggests, of Buddhist devotion. Not surprisingly, scholarly Buddhist monks in provinces like Guangdong became the centers of circles of former loyalists seeking refuge and consolation during the conquest period. Jiangnan, too, had such Buddhist clerics, like Sanfeng of Dengwei and Kaiyuan at Huashan.268 Frequently, loyalist literati simply became Buddhist devouts on their own, living as laymen (jushi) or else taking a Buddhist name and residing near a temple while simultaneously following Daoist meditation practices, still remaining halfway in the world of literati.269

Wan Shouqi, who had been captured and thrown in prison at the time of the Songjiang uprising, was just such a person. Thanks to “secret help,” Wan was able to escape from prison two months after his arrest and left the Suzhou region to return north of the river and seek refuge in Huai’an. During the next year, Wan Shouqi managed to return to his native city of Xuzhou, where he found that his family’s compound and gardens had been largely ruined, and its vast landholdings taken over by conquerors and collaborators.270 Some of the buildings had been occupied by bandits when they took the city during the interregnum, and the few standing dwellings had been turned into residences for the new group of Qing officials administering the city.271 Wan’s friend, the poet Yan

267 Yan Ermei, Baichun shan ren ji, 10:28.
268 Kaiyuan, whose family name was Xiong and who was also known as Zhengzhi, was a Ming jinshi who had served as a ministry secretary before the fall of the dynasty. After the conquest of Jiangnan, he took the tonsure and became a follower of the monk Hongchu, developing his own band of followers at Huashan on Mt. Lingyan just west of Suzhou. Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 174:7b. For Sanfeng, and for other instances of Buddhist withdrawal, see Ibid., 174:7a, and 168:10b.
269 Wan, Xi xi caotang ji, 3:11b.
270 Wan Shouqi’s family owned several thousand qing—one qing being equal to 15.13 acres—of fields, gardens, and other property. Its residence was as grand as a prince’s dwelling. Huang Ming yimin zhuai, juan 2.
271 Luo, Wan Nianshao xiansheng nianpu, wanpu, p. 96.
Ermei, traveling through Xuzhou after the conquest, described the ruined family mansion in a poem entitled "Going to Xuzhou, I Pass by Wan Nianshao's Old Home":

Who dares speak here and now?  
None but me, I shall allow.  
The master's family has left no trace—  
Not even coffins there in place.  
Weeds lie thick on the courtyard floor,  
And the fall wind drums at the sagging door.  
Gone forever is any sense of zest  
For all but swallows, swooping down to nest.272

Wan Shouqi tried to sell what he could of the few stony fields that had not been occupied or seized by others, but got very little money from his property.273 To support his wife and son, he at first relied upon selling his calligraphy, seal carvings, and paintings.274 Later, he bought a vegetable garden where he grew medicinal plants.275

We live in a rundown little alley, surrounded in front and in back by peasants who raise pigs for a living. People seldom come to visit us there, but there is a temple nearby in the western suburbs called the Puying temple. Sometimes I wander through its gates, dragging my cane behind, and engage the novices in argument. Ah, now that

272 Yan, Baichun shan ren ji, 5:47b. Nianshao was the zi of Wan Shaoqi.  
273 Wan, Xi xi caotang ji, 1:3.  
274 In the Arthur Sackler Collection at Princeton University's Art Museum there is an album of 6 paintings and 12 calligraphy leaves by Wan Shouqi, dated 1650 and entitled Shanshui huahui fashu ce (Album of landscapes, flowers, and calligraphy). The style of the paintings is taut and understated, dryly drawn and even elusive. In the first of these, a river scene with a bare-branched almost wispy tree in the foreground, an old man wearing a wide-brimmed straw hat sits forlornly in a small boat. The faintest suggestion of a shoreline stretches behind him. In another one of the album leaves, "Leaning on a Staff in an Autumn Grove" (Qiu lin yi zhang), a scholar stands looking up at a hut, his back to the viewer, with his hair tied in a knot. Again, the impression is one of sparse forlornness and Daoist solitude.  
275 Wan, Xi xi caotang ji, 3:10a.
I think of it. . . . The empire is so big, the four seas so vast. I wonder what's become of those I used to argue with before: the sage emperor, the shining prince, the loyal ministers, the righteous scholars. In times like these, I have no idea where they have gone.

Sometime early in 1646, Wan Shouqi decided to “abandon the ephemeral world for the true Reality” and took the Buddhist names of Huishou, Shamen huishou, and Mingzhi daoren. But his new attachments as a Buddhist did not keep him from eating meat or drinking alcohol, and his contemporaries saw him as a hybrid figure. A resident of Tongshan, the prefectural city of Xuzhou, wrote:

My townsman, Mr. Wan Nianshao, was a famous second-degree graduate of the Ming. After the rule changed, he lived in seclusion, not serving as an official, wearing a scholar’s gown and monk’s cap. He told fortunes and made his living as a writer. He used to wander about Wu and Chu with other eccentric loyalists and aged remnants, mourning all up and down that side of the vast river.

Half in scholar’s gown, half in priest’s hat, his thin, sharp face drawn to a point by his beard, Wan Shouqi’s mixed mien symbolized the fate of many of those actively engaged literati who had managed to survive the initial conquest of Jiangnan. His Confucian garb reminded acquaintances that he once had been a Ming graduate and for that dynasty had taken arms; his Buddhist hat bespoke his fortunes in the present and the price he had paid for his loyalist activities.

During that same year, 1646, Wan Shouqi’s former friend Li

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276 Yan, Baichun shan ren ji, 3:29.
277 Wan, Xi xi caotang ji, 3:29b–30a.
278 Michele Pirazzoli and Hou Ching-lang, “Un Rouleau de Wan Shouqi,” p. 156.
279 Wan, Xi xi caotang ji, 1:3a.
280 There is a portrait of Wan Shouqi in Ibid., p. 17.
281 An anonymous 18th-century Korean biographer spoke of the great “moral courage” (qijie) of Wan Shouqi. Huang Ming yimin zhuan, juan 2.
Picnicking beside a stream. Anon., Bai yong tupu [Illustrated register of a hundred chants] (1596), vol. 23.

Wen visited him in Huai’an. For the past two years the collaborator Li had been Manchu Prince-Regent Dorgon’s personal secretary, drafting many of the pronouncements used against the loyalists in 1645. Now, by way of recompense for services rendered, he asked Dorgon for permission to return home to Huating on leave. On the way there, he stopped off in Huai’an to see his loyalist
friend. For, in spite of the political differences between them, the two literati had not cut their mutual ties, especially after the matter of the conquest was settled for them individually. Nevertheless, it was a very difficult meeting for Li Wen, partly because Wan Shouqi’s Buddhist clothing seemed a reproach to his own collaboration. When he came face to face with Wan, his eyes filled with tears and he wept, comparing himself aloud to the infamous Li Ling, who had collaborated with the Xiongnu, and thus by inference identifying Wan Shouqi with Su Wu, who had remained faithful to the Han.

The same historical analogy occurred to onlookers when Li Wen visited Chen Zilong shortly after leaving Wan Shouqi in Huai’an. Chen Zilong had been very much on the move since leaving his sick grandmother in Kunshun after Songjiang fell. Bolo’s armies were sweeping through eastern Zhejiang, and it was

282 According to Gui Zhuang, Wan Shouqi’s home was a major stopping-off place for Jiangnan scholars traveling north and south. It was very common for literati to gather at his house and hold discussions together. Gui Zhuang ji, p. 316.

283 This was not unusual. Gong Xian, the painter who proudly called himself a “great commoner” (dabuyi) by way of announcing his loyalist commitments, painted one of his most famous masterpieces, “Landscape with Pavilion on a Peak,” for the famous Qing official Wang Shizhen. And, of course, many loyalist painters gathered around Zhou Lianggong, the Suzhou gentryman who became such an important patron for the Nanjing school after he helped pacify parts of Central China for the Qing. Marc Wilson, Kung Hsien, pp. 10–14.

284 Hou, Zhianghui tang ji, Siyi tang shiji, 5:10a. Li Ling (d. 40 B.C.), a Han general, surrendered to the Xiongnu. Su Wu (d. 60 B.C.) had been sent as an ambassador to the Xiongnu by Han Wudi. The Xiongnu imprisoned Su Wu for 19 years, throwing him at times into a pit where he survived by eating snow. Eventually he was sent to the far north near Lake Baikal where he lived as a shepherd. Whereas Li Ling accepted a post in the Xiongnu court, Su Wu steadfastly refused one. Thus, when the two men met, Li Ling felt intense shame in the face of Su Wu’s devoted loyalty. Five years after peace was concluded between the Han empire and the Xiongnu in 86 B.C., Su Wu was allowed to return to China. In admiration of his steadfastness, Li Ling presented him with a parting gift. He also is supposed to have sent Su Wu a letter, expressing his own personal regret and respect for the loyalist. The letter, which appeared in the anthology Wen xuan and was read by every ex-
difficult to avoid arrest if one were a long-haired and obviously well-to-do scholar. Finding refuge just northwest of Jiashan in a Chan monastery, Chen later moved to a former student’s home nearby, and then moved again. During this time, Chen had been appointed to office both by the Prince of Lu in Shaoxing and the Prince of Tang in Fuzhou. After his grandmother’s death in April or May, 1646, he tried to reach Shaoxing, but could not get past the Manchu patrols guarding Hangzhou Bay. He finally did see the Prince of Lu early in the summer, and reported on the military situation north of the Qiantang River. Then he returned to Songjiang by a circuitous route, and by the time Li Wen came to visit him early in 1647, he was living in a small hut on “Heavenly Repose” (Tianning), the country estate owned by his friend Qian Shuguang. Although Chen Zilong welcomed Li Wen warmly and their conversation was amiable, the collaborator—the Qing regent’s amanuensis—must once again have keenly felt the unspoken rebuke of his former fellow student and friend. He may even have compared himself to the notorious Han renegade again, because one of Chen Zilong’s students later described the meeting as reminiscent of Su Wu and Li Ling’s famous encounter. Shortly after the visit, Li Wen became extremely depressed, fell ill and took to his deathbed. Even though the Jiangnan resistance movement was far from ended, the plight of its earliest victims was already assuming a tragic dimension.

285 Chen, Chen Zhongyuan quanzhi, nianpu, xia, pp. 4b–5a; Hou, Zhuanghui tangji, Siyi tang shiji, 4:10a; Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-lung,” pp. 135–137.
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The Great Enterprise
Et surtout, il conviendrait de ne pas oublier que dans la vie tout se mêle, réalités de longue, de moyenne et de courte durée. Entre ces éléments, l'histoire n'est pas choix, mais mélange.

Fernand Braudel, *Annales* 8.1:73.

The greatness of the empire, the cause of its life or death, the incipiency of its rise or fall, are not to be found in the distance beyond it. You cannot reach into it from afar and turn its pivot.

The Great Enterprise

The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China

IN TWO VOLUMES • VOLUME II

Frederic Wakeman, Jr.

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To my mother and father
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CHAPTER NINE

Local Control in North China

In my own view, Liu Wenbing, Guo Junzhen, Jiu Tonghe, and Sun Zhuzei are like swarms of bees and colonies of ants resisting our columns’ advance. Allowed to surrender, they become insubordinate. Opposed forcibly, they flee in haste. They tax our soldiers’ strength and deplete our armies’ rations. For twenty years now they have poisoned to death all living things. Whether lord (shi) or commoner (shu), everyone in Shaanxi wants to eat the flesh and sleep on the skins [of his enemies like a savage].

Lei Xing, Memorial from Shaanxi, 1647, Ming Qing shiliao, bing, 6th ben, cited in Xie Guozhen, ed., Qingchu nongmin qi yi ziliao jilu, p. 271.

Although Ajige and his military commanders claimed in the spring of 1645 that Hebei, Shanxi, and Shaanxi had been “stabilized” after the Shun armies were expelled from Xi’an, conditions in these provinces were far from settled. Between Beijing and Datong, for instance, in Xuanhua prefecture, militant sectarians who called themselves “Supreme Heaven’s Clear and Pure Good Friends” (Huang tian qing jing jing shan you) took up arms against the new government. Acolytes of both sexes, led by trained boxers, repulsed imperial troops; and when the governor, Zhang Mingjun, rounded up the ringleaders, other messianic figures arose to replace them.¹ The same sect also inspired uprisings in neighboring

¹ On March 13, 1645, Zhang Mingjun reported that the uprising had broken out
Shanxi, where Governor Ma Guozhu and General Li Jian momentarily ceased military operations against the Shun rebel Gao Jiuying in order to extirpate the “Society of Good Friends” (Shanyou hui) around Ningwu, in the northwestern corner of the province. While Gao Jiuying was appeased with a pardon from the Ningwu military commander, General Gao Xun, Li Jian went on to suppress other sectarians, also identified with the Society of Good Friends, in the southeastern part of the province. Although several Qing officials argued that the peasants there were harmless pious folk, others called them “demon bandits” (yaozei) who “acted like they were possessed” (zuo sui). This was enough reason for General Li to order his men to massacre anyone believed to be a member of a popular religious sect, which in practice meant entering and destroying bao (forts) that had been designated by the authorities as communities of the faithful. Thousands perished in this manner.3

At the same time, though not necessarily connected with the Shanyou Hui uprising, an analogous millenarian rebellion also broke out to the west around Xi’an, the capital of Shaanxi. As the viceroy of the province rather laconically reported to Dorgon:

at a small village called Zhangjiayu. One of the sect’s leaders, named Cai Yu, had taken on the ritual name of Yu Chi, who was one of the two guardian deities painted on every yamen door. The primary leader, said to be named Li Yimei, was never captured. Although many were arrested, on May 26, a wizard (yaomin) named Liu Bosi claimed to have excavated a divine tablet, which gave him the right to call himself “Dipper Star” (Tiangang xing). He was arrested and imprisoned before he could attract enough followers to begin an uprising. Xie Guozhen, ed., Qingchu nongmin qiyi ziliao jilu, pp. 71–72.

2 According to Qing intelligence reports, the Shanyou hui was an offshoot of a sect called the Duzhang jiao. It was founded by a priestess (yaofu) named Cui. She also incited an uprising across the Great Wall at Shuozhou led by a man named Wu Dakuan. After Wu was captured and beheaded, a number of his followers came across the Great Wall and joined the Shanyou hui in Ningwu, and the sect then proceeded to attack some of the military camps (bao) in that sector. One contingent of troops, commanded by a regular Qing colonel, was defeated. During the summer of 1645 Governor Ma and General Li put together a major force, assembled from various district garrisons, which defeated the Society of Good Friends, beheaded Madame Cui, killed the sect’s members, and burned the followers’ dwellings. Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 250.

3 Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 2, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 251.
One day I was seated in my yamen when the rumor [reached me] that a number of dragons had descended from Heaven. In a short while one of the xiangyue (village covenant) headmen sent over one of the aforesaid “dragons,” which turned out to be a demon sutra on the “Imperial Ultimate” (Huang ji).4

The “demon” behind the sutra was the religious prophet known as Hu Shoulong. Hu was said to have “deluded” the people by making “demon seeds,” attracting more than twenty thousand followers to whom he announced the coming of the Qingguang (Bright and Glorious) reign year. As soon as the viceroy heard about this assembly of devout millenarians, he sent a military column into the countryside, and his soldiers promptly killed or dispersed the members of Hu Shoulong’s “demon band” (yaodang).5

Meng Qiaofang and the Initial Pacification of Shaanxi

The viceroy who acted so ruthlessly in Shaanxi was Lieutenant-General Meng Qiaofang, the Senior Vice-President of the Board of Punishments who had served with such special valor at the siege of Jinzhou. Entering China at Dorgon’s side in 1644, Meng early in the following year had been appointed Senior Vice-President of the Censorate, Right Vice-President of the Board of War, and Governor-General of Shaanxi and the Sanbian.6 Under his command were redoubtable forces, including the Xi’an banner garrison of Dorgon’s long-time favorite, Grand Secretary Holhoi, and the Hezhou garrison of recently surrendered Colonel Ren Zhen.7

4 Da-Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu (hereafter Shizu shilu), 17:20, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 270.
5 Shizu shilu, 17:20, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 270.
6 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 267.
7 Holhoi’s contingent mainly consisted of Chinese Blue Banner soldiers, commanded by Li Guohan, a bondservant who belonged to the Imperial Bodyguards; and Lieutenant-General Bayan, the half-Manchu son of Li Yongfang, the first Ming officer known to have surrendered to the Manchus. Shizu shilu, 21:257b; Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, p. 480. Ren Zhen, who had commanded the Hezhou garrison under the Ming and held it
Yet even these experienced and disciplined soldiers found the province of Shaanxi exceptionally hard to bring under control.

During the Ming period, Shaanxi province had incorporated both the heartland of ancient China and parts of the Central Asian world beyond what was once the center of the ecumene. What are now the separate provinces of Gansu and Ningxia were then administered under a single viceroy.8 To Chinese traveling "west of the river" (as the Gansu corridor was then called) this was like a foreign land. Not only were the towns closed and castle-like, sharply demarcated from the countryside like cities in the Middle East and Central Asia; the people were ethnically different as well.9 By the mid-seventeenth century, this portion of northwestern Shaanxi as well as the Huangzhong area around Lake Kokonor were settled by a complicated ethnic mixture of Mongolian-speaking lamaist Mongours (turen), lamaist and Muslim Tibetans, Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese, Turkic-speaking and Tibetan-speaking Muslim Salars, Tibetan-speaking Muslims of Mongolian origin, lamaist Mongols, and Muslim Mongours.10 Many of these peoples

8 Gansu, for instance, was divided into twelve commanderies (wei) under native chieftains. These commanderies were tribal territories; administration resided with the chief's tent. The status of the commanderies lapsed toward the end of the Ming, though the native territories remained. The Chinese administrator of these territories was either the provincial military commissioner or the provincial treasurer. Henry Serruys, "The Mongols of Kansu during the Ming," pp. 255–271; Camille Imbault-Huart, "Deux Insurrections des Mahometans de Kan-sou," p. 496.

9 Joseph Fletcher, "China's Northwest at the Time of the Ming–Ch'ing Transition," pp. 4–5.

10 Ibid., p. 26. The Mongours were tribesmen settled under the Mongols in the mountainous borderlands known as Xining, which is between the Gansu corridor and what is now Qinghai. Huangzhong lies in central Gansu, separated from western Gansu by the Nanshan mountain range, and from eastern Gansu by the Yellow River. Louis M. J. Schram, The Mongours of the Kansu-Tibetan Frontier, Part 3, p. 52.
depended in part for a living upon the east-west caravan trade.\footnote{11} After the Timurid empire declined and collapsed in the latter part of the 15th century, the nomadic communities of Central Asia—Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks—gained critical advantage over the urban centers of Samarkand and Herat and began to attack merchant caravans enroute to Turkestan.\footnote{12} Not long after this, the spread of European maritime trade with the Orient caused commercial connections to shift elsewhere.\footnote{13} The result was a profound economic depression in China’s northwest.\footnote{14}

11 Although Lattimore has argued that the Mongols were self-sufficient (they could indeed provide for all of their needs as long as their herds were kept up), Rossabi maintains that in emergencies, such as bad winters when snow covered the grazing land, the Mongols relied on stores of grain as well as certain other foreign commodities. Moreover, the spread of Buddhism after Altan Khan converted to Yellow Sect Lamaism in 1577 meant that they required tea for religious purposes. Morris Rossabi, \textit{China and Inner Asia from 1368 to the Present}, pp. 40–41, and 49–50. Jagchid argues even more vigorously that Mongols resorted to war against the Chinese because they depended upon the Central Kingdom’s agricultural society for their own economic needs and were kept from normal intercourse by China’s closed-door policy. Sechin Jagchid, “Patterns of Trade and Conflict Between China and the Nomads of Mongolia,” pp. 178–183. See also L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., \textit{Dictionary of Ming Biography}, pp. 8–9; Thomas J. Barfield, “The Hsiung-nu Imperial Confederacy,” p. 52.

12 In Samarkand (whence tribute was sent to China), Shahrukh died in 1447; and his successor, Ulugh-beg, was killed by his own son in 1449. Shortly afterwards, Turfan—a relatively peaceful state in the early 1400s—demanded that the Chinese recognize it as a great Muslim power. In 1469, however, the Ming Ministry of Rites refused to bestow the four-clawed dragon robe on Turfan’s Sultan Ali, who four years later captured Hami and further hindered the caravan trade. After the middle of the 15th century, not a single tribute mission from Herat reached Ming China. Rossabi, \textit{China and Inner Asia}, p. 38; Morris Rossabi, “The Tea and Horse Trade with Inner Asia during the Ming,” pp. 152–153; idem, “Muslim and Central Asian Revolts,” pp. 178–179.


14 Morris Rossabi, “Muslim and Central Asian Revolts in Late Ming and Early Ch’ing,” pp. 2–5; Rossabi, “Muslim and Central Asian Revolts,” p. 174. But see also Fletcher, “China’s Northwest,” p. 15. Fletcher asserts that: “Neither the economy of sedentary Central Asia as a whole nor the power of the nomads of the Inner Asian steppe can be shown to have depended mainly on the east-west caravan trade.” He does not, however, introduce evidence in this particular paper to substantiate his assertion. In global economic terms, the
At the same time the area was increasingly troubled by Mongol raids.\textsuperscript{15} The collapse of the Chagatai khanate and of unified rule in Kashgar after the death of ‘Abd al-Rashid (r. 1533–1565) only worsened matters.\textsuperscript{16} As the inner steppe nomads gravitated toward the Chinese orbit, they became more and more dependent upon the sedentary populations of the northwest for their economic existence. They also began to compete more avidly with one an-

17th century certainly was characterized by a major revolution in the structure of world trade. The 16th-century shift of the Asian-European carrying trade from caravans to carracks had made the Portuguese king the world’s biggest tax-gatherer. But, after its initial expansion, the Iberian commerce in pepper, spices, drugs, and silks did not significantly expand. Rather, increases in European consumption were met through the Levant. With the establishment of the Dutch and English East India Companies in the 17th century, however, many of these goods simply disappeared from the intercontinental caravan trade routes, and there was a dramatic increase in the number of ships sent out from Western Europe. This structural revolution, which was symbolized by the fall of Hormuz in 1622, certainly must have had an influence on the economy of China’s Inner Asian frontier, but the precise nature of its impact remains to be studied. For the expansion in maritime trade, see Niels Steensgaard, \textit{The Asian Trade Revolution of the 17th Century}, passim. As far as regional diplomatic and political relationships were concerned, by the time of the Manchu invasion, the Timurid and Mogul realms in Central Asia had broken up into small kingdoms and principalities. Eastern Turkestan was divided among city-states whose inhabitants spoke Turkic languages, and who shared Islamic culture, but who lacked a sense of single nationality. Because these were mainly Sunnite Muslims, they were cut off from normal relations with the Shi’ite Persians. Yet, they were no closer to China. Central Asians “saw China mostly as a distant empire, a market partly dependent on central Asian commerce, and an enormous body of heathen whom Muslims would some day convert.” Joseph F. Fletcher, “China and Central Asia,” p. 218.

15 Batu (c. 1464–1532), entitled Dayan Khan, unified the Eastern Mongols, defeated the Oirats, and pacified Outer Mongolia. From 1480 on, after the Chinese denied his request for trade, every single year saw a major Mongol raid across the Chinese border. By the time of the Qing conquest, the Zunghar Mongols, led by Qaraqula and his son Batūr Qunγ Tayiγ, were attempting to form a unified state by promoting Buddhism, creating a new Mongol script, and developing agriculture. Rossabi, “Muslim and Central Asian Revolts,” p. 190; Rossabi, \textit{China and Inner Asia}, pp. 44–45.

16 Fletcher, “China’s Northwest,” p. 27; Rossabi, “Muslim and Central Asian Revolts in Late Ming and Early Ch’ing,” p. 6.
other. In Huangzhong, the native rulers of the Mongours (who were *tusi* confirmed by the Ming emperor) resisted the growing encroachments of Tibetan lamaseries for land and food; and by the 1590s, feuds and wars between the *tusi* and the lamas had devastated the area. Nevertheless, because of the historical confirmation of their authority by the Ming throne, the Mongour *tusi* of Xining remained loyal to the dynasty when rebellions spread during the seventeenth century. They crushed a Tibetan revolt in 1642, and opposed Li Zicheng when he attacked Xining that same year. Although the Mongours ambushed and massacred a major contingent of Li’s troops in 1644, the “barbarians” of the Gansu corridor were unable to hold off the Shun armies after they made Shaanxi their base. Suzhou was taken after much of the population was slaughtered; and Xining was sacked and many of the *tusi* were killed. Consequently, when Ajige expelled Li Zicheng from Xi’an the Mongours rapidly became Qing allies, being confirmed once again in their position by Ajige as well as by Viceroy Meng Qiaofang.

The alliance with the Mongours was all the more important because Meng Qiaofang immediately encountered severe resistance from the many armies still remaining in Shaanxi province after the expulsion of Li Zicheng. The largest of these, a force of nearly seventy thousand well armed men, was commanded by a former Ming regional vice-commander named Sun Shoufa. Sun, a military expert born in Shaanxi, had established a small Ming loyalist regime on Zhongnan Mountain, south of Xi’an. There, in late May or early June of 1645, he had elevated the fourth son of the Ming Prince of Qin to the rank of Prince of Hanzhong, which was the prefectural capital southwest of the mountain. Serving under him, and also a former Ming officer, was Colonel He Zhen, who now led three thousand *yi yong* (righteous braves) from Zhongnan in an attack on Fengxiang across the Wei River. The Ming loyalist attack on Fengxiang was a success, and a number of other rebels

17 Fletcher, “China’s Northwest,” p. 28. In 1551 the Tibetan population northeast of Xining revolted, defeating the Ming forces sent against them.
18 Ibid., p. 29; Schram, Mongours, pp. 51–53.
responded to Sun Shoufa’s call to arms against the new provincial authorities. The most powerful of Sun’s new allies was Wu Da-ding, who formerly headed the Ming garrison of Guyuan in the Liupan Mountains.19 Sun believed that with Wu’s help it would be possible to capture the provincial capital, which was only lightly defended by seven hundred Qing soldiers. In late January or early February of 1646, the Ming loyalists descended from the highlands southeast of Xi’an and invested the city. On February 20, however, relief arrived unexpectedly in the form of a column commanded by Meng Qiaofang himself. Breaking through Sun Shoufa’s lines, Viceroy Meng regrouped in the city. Leaving defense of Xi’an proper in Holhoi’s hands, Meng first carefully flanked the loyalist troops on both sides with recently defected Han soldiers, and then launched a fierce frontal assault with imperial bannermen.20 Thousands of loyalists were slaughtered, and the rebel army was routed, fleeing in all directions.21

Meng’s lieutenants pursued the fleeing rebels. Li Guohan led his troops eastward, executing more than one thousand loyalists led by a lower degree-holder from Weinan, and attacking rebels under Liu Wenbing across the border near Puzhou in Shanxi; Holhoi pursued other remnants from the Xi’an uprising toward the north.22 The grand secretary rode deep into Shanxi in pursuit, defeating the Earl of Guangshan, Liu Tichun, at Shanyin near Datong on April 25, 1646. After that engagement, Holhoi claimed to have beheaded over twenty-two thousand rebels, including the loyalists’ leader, Sun Shoufa.23 However, Sun was actually at that

19 The others included Liu Wenbing, He Hongqi, Guo Jinzheng, Huang Jinyu, Jiao Rong, and Chou Huang. Guo Jinzheng is probably the same person as Guo Junzhen.
20 Chen De’s army flanked the west and Ren Zhen, leaving by the north gate, flanked the east. The assault was led by Imperial Bodyguard Li Guohan and gusa ejen Mergen. According to one source, Ren Zhen defended the west gate. Qing shi liezhuang, p. 38b.
21 Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 267; Shizu shilu, 23:273b; Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 422–423.
22 Shizu shilu, 24:285a.
23 Ibid., 25:292a.
time hiding in the mountains near Xing’an far to the south. There, he had allied himself with local stockade heads who already controlled the mountain refuges, and with the help of Wu Dading and some of the others had begun rebuilding his military strength. Before Sun could succeed, however, Meng Qiaofang got wind of his whereabouts and despatched a light cavalry unit which found his encampment. Though Sun is said to have killed a score or more of his enemies, the Qing soldiers finally overwhelmed the Ming loyalist leader. His head was carried back to Xi’an, but his death neither caused the disbandment of his army (Wu Dading escaped for the time being into Sichuan and then set up a resistance base at Guyuan) nor brought peace to the southeast (He Zhen would continue to ally with the local zhai of bandits long holding sway over that region).  

The Qing forces by now, under the leadership of Meng Qiaofang, were especially good at rapidly bringing together a number of different fighting units into a single well-coordinated strike force. Once assembled, such a force was nearly indomitable, as victory after victory in the Shaanxi campaign was to show. But dispersing the armies, and moving them from their collective garrison towns to try to extend control across the countryside, was not nearly as effective. Holhoei was able to drive the main forces of He Zhen out of the rural zone between Yan’an and Xi’an; but Liu Wenbing easily managed to evade capture for nearly a year, and with his band of a thousand men dashed “madly and recklessly back and forth,” inciting other local groups to defy the provincial government with “passionate displays of power.”

24 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 269; Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 422–423.
25 There were not enough troops available at this time to man scattered local garrisons. In November, 1646, Meng Qiaofang had detached a portion of his army to accompany Haoge on his campaign into Sichuan. Haoge and his men encountered Zhang Xianzhong at Xichong on January 2, 1647, and killed the rebel.
26 Memorial dated August 31, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 270. The governor at Yan’an, Wang Zhengzhi, claimed in this memorial that uprisings in his jurisdiction were inspired by Liu Wenbing, who along with Zhang Yingyuan “summoned each locale’s bandits” for a mass uprising.
While Holhoi tried to create a rebel-free zone to the north and east of Xi’an, two of Meng Qiaofang’s other commanders assumed responsibility for asserting Qing control over western Shaanxi. Liu Fangming and Ma Ning shared several traits in common. Both were natives of Ningxia, and both were former field-grade Ming officers who had served in Gansu and now were Qing commanders belonging to the Han White Banner. 

27 Brigade-General Liu and Lieutenant-Colonel Ma first moved against Guyuan, which they readily took from Wu Dading, driving him out of the city. Then they moved out to Gongchang, where the highway turned northwest toward the Yellow River and the Gansu corridor. There word came that the Ningxia garrison soldiers had mutinied to the north, killing their governor, Jiao Anmin. Liu Fangming immediately led a detachment in person to Ningxia, where he discovered that the mutineers had been incited by their two adjutant-generals, Wang Yuan and Ma De. Liu pretended to acquiesce in the fait accompli, and rewarded Ma De with his own command at what is now Yanchi in Ningxia along the Great Wall facing the Maowusu Desert in Inner Mongolia. Actually, however, Liu’s intention was to isolate one rebel commander from the other. Once Ma De had left, Liu lulled Wang Yuan’s suspicions with a show of great confidence, and then asked him to bring his men out of the Ningxia garrison to attack a nearby bandit group. Waiting in ambush were Liu Fangming’s men who fell upon the soldiers, routed them, and seized Wang Yuan who was beheaded for treason. Ma De remained unpunished.

The lesson was not lost on the mutineer. In the spring of 1647, Ma De abandoned Yanchi and moved westward to seek refuge in the Helan Mountains, looting military caches along the way. Near Honggucheng, just west of Lanzhou, Ma De fell in with the outlaw He Hongqi. The two rebels were emboldened by their combined numbers to double back on Ma’s trail and strike across

27 Both men—who may have been fellow Muslims too—also earned great military reputations later in the south where Liu fought Coxinga after 1659 and where Ma served in Sichuan, standing firmly on the side of the Kangxi Emperor during the Three Feudatories revolt. Er chen zhuan, 3:21–24, and 6:29–30.
northern Shaanxi at the city of Anding, north of Yan’an. There they gathered more supporters when a local bandit chieftain named Wang Yilin arose in response, killing the Yan’an garrison commander, Colonel Zhang Ji.

In response, the Qing forces divided into two groups. One, under Liu Fangming, pursued Wang Yilin and Ma De, catching up with the rebels at Yuwang, north of Guyuan, where Wang was killed. Ma De managed to escape on horseback, but he was ridden down and captured. Liu ordered his body torn in two as punishment. The second group, commanded by Ma Ning, Zhang Yong, and Liu Youyuan, attacked Ma De’s ally, He Hongqi. Their campaign was more protracted because even though He was killed in the initial battle, his allies occupied a number of stockades in northern Shaanxi. One after another, however, these rebel redoubts were surrounded and taken. One chief was allowed to surrender; the rest were beheaded.

Around Yan’an proper, where Wang Yilin had originated, banditry had been endemic for decades. The previous year the Ming loyalist Liu Wenbing had easily incited uprisings there, skillfully using his knowledge of the terrain to elude capture. The new governor of Shaanxi, Lei Xing, was determined to hunt down the partisans. In April, 1647, he ordered Bordered Blue and Solid Red Manchu Bannermen to begin a systematic extermination of all outlaws and rebels in districts surrounding Yan’an. The Manchu soldiers did not bother to make body counts in most cases, though they did record the voluminous amounts of weapons, sets of armor, and livestock captured. Many outlaw bands escaped slaughter by fleeing deep into the forested mountains. But this time Liu Wenbing failed to evade the sweep. On April 30 he and some of the other former chieftains of He Zhen were finally taken, along with several “bogus” judges and magistrates bearing Ming seals of appointment. Governor Lei Xing jubilantly reported:

28 This and the above information giving details of the Ningxia mutiny come mainly from Qing shi gao, biography of Liu Fangming, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 269.

29 Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 267.

30 See, e.g., Shizushilu, 31:372b.
On April 18 we mustered our Manchu and Han officers and soldiers to leave the fortifications and set up secret ambushes, advancing by columns. Within seven days they had encountered the bandits at Qilichuan. At Liangjia, near Bocun, they beheaded some, and chased the others on to Lanzhuanggou. There our men were attacked on all sides. Guo Junzhen and all the other bandit leaders were completely pacified—utterly exterminated—while their chief Liu Wenbing was captured alive. We captured horses, mules, cattle, donkeys, tools, servants, and divided them all up to reward each brigade. [Liu] Wenbing has since been remanded as a prisoner to the provincial [authorities], and on May 9 we cut off his head and ripped apart his corpse. [Guo] Junzhen's severed head was hung from on high as a warning. In this one tour of duty, two rebel [leaders] were killed, and their partisans completely wiped out. [This victory] surely was owing to the majesty and charisma (ling) of our emperor, to the sage counsel of the imperial prince-regent, and to the ability of all our Manchu and Han officers to carry out their orders.31

By the summer of 1647, then, the Qing forces had imposed military order upon the central districts of Shaanxi, and controlled the approaches to both sides of the main highway linking Yan’an and Xi’an. However, the provincial capital would not really be secure until Meng Qiaofang’s armies controlled the Han River highlands in the southeastern corner of the province around Xing’an and Hanzhong.

**“Longhairs” in the Highlands**

Many of the loyalist bands that had attacked Xi’an and Yan’an had originally been formed in the highlands, where heavily forested mountains ranged 1,500 to 3,000 meters above sea level. Because of the rugged terrain, and because the highlands were at the juncture of four provinces, the area had long been known for its out-

31 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 271. See also Shizu shilu, 31:370b. Guo Junzhen for years fought alongside Sun Shoufa. Ibid., 30:353.
law lairs and for the readiness of its natives to flout civil authority: "They all wear their hair [long] and [are not frightened to] look danger in the face."\(^{32}\)

The leading rebel in the southeast was Sun Shoufa’s former aide, the Ming loyalist Colonel He Zhen, whose army of eighty thousand men had captured Fengxiang in 1645 and had attacked Xi’an that same winter.\(^{33}\) Now he controlled the town of Xing’an in the Han River highlands. To bring that area under Qing rule, Governor-General Meng Qiaofang in December, 1646, ordered Colonel Ren Zhen and Colonel Wang Ping to lead an expedition into the southeastern corner of the province. Early in 1647 Colonel Wang reached Xing’an, and He Zhen abandoned the city, retreating toward Hanzhong in the west. According to Colonel Wang’s report, at a place called Banqiao, He Zhen decided to make a stand and fight. Wang Ping’s Manchu-Han troops thereupon won a great victory. Over three thousand of the rebels were killed, and another fifteen hundred surrendered to the Qing. Among the dead, claimed Colonel Wang, was He Zhen himself.\(^{34}\) Whether Wang made a mistaken identification, or whether someone else then claimed the name “He Zhen,” is impossible to say. But according to the central government’s archives, He Zhen in name at least survived this putative death. As late as December 19, 1648, nearly two years afterwards, He Zhen was reported by Governor Huang Erxing as trying to block grain transportation along the Wei River; and in April of the following year, the He Zhen band was still fighting Colonel Ren Zhen in the southeast.\(^{35}\) As a generic designation, then, “He Zhen” continued to be used to describe the Xing’an rebels who had launched the original attack on Xi’an in 1645–1646.

\(^{32}\) Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 272. The area was also well known for the number of liumín (vagrants) who wandered there from Anhui, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian. Fu Yiling, “Qingdai zhongye Chuan-Shan-Hu san sheng bianqu jingji xingtai de bianhua,” p. 49.


\(^{34}\) Shizu shilu, 29:346b.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 41:276b; and 43:504b–505a.
A well armed and disciplined paramilitary force, He Zhen’s partisans contrasted with most of the more primitively equipped bands of the Xing’an area. His outlaws were mainly local brigands. They clustered in small zhai (stockades) amid the dense undergrowth of these rugged, overgrown mountains, dwelling ten to fifteen men in each with their wives, children, and livestock. The zhai, which were often built around temples, reinforced each other and, though relatively independent, were often identified with a major “king” or “prince” who gave particular zhai leaders military documents appointing them colonels or majors in the rebel force. On occasion, the “king” would assemble members of a group of zhai around his own stockade into a raiding force, and descend into agricultural communities in the valleys to forage. Li Kui, for example, led members of the scattered mountain zhai of Zhen’an district on periodic raids, and quite appropriately styled himself “Scavenger King” (Saodi wang). Yet in spite of the occasional foray into neighboring communities, these social bandits seem to have enjoyed a measure of popular protection. At least, the authorities were quick to admit that at the first sign of a government military move against the zhai, intelligence was immediately transmitted to the outlaws, who abandoned their redoubts in the foothills and moved into more impregnable stockades in the higher mountains.

Zhai outlaws did not normally attack district capitals unless they were backed up by larger and better armed groups of rebels. In April, 1648, such a force appeared in the Ren River valley southwest of Xing’an in the form of Wu Dading’s loyalist army.

36 For instance, the famous rebel leader Sun Shoujin (who may have been Sun Shoufa’s brother) had during the 1650s his own zhai at Mount Banchang near Xing’an. His stockade was protected by two other nearby zhai, one of which commanded a high mountain defile which could easily be defended against a much superior enemy force. The back of Mount Banchang housed yet two more stockades of allies who guarded Sun’s rear. And on the slopes below there were a total of nine other zhai spread out like points of a star, which represented a kind of outer perimeter of defense. Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 277.

37 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 273–274.
Wu was the Ming officer who had earlier garrisoned Guyuan. Expelled by Liu Fangming, Wu Dading had sought refuge in the highlands of Ziyang district, and now he and his men assembled other loyalist bands and led them in an attack on the neighboring county seat of Hanyin, which they looted.\(^{38}\)

The Qing garrison at Xing’an, just across the Han River, was commanded by Brigade-General Ren Zhen. His troops were at full muster, and General Ren decided that the provocative attack on Hanyin demanded a vigorous response.\(^{39}\) To avoid alerting the rebels’ spies, General Ren had his men prepare to move out at night, and then swiftly on April 21 led them north into the Zhen’an foothills to quell the outlaws. The next day, at a place appropriately called the “Plateau of the Prince of Evil” (Mowangping), Ren’s men stumbled upon their first large bandit camp, which they surrounded and attacked. The surprised outlaws tumbled out of their fortification in disarray. They stood little chance against the crack Manchu-Han troops. Several hundred rebels were killed, and others captured, including a chief called “the tiger” (hu). Because the Qing forces had not closed in on the rebel camp until it was quite late in the day, darkness fell before the fighting stopped. In the confusion of twilight many of the bandits escaped. The next day, after counting the captured military patents, weapons, stock, women, and other chattel, the troopers fanned out through the woods hunting down survivors. The captured outlaws were brought before General Ren, who made it quite clear that he had deliberately allowed these men to survive so that they could guide his men on to other hidden rebel camps. As Ren Zhen explained to Governor Huang:

This official is in sympathy with our great Qing [dynasty’s] policy of clemency. The net was opened up on one side, and I permitted

\(^{38}\) Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 274.

\(^{39}\) Previously, the Xing’an garrison had been undermanned, and Ren Zhen had been reluctant to commit his troops to mountain warfare because he feared that revolt would flare up elsewhere. Now, 4,000 soldiers earlier transferred to serve under Shaanxi Governor Huang Erxing were returned to the Xing’an commander. Qing shi liezhuang, p. 38b.
them to surrender, speaking to them kindly of the edict offering amnesty. I then ordered them to help lead us to kill the [remaining] bandit nie (bastards) and thus prove they deserve [mercy]. The leaders wanted to be released and some were willing to die in their place, yet they followed orders and each of the surrendered males guided us to hunt down and kill [the rest].

On April 28, then, General Ren’s men, guided by the surviving bandits from the Mowangping camp, moved on from one “lair” to the next, “hacking them to death till we lost count.” The only ones to escape were those outlaws who had enough warning to abandon their zhai and flee to the most precipitous and inaccessible areas of the mountains they knew so well. On May 12, Ren’s expedition returned to its base, and the general reported to Beijing that even though he could not guarantee that there would not be fresh uprisings and raids in the future, for the moment the Zhen’an mountains were settled and the district magistrate could administer the area in peace.

The Zhen’an outlaws, however, were not the principal threat to the Qing garrison at Xing’an; nor were they even responsible for the attack on Hanyin. Rather, as Governor Huang explained, the entire Ren River valley was overrun by well organized “long-hairs,” originally trained by Sun Shoufa and presently operating under a Ming loyalist reign name (Longwu). The presence of Wu Dading in Ziyang district now provided the potential for a major uprising of the zhai and the descent of their bands upon valley settlements; for even though Qing troops had captured Ziyang city from Sun Shoufa much earlier, Wu Dading had been able to acquire the support of numerous local zhai in the mountains outside the city and raided virtually at will.

Consequently, after only two days’ rest in barracks, General Ren Zhen on May 14 led a sweep across the Ren River, bringing

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40 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 274.
41 Ibid., p. 274. Ren Zhen attributed their victory to “the great benevolence of our emperor on high, and the majesty and charisma (ling) of the imperial regent.”
42 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 272–273.
back 274 heads which were hung outside Xing’an’s main gate. Then, after several weeks rest, General Ren took his soldiers to Ziyang city, and from there, on June 22, began the march up narrow defiles and along nearly impassable paths toward Wu Dading’s base. The Manchu-Han troops soon were ambushed by Wu Dading and his local allies. The stones and arrows which the hill-men hurled down upon the Qing soldiers nearly broke their ranks, but Ren’s men—including some of his own retainers (jiading)—held their position, and Ren Zhen later claimed that it was their staunchness under fire that eroded the local rebels’ confidence in Wu Dading’s ability to withstand the imperial forces. By the time Ren Zhen disengaged on June 29 and returned to Ziyang’s district capital, twelve major stockade leaders (baozhai tou) had surrendered to him, cutting their hair back and commanding their kinfolk and followers to acknowledge the virtuous rule of the Great Qing.  

The temporary pacification of both the Shaanxi lowlands and highlands helped the Qing government stabilize its domination over neighboring Shanxi province as well. Earlier, in August, 1645, the Shun remnants under Gao Jiuying had betrayed their amnesty by raising the flag of rebellion at Kelan. Li Jian had captured the rebel, beheaded him and killed all of his men. As Meng Qiaofang and his commanders steadily destroyed rebel units to the west, Governor Ma Guozhu proceeded to consolidate Qing control over Shanxi.

Guozhu pacified Shanxi in just over a year, arresting and executing remnant bands of [Li] Zicheng’s men lurking among the people. He pacified the multitude and soothed the law-abiding. The people gradually resumed their occupations.  

The central government in Beijing replaced Ma, a military man, with a civil governor, Shen Chaoji, and began making formal appointments to the provincial bureaucracy, filling long empty va-

43 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 272–273. See also Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 267.
44 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 249–250.
cancies and conducting personnel evaluations once again in con-
formancy with procedures in fully pacified areas where normal
government prevailed.\footnote{Ibid., p. 250. Shen Chaoji (d. 1648), from Fengtian, proved to be an energetic
official, dedicated to restoring order as well as an ostensibly more pristine ad-
ministration to the province. Subordinates were quickly brought to heel if
they were accused of overbearing attitudes. “More than twenty corrupt
clers” were impeached for malfeance. The tax burden on the populace was
lightened by reducing the quota for courier expenses from 200,000 to 150,000
taels. And instead of having that particular corveé commutation collected by
the rotational lizhang (tax headman), Shen appointed regular tax collectors
who reported directly to him. Wang Yunwu, ed., Da Qing yitongzhi, 135:32a;
Wang Xuan and Yang Du, comps., Shanxi tongzhi, 104:28a.}

\section*{Extermination in Shandong}

The pacification of Shandong, to the east of the capital, was quite
another matter. Despite the most draconian government measures
(in December, 1646, a Manchu contingent beheaded over sixteen
thousand people in one prefecture alone), the insurgency there
continued.\footnote{This military expedition was commanded by Jueshan. Shizu shilu, 29:348a.
The memorial was received on December 24, 1646.} In Yanzhou prefecture, the roads were often cut by
bandits, and entire districts were frequently overrun by heavily
armed men. The Ming magistrates in these districts, and especi-
ally around the area known as Nine Mountains (Jiu shan), had ini-
tially greeted the arrival of Qing forces with relief at having found
a new ally in their ongoing war against the local bandits. Many of
them reported in great detail on the size, location, and leadership
of the rebel groups and pledged to cooperate in destroying them.
From their reports provincial-level officials soon received, and
communicated to the court, a very clear notion of the extent of
disorder in the province, and in Yanzhou in particular. For exam-
ple, Wu Choufei, the magistrate of Zou xian in that prefecture,
listed 52 gangs (dang) in his district, each one numbering 400–500
members.\footnote{Memorial dated September 23, 1644, Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 5, in Xie,
February of 1647, this situation called for the strongest countermeasures. Wu Da appealed to Dorgon in the most fervent terms, describing the turmoil in Shandong and pointing out that this province was a "funnel" leading into the imperial domains. If this disorder was allowed to continue, "the people will begin to doubt that our army will ever move [against the rebels], and no matter who the bandit, he will [be able to] use uncertainty to spread further uncertainty." Therefore, argued Wu, it would be a great mistake for Dorgon to send the Manchu imperial armies on to the south to fight to the Ming remnants. Once removed from the north, revolts would break out in their rear; in the case of Shandong, this would mean cutting the armies' own supply lines.  

Wu Da went on to point out that what he regarded as a strategic error was largely the result of faulty reporting from the province itself. Local officials had been deluding themselves (and their superiors) with glowing accounts of their successful anti-bandit campaigns. The tried-and-true notion that "to catch the bandits you must catch their king; to shoot a man you must first shoot his horse," was simply not working out in practice. For one, the bandits of Shandong had a superb intelligence system. Their spies and sympathizers among the yamen clerks warned them the moment a military expedition was sent into their region, giving them time to "change their stripes" and pose as peasants. If, on the other hand, the guards units in the major garrison towns waited for xian mag-

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Qingchu nongmin, pp. 78–80. Another report listed the gang leaders by name and title, making the point that they had been well known local "kings" (e.g., "the Great King Who Soars to Heaven," Chong tian da wang; or "the Great Scavenger King," Saodi da wang) for a long time "and simply cannot be compared to run-of-the-mill local bandits." Memorial dated October 1, 1644, Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 1, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 74. The reason for their incomparability, one memorialist explained, was that as soon as one of these leaders established a large band, he immediately adopted a monarchic title. And instead of roaming about with his men like simple vagabonds or highwaymen, these bandits built large and well fortified base camps, defended with elaborate military equipment, guns and cannon, from whence they sallied forth to loot and burn the towns around. Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 1, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 74. The memorialist was Yang Fangxing.

48 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 84–85.
istrates to report attacks by these rebellious armies, the imperial reinforcements never arrived in time to catch the criminals. To attack their bases was next to impossible in most cases because they occupied mountaintops or caves. Cavalry could not be used in such terrain, nor was it usually possible to haul artillery up the mountains to shell their redoubts. The only alternative, argued Wu, was an all-out policy of jiao, surrounding the bandits’ base camps and showing no mercy. For too long tactics had been dilatory and ineffective, alternating between “soothing” and “extermination.” Now, Dorgon was urged to send the Grand Army immediately to Ji’nan and Dongchang before the people of Shandong might sense the dynasty’s hesitation and arise on all four sides against the Qing.49

Wu Da’s dire predictions of an imminent province-wide uprising were partly realized, although his panicked appeal for the Grand Army to rescue them was not answered. There was a major revolt in March and April of 1647 around Zouping northeast of the provincial capital, and a total of fourteen zhou and xian were attacked by one rebel “king” or another. Wu Da’s successor as governor, Ding Wensheng, claimed to have completely exterminated these rebels in April, but as the attacks continued, he was accused of being dilatory, and stripped of office by the Board of Punishments.50 This, then, certainly was a critical period for parts of the province, but there was little that successive governors could do except hope that each of the district capitals would mobilize its defenses against these armies descended from the mountainous countryside. Usually, as Wu Da had pointed out, the magistrate’s report of an attack arrived long after the struggle was over; and it usually signalled victorious defense against a brief siege, with the magistrate, the local brigade commanders, the constable, and the gentry all mobilizing their housemen to resist rebel firecart attacks on their walls.51 Much more unsettling was no report

49 Ibid.
50 Ding’s report of victory reached the capital on April 14, 1647. Shizu shilu, 31:363b. For his punishment see Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 82.
51 See, for example, the report from Ling xian dated the tenth lunar month of 1647, Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 84.
at all, which might well mean that a city had succumbed to rebels; or, only slightly better, the oral report by a magistrate who had been forced to flee his capital because it had fallen to bandits.\footnote{A typical example of the latter was the fall of Yixian, the important city between the Grand Canal and the imperial highway. On November 26, 1647, Zhang Ruxiu, Ding Wensheng's successor, reported that 400 mounted bandits and an unspecified number of men on foot had attacked Yixian during the night, and the following day had overcome the yamen guard and scaled the walls with ladders, killing and robbing as they entered the city. The magistrate and director of studies managed to escape, but the rest of the yamen staff was killed by the rebels, who looted the city and returned to their base in the hills. \textit{Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7}, in Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, p. 80.}

In some cases, however, local officials or gentrymen managed to receive intelligence of such attacks in advance and so prepared their defenses in time to stave off a siege. This was true for the important commercial center of Zhangqiu on the Grand Canal. The leading rebel in this area, active even before the fall of the Ming, was an outlaw named Ding Weiyue. For years Ding had made a practice of attacking and looting the treasuries of district capitals in the eastern portions of Yanzhou prefecture. On November 10, 1647, the assistant prefect in charge of the defense of Zhangqiu, a former Ming sub-director of studies named Wu Tonglong who had like most of the local officials in this part of Shandong agreed to serve the Qing, received reports that Ding had gathered several thousand of his followers and was preparing to attack the city. Appealing for help from the prefect at Yanzhou, the assistant prefect and the local gentry (\textit{xiangshen}), led by a man named Zhang Jingji, organized retainers and townsfolk into a defense force which held off Ding’s men for twenty-four hours and arrested fifth columnists (\textit{neiyings}) within the city.\footnote{\textit{Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7}, in Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, p. 86.} Intelligence also helped the Zhangqiu assistant prefect discover, on January 8, 1648, the whereabouts of Ding’s main force of about one thousand men in the Liangshanbo Mountains where Song Jiang of \textit{Water Margin} fame had once had his headquarters. Sending to the Manchu garrison at Dongchang for help, Assistant Prefect Wu Tonglong had his men lead the bannermen into Liangshanbo. At dusk on January
10 the Qing column unexpectedly encountered Ding Weiyue's small army, and a fierce battle ensued. To the glory of the Hurha commander, Sarhuda, the imperial forces won a great victory, killing "innumerable bandits" including Ding Weiyue himself. For the moment, the mouth of the Shandong "funnel" was securely in Manchu hands.\(^4\)

While fighting continued to rage along the peripheries of the north China plain, the new government took several measures to reinforce its control over the population in less unruly areas closer to the major cities it now dominated. Four sets of policies were emphasized: the appointment of conscientious magistrates and the correction of yamen functionaries' abuses; the registration of households and the formation of mutual-responsibility units; the control of firearms and livestock; and the use of selective amnesties to discriminate between bandit leaders and their followers.

**Magistrates and Yamen Clerks**

The Qing government clearly recognized, from the moment it occupied Beijing, the importance of appointing good local magistrates.\(^5\) In June 1644, the Board of Civil Appointments noted that special care was to be taken in appointing local military and civil officials to ensure that they fulfilled the task of eradicating local bandits and brought order back to the rural population.\(^6\) These were

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55 For the key role of the Qing local magistrate in cases of subversion and rebellion, see: Paul H. Ch'en, "Disloyalty to the State in Late Imperial China," p. 180.

56 *Shizu shilu*, 5:22, cited in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 55. This order also suggested that local officials' salaries were too low and that they should be raised. However, during the Shunzhi and early Kangxi periods, the regular salary of district magistrates (which was originally about 123 taels per annum) was re-
not in the majority either Manchu or Han bannermen, but rather regular Han Chinese—and usually collaborators who had already served the Ming as local officials. Bannermen occupied key positions in the higher levels of the government, but there were simply not enough of them to staff prefectural and district posts in any great number. In fact, during the Shunzhi reign, only one out of every twelve or thirteen magistrates was a bannerman. The government had perforce to rely almost entirely upon Chinese collaborators for county-level posts throughout the empire.\(^57\) (See Appendix C.)

Fortunately for the new government, there were plenty of former Ming officials and clerks who were quite willing to serve. In the throne’s opinion, there were far too many of them—especially supernumerary functionaries and district registrars. On June 8, 1646, an edict was sent to the Board of Civil Appointments which read:

> The court establishes official posts to govern the people, yet supernumerary functionaries (rongyuan) have just the opposite effect, afflicting the people. Each prefecture is to establish one official to be retired. He is to resign his rank and not remain temporarily [in the yamen] as a retired official. These dismissals should be completely carried out. A large district (xian) is to have one magistrate, one assistant magistrate, and one warden. A small district is to have one magistrate and one warden. All registrars (zhubu) are to be dismissed. The official duties they originally assumed are to revert to the assistant magistrate in a large district, and to the warden in a small district. The retired officials and registrars who have been dismissed should proceed to the Board for reappointment (gaixuan).\(^58\)

While the throne so decisively trimmed down surplus officials, most of them lower-ranking functionaries and clerks, it also called

\(^57\) Some historians have argued that the Qing regime controlled local government by bringing in Manchu outsiders. This is incorrect. See John Watt, “The Yamen as a Socio-political System,” p. 25.

\(^58\) Shizu shilu, 25:302a.
for increased efficiency in local government and heightened measures to detect and prevent corruption. Thus, in spite of having a much smaller staff of regularly appointed officials to assist him, the district magistrate was under more pressure than ever to perform effectively. This meant that the magistrate had to rely even more heavily on his private aides, who actually administered local government for him.59

By the end of the Ming period, the distinction between regularly appointed magistrates (almost invariably examination degree-holders) and the yamen sub-bureaucracy was quite sharp. The magistrates, who were outsiders and generalists, had to rely upon their clerks, who were insiders and specialists. The creation of a lower bureaucracy of professional taxation and legal specialists did rationalize the functioning of Ming administration, allowing the Confucian-trained district magistrate to stress moral governance while his own clerks mastered the law codes; but the fact that the central government refused formally to recognize, much less pay, these clerks meant that the professionalization of local administration remained hors du cabinet.60

This was partly the result of the Ming dynasty's economizing.61 By setting low quotas on the numbers of aides officially allowed, the imperial government forced the growing network of clerks to find informal means of funding themselves. It was relatively natural for the government to permit this to happen because local clerical duties were historically confused with regular corvée service to the local yamen. In theory, in other words, the residents of a locale should provide the kinds of tax collection and self-policing services that were actually, by the 1600s, performed mainly by government agents and policemen. Of course, it was always possible

59 John R. Watt, The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China, pp. 140–143.
60 Watt, “Yamen,” p. 35.
61 This drift of power downwards appears to have begun during the Yuan period, or so at least Ming Taizu had believed. The Hongwu Emperor thought that because the Mongols lacked “the impartial mind of empire,” they were easily fooled by corrupt clerks and underlings, who took advantage of the barbarians’ “loose” controls over the bureaucracy to entrench themselves. John Dardess, “Ming T’ai-tsu on the Yüan,” pp. 8–9.
for the government to assess the cost of these services and levy them upon local landholders. That would have increased the taxes upon the district gentry, however, and—especially during the last years of the Ming when the throne was frightened of losing the gentry's support—such assessments were rejected in favor of informal means of support: legal fees charged by the clerks themselves, salaries paid out of the magistrate's own pocket, and so forth.

The new Qing dynasty, also eager to keep down taxes, preferred to follow the practice set by the Ming government. This was a false economy. To reduce local administrative expenses by ordering that the yamen registrar's post be abolished and his services assumed by the assistant magistrate or warden simply increased the work load of the clerks who actually kept track of a district's paperwork. Yet as the work load increased and the importance of the clerical sub-bureaucracy grew, the clerks themselves were just as strictly denied personal access to higher bureaucratic rank. Naturally, their own private compensation for this lack of public reward was embezzlement and bribery.\(^\text{62}\)

Merely emphasizing the importance of appointing good men to the posts of local magistrates was therefore not sufficient to guarantee good local government. The Qing government soon discovered that yamen clerks and runners were one of the most intractable elements in the entire bureaucracy. To be sure, they were all too easily blamed for nearly every failing of district and prefectoral government, and became the scapegoats for structural deficiencies such as the incompatibility between the central government's wish to increase the efficiency of local government as a judicial and fiscal agent of the throne, and its refusal to provide the financial wherewithal to pay for more manpower toward that end. But even though there was this tendency to exaggerate the crude self-interest of yamen help, there is no question but that clerks and runners did form in each district yamen a deeply entrenched group of underlings who usually afflicted the local population with every abuse possible. As a result, the Qing government devoted much attention to detecting and punishing the illegal activities of "yamen

grubs" (yadu), and the accounts of eminent local officials of this period are filled with references to their efforts to curtail "the corrupt and dirty practices of yamen clerks" (lixu tandu zhi feng).  

Consequently, the solution in the end put yet even more stress upon the indispensable local magistrate, whose own integrity was—much like the emperor in the system at large—critical to the control of his subordinates. Hardly trusting hortatory appeals, however, the Qing government proceeded to increase its own sanctions upon regularly appointed officials; and there is no question but that one of the major reasons for the increased efficiency of legal control and tax collection during the first part of the dynasty's reign was the creation of a regular and efficient system of evaluations which judged local officials' performances by new standards of administrative accomplishment. The pressure on the individual local magistrate may have grown nigh intolerable, but his performance was stretched to much greater efficiency by disciplinary regulations which, to a degree extraordinary in pre-modern bureaucracies, sought to regulate every aspect of official behavior. Above all, during and after the Oboi Regency (1661–1669), the Qing bureaucratic review system (kao cheng) became almost entirely concerned with evaluating a local magistrate's ability to apprehend and punish felons, and to collect the taxes on time and up to quota. In the short run, this reliance upon the sole figure of the magistrate streamlined government operations and strengthened its local control system.

63 See, e.g., Shen Yiji, ed., Zhejiang tongzhi, p. 2521 (149:2); Huang Zhijun, comp., Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 1839 (112:33).
64 Punishments were strict. In 1659 the Shunzhi Emperor decreed that any official who took ten taels or more of public money would be sent into exile. Adam Y. C. Lui, Corruption in China during the Early Ch'ing Period, 1644–1660, p. 1.
67 In the long run, however, this exclusive focus upon the magistrate further denied yamen subordinates access to the central government, which in turn lost direct control over lower-level administration. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "The Evolution of Local Control in Late Imperial China," passim.
Mutual-Responsibility Units

The second set of policies adopted by the Qing government concerned the registration of households into mutual-responsibility units. At first, the Manchus employed a variant of the Ming local control system. From 1644 to 1646, the zongjia system (ten families formed a unit headed by a jiazhang, and every hundred families selected a zongjiazhang) prevailed. Ordered in 1644 under the "neighborhood security investigation law" (linbao jiancha fa), this new system was designed to control and arrest bandits, fugitives, and traitors (jiangui). The goals of the system were thus close to those of the military occupation force, and the zongjiazhang were correspondingly supposed to report directly to the Board of War.

As Dorgon explained in an edict dated September 8, 1644:

The villages belonging to each prefecture, county (zhou), district (xian), and garrison (wei) are to establish one jiazhang for every ten families, and one zongjia for every hundred families. Wherever there are bandits, fugitives, felons, and thieves making trouble, then they should immediately be reported by neighbors to the jiazhang. The jiazhang will report to the zongjiazhang, and he in turn to the prefect or magistrate. After the latter have confirmed the accuracy [of the information], they should report to the Board of War. If there is evil secretly committed by one family, and if the nine neighboring families, the jiazhang, and the zongjiazhang do not first report it, they will all be punished severely without leniency.

The early Qing control system was thus initially intended to detect miscreants and to keep the newly acquired population under tight control. An effort was made to fix people in place, and to use

68 Wen Juntian, Zhongguo baojia zhidu, pp. 205, 216. The Huangchao tongdian states that a full-fledged baojia system was inaugurated in 1644, but Wen Juntian shows this to be incorrect and a later editorial insertion. Later in the dynasty the baojia and lijia were placed under the Board of Revenue. E-tu Zen Sun, "The Board of Revenue in Nineteenth-Century China," p. 204.
69 Shizu shilu, 7:81b. See also Ji Huang, Huangchao wenxian tongkao, 21:5a. On August 18, 1646, the Board of War was especially advised to use the zongjia to punish those who gave shelter to fugitives. Shizu shilu, 27:320a.
the household registration system of the zongjia to keep people from wandering about, especially in troubled areas like Shandong. In 1646 the government even ordered that registers be prepared according to the former Ming hereditary categories (military households, artisans’ households, and so forth). People were warned that they would be punished if they pretended to be from another category, and the earlier Ming distinction between labor services (yi) and land taxes (fu) was reiterated.

Beginning in 1646, when the heads of the zongjia system were supposed to report directly to the Board of War, these registration units were linked with an effort to control access to military supplies, including horses and firearms. This policy was the idea of Ingguldai, the man who had organized logistics for the banner armies and who had arranged for supplies from Korea before and after the 1636–1637 Manchu invasion of that country. Named President of the Board of Revenue in 1644, he had begun urging in November, 1646, that strict laws be promulgated to prevent people from selling military supplies to bandits. On December 1, 1646, the government announced:

In order to shut off the bandits’ sources [of supply], it is forbidden for people to trade privately in horses, mules, armor, helmets,

70 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 15. The attempt to connect people with their locale was also extended to students. In 1645 it was announced that many aspirants were falsely registered, and students henceforth would have to prove that their ancestors had been registered locally for 20 years or more in the same place, or else owned property there, in order to be admitted to the exams. He Bingdi, Zhongguo huiguan shilun, p. 8.

71 Wen, Baqia zhidu, pp. 201–205, 216. The new government had earlier announced, on June 12, 1645, that henceforth the hereditary category of jiang (artisan) would be abolished, and that the levy on the capital labor duties of artisans would no longer be imposed. Instead, the artisans who began working on the Taihe Palace that year were paid according to the labor they performed. Peng Zeyi, “Qingdai qianqi shougongye de fazhan,” pp. 3–4. Even in the 19th century, there were still four vestigial “registries” (ji) kept, divided into the categories of min (civilian), jun (military), shang (merchant), and zao (salt maker). But because the separate labor service tax had been eliminated after the Yongzheng period, these categories had no real fiscal importance. Sun, “Board of Revenue,” pp. 201–202.
bows, arrows, knives, guns, cannons, and muskets. We will follow the request of Ingguldai, President of the Board of Revenue.72

The early 1600s had seen a proliferation of firearms in East Asia, and in China foreign cannons and domestic guns were widely used by regular military units as well as rebels, by local magnates as well as bandits.73 This was especially true in highly militarized areas like the northwest, or like Shandong, where rebellion and invasion had led, indeed forced, many landlords and peasants to acquire arms. It would take many years for the Qing fully to enforce this regulation, but the obsessive enumeration by Qing field commanders of each weapon captured from enemy forces reflects the government’s determination to take weapons out of the hands of civilians and devise regulations to keep them from acquiring new ones.74

At first, the government focussed its attention mainly on controlling firearms and horses by policing the communications system; transients and travellers were the major target. In April, 1647, special laws were announced for Beijing and its environs.

1. All arms makers in the city had to register with their local taxation offices. Anyone other than officials or soldiers who wanted to buy a weapon had to register his name and pay a special tax. Private arms dealers would be severely punished.

72 Shizu shilu, 28:337b.
73 The introduction of the new handguns and cannons at this time may even have “helped to feed the late Ming White Lotus martial arts tradition that for several hundred years thereafter would argue persuasively for its ability to provide effective protection against these terrifying forms of firepower.” Susan Naquin, Shantung Rebellion, p. 192.
74 By the late 18th and early 19th centuries, arms control was so efficient that conspirators who wished to acquire knives from blacksmiths ran the risk of being denounced to the authorities. Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China, passim. See also Naquin, Shantung, p. 24. But see also Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, p. 21. The disorderly years of the last half of the 19th century were in part the result of the import and manufacture of Western firearms, and the gun-running of American and English merchants. Wake-man, “Evolution of Local Control,” p. 17.
2. *Baojia* units would be instituted ward-by-ward.

3. Strangers should be arrested if seen carrying weapons.

4. The practice of allowing lawless elements either to join Manchu households as slaves or the rearguards of imperial “correction” forces as camp followers was strictly prohibited; future infractions would be severely punished.

5. Special Manchu guards units were assigned to checkpoints outside the outer gates of the city to examine everyone entering the capital.

6. Sheds and guardposts were ordered built outside the walls to house the bannermen assigned to patrol the face of the walls at their base.  

7. Provincial officials were told that households engaged in horse breeding henceforth would have to obtain special permits and restrict the sale of livestock to “reliable” elements.

8. Innkeepers and hostelers were warned that they would have to ask any men riding horses to show that they possessed permits for the animals. If their suspicions were aroused, they would have to report the fact immediately to local defense officials.  

Conventional military police measures of this sort, however, only curtailed weapons and mounts that were bought and sold. By October, 1648, the throne was aware that many bandits forged their own weapons and traded in horses. The Board of War was therefore ordered to see that, excepting officials and military officers, no one be allowed to raise horses nor possess weapons. Officials were ordered to seize such livestock, paying the owners a fair price, and to confiscate all weapons, storing those which could be used and destroying the rest. Most important, the local chiefs of

75 Beijing had possessed, under the Ming, a system of local police stations called *pushe*. These way stations for government messengers and guards had constables attached to them. However, by the 17th century, most of these had either disappeared or were in such run-down condition as to be virtually unusable. James Peter Geiss, “Peking under the Ming,” p. 193.

control units like the zongjia or baojia were to pledge that their charges would not raise horses nor hoard weapons in the future, being informed that either activity would be regarded tantamount to conspiring to rebel.\(^7\)

As time went on, the government came to rely more and more upon the mutual-responsibility units in order to keep weapons away from bandits, and even to restore them to their rightful owners if they were guaranteed to be “good people” by their “heads of ten households” (shijiazhang). Less than a year after the initial fiat prohibiting weapons altogether, Dorgon decreed that weapons should be given back to such people so that they could protect themselves against outlaws.

Recently we have heard that the people have no weapons and cannot repel aggressors. Bandits on the other hand can profit, and the good people have to endure bitter and poisonous misfortunes. Now we think that the weapons and armor which the people originally ought not to have had, and which were strictly forbidden in the past, such as muskets, fowling pieces, bows and arrows, knives, spears, and horses, ought now to be retained in their possession and not forbidden. Return to their original owners those [weapons] which were initially turned over to the officials.\(^8\)

Thus, the “good people” who belonged to local mutual-responsibility units were granted the right to arm themselves in self-defense, somewhat like members of the closely connected baojia and tuanlian organizations of the late 18th and 19th centuries.

**Selective Amnesties**

Just as effective weapons control seemed to depend upon distinguishing between liang min (good people) and zei (bandits), so did an expeditious use of amnesties appear to require a similar discrimination between the bulk of the peasant population and the

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77 *Shizu shilu*, 40:464a. The chiefs here are called linyou shi jia zhang (heads of every ten neighboring households).

78 *Shizu shilu*, 43:505a. The edict is dated May 6, 1649.
permanently disordered elements within it. This distinction rested upon the assumption that most riots and rebellions were caused either by professional trouble-makers or sectarian preachers who “aroused and deluded” the people to follow them. And that assumption in turn was reinforced in 1646 and 1647 by a number of sectarian uprisings that broke out west of Beijing in Shanxi province. In May, 1646, a monk named Liu Guangpu incited a brief uprising in the northwest corner of that province, and it was followed by another rebellion of “heretics” (zuodao) in that same area. The latter spread down through the Lüliang Mountains to Ningxiang, west of Taiyuan. The sectarians, led by a man named...

80 The authorities in Taiyuan were also aroused by a major case involving a Ming prince’s heir, who was secretly given shelter by a close relative. Memorial from the Supervising Censor for Shanxi, in Gugong bowuyuan Ming-Qing dang’anbu, comp., Qingdai dang’an shiliao congbian, fascicle 3, pp. 91–94.
Yang Chunchang, were decimated by the fall of 1647; but there simultaneously arose yet another movement of “deviant sectarian” (xie jiao,) led by a man named Gao Fei, who were still resisting imperial troops well into the winter of 1647–1648. This coincided with the most alarming sectarian movement of the season, Zheng Dengqi’s rebellion, which broke out in November, 1647, in southwestern Shanxi near the bend of the Yellow River.

The uprising began as a result of government persecution. Zheng Dengqi and Zheng Huiafa were accused of assembling followers and plotting rebellion. The authorities managed to arrest Zheng Huiafa, but Zheng Dengqi escaped and fled deep into the mountain country of Jishan district, close to the Shaanxi border. There, he and his mounted followers occupied stockades (zhai) on the mountain peaks, and Deng began to call himself “Preacher of the Great Completion” (Dacheng jiaoshi), attracting to his side two Buddhist monks, Wang Yuetian and Wang Ming. The two monks helped Zheng establish his headquarters in a temple on one of the mountains in the Longmen range. There, Zheng attracted yet more believers, as well as a member of the Ming royal family named Zhu Meichuan. According to reports received by Governor Zhu Shichang, “under the pretext of offering prayers to the

81 Shizu shilu, 32:20, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 252. There were also non-sectarian uprisings at this time. On October 19, 1647, Governor Zhu Shichang, of the Han Bordered Red Banner, led 800 cavalymen against 500 armored outlaws on horseback under Li Hualong and his brother Qilong at Yuxian, thirty li east of the provincial capital. Zhu Shichang, a former Ming major who now held the rank of general, had suffered Taizong’s disfavor in 1638 when he spoke out against the Manchu practice of enslaving women prisoners of war. Taizong called Zhu a traitor and accused him of being in league with the Ming. Dorgon later reinstated the loyal general. Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 253–254; Narakino Shimesu, Shindai jūyō shokkan no kenkyū, p. 544.

82 Dacheng both describes the Yellow Emperor’s ordering of all things and Confucius’s making a grand harmony or concert out of individual melodies. It is also a Buddhist term, Mahasambhava or “Great Completion,” referring to the imaginary realm in which appeared 20,000 kotis of Buddhas all of the same title: Bhismagarjitaqhosasvaraja. William Edward Soothill and Lewis Hodous, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, p. 89.
dead,” the Longmen temple group was actually conspiring against the government.\footnote{83}{Donghua lu, Shunzhi 4/10, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 252.}

This rash of sectarian uprisings, coupled with the continuing incidence of armed attacks by bandits on yamens in supposedly settled areas, led the Qing government to emphasize once more a policy of granting amnesties (zhaojiu). This time it chose to initiate two new measures. The first was to get the dynasty’s pacification officials to realize that the “good people” had to be treated differently from those who led them into evil ways. Pacification officials were, on the one hand, told by the throne they must not be afraid to report that the people living in areas for which they were responsible had “developed bandits’ feelings.” On the other hand, they were also told to stop regarding certain areas as being intrinsically disloyal. Even those areas long occupied by bandit camps still had some “good and peaceful people” residing in them, and these liang min should not automatically fall under suspicion; indeed, it was very important for them to be distinguished from “genuine bandits” and from the shamans and magicians who were arousing them with strange heterodox rumors.\footnote{84}{Shizu shilu, 31:364. It was believed that by the very act of settling people down, their social character was changed. As one official pointed out early in the Shunzhi period: “When vagabonds (liumin) are settled, then you turn bandits into people. When vagabonds scatter, then you turn people into bandits.” Guo Songyi, “Qingchu fengjian guojia kenhuang zhengce fenxi,” p. 114.}

The second measure was directed toward the bandits and rebels themselves. Clemency was promised, on April 18, 1647, to all partisans who turned themselves in to their local yamens or military posts.\footnote{85}{The announcement coincided with reports from Governor Yu Qinglian at Baoding that bandits had suddenly appeared in great numbers in Hejian prefecture. The prefect and warden there had been wounded, and the garrison commander had hanged himself.}

Recently, robbers and outlaws have flourished, causing the people to flee in alarm and uncertainty by spreading lies. Truly, [the populace] deserves our compassion! We shall henceforth hold wide the door for a special voluntary surrender, allowing [the outlaws] to
make a fresh start. Strive to bring about a change of heart in the robbers and outlaws, so that the good people may pursue their callings in peace. From now on, regardless of the severity of their crimes, all former bandits who can present themselves at an official post or before the Board of War to avow in detail their real outlaw names and residences will not only be personally pardoned for their offenses, they will also duly receive their own illegal booty as a reward [for turning themselves in].

During the winter of 1647–1648 this unusually concessive policy, with accurate intelligence reports and the brisk execution of the sect’s leaders, enabled the Shanxi provincial government to dissipate the Longmen millenarian movement. In Hebei, local police measures appeared to be bringing the sale and manufacture of weapons under control, and the household registration system seemed to be curbing incidents of sectarianism and local banditry.

By the early months of 1648, relative calm had settled over most of north China. On the periphery, in restive regions like the Han River highlands, a ruthless policy of systematic slaughter had made the cities secure and the major highways safe. In the core regions of the Central Plain, selective amnesties and local control measures had settled the population and curbed all but the most devoted sectarians. For a while, the Qing court experienced a relief from the nearly constant sense of alarm aroused by so many reports of peasant uprisings and loyalist conspiracies during the past year. But this was only a deceptive hiatus; the lull was soon to prove short lived.

86 Shizu shilu, 31:364.
87 Ibid., 45:527b–528a.
“Foolish Stratagems in Critical Times”

River deep, melancholy as we drum the sweep. Cold sea, remembrances while we float by raft. At this spot all must haul by land: Are there men who will stop to lend a hand? Alarums behind, I neglect the year and month, Whirling at anchor, resent my wife and child, Yet cannot grieve at so deprived a state When qian and kun determine each man’s fate.¹

Chen Zilong, *Chen Zhongyu quan ji*, 14:26b.

Although the major urban centers of Jiangnan were all securely occupied during the winter of 1645–1646, few Qing administrators believed that the region was completely under their control. For one, Chongming Island continued to harbor pirates, and Qing naval forces on more than one occasion clashed with loyalist forces there.² Moreover, as the Nanjing governor, Mao Jiuhua, had pointed out to the Manchu court in Beijing, there was a grave risk that loyalist remnants in the lower Yangzi region might link up

¹ *Qian* (heaven) and *kun* (earth) are the first two hexagrams of the *Book of Changes*.
with other resistance forces upstream, and especially with some of the bandits around Anqing. Dissident groups in that region were potential allies of the famous “forty-eight stockades” (sishiba zhai) further inland in Huguang province. There was thus a possibility of loyalist movements spreading up and down the Yangzi River, choking off the Qing administration in Nanjing, where popular opposition to the new rule was evident in districts immediately around the former southern capital. Hence, it was important not to arouse this great mass of people by abandoning the policy of peaceful collaboration in order to take reprisals for the uprisings of 1645. Mao consequently argued that:

We should not merely pay lip service [to the notion that] in order to win the people we must win their minds. If there is war with this great mass [of people], then who will be able to drive them off? If they attack the cities, then which one will not be conquered [by them]?³

Partly out of weakness, then, the Qing government continued in 1646 to pursue a policy of collaboration with the local elites of Jiangnan. Particularly favored was the architect of that policy, Qian Qianyi, who was invited in March to come to Beijing and become deputy chief of the archives, and editor-in-chief of the Ming History.⁴

Qian Qianyi and the Taint of Collaboration

By now, Qian Qianyi’s reputation for personal compromise was notorious. Before going north to take up his new post, Qian Qianyi had paid a visit to Tiger Hill outside Suzhou. On that particular day he was wearing a specially tailored coat with a very small collar and large sleeves. Another Jiangnan scholar who was walking

³ Memorial dated December, 1645, Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie Guo-zhen, ed., Qingchu nongmin qi yi ziliao jilu, pp. 128–129.
⁴ Luther Carrington Goodrich, The Literary Inquisition of Ch’ien-lung, p. 100. His official title was elevated to Senior Vice-President of Rites.
in front of him noticed the coat and searchingly asked him what kind of style the garment represented. Qian Qianyi archly responded, "The small collar is to show my respect for the regulations (zhi) of the present dynasty. The large sleeves are so as not to forget the former dynasty." The scholar sarcastically commented, "Your excellency is truly capable of being the leader (lingxiu, lit.
collar-sleeve) of two dynasties.”\(^5\) Thus, although Dorgon might not have fully realized it at the time, to bring such a turncoat north to the capital raised anew the issue of late Ming political immor-
ality and corruption.

Even at the time of the fall of Nanjing, when Qian Qianyi had surrendered to the Manchus, there had been some talk at court of the dubious moral qualities of the Nanjing ministers who had welcomed Dodo. A department director of the Board of Civil Ap-
pointments named Xiong Wenju argued against employing these new adherents, whom he termed “marketplace troublemakers” (shijing maolan), and extolled instead the more righteous elements who had hidden in the forests and hills.\(^6\) Xiong was not lacking in opportunism himself: he had served the Ming, Li Zicheng, and now Dorgon. In fact, he may even have been publicly pilloried by men like Qian Qianyi in the Hongguang court. But his repeated warnings reminded Dorgon, who had been forgiving of simple bureaucratic opportunism while intolerant of idealistic political factionalism, that men who served in the Hongguang regime were more strongly identified with conventional late Ming party strife than northern collaborators.

After Qian Qianyi came to Beijing, Dorgon was alerted once again to the danger of employing former Ming officials who might revive the factionalism of the Tianqi and Chongzhen courts. All that summer the court had been jubilant over the reports from Zhang Cunren, the old Liaodong officer who had joined the Man-
chus in 1631. Named Governor-General of Zhejiang and Fujian as of December, 1645, Zhang had been highly successful in fighting the armies of both the Prince of Tang and the Prince of Lu.\(^7\) As his reports indicated, scores—even hundreds—of officials serving these regimes were surrendering to his forces. By September, 1646, many of these Southern Ming scholar-officials had arrived in Beijing to await assignment under the new dynasty. There were so many of them, in fact, that there were many more applicants than posts to fill. Partly because of this, it was proposed that all of these

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5 Ge Wanli, comp., Qian Muzhai xiansheng yishi ji nianpu, p. 18.
6 Er chen zhu, 12:34–35.
7 Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, p. 57.
men be carefully investigated in order to make certain that their political histories were acceptable. Yuan Maogong, a supervising secretary in the Board of Rites which was trying to assign these literati to new positions, explained the problem to the throne. He specifically addressed himself to the person of Ruan Dacheng—who was by now both a pariah among southern literati and a camp follower of the Manchus.8

Like Ma Shiyi ng, Ruan Dacheng had fled from Nanjing before the city was surrendered to Dodo and the Qing forces. After taking temporary refuge with General Huang Degong at Wuhu, Ruan had moved on to Hangzhou until that city, too, succumbed to Dodo. Leaving Hangzhou, Ruan had tried to secure asylum in the city of Jinhua in central Zhejiang, but the gentry there refused him entry. He was therefore forced to go on to Yanzhou and seek refuge with General Fang Guoan.9 Apparently Ruan and Ma Shiyi ng, who was then also with General Fang, had competed vigorously for influence over the militarist. Losing the struggle, Ruan surrendered to Zhang Cunren in the autumn of 1646; and while Ma Shiyi ng was executed, Ruan was ordered to serve on the staff of the beile who had captured him.10 It was in this capacity that he took revenge upon the good folk of Jinhua, leading back a Manchu contingent to sack the city that had turned him away.11

What Yuan Maogong now wished to point out to the regime was that men with reputations as unsavory as was Ruan Dacheng’s would taint the new dynasty. Yuan told the throne that Ruan Dacheng had so “disserved the Ming court” as to make the “forest

8 Nevertheless, Feng Quan—Ruan’s former ally—had audaciously nominated him for a Qing post, Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, supplement, xia, p. 4a.
9 Fang Guoan was both a fellow townsman and former lieutenant of Ma Shiyi ng. Captured by the Qing, he was beheaded. Zhang Tingyu et al., comps., Ming shi (Guofang yanjiuyuan), p. 3498 (hereafter cited as Ming shi).
10 “The Governor-General of Zhejiang and Fujian, Zhang Cunren, memorialized, reporting that the so-called ‘Grand Secretaries’ Xie Sanbin and Song Zhipu, ‘Minister of War’ Ruan Dacheng, ‘Minister of Justice’ Su Zhuang, and others numbering altogether 48 people surrendered.” Da-Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu, (hereafter cited as Shizu shilu) 27:327a, dated September 22, 1646.
of scholars regard him as beyond the pale.” Because Ruan had “slandered the tens of thousands of scholarly souls of Jiangnan,” to employ him publicly would incur the resentment of the southern literati. Moreover, “if he could disserve a former dynasty, then he would of needs disserve us now.”

As it soon turned out, Ruan Dacheng rapidly disappeared from the scene. Some claimed that he became a monk in Zhejiang, but the far more plausible version of his last days is that he threw himself wholeheartedly into entertaining and advising the Qing troops, perhaps reliving his earlier hopes of becoming a military hero. Ruan appears to have engaged himself so energetically in these military activities along the Fujian-Zhejiang border, in fact, that he would tuck up his scholar’s robes and join the soldiers on the march. During one of these strenuous hikes in the mountains of northern Fujian, he collapsed and died.

Ruan’s death, however, did not make Yuan Maogong’s argument entirely irrelevant. In that same memorial warning against the employment of Ruan, Yuan Maogong also suggested that other former Ming officials be investigated as well. Since they could not be employed immediately, these surrendered literati should return home where they could help restore order and see that power did not fall into the hands of local bullies.

I beg for an imperial order to the said board to fully investigate those who have served as southern [Ming] officials at their capital and then order each of them to return to his native place [so that we may have time to] quietly listen and carefully consider the capabilities [of each man] for employment.

Several weeks before Dorgon actually received this memorial, Qian Qianyi had already asked to be allowed to return home, ex-

12 Memorial dated September 7, 1647, Ming-Qing shiliao, ding, 1:1 in Nanming shiliao, p. 36.
13 Xie Guozhen, Ming-Qing zhi ji dangshe yundong kao, p. 108; Crawford, “Juan Ta-ch’eng,” pp. 48, 75.
14 Memorial dated September 7, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, ding, 1:1 in Nanming shiliao, p. 36.
cusing himself from work in the capital on the grounds of illness. Although Dorgon continued to regard him with favor, delegating two imperial officials to look after him and granting him permission to use the government post-stations to travel south, Qian Qianyi’s retirement coincided with Yuan Maogong’s warnings about the unsavory political practices of many collaborators. His departure thus signalled the rise to prominence of younger men like Chen Zhilin who were not so badly tainted by previous political factionalism, nor so strongly associated in the public’s mind with opportunistic collaboration.  

**Tu Guobao and the Lake Tai Loyalists**

Qian Qianyi’s political demise after 1646 did not immediately affect the general Qing policy of cooperation with the local elites of Jiangnan. After the initial Songjiang uprising had been repressed with military force, the Grand Coordinator for Military Affairs in the region, Governor Tu Guobao, took on the task of attracting farmers back to their holdings and grain merchants back to their stores. Even in peaceful times, the Su-Song-Tai circuit could not grow enough grain to feed itself, and had to rely upon grain merchants to import rice from other provinces. After the 1645 disorders, when Yang Wencong’s troops had plundered the area and when the Lake Tai “White Headed Army” had broken into the warehouses of Suzhou, the grain merchants had been frightened off.

After recovering these warehouses in August, Governor Tu had managed to identify which portion of this grain “was part of the hard earned capital of long distance merchants,” and turned over 23,000 piculs of stored rice to the original owners in order to persuade the grain merchants of Suzhou to go back into business

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again. He was thus initially quite successful in restoring some measure of economic stability to the area.

Tu Guobao’s efforts to gain the cooperation of the inhabitants of Jiangnan in this program of economic reconstruction were hampered, however, by the continuing presence of the loyalist forces under Wu Yi in the Lake Tai area. After the failure to take Suzhou, Wu Yi’s men had fled into the marshland to regroup. Joined there by other loyalist remnants, Wu Yi had allied his own forces with a small army commanded by a man named Zhou Rui; and together, they established at Changbai Pond the nucleus of a new loyalist confederation. Their first reported victory came on March 2,

16 Measures were also taken to reconstitute the state’s salt monopoly. When Li Fayuan took over as salt commissioner in 1645, he found Yangzhou to be “a city in ruins, overgrown with weeds.” The salt merchants of the Lianghuai area had all lost their capital and fled. While the government looked to him for revenue to cover military costs, Li repeatedly memorialized in favor of remitting excessive levies and wastage fees in order to lure the merchants back. Gradually, merchants returned to the area and began to produce and sell salt again. Wang Sizhi and Jin Chengji, “Qingchao qianqi Lianghuai yanshang de shengshuai,” pp. 1–2.

17 Memorial dated October, 1645, Nanning shiliao, pp. 4–6. By 1646–1647, the cotton industry of the Su-Song area had also begun to recover. Peng Zeyi, “Qingdai qianqi shouqongye de fazhan,” p. 9. For the Qing government’s support of the interregional grain trade, see Chin Shih, “Peasant Economy and Rural Society in the Lake Tai area, 1368–1840,” ch. 6, p. 8. Tax remissions were also granted by the central government to help ease the pacification. Henan and Jiangnan were all excused from supplementary taxes in perpetuity, and were also forgiven past arrears as of June 24, 1645. The same measures, plus special grants of food and clothing to the elderly (who were also exempted from service taxes), were extended to Zhejiang and Fujian later on March 17, 1647. Shen Yiji, ed., Zhejiang tongzhi, 76:1–2a; Shizu shilu, 30:356–357a. According to a stele erected in Jiading in 1646, peasants were strongly encouraged to reclaim lands abandoned since the Wanli period, and special measures were taken to curb the corrupt practices of yamen tax collectors. Shanghai bowuguan tushu ziliao shi, eds., Shanghai beike ziliao xuanji, pp. 139–143.

18 Some sources indicate that Wu Yi was invited to resume command of the loyalist forces by Zhou Rui. Chen Zilong, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia, pp. 3b–4a. The superior position of Zhou Rui is also accepted by Wen Ruilin in Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 398–401. This version was adopted by the compilers of the dynastic history. Ming shi, p. 3115. Lake Tai appears to have
1646, when they emerged from the confines of the lake and took over Wujiang again, killing the magistrate and pillaging the district. 19 Although they quickly abandoned the city, Zhou Rui and Wu Yi’s men ventured forth much more boldly after this attack, and gradually came to control the entire east shore of Lake Tai. Hampered by a lack of competent sailors, the Qing forces were ill equipped to restrain the fishermen and smugglers who made up the bulk of Wu Yi’s marines; and on May 11, 1646, Tu Guobao’s forces, supplemented with soldiers from Songjiang commanded by General Wu Shengzhao, suffered severe casualties as they fought off yet another attack by over one thousand loyalist boats upon the city of Wujiang. 20

Wu Yi’s exploits became known throughout Jiangnan, and news of his and Zhou Rui’s military offensives reached the court of the Prince of Lu in Zhejiang. Through Zhou Rui’s secretary, Dai Zhijun (who was Yang Tingshu’s student), the Lake Tai fighters were put in touch with gentry loyalists who had survived the Songjiang uprising, and especially with Chen Zilong, who was then living in Jiashan. 21 Partly through men like these, who were

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19 Wujiang xiangzhi cited in Wu Weiye, Wushi jilan, 4, shang, 2a; Wang Yunwu, ed., Da Qing yitongzhi, p. 952 (83:15a). Hong Chengzhou ordered an official investigation into the reason why the city fell so easily. Tu Guobao discovered that the city’s warden had concerned himself solely with police matters, leaving local defense to members of the gentry and the director of studies, who was indicted for malfeasance for neglecting to defend the city’s moat. Memorial which reached Beijing on October 20, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, ji, 1:18, in Nanning shiliao, pp. 39–42.

20 Memorial from Tu Guobao, dated May 16, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, ji, 1:14–15, in Nanning shiliao, pp. 30–32. Governor Tu asked to be allowed to divert local funds and assess special taxes to provide for the training of 2,000 marines and sailors.

21 Members of Wu Yi’s staff included Chen Ji, Zhu Bin, and Shen Pan. Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia, p. 3a.
themselves in contact with the Ming loyalist court in Zhejiang, Wu Yi was directly reached by the Lu regime, which recognized his growing eminence and enfeoffed him that spring as Earl of Changxing. At the same time Wu Yi and Zhou Rui organized their army into formal banners, cut special seals, appointed regular officials, and created a proper secretariat, which Chen Zilong was promptly invited to join.  

Chen Zilong accepted the invitation to join Wu Yi’s nufu, and together with two of his own disciples, Wang Yun and Qian Shuguang, set off for the loyalist camp at Lake Tai. There they set up their offices in the ruins of an abandoned academy on an island in the marshes, but soon became disenchanted with both their quarters and the prospects of Wu Yi leading a successful war against the Qing. Wang Yun gives some hint of the reasons why they soon left the academy and took shelter on Qian’s family estate, when he wrote that: “Changxing may be one of the heroes of our age, but in my view his strategy tends to underestimate the enemy. Besides, he has recruited retainers who look down upon learned scholars. The only reason all of these generals serve is to rob and plunder. Though an army has been assembled, it has not been put in order, and they remain a dissolute bunch altogether.”

Governor Tu Guobao, on the other hand, continued to regard Wu Yi and his army as a very real threat to the security of all Jiangnan, especially if the loyalists managed to break through the Qing lines to the southeast and made contact with the Southern Ming armies fighting in Zhejiang. Wu, in fact, did decide to try to break through the Qing cordon encircling Lake Tai by attacking

22 Ibid., p. 4; Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 90; Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 133–134.
23 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia, 4. Wang Yun wrote the supplement to Chen’s nianpu for the years 1645–1647. Qian died shortly afterwards.
24 Memorial from Tu Guobao, dated May 16, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, ji, 1: 14–15, in Nanming shiliao, pp. 30–32. Though by July, 1646 Shaoxing was in Manchu hands, the districts between there and Ningbo were still not entirely settled. The “cave lords of Da Lan Mountain” (Da lan dong zhu), led by Wang Yi, vigorously resisted Qing forces in the Siming shan area between the two cities. After Wang was defeated, these mountain bands, led by chiefs like Hu Shuangqi, continued to defy Qing rule through the 1670s. Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 19.
the city of Jiashan, which was said to be poorly defended. Word came to him, moreover, that the magistrate at Jiashan was secretly in sympathy with the Ming loyalist cause. Wu therefore contacted the official, who suggested a secret meeting between the two of them in Jiashan proper to discuss arrangements for a coordinated uprising later. Wu Yi, who was noted for his physical agility and spiritual boldness, apparently did not suspect that this was a trap. He boldly accepted the magistrate's invitation and entered Jiashan, only to be ambushed. Qing soldiers seized him, and the magistrate turned Wu Yi over to the authorities in Hangzhou, who summarily executed the loyalist on July 15, 1646, outside the Caoqiao Gate.25

Wu Yi's death did not put an end either to the military activities of the Lake Tai bands or to the hopes of diehard loyalists among the gentry of Jiangnan. For one, the lake itself continued to attract desperadoes and adventurers. The area just south of the lake and marshes, in northern Zhejiang, was a continual source of fresh recruits for the forces in the lake. Because the waterways were such important commercial concourses (merchants transporting goods north from Guangdong or Fujian towards the Yangzi and Huai River valleys had no choice but to pass through this narrow stretch between mountains and sea), and because the area came under the jurisdiction of three often non-cooperative different authorities (Huzhou, Jiaxing, and the imperial authority in Nanzhili), this was a haven for bandits of all sorts; and it would be many years before the Qing officials brought the sanctuary under direct control.26

Second, Wu Yi's death may have left the northern Lake Tai bands

25 Gu Yuan et al., comps., Wu jun wubai mingxian tu zhuan zan, 15:8; Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 91; Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 134. One hundred and thirty years later, at the order of the Qianlong Emperor, Wu Yi's tomb there became a national shrine. For a slightly different account, see Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia, 4b-5a.

26 Fu Yiling, Mingdai Jiangnan shimin jingji shitan, p. 88. Because they were afraid that a resistance movement would disrupt commerce, the Anhui merchants residing in Linghu (Guian) had earlier collected subscriptions to pay the Qing forces when they arrived there. Linghu was thus spared military casualties, and business continued as usual. Shih, "Peasant Economy," ch. 3, pp. 27–28.
leaderless, but they soon passed through the hands of various former staff members, ending up under the general command of Zhou Rui. 27 Finally, even though Governor Tu Guobao reported to Beijing on the beauty and calm of the landscape around Suzhou at the end of the summer of 1646, after the execution of Wu Yi that July, there was still a great deal of barely concealed hostility and resentment, especially among younger members of the Jiangnan literati. 28 The prefectural examinations, scheduled for September, 1646, actually had to be postponed until November when it was discovered that some of the candidates were hiding long hair under their hats, and when one candidate publicly excoriated Tu Guobao for being a traitor. 29 And that December, a demented scholar from Wuxi named Wang Mou led a suicidal attack on Jiangyin and was killed. 30

As long as these seemed to be isolated and aberrant incidents, collaborators like Tu Guobao remained self-confident. But when there were suggestions that these incidents were merely visible manifestations of much broader and more widespread discontent, then he and Hong Chengchou grew worried. Especially troubling was the crescendo of social disorder to the south of Nanjing at Liyang along what is now the Anhui and Zhejiang borders, and the spate of loyalist activity that appeared to extend in a broad belt from the seacoast districts of the Huaiyang area across the Grand Canal into Wanbei (northern Anhui). 31

27 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 399–400.
28 Memorial from Tu Guobao which reached Beijing on September 7, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, yi, 1:16, in Nanming shiliao, pp. 33–34.
29 The latter was a man from Wujin named Xu Sheng. He accused the governor of betraying the Ming, adding “Today the literati leave you with a smile on their face. You do not see them returning home with a sob in their throat.” Xu and a number of others were arrested and executed. Ji Liuqi, Mingji nanlue, p. 282.
30 His followers were mainly vegetable vendors, who fled at the sight of a sword. Ji, Mingji nanlue, p. 272.
31 Ming-Qing shiliao, ji, 1:14, in Nanming shiliao, pp. 29–30; Xie, Qingchu nong-min, pp. 142–145.
The Liyang and Huaiyang Uprisings

The Liyang uprising started as a gentry resistance movement against Qing rule and quickly turned into a revolt of poor peasants, serfs, and tenants led by two bondservants (pu) named Pan Mao and Pan Zhen. The rebellion had begun before the Manchus arrived in Nanjing, and by the time they tried to recover the sixteen qu in this area, they found out that the Pans had attracted a great number of the poor and oppressed menials of southern Jiangsu and had formed them into two large troops of armed men called “pared noses” (xiao bi) and “enamels” (falang) who had taken over the district capital.\(^{32}\) Liyang itself had been devastated by warfare, whether looted by Qing troops or pillaged by the peasants: “just empty houses and four bare walls.”\(^ {33}\) And even though the Nanjing authorities were able to set up a “secure” area in nearby Gaochun district, they hardly dared to enter Liyang district at all during the fall and winter of 1645, leaving local administration in the hands of the Pans themselves.\(^ {34}\) Close to Nanjing,

32 Six days after the Qing army crossed the Yangzi River to attack Nanjing, a gentry committee and the Southern Ming magistrate, Li Simo, turned for help to Pan Mao, a local defense leader who was also a serf of the Peng family. After Magistrate Li fled on June 23, Pan Mao and his gang surrendered the city’s population registers to the Qing and turned upon the gentry, looting their homes and torturing their persons for valuables. Daubing mud upon their faces (which may have been the reason they were called the “gang of pared noses,” xiao bi dang), the serfs so humiliated and terrified the rural landlords around Liyang that a counter-militia was formed. The landlords’ vigilantes captured and mutilated a number of the Pans’ men, and the “pared noses” (who were driven back into Liyang city) asked for help from the Qing. Armored bannermen were more than a match for the landlords’ militia, but the Qing troops also got out of hand and pillaged a number of villages in the area. After bribing some nameless Qing higher-ups, Pan Mao and Pan Zhen were appointed administrators of Liyang and more or less officially governed the area from August 15 to November 11, 1645. Zhou Tingying, Lai jiang jishi benmo, pp. 139–150; Xie, Nanming shiliie, p. 92.

33 Memorial from Mao Jiuhua, dated December, 1645, Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6 in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 128–129.

34 Liyang xianzhi, juan 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 129. In November, 1645, several prominent members of the Liyang gentry secretly contacted the Qing
trouble was stirring at Tangshan which was looted and partially burned that next summer by a “demon scholar” (yaosheng) leading local bandits. At the same time, reports were also reaching Nanjing (whence they were transmitted to Dorgon in Beijing) of pirate-loyalists attacking Qing forces in Rugao in Huaiyang north of the Yangzi.

The loyalist activity in the Huaiyang area was known to the Qing officials in Nanjing to have been directly inspired by a Ming prince, identified in official despatches as the Prince of Xinchang. This man, who had based himself in northeastern Jiangsu at Mt. Yuntai, had been linked by a number of different officials with loyalist elements in Haizhou, Ganyu, and Pizhou districts in the far north of Jiangnan. It was apparently he, then, who had ordered an attack upon the Lianghuai salt capital of Yancheng, and in response to that command, local bravos like the salt worker Miao Dingji or like the local militia leaders Gao Jinzhong and Wang Qiaolin had assaulted the city in October of 1645. The attack was driven off, however, and the Prince of Xinchang was eventually tracked down at Haizhou, captured, and brought back to Huai’an to be beheaded.
The death of the Prince of Xinchang did not end the resistance movement in the Jiangbei area. Another Ming noble, the Prince of Ruian (Zhu Yile), managed to commission a number of loyalist militia leaders and lower degree-holders in districts throughout the Huaiyang area as well as some closer to Nanjing itself.\(^\text{38}\) While his military aide, Zhu Junzhao, organized a fifth column in Nanjing, the Prince of Ruian also got in touch with Zhu Yixi, the Prince of Ruichang, who pledged his bandit forces to a coordinated attack upon the old southern capital.\(^\text{39}\)

The Qing government in Nanjing got wind of this forthcoming attack in early September, 1646.\(^\text{40}\) One of Zhu Junzhao’s secret agents revealed the conspiracy to betray the city from within, while another informer at Longtan, thirty kilometers away, reported that loyalists in that area, assembled by Zhu Yixi, were in clandestine contact with the Prince of Ruian.\(^\text{41}\) As Qing military

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*Guangtao, “Hong Chengchou bei Ming shimo,”* p. 256; *Shizu shilu, 22: 264a.* In addition to uprisings in Xiuning and Anqing, organized around the short-lived loyalist movement led by Jin Sheng, there was a major Southern Ming rebellion upriver at Wuchang led by the Prince of Jing. Zhang Tianlu (a former Ming regional commander under Shi Kefa) suppressed the latter uprising. *Wen, Nanjiang yishi,* pp. 238–241; *Xie, Qingchu nongmin,* pp. 140–142.

\(^\text{38}\) These included: Xie Zhuo at Liyang, Si Shipan at Yancheng, Wu Yuancheng at Guangde, and Zhang Mingsheng near Rugao. *Wen, Nanjiang yishi,* p. 369; Hong Chengchou's biography in the *Qing shi gao,* cited in Li, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 259.

\(^\text{39}\) *Shizu shilu,* 24: 28–29. The title of Zhu Yixi may have been spurious. Identified as the Prince of Ruichang in some texts, in others he is mistaken for Zhu Yishi, the Prince of Le’an. Zhu Yixi is also sometimes called Zhu Yili. Li, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 258.

\(^\text{40}\) Earlier, on March 6, 1646, Zhu Yishi had tried unsuccessfully to storm the eastern Zhaoyang Gate. The attack was foiled, and a number of loyalists were killed as they fled to the safety of Mount She's wooded slopes, northeast of Nanjing. *Ming-Qing shiliao,* 1: 170, and Hong Chengchou's biography in the *Qing shi gao,* cited in Li, “Hong Chengchou,” pp. 258–259.

\(^\text{41}\) According to a confession by one of the loyalists to Qing judicial interrogators later: “The false prince Ruian and Zhu Junzhao plotted to gather the bandit groups (dang) from each area, but they lacked money and weapons. Thus, they first intended to cross into Jiangbei and with secret agents attack and take the two districts of Liuhe and Yizhen. Once they had acquired money and weapons they would use a base in the mountain passes and summon the ban-
patrols reported that enemy troops were massing outside the Zhaoyang Gate by the imperial tombs on the east side of Nanjing, the major officials within the city held a war council. Their military position was far from impregnable, especially if this attack turned out to be the point d'appui for further uprisings in Jiangnan proper, and especially in the Songjiang area. Hong Chengchou did command a number of "southern troops," but as we have already seen, these were almost more of a liability than an asset. Hong himself dismissed them contemptuously as being "fragile and weak. None have horses and all claim to be lacking armor and arrows; they are still devising means to get equipment." There was no comparing them with Bashan's Manchu troops ("At the first alarm they were quickly filled with zealous ardor, and as soon as they approach the enemy, they rush into the vanguard") or with Zhang Dayou's Chinese bannermen; but there were not many of the former and only four thousand of the latter.  

Nevertheless, it was decided to divide this limited number of crack troops into two different groups. One unit, under Bashan and General Chen Jin was to march east to Longtan to nip that campaign in the bud, while the other remained behind under Hong Chengchou and General Zhang Dayou to defend Nanjing against the estimated ten thousand troops gathering outside the city's vast walls.  

Bashan's expedition left Nanjing on September 18, reaching the outskirts of Longtan the following day. The Manchu troops were restrained from indiscriminate slaughter, their disciplined self-

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42 Memorial from Hong Chengchou dated October 8, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 2:170.

43 At the same time, the official in charge of river defense, Fan Chengzu (who was probably the brother of the celebrated Qing martyr Fan Chengmo), led some of his men across the river to Liuhe and Yizhen to quell possible uprisings there. Memorial from Hong Chengchou dated October 8, 1646, Ibid.
control obviously contrasting with some of the Chinese warlords’ soldiers’ wanton and barbarous behavior one year earlier in Jiangnan.\(^{44}\) Bashan first cordoned off the entire area and then sent his soldiers to warn, village by village, local residents that they must turn over “bandits” in their midst. The alternative, presumably, was also specified by special courts martial. In the next ten days, villagers either dragged in or denounced over four hundred people, and Hong Chengchou later claimed that all of these “confessed” their guilt under formal interrogation. Then, Bashan returned to Nanjing.\(^{45}\)

By that time, the city was already under attack. Loyalists under the command of the Ming princes had assaulted the Shence Gate, while their allies within the city had tried to start fires to distract Zhang Dayou and the other defenders. This diversion had failed. Using the information given him by informers, Hong Chengchou had already begun to round up supporters of the Prince of Ruian. Now, with Bashan’s additional troops, Hong proceeded on October 2 to seal every gate in the city at dawn and arrest “a great number” of suspects, each of whom was officially reported to have been caught carrying official Southern Ming documents. Bashan also took prisoner and executed some of the princes’ soldiers fighting outside the Zhaoyang and Taiping gates, and the loyalists’ main body of troops fled back into the countryside.\(^{46}\) Some of the

\(^{44}\) This was testimony to Bashan’s own realization that although the populace of that district could in principle be divided into “good people” (liang min) and “bandits” (zei), in practice it was hard to tell between them. “All the officials witnessed a meeting of the town’s good people, and they were struck by the difficulty of distinguishing them from actual bandits. If the soldiers were allowed to slaughter indiscriminately, then it would be impossible to separate stones from jade.” Memorial from Hong Chengchou dated October 8, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 2:170.

\(^{45}\) Memorial from Hong Chengchou dated October 8, 1646, Ibid.

\(^{46}\) In Hong Chengchou’s biography in the Qing shi gao it is reported that Zhu Yili (i.e., Zhu Yixi) was captured during the loyalists’ attack on the city. This statement was probably based on the entry in the Donghua lu for September 22, 1646, which states that Zhu Yishi (i.e., Zhu Yixi) was taken prisoner on that date. Both of these assertions are belied by a memorial from Hong Chengchou, dated November 8, which mentions that Zhu Yixi had not yet
loyalists sought refuge by Lake Tai. The Prince of Ruian, accompanied by his closest lieutenants, sought sanctuary far upstream at Susong, in the southwestern reaches of Anhui. He was unable, however, to escape the relentless pursuit of Bashan’s men, who brought back his severed head in the early months of 1647 and—at the orders of the Board of War in Beijing—carried their grisly trophy from town to town along the great river to illustrate the punishment accorded those who took arms against the ruling dynasty.47

Ming Loyalist Setbacks in 1646

The failure of the Ming loyalist forces in Anhui and Jiangsu to press their attack on Nanjing coincided with a general loyalist collapse through South China in the fall of 1646.48 Zhejiang was the first loyalist center to fall.49 The Qing occupation of that province,

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47 Shizu shilu, 28:331b, and 30:353b, 360a; memorial from Hong Chengchou dated February 13, 1647, Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 2:175; Nanming shiliao, p. 184; biographies of Hong Chengchou and Bashan in the Qing shi gao, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 126–128; Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 93. At this time also, magistrates in some of the counties upriver from Nanjing began to rebuild local Confucian temples, as a sign of restored stability. See, for example, Zhang Qijun et al., eds., Quanjiao xianzhi, p. 344.

48 John E. Wills, Jr., “Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang,” pp. 221–222.

49 Prince Bolo had reached Hangzhou on June 14, 1646. The Southern Ming forces on the other side of the Qiantang River were commanded by Fang Guoan. The Manchu troops were able to cross the river on horseback because the water level had fallen due to drought, and on July 10 Fang’s forces were routed and fell back on Shaoxing where Regent Lu had his court. Three days later Qing troops converged on the area, and Regent Lu—after being unable to hold the pass between Taizhou and Shaoxing—fled by sea from Haimen. He found refuge with Zhang Mingzhen, who later took him to the Zhoushan
which was first placed under the administration of Governor-General Zhang Cunren, was greatly aided by numerous local collaborators, many of whom were Roman Catholics who looked to Tong Guoqi for political leadership. Tong Guoqi was one of the Liaodong Tongts, who became adherents of the Manchus. Tong Guoqi himself had migrated south to Zhejiang before the Manchus entered the Central Plain, and in Hangzhou he came into contact with the Christian converts associated with the gentry leader Zhu Zongyuan. Zhu’s works had a wide currency at the time of the Manchu invasion. They argued that China in the past had been too much centered upon itself, and that the Chinese notion of “barbarians” (yì) was a cultural conceit which ignored the fact that different countries had different values. Pleading for cultural universalism, Zhu Zongyuan also maintained that foreigners—whether Christian fathers like Aleni or Manchu rulers like Dorgon—could bring with them a new “compass” to find the Dao. Europe itself, he claimed, was an ideal society, where there was little theft, where wisdom was respected, and where all social classes lived in harmony. Zhejiang needed that kind of social guid-

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50 Initially, the Qing occupation was badly hindered both by carpetbaggers and by local “bandits” or “pirates.” For details on the abuses perpetrated by collaborators and clerks, see the memorials from Ming-Qing shiliao in Nanming shiliao, pp. 15–17, 23. For reports of pirate and bandit activity, see Ibid., pp. 60–62, 102–108, 120, 136–137, 142–143; Chen Botao, Sheng chao Yuedong yimin lu si juan, 2:27–29; Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 146–147. Some resistance continued in the 1650s (see Ibid., pp. 147–154), but after the establishment of a permanent Manchu garrison in Hangzhou in December, 1649, the level of disorder lowered. Nanming shiliao, p. 149; Shen, Zhejiang tongzhi, p. 2522 (149:3a).

51 Tong Tulai, who had played a major role in the initial military sweep through Zhejiang, was one of his kinsmen. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 794.

52 L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, p. 29.
ance now because "East and West have the same Dao, the same mind." The Manchus, too, brought a common Dao to China. After all, Zhu pointed out, the great Shun himself had once been called an "eastern barbarian" (dong yi). Zhu Zongyuan therefore supported Manchu rule, and as he did so, carried with him many of the Catholics who had already been strongly influenced by his works. These collaborators, in turn, depended upon Tong Guoqi for support; and Tong, who was named governor of Fujian and Zhejiang, had their help in controlling the province.

Fujian was a much harder province to control, but the loyalist movement there too was suppressed in the fall of 1646. The Longwu regime of the Prince of Tang had been established in August, 1645, under the protection of the sealord Zheng Zhilong at Fuzhou. Although several northern expeditions were launched (including one ill-fated foray into Jiangxi led by the famous scholar Huang Daozhou in September, 1645), the main hope of the Longwu regime was to link up with the forces of He Tengjiao at Changsha in Huguang province. However, Zheng Zhilong was unwilling to let the Prince of Tang leave his "protection," and ultimately the pirate chief betrayed the loyalist cause by secretly contacting Hong Chengchou and offering to surrender. Hoping to be granted honors and reward by Bolo, who commanded the Qing forces press-

53 Okamoto Sai, "La Crise politique et morale des mandarins du sud à l'époque de transition," p. 85; see also pp. 57–59.
54 Ibid., pp. 86–96. Christianity was especially well entrenched in Zhejiang. During the 1630s, opponents of the creed claimed that Zhejiang provincial officials were secretly allied with Christians and served as their protectors. Douglas Lancashire, "Buddhist Reaction to Christianity in Late Ming China," pp. 91–92.
55 A major military effort was made by the Tang regime's armies in central and southern Anhui, where the loyalist official Jin Sheng was eventually killed. A report to the Qing government by Zhang Tianlu in the winter of 1645–1646 described the devastation in the four prefectures of Chizhou, Taiping, Huizhou, and Ningguo in vivid terms. Both cities and countryside were empty of life, and the drying bones were like grass in the fields. At night the air shimmered with green will-o'-the-wisps. Ming-Qing shiliao, 3:516, cited in Li, "Hong Chengchou," p. 260.
ing down upon Fujian from Zhejiang, Zheng Zhilong voluntarily withdrew some of his own forces defending northern Fujian. This opened the way for an attack led by Li Chengdong and Tong Yangjia. Forced to flee from his temporary court, the former Prince of Tang and his wife were captured at Dingzhou on October 6, and summarily executed. Shortly afterwards, Zheng Zhilong formally surrendered, and though his life was spared, he was sent north to Beijing as a prisoner of the Manchus.

Meanwhile, Southern Ming forces under Yang Tinglin had been trying to hold the strategic fortress of Ganzhou against a siege mounted by the Qing adherent Jin Shenghuan. When word reached Ganzhou in November, 1646, of the Longwu Emperor's death, the Southern Ming resistance there collapsed, and all of Jiangxi became a satrapy of Jin Shenghuan. By December of 1646 there were only a few major military leaders still resisting the Qing advance in the south: He Tengjiao and Chu Yinxi in Hunan; Zheng Chenggong (Zhilin's son) and Huang Binqing on the southeastern coast; and Qu Shishi and Ding Kuichu in the Liangguang.

To be sure, there were two newly established Southern Ming courts in Guangdong. Su Guansheng, who had been an important supporter of the Longwu Emperor, had escaped from Fujian to Guangzhou (Canton), where he enthroned the second Prince of Tang (who had fled by sea) as the Shaowu Emperor on December 11, 1646. Upriver at Zhaoqing, the Prince of Yongming was

57 Zha, Guo shou lu, p. 138; Qian, Nan zhong ji, p. 115.
58 Fuzhou was virtually abandoned, its arsenal destroyed, by Zheng Zhilong when the Qing forces entered the city on October 17, 1646. Zheng withdrew to his base at Anhai, and then surrendered to the Qing commanders in Fuzhou on November 21. Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 61–62; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 110–111.
59 Chu Hua, Hu cheng beikao, 1:11b.
61 Lacking court dress, the thousands of officials who were appointed to the Shaowu government during the next ten days had to buy theatrical robes from local actors. David Harrison Shore, “Last Court of Ming China,” pp. 25–27. See also de Palafox, Histoire de la conquête de la Chine par les Tartares, pp. 145–146.
shortly after that, on December 24, enthroned as the Yongli Emperor. But the former court mainly consisted of Cantonese supporters, and the latter of loyalists from other parts of China; and soon the two sides were actually engaging in civil war with each other. While the Shaowu and Yongli courts were fighting each other in January, 1647, Li Chengdong (closely supervised by one of the "old men" from Liaodong, Tong Yangjia) was moving his troops in from Fujian, taking Chaozhou and Huizhou. Sending in forged Southern Ming battle reports to Su Guansheng in Guangzhou, Li Chengdong was able to take the loyalist by surprise on January 20, 1647. A vanguard of no more than one thousand Qing soldiers were mistaken for bandit allies of the Shaowu regime and admitted into the city walls. Within a few days they had taken over the city, caused Su Guansheng to commit suicide, executed the Shaowu Emperor, and frightened the Yongli Emperor into secretly abandoning Zhaoqing at night to flee to northern Guangxi.

62 The Prince of Yongming, whose name was Zhu Youlang, was the sole surviving grandson of the Wanli Emperor. He was also known as the Prince of Gui, which was the title he succeeded to after the death of the Longwu Emperor. Fleeing Zhang Xianzhong’s advance into southern Huguang, the Prince of Yongming had earlier, in mid-November, been persuaded by his military protector, Ding Kuichu, to become regent in Zhaoqing upon hearing of Longwu’s death. On November 22, learning that Ganzhou had fallen, the new regent had left Guangdong for Wuzhou, just across the border in Guangxi. Thus, Su Guansheng and other Guangzhou officials felt they had been abandoned by the new regent, and consequently named Longwu’s younger brother, Zhu Yuyue (the Prince of Tang), Shaowu Emperor on December 12 in Canton. When word of this reached Wuzhou, the Prince of Yongming’s entourage decided that he should return to Zhaoqing and also assume the throne as the Yongli Emperor, which he became twelve days later. Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 63–65; Shore, “Last Court,” pp. 22, 29; Zha Jizuo, Dongshan guoyu, p. 87.

63 There were two battles between the Yongli and Shaowu forces. The Battle of Sanshui, on January 4, 1647, was won by the Yongli loyalists. The Battle of Haikou (Sanshankou), three days later, saw the tide turn: the Yongli force was almost entirely wiped out. Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 65–66; Shore, “Last Court,” p. 31.

64 Ibid., pp. 31–32.

On February 20, 1647, Li Chengdong took Zhaoqing without encountering resistance, and by April he had Qu Shisi under siege at Guilin.66

While the loyalists suffered severe setbacks in the far south, partisans around Nanjing discovered that the attack of the Prince of Ruian had exposed a number of their groups to attack and destruction by Hong Chengchou's forces. Furthermore, the uprising itself had enabled Hong to make a strong argument to the Board of War in Beijing to be allowed to retain at his side Bashan, whose army had been on the eve of the Prince of Ruian's attack ordered to take over pacification efforts in the Huguang area, but was now to be kept in the garrison at Nanjing.67 Finally, the vigorous response of


67 Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 2:170. The order had reached Nanjing on October 8, and was presumably issued around mid-September in Beijing. Hong argued forcefully that because the troops of Yang Wulie, Gao Jinhu, and Lin Guangyuan, which were 3,000 of his best soldiers, had been sent on to Jiangxi, he badly needed Bashan's men. That argument alone would not have carried sufficient weight, because another 4,000 men had been sent as replacements. (On March 31, 1646, the Korean envoy to the Qing court had reported that the government was already having trouble meeting Hong Chengchou's requests for more soldiers and supplies. Wu Han, comp., Chaoxian Li chao shilu zhong de Zhongguo shiliao, pp. 3755–3756.) Because of the attack, the court in Beijing agreed to let Bashan stay. However, Hong (who may have felt that the uprising reflected badly on his own policy of amnesty) was not allowed to return to the north at this time, as he requested. Instead, the throne ordered him to continue his work in Jiangnan and signalled its approval of his handling of affairs there by giving his wife 100 pieces of white gold and 200 sable skins. Biography of Hong Chengchou in the Qing shi gao, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 127–128. The Manchu court regarded Hong's pacification of Jiangnan as being "the first accomplishment of establishing the Qing," because it meant securing that region's economic resources for the conquest of the rest of the country. Li, "Hong Chengchou," p. 252.
the Nanjing garrison to the attack altogether seemed a sign of Qing stability, and thus may have considerably helped Suzhou’s governor, Tu Guobao, in his own ongoing efforts to eradicate resistance around Lake Tai.68

In addition to training special marines to attack the Lake Tai bandits, Governor Tu had appointed district officers to each of the counties surrounding Lake Tai and was conscripting soldiers in the area.69 Closer administrative control over the surrounding countryside made it possible for Tu to interdict the resistsants’ access to necessary food supplies. The Lake Tai outlaws gained much of their sustenance from fish, but they also needed grain to survive. That meant landing periodically in farming areas to buy or steal rice. During such forays they were extremely vulnerable to regular infantry and artillery attacks.70 As the cordon was tightened in February and March of 1647, reports began to flow into Nanjing of one rebel band after another being taken by Qing military units.71 Many of these surrendering loyalist bands were consequently enrolled as soldiers in units commanded by Wu Shengzhao, the head of the provincial garrison at Songjiang. In fact so many of these surrendering rebels were placed under that officer’s command that the court in Beijing became concerned about Wu’s reliability.72

Wu Shengzhao was a native of Liaodong who was said by some to have been a former aide of Wu Sangui. By the early summer of 1645, however, he was attached to the command of Li Chengdong, whom he served as a lieutenant during the bloody pacification of Jiangnan. His greatest accomplishment then was to secure the surrender of two major Lake Tai bands: one under Dai Zhijun,
who brought his soldiers to Songjiang to serve directly under Wu Shengzhao, and another commanded by one of Wu Yi’s former aides, Zhou Qian.\(^{73}\) Partly because of these successes, Wu inherited Li Chengdong’s command when the latter moved on to Fujian in 1646, leaving his former lieutenant to occupy the garrison chief’s house, which was the recently commandeered mansion of the Xu family.\(^{74}\) Wu soon developed close relations with several members of the local gentry serving in his secretariat. Through their efforts he was not only subverted to Ming loyalty, but was also persuaded to consider a military alliance with the supporters of the Prince of Lu in Amoy, and especially with the naval overlord of Zhoushan Island, Huang Binqing.\(^{75}\)

Huang Binqing had initially supported the Prince of Tang, but he had later been persuaded to invite the Prince of Lu and his main military supporter, Zhang Mingzhen (who occupied several islands off of the Fujian-Guangdong coast), to take refuge on Zhoushan.\(^{76}\) Later, after the Prince of Tang was captured, almost all of the maritime warlords of the southeastern coast had turned to the

\(^{73}\) Dai, as we have noted, was Yang Tingshu’s student. Ji, *Mingji nanliüe*, p. 280. Zhou Qian, not to be confused with Zhou Rui, entered Wu Shengzhao’s secretariat. Chen, *Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia*, p. 9.

\(^{74}\) The house had been built by Xu Jie, Xu Fuyuan’s ancestor. Goodrich and Fang, *Ming Biography*, p. 576.

\(^{75}\) Guan Zhizhu and his brother, Yunpo, were especially noted for using examples from the classics to try to inspire loyalist sentiments in Wu Shengzhao. But it was Dai Zhijun and Zhou Qian who urged him to contact Huang Binqing. Chen, *Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia*, pp. 7b, 9–10a.

\(^{76}\) Huang Binqing was originally from Zhangzhou (Fujian). In 1644 he broke up his family and recruited soldiers and sailors in order to “succor the king” (*qin wang*). He and his forces got as far north as Shandong before they received word that Beijing had fallen. He then returned to Nanjing where he was given a seal, appointed a general, and sent to garrison Wuhu. Huang was related to Zhang Mingzhen by marriage. However, that was not to prevent Zhang from later killing his military rival. *Nanjing shiliae*, pp. 453–458. Zhang Mingzhen was a native of Nanjing who received his military *jinshi* in 1638. At the time of the fall of the Nanjing regime, he held the post of major at a garrison just south of Ningbo. He transferred his loyalty to the Prince of Lu, who made him a general, and later an earl. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 46–47. See also Struve, “Uses of History,” pp. 19–20.
Prince of Lu, who had been invited by Zheng Cai to establish his temporary court (xingzai) at Amoy on December 30, 1646. Dai Zhijun and other Lake Tai loyalist leaders believed that if they could persuade someone as powerful as Huang Binqing to recognize them as intermediaries, then they might be able in turn to persuade General Wu Shengzhao to revolt on land while the Southern Ming navies attacked by sea—a strategy that was to remain a dream of Southern Ming loyalists until at least 1659.

Suggestions of an alliance between Jiangnan loyalists and the southern navies fell upon receptive ears. The mainland defeats suffered by the loyalists in eastern Zhejiang in 1646 threw almost the entire loyalist movement upon coastal ports and offshore islands in Zhejiang and Fujian. The defeats also played into the hands of those advisers to the Prince of Lu who believed that despite Qing officials’ treachery the previous year, the only possibility for recovery of their military fortunes lay in cultivating alliances with important regional commanders of the Manchu dynasty. This hope in turn was predicated upon the realistic assessment that the new dynasty had been forced to rely upon untried allies in order to extend itself so rapidly over central China. Nevertheless, both because of the previous year’s deceit and because of the understandable reluctance of naval commanders like Zheng Cai to rely too heavily upon land forces, the court of Lu had to be convinced that reliable allies did exist in Jiangnan. To determine this, and to communicate directly with gentry loyalists, the court of Lu retained a Jiashan zhusheng appropriately named Xia Baomo (“Valuable Stratagems” Xia). Xia had already conveyed information from

77 Zheng Cai had been one of the chief supporters of the Prince of Tang. He refused to give in to the pleas of Zheng Zhilong to join the Qing and instead threw his lot in with the Prince of Lu. Later he became extremely important in forging the alliance between that prince and Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga). Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 47, 181.

78 The Qing dufu of eastern Zhejiang had managed to persuade some of the maternal relatives of the Prince of Lu that he was willing to surrender to the new “administrator of the realm” (jianguo). The Lu courtiers’ gullibility had led them to overestimate their chances of capturing Hangzhou and Jiaxing, and this had directly contributed to their military defeat in that province. Zha, Guo shou lu, p. 109.
Wu Yi to the Lu court, and now returned to the Songjiang area to contact agents there.79

Just as the military fortunes of the Zhejiang loyalists disposed them favorably towards an alliance with the Songjiang resisters, so did the political vulnerability of Wu Shengzhao interest him in an uprising. His incorporation of so many Lake Tai rebels had already aroused the suspicions of Governor Tu Guobao and Viceroy Hong Chengchou.80 General Wu was aware of their misgivings and so was prone to accept Xia Baomo’s invitation to conspire with the Zhoushan loyalists. Wu Shengzhao therefore took two important steps early in 1647. One was to exchange gifts and supplies secretly with Huang Binqing: Jiangnan rice in exchange for Zhoushan pearls. The second was, through Dai Zhijun, to get in touch with the leading gentry loyalist of Songjiang, Chen Zilong.81

Chen Zilong and the Songjiang Mutiny

By early May, 1647, after attending funeral ceremonies honoring Xia Yunyi for his loyalist suicide, Chen Zilong seems to have recovered some of his own resolve as a loyalist.82 At the very least, he felt he could do nothing other than remain true to the Ming cause, if only because his public image as a loyalist forbade him other alternatives. He had, in short, resigned himself to “foolish stratagems” in “critical times,” as a poem written then revealed.

Foolish stratagems: to survive I seek the wilds.
 Critical times: fit to hide in the wastes.
 Friends pity Yu Rang.
 A daughter recognizes Han Kang.
 The Zhou bronze endures fluctuation.

79 Ibid.
80 Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 91.
81 The initiative in these arrangements is not clearly assigned. Wu may even have contacted Xia on his own, and Dai may have brought Chen to Wu’s attention in the first place.
82 Hou Fangyu, Zhuanghui tang ji, Siyi tang shiji, 5:9b; William S. Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-lung,” pp. 139–140.
Qin's ashes spread cross the expanse.

Though Heaven's vast, this road's a narrow space.

Shall we ever find a soaring place?  

Most telling in this haunting poem, penned by a man caught between dying and rising regimes, was the reference to Han Kang. As the tale was usually told, Han Kang was a man of the Eastern Han who sold medicine at Chang'an. He was noted far and wide for refusing to bargain on prices. His daughter, who accompanied him on his medicine purchasing and selling trips, once grew angry with him when he lost money by proudly refusing to haggle with a customer. He told her in response that he, Han Kang, could not bargain even if he wanted to because his reputation forbade it. Like Han Kang, then, Chen Zilong would remain a loyalist because he could not do otherwise. It was thus concern for his name, or fear of betraying it, that continued to impel Chen Zilong to act; the commitment to his self-integrity, defined by a personal history of righteous action, drove him one last time to Songjiang to join in Wu Shengzhao's conspiracy.

Chen Zilong may have provided two major services to General Wu. He may have brought into the conspiracy the circle of literati loyalists who had survived the first Songjiang resistance, and he may also have conveyed to the court of Lu the persuasion that General Wu could be trusted to revolt as planned. Huang Bingqing's own misgivings were presumably allayed, because Huang himself subsequently agreed to support a naval expedition north under Zhang Mingzhen to coincide with an uprising led by General Wu Shengzhao in Songjiang—the two to combine on May 20, 83

83 Chen, *Chen Zhongyu quan ji*, 14:26b–27a. Yu Rang is the hero of a famous story which appears in the *Plans of the Warring States* (*Zhan guo ce*), written in the 3rd–2nd century B.C. This story has been translated into Western languages several times. One version can be found in Wolfgang Bauer and Herbert Franke, eds., *The Golden Casket*, pp. 25–27. Like Chiushingura for the Japanese, the tale of Yu Rang epitomized the Chinese determination of a retainer to avenge the death of his lord. "Zhou bronze" is used here to translate "the ding of Zhou." That particular ritual vessel possessed the manes of the reign. It symbolized the Zhou's divine legitimacy and right to rule. Here, it is used to signify the absolute legitimacy of the dynasty.
1647, in an attack overland and up the Yangzi River on the Qing collaborators and Manchu garrisons in Nanjing.\textsuperscript{84}

As plans for the uprising were made, news about it became common knowledge among the secretaries and clerks in Wu’s yamen. When Chen Zilong moved to the outskirts of Songjiang on May 12—eight days before the two forces were supposed to converge—and dramatically announced to his disciple what he had until then thought to be a secret, the shocked student told his master that everyone in the city knew of the plot, and pleaded with Chen to give up any thought of participating.\textsuperscript{85} Little wonder then that word of the conspiracy reached the Qing authorities in Nanjing. Two days before the uprising was scheduled to begin, Hong Chengchou received a secret message from Yang Zhiyi, the Assistant Prefect of Songjiang. Yang, who was the son of the famed Donglin martyr Yang Lian, wrote that Wu Shenzhao was planning to mutiny.\textsuperscript{86} Hong realized that it was too late to reach Songjiang in time to forestall the rebellion, but he immediately alerted Tu Guobao about the imminent invasion, thus arousing military units along the Yangzi shore for what was to prove the decisive battle of the campaign. As an afterthought, Hong also or-

\textsuperscript{84} Chen, \textit{Chen Zhongyu quan ji}, nianpu, xia, p. 10a. One of Chen Zilong’s students finished up the last couple of years of Chen’s chronological biography. He tries to show that Chen was not directly involved in the uprising, but there is too much other evidence to the contrary. Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-lung,” pp. 139–140.

\textsuperscript{85} Chen, \textit{Chen Zhongyu quan ji}, nianpu, xia, p. 7b.

\textsuperscript{86} There is little evidence that any of the local officials—many of them former Ming gentrymen now collaborating with the Manchu dynasty—were willing to join Wu Shenzhao and the Songjiang gentry loyalists. In nearby Changzhou, for instance, “twenty-three righteous scholars” (ershisan yishi) pledged with Liu Shu (jinshi 1643) to rebel for the Prince of Lu. The local Qing magistrate, Li Shi, happened to be a classmate of Liu Shu, having also won his highest degree in 1643. Nevertheless, he remained loyal to the new dynasty rather than ally himself with the local gentry under his tongnian. Liu Shu was captured and killed. Li Shi himself promptly retired, perhaps because he was afraid of being implicated. In 1661, however, he read second in the palace examinations and re-entered the bureaucracy, rising to become President of Revenue during the Kangxi reign. Ji, \textit{Mingji nanli}, p. 275; Wang, \textit{Da Qing yitongzhi}, p. 916 (80:26a). For Li Shi’s life, see Huang Zhijun, comp., \textit{Jiangnan tongzhi}, p. 2890 (172:11a).
dered that members of Wu Shengzhao’s family held hostage in Nanjing be promptly executed.87

Meanwhile, Wu Shengzhao had learned of Yang Zhiyi’s betrayal. Believing that some of the other city officials might have been secretly in touch with the Nanjing viceroyalty as well, General Wu assembled his garrison of two thousand soldiers in front of the city’s walls, and as they were swearing an oath to join the Southern Ming armada and overthrow the Qing dynasty, Yang Zhiyi along with the prefect and magistrate of Songjiang were executed in front of them.88

Wu Shengzhao was still confident that his enterprise would succeed. As far as he could tell, Zhang Mingzhen’s armada had rounded the tip of Jiangnan and was even then preparing a rendezvous up the Yangzi River. How was he to know that natural forces had already doomed the rebellion? Two days before the execution of the officials of Songjiang, the Southern Ming armada had stopped to forage at Luyuan about fifty kilometers upriver from Chongming Island. That night the weather turned sultry, and during the early morning watch of May 18 a small typhoon swept across the Yangzi mouth and struck the fleet at its moorings. Before the ships could weigh anchor and make for the safety of the open sea, nearly all of Zhang Mingzhen’s vessels and about half of Huang Binqing’s ships foundered. Many of the sailors and marines managed to swim ashore at Luyuan, but they were greeted by soldiers from the nearby garrison of Fushan, notified in advance by Tu Guobao of the imminent invasion. The Qing warriors easily picked off with swords and crossbows a thousand of the Southern Ming soldiers who straggled ashore, and captured another five hundred, including Zhang Mingzhen’s brother, Mingbin. Zhang Mingzhen himself, along with Huang Binqing and Zhang Huangyan, managed to escape by sea.89

89 Memorial from Tu Guobao in Nanming shiliao, pp. 58–69. For Huang Bin-
Meanwhile, ignorant of the defeat, General Wu Shengzhao had sent one of his own units, commanded by Colonel Zhang Shixun, north from Songjiang to guide the Zhejiang loyalists to his army headquarters. Colonel Zhang waited in vain for the allies to arrive and, as the hours went by, slowly grew convinced that there would be no fleet from the south. He decided that he must look after his own fortunes at this point, and precipitately returned to Songjiang. He and his men quickly overpowered Wu Shengzhao’s guards, seized the general, and took over the yamen. Then, using Wu’s name, Colonel Zhang ordered other key leaders of the uprising into the prefectural yamen. The most important military rival to take into account was Dai Zhijun, but Colonel Zhang managed to kill him quickly, and the leaderless Lake Tai bandits retreated back across the hills into the lakelands. Zhang then formally reported the revolt to Nanjing and remanded General Wu to the custody of Viceroy Hong.\(^9\)

Although the Luyuan debacle and the suppression of the Songjiang mutiny were great victories for the Qing government, they were followed by official suspicion and doubt rather than confidence and euphoria. It was only a few weeks earlier, in April, 1647, that the Qing court had renewed its policy of granting amnesties. Now that seemed a gesture of weakness, followed as it was by a fresh outbreak of loyalist rebellion in the economic heartland of the empire. Consequently, after the sinking of the Lu armada, Tu was censured by Bashan for requesting that amnesty be granted to Zhang Mingbin on the grounds that he had surrendered without resistance. It was precisely that kind of leniency—Bashan argued—that had encouraged men like Wu Shengzhao to rebel in the first place. The President of the Board of War went on rather grudgingly to admit that there were probably too many Luyuan prisoners to be executed, but he preferred that they be treated as prisoners of war and used for corvée, rather than be admitted into the Qing naval garrisons as regular sailors. He also suggested that

\(^9\) qing’s later raids, see the memorial from Zhang Cunren, dated February 8, 1648, in Ibid., pp. 101–102.

\(^90\) Chu, Hucheng heikao, 3:4a; Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia, p. 10a. Zhang Shixun is sometimes mentioned in other sources as Zhan Shixun.
Tu Guobao’s behavior should be investigated by the Board of Civil Appointments. The throne concurred.  

Hong Chengchou fell under suspicion, too, because the Qing court linked him with loyalist literati whose role in the conspiracy was vastly overestimated by the officials investigating the revolt after it was quelled. This was partly owing to the literati themselves, who deliberately aggrandized their own importance. Shen Tingyang, a member of the Jiangnan gentry who had been aboard one of the Lu vessels at Luyuan when the storm came up, spotted the Qing troops along the shore and said:

If the wind and waves are like this, then what must be the intent of Heaven? I should die myself [in the storm] in order to return [the benevolence of] the country (guo). But to die like this is to die anonymously."

In search of a name for himself, then, Shen Tingyang called out to the Qing officers, identifying himself as a censor in the Lu court. Later, during his interrogation at Suzhou, he claimed it was he who had persuaded Huang Binqing to join the armada by telling him that many Jiangnan literati had still not shaved their heads and remained loyal to the Ming cause. Disdaining offers of amnesty in order to die a loyalist, Shen earned a martyr’s fame, and, in so doing, helped persuade his executioners that Jiangnan was honey-combed with cells of dissident literati.

The Roundup of the Literati

Believing that the main instigators of the revolt were Jiangnan literati secretly conspiring with the Southern Ming, the imperial gov-

91 Memorial dated December 16, 1647, in Nanming shiliao, pp. 85–87.
92 To be sure, simultaneously there had erupted a gentry-led loyalist uprising in the Huai’an area which seemed to the government to be part of a wider conspiracy. Zha, Guo shou lu, p. 100; Nanming shiliao, pp. 80–82.
93 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 248–249.
94 Ibid., pp. 249–250.
ernment entrusted eradication of the traitors to those officials least tainted by their connections to scholarly circles. Hong Chengchou and Tu Guobao thus momentarily turned over the responsibility for pacification following the Songjiang mutiny to Chen Jin and Bashan. Chen Jin was one of the “old men” from Liaodong, who had been recommended to Hung Taiji by Ning Wanwo in 1633. Utterly loyal, he accepted his assignment to govern Suzhou in the wake of Wu Shengzhao’s uprising determined “to utilize this opportunity to exterminate the famous scholars of the three Wu.”

Under his administration, the military and police authorities of eastern Jiangnan began the search for the key figures behind the revolt, and soon settled upon the name of Chen Zilong as a leading conspirator. Although Chen had probably been an intermediary between Wu Shengzhao and the Lu court, he was really only on the periphery of the Songjiang mutiny, living outside the city and mainly ignorant of Wu’s day-by-day machinations.

Nevertheless, to Chen Jin and the Qing government, Chen Zilong quickly became known as the symbolic leader of the revolt, and the net around him soon tightened. At first he escaped arrest with Xia Zhixu, Xia Yunyi’s brother. Then the Xia family was tracked down. Xia Yunyi’s son, Wanchun, who had joined the Lake Tai bandits after his father’s suicide, was seized and taken to Nanjing. There, Hong Chengchou, touched by the youth of the prisoner, tried to persuade him to contribute his considerable literary talents to the new dynasty. Xia Wanchun’s response was to insult Hong for being a collaborator. After Xia Wanchun was decapitated, his uncle Zhidan felt that he had no choice but to die.

95 Although he was to play a major role against Ming loyalists in Fujian, Chen Jin’s most glorious moment came in 1651, when he led the Qing forces that took Zhoushan Island from the Southern Ming navy. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 592.


97 By the late eighteenth century the Songjiang resistance had been entirely transformed into an example of gentry loyalism, much as the Jiangyin uprising was so interpreted. The district director of studies in 1784 built a “shrine to the loyal and righteous” in Qingpu, commemorating the leadership of Chen Zilong. Chen, *Chen Zhongyu quan ji*, introduction.
as well, and so hanged himself in the local Confucian temple.98 Meanwhile others were captured by Qing patrols and put under arrest. In addition to Yang Tingshu, who was seized because he had been Dai Zhijun’s teacher, more than forty famous Jiangnan scholars were executed in Nanjing.99 Many others were killed on the spot by Chen Jin’s troopers, who were garrisoned in the western suburbs of Songjiang. Ultimately about a thousand scholars, including one acting magistrate, were brought in; in Governor Tu Guobao’s summary words: “Nothing that chewed was left after the roundup.”100

After Xia Zhidan’s suicide, Chen Zilong had sought refuge in the home of a close friend, Hou Qizeng. But as the roundup continued, he had to move on: first to an old servant’s house, then to another friend’s home. There, he was at last discovered by the police, who surrounded the house until he surrendered. The police immediately took him to Chen Jin to whom Chen Zilong would only say that he had been a member of the Chongzhen court. Despite Chen Jin’s frightening reputation, Chen Zilong retained his composure throughout the interrogation. When questioned about his long hair, he simply said: “I am keeping my hair in order to look upon my emperor [with dignity] in the world below.”101 Undoubtedly planning a public execution, Chen Jin ordered that the loyalist be taken to Nanjing for further interrogation and trial. But Chen Zilong managed to avoid the ordeal of such a spectacle. On June 15, 1647, as the police boat passed by night under the Kuatang Bridge on the way from Suzhou to Nanjing, Chen managed to break his bonds and threw himself into the river. Although there were swimmers among the police who jumped into the water and recovered his body, Chen Zilong had drowned himself. The policemen were infuriated by their prisoner’s suicide, and, before they threw Chen’s corpse back in the river, cut off his head.

98 Xie, Nanming shilüe, pp. 80–81. Xia Zhidan left a note which read in part: “Alas, what the new dynasty (chao) calls ‘rebel’ is what the former state (guo) called ‘loyalist.’” Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 244.
100 Nanming shiliao, p. 58; Chu, Hucheng beikao, 3:3b–4a.
Several days later, some of Chen's students recovered the remains and buried them in the Chen family mausoleum. A fitting epitaph for his tomb would have been the last stanza of his poem on "foolish stratagems" in "critical times."

Old things pass, and time is spent. Strange landscapes unreeL, and ideas are renewed. Hatred has no thousand-day wine, Yet my mortal burdens still confine. The flowering Han expires with the iris. The elusive Qin fails with the peach blossoms. Beyond the seas and lakes, so still and so alone, I remain between Heaven and Earth, relic of another throne.

The purge of loyalist literati did not mean that resistance ended altogether in Jiangnan in 1647, nor that the local gentry's control had been crushed. The gentry retained a great deal of economic power and social influence which it would continue to monopolize for a decade to come. Yet in spite of this residual local autonomy, the back of political opposition in the lower Yangzi region was broken in 1647. The area's yamens would soon be staffed by reliable bannermen, and not until the 19th century would there be any kind of fundamental challenge to the dynasty's hegemony over the people of Jiangnan. So powerfully entrenched was the new government now that it could afford to reverse the former policy of accepting one-time Ming officials virtually without question; it could even risk casting doubts and aspersions upon the men who

102 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia, p. 10; Ji, Mingji nanlīe, p. 279; Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 248; Shizu shilu, 32:378; Atwell, "Ch’en Tzu-lung," p. 141.
103 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, 14:27a. "Thousand day wine" was a legendary potion, one drop of which intoxicated a person for a thousand days. The iris (zhicao) is synonymous with a rare fungus with a purple stalk which keeps for a long time. According to the Hou Han shu, annals of Emperor Ming's reign: "In the 17th year of Yongping (74 a.d.), zhicao grew in front of the palace." The plant thus came to symbolize the prosperity and peace of a good reign. According to the Furui zhi of the Song shu: "If the ruler is benevolent and humane, then zhicao will grow."
had forged that policy in the first place, including Hong Chengchou himself.

While Chen Jin was conducting his own purge in Songjiang and Suzhou, Bashan was left to handle the interrogations of some of the higher-ranking captives in Nanjing. Wu Shengzhao, of course, had been remanded to Nanjing, and in the course of his questioning revealed that several important gentrymen were involved in the plot. In this atmosphere of heightened suspicion, a Qing major captured a courier on October 1, 1647, bearing documents and letters from the court of Lu. Upon examination, the papers were found to include Southern Ming patents of nobility enfeoffing Hong Chengchou as a duke and Tu Guobao as a marquis. There were also found letters from Huang Binqing addressed to these two men, and containing references suggesting that Hong and Tu had had a prior correspondence with the Zhoushan warlord. Although these papers could easily have been allowed to fall into Qing hands just to discredit Hong and Tu, the government ordered Bashan to make a complete investigation. However, the Qing court also ordered that Hong Chengchou be given every chance to clear himself and that he participate in the interrogations along with Bashan. 104

Intrigues in Huai’an

In spite of the suspicion directed against him, Hong Chengchou continued to take full responsibility for the continuing pacification of other parts of the region under the Nanjing viceroyalty’s jurisdiction. Songjiang was by now under firm control once again, but Hong remained concerned about the security of Jiangning to the south, where there were loyalist forces, and of the Grand Canal zone to the north. 105 Beyond Yangzhou, at Huai’an, the tribute vessels of the dynasty were laden with grain, ready to move north to supply the Qing capital in Beijing. Yet they and the communi-

104 Ji, Mingji nanlùe, p. 278; Zha, Guo shou lu, pp. 109, 123.
105 There were reports of loyalist uprisings at Jiangning in late September, 1647. Shizu shilu, 33:397a.
cation channel itself were vulnerable to continuing loyalist attacks from the districts to the east. There, in the salt-producing zone of northern Jiangsu where many of the inhabitants were professional smugglers, a group of about two thousand "local bandits" attacked the prefectural capital of Miaowan on October 9, 1647. Striking in the early hours of the morning, they were initially repelled by the Qing major in command of the garrison. But they attacked again in broad daylight, wounding the major and driving the Qing prefect and magistrate out of the town. The loyalists, who were led by an outlaw named Zhang Huashan and a self-styled Ming Prince of Yi, raised the banner of the Longwu Emperor and gathered more forces to threaten Huai’an.¹⁰⁶

The Qing viceroy in charge of grain transport along the Grand Canal was Yang Shengyuan. From his headquarters in Huai’an he reported to Hong Chengzhou that Miaowan “is now turned into a bandit base. In this region of salt fields the inhabitants have all become bandits and their power has really gotten out of hand."¹⁰⁷ Yang also told Hong that he had taken immediate steps to defend Huai’an itself, which the rebels had announced they would attack on October 10. While regular garrison units were being sent toward Miaowan, special grain transport troops had been stationed along the canal to protect the laden vessels, many of which had already set sail for the north. But Yang did not believe that he could contain the resistance with the forces at his command alone. To keep the "tendrils of rebellion" from spreading, he required reinforcements immediately. The situation was so urgent that he could not wait for troops from the north to arrive. So he requested

¹⁰⁶ Shizu shilu, 34:10; Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 2, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 124. The Qing prefect was Wu Rujie, who was one of the militia leaders of Xuzhou, described earlier, who joined the Qing armies as they moved south. He was particularly good at persuading loyalists to surrender peaceably and, after his stint as prefect in Miaowan, he became provincial judge of Zhejiang, stationed in Ningbo. There he helped break up the bandit gangs in the surrounding hill districts and became a notedly popular official. Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 151:24b–25a. For the resistance movement led by Wang Yi in the Siming Mountains until October, 1850, see Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 102–105.

¹⁰⁷ Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 2, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 125.
at least two to three thousand Han and Manchu troops right away from the forces at Hong’s disposal.  

As soon as he received Yang’s plea for aid, Hong Chengchou called a conference in Nanjing with his major military officials, Chen Jin, Chen Tai, and Zhang Dayou. Though Governor-General Yang might have exaggerated the military threat to Huai’an, there was no question but that the empire’s most important artery, even now carrying sustenance to the capital, had to be protected. Hong Chengchou therefore drew twenty-five hundred men from the Nanjing garrison, and placed them under the command of Zhang Dayou, who was provincial tidu. As Hong later explained in his memorial to Dorgon:

All the troops were to advance in the attack when the best opportunity occurred. They were to obey the plans agreed upon together by the provincial commander of the Han troops and the Grain Transport Governor-General. They had to have complete agreement. Above all, the Manchu and Han officers and men were to be severely restrained, forced to maintain discipline without the slightest transgression, with regard both to exterminating the bandits and to protecting the people as they secure peace in this valuable area.

These troops were to depart from Jiangning on October 14. By that time the loyalist attack on Huai’an had already taken place.

The forces that attacked Huai’an the first time were commanded by a man named Zhou Wenshan, whose eight hundred soldiers were said to be from Yancheng, eighty kilometers to the east. Zhou Wenshan’s men broke though the wall of Huai’an near the east gate, but they were repelled after eight hours of fighting in the early hours of the morning of October 10. Zhou Wenshan was killed during this engagement. Although the garrison troops remaining in Huai’an were only a little more than a hundred men, they also managed to drive off the second wave of attackers under

108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
the Prince of Yi, whose men they ambushed as the loyalist canal boats sailed toward the city. The main loyalist force then retreated back to Miaowan.\textsuperscript{110}

The reinforcements that arrived a few days later therefore found the situation much less desperate than they had feared. Marching on to Miaowan under the command of Viceroy Yang Shengyuan, the Qing forces proceeded to overwhelm the loyalists, recapturing the city and beheading a number of resisters who fell into their hands.\textsuperscript{111} Although Zhang Huashan was one of those they killed, the Prince of Yi cut his hair, and posing as a Buddhist monk, managed to escape from the city.\textsuperscript{112} Yang Shengyuan subsequently ordered a widespread manhunt for the missing prince. Reward posters were circulated throughout the Subei area, and after yamen runners captured and interrogated a monk who personally knew the Prince of Yi, the authorities secured and distributed a description of the man. The capture and interrogation of other Buddhist monks netted the name of a Daoist priest and bandit leader named Sun Shengyu with whom the so-called Prince of Yi might have sought refuge. Sun lived in a village called Shuangdian (Twin Stores), near the city of Rugao to the south of Huai’an. Special investigators and a squadron of military police were sent from Yangzhou, and at midnight on the 18th of January, they surrounded Shuangdian and raided Sun’s house. Sun Shengyu was seized, documents of the Ming cause being found in his belongings; and the following day the police officers searched the village thoroughly and arrested three other local loyalists who were also in the possession of Ming documents. One of these three broke under interrogation and admitted that the man they called the Prince of Yi had been hiding in their village earlier, but that he had escaped to a nearby hamlet just before the police arrived. After forcing their prisoner to give them the name of the household where the loyalist leader had fled, the police encircled the hamlet and descended upon the rebel’s last refuge. Seized along with the prince

\textsuperscript{110} Qing shi gao, biography of Kuli, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 123.

\textsuperscript{111} Shizu shilu, 34:401b.

\textsuperscript{112} Ming-Qing shiliào, jia, ben 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 125.
was his son. After the captives were taken back to Yang Sheng-yuan, who had set up a temporary headquarters in Rugao to supervise the investigation, it was discovered that they were minor imperial nobles formerly attached to the Henan Prince of Zhou. Satisfied of their insignificance, Viceroy Yang ordered them killed, and they were promptly executed.113

The pursuit and capture of the Prince of Yi led to the discovery of other Ming loyalists in the area. Some of these were perfectly harmless individuals, but—in light of the feverish concern of the authorities in Beijing at this point—any evidence of loyalist activity in so sensitive an area as the place where the tribute grain fleet gathered called for the most scrupulous attention. The Qing authorities were especially disturbed at this time by reports of individuals—especially literati—who had already embraced the new dynasty by cutting their hair, and yet had since then reverted to Ming hairstyles or loyalist attitudes.114

113 Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 3, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 125–126. This document, which is a memorial from Yang Shengyuan dated November 27, 1647, is also briefly mentioned in Shizu shilu, 35:409.

114 Two of Rugao's most prominent residents at this time, the dramatist Li Yu and the poet Mao Xiang, strictly eschewed such activity. Both men had their own dramatic troupes, and Mao Xiang was especially known for his theater parties. Together with his concubine, Dong Xiaowan, Mao perpetuated, in the seclusion of his home, the erotic aestheticism of the late Ming. On winter nights, the lovers, in the seclusion of their carpeted bedchamber, would burn incense in 15th-century vessels, inhaling the intoxicating smell together “in a spellbound atmosphere without going to bed until daybreak.” Mao P'i-chiang, The Reminiscences of Tung Hsiao-wan, p. 53. Dong Xiaowan grew ill of consumption, however, and began to waste away. Just before her death in 1651 at the age of 28, she rallied briefly when Mao Xiang brought her autumn chrysanthemums. “Every night she lighted virescent candles and threw a white folding screen of six folds around the flowers on three sides, placing a seat among the flowers and adjusting the position of the chrysanthemum in such a way as to make it cast its shadow on the screen in the most graceful manner imaginable. She then began to drag herself into the enclosure, and when she was among the flowers, both her shadow and that of the flowers were thrown on the screen. Turning around to look at the screen she said to me: 'The fascinating appearance of the chrysanthemum has been fully defined; but how about my slender figure?' On recalling it today the whole captivating scene rose vividly before my eyes as if in a picture.” Ibid.,
When the patrols sent out to arrest the Prince of Yi returned to Shuangdian, for instance, one of their officers noticed some characters painted on the wall of the local temple of Guandi which warned of a “suspicious guest” observed in the household of a man named Wu Xintian. His curiosity piqued, the Qing officer went to the Wu household, where he was struck by the impudence of the family tutor, a man named Xu Yuanbo. Xu was taken into custody and thoroughly interrogated. It emerged that his father, Xu Zhiqing, had been a Ming official. When the first Qing forces entered Shuangdian district in August, 1645, however, the father had told his son that he must shave his forehead and accept the Manchus’ rule. Xu Yuanbo had dutifully complied. Shortly after that, the young scholar became a tutor in the Wu household, where he had access to the family library and its accounts of Chinese martial heroes. Inspired by these tales of heroic chivalry and Confucian righteousness, Xu Yuanbo secretly tattooed three loyalist slogans on his body: “Shame not for our dynasty” on his chest, “I was born a man of the Ming” on his right arm, and “I will die for the spirits of the Ming” on his left arm. He kept these tattoos concealed, hiding his loyalist sympathies from his employers. Just before the Huai’an attack, however, his slogans had been seen by several prying Wu children as he was taking off his clothes to bathe himself. News of these tattoos had spread from the children in the family compound to the adults, and someone—perhaps a jealous servant—had therefore written the phrase on the Guandi temple that alerted the Qing patrol.115

pp. 56–57. After her death (many people thought she had actually been carried away by the Shunzhi Emperor), Mao Xiang was recommended for office repeatedly, but he refused each time. Instead, he fell in love with other concubines, entertained frequently, published his own poetry, and patronized younger artists like the painters Cai Han and Jin Yue. Chen Weisong, the son of Chen Zhenhui, lived many years with Mao, studying there. Among the actors in Mao’s troupe was a handsome boy named Xu Ziyun. Mao placed the youth in Chen’s custody, and his verses praising the actor’s performances became famous in China’s literature. Zhang Lüxiang, Chongding Yangyuan xiansheng guanji, pp. xiii–xiv; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 103, 496, 566.

115 Ming-Qing shiliao, p. 99.
The Qing censor in charge of this case was particularly concerned about Xu Yuanbo’s connections with other loyalists. Had he been secretly in touch with other pro-Ming elements in the region? Xu insisted that he had not, and so it was reported to Yangzhou. The censor was so concerned, however, that he himself went to Rugao to interrogate the suspect in person. He had been suspicious, for instance, of the tattoos themselves. How could Xu have so inscribed his own body? Must he not have had the help of others? Only after seeing how awkwardly drawn were the tattoos was the censor persuaded that Xu had indeed acted alone. But once that fear was allayed, the censor still felt that Xu’s crime had to be severely punished. As he memorialized to Beijing:

After the Qing dynasty was established and violence and death were eradicated, all of the masses sensed our virtue and were converted to us. How could this rebellious creature, Xu Yuanbo, dare to cast himself out of our divine era, and dare to reject our august magnificence and magnanimous bounty? At first he concealed [his evil intent] by cutting his hair. But then, by insanely scratching such words upon himself, he revealed his rebellious nature. How can we possibly refuse to behead him? His wife, née Zhu, should be made the chattel of some meritorious official. His property should be confiscated. And even though his father lives elsewhere and knows nothing of this, treacherous conspiracy is not limited by differences of locale and principles cannot be bent.116

So even Xu Yuanbo’s father—who was not in the least implicated—should be punished as well because of the heinous quality of the crime.

Qing Suspicions

There thus developed during the winter of 1647–1648 a growing suspicion on the part of some Qing leaders that erstwhile collabo-

116 Ibid., p. 100. The censor’s name was Sheng Fuxuan. There was an uprising in Chao district at about that same time when scholars who had already shaved their heads reverted to Ming loyalism. Ibid., pp. 108–109, 111–119.
rators were secretly harboring reasonable sentiments. This suspicion extended even to high officials responsible for the suppression of Ming loyalist activities, like Yang Shengyuan (who was soon removed from office for “carelessness in handling defense matters”) and Hong Chengchou (who was already under a cloud because of intercepted letters from Huang Binqing). Hong was shortly to become even more gravely compromised. In October, 1647, at just about the same time that the attack on Huai’an was taking place, guards at the gates of Nanjing stopped a Buddhist monk leaving the city and asked to see his passport. The priest produced a restricted passport signed and sealed by Hong Chengchou. Perhaps because of the restrictions on the passport, the guards demanded that the monk open his baggage. When he did so the soldiers found several suspicious looking documents. Upon examination they turned out to be a letter from the Hongguang Emperor to Ruan Dacheng, along with correspondence indicating that loyalists in the far south were in touch with Viceroy Hong Chengchou in Nanjing.

The monk’s name was Hanke. The first character, Han, indicated that he had been ordained by Daodu, the famous abbot of Guizong Temple in Nankang (Jiangxi). Daodu was also the teacher of the Cantonese monk Hanshi, many of whose Chan disciples were Guangdong loyalists. As boys, Hanshi and Hanke

117 At this time, there was also considerable friction between the local inhabitants of Jiangnan and the Manchu banner troops garrisoning that area. The zongdu, Ma Guozhu, is said to have alleviated these tensions by disciplinary measures, but there may have been enough popular discontent at the time to keep some loyalist hopes alive. Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 1839 (112:33a).
118 Shizu shilu, 34:12. See Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 124.
119 Peng Guodong, Qing shi wenyan zhi, p. 1; Xie, Nanming shilüe, p. 93; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, p. 494.
120 Chen Botao, Sheng chao Yuedong yimin lu, 3:28b; Wang Zongyan, Tianran heshang nianpu, passim; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, pp. 491–494. Out of a total of 266 biographies of Cantonese loyalists contained in Chen, Sheng chao Yuedong yimin lu, and Qu Dajun, Huang Ming sichao, 40 of the loyalists became monks during the wars of resistance in the south. Of these 40, 27 “served” Hanshi as Buddhist devotees. That these were mainly all gentry leaders can be derived from the high status of the group. Of the 40 loyalist monks, 22 were zhusheng, 3 gongsheng, 4 juren, and 2 jinshi. In other
had been very close friends. Then, before he took the tonsure, Hanke's name had been Han Zonglai.¹²¹ His family had sacrificed many to the anti-Manchu cause, an uncle and three of Hanke's brothers having already died as loyalists.¹²²

The correspondence linking Hong Chengchou with southern loyalists did not in itself incriminate the viceroy as a secret agent of the Southern Ming cause. However, the very possibility of a connection between Nanjing's leading collaborator and Guangdong loyalist circles was, especially at this time, a frightening thought to the Qing court. In early August, 1647, the two major loyalist leaders of Guangdong, Chen Zizhuang and Chen Bangyan, had arranged to coordinate a number of uprisings in the Pearl River delta designed to draw the Qing commander Li Chengdong out of Guangzhou.¹²³ When Li Chengdong did leave the city to come to the defense of Xin'an, leaving Guangzhou exposed, Chen Zizhuang attacked the city behind him.¹²⁴ Meanwhile Cheng Bangyan had carefully positioned his own troops and ships between Li Chengdong and Guangzhou, at a place called Yuzhuzhou, and when Li's junks arrived there, a battle was fought. The first stage

words, over ten percent of the important loyalists of Guangdong during the Ming-Qing transition became disciples of the monk Hanshi. The famous essayist and poet Qu Dajun was also a disciple of Hanshi. See also Struve, "Uses of History," pp. 95–96; Shore, "Last Court," p. 59.
¹²¹ Xie, Dangshe yundong, pp. 243–249.
¹²³ Li's initial military task was to invest the loyalist forces at Guilin, which he attacked in April, 1647. At that time, Chen Bangyan and the brigand Yu Long attacked Guangzhou, while Zhang Jiayu (a Hanlin bachelor blacklisted for serving Li Zicheng) led an uprising in Dongguan. Viceroy Tong Yangjia, then in command in Guangzhou, urgently requested Li Chengdong to drop the siege of Guilin and rescue Guangzhou. After Li returned to eastern Guangdong, he killed Yu Long and drove back Zhang Jiayu to Huizhou, then occupied Guangzhou which he now protected. Struve, "Sketch of Southern Ming Events," pp. 13–16; Bowra, "Conquest of Canton," p. 89; Struve, "Uses of History," p. 22; idem., "Southern Ming," pp. 69–71; Zha, Dongshan guoyu, pp. 76–77; Shore, "Last Court," pp. 71, 77–78.
of the encounter was a success for the loyalists. Chen Bangyan’s firecrafts drifted into Li Chengdong’s fleet, setting many vessels on fire, and the loyalists exacted a heavy toll. Then a line squall struck both sets of vessels. In spite of Chen’s claims to superior seamanship, however, Li Chengdong’s captains turned the situation around by regrouping their vessels and sailing downwind upon the Ming forces which turned and ran before them. The battle was decisive. Although Chen Bangyan fled to Qingyuan (about sixty kilometers north-northwest of Guangzhou), Li Chengdong moved steadily after him, destroying militia units and taking towns along the way. On November 25, 1647, Chen Zizhuang was captured at Gaoming, and taken back to Guangzhou to be executed on December 1.

The battle was decisive. Although Chen Bangyan fled to Qingyuan (about sixty kilometers north-northwest of Guangzhou), Li Chengdong moved steadily after him, destroying militia units and taking towns along the way. On November 25, 1647, Chen Zizhuang was captured at Gaoming, and taken back to Guangzhou to be executed on December 1. By then Li Chengdong had besieged Qingyuan, blowing open the city wall with gunpowder and entering it with his twenty thousand men. A hero to the end, Chen Bangyan, wounded thrice, penned his epitaph in a friend’s quiet garden:

No fists, no braves left. No rations, no soldiers.
Bonded with mountains and sea, I swore to help restore [the Ming].
Fate gave us no help. We were entangled in misfortune.
One thousand autumns hence, let this solitary inscription give witness.

125 The August-September, 1647 Canton uprising is recounted in detail in Liang Fu, Lingnan lishi renwu conglan, pp. 96–105; Chen, Sheng chao Yue dong yimin lu, shengfu, 5:126ff.; Qu, Huang Ming sichao, juan 10; Huang Zongxi, Xing chao lu, 2:3b–4a.
126 Qu Qimei, Yue you jianwen, p. 48. Zhang Jiayu was killed in early November at Zengcheng. Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 71; Zha, Dongshan guoyu, p. 79.
127 Liang, Lingnan lishi renwu, p. 105. Shore gives these as Chen Bangyan’s last words: “Heaven’s created, ah, these many troubles, / I am at the water margins [and making my last stand] / As a scholar [playing with] many martial strategies. / Time, alas, is not with me. / After me, ah, what will happen? / [At this point] my person, ah, suffers alone / On Mount Yai [where the Southern Song loyalists made their last stand against the Mongols in 1279] examples of loyal spirits dwell, / Shining in glory through the ages.” Shore, “Last Court,” p. 80.
Chen then tried to drown himself in a pond, but the water was too shallow. Lying in a swoon there, he was taken by Qing troops. Five days later he died the "lingering death," and the 1647 uprising had ended.\footnote{128}

But none of this was foreordained when Hanke was captured over two months earlier at the city gate of Nanjing. The document he carried suggested to Bashan and Dorgon, as well, that Hong had been communicating with Cantonese loyalists, and that perhaps another union between Jiangnan literati and southern resisters was in the making. Of course, there was always the chance that this document, too, was designed to sow suspicion. However, it soon became known that the monk Hanke’s father was Han Rizuan, the former Minister of Rites. And Han Rizuan, as many well knew, had been Hong Chengchou’s examination supervisor. Consequently, after conducting the interrogation of four of Hanke’s own disciples (who turned out to be quite innocent themselves), Viceroy Hong memorialized the throne, acknowledging his personal connections with the monk and avowing that he had conferred a passport upon him.

The criminal monk Hanke is the son of my former teacher when I sat for the metropolitan examinations: Han Rizuan, who was once the Ming Minister of Rites. It is many years since he left his family. In the first lunar month of 1645 he came to Jiangning from Guangdong to print sutras. Then the Grand Army came to pacify the south, and the roads to Guangdong were blocked so that he could not return. He stayed for a long time in the capital. I was in Jiangnan, but I never set eyes upon him. Now because the roads to Guangdong are open, he was to return to his village and asked me for a passport. I gave him a written passport, but the restrictions on it were extremely severe. Therefore, when he left by the city gate he was searched. In his trunk there was the draft of a letter from the Prince of Fu to Ruan Dacheng. The characters failed to avoid taboo [words]. There was also a document recording rebellion, which involved current affairs. Hanke did not actually carry out [sedition] in person, but he brought this transgression upon himself. I have been connected with Hanke’s family for generations and it is difficult to

avoid suspicion. I dare not trust my own judgment when it comes to [deciding] whether the nature of the crime is severe or light.  

Hong Chengchou concluded by saying that he would send the original passport issued to Hanke to the Inner Courts in Beijing, and that he would remand the monk’s case to the appropriate board.  

The appropriate bodies in the capital had no doubt about the gravity of the matter. When Hanke arrived in Beijing guarded by Bashan’s men, his case was carefully reviewed. Although there was no evidence that Hanke was a conspirator, his diary contained several anti-Manchu passages, for which he was sentenced to life-long exile in Liaodong. Meanwhile, the throne issued a rescript which read: “Hong Chengchou displayed the partiality of a disciple to his teacher and presumptuously used his imperial orders to grant a passport. This was extremely unreasonable. Let the appropriate offices all memorialize.” The various boards thereupon discussed the case and agreed that Hong Chengchou’s punishment should be severe; they recommended that he be stripped of all his ranks and dismissed from office.  

Any other official would have been promptly punished, but Hong more than any other single figure symbolized the steadfast service of southern collaborators with the regime. To dismiss him so publicly would mean exposing the suspicion of treason among the highest ranks of the dynasty’s Han adherents. Dorgon therefore decided for the moment to ignore the recommendation of the Board of Personnel, and pardoned Hong Chengchou. Almost si-

129 Peng, *Qing shi wenyan zhi*, p. 1. The memorial was dated December 11, 1647.  
130 Ibid.  
131 Chen, *Sheng chao Yuedong yimin lu*, 1:54–55. In Shenyang, Hanke formed the Frosty Weather Poetry Club (Bingtian shishe) with other exiled loyalists. Later he became abbot of the Dragon Spring Temple (Longquan si) on Mt. Qian in Liaoyang, where his sermons attracted other political exiles from all over the northeast. By the time he died in 1660, the temple had developed into a great Buddhist center. Goodrich and Fang, *Ming Biography*, p. 494.  
133 Ibid.
multaneously, Hong's mother fell ill, and he applied immediately for a leave-of-absence to care for her. The furlough was granted, and as Lekedehun succeeded him in the viceroyalty to Nanjing, Hong temporarily bowed out of the Qing government's service.  

Loyalist Hopes Revived and Crushed

During the fall and early winter of 1647 the pacification of Jiangnan continued; and like north China, the lower reaches of the Yangzi experienced a temporary lull. All of that suddenly changed early in 1648 when two of the former Ming officials upon whom the Qing government had depended to govern the south rebelled, one after the other in February and May. The first to revolt was Jin Shenghuan, the former Ming general who had completed the Qing conquest of Jiangxi. General Jin, expecting high honors and a free hand in the province, had become upset when he was only

134 Qing shi gao, Hong Chengchou's biography, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 127–128. Hong Chengchou had earlier, on March 30, 1647, requested mourning leave. Although his father had passed away on November 8, 1643, Hong did not learn of this until a servant from the family home in Quanzhou prefecture made his way to Nanjing on March 25, 1647, and told the viceroy the sad news. See the memorial by Hong Chengchou in the Beijing University collection cited in Li, "Hong Chengchou," p. 247. Presumably permission was not granted by Dorgon on that occasion. At that time, Hong Chengchou's mother was still at home in Fujian. On July 29, Hong received word that his mother had left home and was staying over in Suzhou. On August 4, 1647, she reached Nanjing. According to Hong's memorial of thanks to the throne for employing him as an official in Jiangnan, when he saw his mother (who was nearly 80 and quite frail) and when she saw him (his hair having turned white in the interim), both burst into tears. Ming-Qing shiliao, 1:509, dated August 10, 1647, and cited in Ibid., p. 246. This account of their meeting seems to belie popular (and perhaps apocryphal) accounts of their meeting in the capital later, when she berated him for being a turncoat (see chapter 13). According to another memorial, Hong Chengchou's mother was with him in the capital when he moved to Beijing after his resignation was accepted. The memorial is not dated, but from internal evidence it appears to have been written in 1648. Ming-Qing shiliao, 3:130, cited in Ibid., pp. 247–248.
given the title of regional commander and placed under the supervision of a Manchu governor-general.\textsuperscript{135} Egged on by a Daoist priest as well as by a former follower of Li Zicheng nicknamed “Piebald Wang” (Wang Zamao—actually Wang Deren), Jin Shenghuan revolted on February 22, 1648, killing the Qing civil governor and declaring his allegiance to the Yongli Emperor.\textsuperscript{136} Jin quickly attracted the support of several leading Southern Ming loyalists like Jiang Yueguang and Qiu Zude, and established his hegemony over northern Jiangxi while laying siege to Ganzhou in the southern region of the province.\textsuperscript{137}

Li Chengdong, conqueror of Guangdong, was also offended when he was only named regional commander under the watchful eye of Tong Yangjia, viceroy of the Liangguang. Like Jin Shenghuan, Li resented the Qing method of appointing Manchu or Han bannermen to positions where they could act as a check against these newer adherents. Tong Yangjia did not make the arrangement any easier to accept because, as an “old man” and close confidant of leading Manchu princes like Bolo, Tong felt that he could afford to act quite arrogantly toward Li Chengdong. Li’s ruffled pride was further inflamed by the incitement he was secretly receiving from his concubine, who was formerly the concubine of Chen Zizhuang and who remained a staunch Ming loyalist after Li had seized her and forced her to become his wife. Consequently, in May, 1648, when Tong Yangjia ordered Li Chengdong to take his army north and relieve the pressure on Ganzhou, Li mutinied.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{135} Dong Ming wenjian lu, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{136} Wang Deren, who had been impeached for his homicidal brutality, forced Jin Shenghuan’s hand. On February 20–21, his men in Nanchang imprisoned the Qing governor, murdered the regional inspector, and cut off their queues. Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 77–78.
\textsuperscript{138} Shore, “Last Court,” pp. 89–90.
Tong Yangjia was at first forced to go back to wearing Ming dress, and then five months later he was killed when he secretly tried to contact the Qing government. The Yongli Emperor, who had sought refuge in Nanning, was invited back to Zhaoqing, where he set up court on September 20, 1648, making Li Chengdong a duke; and at the same time other Yongli generals in southern Huguang, under He Tengjiao, were encouraged to retake a number of important garrisons. By October, 1648, most of the south was in the hands of Southern Ming loyalists, and Qing authority was confined to a few enclaves in Guangdong and southern Jiangxi, especially Ganzhou.

The Southern Ming resurgence, however, subsided nearly as

139 Hua Fuli, the scholar-official who left such a vivid diary of these events, wrote: “At the very end of the fourth moon [i.e., about May 21, 1648], Li Chengdong suddenly reversed his opposition to the Ming court, sending three men—Hong Tianzhuo, Pan Zengwei, and Li Qi—to present an invitation welcoming the [imperial] carriage. On July 29, 1648, the carriage of the Yongli Emperor descended to Zhaoqing. At that time in Nanning city I once again heard the wild fowl crow at the second [drum of the] night watch. I made up my mind to descend eastward, but what a hardship without a boat!” However, Hua—after having his luggage robbed—managed to use a friend’s boat to sail down the West River into Guangdong. “All day, all night—the drumming oars descending for 3,000 li. When we passed Zhaoqing I heard in the night the sound of war drums. A voice called out, ‘This is the imperial barge.’ At first I did not believe it. The next day I saw it and it was indeed [the barge]!” Hua Fuli, Liangguang jilüe, pp. 73–74. See also Liang, Lingnan lishi renwu, p. 117.

140 Tsao Kai-fu, “The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories against the Manchu Throne in China,” pp. 42–45; Struve, “Uses of History,” pp. 23–24; idem, “Sketch of Southern Ming Events,” pp. 20–21; idem, “Southern Ming,” pp. 79–80. The Southern Ming resurgence inspired the retired Qing collaborator Qian Qianyi secretly to write to his former disciple Qu Shisi, who was a leading minister at the Yongli court. In the letter, Qian claimed that, though he had served the Manchus, “never for an instant had he forgotten our dynasty.” Comparing the empire to a chess board, he urged Qu to bring the Ming court back to Nanjing. He also provided Qu with information as to which generals on the Qing side might be about to surrender, and suggested bribing them: “In the present situation we must not be stingy in breaking precedents of reward in order to encourage their spirit of loyalty and righteousness, and discourage their willingness to work for the Manchus.” Cited in Shore, “Last Court,” pp. 167–168.
rapidly as it had risen. Ganzhou did not fall to the Ming loyalists. Instead, rapidly massing its forces in central China, the Qing court sent two powerful military columns into the south. Through Huguang came a mixed Mongol-Manchu-Han force of thirty thousand troops under Kong Youde, Jirgalang, and Lekedehun.141 Through Jiangxi, bearing down upon Jin Shenghuan immured in Nanchang and Li Chengdong in northern Guangdong, came the other wing of the southern military expedition, which was commanded by Tantai, Holhoi, Shang Kexi, and Geng Zhongming. On March 1, 1649, Nanchang fell; and Jin Shenghuan, who was wounded, drowned himself in a pond.142 The following month, Li Chengdong, who had steadily been losing men, accidentally drowned while fording a river near Xinfeng.143 Meanwhile, in Huguang, Kong Youde and his column closed with He Tengjiao, whom they captured and killed at Xiangtan. By November, 1649, Huguang was securely under Qing control once more.144 Through the early months of 1650, most of northern Guangdong was overrun. The Yongli Emperor and his court fled west to Wuzhou, and eventually via Nanning to Guizhou. Finally, on November 24, 1650, after a harsh ten-month siege involving extra embattlements, a special wooden assault castle, and Dutch gunners, Guangzhou fell to Shang Kexi.145 During the following ten days the city was

141 Shizu shilu, 27:327a. Jirgalang—whose advance was slowed by Chuang remnants under Li Chixin—administered what was euphemistically called “heavy punishment” to the city of Xiangtan. He ordered a six-days massacre, and even after he commanded his soldiers to sheathe their weapons, they continued to slaughter for another three days. Half a month later, Wang Hui, a member of the local gentry, entered the city, which reeked nauseatingly of death. Corpses filled the streets, which were stained with blood, and no more than a hundred survivors (including many who were critically wounded) remained. Gu Cheng, “Lun Qingchu shehui maodun,” p. 145. See also Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 89–90.

142 Zha, Dongshan guoyu, p. 52.

143 Dong Ming wenjian lu, p. 27. See also Hua, Liangguang jilüe, p. 74.

144 The province, which was terribly depopulated, did not have the resources to support He’s armies, along with remnants of Li Zicheng, Zhang Xianzhong, and Zuo Liangyu’s armies. Shore, “Last Court,” pp. 37–39.

145 Shang had 73 cannons of his own, plus abundant muskets and gunpowder. Ibid., pp. 183–184.
pillaged, and as many as seventy thousand people were killed. The huge funeral pyre of corpses which burned for days outside the east gate of the city—and which was still visible as a mound of congealed ashes in the 19th century—signalled the end of a true Ming restoration in many loyalists' eyes.  

Nevertheless, the military supporters of the Prince of Lu along the southeastern coast continued to try to establish links with whatever remnants there were of the loyalist circles in Jiangnan that had participated in the tragic 1647 uprising. The leading figure behind much of this activity was the sealord Zhang Mingzhen. After the failure of the 1647 expedition, Zhang had rebuilt his navy and established a base at Shacheng, on the Zhejiang-Fujian border. This became the headquarters of Regent Lu's regime, whence raids were carried out along the coast as far as Jiangnan. In July, 1649, Zhang decided to move the center of his activities even farther north, and by August he and the Prince of Lu had ensconced themselves at Jiantiaosuo on the Zhejiang coast between Haimen and Ningbo. There, Zhang began again to make plans for combining an invasion of Jiangnan by sea with an uprising ashore.  

Many of the gentry loyalists who had hoped for a similar com-
bined attack in 1647 were now either dead or in internal exile. Consequently, the Ming loyalists at the Lu court had to turn to a much less prominent social stratum: lower-ranking gentry, adventurers, monks, even bandits. Investing loyalists from Jiangnan with seals of silver or letters of commission, the court of Lu would send these envoys back into Qing-occupied territory as secret agents to contact other sympathizers and prepare for an uprising. If the persons contacted proved to be amenable, then they in turn were invested with a military rank via the letter of commission by the envoy himself. Unfortunately for the Ming loyalists, this was not a very secure way of organizing an armed rebellion. When one Luo Guangyao contacted a number of local magnates and bandit chiefs in the Haizhou area of northern Jiangsu, preparing for a combined land and sea attack on Tianjin in the summer of 1649, the plot was discovered and Luo was arrested. His seizure and subsequent interrogation by officials from the Board of War uncovered other conspirators in the Jiangnan and Jiangbei areas. News of this conspiracy must have alarmed the court in Beijing, but it also considerably set back plans at the Lu court for sending a maritime expedition north. It is quite telling to observe that a number of Ming princes in Jiangnan surrendered in 1649 in exchange for amnesties. See the memorial from Ma Guozhu dated September 22, 1649, in Gugong bowuyuan, Qingdai dang'an shiliao congbian, fascicle 3, pp. 101–105.

150 Report from the Board of War. The first portion of the document is missing, and the memorialist's name is not given. From internal evidence, the document seems to date from the spring of 1649. Nanming shiliao, pp. 151–158. The Haizhou area with its households of fishermen and salt makers was very difficult for the Qing authorities to control. Wu Weihua, the viceroy in charge of the Grand Canal zone, had put down rebellions in Ganyu (led by a monk named Li Er) and around Huai'an (led by Zhu Can and Gao Liu) in October, 1648, but the coastal villagers remained a serious problem. They were quick to form gangs and to slip back and forth along the coast to Shandong. Around Mt. Yuntai, a peasant army led by Gao Jinzhong and Feng Baoguo allied itself with the Elm Garden Army of Shandong, and on April 17, 1649, attacked and took Haizhou, killing the top officials there. The city was retaken, but the Yuntai band mainly escaped. Haizhou zhi [Haizhou gazetteer], juan 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 126; Nanming shiliao, pp. 120–121; Shizu shilu, 45:525b.
The Southern Ming’s hopes for a maritime offensive were also dashed for the time being by a falling out between the two rivals Zhang Mingzhen and Huang Binqing. Huang, who controlled the island of Zhoushan, was finally, in October, 1649, betrayed by one of his generals to Zhang and subsequently committed suicide. But once this struggle was over, Zhang Mingzhen again made plans for fomenting an uprising in the north. Transferring his headquarters, and the Prince of Lu, to Zhoushan Island on November 23, 1649, Zhang again encouraged dissidents in Jiangnan to plan for an uprising. This time the main contacts were provided by a monk from Jiaxing named Mao Yuanzhai. On March 13, 1650, Mao and six other Ming loyalists held a meeting in an empty pavilion on the estate of an old official named Han Gongshu. At that meeting they held religious worship, and then together swore an oath to rebel. Ten days later, two of the men—Mao Yuanzhai and Wu Yongzhi—left for Zhoushan, where they were given an audience by the Prince of Lu and commissioned as Southern Ming officers. Wu Yongzhi remained at the court of Lu, but Mao Yuanchai returned to the mainland with special letters of commission and proceeded to contact his original cell of loyalists while at the same time discussing plans for an uprising with the others.

Meanwhile, Zhang Mingzhen prepared and then launched a naval expedition to southern Jiangsu, taking along with him the Prince of Lu. Quite by coincidence, a Qing force led by Chen Jin was at that time sweeping through the Siming Hills, clearing east-

152 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 47. The general was named Wang Chaoxian. Zhang Mingzhen had been trying to get control of Zhoushan for some time. At this time his military headquarters at Jiantiaosuo was running out of supplies. Struve, "Uses of History," p. 20; idem, "Southern Ming," pp. 102–103.

153 This is a report from the anchashi of Jiangnan province after the rebellion was uncovered and the conspirators had been interrogated. It is enclosed in a memorial from the xun'an of the Su-Song circuit, Qin Shizhen. The memorial is dated November 18, 1652. Namming shiliao, pp. 290–299. Jiangnan was changed from a special imperial district into a province on August 18, 1651, at the behest of the Board of War, which for military purposes thought that there should be a unified provincial headquarters, instead of an upriver (shangjiang) and downriver (xiajiang) command. Shizu shilu, 58:3b.
ern Zhejiang of loyalist bands. On October 15, 1651, Chen Jin’s soldiers took the Zhoushan Islands’ main defenses, which were betrayed to them by some of Huang Binqings former lieutenants.154 Most of the members of Zhang Mingzhens family were killed; and Zhang, having lost his base, had to sail to Xiamen (Amoy) with the prince and seek the protection of Zheng Cheng-gong.155 At the same time in Jiangnan to the north, one of the men to whom Mao Yuanchai had given a letter of commission from the court of Lu turned coat and betrayed the entire network of conspirators to the Qing authorities in Suzhou. The letter of commission which this man handed over to the Qing officials included a plan for attacking Nanjing and leading a northern expedition (beifa) to Beijing; it was sealed with the chop of Zhang Mingzhen. By April, 1652, all of the conspirators had been rounded up, and the loyalists were completely foiled.156

Wan Shouqi and Gu Yanwu

As peace returned to Jiangnan and Jiangbei, the residents there slowly began to rebuild their lives.157 In 1648, the painter Wan

155 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 47; Struve, “Uses of History,” p. 20. Zheng had just accepted enfeoffment as a duke from the Yongli Emperor. After Zhang Mingzhens weakened forces were incorporated into the forces of Zheng Chenggong (who accepted the authority of the Yongli Emperor in principle), the Prince of Lu, perhaps in 1653, renounced his regental title and established his residence on Jinmen (Quemoy) Island. He died there nine years later. Zha Jizuo, Lu chunqiu, p. 75; Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 102–105.
156 Nanming shiliao, pp. 290–291.
157 Governor Tu Guobao’s policy of directly sponsoring economic reconstruction was continued by other officials throughout these years, especially in the Jiangnan region’s textile industries. The first Manchu administrator of the textile industry and superintendents of the imperial silk works were appointed to office in 1646. They immediately selected reasonably well-to-do families in Suzhou, Songjiang, and Changzhou prefectures to be loom households. The existing weaving facilities were repaired and expanded (in Su-
Shouqi had decided to move out of his “rundown little alley” and had taken his family to Puxi, about 35 li from Huai’an near Lake Hongze. There he built a studio for his family called the “Grass Hut West of the Marshes” (Xi xi cao tang). The studio was entirely surrounded by water.\textsuperscript{158} Less than a year after moving to Puxi, Wan returned briefly to Jiangnan, paying a visit of respect to the tomb of the Ming founder.\textsuperscript{159} He also visited the heirs of his close friend, the collaborator Huang Jiarui, who had been killed during the 1645 Songjiang uprising. Returning to Huai’an from Xuzhou by boat, Wan settled in at Puxi once again. Though his health was declining, his fortune was improving. His painting and calligraphy were much in demand, and like the famous 16th-century Suzhou painter Tang Yin (zi Ziwei), he enjoyed living off his art works: “Me, I am like Tang Ziwei, who said, ‘In my spare time I paint blue mountains to sell, for I will not use money unfairly acquired in the vulgar world.’”\textsuperscript{160} He was now able to buy some property south of the “Grass Hut West of the Marshes” and there he built a garden, which he called Nan cun (Southern Garden) to evoke the memory of the poetic recluse Tao Yuanming.\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{158} Wan Shouqi, \textit{Xi xi caotang ji}, 1:20b–21a.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 3:3b–4a.
\textsuperscript{160} Michele Pirazzoli and Hou Ching-lang, “Un Rouleau de Wan Shouqi,” pp. 157–158. Tang Yin (1470–1523), whose personal seal read, “Foremost Rake South of the Yangzi River” (\textit{jiangnan di yi fengliu caizi}), was considered one of the four best painters of the Ming. Goodrich and Fang, \textit{Ming Biography}, pp. 1256–1258.
In the studio and garden at Puxi, Wan Shouqi gathered around him those friends who had survived the debacle of the late 1640s in Jiangnan. Hu Yanyuan, the famous Zhejiang calligrapher, joined this circle which often met for poetry contests, and those who failed to match the rhymes bought the others wine and food. Wan Shouqi’s later writings thus abound with references to old friends, accounts of visits to former teachers, tales of visits to the tombs of dead loyalists, and descriptions of poetry composition and painting beside the water’s edge.

Wan Shouqi’s paintings were in high demand but not easily acquired. The 19th-century calligrapher He Shaoji wrote in a colophon (1852) to one of these:

The paintings of Shou daoren [which was one of Wan Shouqi’s studio names] are rare. They are generally spontaneously done in dry ink and with a sparse brush. He often drew his retreat, “Grass Hut West of the Marshes,” for his friends. I do not know the scenery there myself, and I imagine it as stripped bare as in his painting. Once, when I was in the capital, I was able to see a scroll by him, “Qiu jiang song bie tu” [Picture of a parting on the autumnal river], done for Gu Yanwu, who, while transporting rice by boat, stopped on the way to visit him. Wan offered him this painting when Gu left.

162 Lists of these names can be found in Wan, Xi xi caotang ji, 1:25a; 2:19a, 24a. Wan’s circle included Zhou Lianggong, Fang Yizhi, Qian Qianyi, and the Xin’an painter Cheng Sui, who wrote a famous poem about visiting Wan at the “Grass Hut West of the Marshes.” Zhuo Erkan, comp., Ming yimin shi, pp. 323–324. See also Scarlett Jang, “Cheng Sui,” p. 111.

163 See, e.g., Wan, Xi xi caotang ji, 2:10b, 25a, where his name appears as Hu Jie.

164 He Shaoji, transl. in Pirazzoli and Hou, “Wan Shouqi,” p. 160. The colophon is dated 1852. He (1799–1873) was a member of a famous family of Suzhou painters. After a court career in the Hanlin and as a proctor in the Historiographical Office, He returned to Suzhou where he was a well known calligrapher. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 287. Wan Shouqi’s paintings are thought by some art historians to be very representative of the “dry linear style” characteristic of much yimin (remnant Ming loyalists) brushwork. Fu Shen, “An Aspect of Mid-Seventeenth Century Chinese Painting,” p. 609. For the motivations and motifs of yimin painters in the early Qing, see especially Ellen Johnston Laing, “Wen Tien and Chin Chün-ming.”
The famous scroll which Wan Shouqi painted for Gu Yanwu was, as the colophon states, done during Gu’s visit to Wan Shouqi in 1651.\textsuperscript{165}

In 1651 Gu Yanwu was 39 sui. That summer he had paid one of his repeated visits to the Xiaoling tomb in Jinling (Nanjing). It was very common for former Ming loyalists to visit the Ming tombs, but for Gu Yanwu this was one of six visits to the tomb of the Ming founder, and there would be another four visits to the Siling tomb of the Chongzhen Emperor in the north.\textsuperscript{166} His obsession

\textsuperscript{165} Luo Zhenyu, \textit{Wan Nianshao xiansheng nianpu, wanpu}, p. 11b. The painting was entitled “Qiu jiang bie si” (Parting thoughts on the autumnal river). Wan’s own colophon reads in part: “Seeing off the master (xiansheng) as he crosses the river at Huaiyin returning to Tangshi.” Wan also refers to Gu by one of his given names (Guinian) in the colophon. Zhang Mu, \textit{Gu Tinglin xiansheng nianpu}, p. 1. During the 1920s, the historian Xie Guozhen saw a painting of a boat in the home of his teacher, Liang Qichao. The painting belonged to a collector named Yu Yueyuan and was stored in his household. On the painting was a colophon explaining that the painting was given by Wan Shouqi to Gu Yanwu in exchange for a poem. Liang Qichao had also added a colophon to the painting. Xie Guozhen, \textit{Gu Ningren xuepu}, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{166} Zhang Tingrong, \textit{Qing chu si da shi shengming zhi xue}, p. 47. See also Willard J. Peterson, “The Life of Ku Yen-wu, Part II,” pp. 209, 243. For an example of a typical loyalist visit to the Ming tombs, see Gu Yanwu, \textit{Tinglin shi wen ji, Tinglin shiji}, 4:18b. After Dodo took Nanjing, the Manchus designated two eunuchs to guard over the Xiaoling (the tomb of Hongwu). Before then, the tomb was quite dilapidated. There is now to be found near the tumbled \textit{pailou} in Nanjing that marks the approach to the tomb a stele containing an edict from Chongzhen dated 1641. The edict warns people who defile the area, as it has been defiled and damaged in recent years, that they will be severely punished. Under the Qing forty households from a village nearby were attached to the eunuchs to take care of the tomb. Gaillard, \textit{Nankin}, p. 237. According to Willard Peterson, Gu Yanwu probably bribed these eunuch guards in order to visit the tomb. (Private communication.) In 1660 Gu wrote a poem about his visits to the Hongwu and Yongle Emperors’ tombs: “How long is my acquaintance with these eunuchs and monks guarding the gates? / Gazing at me, they wonder why this man comes so often, / And ask: ‘What business have you that brings you over these three thousand miles, / Visiting Changling in spring and Xiaoling in autumn?’” Kojiro Yoshikawa, “Political Disengagement in Seventeenth Century Chinese Literature,” p. 10.
The polymath Gu Yanwu (1613–1682). Ye Gongchuo, comp., Qingdai xuezhe xiang zhuan (Shanghai, 1930), vol. 1, ce 1.
with the mausolea and manes of the first and last Ming emperor
may have had something to do with the loyalist suicide of his
mother, whose letter to him had so emphatically enjoined: "Do
not take office under two surnames" (Wu shi er xing).\textsuperscript{167} It certainly
must have reflected Gu Yanwu's own personal sense of guilt for
simply having survived the holocaust when so many of his closest
friends and relatives had not.\textsuperscript{168} In 1647 he had written:

I think of uncles and brothers and cousins who have died in the last
two years, those in-laws and friends who have died, those who
were older than I and have died, those who were younger than I
and have died, and the number is uncountable.\textsuperscript{169}

He had had his personal travails, of course, during those years. In
1650, Gu had also written:

Having removed my hair here and there,
I took the guise of a traveling merchant.
Alas, when I think of these five years,
It has not been easy for me to live like this.
My arduous journeying took me over land and water;
My enemy is waiting at my gate.\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{167} This at least is faintly suggested in the letter which Gu wrote to the Bureau
of Historiography, recounting his mother's death for the editors of the Ming
History. "Yu Shi guan zhu jun shu" (Letter to all of their excellencies in the
Bureau of Historiography), in Gu Yanwu, Tinglin shi wen ji, Tinglin wenji,
3:12b–13a. See also Liu Shengmu, Changchu zhai suibi, 1:2b–3a; Shi Jin,
\textsuperscript{168} Such was also the reaction of the painter Chen Hongshou, who never could
forget how he had lost his nerve during the resistance. James Cahill, ed., The
Restless Landscape, pp. 146–147.
\textsuperscript{169} Peterson, "The Life of Ku Yen-wu," Part I, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p. 150. Gu Yanwu's reference to the enemy at the gate was not hyper-
bolic. At the time of his foster grandfather's (Shaofei) death in 1641, Gu had
mortgaged 800 mu of the family land to pay for the funeral. The mortgagee
was a Kunshan gentryman named Ye Fangheng, who coveted the Gu family
lands. In 1652, one of the servants of the Gu family, a man named Lu En,
joined the Ye household and agreed to accuse Gu Yanwu of supporting the
Southern Ming in order to help Ye sequester the property. In 1655, Gu was
to kill Lu En in revenge. During the following two years, Gu would be sen-
By 1651, then, he may have been eager to seek out fellow survivors with whom he could share his experiences and memories. On September 28, Gu Yanwu went to Huai’an to call upon Wan Shouqi. The two men quickly formed a close relationship.

At that time it was the usual practice to exchange a poem for a painting. Thus Gu Yanwu’s gift in return for the valuable scroll which Wan Shouqi painted for him was a long poem, composed in celebration of Wan’s years after the resistance in Songjiang had ended. Written in the semi-private language of the literati of China, the poem was a testimony from Gu—who only appears within the poem as a similarly displaced fellow traveler—to a man whose own active involvement he admired and whose very person may have represented to Gu Yanwu the actual hope of a Ming restoration.

For the Departure of Wan Shouqi the Graduate

A White Dragon changed into a fish
And fell into Yu Qie’s net.
The fisherman was too frightened to kill him
But let him continue on his long journey.
The talent of myriad generations,
Profound and pristine, noble and lively,
Must appear fettered in times of danger.

tenced to forced labor, would appeal the verdict, would be beaten and released from jail, and would have to flee Jiangnan for north China after Ye’s hired assassins tried to kill him. Ibid., pp. 154–156.

171 Zhang, Gu Tinglin xiansheng nianpu, p. 23.

172 Shortly after this, Wan Shouqi was among a number of Gu Yanwu’s close friends who signed a public notice introducing Gu to other scholars in the empire as a man of great repute, and announcing his plans to travel about, looking at rare books, antiquities, and so forth. This letter, which was brought to my attention by Ch’eng I-fan, is enclosed in “Tongzhi zeng yan” (Words sent by comrades), in Gu Yanwu, Tinglin xiansheng yishu huiji, 1888 ed., 40:1–3.

173 “Artistic activity is the means of expression of friendship. He who inscribes repays the painting with a poem, and he who paints uses (substitutes) the paint for a poem. Painting and poetry assuage longing.” Jao Tsung-i, “Painting and the Literati in the late Ming,” p. 143.
He by nature loyal, righteous and unswerving,
Angered and retired at once.
He cut his hair and changed his features,
Telling fortunes west of the river
And composing verse of enduring worth.
North and south, around Chu district,
Night and day, wheels rushing on,
He dares to spy out the north.
There are no two scholars of like talent elsewhere.
He turns back and gazes toward Pengcheng,
In former times the grounds of a hegemon.
Sometime, once again, the mists here will dissipate.
For the moment, though, the mountains and rivers are still defiled.
They came so far as to seize Nanjing,
The nine provinces in their grasp.
So you turn back your carriage to retire east of the Huai,
To compose your poems and draw close the study curtains
In memory of the former gate porter of Wu city.
In the Void you mourn the mountain spirits,
No hope for help from the south.
I, too, have fluttered here and there,
A thousand leagues along mountain paths,
In the boundlessness at least attaining some release.
We must wait until the waters of the Huai settle.
Then, in the clear autumn, I will send a boat of Wu.174

Gu Yanwu’s poem was deliberately allusive. The White Dragon was the Heavenly Emperor’s mythical pet who descended to earth in the guise of a fish. In the original myth the fisherman Yu Qie struck the dragon in the eye with an arrow, not realizing that it was a divine being. The dragon then resumed its higher incarnation and flew back to the Heavenly Emperor, crying for Yu Qie to be punished; but the Emperor refused to do so, saying that the White Dragon should not have taken such a lowly form in the first place.175

174 Gu, Tinglin shi wen ji, Tinglin shiji, 2:3a. This poem is also to be found in Gu Yanwu, Tinglin xiansheng yishu huiji, 1906 ed., Tinglin shiji [Collected poems of Tinglin], 2:3b.
175 The myth occurs in the Han period work Shuo yuan.
As Gu used the myth, however, Yu Qie was like the Manchu conquerors themselves. Having captured the White Dragon—noble Wan Shouqi—they recognized him for what he was and were “too frightened to kill” such a divine creature. And Wan himself, like the holy dragon, was let free to wander again once he had changed back to his spiritual form.\textsuperscript{176}

In his changed form, Wan Shouqi “dares to spy out the north”—a line which referred to the Tang hero Quan Gao, who carried out an important mission to the north for Emperor Xuanzong (r. 847–859) during the late Tang “restoration.” Quan Gao also returned from the north to care for his sick mother, which may be the way in which Gu Yanwu (who had not actively served in the loyalist cause for that reason) viewed Wan Shouqi’s attachment to home and hearth at this point. But though the poem clearly admitted that Wan Shouqi had thus retired from active service in the Ming cause, it also suggested two lines later that he may just have been biding his time. For, “he turns back and gazes toward Pengcheng,” the base of a “hegemon.” Pengcheng was in ancient times the name for the area just around Xuzhou, which was the seat of the hegemon of Chu, Xiang Yu, who led the attack against the Qin in 209 B.C. It may take years—Gu Yanwu seemed to be saying—for the enemy to be overthrown, but eventually the waters of the Huai would settle and: “sometime, once again, the mists here will dissipate.”

There was no question of the illegitimacy of the Qing occupation as far as Gu’s poem to Wan was concerned. Wan himself was

\textsuperscript{176} There are deeper resonances here: hints of grander outcomes. In the original myth, the White Dragon’s trip to earth is a descent “into a clear and cold abyss.” That same image of the “abyss” occurs in the explanation of the first hexagram (qian) of the Book of Changes. There the entire hexagram describes the imperial dragon, and the “abyss” itself is closely linked with 9–3, which is enjoined as the moment of supreme action when the dragon begins to come out of hiding, and prepares to ascend again. The image of an obvious dynastic rise—suggesting a new Ming dynasty—is reinforced by the reference to Chu where the rebellions against the Qin first broke out. Here, too, there is a hint that like the Qin, the Manchus are but a harsh ephemeral dynasty, imposing order after a period of anarchy though doomed to fall in a few short years.
said to draw his study curtains to compose poetry in honor of the "gate porter of Wu," which referred to Mei Fu of the Latter Han who refused to take office under Wang Mang the usurper. Mei Fu was supposed to have become an immortal; so also should Wan, without "hope for help from the south," mourn like a spirit for the defiled mountains of China. Like Gu, Wan would find in the very formlessness of his transient life the freedom they ultimately desired.

The final two lines of Gu Yanwu's poem spoke ambiguously of sending a boat for Wan once the Huai waters had settled. Was Gu Yanwu inviting Wan Shouqi to join him on his travels? Or was he hinting that the resists of Wu would rise again, and fetch Wan Shouqi for their cause when the moment came?

The Manchu conquest of China was far from completed. There would be a Southern Ming regime to look toward for more than another decade, and other Ming loyalists—however credible—years after that. Yet the occupation of Jiangnan was consolidated. One wonders, then, how Gu Yanwu could seriously have suggested that Wu would rise again. Certainly, Gu Yanwu and Wan Shouqi may have felt that the Qing dynasty was bound to be transitory. The analogy with the Yuan dynasty, as well as the Qin, was always present; and Gu Yanwu had earlier written with pointed parallels of the supposed discovery of the famous Xin shi (History of mind) in a well in Chengtian Temple in Suzhou in 1638. That rediscovered account of the Southern Song, written at the time by the painter Zheng Sixiao, had predicted that the Yuan would only last a century, or even less. Gu himself had underscored that prediction, which turned out to be true, and hence more than implied that the same would be so for the Manchus. Besides, even if the Qing did reign for awhile, as the Yuan had, the culture of China would continue to flourish and would thus survive such an intermittent period of barbarian rule.

178 The Yuan analogy was frequently made by early Qing writers. As John Lan-
But to argue for the transiency of the Qing was not at all the same as to continue calling for a genuine Ming restoration. In that sense, the sheer allusiveness, the deliberate lack of clarity, the ambiguous statements about spiritual development against the backdrop of the ambitions of Wu—all of these obscurities in Gu Yanwu’s poem to Wan Shouqí may have reflected Gu’s own private belief that while a time might come for resistance, the hope for a genuine loyalist restoration had nearly vanished. Indeed, at one point during his travels in this period, Gu Yanwu wrote of scholars who lamented the fall of the Ming: “The remnants (yimin) conceive of schemes to gain hegemony. Roaming here and there they feel such melancholy. But do not laugh at an impoverished ru.” One would hardly laugh at a man imprisoned in 1670 for writing an anti-Manchu tract, but one may at least suggest that Gu’s own restlessness, his constant traveling the length and breadth of China, reflected a longing to escape from the oppressive realization that, in actuality, the Ming was no more.

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179 Gu, Tinglin shi wen ji, Tinglin shijí, 3:1b. The term yimin, which dates back to the Book of Odes, can be translated as “remnant people.” Yimin are usually distinguished from zhong yi (loyal and righteous) who were loyalist martyrs. See Langlois, “Chinese Culturalism,” pp. 378–379.
180 On the “longing to escape from the oppression of the actual,” see Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 72. On Gu’s travels and his arrest in 1670, see Etienne Balazs, Political Theory and Administrative Reality in Traditional China, p. 31. Peterson also suggests that Gu’s loyalism was ambiguous. “The Manchu conquest provided the occasion for Ku to manifest an uncompromising stance of virtue on an externally determinable basis. . . . His refusal to take examinations under the Ch’ing may in part be interpreted as his choosing to avoid the intense social competition in which he had failed to advance as a young man. Instead, he devoted his energies to alternative means of establishing a reputation, the achievement of which could be re-
Other contemporaries seem to have reached the same conclusion, especially after the second Guangdong uprising failed in 1650. Yan Ermei, who by then had acquired a considerable public reputation as a lyricist, gave up his wanderings to settle down. He accepted the patronage of Governor Zhao Fuxing, who sent an envoy to Yan's temporary dwelling at Dahewei to invite him respectfully to be his guest. With his hair tied up in a knot under a red-tasseled hat, Yan rode to the governor's guest house with all his belongings. He wept with relief at finding a place to settle down, and summed up his present and past for himself:

Well, I'm bedded and boarded just like the good old days. A scholar should persevere and cultivate his will. People should discipline themselves to keep from rotting away. The early morning skin of garded as having been incumbent upon him as the adopted son of a paragon of virtue. Whatever his motivations, the fall of the Ming was the occasion for Ku to change his life completely." Peterson, "Ku Yen-wu, Part I," p. 152. The theme of travel as a means of escape from the present is also to be seen in the poetry of the loyalist painter Gong Xian. Zhuo, Ming yimin shi, p. 330. See also Jerome Silbergeld, "The Political Landscapes of Kung Hsien in Painting and Poetry," p. 564; idem, "Kung Hsien's Self-Portrait in Willows," pp. 7–10. Of course, travel itself was part of what we have come to think of as a literati style of life in late imperial China, especially after the 15th century. Timothy Brook, "Guides for Vexed Travelers," p. 41. Lovell has noted: "Indeed, it would be difficult to think of a society in history in which travel played as significant a role in the life of a certain social caste as it did to the educated Chinese... In a life not infrequently touched by disappointments, and partings and sudden deaths, his imagination found solace in the cosmic imagery of man as a traveler through the journey of life." Hin-cheung Lovell, "A Question of Choice, A Matter of Rendition," pp. 63–64. For the extraordinary amount of time spent by Chinese literati in traveling, which was regarded as a life-long activity, see Li Chi, The Love of Nature, pp. 5–6.

182 Yan Ermei's lyrics were still known to Xuzhou people in the 20th century. Xie Guozhen, Gu Ningren xuepu, p. 140.
183 Yan was then staying with a wealthy landowner named Tao Yu, m. Wanming.
frost is stripped away by rushing water; the strong wind tests the mettle of the grass. Men are like this too.¹⁸⁴

Nor did Wan Shouqi heed Gu Yanwu’s call to “flutter here and there.” Wan did take a trip to Kunshan early in 1652, but his purpose was to invite Gu Yanwu’s close friend Gui Zhuang to come back to Huaiyin with him and become his son’s tutor. Perhaps he had intimations of his own frailty and wanted to be sure to provide for his son’s education, because only a few days after he returned with Gui Zhuang to the “Grass Hut West of the Marshes,” Wan Shouqi fell ill of the spleen. The disease took a rapid toll on the painter. In a few weeks he was near death, and on the third day of the fifth lunar month, at the age of 50, Wan Shouqi passed away.¹⁸⁵ His last painting remained unfinished, but he did manage to write a few final lines of poetry evoking for one last time the brittle evanescence of those troubled and bitter years. The poem “Wind and Rain at a Time of Sickness” is mostly missing, but the lines remaining read:

Thousands of layers of dreams,
Ten thousand li from home,
Wandering to the ends of the earth.
Day by day the autumn light approaches.
What year is it now?
Muddled, won’t remember.
So many feelings in the corner of the room
Where there still hangs a calendar of Chongzhen.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ Wan, *Xi xi caotang ji*, 4:6b.
The Final Pacification of the North

I rode by starlight, crossing west of the river on patrol. Nothing but desert lies before one's eyes. This is another world: hundreds of leagues of broken columns of rising smoke, mountains bare of foliage, lands that yield no grain. Along the roadway, there are none but barbarians (*fanren*) who surround us back and front.


The sense of relief in the Qing court, which was encouraged by the glowing reports of its pacification officials during the winter of 1647–1648, was very short-lived. The spring of 1648 brought with it a sudden reversal of fortunes for the Manchus: many of the areas in north China which the court had thought were under control burst into rebellion once more. The reversal coincided with, and may even have been a direct response to, the resurgence of loyalist activity in south China after Jin Shenghuan and Li Chengdong reverted to the Ming cause.

One of the first areas where rebellion broke out in the north was around Tianjin. The disorder there that Lei Xing tried to subdue had continued after the revolts of 1644–1645. In fact, Zhang Xin, the former Ming Minister of Punishments from Shandong, was demoted and disgraced as governor of Zhili for having glossed over the defeats which he had suffered at the hands of these "coastal
bandits" in the summer of 1647.1 His successor, Li Youlong, soon realized how well entrenched and dangerous the rebels were—especially those claiming to represent the Ming royal house. In March of 1648 a bandit leader in Qingyun, south of Tianjin on the Shandong border, announced himself to be the heir apparent of Emperor Xizong (r. 1621). This man, Yang Sihai by name, was joined by a Sanhe woman named Zhang who pretended to be Xizong's former consort. Uniting with another bandit leader named Zhang Tianbao, the rebels made Ming seals and flags, and gathered enough forces to hand Li Youlong a severe defeat. Three months later, in June, Li and Brigade General Su Pinghan sent another military contingent against the rebels, but inflicted only minor casualties on the Ming loyalists. That August the rebels once again assembled to attack the important district capital of Jinghai on the Grand Canal south of Tianjin. This time Li Youlong was able to seize some of the rebel leaders, but he was already coming to feel that piecemeal measures of repression were simply making matters worse in the Tianjin area. Counting on the support of the Vice-President of Revenue, Wang Gongbi, Li argued that zhaofu (soothing) should be applied, and invited some of the bandits to his own camp. This failed to stem the rebellion. On September 18, 1648, Li and Su Pinghan claimed to have exterminated a number of rebels east of Tianjin, but Li was soon removed from his post for the same reasons as his predecessor's dismissal. The region would continue to be troubled by rebellion until well into 1649, when the court finally sent in "heavy troops" and increased the size of the Tianjin garrison.2

1 Da-Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu (hereafter Shizu shilu), 34:3, 34:18, cited in Xie Guozhen, ed., Qingchu nongmin qi yi ziliao jilu, p. 53. Zhang had been recommended for the governorship of Tianjin in 1645. He was demoted on August 9, 1647, and resigned shortly afterwards on the pretext of illness. His son, Zhang Duan, also appears in the Er chen zhuang. Zhang Duan was among the Shandong gentrymen recommended for high office by Wang Aoyong, governor of Shandong. Like Chen Mingxia, Zhang Duan had passed the jinshi examination of 1643, and was posted to the Hongwen Yuan. He later became a grand secretary. Er chen zhuang, 12:14a–15b.
2 Er chen zhuang, juan 6, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 53; Shizu shilu, 40:461b. See also Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 7; Xie Guozhen, Nanming ziliao, p. 97.
The Elm Garden Army

Even though the Tianjin uprisings caused considerable consterna-
tion at court, they were soon overshadowed by the alarming activ-
ities of the Elm Garden Army (Yuyuan jun). This was a collection
of loyalist bands operating out of the forested district of Caozhou
in southwestern Shandong along the borders of Hebei and Henan.
For years, gangs of armed men had been raiding across those bor-
ders, attacking cities in Hebei’s (Beizhili) Daming prefecture or in
districts around Kaifeng in Henan. The government tolerated
these forays as long as they remained sporadic incidents. However,
there was always the potential for large armed units from Cao-
zhou to actually seize a district capital and unite both with local
bandits as well as with rebel or Ming loyalist units from the neigh-
boring provinces of Hebei and Henan. In that event, communica-
tions along both the Grand Canal and the imperial highway run-
ning through Daming prefecture in Hebei would be threatened,
and consequently government control over southern Hebei, south-
ern Shandong, and northern Henan would be placed in jeopardy.

That threat materialized in the fourth lunar month (April 23–
May 21) of 1648 when an Elm Garden Army leader named Li
Huajing surrounded and besieged the city of Dongming just
across the Hebei border from Caozhou. As local dissidents arose
in response, Li Huajing seized Dongming, and then turned back
into southern Shandong where by late summer he had managed to
attack and capture Caozhou itself and the surrounding district
capitals of Cao, Dingtao, and Chengwu. While the Shandong re-
bel leaders pushed westward across the Hebei border, local gangs joined

3 Most recently, in February, 1647, a bandit named Kong Wu had plundered
Nanle in Daming before being killed by Kong Xigui. At the same time, the
Shandong rebel Ding Mingwu attacked Kaizhou in Daming. The local prefect
was killed, but a spirited resistance was led by the magistrate and Ding was
killed in turn. Kong Xigui’s biography in Er chen zhuang, juan 4; Daming fuzhi
[Prefectural gazetteer of Daming], Xianfeng edition, juan 4, cited in Xie,
Qingchu nongmin, p. 97.
4 Caozhou fuzhi [Caozhou prefectural gazetteer], cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin,
p. 91.
in the attack on cities like Qingfeng and Nanyue. In these district capitals, which were closer to the major garrison town of Daming, the local military officials and gentry were able to drive off the rebels, but casualties were heavy on the imperial side. In the other direction, driving up toward central Shandong, the rebels attacked the town of Juye and kept it under siege from August 30 to September 5 before being driven off by reinforcements. To the south, Li Huajing's men crossed the Henan border and the Yellow River to attack Guide. Closer to Kaifeng, the Hebei rebel general Liu Zhibing laid siege to Lanyang on September 20. Soon the entire north bank of the Yellow River opposite Kaifeng had fallen into rebel hands, and the city of Fengqiu had become the headquarters for an army from Caoxian commanded by Fan Shenxing, who— it was reported in official despatches—transformed mere local “bandits” (kou) into dangerously ambitious “brigands” (dao).

The Elm Garden Army—which was said to total twenty thousand—was actually a conglomeration of more than twenty self-contained rebel brigades (ying) of about one thousand men each, scattered across the three provinces. Battle reports described their encampments as being housed in large fortified castles (lou) with inner redoubts and defended by cannons, even including Portuguese (Folangji) artillery. The towers were often crowned with large white banners, and the rebels kept their women and live-

6 *Ming-Qing shiliao, bing*, *ben* 7, cited in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 91.
8 Biography of Wu Jingdao in *Qing shi gao, liezhuan* 27, cited in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 98.
9 *Ming-Qing shiliao, bing*, *ben* 7, cited in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 91.
10 It is not clear from the Qing battle reports whether these castles had belonged to the rebels in the first place or were captured in the course of the uprising. Usually, they were named after families (e.g., *Majialou*, the “Ma Family Castle”), with the surnames differing from those of the *ying* leaders, so that it is possible that these were taken by the rebels after they had decided to attack the district capitals.
stock in the encampments with them. When Manchu and Mongol troops attacked the rebel fortifications, they sometimes simply burned the castles down, destroying everyone in the conflagration. At other times they were more discriminating, killing the men and distributing the livestock and women among their own soldiers. Few prisoners were taken, and most of these were simply interrogated on the spot, then decapitated and their heads displayed as public warnings.\(^1\)

The various ying or brigades of the Elm Garden Army were linked in their common opposition to the Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese soldiers fighting on the side of the government, as well as by a loose system of alliances between one ying and the next. For example, the main road to Caoxian was occupied by two major rebel camps, about ten li apart. They were quite separate groups, one commanded by a man named Fan and the other by someone named Xiao, but they regarded each other as allies and would come to the other’s aid if under attack.\(^12\) Overall, their strategy hardly seems to have been coordinated, and what gave them general unity in the eyes of the Qing officials reporting on their activities was the use of Ming titles, princely ranks, and official designations. Li Huajing himself had even ensconced a distant Ming royal relative in his headquarters at Dongming, and orders and patents were being issued in the name of a Tianzheng Emperor.\(^13\)

What also gave the Elm Garden Army an appearance of organized coordination in the eyes of Dorgon and his advisors was the possibility of a conspiracy linking the rebel leaders with the former warlord of Shandong, Liu Zeqing, who was now residing in the imperial capital. At the time the Grand Army had crossed the Yellow River to attack Yangzhou, Jiangbei loyalists like Yan Ermei had hoped that Liu Zeqing would support the Southern Ming cause. However, Liu saw greater opportunities on the side of the

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11 See the various detailed battle reports by Major Tong Wenhuan and Captain Zhao Chengji in Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 3, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 98.

12 See Major Tong Wenhuan’s report on his engagement with these rebels in Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 3, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 98.

13 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 91.
Qing. When Dodo sent Junta, the distinguished Tunggiya general, to Huai'an to invite Liu's collaboration, the Shandong warlord surrendered his personal army of fifty officers and two thousand men to the Manchu general, receiving in exchange amnesty and the rank of viscount third class.\textsuperscript{14}

Perhaps it was the relatively low rank of his aristocratic title that nettled Liu Zeqing into sedition. He was a man well known for his ambition, often being heard by banquet guests to boast: “At twenty-one I threw down my brush. At thirty-one I became a general. By forty-one I was a well known political figure. After all, we don't know what will happen in the next twenty years, do we?”\textsuperscript{15} He was known as well for his impetuousness, having killed a yamen lictor with his fists during a brawl while he was a student attending the local examinations.\textsuperscript{16} Such rashness may have also prompted the treacherous activities that began to come to light after September 5, when a man named Cheng Wanzhan led one thousand armed men in an attack on the district capital of Dan, which lies just east of Caoxian.\textsuperscript{17}

After the attack on Dan was foiled, the local magistrate reported that Cheng Wanzhan was none other than the estate bailiff (\textit{zhuang-tou}) of Liu Zeqing, whose own family members were prominent local magnates in Caoxian itself. Dorgon reacted to the news warily. “It is impossible to know yet,” he told the Board of War, “whether he [Liu Zeqing] has bitten the hand that feeds him, or whether others are spreading rumors.”\textsuperscript{18} There was no point in needlessly provoking a prominent collaborator like Liu who came, after all, from the province where most of Dorgon's highest civil officials originated. Other Shandong notables now collaborating

\textsuperscript{14} Yao Guangxiao et al., eds., \textit{Ming shilu} (hereafter \textit{Ming shilu}), 17:9a, 13b; Kunshan yimin ningren Gu Yanwu (Wen Bing), \textit{Sheng'an benji} (\textit{Jiayi shian}) (hereafter \textit{Wen Bing, Jiayi shian}), p. 41; Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, p. 11; Arthur W. Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period}, pp. 531–532.

\textsuperscript{15} Xia Yunyi, \textit{Xu xing cu lu}, p. 68. According to rumor, Liu—who had been a bandit—became a general after giving Grand Secretary Zhou Yanru a bribe of 200,000 taels. Zhang Yi, \textit{Sou wen xu bi}, 1:13a.

\textsuperscript{16} Xia, \textit{Xu xing cu lu}, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7}, cited in Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, pp. 94–95.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 95.
with the Manchus might regard an accusation of treason as slander, an effort by Liu’s many political enemies to take unjust advantage of the participation of his retainers in the Elm Garden Army affair, and perhaps even turn on the dynasty themselves. If Liu Zeqing was indeed implicated in this local rebellion, that would have to be demonstrated with hard evidence.

Let him be constantly watched from dawn to dusk and not allowed personally to send someone towards the region of Caoxian. If anyone arrives from Caoxian, then he must promptly leave again. Nor must we allow his kinsmen to approach other families, nor if their retainers come, can they be allowed to enter. 19

The Board of War was to treat Liu with special consideration and not place him under arrest. “Wait until the crisis of Caoxian is settled,” Dorgon commanded, “and then things will appear more clearly.” 20

The military suppression of “the crisis at Caoxian,” like the quelling of the rest of the uprisings that autumn in the three provinces’ border area, fell under the general supervision of the Director-General of Conservancy, Yang Fangxing. 21 However a great deal of support was provided by the governor of Henan, Wu Jingdao, who placed general responsibility for suppressing the rebels in the hands of the former Ming general Gao Di. It was Gao, then, who began to clear the south bank of the Yellow River in Henan, driving the Elm Garden forces back towards Lanyang, while Brigade General Kong Xigui cut off the escape route to the east. 22 The Qing hero of this campaign was a major named Tong Wenhuan who had been transferred along with his elite cavalry unit from a Mongol garrison force to Wang Jingdao’s command. On September 20, Major Tong defeated Liu Zhibing’s Elm Gar-

19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 The Eastern Conservancy comprised all Henan and Shandong rivers (including the Yellow River) plus the Grand Canal. The Director-General’s office and residence were in Jining. Susan Naquin, *Shantung Rebellion*, p. 21.
den rebels at Lanyang, and helped drive the enemy back across the Yellow River toward Fengqiu where Fan Shenxing was killed. By October 28, Gao Di’s men were attacking and burning bandit castles along the north bank of the Yellow River. Two days later, to the east, General Kong Xigui had despatched two Manchu detachments toward Caoxian. The latter interrogated prisoners of war captured enroute until they discovered the whereabouts of a force of over ten thousand rebels near the “Zhang Family Castle” (Zhangjialou) outside Caoxian, under the command of a “duke” named Zhang Guangsu. The Manchus subsequently sent an elite cavalry and infantry force of one thousand soldiers to attack the bandit camp near the district capital. In the ensuing encounter, thousands of Elm Garden rebels were killed, twelve major officers were captured, and those who escaped were surrounded in their barricaded Zhangjialou. When the ramparts were taken and destroyed, the rebels locked themselves in the tower itself, which was set on fire by the Manchus. The rebels either perished in the flames or were killed as they fled the burning redoubt. Caoxian was now thrown open to Qing troops, and the road between that city and Dongming was cleared of rebel cavalry by Major Tong Wenhuan’s Mongols between November 4 and 6, 1648.23

Dongming itself had been besieged by a joint Chinese-Manchu force since September 13. The rebels had first put up a defense outside the city, fighting fiercely and reluctantly yielding ground. By September 17, they had abandoned their first line of defense to retreat into the city. Four days later, a group of rebel cavalry and infantrymen tried to relieve the city from the northeast, but the Qing forces managed to drive them off. On October 11, the attackers offered to negotiate with Li Huajing, who led the defense of Dongming. Parleys were held, and the Qing commanders offered to spare Li Huajing and the other Elm Garden leaders if they would surrender the Ming relative whom they had enthroned as the Tianzheng Emperor. Li refused, both then and again on October 30, to yield the Ming pretender. On November 16, heavy

23 This account is based on successive military reports filed with Wu Jingdao’s report in Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 3, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 98–99.
Manchu artillery units finally reached Dongming, bringing cannon strong enough to break through the city's thick walls. All through the 17th, and on into the early hours of the next day, the Manchu cannon bombarded the city. On November 18 the north-west corner of the wall collapsed, and the Manchus breached the Elm Garden rebels' defenses. Many were killed in the massacre that followed, but Li Huajing and Li Hongji were taken alive for questioning. The "crisis at Caoxian" was over for the time being, and prisoners were now in Qing hands who could prove Liu Zeqing either guilty or innocent of involvement in the conspiracy.

**The Case of Liu Zeqing**

Even before the fall of Dongming and Caoxian new evidence had come to light which implicated Liu Zeqing in the uprising. On November 4, 1648, while Major Tong Wenhuan's cavalrymen were clearing the road between Dongming and Caoxian, a young maid named Chen Gui was seized by the police as she clambered over the back wall of Liu Zeqing's family compound in Beijing. Under interrogation by the Board of Punishments she said that she had seen a letter from Liu to his mother in Caoxian warning her of the impending uprising before it occurred. Furthermore, she had heard rumors in the household that another letter had been sent by Liu to the Elm Garden rebels, promising to lead an uprising in the capital on October 1.

On the basis of this new evidence, and with most of the principal protagonists in its hands, the government felt that the time had come to round up members of the Liu family. On December 3, Dorgon issued an imperial rescript charging Liu Zeqing with treason and ordering a complete investigation of the case. Wu Dahai, President of Punishments, then assigned judicial agents to interrogate Li Hongji and Li Huajing, who soon broke down and told them what they wanted to know. According to their testimony,

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24 *Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7*, cited in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, pp. 92–94.
25 This and the following information come from the legal report by Wu Dahai in *Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7*, cited in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, pp. 94–97.
Liu Zeqing’s nephew, Liu Zhigan, had secretly visited the south disguised as a Buddhist monk. He had returned in the company of two men, Zheng Longfang and Yao Wenchang, who were formerly colonels in Liu Zeqing’s command and now served as generals for the Southern Ming court. The two men had been assigned to plot a Ming loyalist uprising in Caoxian. If Li Huajing and Li Hongji were to join them—Liu Zhigan had promised—they would then be named general and prince respectively. The plan had been to initiate an uprising in Caoxian timed to coincide with an uprising in Beijing, led by Liu Zeqing. Consequently, having told them about the conspiracy, Liu Zhigan had left for the capital to coordinate plans with his uncle. Eight days later, on July 17, 1648, Liu Zhigan had returned from Beijing and had contacted Li Hongji, ordering him to attack Caoxian on August 24. As it turned out, the attack did not actually take place until September 5, but this was the conspiracy behind it.

Based on Li Huajing and Li Hongji’s testimony alone, the government’s case did not directly incriminate Liu Zeqing. For, the two rebels only had the word of Liu Zhigan that his uncle was engaged in the conspiracy; they could not personally assure the investigators of Liu Zeqing’s direct complicity. Soon, however, the Board of Punishments’ agents produced new evidence that did implicate him. Under interrogation, Liu Zeqing’s stepson, Jixian, reported that the old general had been infuriated when his nephew, Zhigan, was not selected by the Qing government to become a member of the prestigious Imperial Bodyguard. He had then sent one of his retainers with the following message to member of the Liu family in Caoxian: “In my opinion, [the Manchus] are a bunch of small fry. The Qing state does not know how to employ people. Its good fortune won’t last long.” The retainer also brought a specially sealed letter for Zhigan, which Jixian and the others were not allowed to see.

Remembering the maid’s story of a letter setting the date of October 1 for Zeqing’s own uprising in the capital, the interrogators from the Board of Punishments re-questioned Liu Zhigan, asking

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 95.
him if he had received a letter from his uncle at that time. "Yes," Zhigan responded, "there was a letter enclosed in a parcel; but I lost it and have forgotten the words written on it." Other members of the family having also confirmed that Zhigan had received a letter, the question was finally put to General Liu Zeqing himself. Zeqing's answer was that, "I originally sent out two letters to the family. One was solely for Liu Zhigan to read." What, the investigators persistently asked, was in the letter? "I only remember the other one," Liu Zeqing insisted. Finally, the interrogators confronted Liu Zeqing with a report from one of the guards assigned to watch him during the period of house arrest. The guard's report stated that he had seen the general late one night burn a sheaf of documents. What were these papers if not incriminating evidence of some kind? After repeated questioning, Liu Zeqing at last confessed that the papers he had burned included his Ming patent of nobility, conferring the title of the Marquis of Dongping upon him for becoming one of the four Guardian Generals.

The Board of Punishment investigators were thus able to conclude several points with a reasonable degree of certainty. First, Liu Zeqing had indeed sent a retainer to Caoxian against imperial orders. Second, he had sent two letters, one of which was secret. Zhigan's tale that the secret letter had been lost and that he had forgotten its contents the investigators found difficult to believe.

[Third,] there is the burning of the document. Zeqing has confessed that this was a Ming patent of nobility. Yet it has already been five years since our dynasty received the mandate. He ought to have surrendered it sooner instead of secreting it away until now. After all, what could his intention be?

Fourth was the matter of motivation. His nephew Zhigan had indeed been passed over for appointment into the Imperial Bodyguard, and it was the communication between the two of them that plausibly seemed to lie at the heart of the conspiracy. Fifth was the testimony from the Elm Garden rebels themselves that Zhigan had adopted a Buddhist disguise to get in touch with Ming loyal-

28 Ibid.
ists. Finally, and most infuriating of all in certain respects, was Liu Zeqing’s cavalier and sarcastic comment that the Manchus were “small fry,” or as he literally put it, “shrimps frying meat.” The government investigators bitterly picked up Zeqing’s own slur to comment on his ingratitude:

On the day we sallied forth to the hunt, we were aroused with bravery and fought to victory. When you capture a wild beast, then you roast him together for food. Even though Zeqing hunted [with us], these words were truly [uttered by him].

Yet however annoyed he may have been by Liu’s deprecation, Dorgon was still very conscious of the political risk of making a Han adherent like Zeqing appear a martyr to Manchu paranoia. The prince-regent therefore insisted that the Manchu and Chinese presidents of all six boards try the case, and that all officials of vice-presidential rank and above be made privy to the matter. On December 9, after Zeqing had been formally convicted as chief conspirator of the Caoxian uprising, he, his nephew Zhigan, Li Hongji, and Li Huajing were all executed. The remaining members of the Liu family were banished from Shandong and sent into exile.

The Muslim Revolt of 1648

While these events were unfolding in Shandong, far to the west, along the Central Asian frontier, another kind of rebellion was erupting: Muslim communities revolted against Qing rule in Gansu and western Shaanxi. The causes of the Muslim revolt of May, 1648 are obscure. As has been mentioned earlier, some historians argue that the decline in Central Asian trade provoked an economic depression that led to a rising crescendo of Muslim revolts in the late Ming, with many Chinese Muslims joining in the large rebellions that coalesced around the figure of Li Zicheng.

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
Economic advantage and trading privileges had been a primary cause of friction between the Ming court and the merchants and rulers of Turfan during the 16th century. In fact, warriors from Turfan had raided the Gansu corridor in the 1520s after repeated clashes between Ming border troops and Muslim soldiers over the evasion of tributary regulations. In the course of these disorders, and especially after the conquest by Turfan of Hami in 1513, tens of thousands of Hami Muslim refugees fled into Chinese territory and were settled in the Gansu corridor at places like Suzhou, Ganzhou, and Liangzhou. These refugees later provided a direct link to Hami, which was important to the 1648–1649 uprising. They also increased the competition for available resources with both non-Muslim and Muslim Chinese settlers already residing in those places. Banditry became quite common, especially as the decline in the horse and tea trade may have affected the livelihood of Muslims whose commonest shared surname (Ma, horse) underscored their prominent role in horse breeding and the transport of trading goods. Lao Huihui ("Old Muslim"), the rebel leader who helped Li Zicheng at a nadir in his fortunes, was only the most famous of many different outlaws along the frontier. Some of them were no doubt driven to banditry by the reduction in the postal system in the late Ming (one-third of the postal station attendants were dismissed in an economy measure in 1629, and many of these in fact were Muslims). Revolt became chronic, and Muslim uprisings occurred steadily until the fall of the Ming dynasty—on the average, one every six or seven years.31

If the Muslim merchants of the northwest expected better trading conditions under the Qing, they were bound to be disappointed. At that time, communications with tributary states—and hence trading relations with Turfan and other Central Asian kingdoms—were the responsibility of the College of Translators (Si yi guan) of the Board of Rites.32 The head of this office during the

31 Morris Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts in Late Ming and Early Ch'ing," pp. 21–27. See, for example, Ma De's uprising in September, 1647, in Ningxia. Shizh shilu, 33:397a.
32 During most of the Qing period, relations with Mongolia, Kokonor, and the Muslim states in western China were under the supervision of the Court of Colonial Affairs (Lifan Yuan), which was formally established in 1638 as the
early Qing was Sun Chengze (jinshi 1631, Beijing), a former metropolitan censor-in-chief, who had agreed to resume that post after Dorgon entered the capital, and who also became sub-director of the Court of Sacrificial Worship (Taichang si). It is not known whether Sun himself issued the trading regulations that soon were made known by the Board of Rites, but they certainly received his approval; they also reflected the same general restrictive trading policy earlier implemented by the Ming. Khalka Mongols wishing to trade were told that caravans would not be allowed through the passes at Zhangjiakou (Kalgan) and Gubeikou north of Beijing along the Great Wall. Envoys from Turfan were again given the old Ming regulations which had earlier provoked warfare in the west, and warned that infringements would be strictly punished. They were also told that while their caravaneers would be allowed to trade at Lanzhou, they would be kept under the most careful military guard. Furthermore, the old horse and tea trade was to

successor to the Mongol Office (Menggu Yamen). After the Manchus entered Beijing, the chief counsellor (chengzheng) of the Court of Colonial Affairs was given the title of president (shangshu) so as to rank equally with the heads of the Six Boards. In 1659, the Court was integrated with the Board of Rites and, after a two-year hiatus, the rank of president was again conferred on its director. The president of the Court was always a Manchu, and he was seconded by Manchu and Mongol vice-presidents. During the first decade of the new dynasty, however, the responsibility of the Court (whose president after 1647 was Nikan) was restricted to Mongolian judicial, political, and military affairs. Trading regulations for other Central Asian states and tributaries issued directly from the Board of Rites. The College of Translators, formerly known as the Residence for Envoys of the Four Tributary States (Hui tong si yi guan), bore responsibility for arrangements concerning representatives from Korea, Siam, Tonkin, and Burma—leaving Central Asian affairs entirely up to the Lifan Yuan. Lü Shipeng, “Qingdai de lifanyuan,” passim.

33 When Beijing fell to Li Zicheng, Sun, who was fifty years old at the time, thrice tried to kill himself, but his life was saved by a Shun official who had known Sun when he was a magistrate in Henan. Sun eventually agreed to join the Shun regime, and was thus compromised into service with the Qing. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 669–670.


36 Shizu shilu, 26:310a, dated July 1, 1646. See also Ji Huang, Huangchao wen-xian tongkao, 33:3b; Joseph F. Fletcher, “China and Central Asia,” p. 218.
be carried on only outside of Chinese borders at the former horse markets set up by the Ming dynasty.\(^\text{37}\)

These strict trading regulations on the one hand represented the determination of former Ming officials like Sun Chengze to rebuild the system of restricted privileges and access that had been a cornerstone of earlier dynastic diplomacy. On the other hand, while they reflected the Manchus' own special awareness of the strategic importance of special trading rights to ambitious tribal leaders, they also represented Dorgon's determination to assume the same role in the Asian world order that the Ming dynasty had held before the rise of his father, Nurhaci. By inviting tribute missions in July, 1646, the Qing government was both reconstructing the Ming trading system to keep order among foreign allies, and asserting a claim for the supremacy of the new Son of Heaven over alien vassals.\(^\text{38}\) Unfortunately, however, the immediate effect of this decision was undoubtedly to arouse Turfan and its own dependencies against Qing rule, and probably to exacerbate the economic conditions that had led to social disorder and rebellion in the past.

Yet economic explanations are not the only reasons given for the growing incidence of Muslim rebellions in the late Ming, culminating in the 1648–1649 revolt. Partly because of the rebellion of the so-called "New Sect" (Xin jiao) among Gansu Muslims in the mid-nineteenth century, some historians have suggested that endemic communal conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims was exacerbated during the Ming, growing even worse under the

\(^{37}\) Shi\(\text{zu shi}\)lu, 26:311a, dated July 4, 1646. The Qing established six branches of the Tea Horse Office (Cha ma si) in northwestern China, but the trade did not flourish. By the 1670s much of the tea collected by the government was used to pay soldiers rather than purchase horses, and within fifty years the Qing was exporting more of its tea to Russia and western Europe. Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts," p. 191.

\(^{38}\) Lo-shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, pp. 5–6; Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts in Late Ming and Early Ch'ing," passim; Gertraude Roth Li, "The Rise of the Early Manchu State," p. 31. Turfan did accept tributary status then. Hami did not submit until 1696. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia," p. 218.
Qing.\textsuperscript{39} Even more intriguing is the suggestion that religious impulses lay behind the revolts, which may have been inspired by militant Sufi sects.\textsuperscript{40}

The most famous leader of the Muslim rebels in western Gansu was a man named Milayin.\textsuperscript{41} The prefectural gazetteer of Ganzhou predictably describes him as a "cruel and crafty" Muslim who had raised his own band of soldiers to help the local officials track

\textsuperscript{39} Raphael Israeli, "Chinese versus Muslims," \textit{passim.}

\textsuperscript{40} During the 12th and 13th centuries, schools (tarikats) were founded by Sufi masters devoted to restoring a fundamentalist orthodoxy that would remove the non-Islamic customs creeping into Muslim communities in Persia and Central Asia. One of these sects, which was characterized by a silent \textit{dhikr} (remembrance), was founded by Baha’al-Din Naqshband in the late 1300s. Two centuries later, the Naqshbandiyya teaching was transmitted through Central Asia by Makhdüm-i A’zam; and then by his grandson, Muhammad Yusuf, as far east as Hami. Muhammad Yusuf himself travelled as far as Suzhou, into the Gansu corridor, and there is a strong likelihood that later Naqshbandiyya leaders or "khojas," who claimed descent from the Prophet, and who founded their own political dynasty in Kashgar after the Chagatai khanate foundered, may have incited the Gansu and Kokonor Muslims to rebel. Joseph Fletcher, "China’s Northwest at the Time of the Ming-Ch’ing Transition," pp. 16–20. See also Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts," p. 173. But even though this link between the Sufi religious leaders of Central Asia and the Muslim rebels of China’s northwest exists, it is a tenuous connection. There is, in fact, no direct evidence connecting the presence of the Naqshbandiyya sectarians in Hami or among Hami refugees in Gansu and Ningxia with the rebels themselves. Moreover, citing numerous instances of Muslims cooperating with the Qing government, Lipman has argued that Naqshbandiyya Sufism, "far from being inherently subversive in a non-Muslim state, is very flexible and can come to an understanding with the secular political order." Jonathan N. Lipman, "Muslims in Northwest China," p. 12.

\textsuperscript{41} In Chinese texts Milayin is often referred to by his given name, Layin, suggesting that Mi was a surname. In the following general account of the rebellion, I have relied at various points upon the brief narratives supplied by: Camille Imbault-Huart, "Deux Insurrections des Mahometans de Kan-sou," pp. 497–504; Fletcher, "China’s Northwest," pp. 29–31; Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts in Late Ming and Early Ch’ing," pp. 31–32; Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts," p. 191; Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, p. 572; and Louis M. J. Schram, \textit{The Mongours of the Kansu-Tibetan Frontier}, \textit{Part 3}, pp. 53–54. My main sources, however, are given in the footnotes.
down and kill remnants of Li Zicheng's rebel force. In May, 1648, Milayin and another Muslim leader, Ding Guodong, initiated an uprising against the Qing. Persuading the former Ming Prince of Yanchang, Zhu Shichuan, to declare them in legitimate loyalist rebellion, the two Muslim leaders quickly took Ganzhou and Liangzhou, then swept swiftly down the spur of the Great Wall to cross the Yellow River at Lanzhou and attack the important garrison city of Gongchang.

Their presence before the city of Gongchang, to which they laid siege, struck terror in many. While they claimed to have a million followers, official sources enumerated one hundred thousand rebels—Hami and Chinese Muslims from Gansu, Chinese Muslims from Liangzhou who had arisen in response, Shun remnants, and local outlaws who answered their call for rebellion in the name of the Ming prince. Informed of the uprising, the Qing court prepared to send a major military expedition, and eventually appointed gusai beise Tunci head of the expedition of banner troops, seconded by gusa ejen Handai of the Qing royal family, who commanded Mongol troops of his own. The Qing government also declared a little later that year that areas in central and southern Shaanxi like Xi'an, Yan'an, Lintao, and Hanzhong—all of which had been damaged from hailstorms the previous year—would receive tax remissions. Governor-General Meng Qiaofang (who was then residing in the garrison at Guyuan) had no quarrels with either policy, but he did suggest that he himself strike right away, before the rebels had time to consolidate their confederation and take the city of Gongchang. He therefore immediately despatched a relief force under Zhao Guangrui and Ma Ning to save Gongchang. The Manchu-Chinese force sped to Gongchang and, on May 25, drove the Muslims away from the city after killing over three thousand of them.

Milayin and Ding Guodong fell back upon Lintao, where the

42 Ganzhou fuzhi [Ganzhou prefectural gazetteer], juan 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 280.
43 Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268.
45 Shizu shilu, 38:447a.
local Muslims arose after their arrival. Meng Qiaofang divided his pursuing troops into three separate columns: one commanded by Colonel Ma Ning, one by Zhao Guangrui, and one by Major Zhang Yong. On June 10, 1648, Zhang Yong's force led the attack against Lintao, although Ma Ning's men also participated. The city was retaken after an attack on the barracks, where seven hundred rebels under the Muslim leader Ma Hanshan were killed. With Lintao in their hands, the Qing commanders now only had to overcome the Muslim defenses at Lanzhou in order to remove the last impediment to their force crossing the river into western Gansu. Meng Qiaofang decided to supervise this part of the campaign personally. While Zhang Yong continued to hunt down other Muslims in the area, and captured and killed the Ming prince Zhu Shichuan, Meng led his personal troops to Gongchang and thence to the walls of Lanzhou, where he rendezvoused with his three commanders—Ma, Zhao, and Zhang. The attack on Lanzhou was brief. The Muslims quickly abandoned the city and crossed back into the hexi (west of the river) region, burning the bridge across the Yellow River behind them. Only one major Muslim rebel contingent remained east of the river, and within a few days that group, holding Lanzhou under the command of Ding Jiasheng, had been annihilated. All major strongholds on the east side of the Yellow River were now under the Qing forces' control again, as Meng Qiaofang triumphantly memorialized to Beijing on June 24, 1648.

By July, 1648, then, the imperial forces were ready to cross the Yellow River and pursue Milayin and Ding Guodong toward Liangzhou. The rebels put up very little resistance in that city, which was taken in August, and understandably retreated to more familiar home territory around Ganzhou, their point of origin. The circumstances of their defeat there are not very clear. Ac-

46 Shizu shilu, 38:448b. The casualties are given in Meng's biography in Qing shi gao, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268.
47 Shizu shilu, 38:449b. See also his memorial of July 30, 1648, in ibid., 38:455b, where he speaks of finally "pacifying" all the Muslim partisans in the Lanzhou area, which suggests that, with the help of loyal Mongour troops, the mopping up operations took another full month.
cording to a fanciful tale recorded by the 19th-century historian Wei Yuan in the *Shengwu ji* (Record of imperial military exploits), Meng Qiaofang himself reached Ganzhou in October, 1648, and quickly tricked the rebels out of their fort and into an ambush he had carefully prepared. Yet although he and Zhang Yong are then supposed to have killed unbelievably vast numbers of rebels, the siege of Ganzhou somehow lasted more than six months.  

Eventually, after Zhang Yong had been made acting commander-in-chief of Gansu, his forces—led by Manchu Plain Red Bannermen—used scaling ladders to attack the western wall. On March 5, 1649, Zhang Yong and seven hundred of his men were able to penetrate the southwestern corner of Ganzhou city where they engaged in five days of fierce street fighting. Seventy percent of Zhang Yong’s men were casualties. Thus, although he claimed a victory and said that over half of the Muslim rebels were killed, and although Meng Qiaofang reported that the Muslims of Ganzhou had been pacified, the situation was more likely a military stalemate, and the result actually a negotiated surrender.  

On April 2, 1649, Milayin and Ding Guodong came out of the city and surrendered it to the Qing troops. As part of the arrangement, Milayin was himself given the rank of colonel in the Qing army, and appointed to the Lanzhou garrison, though in effect remaining in Ganzhou.

Milayin’s adherence to the imperial government lasted just about as long as there were sufficient Qing troops in Ganzhou to counterbalance his forces. That was not for very long. On April 27, 1649—less than four weeks after Meng’s victory memorial—Milayin decided that the military balance was once again in his favor. For as soon as the western Gansu Muslim rebellion had ostensibly been settled, bringing Governor-General Meng great acclaim at

48 Imbault-Huart, “Deux Insurrections.” According to Meng’s own biography in the *Qing History*, he and Zhang Yong did start the siege then, and attacked Ganzhou by night, but the long interval between the attack and the surrender of the city is not filled with historical detail.


50 *Qing shi gao*, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 268.
court, the imperial government had begun requesting troop transfers from the Shaanxi theater to Sichuan to confront the increasingly powerful forces of the Southern Ming there. These transfers stretched their occupying forces in Shaanxi dangerously thin, but there was little else that the Qing leaders could do in the face of the Southern Ming resurgence in 1648 and 1649. In the early months of 1649, in fact, a Southern Ming victory over the Qing did not appear totally unlikely. Milayin's decision to resume his war against the imperial government may thus have been as much determined by his knowledge of the growing warfare in the south as by pressure from his own followers, or a putative belief in the need for a *jihad* against the infidels.

Milayin's plans for a revolt apparently were known to the Ganzhou garrison commander, Liu Liangchen. Before the commander could take steps of his own, however, the Muslim leader sent word to the governor of Gansu, Zhang Wenheng, that he himself had caught wind of a possible mutiny. Milayin suggested that he and Governor Zhang confer, and proposed that they meet at a banquet in the northern part of Ganzhou city. Within his own military unit, Milayin had to face the opposition of his lieutenant-colonel, who was probably an officer planted in his men's midst by Meng Qiaofang. Before Zhang arrived for the feast, then, Milayin had the lieutenant-colonel poisoned and, when the governor did present himself, led his men from ambush to kill Zhang Wenheng and seize control of the city on April 27, 1649. Several other Qing officials were killed, although the magistrate and a senior military official accepted office under the rebels.51

Since Ding Guodong responded almost immediately, the same sequence of events virtually took place all over again. Muslims immediately arose in Suzhou and Liangzhou, and Milayin proceeded south to attack Lanzhou and Lintao where both magistrates were killed. This time, however, Meng Qiaofang crossed the Yellow River right away, and drove Milayin back into Ganzhou as quickly

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as possible. The city did not surrender, and Meng began to prepare for a long siege by building high embankments and digging trenches around the city. Before Ganzhou could be thus encircled, however, Milayin broke out of the Qing enclosure and fled. He did not get far. That night Meng’s soldiers tracked down the Muslim rebel at a small oasis nearby, and after a brief skirmish Milayin was finally killed.\(^52\)

In the meantime, the other Muslim leader, Ding Guodong, had installed himself in Suzhou at the western terminus of the Great Wall, about 660 kilometers southeast of Hami, then ruled by Babai Khan. Perhaps because so much of his support came from Hami refugees, and almost certainly because he wished military supplies and reinforcements from the Hami Muslims, Ding Guodong invited Sa’id Baba, the son of the Prince of Hami, to come to Suzhou and rule as the Prince of Turumtay.\(^53\) Shortly after Sa’id Baba arrived, Lanzhou fell, and Meng Qiaofang immediately moved his army out to Suzhou to invest the Prince of Turumtay’s new capital. The city was surrounded with deep moats and high palisades, and the siege promised to be a long one. Before it could be fully pursued, however, Governor-General Meng suddenly found his rear base in jeopardy. According to his official biography:

\[\text{[Ding] Guodong had once again seized Suzhou [garrison] in alliance with Tuluntai who was called Prince Luntai, while Guodong named himself viceroy. The walls were defended, and [the rebels] emerged to pillage Wuwei, Zhangye, and Jiquan. At that same time, the Pingyang bandits [of Shanxi] Yu Yin and Han Zhaoxuan responded to the revolt of Datong’s rebel general, Jiang Xiang, and with three hundred thousand men stormed Puzhou. The throne or-}\]

52 *Qing shi gao*, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 268.
53 In Chinese texts Turumtai is identified as “the turbaned Muslim (chan tou hui) Tuluntai.” See *Qing shi gao*, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 268. Ding Guodong may also have tried to get support from the Mongours of Xining. But there the local *tusi*, because of their struggles with the lamaseries, had a history of supporting the ruling dynasty in Beijing. Furthermore, after August 16, all of Xining’s taxes were remitted at the order of the throne. Fletcher, “China’s Northwest,” p. 31. See also Rossabi, “Muslim and Central Asian Revolts,” p. 192.
ordered [Meng] Qiaofang and Ese to send back their armies to resist them. Qiaofang left braves (yong) [under Ma Ning] to besiege Suzhou and led his army back east.\textsuperscript{54}

It was thus the mutiny of Jiang Xiang—an even more critical event than the conspiracy of the Elm Garden Army—at Datong, just 250 kilometers west of Beijing, that forced Meng Qiaofang to abandon Suzhou and turn back to the aid of the beleaguered and nearly overwhelmed Qing armies in Shanxi.

\section*{Jiang Xiang's Rebellion}

Jiang Xiang's rebellion, which occupied the attention of the court and Prince-Regent Dorgon for nearly a year, may have been the end result of famines and floods in north China plus the Ming resurgence in the south, but the immediate cause was Dorgon's appointment of Ajige, Prince Ying, to take general command of the Datong border area.\textsuperscript{55} Earlier, Dorgon had invited some of his allies among the Khalka Mongols to cross over the wall into the frontier zone. However, the tribesmen could not resist the temptation to raid the Chinese homesteads in the area, seizing women and livestock.\textsuperscript{56} Dorgon's intention in appointing Ajige to this command, then, was motivated both by the urgent need to bring the unruly Khalkas to heel, as well as perhaps by the desire to distance Ajige from Beijing where he and Dorgon were rivals for political power. However, General Jiang Xiang chose to interpret the appointment as an abrogation of his authority as satrap of Datong and most of northern Shanxi. On January 15, 1649, while the civil governor, treasurer, and prefect were all outside the city walls tal-

\textsuperscript{54} Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268.
\textsuperscript{55} For reports of starving mobs in Xuanhua district, near Datong, in the winter of 1648–1649, see Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 73. There were also reports of severe floods during the spring and early summer. See Shizu shilu, 45:526b.
\textsuperscript{56} Zeng Guoquan, sponsor, Shanxi tongzhi, 18:20a, and 78:16b.
lying cavalry supplies and taxes, Jiang Xiang closed Datong’s massive gates and declared himself in rebellion.57

Ajige responded with alacrity. Receiving news of the revolt almost immediately, he rode through the night of January 15 in time to contain Jiang Xiang’s main force that next day at Datong. However, he was not quick enough to keep Jiang Xiang from sending out a column under one of his lieutenants, Jiang Yingxun, to arouse similar rebellions at Shuozhou and Ninghua.58 For some time, Jiang Xiang and his aides had been secretly corresponding with former Ming military officers in other Shanxi garrisons, encouraging them to plot a rebellion against the Qing.59 Now, these soldiers threatened to arise like “wild animals,” and overthrow Qing rule.60 Almost overnight, Kelan and Puzhou fell into the hands of rebel forces.61 As “the seditious miasma coagulated

57 Shi zh shi lu, 41:487b; Zhang Tingyu, et al., comps., Ming shi (Guofang yan- jiuyuan), pp. 4118–4119 (hereafter Ming shi); Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 5. Having been constructed to withstand Mongol cavalry attacks, Datong’s cannon-mounted battlements were ordinarily impregnable to almost any group that chose to assault the city. James Peter Geiss, “Peking under the Ming,” p. 130. One of the first instances of Qing loyalty occurred at this time. The intendant for this military circuit, Xu Yifan (1629 jinshi, Jiangnan), was trapped inside the city. A gentryman who had elected to join the Qing in 1644, he had already served in the capital as a senior secretary in the Board of Rites. When the revolt began, Xu Yifan tried to persuade some of the inhabitants to carry out their duty to remain loyal to the new dynasty; but, while he harangued the mob, he was cut down by the mutineers’ swords. Er chen zhuan, 1:24.


59 Shi zh shi lu, 41:489a. Jiang Xiang also sent a letter to Liu Zeqing, inviting him to join him. News of that was divulged, and it was one of the factors leading to Liu’s execution for the Elm Garden Army conspiracy. Ma Daoyuan, Wu Meian nianpu, p. 47.

60 Er chen zhuan, biography of Zhu Shichang, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 252.

61 In certain respects, this was a sergeants’ revolt. There were many cases of lower-ranking petty officers and non-commissioned officers who were contacted by officers under whom they had formerly served in the Ming army, and who then turned against their commanders, or killed the local magistrate, and took over the towns they occupied. The rebellion at Puzhou was a typical example of this. Zeng, Shanxi tongzhi, 18:19–20a, 28a. In other cases, rural
into a mass,” the provincial governor’s Manchu-Han forces were stretched thin. In the northeast, “bandits” from Daizhou took over Pian Pass and Hequ, and formed an alliance with the well-known outlaws Liu Qian and Zhang Wugui. Like the rural loyalists of Jiangnan in 1645, these diehards would storm and take a rural fort, and then forcibly cut off the queues of the peasants they found hiding within the walls of each stockade. This powerful confederation soon controlled most of the mountain passes in northeastern Shanxi, as well as most of the countryside as far south as Xinkou, where its men severed the main highway to Taiyuan, cutting the capital of the province off from the northern road to Beijing.

Ningwu itself was occupied by the remnants of the army of Li Ji who had pacified Yanmen (Daizhou) for the Qing. Several of his officers, including General Liu Wei, had been secretly corresponding with Jiang Xiang’s officers in Datong. When the uprising began there they revolted in turn, killing Li Ji and declaring allegiance to the Ming. This force, which included 3 colonels, 11 majors, 40 captains, and 5,400 cavalry and infantry, went on to occupy Ningwu under the general supervision of Circuit Intendant Zhao Menglong. Soon the Ningwu army became the most dominant force in the upper Fen River valley, controlling a chain of redoubts and stockades as well as the district capitals of Ninghua and Jingle to the south along the river itself. There was thus a solid band of resistsants cutting the Qing armies along the Great Wall off from central Shanxi. Only the central road from Hebei, via Gu Pass, remained open.

To the west of Taiyuan, the towns of Shilou, Yonghe, and Jiaocheng were all in rebel hands. According to Regional Inspector

redoubts (bao) were seized by local Ming loyalists, while the outlaws inhabiting the mountain stockades (zhai) linked together once more to overthrow civil authority.

62 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 255.
63 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 253.
64 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 256.
65 Zeng, Shanxi tongzhi, 78:17.
66 Shizu shilu, 45:534.
Cai Yinggui, the inhabitants of each *zhou* and *xian* were arising against the provincial government. Ming decrees and rebel placards were appearing everywhere. District magistrates were panicked. Not only could they not defend their city walls; they could barely hope to defend their inner yamens because of the general atmosphere of fear and riot.\(^{67}\) In Jiexiu, a former Ming general who had retired to a Buddhist monastery and was known only as Monk Hou assembled a gang (*dang*) and took over the town.\(^{68}\) At Pinglu, where soldiers loyal to Jiang Xiang had killed the military rations intendant and taken over a postal courier station, a member of the local gentry named Li Yukui (*jinshi* 1622), who had served both in the Ming Censorate and as regional inspector of Ningxia, raised an army and actually took over Tong Pass and the district capitals of Pu and Jie counties.\(^{69}\) To add fuel to the flames, thousands of Shaanxi bandits were crossing the Yellow River by crudely rigged boats and rafts, coming into the province to loot for themselves. Some were Central Asians, and men with long rifles were sighted riding on camels through the Lüliang Mountains.\(^{70}\)

As the rebellion spread rapidly across all of northern Shanxi, Ajige coolly tried to gather intelligence. By January 28, 1649, Mongol reinforcements had reached his camp outside Datong, and scouting parties were able to ascertain that eleven towns in that area were in open revolt.\(^{71}\) The next day, January 29, Manchu heavy artillery units arrived, bringing big *hongyipao* (red cloth cannons) to hammer home the siege; and within ten days the court despatched additional banner forces to Ajige’s command.\(^{72}\)

Although the northern route into Hebei was severed, the main road from Zhending through Gu Pass was still open as far as Taiyuan; and it was along this highway that other reinforcements were sent to relieve Governor Zhu Shichang. The commander of this relief force was none other than Nikan (d. 1660), venerable

\(^{67}\) Ming-Qing shiliao, *bing*, *ben* 8, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 253.
\(^{70}\) Ming-Qing shiliao, *bing*, *ben* 8, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 253.
\(^{71}\) *Shizu shilu*, 41:484b.
\(^{72}\) Ibid., 41:485a, 486b.
leader of the Nara clan who had fought at Nurhaci’s side after Ula was defeated in 1613, and who had gone on to become a key intermediary between the Manchus and Mongols. In 1639, it had been Nikan who was placed in charge of recruiting Mongols for the Manchu armies; and it was he, as well, who led those Mongols into Henan after the occupation of Beijing. Now president of the Court of Colonial Affairs in the capital, he had been despatched from his diplomatic duties to relieve Taiyuan from the east.

His arrival was most welcome to Governor Zhu Shichang. A new threat to Taiyuan had materialized in the person of Jiang Jianxun, the brother of the man whom Jiang Xiang had sent out of Datong to arouse rebellions elsewhere. Jiang Jianxun, who now called himself “Governor of Shanxi,” had been one of those who revolted at the time of Jiang Xiang’s mutiny. Pushing down near Taiyuan, he had occupied the town of Xinzhou, and from there was beginning to move on toward the provincial capital. Now, with the reinforcements at hand, Governor Zhu drove the rebels back to Xinzhou, and under the town’s walls engaged the Ming loyalists in battle. Jiang Jianxun was soundly defeated in the engagement that followed. The Manchu, Mongol, and Han banner-men killed over two thousand of Jiang’s soldiers, captured many horses and sets of armor, and would have continued pursuing the routed remnants had the roads north of Xinzhou not been dangerously narrow and steep.

Nikan, however, did not remain at Taiyuan for very long. Once this battle was over, he speedily cleared the main highway and rode north to try to recapture Ningwu, which he invested for nearly a month before giving up that siege to join the main body of Ajige’s forces directly attacking Jiang Xiang. Once Nikan departed, Jiang Jianxun was able to regroup his forces in southern Shanxi, where he attracted tens of thousands of rebels and out-

75 *Shizu shilu*, 42:491b–492a; Yang Guotai et al., eds., *Taiyuan xianzhi*, 16:3.
laws, including the ones crossing the Shaanxi border, to join his army. While rebels took advantage of Nikan’s move toward Datong to capture the city of Baode on the Shaanxi border and the towns of Yonghe and Shilou in the Lüliang Mountains, Jiang Jianxun took Jiaocheng southwest of Taiyuan, and from there moved on Fenzhou. Capturing Fenzhou, he then proceeded north toward Taiyuan, and set up a military headquarters for his large army in Jinci, where the founder of the Tang dynasty had performed libations during his historic uprising a millenium earlier.\(^7\) From there, Jiang Jianxun launched his attack on Taiyuan, trying to take the city by surprise with an assault in the dark of night. The attack failed; but even though his men were driven off, Jiang Jianxun did not cease to be a menace to the Qing garrison in Taiyuan.\(^8\) He kept the main body of his forces nearby, and was in an excellent position to renew his assault at any moment. Moreover, while the Qing forces were tied down at the siege of Datong, Jiang Jianxun also plainly intended to cut off the southern tip of the province, just below Pingyang and Lu’an, and turn that part of Shanxi into his own preserve by occupying all of the district capitals.\(^9\)

Governor Zhu explained how serious the situation was in a terse memorial to the court:

> Since the siege of Ningwu has been terminated, the bandits (\(\text{\textit{zei}}\)) have gradually pressed in upon the provincial capital. Even though we are defended by Mongol troops, their strength is halved and the bandits have forgotten the meaning of fear. If we wait until after Jiang Xiang has been wiped out to transfer the army back [to Taiyuan] to destroy each [of the individual rebel groups], I am afraid that [the outlaws] will multiply and sprout new tendrils. Moreover, the autumn harvest taxes for military expenses derive from the provincial capital and from remittances from [more prosperous] towns farther south like Fenzhou, Pingyang and Lu’an. If any [of these] places are surrounded, then the entire province will feel the impact. Yet as soon as Pian Pass and Ningwu are recovered, the bandits west of the [Fen] river will observe the trend and give up their evil

\(^7\) Zang Lihe et al., comps., \(\text{\textit{Zhongguo gujin diming da cidian}}\), p. 704.
\(^8\) Yang et al., \(\text{\textit{Taiyuan xianzhi}}\), 16:3.
\(^9\) Ming-Qing shiliao, \(\text{\textit{bing, ben 3}}\), in Xie, \(\text{\textit{Qingchu nongmin}}\), p. 255.
ways. I request that you despatch several hundred Manchu troops to defend the provincial capital. If there are crises south of the capital, then [we should] rush part of these [forces] to exterminate [the rebels]. Troops should be sent separately to garrison Daizhou, and then we can take Pian Pass and Ningwu in succession. The bandits dread the Manchu troops as though they were ghosts. Your minister is thus inspired to make the above request.80

Dorgon's prompt response was to command the Board of War to deliberate and take appropriate action, for the prince-regent had clearly come to feel that the province was almost out of Qing control. While continuing to make preparations for a long campaign involving a major expeditionary force, Dorgon had special edicts prepared to try to hold public opinion to the Manchu side and persuade any who might still be wavering to remain loyal to the government. Two such edicts were issued on February 26, 1649.

The first edict was addressed to the civil and military officials, soldiers, and civilians of the province of Shanxi:

Jiang Xiang has rebelled and is in terror of being executed. He has collected adherents and assembled followers, fabricating lies and deceits to beguile them to kill officials and soldiers. All of you are mistaken to believe these are true, and thus to rebel en masse. . . . I cannot bear to see you die because of your own stupidity. Therefore, a special edict is ordered to announce your collective pardon. If, on the day the pardon arrives, you can repent your earlier faults, turn over a new leaf and return to us, we will forgive your former crimes and continue to nurture you in our benevolence. But if you cling stubbornly to your delusions and continue to believe Jiang Xiang, you will bring death upon yourselves.81

The edict went on to explain that the Grand Army of the Qing was fast arriving in Shanxi, and that those who waited too long after its occupation would not be spared.

The second edict was prepared especially for those besieged at Datong. It read:

80 Er chen zhuan, biography of Zhu Shichang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 252.
81 Shizu shilu, 42:492.
Jiang Xiang has himself committed a great crime by rebelling, arousing the masses and misleading the innocent. . . . I have ordered the Grand Army to surround the city, building fortifications and digging trenches so that none of the people within the city can escape. After [the siegeworks are finished] we will employ heavy artillery for our assault, and then execute a complete massacre. If any of you—officials and commoners—will either arrest Jiang Xiang and turn him over to us, or kill him and surrender to us, before the siege embankments are constructed, your former crimes will be forgiven and you will continue to receive our benevolent nurture. Not only will you save your lives; you will also preserve your parents, wives and children intact. You should speedily decide upon this!82

There was no formal response to this threat.

On March 6, 1649, even before his expeditionary force left Beijing, Dorgon received his first genuinely positive battle report from Ajige. The initial news was bad: the rebel Liu Qian had taken the outer fortifications of Daizhou, which had been in Qing hands, and the city had been barely able to resist. Ajige, however, had promptly despatched Bolo to rescue the city. With scaling ladders, the Manchu troops had retaken the outer fortifications. Trapped between those ramparts and the inner walls, the rebels were slaughtered, and the siege of the city was lifted.83

Three weeks later, Dorgon himself led a column of troops out of the capital toward Shanxi under the banner of “imperial rectification” (zheng).84 As the Grand Army drew near, several of the districts around Datong took advantage of his offer of amnesty to surrender to him. At Shanyin, halfway between Ningwu and Datong, the local magistrate led his own soldiers out of the city walls and asked to be allowed to render allegiance to the prince-regent.85 These defections gave Dorgon hope that he could still persuade the defenders of Datong to surrender. When he reached that city on April 23, he sent word within that several district capi-

82 Ibid., 42:492b.
83 Ibid., 42:494-495a.
84 Ibid., 42:497a. See also Erich Hauer, “Prinz Dorgon,” pp. 41–42.
85 Shizu shilu, 43:502b.
tals had already opened their gates to the Qing soldiers, and that Jiang Xiang had better quickly do the same. Reextending his offer of a pardon to others, Dorgon was especially propitiatory toward a messenger from General Jiang. The messenger was sent back to the city with Dorgon’s sealed statement that “there must have been some difficulty which caused [Jiang] to revolt,” and which also contained an offer of absolute pardon if the general would surrender immediately.\textsuperscript{86}

Dorgon received no answer, and—gradually convinced that none would shortly be forthcoming—returned within a week or so to the capital. After he departed, however, General Jiang did attempt a sally to break the tightening enclosure around his city. On May 8, couriers reached Beijing with news from Bolo, who had joined Ajige at the siege, that two rebel contingents, totalling over five thousand soldiers, had emerged from Datong to establish camps along the roads leading north of the city. This effort to enlarge the defense perimeter was a failure. Manchu troops broke through the camps’ defense, and pursued the routed rebels back to the shelter of the city walls where Jiang had himself to lead out yet another thousand-odd men to rescue the survivors.\textsuperscript{87}

Bolo could not press his advantage. Although the siege was still maintained at Datong, the imperial forces were diverted by new rebel victories around Fenzhou southwest of the provincial capital. Governor Zhu’s warning in his earlier memorial had proved correct. The Qing officials simply could not afford to ignore Jiang Jianxun’s activities in the wealthier southern portions of the province, nor the possibility of a fresh rebel convergence upon Taiyuan itself. On June 6, 1649, Dorgon elevated Bolo to a prince of the first degree (\textit{qin} wang) and named him Generalissimo to Settle the West (Ding xi dajiangjun). His responsibility henceforth would be to destroy the rebel contingents in the southern and western portions of the province, while command of the siege forces at Datong would be left in the hands of Nikan.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 43:502–503a.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 43:506a.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 43:510a; \textit{Qing shi gao}, biography of Bolo, in Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, p. 255.
Bolo’s arrival completely altered the situation around Taiyuan. As his Manchu troops advanced, Jiang Jianxun’s men fell back upon their former headquarters at Jinci. Bolo was reluctant to attack the town, because he knew that the Tang shrine there was filled with gold and jade that he feared might burn if artillery were used and assault troops unleashed. He therefore proceeded to invest the town but, before Bolo’s men could finish digging a moat, Jiang Jianxun desperately tried to break through the Manchu envelopment with his own cavalry, hoping to flee back to Fenzhou. The Manchu lines were unassailable. Jiang Jianxun was killed, his cavalry elite cut down, and his leaderless infantry back in the town methodically slaughtered. Bolo then proceeded without respite to press on down to the Fen River valley. Subduing Fenzhou, and a number of districts in the southwestern sector near the provincial capital (Wenshui, for instance), Bolo quickly expelled the enemy from Jiaocheng, and then sent a force to Pingyang which drove the southern rebels back down the river. Other soldiers under Bolo’s command then proceeded against a force of ten thousand rebel soldiers at Jiang, defeating the loyalists and beheading over two thousand of them. By July 6, 1649, word had reached Beijing that at least the central part of Shanxi as far south as Hezhou on the Fen River was safely pacified. And within two more weeks Bolo was able to report that the rebel force near Pingyang had been roundly

89 Yang, Taiyuan xianzhi, 16:3; Shizu shilu, 46:538b.
90 Qing shi gao, biography of Bolo, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 255; Shizu shilu, 44:520a. It must have been difficult to keep this army of “imperial rectification” from looting. An edict of June 23, 1649, read: “Armies on the march . . . may not acquire more than the prescribed amount of cooking pots, bedding, fodder knives and horse troughs. Capable officials must be sent to investigate this personally for themselves. . . . They must continue to discipline the soldiers, so that not a single good is forcibly seized from the people. Shortly, let officials be sent to investigate, and if there are any who have plundered and harmed the people, then let them be immediately investigated and severely punished, and let their commanding officers be tried with them. . . . From now on if there are any who steal a single piece of property from a Han person, let them be beheaded on the spot. If their household slaves (jianu) commit a crime, then the punishment must be extended to the head of the household.” Shizu shilu, 44:512.
defeated by Manchu troops and forced to flee across the Yellow River into Shaanxi.91

Because of this good news, orders were issued from Beijing to Bolo to return to the capital with his troops. Bolo respectfully suggested that this would be a mistake. Even though Taiyuan, Fenzhou, and Pingyang had all been recovered, many local districts were still in arms against the Qing. If he did withdraw from the central and southern portions of the province at this point, the rebel remnants would fill the void he left behind. All that had been won would be lost again.92 The Manchu prince’s warning was substantiated by a fresh outbreak in Pingyang prefecture in mid-August. On August 28, 1649, Governor Zhu Shichang sent a memorial to Beijing which reported that local “robbers and bandits” had arisen there in large numbers. These were not Shaanxi interlopers but rather local district-level forces that were attacking outposts, and even district capitals. Two Qing officers and the district magistrate of Xiaxian had all been killed. A second report four days later brought slightly better news—Bolo had recovered Xiaoyi district near Fenzhou—but the southern tip of the province was obviously besieged by local bandits and vulnerable to fresh attacks from Shaanxi.93 Dorgon therefore agreed to Bolo’s request that he be allowed to remain in central Shanxi, and the prince-regent would later send additional forces from the northwest under Mandahai to help restore local control to the regular provincial government.94

In the meantime, Dorgon himself made another trip to Datong,

91 Shizhishilu, 44:520a. Li Yukui’s zhai was destroyed when the Qing army reached Pinglu. Though his son was killed, Yukui escaped into Shaanxi where he was eventually apprehended, imprisoned, and executed. Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 422.
92 Qing shi gao, biography of Bolo, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 255.
93 Shizhishilu, 45:527b, 529a.
94 Qing shi gao, biography of Bolo, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 255. The commander of Qing forces in the northwest, Mandahai, was aided by his younger brother Wakda. Both noble Manchus (the two were sons of Daisan, of the royal family) faced the large regular rebel force at Ningwu commanded by General Liu Wei.
arriving there on August 7 with fresh troops for the siege. The purpose of his visit included escorting some of the Khalka Mongols back across the Great Wall. He was thus obliged to leave Datong just as the siege began taking its heaviest toll and, on September 29, 1649, was back once again in Beijing when the tide decisively turned. On that day, the three commanders of the siege—Ajige, Nikan, and Grand Secretary Sunahai—received a secret courier from Datong in their quarters. This man, Captain Liu Bao, brought word to them from Brigade General Yang Zhenwei from within the city walls. Yang’s message read:

We originally belonged to the virtuous people, but were forced to revolt by the rebellious bandit Jiang Xiang. When the Grand Army surrounded Datong we wanted to behead Jiang Xiang and surrender, but unfortunately our strength was wanting. You simply waited. Now our soldiers and civilians are starving and in danger of all dying. We have asked each official [secretly] for a plan, and twenty-three in all have joined us in a conspiracy, agreeing to behead Jiang Xiang and surrender.

The three Manchu commanders consented to the arrangement without consulting the court, because this tallied precisely with the offer which Dorgon had earlier made to the soldiers of Datong. Once Yang Zhenwei received Ajige’s affirmative response, the conspiracy was set in motion. Jiang Xiang’s guards were disarmed, his two brothers (Jiang Lin and Jiang Youguang) were seized, and on October 4 all three men were decapitated. The following day, October 5, after the three men’s heads had been presented to Ajige, Nikan, and Sunahai, the Grand Army entered Datong. One of its first acts upon occupying the city was to raze the city’s walls down to a level of five chi (1.8 meters). Datong was to be a mutineer’s bastion no more.

The fall of Datong did not bring all resistance in Shanxi to an

95 Shizu shilu, 44:523b.
96 Zeng, Shanxi tongzhi, 18:25b.
97 Shizu shilu, 46:535, memorial received in Beijing on October 7, 1649.
98 Zeng, Shanxi tongzhi, 18:26a; Shizu shilu, 46:535; Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 422.
end, but it certainly did mark the conclusion of the mutiny in the northern part of the province. In the city itself, some of the freebooters who had formed part of Jiang Xiang’s quasi-private army were now incorporated into the Qing banner forces.\(^9\) Elsewhere, mutinous units like General Liu Wei’s army at Ningwu saw no alternative but to turn themselves over to the Qing. The day after Jiang’s assassination, Liu’s army, which controlled nearly all of the upper Fen valley, surrendered \emph{en masse} to Mandahai, and the north of the province was again largely at peace.\(^{100}\)

The victory in the north freed Mandahai’s troops to help Bolo subdue southern Shanxi. There, local bandits—some of whom would continue to roam the province for years—with paramilitary units, bearing banners, operating alone or in conjunction, had overrun many district capitals. In the far southwest, for instance, a major resistance force under Yu Yin and Han Zhaoxuan had taken the city of Puzhou on the Yellow River and, with the help of Shaanxi forces, had avowed its allegiance to the Yongli Emperor. The Qing crushed this uprising ruthlessly. Drawing upon the help of Shaanxi Viceroy Meng Qiaofang, the imperial troops stormed Puzhou. As described in the official battle report by the local commander of the Pingyuan garrison, the Manchu and Han generals launched a carefully coordinated attack on Puzhou shortly before dawn on November 11, 1649. One group of Manchu troops used scaling ladders to climb the north wall, while others blocked off other exits from the city. The scaling party entered the city at 5 A.M., and began a systematic slaughter that lasted until noon and took approximately ten thousand lives. “Corpses filled the streets and thoroughfares.” Some of the defenders tried to fight their way

\(^9\) Wang Fuchen is a good example of this sort of person. Wang, a former outlaw, had been a colonel under Jiang Xiang. After surrendering, he enlisted in the Solid White Banner and became a member of the Imperial Bodyguard. His accomplishments under Hong Chengchou’s command in the southwest in 1653 led to promotion to brigade-general, and eventually command of the armies of eastern Yunnan. Wang joined Wu Sangui’s revolt in 1674, and nearly lost the imperial side the civil war by taking most of Gansu and Shaanxi away from the Qing. Eventually, Wang hanged himself in 1681 at Xi’an. Hummel, \emph{Eminent Chinese}, pp. 816–817.

\(^{100}\) \emph{Shizu shilu}, 45:534.
out of the southern gate, but over one thousand of those were killed by Manchu-Han troops. Countless more were thrown into salt pools and drowned. Those who managed to swim out of the salt ponds were met on the west bank by Qing soldiers and cut down as they clambered onto the shore. Altogether nearly a hundred loyalist officers and civil officials were killed. What was most telling about the Puzhou massacre was the chilling efficiency with which the bannermen carried out their assignment. In contrast to the feverish bloodlust of the freebooting renegades who conducted most of the slaughter at Yangzhou, Jiangyin, and Jiading, the Manchu-Han forces that “rectified” the loyalists of Puzhou did so with cold calculation. If the Grand Army was aroused by mutineers who would subsequently reject promises of amnesty, then the horrible consequences must be clear to all who observed.

There were still battles to be fought. Meng Qiaofang’s army marched and rode to Ronghe, north of Puzhou on the Yellow River, where one of Jiang Xiang’s allies, General Bai Zhang, had attacked the city with an army of six thousand.

[Colonel Zhao] Guangrui crushed them, decapitating over two thousand. [Bai] Zhang marched north, followed by the imperial army which pressed the outlaws into the river where many drowned. [Bai] Zhang was subsequently struck and beheaded. The surviving outlaws entered Sunjizhen [just south of Ronghe], and were exterminated. We again proceeded toward Jinshi [east of Pingyang] but before we had gone twenty li our army encountered resistance from the intendant appointed by [Jiang] Xiang—Wei Dengfang of the Blue Banner—whose several thousand men relied upon the mountainous terrain [for protection]. His general, Zhang Wanquan, came to his help with another four thousand men to do battle. [Zhao] Guangrui beheaded Wanquan, and returned to attack Dengfang, beheading General Wang Guoxian and another three

101 *Shizu shilu*, 45:9; *Ming-Qing shiliao*, bing, ben 8, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, pp. 256–257. The Pingyuan commander claimed to have killed both Han Zhaoxuan and Yu Yin, the leaders of the loyalist force. However, they or their namesakes were later beheaded at Yuncheng. See below.
thousand men or more. Senior Secretary Dumin was also ordered to attack Jiezhou [east of Puzhou]. He destroyed Bian Wang, Zhang Wu and Dang Zicheng, the chief rebels there; and Yonghe, Jishi and Jiezhou all fell [to our troops]. Dumin exterminated the remaining bandits at Houma postal station. Gente also destroyed Guo Zhong-jie, who had been appointed chief military commissioner [by Jiang Xiang]. In the 9th lunar month [October 6–November 3], [Zhao] Guangrui advanced against Yuncheng, beheading [Yu] Yin and [Han] Zhaoxuan so that all of the treacherous rebels who were [Jiang] Xiang’s followers were utterly destroyed.103

Other imperial units cleared the highway between Taiyuan and Pingyang. Two of the district capitals, Taigu and Pingyao, refused to surrender. In both cases no quarter was given: the rebels were overwhelmed and killed.104 To the east, near the Hebei-Henan border in the Taihang range, rebels had cordoned off the city of Lu’an, occupying most of the districts between it and Pingyang on the north-south highway. In late November, 1649, two columns of Manchu-Han troops were sent out from the Fen valley by Man-dahai. The resistance was stronger than expected; the defenders, both mounted and afoot, were well armed. Nevertheless, the Qing troops pushed on, district by district, fighting along the way, until they had reached Lu’an which gave up without a struggle. The “bandits” had fled elsewhere, and would prove to be a problem for civil administrators of the province later when the Grand Army was withdrawn to maintain a cordon sanitaire around Beijing; but the fall of Lu’an meant that Shanxi had officially been “pacified.” Henceforth, local control and the suppression of criminal or resistance forces would depend upon the regular civil authorities. The Jiang Xiang mutiny was officially settled.105

102 Zhangjing was a rank assigned to many Manchu banner officers.
103 Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268. See also Shizu shilu, 45:528–529, 533b–534a, and 46:542a.
104 Shizu shilu, 46:544b.
105 Shizu shilu, 46:545a; Qing shi gao, biography of Liang Huafeng, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 255.
The Subjugation of the West

While Meng Qiaofang's Shaanxi forces were marching to the aid of Bolo and Mandahai, the province they had left behind predictably roiled with fresh rebellions in response to the resurgence of the Southern Ming court and the Jiang Xiang mutiny. In the southern part of Shaanxi—which was assigned by Dorgon to Wu Sangui, the Prince Who Pacifies the West (Ping xi wang)—a man named Zhu Senfu, who claimed to be a member of the Ming royal family, named himself Prince of Qin. His main supporter was a local outlaw, Zhao Ronggui, whose ten-thousand-man army defended the prince in his headquarters at Jiezhou, not far from the Sichuan border. Wu Sangui, with the help of Imperial Guardsman Li Guohan and General Xu Zhankui, killed more than seven thousand men when they attacked Jiezhou. Both the outlaw and prince's bodies were among the corpses later discovered in the rubble.\(^{106}\)

On the heels of the Jiezhou incident, a major rebellion broke out at Yan'an. The governor there was Wang Zhengzhi (jinshi 1628, Beizhili), who had been Vice-Minister of Finance under the Ming, and who had been named to that same position under the Qing. In 1645, Wang had been appointed Right Vice-President of War, though actually posted into the field to serve as governor of Yan'an. When the Jiang Xiang revolt first broke out, Governor Wang had sent his ranking military commander, General Wang Yongqiang, to prepare defenses against the rebel. Instead General Wang had contacted the Jiang Xiang forces secretly, and then had mutinied. According to a report from Governor Huang Erxing, on April 19, 1649, the mutineers had attacked Yan'an, taken the city and surrounding nineteen districts, and killed Governor Wang Zhengzhi.

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106 Shizu shilu, 42:497b–498a; Qing shi gao, biography of Xu Zhankui, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 275–276. Wu Sangui absorbed some of these rebel units into his own personal army, and was consequently reprimanded by the Qing court for not having killed a number of Ming officers and soldiers captured on that battlefield. Tsao Kai-fu, "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories against the Manchu Throne in China," p. 51.
and the circuit intendant. Liu Denglou, the garrison commander at Yulin, between Yan’an and the Great Wall, also decided to mutiny. Colonel Liu Denglou had been a subordinate of Liu Fangming, regional vice-commander of the troops left behind to garrison Ningxia when the Sichuan campaign forces were mustered. Liu Denglou had earned considerable military honor in the campaign against Ma De in 1647, and was rewarded with the Yulin garrison. Now, hearing of Jiang Xiang’s revolt, he “changed clothing” and declared himself “Great Ming Regional Pacification Commander.” After killing the circuit intendant, Colonel Liu sent a letter to Liu Fangming, asking for support and aid. Liu Fangming, furiously loyal to the Qing by now, showed the letter to Ningxia Governor Li Jian, and vowed his determination to crush the rebel.  

Before any of the major Qing officials in the province could do much more than absorb the alarming news that two major military centers, Yan’an and Yulin, were both in open rebellion, reports reached Governor Huang Erxing on April 23, 1649 that Wang Yongqiang had occupied still other district capitals, that the Mongol leader Zhamusu had taken arms against the Qing in the Helan Mountains, and that Liu Denglou had allied with Zhamusu and instigated a mutiny at the Dingbian garrison where he had won the populace’s support. Obviously, throughout Ningxia, in reaction to the Jiang Xiang revolt, many of the professional soldiers who had originally accepted the Qing were having second thoughts; and some of those were now willfully rebelling against the new government in northern Shaanxi.

Wu Sangui’s army made short shrift of Wang Yongqiang’s rebel forces. On May 8, 1649, Wu reported that his men had encountered Wang’s army, routed the enemy, and taken more than seven thousand heads. Moving north, Wu Sangui’s troops captured
and killed some of the local district officials appointed by Wang. On July 2, it was reported that Wu, gusa ejen Mergen, and Li Guohan had led their first attack on Yan’an prefecture, where many of the outlaw bands simply melted away at the sight of the imperial forces.\textsuperscript{112} The rebellion was by no means over after the city was retaken: local bandits northwest of Xi’an had to be quelled, and throughout the month of August, 1649, the provincial forces fought bands of rebels like the two thousand men led by “Iron Cudgel” Zhao (Zhao Tiegun) around Yan’an.\textsuperscript{113} All of these engagements were minor ones, however, and more a matter of mopping up resistance from small, fairly isolated bands than fighting major armies. Still, the casualties on the rebel side were far from negligible. Through those several weeks, Wu Sangui and Li Guohan’s men beheaded at least four thousand six hundred “outlaws”; on September 5, they could claim that Yan’an and Suide prefectures were under complete control.\textsuperscript{114} Yulin, too, was brought under control about the same time. While Li Guohan and Li Jian’s soldiers fought the Mongol Zhamusu, Liu Fangming moved along the Great Wall to engage his former lieutenant, Liu Denglou, in battle at a place called Guantuan Manor near Yulin. The battle fought by the two sides was one of the most severe in the campaign. In fact, at one point Liu Fangming’s own officers threatened to withdraw under the heavy arrow fire of the enemy, but Fangming taunted them back into battle and eventually defeated and then killed Liu Denglou.\textsuperscript{115}

The imperial forces’ victories in central Shaanxi and Ningxia coincided with Meng Qiaofang’s triumphant march through southern Shanxi against Jiang Xiang’s allies. By the time Wu Sangui, Li Guohan, and Liu Fangming had finished their operations, Meng was ready to return to Shaanxi, where he led his men quickly across the province to resume his place at the head of the forces besieging the rebels under Ding Guodong at Suzhou. Now, with

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 43:506b, 517a.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 45:526b–527.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 45:528b. See also Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, pp. 274–275.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} \textit{Qing shi gao}, biography of Liu Fangming, in Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, p. 270; \textit{Shizu shilu}, 46:544a.
\end{itemize}
his rear secure and a full contingent of soldiers at his disposal, Meng found Suzhou an easy prize, and it was almost anticlimactic to attack and take the Muslim stronghold. "In the eleventh lunar month [December 4, 1649–January 1, 1650]," Viceroy Meng laconically reported to Dorgon, "our braves took Suzhou. They killed [Ding] Guodong, [Tu] Luntai, and such of their partisans as Hei Chengyun." Altogether, he said, more than five thousand rebels were beheaded. "West of the river all is at peace."116 In the course of a little over two years Meng Qiaofang had recovered over one hundred cities and fortified towns. President of the Board of War after 1650, Meng became one of the most highly decorated of all the Chinese who served the Manchus. He was ennobled as a baron in 1652, and would be described by the Kangxi Emperor—who saw him posthumously entered in the Temple of Eminent Statesmen—as one of the two most useful Han officers in the conquest of China. The victories that earned him such merit, however, took a terrible human toll. During his tenure as viceroy of Shaanxi, Meng killed or captured more than 176,000 people.117

The fall of Suzhou and the death of Ding Guodong and Turumtay decisively ended the 1648–1649 Muslim rebellion in western Gansu. Nevertheless, in order for the area to remain settled and under control, pacification policies would have to be devised to keep those Muslim communities reasonably content and free from conflict. Initially, this meant tried-and-true, conventional methods of social welfare and administrative improvement. The new civil governor, Zhang Zhongyuan, who entered the province on March 29, 1650, embodied these measures. At first horrified by the sight

116 Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268. See also Lanzhou fazhi [Lanzhou prefectural gazetteer], juan 6, also cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 280. Word of the fall of Suzhou reached the court on January 16, 1650.

117 Schram, Mongours, p. 54; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 572. Four years after Meng Qiaofang’s death in 1658, a stele was placed in the Jianfu Temple in Xi’an by the grateful gentry of Shaanxi, praising him for extirpation of "spurious" officials and troops. There was also a stele, the text of which was written by Wang Shizhen, placed in a temple in Beijing. Zhou Weizhou, "Shaanxi faxian de liang tong you guan Mingmo nongmin zhanzheng de beishi," p. 47.
of the "ravaged masses" when he reached Gongchang on May 2, he felt it his first duty to comfort the "hundred surnames," and—the prototypical civil official coming in to heal the wounds of war once the campaigners had moved on—he soon ascertained by personally making inquiries in surrounding villages that the inhabitants of the province suffered much at the hands of venal yamen officials. Military officials, in particular, were the cause of much complaint, and Governor Zhang accordingly encouraged formal legal arraignments, and promised swift punishment. But he was also deeply worried about conditions in hexi, "west of the river" and on up the Gansu corridor. Riding across the Yellow River, he was awed by the desert, and even frightened of the "barbarians" he now saw all around him.

I announced our dynasty's virtue and majesty to keep them in order. I was prepared to distribute tobacco, tea, and silver certificates to them as bounty, commanding them both to fear and to enjoy [our presence].

On June 27, 1650, Zhang Zhongyuan reached Ganzhou, where his immediate problem was deciding how much bounty to distribute among the garrison troops there. A stickler for regulations, Zhang did not think that the former extremely low quotas were appropriate, but he did not dare on his own to charge what he did want to distribute to office expenses. He therefore personally rewarded money and clothing to the soldiers and officers according to their rank, having had the forethought to bring those supplies along to encourage the military support of the garrisons along the frontier. His policy, he felt, was a great success. Upon receiving the bounty—he was quick to note in his report to the court—the troops huzzahed, "May the Emperor live forever," and saw Governor Zhang off with great fanfare. The experience convinced him that the soldiers were solidly behind the dynasty, and that future mutinies might be prevented.

Moreover, it is said that in the Gansu region there are not only Muslim rebellions. Constant uproar is the rule rather than the ex-

118 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 282.
ception, with officials being murdered for the goods [in their possession]. Frontier customs being so horrible, they may let themselves be pacified but they do not let themselves be won over. Fortunately, today’s pacification officials are not so easily compromised. The garrison commanders are deeply concerned for the welfare of their officers and soldiers. They pacify in harmony and rectitude, and each one carries out his duties conscientiously. Consequently, of all the civil and military officials, high and low, there is not a single one who does not respectfully uphold the law. At first, I experienced the gravest concern for this region, but that has changed to great relief. The emperor and the prince-regent can now be freed from the anxiety with which they once looked toward the west. 119

For Zhang Zhongyuan, then, the best way to alleviate the ravages of war and rebellion was to have incorruptible officials encourage loyalty and respect for the law. But such measures as paying military bounties to frontier armies, while perhaps well designed to gain the immediate favor of the garrison troops and to protect the inhabitants from looting, could not offer a long-term solution to the problem of communal conflict on the frontier.

Earlier, however, such a solution had been proposed. On June 25, 1648, while the Muslim rebels and the Qing forces still engaged in hostilities, He Bi, a supervising secretary in the Office of Scrutiny of the Board of War, presented a long and important memorial to the throne about ways to exert local control over that particularly troubled region. He began by praising the speed with which Meng Qiaofang had succeeded, in less than half a month, in recovering the major cities of Gansu by crushing the Muslim rebels. “Subduing such despicable wretches” (xiaochour) was “like catching foxes and rats in your hands,” but it had been done with despatch thanks to the prince-regent’s majesty and charisma, and thanks to the fighting spirit of Governor-General Meng’s troops. There was nonetheless the very great possibility that conflict with the Muslims might recur. No one—He quickly added—could disagree with the sage policy of imperial clemency, but it might be pointed out that those who committed such rav-

119 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 283.
ages (Milayin, after all, was at that time momentarily a colonel in the Qing army) were not all killed. Furthermore, Muslims and Chinese were continuing to live alongside each other in the major cities of the northwest. "Their customs are different and this results eventually in mutual suspicion." He therefore proposed that a policy of ethnic resettlement be adopted. Muslim communities, he suggested, should be located at least fifty li from the Han zhou, xian, or wei nearest to them, wherever there were secluded areas suitable for colonization. There they should be taken with their families, and transformed from martial horsemen into peaceful peasants.

Forbid them to breed horses or to keep weapons. Command their religious leaders to take charge, regulating their movements back and forth. Let them all cultivate the soil, and so gradually allay their ferocious natures.

According to this "long-term plan," local Chinese inhabitants should also make periodic surprise visits to such Muslim communities to make sure that these rules were being carefully observed.120

He Bi's segregation policy received an imperial endorsement: the Muslims were henceforth to be resettled and kept apart.121 With the help of their Mongol and Mongour allies, the Qing administrators moved Hami and Chinese Muslim communities a considerable distance away from settled urban clusters, market towns, and garrisons; they also tried to sever all relations between Suzhou Muslims and Hami itself. Jiayu Pass was blocked off, and the Qing government was to refuse to accept tribute from Western

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120 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 282.
121 One important reason for the government's decision to resettle the Muslim communities in this way was its own experience in interracial dwelling. As we have seen, in both Liaoning and later in Beijing, the Manchus had developed the practice of separating ethnic groups in an effort to forestall communal tension. This kind of segregated ethnic resettlement was used later to deal with Muslim rebels in the 19th century. When Muslims surrendered to Zuo Zongtang, especially in the Suzhou area, "The Moslems were ordered to migrate in groups to new isolated areas." Wen-djang Chu, The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China, pp. 149–150.
Asia until 1855, when the Manchus accepted the apologies of a Mogul embassy for Hami’s alliance with Ding Guodong.\textsuperscript{122}

The Muslim resettlement did not put an end to all rebellious activity. In Xining, where the Mongour tusi had stood by the government during the Gansu rebellion, a revolt broke out in 1653, led by a Muslim mulla. But even though some Qing officials then claimed that the leader of the revolt had been in touch with Hami, careful investigation proved this not to be the case.\textsuperscript{123} Although there are no grounds for attributing inter-religious harmony to the Qing policy of segregating these different communities, there did ensue more than a century of peace along the northwestern frontier.\textsuperscript{124}

**Southeastern Shaanxi and the Han River Highlands**

While the dust finally settled in the arid northwest, southeastern Shaanxi continued to remain a problematical zone of administration for the Qing authorities. To some degree this was because that part of China, well within the Great Wall, was oddly enough more savage and less accessible to military force than the frontier zone. In the latter region, traders had settled in mercantile cities and garrison towns, offering supplies and refreshment to the caravaneers, herdsmen, and bandits around them. These urban oases had pro-

\textsuperscript{122} Fletcher, “China’s Northwest,” p. 21.

\textsuperscript{123} Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 283–284. The report is dated January 19, 1654.

\textsuperscript{124} There were, of course, major wars with the Hodja in Yarkand in 1758–1759, and with the Muslims of Ush (Ili) in 1765; but within Gansu itself there were no major rebellions until 1781 and 1784, when it is possible to be much more positive about tracing connections to the Naqshbandiyya “new sect” of Sufi militants. Rossabi notes that later during the Qing, when Muslims rebelled, they did so on their own without the cooperation of Chinese dissidents. Rossabi, “Muslim and Central Asian Revolts,” p. 193. Perhaps this was the result of Manchu apartheid policies, which may ultimately have so separated the Han and Hui as to make them mutually hostile communities during the inter-ethnic struggles of the 1850s and '60s.
vided coherent reservoirs of manpower from their tightly fashioned Muslim communities when the call for rebellion was heard. Once military hostilities were over, however, the concentrated populations of these towns and cities were brought more easily under control than scattered rural inhabitants. In the southeast, on the other hand, resistance was not so tightly focussed. In contrast to the cities and towns of the caravan routes were the small stockades and mountain redoubts of a forested terrain where men could hide out for years from their pursuers. As we have seen, Ren Zhen's earlier campaigns around Xing'an may have temporarily helped the local magistrate to rule, but his victories did not settle the conflict definitively.

One reason for this was proximity to Sichuan, which meant that it was much easier for rebels and outlaws in this part of Shaanxi to get in touch with Ming loyalist groups in the south. Thus the army of Ming Colonel Tang Zhongheng, which operated along the Sichuan-Shaanxi border, included two Ming princes (Zhu Changying and Zhu Youdu), one Ming commander, and one Ming censorial military supervisor, as well as a Mongol commander named Shibulai. When Ren Zhen defeated Tang, after a harsh campaign during the last days of the Jiang Xiang revolt, many Ming seals were captured by the Qing troops, so that the connections with the loyalist movement were quite obvious to all.

Perhaps more characteristic of this region than a border-crossing Ming loyalist force was the zhai-dwelling confederation of outlaws under the "Earl of Xing'an" (Xing'an bo), Sun Shoujin. Although the name suggests that Sun Shoujin was Shoufa's brother,

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125 Breaking up the Muslim communities into smaller farming units may have helped alleviate the immediate problem of rebellion, but it later created a greater capacity for revolt across the countryside—as became evident in the Muslim revolts of the mid-19th century.

126 In the 12th lunar month of 1650 [December 23, 1650–January 20, 1651], He Keting led a revolt in Xing'an but he was quickly captured and killed. Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268.

127 Shizu shilu, 46:544a. Tang was beheaded, and the rest handed over to authorities in Xi'an for punishment. Ren Zhen's report is dated November 23, 1649.
it is even more probable that this outlaw leader had taken on the name as a kind of rebel mantle after Sun Shoufa's initial coalition was defeated. Sun Shoujin occupied a mountain fort at Donghe. His major ally, whose own fort was on the Ren River, was General Tan Qi; and there were another thirteen allied stockades built on the hills all around Sun's fort on Banchang Mountain, just south of Ziyang. The location of these redoubts was unknown until Qing Major Yang Jiuming scouted the area in the late spring of 1652, and then reported the existence of the rebel camps to his superiors. By then Ren Zhen (who had been awarded the title of tutor to the heir apparent for his military victories in these rude highlands) had pleaded ill health and had returned to the capital, where he was attached to the Han Solid Yellow Banner. Shanxi Governor Ma Zhixian therefore had to turn to someone else, and appointed General Zhao Guangrui to assemble a punitive force in Xing'an in order to destroy the rebels. 128

General Zhao made careful preparations, getting permission to request neighboring districts to send supplies to Ziyang to outfit an extended campaign. By May 21, 1652, he was ready to send his expedition out of Ziyang, under Major Zhang Dejun, and ford the Han River heading toward Banchang Mountain. Unlike many outlaws who fled at the first sight of government troops, Sun Shoujin's allies immediately girded the line of mountain tops, brandishing long rifles and challenging the columns of Qing troops. The battle raged for a long time. The Qing column withstood the initial fire on its flanks, but the Manchu-Han troops then had to fight their way up the mountainside against a crushing hail of rocks and missiles from the rebels above. By the end of the day, when light waned, the Qing troops had not been able to break through the defile, and it was only the next day, after flanking the "longhairs" (changtou), that they defeated the outpost that guarded the inner reaches further on. That same day, May 22, the imperial forces marched on, planning to camp in the high mountains. However, they ran into an ambush, and fought till dusk, with both sides taking heavy casualties. It was not until the day after that, May 23,
that the mountain mists cleared away enough for Major Zhang Dejun to assess the situation. As zhai after zhai loomed into sight on the mountains above them, the Qing soldiers realized that only an extended siege would serve to reduce Sun Shoujin’s defenses. Major Zhang divided his forces into a number of different groups which were assigned to pin down individual redoubts, as well as to block off escape from the rear. Thus encircling the bandits, he hoped to starve them into surrender.

More than six weeks later, on July 1, 1652, Sun’s Ren River ally, Tan Qi, made up his mind to surrender to the Qing. Fearing that once Sun Shoujin’s camp fell—an eventuality which appeared more and more likely—his men would have to bear the brunt of an extermination campaign, Tan requested amnesty from Major Zhang. When clemency was granted, Tan’s retinue, which included two Ming colonels, one magistrate, four light colonels, four majors and nine captains, “all shaved their heads.” While yet other bands also decided to acknowledge Qing sovereignty in that area, Sun’s hope for rescue from his allies quickly waned. Shortly after Tan’s surrender, Major Zhang attacked the Banchang encampment, and killed the rebel leader along with many of his followers. The zhai was then literally ploughed under. 129

The defeat of Sun Shoujin left only one major outlaw group still at large in southeastern Shaanxi, and even that band knew the end was near. The “Pole Bandits” (Gan zei) led by He Shisheng had terrorized Luonan district since 1647. According to the district gazetteer, this well armed group of five hundred men would periodically descend upon valley villages and plunder them, killing hundreds of men and women. “This was truly the greatest scourge experienced by the people of Luo[nan] in a thousand or more years.” 130 In 1651, however, He Shisheng was drastically defeated by a Qing contingent. 131 Two years later, hoping to bolster his forces, he made an alliance with another local bandit named Wang You, and the two groups of men coalesced. Already, however, the

129 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 276–278; Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 269.
130 Luonan zhi [Luonan gazetteer], cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 279.
131 Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268.
district inhabitants of Luonan were forming "righteous braves" (yi yong) to hunt down the outlaws. Wang You therefore betrayed He Shisheng to the authorities in exchange for his own life, and the Pole Bandits were exterminated.\textsuperscript{132}

Although the chronicles of southeastern Shaanxi during the first decade of Qing rule are mainly accounts of crushing one band after the other, the pacification of the entire province was not just a matter of military suppression. Had the government's hard-pressed forces been compelled to destroy or imprison every single rebel "within the passes," the provincial authorities could never have mustered the manpower to govern effectively. Even as aggressive military commanders defeated individual rebel bands, the overall success of the government's settlement depended upon securing the surrender of other outlaw or loyalist units. And the question then became what was to be done with those new adherents. Meng Qiaofang described the problem—and proposed a solution—quite straightforwardly in 1651:

The customs of Shaanxi are cruel and harsh. The soil is barren and the people poor. Moreover, there are many high mountains and deep valleys which serve as refuges for outlaws and robbers. Since our great Qing stabilized the realm (ding ding), we have swept away the bandit evil. I have promulgated the emperor's benevolence and sternness, and repeatedly both soothed (fu) and attacked (jiao) [the rebels]. All of the major bandits have already been exterminated, one after the other. Only in the mountains of the north and south are there still some bad elements hiding in the thickets, a couple of hundred or perhaps sixty [in each gang], emerging at odd intervals to plunder the villages. When I send troops to kill or arrest them, they have already fled back into the mountains; and then when the soldiers have been recalled, [the bandits] again grab the opportunity to skulk out and wreak terror on the people. According to the emperor's benevolent proclamation, which we received earlier, all of the outlaws and robbers in each local area were either driven [to crime] by hunger and cold, or forced [into banditry] by corrupt officials. They are thus to be pitied—and if they can reform them-

\textsuperscript{132} Shangzhou zhi [Shangzhou district gazetteer], \textit{juan} 14, in Xie, \textit{Qingchu nong-min}, pp. 278–279.
selves, then they will be soothed [i.e. allowed to surrender] and their crimes will be forgiven.

Humbly sharing the emperor's mercy, I have [issued] special [orders to] implement the policy of amnesty (zhaoji). As soon as that was done, there began arriving, one on the heels of the other, those who sincerely submitted in surrender. Yet the original reason for their becoming implicated as outlaws was starvation and exposure. If they go off one by one to become peasants again, for that same reason they will have no family ties, no land to be tilled, no seeds to plant, and no stock to be tended. And if we order them to become traders, then they will have no capital to use, not to speak of their being unaccustomed to management. If we intend to split them up and send each to a garrison to be enrolled in the military registers, [we must remember that frontier posts in] Gansu are three thousand li away, and in Ningxia two thousand li distant. Halfway there they will come to dread the hardship of travel and perforce run away, only to join together later [to rob]. Soon we would be back in the same intolerable situation as before.\textsuperscript{133}

What Meng described had already been happening throughout the province. Prefectural reports from Yan'an, for instance, stated that military groups which had been allowed to surrender not only required special handling and preferential treatment; their individual leaders had been allowed to keep their commands under erstwhile regular military authority, and thus were virtually autonomous.\textsuperscript{134} What Meng Qiaofang therefore proposed was a one-time-only solution. As each group of outlaws accepted amnesty, they should be assigned collectively to the provincial treasurer, who would pay them monthly rations out of tax funds which he normally used to make up quota deficiencies. By thus holding the purse strings to local military salaries at the provincial level, the state treasurer would retain central authority over local defense budgets—at least for this kind of incorporated former rebel or outlaw unit. The new soldiers would then be attached temporarily to the roster of the

\textsuperscript{133} Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 276.

\textsuperscript{134} Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 275. This report, which is dated November 4, 1650, is not complete: the last portion of the document is obliterated.
provincial commander-in-chief and trained for “imperial pacification” (zheng)—that is, given regular advanced military training. Then, as regular military units lost their own men through attrition, these new recruits could gradually be assigned to fill quotas in their place. In the meantime, the Boards of Revenue and War in Beijing would each receive a register (ce) listing the names and rations of each ding so absorbed by the imperial military administration.135

Although Meng Qiaofang’s suggestion was accepted as an interim solution, the question of financing long-term military costs remained unsolved. These new recruits could be carried for awhile on the provincial treasurer’s rosters and paid with surpluses from one area earmarked to cover land tax deficits in another. But over time these funds would eventually be exhausted. Meng Qiaofang therefore also proposed that both in Shaanxi and Sichuan (over which he concurrently held the post of governor-general after 1653) the old system of self-supporting military colonies (tuntian) be revived. If possible, the members of the army of occupation should till the land themselves; but, if the soldiers were unwilling to do so, then peasants should be brought in to “implement the regulations for military colonies for them.”136 Nevertheless, it would be many years before Shaanxi recovered from the devastating and disastrous calamities of the conquest era. In the southeastern highlands, for instance, the mountain slopes were overrun

135 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 276. One of the difficulties in returning to the former Ming military ration system was that a number of provinces simply did not have reliable registers. This was especially true in the west and northwest. See, for example, the memorial dated October 23, 1661 in Gugong bowuyuan Ming-Qing dang’anbu, comp., Qingdai dang’an shiliao congbian, fascicle 4, pp. 18–19.

136 Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 269; Er chen zhu, 2:8a. In Shaanxi, the tuntian system had fallen into complete disuse during the late Ming, and during the Chongzheng reign many of the colonies’ fields had simply been taken over by local magnates. After the system was revived by Meng Qiaofang, the soldiers did prove unwilling to till the land themselves and threatened to mutiny if forced to farm. Instead, peasants were brought in as tenants of the military fields. Gu Yanwu, Tinglin shi wen ji, Tinglin wenji, 1:11b–12a.
with new growth and wild animals; and farmers were replaced by hunters and herb gatherers. Not until the development of maize cultivation, and the immigration of “shed people” (peng min) from the coast in the early 18th century, did the region come to agricultural life again.\(^{137}\)

**The Shanxi Mountain Outlaws**

Shanxi, to the east, was also in a ravaged state after the Jiang Xiang rebellion was suppressed. In theory, pacification was now over; in fact, mopping up operations were considerable military affairs, and responsibility for them was now placed in the hands of the new civil governor, Liu Hongyu. Liu, who held a Ming degree, was a Chinese bannerman.\(^{138}\) Entering the province on horseback through Gu Pass in the middle of summer, he found huts and cottages in ruin, and the people wasted “as from consumption.” Bandits had “trampled down” the counties and districts of the east, and the difficulties of restoring a modicum of prosperity were nearly overwhelming. Governor Liu dutifully ordered that reconstruction and rehabilitation measures be put into effect; he proclaimed an imperial amnesty, and formulaically encouraged the people to resume their former occupations.\(^{139}\) But even as the peasants tightened their belts until the next harvest, outlaws continued

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137 Evelyn S. Rawski, “Agricultural Development in the Han River Highlands.” During the 18th century, the highlands became a very important manufacturing and mining area. Coal was mined, paper was made, iron was cast, and lumber was prepared for the market. Some of the paper factories in the area had several hundred workers each, and the iron factories employed tens of thousands of people. The factories were owned by rich merchants from Xi’an or Hanzhong, who turned over management to local labor contractors. Throughout this period, however, the region continued to be characterized by social banditry. The area was devastated during the White Lotus rebellion of 1796–1801 and never recovered its economic vitality thereafter. Fu Yiling, “Qingdai zhongye Chuan-Shan-Hu san sheng bianqu jingji xingtai de bianhua.”


139 *Ming-Qing shiliao*, *bing*, ben 8, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 257.
to prey upon villagers without the slightest interference from official forces. Many of these gangs antedated the Jiang Xiang revolt, being as much a part of the mountain landscape of Shanxi as its watchtowers and fortresses. Two main groups of outlaws, however, were especially intolerable, the bandits of the Wutai Mountains originally led by Gao Ding, and the forces that had rebelled in the south that now were led by the elusive Zhang Wugui.

The Mt. Wutai area, in eastern Shanxi, was a perfect refuge for outlaws raiding down through the passes into the towns around Zhending in western Hebei: “the forests were thick and the mountains dense.” Banditry was endemic, as General Tong Yangliang explained to his superiors in Beijing:

Because the mountains of Wutai are strung together for over eight hundred li, filled with lofty peaks and inaccessible precipices, with narrow refuges and deep gullies, they are called “the place to flee soldiers” (bi bing zhi di). Thus have the bandits Long-legged Liu [i.e., Liu Changtui] and Third Gao [i.e., Gao San] assembled a group of desperadoes who use the mountains as a refuge from which to wreak havoc. Our troops are few and the mountains are vast. When the soldiers pacify in the east, the bandits flee to the west. When we strike in the west, they hide in the east. We have in this manner deployed our troops for a full year. Even though over half [of the outlaws] have been destroyed or have been granted amnesty, we have not yet been able to wipe them out completely. Long-legged Liu’s force weakened, but he slipped away; and while we repeatedly searched for Third Gao, he too escaped, only suddenly to become a blight [again].

A plan had evolved, even before Governor Liu arrived, to blockade the Wutai outlaws—“Third Gao” (Gao Ding) and “Long-legged Liu” (actually named Liu Yongzhong)—at their main encampment in a place called Caojiazhaihui (Mountain stockade of the Cao family). The passes leading into that area had been barricaded by a force of over 1900 soldiers from different garrisons

140 Qing shi gao, biography of Li Yinzu, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 257.
141 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 258.
around the province. However, Governor Liu did not believe that this strategy was going to succeed. Unless a more forward policy were adopted, the outlaws would continue to move at will in the higher mountains, easily evading the government troops. Liu Hongyu therefore decided on his own to assemble a joint force of 300 regular Manchu armored infantry, 520 of his men, and 770 soldiers from the Ningwu garrison to attack the Wutai stockades and destroy the bandits once and for all.  

The brief campaign was launched during the early summer of 1650. It soon proved to be a failure. The outlaws simply melted back into the mountains, or headed farther north to escape through the passes near Mt. Heng. Consequently, Liu and General Tong Yangliang held a planning conference at Daizhou on October 6. In Tong’s words, “we agreed in general that we should seize the mountain stockades and occupy each of the major roads.” This time, greater precautions were taken to prevent the bandits from escaping. Tong tried to block mountain passes north and south by sending special detachments under his own lieutenants; and in the north, at Hunyuan, he ordered that country militia (minzhuang bingding) be enrolled to supplement his forces and block egress from the Mt. Heng area. Yet once again, most of the outlaws escaped capture or death. Receiving intelligence of the government troops’ movements, the gangs simply split up and fled to other mountains, or into densely wooded foothill areas. In fact, the government forces’ attack actually had the effect of increasing bandit depredations, because—ousted from their base of operations—the rebels were forced to plunder settled villages along the way. Perhaps for this very reason—that is, the accelerated disorder caused by unsuccessful government campaigns—the authorities backed off. By 1651, when he was informed that Gao Ding had fled across the border into Beizhili, Governor Liu simply gave up plans for continuing the campaign altogether. The government troops could easily destroy the “lairs” Gao had left behind, but it would be vir-

142 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 257–258.
143 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 258.
144 Ibid.
tually impossible, in the absence of a coordinated regional campaign, to destroy the rebels with one province's forces alone.\textsuperscript{145}

From the fall of 1651, then, until the spring of 1654, Gao Ding and the numerous small bands of the Wutai region continued to move in and out of the mountains and across the Shanxi-Zhili border virtually unhindered. As long as Gao and his men stayed immured within the high mountains, they were not likely to draw attention to themselves. But in the winter months of 1654, his outlaws moved out of the Shanxi range and down into the Hutuo River valley to the flatlands near Zhending, the important garrison town astride the highway crossing to Beijing. Alarmed local commanders there soon called for a cooperative campaign with soldiers from both Beizhili and Shanxi, and the Zhili governor, Wang Laiyong, brought Gao Ding to the court's attention and argued that the time had come for a concerted military effort against the Wutai outlaws. On April 28, 1654, the throne endorsed the project: "Good. Speedily execute your plans."\textsuperscript{146}

The joint campaign was conducted under the general aegis of

\textsuperscript{145} Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 258–259.

\textsuperscript{146} Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 258. Wang was seconded in his request by the former Ming official, aged Lu Guonan. Governor Liu Hongyu at first welcomed the plan for a combined military campaign, and announced that he had called in his major garrison commanders and was making arrangements to confer with his counterpart, Governor Wang, in Zhili. Ultimately, however, Liu resisted the idea of simply bringing the two provincial military groups together under joint supervision, arguing that the campaign required the leadership of a higher-ranking figure who could command the obedience of regular provincial officers beneath him. Liu may have been pointing to a potential difficulty in chain of command in making this suggestion, but there was also the suggestion that he wished to place responsibility for major decisions in someone else's hands. He pointed out, for instance, that Gao Di was now in Zhili, a full 400 li from his original base at Wutai in Shanxi. Therefore, he argued, the court should appoint someone in Zhili—and specifically a senior official like Lu Guonan—to take charge of the campaign. The Board of War rejected this request. On June 16, 1654, its officials pointed out that Lu Guonan was virtually retired from public service, and reiterated the feasibility of a joint command. Ibid., p. 259.
the Board of War, whose president, Ma Mingpei, was a descen-
dant of the famous Liaoyang military family whose women had
committed mass suicide in 1621 because they thought that their
husbands had died in battle against the Manchus. Actually, of
course, the men had surrendered, and Ma Mingpei himself was a
Chinese Bordered Red bannerman.\[147]\ Under his administrative su-
pervision, the joint Shanxi-Zhili force combined extermination
with a policy of selective amnesties, announcing publicly: “Let
each bandit purge his thoughts and genuinely surrender. If there
are [those who] delay, we will despatch troops to surround and
destroy [them].” Gao Ding himself never formally surrendered,
and may have been killed in a skirmish; but his brother-in-
law, “Three-Dog Dong” (Dong Sangouzi, actually named Dong
Jinglu), did turn himself and his men in, and other bands of out-
laws followed suit as soon as it became obvious that neither prov-
ince offered refuge to them. By late summer, 1654, the Wutai
Mountains were cleared of resisters.\[148]\n
Although Gao Ding had roamed north and south along the
mountain ridges and had moved far into Zhili at times, he and his
men were still firmly based in a single area: the Wutai Mountain
region. The other major bandit group that survived the Jiang
Xiang revolt was not so locally centered. The elusive outlaw
Zhang Wugui was—in contrast to Gao Ding—extraordinarily mo-
bile, riding along the eastern rim of Shanxi from one end of the
province to the other. If he had a single bailiwick, it was the south-
western corner of Shanxi, below Pingyang. But he was found on
so many occasions in the northeast that he cannot be solely identi-

\[147]\ Ma Mingpei was also a classical scholar, and had earned the lower degree by
the age of 17, being a precocious reader and writer. After serving in the
Board of Works under Hung Taiji, he was sent to Shanxi in 1644 to track
down Shun remnants in the Taihang Mountains. Gradually he put together a
contingent of tough Suiyuan troops from what is now Inner Mongolia who
accompanied him to Hunan to campaign in 1645. By 1646 he was assigned
to secure grain supplies in Jiangnan and was named Vice-President of the
Board of Revenue. Ma was so efficient at this that he was named President of
War, the post he now held. *Ma shì jìa pu*, Zuanxiu, n.p.

\[148]\ Ming-Qing shìliào, bǐng, bén 9, in Xie, *Qingchú nòngmín*, p. 260.
fied as a local bandit leader, confined to a single place. In 1649 he was to be found up in Wutai, the following year back in Pingyang, and then again by the end of 1650 in the north once again. Zhang Wugui's extraordinary mobility made him seem all the more dangerous to the authorities, especially because he appeared to arouse local district-level gangs wherever he went. As one official put it after a rebel attack on a district city, Zhang Wugui moved "with the force of a prairie fire which [was so hot that] one could hardly approach." 149

Jiang Xiang's revolt had given Zhang Wugui his first opportunity to forge a major rebel confederation. The disorder engendered by the mutiny throughout Shanxi made it easier to recruit followers, or to persuade smaller outlaw groups to join in a major uprising. And although Zhang had no visible connection with Jiang Xiang, he was able to exploit the Ming loyalist overtones of the resistance to lend his paramilitary forces more of an imperial military character. Whether or not he actually received his official warrants from Ming sympathizers, he did hand out military ranks to lieutenants commanding ancillary gangs. A follower of Zhang's captured much later was found bearing a document of appointment as "lieutenant colonel," dated Yongli 6 and under the rubric "Battalion of Loyalty" (Zhongyi ying). 150 By the early months of

149 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 262. The sources tell us very little about such a legendary figure. Even his name is uncertain. At times he was known as Zhang Wugui; on other occasions he was simply called Zhang Wu. He first appears in the Ming-Qing shiliao in the 7th lunar month of 1646 (August 11–September 8) under the name of Zhang Wu, and is described as being the leader—along with another outlaw named Wang Xiaoqi—of district-level bandits around Pingyang. At the time, he was viewed merely as the local leader of a band of 1,000 men who assembled in high mountain valleys and descended into more settled areas to plunder small villages and hamlets. Only local troops were required to "pacify" his men on this occasion and drive them back into the mountains west of Pingyang. Yuanqu xianzhi [Yuanqu district gazetteer], ch. 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 260.

150 Wenxian congbian, ji 13, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 263. One source claims that Zhang styled himself Prince of Wei. Qing shi gao, biography of Xu Zhankui, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 261.
1649, therefore, Zhang Wugui had assembled a veritable army, led by himself, by his brother Zhang Wuchang, by Wang Shui Tianbing (who is probably the same person as Wang Xiaoqi), and by a man named Yan Ce. This force first attracted the attention of the provincial authorities when it appeared in the northeastern mountains and laid siege to the district capital of Wutai. On February 18, 1649, Zhang Wugui's men nearly took the city walls after a fierce attack; and it was not until a relief force of sixteen hundred men arrived from the provincial capital on February 20 that the imperial soldiers were able to drive off the rebels after killing more than one thousand of them. Zhang Wugui returned briefly to his old haunts in Pingyang, but by 1650 he and Wang (now known to the imperial forces as Wang Taiping) were back in the Wutai area once more, assembling a force near Longquan Pass and threatening Baoding where Lu Guonan had mustered a large garrison of Zhili troops. Qing soldiers were brought back from garrison posts along the Great Wall to drive Zhang back into the Shanxi mountains; and although he once again eluded capture, many of his stockades were destroyed, a number of his men were captured, and two of his generals were beheaded.

For the next four years Zhang Wugui lay low, rebuilding his strength. In 1654, however, he reappeared in southwestern Shanxi again, emerging from the Zhongtiao Mountains to attack the capital of Xiaxian with scaling ladders, and to plunder the county seat of Quwo. But on February 20, 1655, his fortunes ran out. A Manchu scout discovered the general location of his headquarters in the Zhongtiao Mountains; and, provided with even more detailed information about the terrain by a local degree-holder from Xiaxian, four columns of imperial Manchu troops, local district soldiers, and private retainers (neiding) marched secretly out of the Xiaxian and Pinglu county seats during the night of February 22 and converged shortly before dawn around a settlement called Majiangou (Ma Family Gully) on top of Mount Yindong. The in-

151 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 260–261.
152 Er chen zhuang, biography of Lu Guonan, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 261.
153 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 262.
habituants of Majiagou got wind of their attackers even before the sun had risen on February 23, and in the dark a number of the rebels managed to escape. But when there was light enough for the Qing troops to examine those they had killed, they were elated to discover that one of them was the legendary leader, Zhang Wugui himself.

We killed in battle four bandits, and wounded two others with arrows. Among them was the bandit chief Zhang Wu[gui]. His hair was a foot and a half long. Beside his body we found the wooden seal of a so-called general, along with a document marked, “Eighth Year of Yongli.”

Meanwhile, orders were issued by Governor Chen Yingtai to pursue their advantage by rounding up all known supporters of the rebel in the Pingyang and Hedong areas. On March 30, Jing Qizhen—one of Zhang Wugui’s major lieutenants—was captured; and in the following weeks, vigilant Qing patrols captured or killed numerous small bands of ten to fifteen armed men in the mountains of the southwest. By the summer of 1655, all of southern Shanxi was under peaceful control, and the social banditry prevalent there since late Ming times had finally been curtailed.

By then central Hebei (Beizhili) was fully pacified as well. Later, in 1655 and 1671 there would be occasional reports of bandits and outlaws, some of whom terrorized local officials, but these signs of disorder were seldom seen after 1650. Shandong, however, was yet another matter. The execution of Liu Zeqing and the suppression of the Elm Garden Army did not bring peace to Shan- dong. There was a great victory in March, 1649, over the famed

154 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 262.
155 Wenxian congbian, ji 13, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 262–264.
156 Qing shi gao, biography of Wu Zhengzhi; Shizu shilu, 37:12, 78:15, all in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 60. Northeastern Hebei, especially the coastal area around Shanhaiiguan, was devastated during these years of warfare and rebellion. In 1659 Gu Yanwu traveled through this region and recorded its impoverishment and depopulation. Willard J. Peterson, “The Life of Ku Yen-wu, Part II,” p. 206.
bandit leader Sun Huating who had occupied the hilly district of Changqing, outside the provincial capital, for nearly a decade.\(^{157}\) But in southwestern Shandong, along the borders with Hebei and Henan, remnants of the Elm Garden Army continued to make forays into those other provinces and impede traffic along the Grand Canal.\(^{158}\) This was evidently a problem demanding the kind of thorough attention that Wu Da had called for earlier: transferring personnel and troops from other provinces to make certain that this strategic area was demilitarized, its redoubts torn down, the fabric of gentry society restored, and a strong local government apparatus built. It also required someone with the authority to command the military forces of all three provinces, because most of the rebel forces attacked provinces other than their own, and then slipped back across their border into their native sanctuaries.\(^{159}\) In the wake of the Jiang Xiang rebellion, then, Dorgon decided to create a new post: viceroy (zongdu) of the three provinces of Beizhili, Shandong, and Henan, with headquarters at Daming.\(^{160}\) The man chosen to fill this important post was Zhang Cunren.\(^{161}\)

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\(^{157}\) Sun had extended his protection to a Ming pretender, the Prince of Yi. Governor Lü Fengchun sent 880 troops into the mountains, and after fierce fighting captured Sun, his chief lieutenants, and their wives. *Shizu shilu*, 42: 494–495a, 499a; *Ming-Qing shiliiao, jia, ben* 3, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 90.

\(^{158}\) *Bi xian zhi* [Bi district gazetteer], Guangxu edition, juan 8, in Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, pp. 80–81.

\(^{159}\) Fu Zongmao, *Qingdai dufu zhidu*, p. 11.

\(^{160}\) Although there were other viceroyalties—like the one held by Meng Qiaofang—this appointment marked a more regular use of viceroyos (or governors-general) to deal with bandits raiding across provincial borders. Dorgon created 11 viceroyalties and 26 governorships. The Shunzhi Emperor created 14 viceroyalties. Under Dorgon, about 85% of his viceroyos were Manchus. After 1655, when the system of viceroyos was more or less permanently fixed, roughly 90% were Manchus; after 1678, about 70% were Manchus. Cheng Tingheng, ed., *Daming xianzhi*, 12:166; Tsao, “Three Feudatories,” pp. 157–159; Fu, *Qingdai dufu zhidu*, pp. 41–42; Nara-kino Shimesu, “Shindai tokubu Man-Kan hiritsu no hendō ni tsuite.”

\(^{161}\) Xie, *Qingchu nongmin*, p. 11.
Viceroy, Gentry, and Elders

Zhang Cunren was one of the Ming colonels under Zu Dashou who had surrendered to the Manchus in 1631. In 1640 and 1641 he advised the Manchus that the city of Jinzhou could be conquered by subverting the Mongols garrisoned within the city. His was also a strong voice in Qing government circles (after 1636 he served as president of the Censorate) for encouraging more Chinese defectors to join them, emphasizing the services which men like Hong Chengchou and Zu Dashou could perform for the Manchus. Zhang was the one who wrote, in fact, to Wu Sangui first urging his surrender. He was also an excellent field officer, and in 1642 was appointed a meiren ejen or lieutenant-general in the Chinese Bordered Blue Banner. The next year, under Jirgalang's overall command, Zhang took charge of the cannon of his banner, and his artillery force proved to be very important to General Yecen during the subjugation of Shanxi and especially at the capture of Taiyuan in 1644. He served in much the same capacity, as an expert in siege warfare, under Dodo in Henan and Jiangnan. The most difficult test of his skills, however, began when he was appointed governor-general of Zhejiang in 1645 and was thus charged with forging an overall policy of pacification for a province that everyone knew was going to be difficult to control. On the one hand, Zhang Cunren had to fight off attacks against Songzhou by Southern Ming forces under Ma Shiying and Fang Guoan. On the other hand, he also had to devise an effective civil policy for the province itself.  

This was where he proved himself to be more than just a military expert. Fully aware of the difficulty of imposing the hair-cutting order, he had skillfully used the gentry of Songzhou to "soothe" the people, and rewarded the gentry in turn with lighter taxes and a resumption of the civil service examinations. Then, as later in Shandong, he declared that the key to pacification was securing the loyalty of the scholars in the region.  

162 See chapter 10.  
Consequently, one of Viceroy Zhang's first acts after taking office in Daming was to proceed in person to Guide county in northern Henan to pay a call of respect upon Hou Fangyu. For an imperial viceroy to defer to a thirty-two-year-old romantic poet may have appeared unprecedented, but Zhang Cunren had good reasons for wooing the man later tragically depicted as the leading protagonist of *The Peach Blossom Fan*. After the fall of Yangzhou,
where Hou had fled to escape Ruan Dacheng’s agents in Nanjing, the poet had returned to the Hou estates in Henan. As idealized by a contemporary biographer, Hou Fangyu passed the following few years in discreet and genteel semisolitude, “discussing literature with one or two old Confucian scholars (nu).” In fact, Hou was passionately involved in devising ways to restore gentry control over the local countryside—a problem that obviously concerned his family’s landowning interests in the very region that had spawned the Shun rebel regime. Hou Fangyu had thus devised local counterinsurgency measures which involved both the revival of the old xiangyue (village covenant) system, and the systematic organization of a network of local gentry leaders expert in paramilitary activities. Zhang Cunren knew of Hou Fangyu’s efforts in this regard, and he therefore came to guide both to seek Hou Fangyu’s counsel and to be put in touch with members of that network in Shandong.

Flattered by Zheng Cunren’s visit, Hou Fangyu agreed to cooperate. First he provided the viceroy with the names of important local militia leaders in Shangdong like Jia Shitai. Then he agreed to help call together village elders (xiangzhang) to activate the covenant system. Zhang Cunren himself subsequently called on Jia Shitai as well, in order to gain his support; and together this coalition of local gentry and the viceroy divided the countryside into sectors which they made the personal responsibility of individual village elders who were provided with military supplies, official titles, and—perhaps most important—the assurance of rapid and effective military support across provincial boundaries in the event of outlaw or rebel attacks.

At the same time Viceroy Zhang also took conventional military measures to discover the whereabouts of the enemy and cut back on its mobility. Spies were placed in the Elm Garden Army itself. Bridges across the Yellow River were deliberately dismantled to keep the rebels from seeking refuge on one side or the other. Whenever possible, the lou (towers and castles) of suspect rebels

164 Hou Fangyu, Zhuanghui tang ji, Zhuanghui tang wenji, first biography, p. 1b.
165 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 63.
166 Ibid.
were seized and razed. As the counter-insurgency forces steadily increased their pressure against partisans and outlaws, the Elm Garden Army bands began to disperse. Some resumed their occupations as peasants; some retreated deeper into the mountains. Others, like the famous “Nine Mountains Bandit,” Wang Jun, surrendered to Viceroy Zhang in person.\(^{167}\) The gentry loyalist leader Ye Tingxiu, who had provided the Elm Garden Army leaders with one of their important linkages to the Southern Ming court, fled the area altogether and sought refuge in Beijing, hiding for awhile in the home of the poet Gong Dingzi, who had decided to collaborate with the Manchus. Ye’s own family members, left behind in southern Shandong, were all killed by government forces.\(^{168}\) It was thus a tripartite alliance—village leaders, provincial gentry, and regional viceroy—that finally “pacified” Shandong for the Qing, and ended decades of ongoing rebellion in the Henan-Hebei-Shandong triangle.

In 1651, Hou Fangyu took the imperial Qing examinations, but he failed to win a degree. Afterwards, he deeply regretted having given in to pressures from family and friends to sit for the civil service tests. Yet, had he passed, his putative duties as a literary official in the capital would have been far less of a betrayal of the loyalist cause than his actual collaboration with Zhang Cunren in the countryside.\(^{169}\) The next year, 1652, Shandong was declared

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168 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 12.
169 Hou Fangyu’s younger brother, Fangxia, had taken and passed the jinshi examination of 1646. In 1651, Hou Fangyu along with several other scholars founded a club called the Society of the Six Masters of the Snow Garden (Xueyuan liu zi she). His fellow club members—who included Song Luo (Song Quan’s son and the future governor of Jiangsu)—strongly encouraged him to sit for the examinations. Hou was also told that the Shunzhi Emperor was determined to become intimate with Confucian officials, and this had a strong influence on his decision. The most important reason, however, was the continuing pressure of family members, who held up the example of his younger brother to him. Gao Yang, Mingmo si gongzi, p. 57; Langlois, “Chinese Culturalism,” pp. 374–376.
pacified and a secure portion of the Qing domain.\footnote{Shandong did remain a difficult province to govern. Tax evaders continued to hide in caves and become bandits, the coast was hard to control, and sectarian gave it a reputation for restiveness down into modern times. But in 1655 when the Yellow River repeatedly flooded Caozhou prefecture, many of the elm trees were washed away and Qing troops finally entered the isolated villages where the Elm Garden Army had first arisen, and slaughtered the last diehards. For descriptions of the 1655 flood, see Caozhou fuzhi [Prefectural gazetteer of Caozhou], cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 90. See also Shen Yiji, ed., Zhejiang tongzhi, p. 2682 (158:20b); He Zhiji, ed., Anhui tongzhi, p. 2268 (199:8a); Jing Su and Luo Lun, Landlord and Laborer in Late Imperial China, p. 44.} For his own services, Viceroy Zhang was named a Manchu viscount of the first class (jinggini hafan).\footnote{Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 57.} Two years later, still untitled, Hou Fangyu died. He was only 37 years old, and it is said that the dominant mood of the poet’s last few years was bitter remorse and sad regret.\footnote{Gao, Mingmo si gongzi, p. 60. See also Langlois, “Chinese Culturalism,” p. 376.}
The Dorgon Regency

Wherever Our imperial expeditions took place it was always the Uncle Prince who led Us and devised the winning strategy. Whether laying siege to cities or fighting on the battlefield, he could not but conquer and capture. While the Uncle Prince is youthful, he is also conscientious, being righteous and forthright. Loyal and virtuous, he embodies the state (tì guó). He has helped realize the great enterprise.

Fulin, Coronation Speech upon Being Named the Shunzhi Emperor, *Da Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu*, 9:22a.

On May 2, 1644, only seven days before Dorgon made up his mind to embark upon the conquest of China, Grand Secretary Hife presented to the Qing court at Shengjing the Manchu translations of the three dynastic histories of the Liao, Jin, and Yuan dynasties. These histories, Hife explained, contained many lessons from the past, including the “gains and losses of governing” which those earlier conquest dynasties had experienced: “Although these events are long past, they can still influence the present. Although the persons have long died, they can still suffice to be a mirror for the ages.”1 The translation projects had been started in the first

1 *Da Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu* (hereafter *Shizu shilu*), 3:22b. Hife, who was the uncle of Soni, was generously rewarded for his eloquence.
place back in 1636 because Taizong (who had just changed the name of his dynasty from the Latter Jin to the Qing) had believed that every Manchu official should study the history of these three dynasties and "take their good points as appropriate examples and their defects as appropriate warnings." The warnings that Taizong himself had drawn from all three, but above all from the Jin, was the danger of sinification: "Later generations entered the Chinese way and forgot archery." That was still a concern in 1644 for many of the beile who, somewhat reluctantly, went along with Dorgon's decision to invade the Central Plain. But what Dorgon himself also drew from the history of dynasties such as the Jin was the danger of internecine factionalism leading to ruinous disputes between the tribal aristocracy and the imperial throne.

Reading the History of the Jin, one could easily see how such cleavages within the conquering elite could encourage the formation of Chinese bureaucratic cliques, which in turn intensified the hostility between sinified emperors and nativist nobles. One could also see, in the reign of Xizong (1135–1148) for example, how readily Chinese bureaucrats had supported the throne because it promoted centralized civilian authority, while the Jurchen generals and aristocrats had opposed sinification because its institutional ramifications threatened their independent control over their own domains. Disagreements over administrative reforms were thus transformed into bloody struggles for power which crippled the Jin ruling house, just as continuing sinification after 1161 weakened the dynasty's tribal base.

Dorgon must have wondered, while he mulled over the deci-

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that day. He was given an imperial saddle horse and 40 ounces of silver. Shortly afterward, however, he antagonized Tantai, Dorgon's major adviser, and was dismissed from his post. Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, p. 663.
2 Shizu shilu, 3:23a. See also Zhaolian, Xiaoting zalu, 1:1; and Zhang Qiyun, ed., Qing shi, 1:32.
sion to seize Beijing, whether or not the Manchus would be able to avoid a similar end. For them, there was the perennial tension between the Chinese imperial throne and a transmural aristocracy; there also existed a faction-ridden corps of civil servants to be adopted from the fallen Ming; and, in addition, there was the Manchus' own military banner system which readily lent itself to partisan conflict among aristocratic cliques. Moreover, there already existed, in the form of the Assembly of Princes and High Officials and of the Inner Three Courts, political institutions which intensified and focused these potential antagonisms between the Manchu aristocracy and the Sino-Manchu Confucian monarchy.

The Princes' Assembly and the Throne's Secretariat

The Assembly of Princes and High Officials (Yizheng wang dachen huiyi) could be traced back to 1622 when Nurhaci had appointed eight of his beile to a deliberative council which was to rule the empire collectively. The following year eight ministers (dachen) were made deliberative officials, but their function was primarily censorial and mainly intended to alert Nurhaci to plots among the beile. As Hung Taiji succeeded Nurhaci and turned away from collective rule by strengthening the throne, the power and number of the ministers increased. In 1626 the banners were placed under the command of gusan ejen, banner commanders

6 For general discussions of these problems, see: Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, 1:377–379; and Harold Lyman Miller, “Factional Conflict and the Integration of Ch’ing Politics,” p. 3.
7 Dorgon was also very concerned about factionalism because of the maneuvering that took place among the beile when the Shunzhi Emperor was enthroned. Consequently, after the government was set up in Beijing, it was announced that any efforts to form factions among the aristocracy would result in the instant death of the individual involved. Li Ge, “Guanyu Duoergun yongli Fulin wenti de kaocha,” p. 266.
8 Zhaolian, Xiaoting zalu, 4:5b.
who were actually called together into an assembly, which was further expanded in 1637 after Taizong had declared himself Qing emperor. The Assembly was empowered to discuss military affairs and to advise on foreign affairs. It represented the collegial power, stemming from the earliest days of the Manchus' rise, of the tribal aristocracy. Although clearly advisory to the emperor and carefully kept under bureaucratic restraint, the Assembly of Princes and High Officials thus could not act as a collective body for imperial government.

If the Assembly represented collective aristocratic rule, the other institution dating from earlier days obviously stood more for the throne and its decision-making. What would be known after 1658 as the Neige (Inner Secretariat, or Grand Secretariat) was originally a clerical unit supposed to translate Chinese documents into Manchu, and vice-versa. As of 1614, literary clerks (bitieshi) were formally appointed to keep the financial accounts of the niru. These evolved into scholars (ruchen) appointed to record state affairs and translate Chinese materials. At first, they were not necessarily civil appointments, but held military ranks. After 1631, when Hung Taiji established six ministries (boards), civil officials began to fill these clerical ranks; and in 1634, when the Board of Rites tested and appointed sixteen translators with the juren degree, the position became a regular civilian one. Two years later, the Hall of Literature (Wenguan, originally founded in 1629) which they occupied came formally to be known as the Inner Three Courts (Nei San Yuan): the Nei Guoshi Yuan (Inner Court of Historiography) which compiled the Veritable Records, conserved imperial edicts, and provided comments on imperial proclamations; the Nei Mishu Yuan (Inner Court of the Secretariat), which handled diplomatic correspondence, complaints against officials, edicts, and funeral orations; and the Nei Hongwen Yuan (Inner Court of Vast Learn-

9 The beile in the meantime were given bureaucratic rank. In fact, the term beile came to mean prince of the third rank while the first two ranks were called wang.

10 According to Silas Wu, it was the "supreme deliberative body whose power was second only to that of the emperor." Communication and Imperial Control in China, p. 13.
ing), which delivered lectures to the emperor on morality and served as the tutoring office for the imperial heirs. These Inner Three Courts were at first supervised by four grand secretaries—two Manchus and two Chinese. In 1636, the grand secretaries were reduced by one to two Manchus and one Chinese; and the latter remained, until 1644, Fan Wencheng.11

These two institutions, the Assembly and the Inner Three Courts, seemed at first glance to correspond to two similar Ming bodies: the Assembly of Nine Ministers and Censors (Jiu qing kedao huiyi), which consisted of the heads of the Six Ministries, the Censorate, the Transmission Office, and the Court of Judicature and Revision; and the Grand Secretariat of the emperor, including even the Hanlin Academy as the unit closest to the throne and normally held responsible for historiography, drafting important documents, scholarship, compilations, and so forth. In fact, however, the Ming and Qing institutions originally functioned quite differently.

The Ming Assembly of Nine Ministers and Censors, for instance, served as a court audience and was convened for important policy discussions; but the assumptions about this body were clearly that it was an advisory group, waiting upon the emperor, whereas the Qing Assembly of Princes and High Officials was a much more powerful body and represented the earlier Manchu traditions of collegial rule. That distinction was maintained at first under the new dynasty. While the Assembly of Princes was convened to discuss diplomatic and military affairs and to ratify the emperor's decisions in these areas, the Assembly of Nine Ministers (High Officials) was strictly advisory, being convened sometimes with Manchus and Chinese together, sometimes with the ministers separated, to suggest policy formulations, to make nominations for high government positions, and to discuss administrative regulations. The Assembly of Nine Ministers often met with the

Assembly of Princes, but obviously existed as a secondary body to that more powerful one.\(^\text{12}\)

Just as the Assembly of Princes represented a tradition of collective leadership among the beile (as opposed to the power of a single leader like Taizong) and thus reflected Manchu particularities, so did the position of grand secretary at first differ for the Manchus from the office under the Ming. Under Qing Taizong the post of grand secretary was not nearly so exalted a position as it had become during the late Ming.\(^\text{13}\) Actually serving as personal secretaries to the emperor-khan, from whom they derived their power, the two Manchu and one Chinese grand secretaries held rank equal only to that of a colonel. After the capital was moved to Beijing, they continued to function primarily as secretary-advisors. Memorials were submitted by the Six Boards directly to the emperor, so that only those memorials not directly related to one of the six functioning ministries would go through the Inner Three Courts.\(^\text{14}\)

Two new conditions combined to increase the importance of the Secretariat, though not at first necessarily of the grand secretaries themselves. One of these was the conquest itself. The acquisition of many more troops, the complexity of government in Beijing, and the confused lines of command between the capital and the provinces led to a demand for more formal channels of

\(^{12}\) Wu, Communication and Imperial Control, p. 13. When a high official wished to speak to a Manchu prince during joint meetings of the Assembly of Princes and the Assembly of Nine Ministers, he did so on his knees. Wang Sizhi and Jin Chengji, "Cong Qing chu de lizhi kan fengjian guanliao zhengzhi," p. 137.

\(^{13}\) Charles O. Hucker, The Ming Dynasty, p. 89.

\(^{14}\) Wu, Communication and Imperial Control, pp. 10–13. In 1644, as part of the new government’s policy to restore Ming institutions, Dorgon established a separate Hanlin Academy that was incorporated into the Inner Three Courts. The Academy remained part of the Nei San Yuan until 1657, when it recovered its administrative independence. From 1662 to 1670 it was again incorporated in the Inner Three Courts. “Except for some changes in the titles of the staff members, this incorporation did little to alter either its procedure or its functions. In 1670, the Hanlin Academy became an independent institution, and remained so until its abolition in 1906.” Adam Yuen-chung Lui, The Hanlin Academy, pp. 3–4; see also Ibid., p. 215, and Lawrence D. Kessler, K‘ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch‘ing Rule, p. 29.
communication. The government's new policy was finally set on April 11, 1645, when Dorgon issued an edict announcing that thenceforth, all yamens, large and small, inner and outer, would basically follow the Ming rules for memorials. General policy would be that the Six Boards would be the main clearinghouses for memorials. The boards themselves had the right to memorialize the moment documents were prepared, and were then to await imperial endorsements before carrying out the orders. Other yamen should attach themselves to a board by function, and then memorialize through the board; or rather, have the board memorialize for them.

15 The new regime was also extremely conscious of the bureaucratic confusion that had so crippled the Ming dynasty. Two characteristics of the government which the Qing had inherited were attacked. First, there was the tendency of ministry officials to tuiwei or shift one's responsibility to someone else. Supervising Secretary Zhu Zhibi (Office of Scrutiny, Board of Revenue) described that practice as follows: "The nation's affairs rest entirely in the Six Boards, yet the trouble with the Six Boards is simply that they are always avoiding responsibility. On the whole there is far more hesitation and fear of getting involved in affairs than there is resolve to bear responsibility and blame on one's own. Once a matter is encountered those with talent are unwilling to decide and those without talent are unable to decide. If the matter is somewhat important, then a meeting is called to discuss it. Otherwise, it is postponed for days and months, while an external investigation and report are ordered. Or else it is loaded off on someone else, while a governor is charged with looking into the matter and memorializing. Or else there is so much fear of even beginning that a department is named responsible, and that's all there is to it. Carelessness and perfunctory performance of one's duties—constant discussion without result—that's all there is to it." Cited in Wang and Jin, "Cong Qing chu de lizhi," p. 136. The second defect attacked was the actual confusion of functions between ministries. From the outset, high Qing officials were determined to draw very clear distinctions between the responsibilities of the various boards, and thus prescribed very strict punishments for those who erred in assigning particular matters to the most appropriate lei (category) for the board in question to take action. See the Shilu citations in Wang and Jin.

16 Just after becoming a regent, Dorgon had abolished the practice of having Manchu princes manage the Six Boards. Although the move may have been primarily directed against Dorgon's main rival, Haoge (who until then controlled the Board of Revenue), it also reinforced Dorgon's personal control over the bureaucracy. Dorgon took great care to be certain that members of
This rationalization made excellent sense because of the growing volume of paper as *ad hoc* offices tried to approach the prince-regent directly. What proved more difficult to regulate, however, was the precise connection between high provincial military and civil officials and the throne. During the first year of Qing rule in the Central Plain, matters both strategically important and relatively ordinary (e.g. logistics, surrendering officials, and so forth) were reported directly to the throne by Manchu and Chinese regional commanders. For routine matters, this practice was now to cease. The April 11 edict ordered that provincial commanders desiring to memorialize should write up their comments and forward them to the board appropriately concerned with the matter. If the board agreed with the recommendation, it could then memorialize on behalf of the provincial official. If there was disagreement, then the matter should be referred to the Censorate (Duchayuan) which would make a final recommendation on behalf of the bureaucracy. Finally, sensitive matters should come directly to the throne's own secretariat.

All documents on topics which do not concern one of the boards; or which enumerate matters of government policy (*zheng shi*), secrets concerning foreign states, or special military strategy, must be sent directly to the Inner Courts (Neiyuan). ¹⁷

This procedure would hardly resolve the issue satisfactorily. First, the question of what constituted “government policy” (*zheng shi*) remained unanswered. There was a quite murky area which bordered on secret policy making and which might be brought forward via the boards just as well as being sent to the Secretariat. In the former case, of course, state security was at stake, since so

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many of these documents were routinely copied by clerks and circulated outside the bureaucracy. Eventually, therefore, the throne would devise a special secret memorial system quite apart from the regular apparatus for forwarding routine memorials about the day-to-day business of administration. This would serve even more to strengthen the position of the Secretariat—the word in both Chinese and English carries the same connotation of secrecy and confidentiality. The development of this system, however, was not just a matter of the throne’s penchant for keeping its own counsel. While it made perfectly good sense for capital yamens to rationalize their activities by attaching themselves functionally to one of the Six Boards, the major defect in these new memorializing arrangements was the relationship between provincial authorities and central ministries. If only routine business were being conducted, then a stand-off between a governor-general and a board president might have been tolerable. The matter could then, as previewed, have been sent to the Censorate for adjudication and final recommendation to the throne. But what of times of emergency? The exigencies of the conquest did not allow for lengthy negotiations between provincial authorities and central government officials. Thus, the throne’s Secretariat was inevitably reinforced. For, only a group so close to the emperor as to be absolutely reliable transmitters could rapidly convey sensitive matters directly to the throne for immediate decision. This too formed part of the secret memorial system which later emerged.  

Dorgon’s Ascendancy

The second factor which increased the responsibilities of the Neiyuan was Dorgon’s ritual ascendancy after the conquest of Beijing. The occupation of the imperial capital and the establishment of the Qing as pretender to the Chinese Mandate of Heaven strengthened Dorgon’s position enormously, permitting him to

18 Ibid., 20:241b, dated October 15, 1645.
19 Wu, Communication and Imperial Control.
20 Oshibuchi, “Shinchō Junji shoseki,” p. 3.
lay claim both to the military legacy of Nurhaci and Taizong, and to the new role of a Chinese sage-statesman. The two mantles were combined in one when the Qing capital was transferred from Shengjing (Mukden) to Yanjing (Beijing) in the person of the young Shunzhi Emperor.\(^{21}\) The emperor’s retinue had entered the Central Plain through Shanhai Pass on October 9, 1644, and by October 18 it had reached the Grand Canal at Tongzhou, giving Dorgon and the court in Beijing ample time to prepare for the welcoming rites. The following day, October 19, the six-year-old boy was brought through the Zhengyang Gate and welcomed ceremoniously by the prince-regent. It was now possible to complete the plans made on May 9 and install Shunzhi as emperor of China.\(^{22}\)

The formal ritual of imperial ascension was orchestrated by Feng Quan, who had already been asked, along with Xie Sheng, to develop the rites and regulations for the Temple of the Imperial Ancestors (Tai miao) and the Altars of the Soil and Grain (Sheji tan).\(^{23}\) Despite his political notoriety, Feng Quan—who was fifty years old—was acknowledged to be an erudite student of ritual, and an expert in collation rites. He outdid himself for this occasion. The imperial ascension itself had to await the beginning of a new sexagenary cycle, and the next jiazi day which marked such a beginning fell on lunar double-ten day (November 8, 1644).\(^{24}\) Dur-

\(^{21}\) The connection between Beijing (Yanjing) and imperial rule was underscored by Dorgon in the letter which he sent to the Shunzhi Emperor in Shengjing, formally inviting him to transfer his capital. In the letter, Dorgon pointed out that Yanjing had been an imperial capital for a long time, and from it the Ming had ruled a vast realm. It was also the perception of the Manchu aristocracy that establishment of a permanent capital in Beijing would curtail its own privileges by strengthening the monarchy. Many nobles resisted the move. Zheng Kecheng, “Duoergun dui Manzu fengjianhua de gongxian,” p. 10.

\(^{22}\) Zhang, Qing shi, 1:34.

\(^{23}\) Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:382.

\(^{24}\) At this time, as well, the calendar was tested and corrected. On July 29, 1644, Adam Schall—at the order of his religious superior—had somewhat reluctantly petitioned Dorgon, submitting that the Jesuits’ version of the calendar was the most accurate available. The prince-regent agreed that it was important for the Qing dynasty to have as accurate a calendar as possible. The Jesuit method of determining the calendar was therefore tested against the official
ing the next several weeks, therefore, Feng Quan and other members of the Board of Rites put the young boy through a series of carefully rehearsed performances both to mark his own impending occupation of the dragon throne and to celebrate Dorgon’s personal triumph as the conqueror of Beijing. On the first day of the tenth lunar month (October 30), Shunzhi was taken to the Altar of Heaven in the southern suburbs and there was made to conduct sacrifices to Heaven and Earth. At the same time, ritualists went to the Temple of the Imperial Ancestors and the Altars of the Soil and Grain in the Forbidden City to carry out the ceremonies that Feng Quan and Xie Sheng had formulated. The following day, Shunzhi conferred the title of Sacred Duke (Yansheng gong) upon the 65th heir of Confucius, and that of Doctor of Classics (Wujing boshi) upon the cadet of that line as well as upon descendants of famous men of antiquity. And on November 1, “considering that Dorgon, Prince Rui, was of the highest merit, [the Emperor] ordered that the Board of Rites erect a tablet to commemorate him.”

Thus, when the jiazi day arrived on November 8, it was both an occasion of enthronement and a celebration of Dorgon’s newly exalted role as superior prince-regent. The Shunzhi Emperor had his ascension promulgated for him with the formal announcement of the new Qing reign era, which was accompanied by remissions

astronomer’s prediction of eclipses for September 1. Schall’s computation was the most accurate, and on October 31, 1644, the Jesuits’ calculations were adopted and Adam Schall was made director of the Qin Tian Jian (Board of Astronomy). *Shizu shilu*, 6:65b; Lo-shu Fu, *A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations*, pp. 3–5; George H. Dunne, *Generation of Giants*, pp. 324–325; Jonathan D. Spence, *To Change China*, pp. 3–4.

25 For the cosmological importance of this altar, which established the Son of Heaven’s claim to be the center of the universe, see Arthur F. Wright, “The Cosmology of the Chinese City,” p. 71. For a description of the ceremony itself, translated from the *Da Qing huidian*, see E. T. Williams, “The State Religion of China during the Manchu Dynasty,” pp. 12–14.

26 For a description of these offices, as well as the names of the men so honored, see H. S. Brunnett and V. V. Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China*, pp. 493–494.

27 Zhang, *Qing shi*, 1:34.
Through this inner gateway of the Zhengyang Gate, which still stands at the southern end of Tiananmen square in Beijing, only emperors could pass in Ming and Qing times. Osvald Siren, *The Walls and Gates of Peking* (London, 1924), plate 77, reproduced through the courtesy of the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
of taxes and pardons; and at the same time a speech was read for him in fulsome praise of Dorgon’s exploits. Much of the praise concerned Dorgon’s military feats: besides being credited with strategically planning the conquest of north China, Prince Rui was also singled out for his role in the campaigns of 1628 and 1635 against the Chahar Mongols, in opening up lands at Yizhou, and in conducting the sieges of Songshan and Jinzhou. And in addition to being acclaimed for realizing Nurhaci’s “great enterprise” by leading the Manchus into the Central Plain, Dorgon was credited with placing Shunzhi upon the throne. The six-year-old emperor was made to say that:

In addition, he helped Us to ascend to the throne and aids Us personally, his considered calculations being of merit and excellence. He is as great as the Duke of Zhou! The Duke of Zhou once received the mandate handed down by King Wu whom he helped establish as ruler, acting on his behalf to manage the governing of the realm, devoting all his loyalty and filial piety.

According to the emperor’s speechwriter, who was probably Fan Wencheng, Dorgon even “surpassed” (guo) the revered Duke of Zhou because:

The Uncle Prince also led the Grand Army through Shanhai Pass to smash two hundred thousand bandit soldiers, and then proceeded to take Yanjing, pacifying the Central Xia. He invited Us to come to the capital and received Us as a great guest.

Shunzhi’s speech ended with the announcement that Prince Rui was to be given the additional rank of Uncle Prince Regent (Shufu

28 It has been suggested that the Manchus’ decisive role at the battle of Shanhai-guan was exaggerated in the Veritable Records in order to exalt Dorgon’s leadership during the conquest. Wang Chongwu, “Wu Sangui Yu Shanhai-guan zhi zhan,” p. 153.
29 Shizushilu, 9:22b.
30 Ibid.
shezheng wang), elevating him even higher by virtue of his special relationship to the throne.\textsuperscript{31} Two days later, on November 11, the emperor did reinstate the princedom of Su to Haoge, while Ajige was named Prince Ying, but in the same announcement, Shunzhi also demoted Jirgalang from full Prince Regent to Assistant Uncle Prince Regent (Fu zheng shuwang). Dorgon was thus now without peer among the Manchu aristocracy.\textsuperscript{32}

Confucian court ritual played an important part in further enhancing Dorgon’s elevated status once Shunzhi ceremonially occupied the throne in Beijing. The Board of Rites developed the kinds of new rules of precedence that Jirgalang had hoped would not be forthcoming when he suggested that the administration proceed first to Dorgon, and then to his fellow regent. On June 16, 1645, only a little more than six months after being raised above the other Manchu princes, Dorgon was distinguished still further. A change was announced in the ceremonies at court, and it was declared that thereafter all documents were to refer to Dorgon as the Imperial Uncle Prince Regent (Huang shufu shezheng wang).\textsuperscript{33} At that time, the Board of Rites announced that:

At all major ceremonies—like going to the hunt, going on campaign, or reviewing the troops—let all the princes, beile, beise and dukes assemble at a spot where they will be announced by the Board of Rites. The assembly will be told to wait. Then when the Prince [Rui] approaches, each of the officials will kneel in order of rank and see him off. Awaiting the Prince’s return, the [other] princes may retire when ordered to retire. Beile and below will escort the Prince to the gate of his residence and may then retire. Their own attendants will kneel and welcome [the Prince] as they did before.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{31} The Chinese title Shufu, translates “Uncle” (Ecike) in Manchu, but ecike is not just a kinship term; it also designates a rank one grade above that of an imperial prince. Chen Jiexian, Qing shi zabi, 1:39–79; Zheng Tianting, Tan wei ji, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{32} Zhang, Qing shi, 1:35.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 1:37; Zheng, Tan wei ji, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{34} Shizu shilu, 16:16b–17a.
Manchu princes of the blood were clearly differentiated from the other nobility in that they could retire after initially welcoming the Imperial Uncle Prince Regent, but they were still forced to assemble ritually before his arrival and to attend his departure ceremoniously. Moreover, even though princes of the first degree (*qin wang*), along with a few select second-degree princes (*jun wang*) like Abatai, were not forced to kowtow along with the other princes in the presence of Dorgon, they were nevertheless brought under these new protocols and hence formally enclosed in the same set of rituals that the entire court obeyed.\(^{35}\) Thus, while being singled out from other lower-ranking princes in that they did not have to kowtow when receiving a helping of food from Dorgon's own hand at a state banquet, they did have to stand to accept the gift. And, even more tellingly, when the Imperial Uncle Prince Regent issued an order, the messengers bearing his command or his gifts did not have to dismount if they encountered any of the princes on the way, nor did they have to dismount in front of any prince's gate, regardless of that noble's rank. Rank, not person, thus became the criterion for regulating human relations at court; and, at the same time, the envoys of the highest of them all, the Imperial Uncle Prince Regent, bowed to no one.\(^{36}\)

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\(^{35}\) Abatai, commander of the expedition into China in 1643 that took ninety-four cities and 360,000 prisoners, was in command of the troops in Shandong at this point. He had been named a *jun wang* on May 7, 1644, as a reward for having taken Jinzhou. *Shizu shilu*, 4:40b–41a. He died in 1646, leaving his title to his son Yolo. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 4.

\(^{36}\) *Shizu shilu*, 16:17b–18a. On February 10, 1646, Dorgon felt obliged to chide all of his *beile*, *beise*, and high officials for not paying enough respect to the emperor and for trying to "curry favor" by fixing all of their attention upon the prince-regent, to whom they bowed as though he were the true monarch. Zheng, *Tan wei ji*, p. 115. Shortly after this, Dorgon told Fan Wencheng, Ganglin, Ning Wanwo, and several other officials that he had contracted rheumatism and found it uncomfortable to prostrate himself before the Shunzhi Emperor. On January 24, 1648, a number of Dorgon's favorites, including Baiyintu and Xihan (Gongadai's younger brother), told the prince-regent before the entire court that they thought it would be a grave error for him to risk his health by kowtowing to the emperor. This new policy, which Dorgon approved, had been formulated by Suni, Lengsengji, Fan Wencheng, and Ganglin. Oshibuchi, "Shinchô Junji shoseki," pp. 6–7.
As the distance between Dorgon and his kinsmen widened, the importance of the Inner Courts was enhanced. Dorgon made a special point of inviting leading young Ming degree-holders like Wang Chongjian—a Restoration Society member—to join one of the Inner Courts.\(^{37}\) He also agreed in 1645 to revive the Hanlin Academy in name as a merging of the Inner Three Courts. Li Ruolin, a protégé of Feng Quan, who had been a corrector (jiantao) in the Ming Hanlin Academy, was now made both Vice-President of Rites and a supervisor of instruction in the Hongwen Yuan.\(^{38}\) In the latter position, he recommended for appointment to the Inner Courts a slate of six middle-ranking former Hanlin academicians, including Hu Shian (jinshi 1628, Sichuan) and Cheng Kegong (jinshi 1643, Daming) who both went on to become grand secretaries in the 1660s.\(^{39}\)

The connection between the Board of Rites and the Inner Courts was not merely coincidental. True, the figure of Feng Quan incorporated one of the major links because he joined the Inner Courts as a grand secretary in 1645 while still remaining President of Rites.\(^{40}\) But there was also—in addition to the connection between

37 Wang, a native of Beijing, passed the 1643 jinshi exams. He had fled the capital when it fell to Li Zicheng, but he returned in 1645 to join the Qing government. Dorgon appointed him a bachelor in the Guoshi Yuan. In 1658 Wang became President of Rites, retiring with his reputation reasonably intact in 1661. In addition to forming a famous cenacle at his Garden of Felicity (Yiyuan) in the southern suburbs of the capital, Wang was also well known for fathering a large number of successful progeny. Of his six sons, five served in high office. Altogether, four generations of his family were able to enter the Hanlin. Du Dengchun, Sheshi shimo, p. 3b; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 815–816.


39 Er chen zhu, 8:6–7, 9:14–17a, 18–21a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 116–117. During the first two reigns of the Qing, successful jinshi winners could only sit for the palace examinations (chaokao)—which were a prerequisite for entry into the Hanlin—if they were recommended by a senior official. In 1646 about one hundred new jinshi were recommended to sit for the palace exams. The main criteria were age, appearance, and literary skill. In 1646, 49 were actually appointed probationers, as were 23 in 1647. Lui, Hanlin Academy, pp. 12–13, 24.

40 There were other members of the Board of Rites at this time who provided
imperial rites and the power of the regency’s personal secretariat—an ideological bond between Confucian ritual and the restoration of Ming institutions like the Hanlin Academy. When Feng Quan tended to the ceremonies of the ancestral altars, or when Ming court protocol was introduced, the ritualists were seeking to preserve systems of rule that barbarism and rebellion had threatened. The impulse was profoundly conservative, and certainly much more than merely sentimental. If the system could be preserved, or restored without its many flaws, then Confucian advisors would once again play a major role in court decisions, reasonably just government would prevail, and the society would be reconstructed along the hierarchical lines most preferable to the elites that had ruled before the fall of the Ming dynasty. To call for old forms, then, was both ideologically legitimate and politically astute.

Thus, it was with more than nostalgia in mind that Feng Quan persuaded Hong Chengchou to join him in memorializing the throne with a request to return to certain key methods of transmitting official documents. The practice which they advocated, and which had been used by the Ming government, was called piaoni (comparison copy). This was a system whereby a copy of each board’s memorial was sent to the Secretariat (Neige) for the grand secretaries to peruse. This would have been a much more fundamental change in the Qing system than the decision mentioned

strong personal connections with the Inner Courts through their earlier service in the Hanlin Academy. Sun Zhixie (Shandong), for instance, had served in the Hanlin before the fall of the Ming, and now joined the Board of Rites, where he repeatedly memorialized in favor of normative regeneration by forbidding extravagance, discouraging the arrogance of young scholars, and encouraging the proper hierarchy in society. Qing shi liezhuan, 79:25. Yao Wenran (Tongcheng, Anhui), who also served in the Board of Rites during the early Dorgon regency, had been a member of the Hanlin when Li Zicheng took Beijing. “When the Ming fell,” his biography in the provincial gazetteer read, “he locked himself in his house to commit suicide, but with help he was revived. At the beginning of the Shunzhi reign he was selected to serve as a supervising secretary in the Board of Rites.” He Zhiji, ed., Anhui tongzhi, 180:2a. Under the Kangxi Emperor, Yao rose to become President of Punishments, dying in office in 1678. His great-great grandson was Yao Nai, founder of the so-called Tongcheng School in the early 19th century. Huang Zhijun, comp., Jiangnan tongzhi, 146:16a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 900.
above to have documents concerning state policy and national security forwarded to the Secretariat. If the piaoni system were restored, then all of the information coming from the boards would routinely be sent to the Inner Courts, and the power of the grand secretaries in the Qing government would be on a par with the power they had enjoyed under the Ming.  

Although most high-ranking Chinese collaborators might agree on the importance of putting more power in the hands of Han officials, the fact that this conservative innovation was proposed by an official who was associated with some of the worst abuses of the Ming secretariat and its eunuch allies may account for the momentary failure of this motion to pass. Feng Quan’s current activities, too, were beginning to draw criticism; and, not long after the imperial ascension ceremonies, Sun Chengze, who was a junior metropolitan censor in addition to directing the Court of Sacrificial Worship, impeached Feng, implicating such other members of the Inner Three Courts as Hong Chengchou and Xie Sheng.

### Regional Rivalries

Dorgon refused to permit Feng Quan to resign. He seemed to regard attacks upon this particular favorite minister as a sign of renewed factionalism. More and more, Feng Quan was becoming identified with a “northern party,” and his opponents with a “southern party,” supposedly led by Chen Mingxia. Dorgon tried to keep a balance between these factions by strongly supporting both “party leaders.”

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41 Zhang, Qing shi, 246–3786. See also Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 8.
42 Ibid. Sun Chengze enjoyed particular favor under Dorgon, who admired his integrity and out-spokenness. Once, Sun even went so far as to criticize the impropriety of using Manchu rituals to worship Heaven. Dorgon refused to punish him for this explicit judgment that Han ritual was superior to the Manchus’ own ceremonies. Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 9.
43 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:82. Feng Quan’s leadership of the “northern” clique did not preclude his forming alliances with prominent southern officials. He and Qian Qianyi were especially close, and rumor had it that Qian owed Feng a political debt because he had twice turned to him for help: once during the
Chen Mingxia—the famous Restoration Society member who had placed first in the 1643 metropolitan examinations and third in the palace examinations of that year—had joined Dorgon’s court in 1645 at the age of forty. After the fall of Beijing to Li Zicheng, whom he had served, Chen had returned to his home in Liyang, Jiangsu, where he learned that the Nanjing regime of the Prince of Fu had issued orders for his arrest as a traitor to the Ming. Forced to flee, he had taken to the road disguised as a monk, making his way into Anhui province. At Mount Lao, which is on Lake Chao southeast of Hefei, he met up with his old friend and in-law Fang Yizhi, from nearby Tongcheng. Fang gave Chen enough money to travel on to Fujian, and from there, by a circuitous route, he finally managed to make his way north and inland across the Yellow River at Suizhou to Daming. In Daming, Chen looked up his classmate (tongnian) Cheng Kegong, who had just been invited to join the Qing government. By now it was the eleventh lunar month (November 29–December 28) of 1644. While Chen Mingxia stayed at Cheng’s house, the latter went to the governor of Baoding, Wang Wenkui, and told him of Chen’s availability. Governor Wang in turn recommended Chen Mingxia to Beijing, and Dorgon personally invited him to an audience at court.

Chongzhen reign when he was impeached and needed to bribe a eunuch whom Feng knew, and then a second time after Qian joined the Qing government and needed protection against his critics. Sun Kekuan, “Wu Meicun beixing qianhou shi,” p. 6.

44 In addition to earlier sections on Chen Mingxia, see his biography in Er chen zhuan, 11:1–6a; and Ji Liuqi, Mingji beili, p. 117. For Chen’s connection with Dorgon’s supporters (Tantai, Gongdai, Xihan, and so forth), see Oshibuchi, “Shinchô Junji soseki,” p. 6.

45 After Ruan Dacheng began to have Fushe members arrested, Fang Yizhi disguised himself as a drug peddler and escaped to southeastern China, where he refused to join the Prince of Tang’s court in Fuzhou. It was after this that he returned to Anhui. Fang Yizhi’s second son, Zhongtong, was married to the third daughter of Chen Mingxia. Chen Mingxia’s son, furthermore, was married to a daughter of Fang’s younger brother. This information was supplied by Dr. Willard Peterson. See also Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 232; Xu Zi, Xiaotian jinian fukao, p. 84 (3:29b).

46 Tan Qian, Beiyou lu, p. 388.
During that audience, Chen Mingxia boldly beseeched Dorgon to take the dragon throne for himself. The prince-regent rejected the suggestion, saying: “This dynasty has its own household laws with which you are not familiar.” However, Dorgon was evidently quite flattered by the proposal, and subsequently named Chen Mingxia Vice-President of Civil Appointments which was a crucially situated post. As one of the new government’s leading Han personnel officers, Chen was able to nominate other literati from the Fushe circles in the south. He was also in a position to introduce greater order and regularity into the bureaucratic appointment and evaluation procedures of the Qing. Moreover, his opinion on other matters was taken quite seriously. After Nanjing fell to Dodo’s army, for instance, the Nine Chief Ministers and Metropolitan Censors (Jiu qing kedao) recommended that the city retain the same ancillary function as a southern capital as it had enjoyed under the Ming. But Dorgon preferred to heed Chen Mingxia’s advice that the Manchus could “rule the south while residing in the north,” and thus only assigned to Nanjing the same administrative offices which any regular province had.

Although his contributions to reforming Manchu personnel procedures were widely recognized, Chen Mingxia was thought by many people to be too prone to favoritism, especially along regional lines. Just as Feng Quan was blamed by southerners for skewing examination results, so was Chen Mingxia accused by northerners of packing the Board of Civil Appointments in which he served with his cronies. Chen also made recommendations directly to the throne, and it was he who first brought the Jiangnan poet Li Wen to Dorgon’s attention. But in that instance, too, his recommendation was felt to be untoward because Chen wanted to have Li Wen promoted directly into the new Hanlin Academy. This

47 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3787. See also Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 8.
48 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3788.
49 For example, he recommended the appointment of his 1643 jinshi classmate and fellow provincial Jin Gongjing to the Office of Personnel Scrutiny in the board—a post which Jin assumed in 1646. Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 150: 21b–22a.
50 Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 166:7a.
was opposed by other ministers as partisanship, and during the winter of 1644–1645, Chen Mingxia was somewhat under a cloud, having been docked three months salary at the insistence of the Manchu court.\(^{51}\)

Feng Quan, however, was potentially far more vulnerable to such attacks than Chen Mingxia because of irregularities in his personal conduct as well as because of his notorious intimacy with the eunuch Wei Zhongxian, who had once adopted him as a godchild (\textit{ganer}). He perforce relied much more upon the protection of his Manchu sponsors, therefore, than Chen Mingxia did.\(^{52}\) Perhaps that was the reason why Feng Quan made the decision in July, 1645, to curry favor with the Manchus by voluntarily adopting their shaven heads and plaited queues. For a year now, Dorgon had been willing to waive the requirement that Chinese adherents adopt tribal hairstyles. He had made that decision in the first place with great reluctance.\(^{53}\) He was therefore extremely pleased when Feng and two of his closest allies, Li Ruolin and Sun Zhixie, appeared before him in Manchu fashion with shorn forehead, and requested that all Chinese be made to accept the “national custom” (\textit{guo su}) of the Manchus.\(^{54}\) This gesture not only led Dorgon to issue the infamous haircutting order that provoked the resistance movement in Jiangnan, it also reinvigorated the prince-regent’s affection for Feng Quan himself. Feng was therefore well protected when the next major attack upon his person came in October, 1645.\(^{55}\)

\(^{51}\) Tan, \textit{Beiyu lu}, p. 369.

\(^{52}\) In addition to learning how to speak Manchu (which he studied every day), Feng Quan made a special point of cultivating the friendship of the “old men” from Liaodong, and especially Fan Wencheng with whom he enjoyed a very relaxed relationship. Zhang Yi, \textit{Sou wen xu bi}, 1:8b.

\(^{53}\) Because there was so much indecision about the haircutting order, many officials were uncertain about the government’s intention. A number of them in some yamen had already decided to shave their heads and wear the queue because they believed the policy would eventually be enforced. Zhang, \textit{Sou wen xu bi}, 1:9a.

\(^{54}\) Tan, \textit{Beiyu lu}, p. 354.

\(^{55}\) Zhang, \textit{Qingshi}, 246:3786.
The Impeachment of Feng Quan

On October 6, Wu Da, the investigating censor for the Zhejiang circuit, submitted a long memorial which denounced the recurrence of corruption among high officials and singled out Feng Quan—the adopted son of Wei Zhongxian—as “a bewitching and treacherous jackal who wantonly feeds off of the country and brings calamity upon the people.” According to Wu Da, people throughout the empire were gripped by a tremendous sense of outrage when Feng Quan first received the throne’s grace and was appointed to the Inner Courts. It was no accident that during the past six months the area around the capital had been struck by unusually heavy thunderstorms and had been repeatedly flooded. However, Feng Quan himself refused to recognize the connection between these natural disasters and his own deviant practices, for which he was unwilling to take responsibility. Comparing Feng Quan to the obstinate Song minister Wang Anshi, Wu Da went on to say that he had asked Fan Wencheng and other high officials to support his efforts to denounce Feng, and they had done so most energetically; but so far, there had been no response from the throne. Feng Quan, accordingly, was openly contemptuous of his attackers, his crimes becoming more blatant as time passed. He had extorted a bribe of 30,000 ounces of silver from General Jiang Xiang when he surrendered. He had compromised other Han officials in the eyes of the court. He had permitted his son Feng Yuanhuai to use the premises of the Inner Courts to hold banquets. And he had formed a treacherous association with Li Ruolin to promote their partisan interests. Feng Quan was truly as vile as Ruan Dacheng, also a former intimate of Wei Zhongxian, and a

56 Qinhuang jushi, comp., *Huang Qing zouyi*, 1:3a. See also Wang Xianqian, comp., *Donghua lu—Shunzhi chao*, 2:15a; *Shizu shihu*, 20:7–9a.
57 Wang Anshi was evidently viewed quite negatively during the early Qing. In 1663, when ordering a temporary revision in the syllabus of the civil service examinations, the Kangxi Emperor denounced Wang Anshi by way of attacking the eight-legged essay, which was Wang’s invention. Adam Yuen-chung Lui, “Syllabus of the Provincial Examination Under the Early Ch’ing,” p. 392.
man whose corruption had brought about the fall of the Southern Ming regime.\textsuperscript{58}

Wu Da’s impeachment was followed by that of seven others, extending the list of accusations to include the charge of bribing Sun Zhixie to accept Feng Quan’s son Yuanhuai as an officer in Sun’s military command. One memorialist, Li Senxian, again raised Feng Quan’s relationship with the infamous eunuch Wei Zhongxian. Li’s impeachment blamed the fall of the Ming dynasty upon Wei Zhongxian’s corruption and cruelty, and then in turn denounced the eunuch’s adopted son, Feng Quan, for being the instrument of those evil policies. He therefore proposed that the new Qing dynasty demonstrate its commitment to moral government by publicly executing Feng Quan in the marketplace.\textsuperscript{59}

In Dorgon’s eyes, this was going much too far. He himself had vowed to clean up the impure customs of the Ming, but he certainly did not intend to permit his dynasty to be turned into an instrument to punish officials linked by Donglin sympathizers with the forces conventionally believed to have caused the fall of the previous royal house. After the Board of Punishments had investigated the charges and reported them to be without substance, the prince-regent called a meeting of all grand secretaries and supervising secretaries. The meeting was held in the Zhonghe Palace. As soon as the officials had gathered, Dorgon told them quite bluntly that Feng Quan and Li Ruolin had been the first officials voluntarily to comply with the Manchu practice of shaving the head, and that both males and females in the household of Sun Zhixie had adopted Manchu clothing styles. Whereas “all three men were rendering respectful obedience to the regulations of the court,” the officials now impeaching them had obviously formed a partisan faction secretly bent upon attacking the adoption of Manchu customs by Chinese civil servants. It was this kind of behavior—not Feng Quan’s past activities—that had really led to the fall of the Ming dynasty, and he would not permit it to continue.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{58} Qin chuan jushi, \textit{Huang Qing zouyi}, 1:3b-7a.

\textsuperscript{59} Zhang, \textit{Qing shi}, 246:3786; Xiao, \textit{Qingdai tongshi}, 1:382.

\textsuperscript{60} Wang, \textit{ Donghua lu—Shunzhi chao}, 2:15b. See also Zhang, \textit{Qing shi}, 246:3787; Sun Zhentao, \textit{Qing shi shulun}, p. 37; Sun, “Wu Meicun,” p. 12.
After a shocked silence, the sub-director of the Court of Sacrificial Worship, Gong Dingzi, desperately tried to draw the discussion back onto defensible territory. The critical point—he said boldly—was that Feng Quan had once served Wei Zhongxian. But Gong himself was also quite vulnerable in this regard. Not only was the Anhui poet’s personal life notorious; he had served Li Zicheng as well.61 Feng Quan, who of course was present, immediately riposted by attacking Gong Dingzi for having collaborated with the Shun rebels, claiming he had accepted a post as Li Zicheng’s police censor. The prince-regent asked the Anhui poet if this were so. Yes, Gong admitted, and added: “But why just mention me alone? Who has not changed his allegiance in the past? Wei Zheng also changed his allegiance to Tang Taizong.”62 Dorgon

61 Gong was considered one of the “Three Great Poets of the Eastern Yangzi” (jiangzuo san da jia) along with Wu Weiye and Qian Qianyi. From Hefei (Anhui), he had been a censor under the Chongzhen Emperor, and had served Li Zicheng as superintendent of the Northern Beijing Police. He was notorious because of his infatuation for the talented poetess and painter Gu Mei (Sheng), who became his concubine. According to Ji Liuqi, Gong said—at the time Beijing fell to the Shun rebels—that: “I am certainly willing to die, but what can I do since my concubine doesn’t dare [to commit suicide]?” Ji, Mingji beilüe, p. 611. In 1646, when Gong applied for mourning leave for his dead father, he was impeached for immoral conduct. Although his service to the Shun regime was noted, the key charge against him was frivolity: banqueting and drinking instead of devoting himself to public administration. He was also accused of having homosexual affairs with female impersonators, of fornication with actresses and of lavishing gifts upon Gu Mei, whom he bought for 1,000 ounces of gold. His mad infatuation for her, the impeachment said, made him the laughingstock of Jiangnan, and—more seriously—led him to neglect his parents, wife, and children. When his father had died, he had not even stopped carousing and now he had the audacity to ask for mourning leave. Gong was demoted two degrees in rank and transferred. Sun, Qing shi shulun, p. 37; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 431.

62 Sun, Qing shi shulun, p. 37. Wei Zheng, who was associated with the Confucian revival in the early Tang and who was noted for his frank remonstrances to Tang Taizong, had served many masters. During 617–618 he was the adviser to two of the rebels (Yuan Baocang and Li Mi) who were contenders for control over north China; in 618 he surrendered to Tang Gaozu and became a servitor of the Tang prince Li Jiancheng; and in 626, when Li Jiancheng was murdered by Li Shimin in the famous incident at the Xuanwu Gate, he trans-
simply brushed aside the reference to the famous Tang statesman. "Only if a person has already proved himself to be loyal and truthful can he reprove others," the prince-regent told Gong Dingzi. "You yourself are not upright, so how can you reprove others?" Dorgon then peremptorily dismissed the charges against Feng Quan, who remained in office.

**Manchu-Han Dyarchy**

Feng Quan continued to try to use Confucian bureaucratic regulations to break down the distinctions between Manchus and Hans by adhering to strict seniority in ranking the government's grand secretaries. Early in 1646 he memorialized the throne, explaining how honored he had been by Dorgon who had gifted him with a Manchu bride, who had allowed him to be registered among the officials listed just at the end of the Manchu population file, and who had continuously treated him like a "venerated guest" (jing ke). Now, he had one further request to make:

While continuing to tremble [at the thought of my debt to the throne], I especially would like to beseech you to rank Fan Wencheng just after Ganglin. If the sequence is based on seniority, then you should also rank Kicungge after Ning Wanwo.

That year, in determining the processional ranks for the metropolitan examinations, Dorgon ordered that Fen Wencheng be ranked just after the Manchu Grand Secretary Ganglin, and just ahead of Ning Wanwo, who was followed in order of seniority by the

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63 Wang, *Donghua lu—Shunzhi chao*, 2:15b; Sun, *Qing shi shulun*, p. 37.
65 Zhang, *Qing shi*, p. 3787.
Manchu Kicungge. "The empire is a single whole," Dorgon declared. "There are no distinctions between Manchus and Hans."66

Of course, there continued to be considerable distinctions between Manchus and Hans—Dorgon's pronouncement notwithstanding. In capital posts, for instance, Manchu officials always rated a higher rank than their Chinese counterparts: Manchu grand secretaries and board presidents were given rank one; Chinese in those same posts were given rank two.67 Manchu officials also continued to move readily back and forth from military (wu) to civil (wen) ranks in ways denied Chinese officials unless they were Han Bannermen. Manchu officials, if punished, might be dismissed from their position but not reduced in rank—which was a privilege denied Han Chinese. And while Manchus and Chinese were both named to counterpart positions as dual presidents of boards, the seals of office were always kept in the Manchus' hands, and it was only they who attended the official sacrifices at the Temple of Heaven.68 Simply imposing bureaucratic orders of precedence and rank did not altogether abolish the privileges of the conquest elite. Yet there were ways to try to bring about more equality, if not more regulation and control, by the Chinese officials who were now increasingly coming to dominate the old Offices of Scrutiny in the Metropolitan Censorate, which had controlled personnel evaluation under the Ming rulers. In 1646, at the behest of Chen Mingxia who then took over the Board of Civil Appointments, the practice of annual evaluations of officials was again introduced, even though this resumption was bitterly opposed by many Manchus.69 Chen Mingxia also tried to enlist Dorgon's support against the aristocratic arrogance of Manchu officials

66 Ibid. During this period Fan Wencheng was often heard to say, "I am made of Ming bones and Qing flesh." Zhang Yi, Sou wen xu bi, 1:8b. See also Zheng, "Duergun," p. 7. Fan attended, at this time, to the rebuilding in Yangzhou of the altar to the famous Song philosopher Fan Zhongyan, whom he claimed as an ancestor. Yao Wentian, comp., Yangzhou fuzhi, 25:26b.
67 Kessler, K'ang-hsi, p. 123.
68 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 349.
69 Ibid., p. 355; Zha Shenxing, Renhai ji, 1:1b.
attending court sessions. During morning audiences, for instance, when the coaches of Chinese and Manchu officials converged at the palace gates, the Manchu grooms would casually shove aside Chinese attendants to get their masters through first. If a Chinese servant insisted that his own master had precedence by court protocol, the Manchu groom would as often as not lay his whip upon the man until the Han Chinese attendant was altogether cowed. When Chen Mingxia brought this to Dorgon’s attention, the regent ordered that each side must give way to the other, and explicitly prohibited his Manchu officials from abusing their conquerors’ privileges in this fashion. In this way both the Manchu regent and his Chinese advisors benefitted from the ritualization of personal relationships at court, which began to replace the more egalitarian companionships of the military camp and the casual indifference of tribal aristocrats toward civil servants with Confucian pomp and circumstance.

Dorgon did not exercise his control over this new Manchu-Han government with collaborators alone. That would have been impolitic, if not impossible, especially during the early years. His brother Dodo, who replaced Jirgalang as assistant regent in 1647, was an important ally. Dorgon also relied heavily upon three of Nurhaci’s grandsons, who were also followers of Dorgon himself: Bolo, Nikan, and Mandahai. After being rewarded with princely titles in 1644, they became Dorgon’s agents for keeping an eye on other Manchu military leaders. In fact, after 1644 nearly every major military expedition had one of these men sent along to super-

70 Under the Ming all officials—except for the very aged or ill who could be carried in sedan-chairs—had to go by foot from the Chang’an Gate to the Meridian Gate. In the early Qing, Manchu princes, *beile*, and *beise* were allowed to ride their horses through the gate into the Forbidden City until they reached the Jingyun Gate where they had to dismount and proceed on foot. Zhaolian, *Xiaoting xulu*, 1:6a.


72 During 1644, of the Six Boards’ vice-presidents, 7 were Manchus, 9 were Chinese bannermen, 1 was a Mongol, 1 was a regular Chinese official, 4 were of uncertain provenance. Two positions were unfilled. Of all these, 11 were transferred from Mukden. Oxnam, *Horseback*, p. 42.
vise the other commanders. Ubai, another important military supporter of Dorgon, was also a check against aristocratic military intrigue, commanding as he did the vanguard troops of the Four Banners, and serving in all major military engagements from 1637 to 1645. In Beijing itself after 1646, Dorgon’s major private advisor, outside of Fan Wencheng, seems to have been Tantai, the cousin of Nurhaci’s ruthless general Yangguri. Close allies, too, were the two Manchu nobles most noted for their literary skills in Manchu and in Chinese: Ganglin and Kicungge. Ganglin, of the Gualgiya clan, was descended from tribesmen from Suwan and was attached to the Emperor’s Yellow Banner. Early on, Ganglin had become a specialist in translating Chinese, and was named head of the Manchu Secretariat. By 1636, Ganglin had become Grand Secretary in charge of the Guoshi Yuan (Historiography Office), and it was he who submitted the crucial memorial that year in favor of establishing a regularly ranked bureaucracy. Later, after the Manchus took Beijing, he received the Zuo Maodi peace

73 Dorgon’s secret agents in the capital after 1644 were called qishiyuan (detectives). They were mainly Manchus. This system was extended to the provinces in 1649. There were also Manchu officials called qixinlang (counselors) appointed to the yamens of governors and governors-general by Dorgon; they were given the power to send Manchu memorials in secret directly to the prince-regent. It should be noted, however, that the investigative activities of the qishiyuan and qixinlang were hampered because they did not have very casual access to the Han Chinese. Adam Yuen-chung Lui, “Censor, Regent and Emperor in the early Manchu Period,” p. 87; idem, Corruption in China during the Early Ch’ing Period, 1644–1660, p. 50.

74 Oxnam, Horseback, p. 45; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 798, 899. Tantai stood at the head of a group of Dorgon’s cronies who were identified by the Shunzhi Emperor in April, 1652, as being: Baiyintu, Gonggadai, Xihan, Xianbuku, and Lengsengji. Oshibuchi, “Shinchô Junji soseki,” pp. 4, 8–11.

75 In 1598 a Suwan chieftain named Solgo had led 500 tribesmen to join Nurhaci. His son was the famous Fiongdon (1564–1620) who was Nurhaci’s best general, leading the attack on Fushun in 1618 and helping capture Gintaisi and defeat the Yehe. His son Tulai (1600–1646) helped overcome Li Zicheng, and later served under Dodo and Bolo in the south. For his military services, Tulai was named a duke, but he was posthumously disgraced in 1648 when he was accused of having plotted to support Haoge. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 247.
mission in 1644, and regularly took charge of the Manchu examination candidates’ testing, as well as being given responsibility for editing the *Veritable Records* of both Nurhaci’s reign and the later Ming reigns.\(^76\)

Kicungge was another example of a Manchu specializing in literary studies, and therefore committed in part to strengthening the civil bureaucracy with Chinese forms of organization. Selected by Nurhaci to be his private secretary, Kicungge (whose ancestors were Warka tribesmen) was the first to petition in 1631 that the Six Boards be established. He himself became President of Rites after the new government was organized. He was not just a civil official: he also headed a banner company as a *nirui ejen* after 1634 and campaigned under Dorgon against the Ming. However, once the Qing government was established in Beijing he became a prominent member of the Inner Three Courts, taking charge of the Hongwen Yuan in 1645 as a grand secretary, supervising examinations, and editing Nurhaci’s *Veritable Records* along with Ganglin.\(^77\) Both men were therefore trusted by Dorgon in matters that he could not entrust to his Chinese bureaucrats.

Obviously, Dorgon realized how important it was to use Chinese collaborators, but only up to a certain point.\(^78\) This emerges

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\(^76\) Oshibuchi, “Shinchō Junji soseki,” p. 5. He also supervised the compilation of the Tianqi records. During Li Zicheng’s occupation, the Shun soldiers destroyed a great number of the central government’s records and sacked the libraries of the Ming imperial princes. According to Qian Qianyi, all of the Neige library holdings were destroyed, even though the various grand secretaries’ offices and the emperor’s privy papers were left intact. There was no certifiable copy of the *Veritable Records* for the Chongzhen reign, nor were there entries for 1624 and the sixth month of 1627. After the Manchus took over, they put 100 clerks and copyists to work, sorting and collating whatever had not been destroyed by the rebels. On March 26, 1651, Ganglin urged that officials in the central and provincial administrations be ordered to find private copies of the *Veritable Records* and of the *Capital Bulletin* (*Dibao*). He also ordered unorthodox histories (*yeshi*) to be collected. Zhang, *Qing shi*, 246:3786; Lynn A. Struve, “The Hsü Brothers and Semi-official Patronage of Scholars in the K’ang-hsi Period,” pp. 12–14.

\(^77\) Zhang, *Qing shi*, p. 3786.

\(^78\) Dorgon once even warily asked Feng Quan: “Do you still remember your old master?” Feng Quan diplomatically responded that, if Dorgon remembered
again and again in the records kept of his daily meetings with members of the Inner Three Courts.79 "When it comes to using Manchus," Dorgon said at one briefing where he was concerned about the accuracy of a report by a Chinese official, "I know all there is to know about each one of them. But when it comes to Han, then I don't know if they are good or if they are corrupt."80 As always, however, Dorgon’s vision was informed with a sense of expediency. A great many of the Chinese collaborators who were recommended for office ended up, like Feng Quan, by being impeached for immorality or administrative abuses. Yet even though Dorgon remarked upon this to his grand secretaries, he was quick to add: "The officials which we should choose don’t all have to be good. That would be like having to choose military officers from among dwarfs. That’s no good. They would probably have to be sacked."81 The result was that once an official had been selected and admitted to the Inner Court, Dorgon felt he had come to know the man, and thus preferred him to an outsider.

"How is [Yang Fangxing] doing?" he asked his grand secretaries at one such session on July 22, 1645, referring to an official who had submitted a memorial. "Extremely well," the grand secretaries responded. Dorgon approved of the answer: "[Yang Fangxing] came out of the Inner Courts. I know him well."82

the Chongzhen Emperor, then so too would one of the latter’s former ministers recall him. Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 8.

79 These briefings are to be found in Duoergun shezheng riji. This is an extraordinarily revealing documentary record, which consists of secretarial notes of court sessions between Dorgon and his grand secretaries, running from June 22 to August 29, 1645. During these sessions, Dorgon would have his grand secretaries read officials' memorials aloud to him, and then he would ask for further details before making his own comments. The conversation—which is recorded in vernacular Chinese with classical comments—ranges from discussions about the size and cost of the beams used in the construction of the palace, to the marital habits of the Ming emperors. The court notes were found during the Xuantong period and were later printed by the Palace Museum.

80 Duoergun shezheng riji, p. 4.
81 Ibid., p. 5.
82 Ibid.
Of course, Dorgon may have had good reason to suspect the political loyalty of certain Chinese collaborators. There were too many cases of high-ranking adherents who had either, like Liu Ze-qing, turned coat once again; or who, like Hong Chengchou, were suspected of being in contact with loyalist circles in the south. This was especially so in 1648, during the recrudescence of Southern Ming loyalty, when even Qian Qianyi fell under suspicion, was accused of secretly aiding a loyalist agent named Huang Yuqi, and was finally arrested and put on trial in Nanjing. Qian was sixty-six years old by then, and he defended himself before the judge by pointing out his age and emphasizing how many favors he had received from the Qing dynasty. At the same time, the governor-general of Jiangnan, Ma Guozhu, petitioned the throne on his behalf, saying:

_He has served in the highest councils of state. His sons and nephews have likewise gone up for the examinations under the Qing—at which action Qian showed great delight. Surely Qian has shown no sign of forgetting the favors of your majesty._

Eventually the court decided in Qian Qianyi’s favor, declaring that there was no evidence that he had ever met Huang Yuqi. Released from prison in 1648, Qian returned home to his beloved concubine, Liu Shi, who later helped him edit an anthology of Ming poetesses and grew to share his deep and growing interest in Buddhism. During the following sixteen years, Qian Qianyi was to acquire a towering reputation as a critic, essayist, and historian:

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83 Huang Yuqi, a well-known activist, had been arrested on May 18, 1648, in one of the Buddhist temples at Tongzhou in Jiangsu. When he was taken into custody he was found to have seals belonging to the office of the governor-general. Qian Qianyi, then in retirement, was thought to have known Huang Yuqi, and to have been party to the plot. As we have seen, Qian Qianyi was secretly in touch with Ming loyalists, including Qu Shisi, in the south. Peng Guodong, _Qing shi wenyan zhi_, pp. 1–2; Luther Carrington Goodrich, _The Literary Inquisition of Ch’ien-lung_, pp. 100–105; Lynn Ann Struve, “Uses of History in Traditional Chinese Society,” p. 79; Ge Wanli, comp., _Qian Mu-zhai xiansheng yishi ji nianpu_, pp. 1–2.

84 Goodrich, _Literary Inquisition_, p. 101.
author of twenty-two scholarly books on topics ranging from Buddhist metaphysics to Nestorianism in the Tang period. Yet, he never quite managed to divest himself of suspicions that he had compromised himself—as a collaborator in the eyes of Ming loyalists, and as a traitor in the eyes of Qing loyalists. In 1664, Qian Qianyi finally died at the age of 82; and his widow Liu Shi, who had taken the vows of a Buddhist nun a year earlier, soon found that fellow townsmen were able to take advantage of his dubious political reputation to try to appropriate the family’s property. Shamed by this scandal, Liu Shi took her own life, and her rest-

85 Qian Qianyi had been in Beijing when the Nestorian monument was discovered near Xi’an around 1624. He was the first Chinese student of Tang Nestorianism, Manichaeism, and Mohammedanism. Goodrich, Literary Inquisition, pp. 101–102. Qian Qianyi’s cultural accomplishments also justified his collaboration with the Manchus. Believing that culture (wen) had limitless potential and could flourish under non-Han rule, Qian even implied at times that the greatest opportunities for the expression of the Chinese cultural heritage came when barbarians occupied the dragon throne. Under such dynasties government was fairly lax—“the net of the laws was lenient and generous, and men did not have to take official positions”—and therefore one found that during the Yuan, say, poetry societies abounded and literature was stimulated to develop. John D. Langlois, Jr., “Chinese Culturalism and the Yuan Analogy,” p. 370.

86 Gu Yanwu, for instance, refused to have anything to do with Qian Qianyi, and never exchanged namecards with him. When Gu was denounced by his former servant Lu En, and jailed, Gu’s good friend Gui Zhuang went to Qian Qianyi for help. Gu Yanwu was not aware of the visit. Gui Zhuang appealed to Qian’s humaneness, and told him that Gu Yanwu wanted to come and pay a visit of respect to Qian Qianyi, taking him as his teacher. On that basis, Qian Qianyi promised to intercede and speak on behalf of Gu. After he did so, Gu Yanwu was released, but he immediately wrote out a placard which was posted on the streets and which boldly stated over Gu’s signature: “I am not Qian Qianyi’s disciple (mensheng).” Xie Guozhen, Ming-Qing biji tan cong, p. 50. One contemporary said of Qian Qianyi: “He is a person too eager to get position, burning within [with the desire to win the gaze of his sovereign]; he is without principle, going from the one side to the other.” Sun, “Wu Meicun,” p. 11.

87 By the time of his death, Qian had regained some respectability. In 1664, for example, he was paid a visit of respect by Huang Zongxi and his brother Zongyan. Indeed, Huang Zongxi was responsible for Qian Qianyi’s funeral arrangements. Tom Fischer, “Loyalist Alternatives in the Early Ch’ing,” p. 8.
This is purportedly a portrait made in 1643 of Madame Hedong (Liu Shi), Qian Qianyi's wife, by Wu Zhuo. According to James Cahill, it may actually be a picture of a beautiful woman in the abstract, with her name added to it in order to enhance its provocative qualities. Such pictures were frequently painted during and after the Kangxi period (1622–1722). Reproduced through the courtesy of the Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
less spirit was said to haunt Qian Qianyi's house for over a century, until an 18th-century magistrate turned the building into a temple.  

Even though Dorgon distrusted collaborators like Qian Qianyi, especially if they were closely affiliated with Jiangnan literati coteries, he had the good sense not to let this prevent him from using them as adroitly as possible to enhance his own power and authority. Given the much more extreme suspicion of the other Manchu princes, Dorgon functioned as a protector of these Han adherents most of the time; and he utilized them in turn along with the Liaodong “old men” and his Manchu agents to take on more and more of the trappings of a real monarch, and not just a regent. Consequently, other top-ranking princes, like Jirgalang or Haoge, continued to feel resentment at their inferior treatment and strongly disapproved of the way in which Dorgon was turning the situation in Beijing to his personal advantage. In the spring of 1648 this restlessness came very much into the open with the impeachments first of Jirgalang and then of Haoge.

The Arraignment of the Princes

On March 27, 1648, Jirgalang was arraigned before the court on a variety of charges, ranging from the misuse of his position to acquire housing in the capital to a rupture of precedent when the Shunzhi Emperor was taken from Shengjing to Beijing. Most damaging of all was the accusation that he, Jirgalang, had considered having Haoge made ruler at the time that move took place, and for this crime Jirgalang was reduced from the first to the second rank of princes of the blood.  

On March 29, 1648, Haoge himself was impeached, and it became clear, in Dorgon’s eyes at least, that there had existed a major conspiracy to push forth Haoge’s candidacy as emperor, that in fact there was a league of nobles who had sworn an oath to support Haoge, and that this

88 Ge, Qian Muzhai, p. 26; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 530.
89 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:43; Shizu shilu, 37:2–6.
league included men like Suni and even Dorgon's adviser, Tantai. The charge was substantiated by testimony before the Assembly that Haoge had encouraged his candidacy, and had spoken out against Dorgon. Consequently, Haoge was convicted and sentenced to death. Dorgon, in his mercy, reduced the sentence to imprisonment, and permitted Haoge to commit suicide once in jail. Tantai, however, was not punished. In 1648 he was given command of the Qing forces in Jiangxi, and along with Holhoi ordered to subdue the revolt there led by Jin Shenghuan. His victory would be rewarded in 1649 with the title of viscount, and in 1650 Tantai was to become Dorgon's President of Civil Appointments.

At the time that Dorgon caused Haoge to be killed and brought about the humiliation of Jirgalang, he also increased his own status vis-à-vis the Shunzhi Emperor, Fulin, who was now ten years old. Early in 1648 Dorgon ceased prostrating himself before the monarch during court audiences, and that next winter he had his own title changed to Imperial Father Prince Regent (Huang fu shezheng wang). This claim to paternal as well as regental authority over the emperor was substantiated by Dorgon's military supremacy over all the other Manchu leaders. In addition to commanding his own Solid White Banner, Dorgon had by then taken over the Solid Blue Banner, which had originally been Hung Taiji's. In April, 1649, Dorgon's brother Dodo died. Dorgon thereupon claimed

90 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:43; Shizu shilu, 37:7-14.
91 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:43.
92 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 899.
93 The change took place on December 21, 1648, when the emperor performed the winter solstice ceremonies at the Altar of Heaven and the Altars of the Soil and Grain. At that time it was announced that several ancestors, as well as Dorgon, were to be raised in rank. The ostensible reason for this elevation of the regent was—as announced three days later—because Dorgon had brought peace to the tianxia (under-Heaven). Dorgon actually made the change because he wished to distinguish himself from the real uncles of the Shunzhi Emperor as well as to indicate even more clearly that he was higher in rank than other princes of the blood like Jirgalang. The title in Manchu, Han i ama wang, means "Father-Prince of the Khan." In earlier Manchu texts the word "father" or ama is used as a mode of reverential address. For instance, when Nurhaci and Bujantai met, they called each other ama (Chinese fu). Zheng, Tan wei ji, pp. 113, 116-118.
command of Dodo's Bordered White Banner, giving him control of three of the Manchus' Eight Banners, while Fulin himself only personally commanded the two imperial Yellow Banners. 94

Dodo's death also provided Dorgon with the occasion to take steps to halt the growing ambitions of his older brother, Ajige, who was then forty-three years old. Ajige had commanded several of the niru in the White Banners of Dorgon and Dodo. In 1644 he was named Prince Ying and given a rank of the first degree while being sent to northern Shaanxi against the forces of Li Zicheng. While Dodo was sent to Nanjing to pacify Jiangnan, Ajige was given the other major contingent of Qing forces and sent into Hubei after the fleeing Shun forces. There he accepted the surrender of Zuo Menggeng and was lauded for his military prowess; but he prematurely reported Li Zicheng's death, and for this mistake was recalled to Beijing. Late in 1648, however, Ajige was once again placed in command of a major military force and sent to Datong to campaign against the Khalkas; as we have seen, his approach provoked the rebellion of Jiang Xiang. 95

The rebellion of Jiang Xiang was momentarily contained by Ajige, but the actual suppression of the rebels awaited the arrival of Dorgon himself, who commanded the siege of Datong in person. It was at this time, when news arrived that Dodo had contracted smallpox in Beijing and was dead, that Ajige decided to press his own claims for better treatment from Dorgon. He did this by sending Ubai to Dorgon's encampment to present the case for Ajige's promotion on his behalf. 96

Ajige's case was, first of all, directed to clearing his own reputation because of the mistaken report about Li Zicheng's death. He did not confront this issue directly, but rather chose to point out to Dorgon that Dodo had not been an entirely blameless military commander either. For instance, he had not completely exterminated the Shun rebels at Tong Pass when he defeated Li in battle there. Nor had he managed completely to defeat the Sunid Mongols when he pursued them to the Kerelun and Tula rivers in 1646.

95 Ibid., p. 5.
96 Shizu shilu, 44:21b.
Yet despite these lapses Dodo had been named assistant regent in 1647. Now that Dodo was dead, did not he—Ajige—also deserve to be assistant regent? After all, he was the son of Nurhaci and the uncle of the Shunzhi Emperor. Why could Dorgon not name him an Uncle Prince (Shu wang) and thus recognize his merit?97

Dorgon’s reply, conveyed by message through Ubai, was couched in shocked tones. Dodo was only recently dead, yet Ajige was casting aspersions upon his military record already, as though all that Dodo had actually done—defeating Li Zicheng, taking Xi’an, pacifying Jiangnan and Zhejiang, driving out the Sunid Mongols, winning victories over the Khalkas—had amounted to very little. It was clearly a self-seeking ambition on Ajige’s part, and Dorgon would have none of that. “It is quite unreasonable,” he curtly said, “to request on one’s own to become a Shu wang.”98

Undaunted, Ajige responded to Dorgon’s rejection by requesting permission, now that the campaign against Jiang Xiang was proving successful, to build a mansion in Beijing. At the time, Dorgon was opposed to allowing the Manchu princes to create large establishments—both because it enhanced their own stature vis-à-vis his own, and because it was too reminiscent of the opulent displays of Ming princes who had been such a burden on the populace before their dynasty fell.99 He therefore decided to take this opportunity to punish Ajige with more than just a brotherly

97 Ajige also protested against the exceptional arrangements made for Dodo’s second son, Doni, to succeed his father as a prince of the first rank. Shizu shilu, 44:22a.
98 Shizu shilu, 44:22a.
99 On July 26, 1645, Dorgon had asked his grand secretaries how the Ming emperors had chosen their brides. The answer was that the Ministry of Rites would inform a chosen princely establishment (wang fu) that it could select women from within its domain (guo). When Dorgon suggested that this might be done now for the Manchu royal kinsmen, the grand secretaries were adamantly opposed. “At this time, the empire has just been settled. The people’s feelings would be fearful and apprehensive. This matter certainly should not be carried out.” They also warned him that the princely establishments of the Qing should keep down their expenses and not be given large allowances. One reason for the fall of the Ming had been that the prince’s households were such an enormous financial burden. Dorgon agreed with this policy, and announced that he would wait until later to fix the nobles’ allowances. Duergun shezheng riji, p. 7. Later, Dorgon also consulted his other Manchu advisers,
reprimand. He decided to use the Assembly of Princes and High Officials to chastise Ajige publicly.

Since entering Beijing, Dorgon had deliberately tried to make the Assembly into more of an advisory body that discussed, but did not initiate, policy. Just as Taizong had diminished its functions as a collective council of the eight beile by adding ex-officio banner ministers and commanders (gusan ejen), so had Dorgon carried this transformation even further by increasing the membership of the group to include grand secretaries and the presidents of the Six Boards. 100 Instead of acting as a check upon his own growing authority, which in turn derived from his manipulation of the regency-dominated throne, the Assembly became a forum where Dorgon could arrange for the arraignment and denunciation of other powerful aristocrats—in this case, his own brother—who challenged him. 101

Thus, Dorgon now answered Ajige’s request by summoning the Assembly together, and then enumerating before them Ajige’s past crimes: how he had in Datong on his own and without proper authority promoted all the civil and military officials one grade

telling them that he was contemplating the enfeoffment of each of the princes, just as Ming Taizu had done. Suni and other members of the Manchu aristocracy opposed this measure, saying as well that under the Ming princely estates had engrossed too much land, harming the public welfare. In 1650 a schedule of awards of land was finally established. Princes of the blood (qin wang) were given 1,440 mu; second-degree princes (jun wang), 900 mu; beile, 720 mu; and beise, 540 mu. These relatively limited land grants, which were comparatively so much smaller than Ming nobles’ holdings, persisted throughout the Qing dynasty. Zheng, “Duoergun,” p. 10.

100 Wu, Communication and Imperial Control, p. 13; Oxnam, Horseback, pp. 70–71.

101 Critics of the way in which the power of the Assembly had waned complained that the agenda was dominated by the throne, and proposed that each board prepare its own agenda and have its representatives speak for it. They also urged fellow members to speak out more courageously. “In recent years’ meetings, there have been those who speak out because they themselves are propitious, those who remain silent in order to follow the majority, and those who watch the great ministers and are not willing to offend them by speaking. Is this not contrary to the purposes of having a discussion at all?” Shizu shilu, juan 136, cited in Wang and Jin, “Cong Qing chu de lizhi,” p. 137.
and just as arbitrarily dismissed officials elsewhere; how he had disobeyed orders and attacked Hunyuan (a city about sixty kilometers southeast of Datong); and how he had formed a cabal with Wakda, to whom he repeatedly gave goods and property. Of all of these charges the last was by far the most serious, because it strongly implied the Ajige was trying to gain the support of Wakda and his brother Mandahai (the sons of Daisan, who campaigned together with Ajige against Jiang Xiang) in a conspiracy against Dorgon. The Assembly consequently judged that Ajige should be stripped of his princedom, that personnel serving under him should be cashiered, and that Wakda’s properties should be confiscated. Dorgon was content at this point to pardon Ajige, however, and forbade him to attend to board affairs or to entertain Han officials—the last being a precaution against seeking to form a faction with Chinese bureaucrats outside Manchu inner circles.  

The Revival of Literati Networks

During his ascent over the other royal princes, Dorgon drew his Chinese advisers upward with him. Chen Mingxia, for instance, acquired even more prestige and influence. In 1646 his presence in the capital was deemed so important to Dorgon that Chen was ordered to “overcome his feelings” and remain in office despite the Confucian obligation to return home and mourn the death of his father. Two years later, in 1648, when Dorgon first began appointing Han Chinese to the presidencies of the Six Boards, Chen Mingxia was made full President of the Board of Civil Appointments, ranking alongside the Manchu president, Tantai. As Dorgon himself relaxed his own attitudes about “corrupt Ming customs” and as official patronage by high-ranking Chinese ministers became more common, the old networks and alliances began to reform. Increasingly, the ranks of the provincial examina-

102 Shizu shilu, 44:22b.
104 Chen Mingxia appealed this decision, and was actually allowed to return home for temporary mourning.
105 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3788.
tion supervisors were being filled by literati from the south. In 1646 all but one of the eighteen examiners were northerners; by 1648, six of the twenty were from the south. The change was even more evident a few years later. In 1651 nearly half, and in 1654 two-thirds, of the provincial examiners were of southern origin. (See Table 7.) The southerners' revival was even more evident in the palace examinations. In 1646, the top three candidates had been from Shandong, Zhili (Hebei), and Shuntian prefecture; in 1647, all were from Jiangnan. (See Table 8.) And in 1649, when results

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Source: Li Zhouwang, comp., *Ming-Qing like jinshi timing beilu*, passim.

Note: #1 refers to summa candidates, #2 to magna, and #3 to cum laude.

1 Bannermen who passed in the regular examinations.

2 Bannermen who were specially awarded exam ranks.
were announced, the *primus*, Liu Zizhuang, turned out to be a member of the Restoration Society, while twenty four other successful candidates had also belonged to the Fushe.  

However, the networks that were coming back into operation were not functioning like the Restoration Society during its heyday, when membership in the society was one of the keys to examination success. Rather, they were smaller coteries of literati within the society roughly corresponding to the district-level clubs that had coalesced earlier and then had fallen apart during the tumultuous years 1642–1645. Whether or not these coteries were able to help place their members in the government depended upon political happenstance. That is, if someone happened to belong to the circle of a powerful collaborator like Chen Mingxia, then he would be much more likely to enter the government than another person, perhaps also a Fushe member, who was from a different local literary society or district nucleus of prominent literati. If, for example, one were well connected in Suzhou or Taicang, one was much more likely to join the Qing government or pass its exams than if one were from Kunshan or Wujiang. (See Table 9.) Personal connections to powerful patrons were thus being reknit. Faces familiar from the days of partisan involvement were reappearing, but the old coalitions that had dominated the Ming higher civil service were not rebuilt.  

In fact, the grand secretaries continued very much to be regal amanuenses rather than emblematic mandarins representing a bureaucratic interest. They were, under Dorgon, not at all independent of the prince-regent’s desires. In 1649, the same year that a former Fushe member passed first in the palace exams, Dorgon ordered the grand secretaries in charge of compiling the *Veritable Records* for Taizong’s reign to take every opportunity to embellish the prince-regent’s military accomplishments in the chronicle they were editing. The grand secretaries—who included Fan Wen-

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106 Liu is listed as a Fushe member in Wu Shanjia, *Fushe xingshi zhuanliüe*, 8:6. See also Chen Jiexian, *Manwen Qing shihu yanjiu*, pp. 101–102. More than 150 Fushe members are known to have taken civil service exams or to have served under the Qing. Atwell, “Ch’en Tzu-lung,” p. 145.  
Table 9.
Restoration Society Members in Suzhou Prefecture

<table>
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<th>District</th>
<th>Ming degree only</th>
<th>Ming degree and Qing degree</th>
<th>Ming degree, Qing degree, Qing office and degree</th>
<th>Ming degree, Qing office and degree</th>
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Note: In Wu Shanjia, *Fushe xingshi chuanli* , there are listed 330 Fushe members for Suzhou fu, Taicang zhou, Changzhou, Wuxian, Wujiang, Changshu, and Kunshan. Of those, 188 names have no data or additional comments. The other 142 do, and these are the ones listed here, showing whether they had a Ming degree and/or a Qing degree, and whether they served the Manchus.

Cheng, Ganglin, Kicungge, Hong Chengchou, Feng Quan, Ning Wanwo, and Song Quan—did not attempt to defend the traditionally sanctioned independence of the Historiographical Court, and meekly complied with the command.108

108 Chen, *Manwen Qing shilu yanjiu*, pp. 101–102; Oshibuchi, “Shinchō Junji soseki,” p. 5. One can imagine that the Chinese grand secretaries involved in the project welcomed the opportunity to create the impression that the Manchu dynasty had a long history in northeastern Asia, and thus had a prior legitimacy of its own, while at the same time partaking of an ecumene to which both it and the Ming belonged. Stressing the dynasty’s prior Jin origins also extended that legitimacy back even further, and thus helped justify their service to the conquerors, somewhat like that of the Roman, Cassiodorus (the quaestor of the Austro-Gothic ruler Theodor, who reigned from 488 to 526 in Rome), who wrote a history of the Goths which showed that they had had kings for seventeen generations and that their origins belonged to Roman history. The Manchus, on the other hand, did not appear to have the cultural inferiority feelings of the Goths. Rather, they were like
Dorgon's Hegemony and Demise

By now, none were left to stand against Dorgon on anything approaching equal terms except the emperor; and the prince-regent was even beginning to behave like an emperor himself. In 1650 his wife died and at the age of 39 spl he took in marriage the widow of his nephew Haoge, who had committed suicide at Dorgon’s command. At the same time, the prince-regent ordered the king of Korea to send princesses to be his concubines just as though he were the Son of Heaven. While giving Bolo, Nikan, and Mandahai more control over daily administration, Dorgon began to think of devoting more of his own time to leisure. On July 31, 1650, he informed the court that he was tired of the “unbearably muggy and humid” climate of Beijing during the summer months. Beijing had been a capital of China for so long that it was not possible to move the center of government elsewhere, but upon investigating the histories of the Liao, Jin, and Yuan dynasties, he had determined that they also had capital cities beyond the wall outside the borders of China. He therefore had resolved to build a city and palace somewhere in Rehe where he could “escape the heat of summer” (bishu) in the Yan Mountains. The summer capital was to be a modestly sized city because the prince-regent did not wish to impose too heavy a burden upon his subjects. Nevertheless, the various provinces of China were to be assessed 2.5 million ounces of silver, or about twelve percent of all the taxes annually collected in money throughout the empire; and orders
went out to assemble labor crews from all over north China to begin the construction work.\footnote{111}

That winter Dorgon led a hunting expedition beyond the Great Wall, and on December 5, near Harahotton, the Imperial Father Prince Regent fell ill.\footnote{112} Although Dorgon had no way of knowing it at the time, three days later Shang Kexi captured the city of Canton from the Ming loyalists, achieving a major victory in the far southern reaches of the empire. The prince-regent’s health worsened. On the last day of December, 1650, the principal architect of the great Manchu enterprise lay dead in Harahotton. When news of his untimely death reached Beijing, it stunned the court of Shunzhi.\footnote{113} A few days later, on January 8, Dorgon’s hearse was accorded full imperial honors when it neared the capital and was solemnly drawn through the Dongzhi Gate, along the Yuhe Bridge, past streets lined with officials, their wives dressed in white sackcloth standing in the gateways behind them. Many were in tears, and few could have guessed that within weeks the name of the once mighty regent would be publicly abused, and his followers imprisoned in chains.\footnote{114} But shortly after Dorgon was ceremonially entombed, it was curtly announced that the construction of the summer capital was to cease. The poet Wu Weiye wrote:

I hear that the court stops building the upper capital.
The hardship of the people, however, is hardly removed.\footnote{115}

\footnote{111} Ibid.; Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, vol. 1, pp. 382–384; Ray Huang, “Fiscal Administration during the Ming Dynasty,” p. 122.

\footnote{112} Harahotton (Black City), presently Luanping county, lay near Rehe on the Luan River. Erich Hauer, “Prinz Dorgon,” p. 45.

\footnote{113} Zhang, Qing shi, 1:46–47; Jin Sheng, Jin Zhongjie gong wenji, p. 217.

\footnote{114} Shizu shilu, 51:11.

\footnote{115} Wu Weiye, Wu Meicun xiansheng piannian ji, in Taicang xianzhe yishu, 12:1, cited in Lo-shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, p. 425.
Dorgon had made no provisions for his own succession. Without an heir of his own, he had adopted Dodo's son Dorbo, despite Ajige's protest. But Dorbo was too young to play much of a role in the intrigue and tense maneuvers that followed the Imperial Father Prince Regent's unexpected death. There were two immediate competitors for the powerful position which Dorgon had occupied at the center of the regency and above the three banners he commanded. One was Ajige himself. The other was Ubai, Dorgon's lieutenant. Ubai claimed that he had verbal instructions from Dorgon to act as Dorbo's protector, but this was not the sole basis for his contention. The real foundation of his claim was the control which he actually exercised over the two White Banners that Dorgon had placed under his supervision. It was therefore imperative for Ajige, if he were to step into Dorgon's shoes, to take over those two banners from Ubai, and that he prepared to do during the few days following the procession on January 8, 1651. Had Ubai responded on his own, mobilizing the White Banners and pressing Dorbo's claims, a kind of Manchu shogunate might
have emerged from the succession crisis. What happened instead was that the Ubai and his supporters turned to the other Manchu princes, and especially to Jirgalang, for help against Ajige.\(^1\)

Jirgalang, the former co-regent, had returned to Beijing in 1650 in triumph after defeating the Prince of Gui’s forces and capturing He Tengjiao in Hunan.\(^2\) The fifty-three-year-old prince did not wish to see Ajige inherit Dorgon’s regency. He therefore conspired with the other leading Manchu princes, and on January 26, at Dorgon’s funeral, had Ajige arrested and accused of plotting to seize control of the government. In the name of the Shunzhi Emperor, now fourteen sui, Jirgalang had Ajige thrown in jail where he was later forced to commit suicide.\(^3\) Their common enemy defeated, the two allies, Jirgalang and Ubai, now began to compete with one another for control of the regime. Ubai, on his part, had himself and several of his own followers named presidents of boards.\(^4\) Jirgalang, on the other hand, began to cultivate the loyalties of the commanders \((gusa ejen)\) and ranking officers of the Solid Yellow, Bordered Yellow, and Solid White Banners.\(^5\) The first two of these, of course, were the emperor’s own banners, commandeered by Dorgon; and Jirgalang was plainly trying to win over officers who had been angered by Dorgon’s appropriation of their command.\(^6\) At the same time, he was also trying to subvert the Solid White Banner, which was Ubai’s source of military support, and when he ultimately did manage in the days following Ajige’s arrest to win over Suksaha of the Solid White, the balance of power shifted away from Ubai to Jirgalang. The three banners were given

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2 He Tengjiao was seized on March 3, 1649, at Xiangtan. Ibid., p. 398.
4 The Boards of Civil Appointments, Punishments, and Works each added one Manchu presidency after Dorgon’s death. Zhang, *Qing shi*, p. 3791.
5 Jirgalang appointed a number of senior banner officials to the Assembly of Princes and High Officials. Robert B. Oxnam, *Ruling from Horseback*, pp. 70–71.
6 In 1652 Korean envoys told the Shunzhi Emperor that, had it not been for the opposition of the officers of the Yellow Banners, Dorgon would have had himself named emperor instead of Fulin. Zheng Tianting, *Tan wei ji*, p. 116.
a new title—the Three Superior Banners (Shang san qi)—and on February 1 the regency was declared formally over and a new period of direct imperial rule began.7

**Direct Imperial Rule**

If Jirgalang expected to manipulate the Shunzhi Emperor from behind the throne as Dorgon (who was posthumously named “Accomplished Ancestor, Emperor of Righteousness” on February 8) had dominated the court in front of it, he sorely underestimated the capacity of Fulin to turn direct rule to his own advantage. Though only fourteen sui—twelve years old in western eyes—the Shunzhi Emperor had already on his own begun to assert his personal authority in the weeks after Dorgon's death.8 On January 17, for instance, Shunzhi had turned to Tantai and Ubai before the Assembly of Princes and had insisted that, in spite of his youth, he was going to take a direct role in government. Henceforth, he ordered, the members of the Assembly were to memorialize him directly, bringing matters of importance to his attention.9 Of course, the Assembly of Princes was by then more of a judicial

7 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:47. For Jirgalang’s efforts to win the loyalty of the banner commanders, see Oxnam, Horseback, pp. 47–48.
8 Shunzhi’s surprising independence and willfulness were later sharply contrasted with the dependence and vacillation of the young Kangxi Emperor by Father Ferdinand Verbiest, who wrote to his friend Couplet from Beijing in 1670: “The current king [i.e., Kangxi] is still quite young in age and character. He lets himself be easily influenced by the arguments which his entourage whispers in his ear, ordinarily does not decide anything by himself, and wants everything to pass by the presidents or the yamen. [This is] quite different from the case of his father, Shunzhi, who from his most tender youth, decided on his own authority many affairs in a direction quite contrary to the advice of his ministers.” H. Bosmans, “Ferdinand Verbiest,” pp. 380–381. Despite this and other evidence, many historians have mistakenly depreciated Shunzhi’s sovereign power. See, for example, Pei Huang, Autocracy at Work, p. 84.
9 Da Qing Shizhun Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu (hereafter Shizu shilu), 51:12a. Presumably, Shunzhi had learned much of the art of governance from observing Dorgon during court sessions while the prince-regent was still alive.
Empress Xiaozhuang (1613–1688), wife of Taizong and mother of the Shunzhi Emperor. A Mongol princess descended from Chinggis Khan, Xiaozhuang was a powerful figure in the first three reigns of the Qing. Rumor had it that she had even married her brother-in-law Dorgon when he was regent, but this is unsubstantiated. The Kangxi Emperor was especially influenced by Xiaozhuang, who saw to his early education. Qingdai di hou xiang (Beiping, 1934).
gathering and political arena than an executive arm of the throne, and it did not take Fulin long to recognize that imperial rule demanded its own inner bureaucracy in order to be effective. On February 8, one week after his “personal government” (qin zheng) began, he therefore had the Inner Three Courts moved closer to the palace within the Forbidden City.”

It also did not take much time for the Shunzhi Emperor to learn that imperial ritual constituted an important device for exalting his own power over the government in a way designed to overshadow Jirgalang’s personal attachments among banner commanders. On February 20, 1651, a period of great festivity was announced by the emperor to celebrate his mother’s promotion to Empress Dowager Zhaosheng. This celebration was thus an occasion for the emperor to remit taxes, confer gifts, issue a general pardon for official crimes, and promote a number of Manchu aristocrats like Nikan and Bolo who were returned the high ranks which Dorgon had taken away from them.

By February 24, 1651, the emperor and Jirgalang had together mustered enough support to move against Ubai and his supporters, who included his brother Subai and Bolhoi. Nikan and Bolo, so recently restored to their princedoms, testified that Ubai and the Solid White Banner leaders had spread malicious rumors and were guilty themselves of conspiracy and plotting. Ubai and his brother were therefore stripped of their ranks and their property was confiscated by the government. That still left, however, a

10 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:47. Under the Ming, the Neige was within the Forbidden City but outside the inner palace. Ulrich Hans-Richard Mammitzsch, “Wei Chung-hsien,” pp. 62–63.

11 Fulin’s mother, Xiaozhuang, was a Mongol princess of the Borjigit clan and a descendant of Chinggis Khan’s brother. In 1644 when Fulin moved to Beijing, she was elevated from Secondary Consort (Zhuang fei) to Empress Dowager. Her aunt, Empress Xiaoduan, ranked above her; but after the latter’s death in 1649, Xiaozhuang was the highest ranking woman in the palace. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 300.


13 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 218, 798; Oxnam, Horseback, p. 48; Zhang, Qing shi, 1:48. At the time of Ajige’s trial the emperor had become aware that a considerable amount of land had been commended by Chinese to the Bor-
number of important officials who had been closely identified with Dorgon during his ascendancy and who still stood to benefit from the posthumous honors conferred upon him by the court. These officials—men like Ganglin, Kicungge, and even Tantai—represented the kind of Manchu rule-by-elders that Dorgon and Jirgalang had taken advantage of to establish themselves as regents in the first place. For the immediate reason, then, of discrediting Dorgon’s closest followers, as well as the more distant goal of establishing imperial supremacy over princely advisors, the Shunzhi Emperor began to encourage moves to attack Dorgon posthumously. On March 6, 1651, Suksaha, Soni, and others testified before the Assembly that Dorgon had jewelry and clothing that only an emperor was supposed to possess, and that he and Holhoi had been secretly planning to build a capital of their own at Yongping at the time Dorgon died. And six days later, on March 12, the entire denunciation was made public, so that for the first time the inhabitants of the capital, including many Han officials who had not been aware of the proceedings of the Assembly, realized that Dorgon, Chengzong Yi Huangdi (Accomplished Ancestor, Emperor of Righteousness), was being accused of crimes against the Manchu emperor and his nobles.

The public denunciation of Dorgon on March 12, as presented

ordered White and White Banners. The emperor now ordered that commended lands under the White Banner be handed over to the Imperial Household Bureau, thereby swelling its coffers and curbing the economic independence of the White Banner. Edict dated March 18, 1651, and rescript dated March 27, 1651, in Gugong bowuyuan Ming-Qing dang’anbu, comp., Qingdai dang’an shiliao congbian, fascicle 4, pp. 67–69. See also Sudō Yoshiyuki, “Shinchō shoki ni okeru tōjū to sono kigen,” 13.3:35–36. Throughout 1653, officers of the Board of Revenue and of the Censorate sought to restore lands illegally commended to the nira back to their original owners. See the documents in Gugong bowuyuan, Qingdai dang’an, fascicle 4, pp. 72–115.

14 Shizu shilu, 53:18–20a. It was also pointed out that Holhoi had testified against Haoge just to gain Dorgon’s favor, and he was for this crime sentenced to the lingering death. Soni, who was the nephew of Hife, was probably encouraged to testify against Dorgon by the imperial eunuch Wu Liangfu. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 663.

15 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:48.
by the *Veritable Records*, was announced by the young emperor, but expressed through the indictment rendered by Jirgalang, Bolo, and Nikan as the pre-eminent Manchu princes, as well as by the leading ministers of the Inner Three Courts. Their accusation of Dorgon began with the qurillai that was held at the time of Hung Taiji’s death in 1643. Because Fulin had been so young, they explained, it had been necessary to create a dual regency with Dorgon and Jirgalang.

Subsequently, Dorgon, Prince Rui, alone [seized] sole power and would not allow Prince Zheng [Jirgalang] to deliberate on government [affairs]. Then he made his younger brother, Dodo, Prince Yu, assistant regent and they secretly swore to carry out their own interests. He recklessly venerated himself, making the emperor's succession to the throne [of China] altogether seem to be his own doing. He also took all the credit himself for the accomplishments of the princes, great officials, officers and soldiers who had been nurtured in former years by Taizong Wen Huangdi (Great Ancestor, Emperor of Learning) and who had sacrificed their lives and spent their strength for our emperor by attacking cities, destroying the enemy and exterminating the bandits. The insignia which [Dorgon] used, the music, even the people in his bodyguard and retinue, were all intended to lead to the utmost adulation. Furthermore, the mansion which he built was no different from the palace itself.¹⁶

These imperial pretensions all formed part of Dorgon’s scheme to make himself emperor, the princes argued. His other crimes were inspired by the same arrogance. His treating the government’s treasury as though it were his privy purse; his accumulation of gold and jewelry beyond calculation; his appropriation of the lineages of men like Centai and Ganglin, whose *niru* were incorporated in Dorgon’s own banner; his murder of Haoge and subsequent marriage to the dead man’s wife—all these acts were designed to make him so omnipotent that none would speak out against him for fear of being disgraced or killed. It was thus only

after his death, during the Assembly of March 6, that his closest retainers were willing to come forward and reveal that Dorgon in private wore an emperor’s robe and “once secretly discussed with Holhoi, Ubai, Subai, Loso, and Bolhoi his intention to take his two banners and move them to garrison Yongping prefecture,” which was to be his new capital.\(^{17}\) Now, for all to know, the Shunzhi Emperor announced these crimes, condemned Holhoi to death, and stripped Dorgon and his relatives of their exalted ranks.\(^{18}\)

After the public denunciation of Dorgon on March 12, 1651, the Shunzhi Emperor continued to persecute the supporters of Dorgon with the help of Jirgalang and his followers, as well as with the aid of the Manchu President of Civil Appointments, Tantai, who had been a strong supporter of the former prince-regent, but now backed the young emperor. Nobles were wooed with higher ranks. Jirgalang’s own sons, Jidu and Ledu, were given second-degree princedoms; Haoge’s son, Fushou, was restored to his princely rank; Nikan and Bolo once again held the first-degree princely title; and Tantai was, on March 25, 1651, granted a dukedom in reward for his betrayal of his former associates and of Dorgon’s memory.\(^{19}\) With their help, the throne tried Grand Secretaries

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 53:23b. Loso was one of the Sahaliyan beile, often mentioned together with Hife and Kicungge. See Kanda Nobuo, Matsumura Jun, Okada Hidehiro, trans. and annot., Kyū Manshū tō, Tensō kyū nen, 2:371–372. This work, incidentally, renders Bolhoi as Borgoi, but I am following instead Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 798.

\(^{18}\) *Shizu shilu*, 53:24a. On April 29, 1652, the Shunzhi Emperor accused Baiyintu and four other imperial clansmen of having “behind Our back fallen in with Prince Rui in order to bring disorder to the government of the realm” (*yi luan guo zheng*). Ibid., 63:15b. See also Oshibuchi Hajime, “Shinchô Junji shoseki,” p. 4. Baiyintu was the son of Bayara, Nurhaci’s younger brother. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 598. In 1655 two officials suggested that Dorgon’s posthumous punishments should be reduced, but the Assembly, under Jirgalang, refused this request and exiled the two petitioners. Dorgon was not exonerated until 1773, and was not returned his princely rank until 1778 when the great grandson of Dorbo, Chunying, inherited the princedom and joined the Eight Great Families (*Ba da jia*): “The Princes of the Iron Helmet” (Tie maozi wang). Hummel, pp. 218–219.

\(^{19}\) Zhang, *Qing shi*, 1:48–49.
Kicungge, Ganglin, Fan Wencheng, and Ning Wanwo before the Assembly on charges of having conspired with Dorgon to alter the *Veritable Records* of Nurhaci's reign—an effort intended to enhance Dorgon's military reputation. Fan Wencheng and Ning Wanwo, the two venerable Chinese adherents, were exonerated by the Assembly, which was convened on April 17 under Jirgalang's leadership.²⁰ The two Manchu grand secretaries, however, were treated severely. Kicungge and Ganglin were condemned to death, and after the latter was executed his line was ordered extinguished.²¹ Five days later, the special oversight powers that Dorgon had given to Mandahai, Bolo, and Nikan to "manage" (guan) the Six Boards were rescinded.²² And, at the same time, the Emperor's Three Superior Banners were brought under the direct control of the Imperial Household, with Manchu officers being assigned to the command of specific companies.²³

**Bureaucratic Reforms**

While the emperor and Jirgalang together mobilized a portion of the Manchu aristocracy against those nobles who had been Dorgon's closest followers, Shunzhi himself began a conscientious effort to correct the administrative abuses which he claimed had existed during the later years of Dorgon's regency. On the one hand, this did substitute more regular forms—even Ming forms—

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 48, 3786; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 218, 592. Fan Wencheng was temporarily suspended, but rejoined the Assembly the following year and served until his retirement in 1654. Ning Wanwo was soon after this invited to become a grand secretary, and alone among all the Chinese received the rank and stipend of a Manchu. Li Yuandu, *Guochao xianzheng*, 2:10a.
²¹ Zhang, *Qing shi*, p. 3786.
²² Oxnam, *Horseback*, p. 49. Mandahai, Bolo, and Nikan all died that same year—Nikan supposedly in battle, the others of unknown causes.
²³ Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 218; Jonathan D. Spence, *Ts'ao Yin and the K'ang-hsi Emperor*, p. 10. After 1651 there was only one banner (outside of the emperor's own banners) under the exclusive control of a single family: the Solid Red Banner, led by the family of the now dead Daisan. Lawrence D. Kessler, *K’ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule*, p. 14.
of administration for the rather ad hoc methods of Dorgon’s reign as regent. And on the other, it allowed Shunzhi to adopt the posture of a reforming monarch, very much in the Confucian mould, which in turn attracted support for him from officials—both Han and Manchu—who believed that the longevity of Qing rule depended upon its ability to sustain its virtuous and benevolent image in the people’s eyes. The emperor himself specifically pointed this out to the Board of Civil Appointments on March 27, 1651, in a long edict which expressed his concern over reports of official peculation and corruption—reports which suggested to Shunzhi that the dynasty might easily lose the loyalty of the people unless reforms were carried out. The emperor was especially concerned by the thought that higher-ranking officials actually guilty of abus-

24 Xiao Yishan has argued that this tightening up of regulations was only possible because the day-to-day problems of fighting the Ming loyalists had now attenuated. Zhejiang and Fujian had already been pacified, and the only major armies left were Zheng Chenggong’s forces and the troops commanded by Yongli supporters. Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, 1:361. On April 9, 1651, incidentally, Kong Youde conquered Wuzhou, which represented a major victory over the Yongli forces in Guangdong. Zhang, Qing shi, 1:48.

25 It was impossible for officials to live on their nominal salaries. A top-ranking official received 180 taels plus a rice allowance, and a district magistrate of the seventh rank earned only 45 taels in cash. Merely paying one’s private secretaries cost the average official several hundred taels per year. Lacking the opportunity that provincial bureaucrats had to acquire informal fees from their subordinates (mu ye zhi jin—“money sent during darkness”), officials in the capital either depended upon “gift money” (changli), occasionally sent from the provinces, or bribes. Since “gift money” mainly was sent to high officials, the most corrupt officials were usually in the lower ranks. Junior officials in the Board of Civil Appointments (where the lottery system determining appointments could be manipulated), of Revenue (where the measurement of tax receipts could be altered using rigged scales), of Punishments (where the legal agenda could be shifted to favor one party over another), and of War (where promotions could be prematurely granted) had the most opportunities to receive bribes. Adam Yuen-chung Lui, Corruption in China during the Early Ch’ing Period, 1644–1660, pp. 3–5, 27–28, 33, 38–39. In the 18th century, after the Yongzheng Emperor authorized a special supplementary salary (yanglian yin), the average official wages of a district magistrate amounted to about 1,000 taels per year. Chi-ming Hou and Kuo-chi Li, “Local Government Finance in the Late Ch’ing Period,” p. 573.
ing their positions might be shifting blame onto inferiors who were then impeached in their place. 

Ordering that the Board investigate this possibility and tighten up regulations, Shunzhi also transferred several presidents from one board to another, and especially Xie Qiguang from head of the Board of Revenue to presidency of the Board of Punishments. The next day Shunzhi denounced the Board of Revenue's practice of collecting excise taxes at customs barriers from merchants, who thereby suffered financial hardship. This imperial criticism was then followed by another edict on May 29 ordering that officials of insufficient literacy in the Board of Civil Appointments be dismissed.

In the next several days the Shunzhi Emperor reviewed the personnel records of all of his major officials. On April 7, 1651, he announced the results of his survey to the Board of Civil Appointments. They were, to him at least, disappointing. Since taking power in his own right, the emperor had expected his officials to adopt a new attitude of "public devotion and private restraint." But his bureaucrats were still committing the same kinds of abuses they had been guilty of before; they had not "purged their inner organs" of those bad habits. Xie Qiguang, for instance, had never, during his seven years in the Board of Revenue, conducted a com-

26 Shizu shilu, 54:3b–4a. Because the Qing bureaucracy initially had differential punishments (a regular bureaucrat convicted of corruption was frequently exiled or killed while a clerk was usually imprisoned for just a few months), underlings often accepted the blame in a case of corruption, served a short prison term, and then after release rejoined the official's staff under an alias. Knowing of this practice, Shunzhi later in 1655 ordered that the punishments for corruption be commensurate with the seriousness of the crime rather than the rank of the offender. Lui, Corruption, p. 25.

27 Shizu shilu, 54:4. Dang Chongya was transferred in turn from Punishments to Revenue. Other transfers included Jin Zhijun from Works to War, and Liu Yuyou from War to Punishments. ("You" in Liu Yuyou is also written with the radical for persons according to Wang Zongyan, Du "Qing shi gao" zhaji, p. 18.) At first, the Shunzhi Emperor was extraordinarily strict with defendants accused of corruption, which in 1651 was made an unpardonable crime. During his short reign, Shunzhi supervised the prosecution of more cases of corruption than did Kangxi, who ruled six times as long. Lui, Corruption, pp. 53, 65.

28 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 48.

29 Ibid., p. 3786.
plete audit and thorough accounting (xiao suan) of his ledgers. There were enormous deficits in the tribute grain records, amounting to as much as 30 million taels.30 There were also repeated cases of Xie’s ignoring the fixed internal transit duties and allowing individuals to fix excises as they wished, lining their own pockets by charging many times the legal amount and thus threatening the livelihood of merchants. For this malfeasance Xie Qiguang was to be dismissed from office, never to be employed again by the government.31

Subsequently, other functionaries were fired as well, including some of the personnel of the Inner Courts, but the highest-ranking figure to be thrown out of office on April 7 was none other than Dorgon’s faithful collaborator, Grand Secretary Feng Quan. The Shunzhi Emperor had reviewed the 1645 impeachment of Feng by Wu Da, and while he did not pass judgment on those charges, he did conclude that Feng “lacked the substance of a statesman,” being a self-seeking sycophant who consistently avoided taking a position on important issues in order to remain in office. “In the past seven years, he has never once made a statement of his own views on public affairs,” the imperial edict announced, adding that, “he has never disagreed once!” In addition to being a servile timeserver, Feng Quan was also denounced for factionalism, and especially for “forming a cabal for treasonable purposes” with Li Ruolin. The purposes of the faction as such were not specified, but the charge was serious enough to provoke the dismissal of both men from the government.32

30 One of the major reasons for these deficits was the consistent tax arrears of Jiangnan. In 1648 Governor Tu Guobao had reported that there were not sufficient funds to transport the tribute grain of Suzhou, Songjiang, and Changshu; again in 1649 he had memorialized, requesting permission to raise land taxes in Jiangnan. Dorgon refused to approve both of these proposals. There was thus no support from the throne for local officials wishing either to collect existing tax quotas or to increase them. Dorgon was evidently unwilling to confront the Jiangnan gentry on this issue. Zheng Kecheng, “Duoergun dui Manzu fengjianhua de gongxian,” p. 9; Guo Songyi, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji yu Qing chu zhongyang jiquan de maodun ji qi fazhan he bianhua,” p. 132.
31 Shizu shilu, 54:13. For examples of private tax levies in the early Qing, see Li Hua, “Qingdai qianqi fuyi zhidu de gaige,” pp. 100–101.
According to the dynastic history, “Since [Feng] Quan had been dismissed, he was replaced by Chen Mingxia.”\(^{33}\) In fact, the edict of dismissal had been written for the Shunzhi Emperor by Chen Mingxia himself—an act that Feng Quan never forgot.\(^{34}\) For, in effect, Chen Mingxia was Feng Quan’s replacement. On the day that Feng was dismissed, Chen was named by the emperor a grand secretary of the Hongwen Yuan.\(^{35}\) A few days later, on April 10, 1651, the emperor also named Grand Secretary Hong Chenghou as Associate President of the Censorate and made another prominent southerner, Chen Zhilin, President of Rites.\(^{36}\) As a regional group, then, this triumvirin replaced the northern ministers Feng Quan, Li Ruolin, and Xie Qiguang. It was evident at the time that

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33 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3786.
34 Tan Qian, Beiyou lu, p. 389.
35 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3788.
36 Ibid., 1:48. Chen Zhilin, who was Wu Weiye’s son-in-law, was a scion of the famous Chens of Haining in northern Zhejiang, halfway between Hangzhou and the Jiangnan border. Between 1500 and 1900 the Chen family produced 31 jinshi, 103 juren, 74 senior licentiates, and 1,000 xiucai. The lineage’s examination success was built upon an excellent economic foundation. It had, during the 16th century, amassed a great fortune through the salt monopoly. The most famous member of the family during that period was Chen Yujiao, who had a moderately successful bureaucratic career, rising to head the Si yi Guan, but was then disgraced in 1605 when his son was sent to prison for his part in an affray between police and salt smugglers. The family’s financial position was badly shaken by this, but Yujiao’s brother, Chen Yuxiang, helped rebuild the family’s fortune. It was his grandson, Chen Zhilin, however, who really established the clan as an important source of officials of the highest rank under the Qing. Only 40 years old when he surrendered to the Manchus, Chen Zhilin could look forward to a bright future for himself, and rising good fortune that would be shared with the new dynasty. Thirteen members of his family would become officials above the third rank, and three, including himself, were to become grand secretaries. By the late 18th century, it was commonly rumored that the Qianlong Emperor himself was actually born to that clan, partly because he so enjoyed its famous garden, Yu Yuan. Chen Zhilin himself had risen steadily in the service of the Qing. After surrendering in 1645 he had become a reader in the Secretariat. In 1648 he was named Vice-President of Rites. The following year he additionally acquired the position of a censor. His wife, Xu Can, was a famous poetess. Er chen zhuans, 9:10–13a; Gao Yang, Mingyi si gongzi, p. 57; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 96–97; L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, pp. 188–190; Duoergun shezheng riji, p. 59.
the southerners, and the Shunzhi Emperor himself, viewed their role as one of reformers who would correct some of the abuses in the bureaucracy that had developed under their predecessors during Dorgon’s lax reign.\(^{37}\) The initial two or three years of Dorgon’s regency had seen the first great wave of Qing institutional reform. Now, the years 1652–1655 were to witness the second. The reforms were again almost entirely suggested by Ming holdovers in the Six Boards—men whose talents Shunzhi now recognized and whose suggestions for administrative improvements he endorsed.\(^{38}\) (See Table

\(^{37}\) Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 362.

\(^{38}\) Some reforms cannot so readily be identified with individuals, though they had extremely significant economic consequences. The expansion of handicrafts production during the early and mid-Qing, for example, stemmed in part from the changes in state monopoly practices. Handicraft weaving in north China, on the other hand, was stimulated both by the spread of cotton cultivation in Hebei and Shandong in the early Qing, as well as by the opening of textile markets beyond the Great Wall. Kataoka Shibako, “Minmatsu Shinsho no Kahoku ni okeru nōka keiei,” pp. 92–93; Linda Grove and Joseph W. Esherick, “From Feudalism to Capitalism,” pp. 409–410. During the late Ming, the state managed 19 official weaving enterprises, employing the labor of hereditary artisans or their paid substitutes. The Qing reduced the number of enterprises to 3 main centers in Nanjing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou (where the looms were refurbished between 1645 and 1651), shifting to a system of mai si zhao jiang, in which the raw silk was bought at prevailing prices and workers were paid for what they produced. (For the rationalization of the Jiangnan textile industry, see Peng Zeyi, “Qingdai qianqi Jiangnan zhizao de yanjiu,” pp. 91–96.) Though the Qing government continued to levy a special tax on artisans until 1697, by 1726 that particular item in the tax quota had been shifted to landowning households and the hereditary categories of labor service had disappeared. (See Hou and Li, “Local Government Finance,” p. 566.) Roughly the same evolution occurred in the management of the imperial porcelain works at Jingdezhen, which had mainly been run in the Ming by eunuch superintendents. During the Qing the hereditary categories were gradually abolished, and artisans were paid according to the labor they used to make the porcelain. It has been argued that by creating greater incentives for handicraft workers who had been released from their hereditary service obligations, and by ensuring that nearly all of the surplus fabric woven or porcelain produced by state handicrafts workers reached the open market, the government stimulated production and the economy expanded, especially in the ensuing 18th century. Peng Zeyi, “Qingdai qianqi shougongye de fazhan,” pp. 1–6, 11.
10.) One of the most important reform measures set in motion at this time was a thoroughgoing overhaul of the imperial water-works system. The water conservancy of the Yellow River and the supervision of the Grand Canal and the Huai River dike system were administratively located within the Board of Works at the beginning of the Shunzhi reign. Under the Ming, the Ministry of Works did make appointments every three years or so to field offices in cities like Xuzhou in the Grand Canal zone. However, actual control of the administration of the canal zone had long been out of the hands of that particular ministry. Since 1450, the Ming government had been in the practice of appointing an Imperial Canal Commissioner, who was also simultaneously made Grand Coordinator (Zongdu) for the canal zone, which included the seven major prefectures north of the Yangzi (Xuzhou, Huai’an, Yangzhou, and so forth). After the wakō pirates began to plague the Yangzi valley and raid along the Jiangbei and Shandong coast-lines in the latter part of the 16th century, the Canal Commissioner was also concurrently appointed Superintendent of Military Affairs (Tidu junwu) in charge of maritime defense for that area. The Canal Commissioner was thus altogether an official of great authority, who dealt with ministries like that of Works almost as an equal in his own right, and to whom the nominal officials appointed by the Ministry of Works in his region actually reported. With the exception of the command of the Manchurian defense, in fact, this was the most influential appointment outside the capital itself; and it is no accident that the throne only appointed men to this powerful post for very brief terms, averaging only two years each.

39 The destruction of the hydraulic system was far less extensive during the 17th century than during the Yuan-Ming transition, when the exterior dikes and main ramparts were destroyed. Also, the inhabitants of the most ravaged zones in the 14th century had simply disappeared. In the 1640s and 1650s the general structure of the waterworks system remained intact, and survivors of the time of troubles were able to return from the refuge which they had sought in more secure areas earlier. Pierre-Etienne Will, “Un Cycle hydraulique en Chine,” p. 277; Elizabeth J. Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845–1945, p. 13.

40 Ray Huang, “The Grand Canal during the Ming Dynasty,” pp. 44–51.
Table 10.
Reforms Introduced During 1652–1655

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Memorialist</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xiong Wenju</td>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>Officials should rectify their behavior;</td>
<td>1651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jiangxi)</td>
<td>Appointments</td>
<td>Prominent officials should keep their servants and secretaries from exploiting the people; civil and military exams should be restored in Jiangnan.</td>
<td>1652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Yongji</td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Yellow River water conservancy; provide relief for refugees in Zhili by cutting waste in the military; prohibit opportunistic Chinese from joining the banner system.</td>
<td>1652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jiangnan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Yuyou</td>
<td>Punishments</td>
<td>Maintain close supervision for Chinese who join banners for personal gain; clarification of penal statutes.</td>
<td>1652</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Shuntian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhang Fengxiang</td>
<td>Works</td>
<td>Attacks extravagance of officials; court should recruit prominent scholars to compile Qing code.</td>
<td>1652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Shandong)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Xue Suoyun</td>
<td>Punishments</td>
<td>Lost classics should be collected and bought.</td>
<td>1652</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Henan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wei Zhouzuo</td>
<td></td>
<td>More care in the prosecution of alleged bandits; discourage litigation if charges are</td>
<td>1653</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Shanxi)</td>
<td></td>
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2. Zhao Erxun, ed., Qing shi gao, 244:8; He, Huangchao jingshi, 112:43–47.
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<tr>
<th>Memorialist</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheng Kegong</td>
<td>Civil Appointments</td>
<td>found to be false by punishing plaintiff; Eliminate superfluous officials in the bureaucracy; regular examination of officials.</td>
<td>1655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Zhili)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Officials should be recruited and their performance evaluated according to 4 new criteria: eradication of corruption, land reclamation, prompt remittance of taxes, extermination of bandits; only experienced and administratively talented officials should be sent to areas with a history of local corruption and tax evasion.</td>
<td>1653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Huaxi</td>
<td>Punishments</td>
<td>Reform in penal administration, including speedier trials and punishments.</td>
<td>1653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Shandong)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Chang</td>
<td>Works</td>
<td>Reduction of corvée for Shanxi coal miners.</td>
<td>1653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Henan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ren Jun</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unification of lü and lì; Chinese and Manchu legal practices, which were not intermingled, should be carefully disentangled; trials should be carried</td>
<td>1653</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Shandong)</td>
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6 Ibid.
7 Zhao, Qing shi gao, 244:5b–6.
8 Qing shi liezhuan, 79:49b–51a.
9 Ibid., 79:46–47a.
Table 10 (continued)

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<tr>
<th>Memorialist</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Year</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gong Dingzi (Jiangnan)</td>
<td>Punishments</td>
<td>Officials should strictly observe penal regulations;</td>
<td>1653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Baojia</em> should be instituted for refugees.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Zhouyun (Shanxi)</td>
<td>Works</td>
<td>Suppression of local bandits; elimination of local corruption in government postal stations.</td>
<td>1653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Hongzuo (Yunnan)</td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>In order to conquer Yunnan and Guizhou, alliances should be made with native chiefs;</td>
<td>1653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Punishments for generals who embezzle military funds.</td>
<td>1655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Zhilin (Zhejiang)</td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Promote good government by supporting agriculture, exercising prudence in military mobilization, being frugal in setting budgets.</td>
<td>1655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liang Qingbiao (Zhili)</td>
<td>Civil Appointments</td>
<td>Recognize importance of <em>xian</em> magistrates; strict evaluation of officials’ performance.</td>
<td>1655</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 Ibid., 78:51.
11 Ibid., 79:44b–46a; He, *Huangchao jingshi*, 93:8–11.
12 *Qing shi liezhuan*, 78:53–54.
13 Ibid., 78:48b–49.
Now, as the Qing government turned its attention to the problem of water conservancy and tribute grain transport, which was certainly one of the most critical areas of concern for the safety of its rule, the decision was taken to make the director of this aspect of administration even more powerful and independent of the regular ministries, detaching him altogether from the Board of Works, and as well from the offices in the central government concerned with water conservancy as such. This reorganization was carried out under the supervision of one of the most competent "twice-serving ministers," Wang Yongji.\(^{41}\)

Wang was a perfect example of the officials who had established a noted reputation during the last years of the Ming as specialists in fiscal administration, criminal law, and famine relief, and who dis-

\(^{41}\) The Board of Works was not a very important ministry during the Shunzhi period. The Chinese president was Zhang Fengxiang (Shandong) who had had a checkered bureaucratic career. Under the Tianqi Emperor, he had been both Vice-Minister of War and governor of Baoding. He lost both posts because of his Donglin connections during Wei Zhongxian's hegemony; and then, after he was restored to office during the Chongzhen period, he was soon arrested because some of the military equipment he had been in charge of manufacturing turned out to be very poorly made. Later restored yet again to that vice-ministerial position, he was in Beijing when the city fell to Li Zicheng. Tortured to reveal his wealth, he had returned to his home in Tangyi before proceeding south to join the Southern Ming court of the Prince of Tang in Fujian. The prince named him Viceroy of Zhejiang and Nanzhili. When Fujian was conquered by Qing troops, he surrendered to the Manchus, accepting a vice-presidency in the Board of Revenue, and then becoming promoted to President of Works, which was mainly honorific. *Er chen zhuan*, 9:1–2. The real leadership in the board was exercised by Vice-President Ye Chuchun (*jinshi* 1628, Jiangnan) who was one of those rare officials who had begun his career as a prefectural clerk and was then recommended for a regular appointment in the bureaucracy. Ye, who was Vice-Minister of Works when Beijing fell, suffered much the same fate as Chen Mingxia. The Southern Ming court in Nanjing had entered his name on the list of people serving Li Zicheng (*Shun'an* or *zeian*), and he had to flee to the north to save his life. He was promptly given back his post in the Board of Works, and he served in that capacity as a very competent administrator until 1652, when he was transferred to the Board of War to serve as vice-president. *Er chen zhuan*, 12:37–38. For the Qing reconstruction of waterworks in the 1640s and '50s, see also Will, "Cycle hydraulique," p. 276.
covered the opportunity under the new Qing dynasty to implement reforms that they had been frustrated from carrying out earlier. A 1625 jinshi from Jiangnan, Wang had served as a police magistrate under the Ming. He was best known for his tenure as district magistrate of Hangzhou, where he supervised a major local construction project—the building of a large sea wall—and where he also built public granaries for famine relief. Surrendering to the Manchus, he was recommended by the governor of Shuntian, Song Quan, for a post as Director of the Court of Revision and Judicature. In 1647, Wang was named Right Vice-President of Works, and then in 1651 Right Vice-President of Revenue.\(^42\) In that capacity, Wang Yongji was first especially involved in checking up on the lands assigned to military colonies. Soon, however, he turned to take charge of plans for reorganizing the conservancy of the Yellow River and Grand Canal. A special administration was thus formed to supervise these two major waterworks projects. Instead of operating under either the Board of Works or Revenue, this new administration reported directly to the throne, and was placed under a Director-General of the Yellow River and Grand Canal Conservancy (Hedao zongdu), who commanded a force of two thousand soldiers, plus additional boatmen and laborers. A personal staff of twenty-nine officials was appointed to the headquarters of the Director-General in Jining (Shandong), and another thirty lower-ranking officials were posted along the Yellow River and Grand Canal as water conservancy officials.\(^43\)

42 Serving as Left Vice-President of Revenue during this period was Fan Dali, the eldest son of Fan Wencheng. Tan, *Beiyou lu*, p. 376.

43 Service on the water conservancy staff was a special kind of internship that provided an opportunity to train literati, originally educated as generalists, in fiscal administration. Wu Guolong, for example, was a jinshi classmate of Chen Mingxia, and also from Jiangnan, who served on the staff of Director-General Cai Shiying. Later, during the Oboi regency, Wu played an important role in streamlining administrative procedures in the Board of Works. Huang Zhijun, comp., *Jiangnan tongzhi*, 150:22a. See also *Er chen zhuan*, 8:24; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 845–846; Hu Ch’ang-tu, “The Yellow River Administration in the Ch’ing Dynasty,” pp. 505–507. Wang Yongji’s son, Mingde, was also a legal expert. He published a famous work on criminal law, *Reading the Law with a Bodkin at His Girdle (Du lü pei xi)*, in 1674.
The foundation of the director-generalship proved during the next century to be an administrative triumph for the Qing dynasty. The links between the central Board of Works and local officials who actually administered corvée (or at least handled its commutation) had badly attenuated over the course of the Ming dynasty. The result was a waterworks administration that, in general, was close to total collapse. The waterworks themselves, which the Qing inherited from the defunct government in Beijing, were in a shambles. During the first three decades of Qing rule, more than two out of every three years there was a major break in the dike systems with consequent severe flooding. The new government, instead of vainly trying to reforge the links between local administrators and the capital, wisely decided to create an intermediate organization that bypassed the concerned ministries and set up its own apparatus of local conservancy officials who could provide immediate liaison with district and prefectural administrators. While the director-generalship of the Yellow River and Grand Canal Conservancy was in its prime, therefore, it was capable of coordinating a vast waterworks scheme that did a great deal to restore economic health to the capital, and that called upon the zeal of hydrologists who had not been able to muster the authority of the central government to enforce their appeals for local government aid earlier during the Ming. Gigantic projects were under-

44 Harold Lyman Miller, “Factional Conflict and the Integration of Ch'ing Politics,” pp. 142–143. Flooding was especially severe throughout north China during the early 1650s, and again in 1670. Susan Naquin, “The Connectedness behind Rebellion,” p. 444.
45 One of the most dynamic directors in the early Qing was Zhu Zhixi (jinshi 1646, Zhejiang), who was initially recommended for office by the grand secretaries Ganglin and Fan Wencheng. Formerly Chancellor of the Hongwen Yuan, he was named Director-General of the Conservancy in 1657. The following year a disaster occurred. The Yellow River overflowed at Shanyang (jiangsu) and changed its course for the fifth time in Chinese history, flowing below Kaifeng, passing Xuzhou, and intersecting the Grand Canal at Suqian, whence it followed the canal itself as far as Qingjiangpu and then spilled over the plain northeastward until it reached the sea. This would continue to be the Yellow River's course until 1855, and it was Zhu Zhixi's responsibility to regulate the new channel. In addition to stamping out corrupt practices that impeded a steady supply of labor and material to construct new dikes, Zhu
taken, especially during the early part of the Kangxi reign. The Chonghe Canal was constructed in 1686, the mouth of the Yellow River was dredged in 1688, and the crucial embankment at Gaojiayan in Jiangsu was reinforced in 1699. In this way the entire lower run of the Yellow River, which had been in notorious disrepair during the last decades of the Ming, was brought back into full service. For sixty years to come there was not a single disastrous flood along its course—a boon of untold benefit to residents of the Hebei plain and the Huaiyang region.

recognizing the danger that Huai River silt posed to the eastern dikes on Hongze Lake and recommended the construction of two sluices to drain off surplus water into other lakes to the southeast, relieving the strain on the canal works themselves. He remained head of river conservancy until his death in 1666, when cities along the river built temples in his honor. The residents of the canal zone called him “Zhu the Great King” (Zhu da wang), and he was later canonized by the Qing throne. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 178–179; Adam Yuen-chung Lui, The Hanlin Academy, p. 100.

46 The key figure behind most of these great construction projects was Jin Fu, a Han Bordered Yellow Bannerman from Fengtian who had served in the Hanlin Academy, as governor of Anhui, and as President of War before becoming Director-General of the Yellow River and Grand Canal Conservancy. Jin Fu assembled an excellent staff, including the famous hydraulics expert Chen Huang. Jin served as Director-General from 1677 to 1692. Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 112:38. See also Miller, “Factional Conflict,” pp. 144–145. Ultimately, the hydraulic evolution of the Yellow River and Huai River regions followed the same pattern as the Ming cycle: initial reconstruction, subsequent immigration into the area, intensive management without much control of the flood zones, the creation of private dikes, a disequilibrium between demography and hydrography, and a hydraulic crisis which came to a peak at the end of the 18th century and then a nearly overwhelming breakdown a half-century later precipitated by the local ravages of the Taiping invasion. The Qing cycle was different, however, in that there was an unprecedented demographic dynamism, along with an exceptionally efficacious administrative system operating during most of the period under consideration. Will, “Cycle hydraulique,” p. 278.

47 Hu, “Yellow River,” p. 508. By the 19th century, however, the combination of responsibilities for both the Yellow River and the Grand Canal system in a single directorship may have worked against the government’s best interests. By then the Yellow River conservancy was made secondary to keeping the Grand Canal open. Thus, a tremendous amount of effort was placed in keeping the Yellow River from silting and therefore from flooding, for fear that
Another important set of proposals concerned the government's taxation system. As we have seen, the Qing government inherited a hopelessly out-of-date set of tax registers from which more than forty percent of the landholdings had disappeared. During most of the Ming period, the amount of land on the state's tax registers had averaged about 700 million mu. By 1645, this had dropped to only 405 million mu. In 1648, the government decided to try to bring the tax registers up to date by reviving the old lijia system.

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48 In 1578, the registered population of China was 16,692,856 kou, and the arable land totaled 7,130,976 qing. Guo Songyi, “Qingchu fengjian guoqia ken-huang zhengce fenxi,” p. 115.

49 Oxnam, *Horseback*, p. 218. In 1647, the governor of Shanxi reported that 75,525 qing of land were unclaimed. That same year, the governor of Hunan reported homes abandoned and cities emptied; and in Sichuan, leopards and tigers roamed through the streets of towns and entered dwellings at night. In one district, during 1647, 42 people were eaten by tigers. Guo, “Qingchu fengjian guoqia,” p. 112.

50 Miller, “Factional Conflict,” p. 72. In the lijia system, tens of households formed units called jia, of which ten of the latter formed a li or “hamlet.” The “hamlet chief” or lizhang was supposed to be a different head of household each year. That person would be held responsible for “prompting” the other heads of households to pay their taxes through him, though often he was sim-
This coincided with a decision to follow the former Ming policy of establishing hereditary occupational categories (soldier, artisan, commoner), and of detailing fù (land tax) and yì (service tax) obligations separately. Even though the hereditary classifications of the Ming had long since become blurred, and even though the Single Whip reform had obliterated the distinction between fù and yì by commuting both into single cash payments, the Qing government decided to order each prefecture, county, and district throughout the empire to bring its tax registers up to date according to the old Ming tax statutes. These registers were to be put together by lìzhang (hamlet chiefs), who would in turn pass them on to the local magistrate; they would then be forwarded by him to the governor and viceroy, all the way up to the Board of Revenue.\footnote{Supposedly, the Complete Text of the Land and Labor Imposts (Fuyi quanshu) was compiled in 1646. It contained the quotas of land and labor taxes per province, the amount of cultivated land, the number of persons who were subject to corvée, and the quotas to be sent to the imperial treasury. A copy of this was ordered distributed to every zhōu and xiàn for the magistrates to refer to, and a copy was also supposed to be placed in local Confucian temples so that scholars could examine it. All that this meant, in fact, was that the old Wanli period quotas, minus the supernumerary military levies, were supposed to be applied to each locale. Actually, in some cases, the Board of Revenue ordered provincial governors to collect taxes according to the Wanli quotas plus the additional levy known as the Liao xiàng (Liao taxes for military rations). That is, the additional levies of the Tianqi and Chongzhen reigns were not assessed, but the supernumerary tax of the Wanli reign was collected. According to a memorial from Wang Zhizuo, governor of Jiangxi in 1649, the inhabitants of that province were abandoning their lands because of these high taxes. He claimed that over half of the land in the province had been abandoned as a result. At that point (August 22, 1649), Dorgon wrote a vermilion endorsement, ordering that the Wanli Liao xiàng taxes be removed. Gugong bowuyuan Ming-Qing dang'an bu, comp., Qing dai dang'an shiliiao congbian, series 1, pp. 152–153. See also Kung-chuan Hsiao, Rural China, pp. 84–85.} Thus,
just as the zongjia system of local control supposedly culminated in the Board of War, so did this parallel tax registration system theoretically reach all the way up to the Board of Revenue.\textsuperscript{52}

This attempt to use lijia to bring the tax registers up to date failed. On June 3, 1649, the Inner Three Courts received an edict which spoke worriedly, on the one hand, of the amount of land which was simply not listed in the local tax registers; and, on the other, of the tragic plight of many refugees who were close to starvation. The throne thus ordered the Board of Revenue and the Censorate to inform local officials that they must try to get unlisted “refugees” to enroll in the tax system. Then, once it had been determined which lands already had owners (youzhu huangdi), the unclaimed land (wuzhu huangdi) could be distributed among the remaining “refugees” as part of the regular land reclamation system promulgated earlier.\textsuperscript{53} Eventually, by encouraging this sort of homesteading, the Qing government would be able both to reclaim abandoned lands for cultivation and also to get properties

\textsuperscript{52} Wen Juntian, Zhongguo baojia zhidu, pp. 201–218; Tang Di, “Lüelun Qingdai di diding zhidu,” p. 47. As one might expect, in response to the extreme variety of differing local village structures throughout China, the two ideal systems had by 1670 merged into unified but different local organizations: lishe in the north, and zhuang in banner lands; tuzhang or paitou in the south. By the early 18th century—1709 at the latest—this new unified system was simply called baojia. It brought together police and fiscal functions, combining control (ostensible maintenance of the household registers and placards) with the collection of taxes. After the Xianfeng period, baojia became more of a fiscal than a police structure, and the office of the local constable (dibao, difang) acquired more and more importance as a substitute for baojia to guarantee local law and order to the government. Watt, “Yamen,” p. 58; John Robertson Watt, “Theory and Practice in Chinese District Administration,” pp. 356–365; Wen, Baojia zhidu, p. 262; Tang, “Diding zhidu,” pp. 46–50.

\textsuperscript{53} Shizu shilu, 43:509, edict dated June 3, 1649. According to the earlier promulgation, ownerless lands (except in Shandong and Hunan where a nominal fee was charged) were given to cultivators free. In Sichuan, for instance, 30 mu of arable and 50 mu of dry land were given to each household in exchange for registration. Title to the property remained with the government for 3 years in the case of arable, and for 6 years in the case of dry land. Taxation of the property was not to begin until title passed. See also Guo, “Qingchu fengjian guojia,” p. 115.
listed on the tax register once more. But this was yet to come.\footnote{54} Although 710 million \textit{mu} of land would be reported under cultivation in the mid-18th century, by 1662 only 550 million \textit{mu} were listed on the tax registers.\footnote{55} (See Table 11.) Clearly, some other way would have to be devised in the short run to improve the efficiency of tax collection.\footnote{56}

On August 1, 1651, the Supervising Secretary of the Board of Punishments, an outstanding censor named Wei Xiangshu, suggested several ways of improving the government’s budget procedures.\footnote{57} Noting that the central government did not have an accurate accounting of the amount of income collected by officials in the provinces nor a detailed list of local expenses, Wei called for a complete annual accounting by each provincial treasurer of all taxes collected in money and kind, and of all expenses incurred in each major budget category. These fiscal reports were then entered into yellow registers (\textit{huang ce}), and presented to the viceroy who would send them to the court for inspection. Once at court, the

\footnote{54} In 1652, all of China’s provinces—together with Beizhili—had accumulated during that year alone over 4 million taels of tax deficits because of wasteland. Guo, “Qingchu fengjian guojia,” p. 113; idem, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji,” p. 132.

\footnote{55} During the Shunzhi period, a total of 164,263 \textit{qing} of land were reclaimed, or about 9,125 \textit{qing} per year. During the Kangxi reign, 273,671 \textit{qing} (4,561 per year) were reclaimed. Much of the land reclaimed during the Shunzhi period, however, was turned into military colonies and the peasants were made \textit{tun hu} and forced to work in the fields. In 1658, on the other hand, a very high total of 98,259 \textit{qing} of land were reclaimed after the government offered preferential tax treatment to encourage landowners to reclaim fields themselves. Guo, “Qingchu fengjian guojia,” pp. 133–135. In general, the new government was far more successful in registering the lands owned by former relatives of the Ming reigning house than in reclaiming other abandoned or concealed landholdings. By 1646 it had become fairly common practice for local officials to make complete reports on lands owned by Ming nobles in their districts. Sometimes the lands were subsequently confiscated and rented out in order to raise funds for military expenses. See the documents printed in Gugong bowuyuan, \textit{Qingdai dang’an}, fascicle 4, pp. 150–152.

\footnote{56} Han Liang Huang, \textit{The Land Tax in China}, pp. 58–60.

\footnote{57} Wei Xiangshu, from Shanxi, was one of the first Qing \textit{jinshi} degree-holders, having passed the 1646 metropolitan and palace examinations. Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, pp. 848–849.
Table 11.
Increase in Registered Population, Arable, and Tax Revenue, 1652–1661

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (ding)</th>
<th>Increase over 1652 (in percent)</th>
<th>Land under cultivation (in qing)</th>
<th>Increase over 1652 (in percent)</th>
<th>Tax income (land &amp; ding)</th>
<th>Increase over 1652 (in percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td>14,483,858</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>4,033,925</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>21,261,383</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td>13,916,598</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>3,887,926</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>21,287,288</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1654</td>
<td>14,057,205</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>3,896,935</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>21,685,534</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
<td>14,033,900</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>7,877,719</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22,005,954</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td>15,412,776</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4,781,860</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22,089,696</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td>18,611,996</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>4,960,398</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24,366,365</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1658</td>
<td>18,632,881</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4,988,644</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24,584,526</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td>19,008,913</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>5,142,022</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>25,585,823</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1660</td>
<td>19,087,572</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>5,194,038</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>25,664,223</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1661</td>
<td>19,137,652</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>5,265,028</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>25,724,124</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 One qing equals 100 mu.
yellow registers would be completely audited, and clear registers (qing ce) would be compiled in order to determine the income and expenses of the central government, as well as extra sources of income like the salt gabelle. This new accounting system was put into effect during the following year, 1652; and while it certainly did not mean that the tax registration problem had been solved, it did make it possible for the government a little later to discover just where the worst shortages were to be found so that they could be corrected in due time.

In addition to suggesting better tax accounting procedures, Wei Xiangshu became noted for his fearlessness as an impeaching official. Part of his crusade against civil service corruption was directed against the Censorate itself, which had become notorious for its bureaucratic abuses during the last years of the Dorgon regency. According to reports at the time, censors sent out on investigating missions often charged off their own office expenses to local yamen, accepted the help of other officials, claimed excessive per diem reimbursements for their cost of living, and freely accepted bribes. The Shunzhi Emperor was particularly alarmed by reports which made it appear as though his own "speaking officials" (yan guan) were not to be trusted; and on May 5, 1651, he expressed some of his concern in an imperial edict. Therefore, even though he himself had left Beijing on May 22, 1651, for a

58 Shizu shilu, 57:19b–20. Wei Xiangshu was not the only official to call for such reforms. Beginning in the eighth lunar month of 1651, there was a series of memorials from officials in the Jiangnan area, pointing out the irregularities in the land registration system there. Wealthy households were known to resist all efforts to have their land entered on the land survey registers by bribing clerks and officials. Lands that had been reclaimed were also not being registered. It was therefore proposed that extensive and accurate land surveys be carried out. Nishimura Genshô, "Shinsho no tochi jöryô ni tsuite," pp. 425–426.


60 In 1648, six provincial censors and supervising secretaries were either dismissed or degraded; and in 1649, Zhou Shike, a provincial censor, was convicted of corruption and sentenced to death. Adam Yuen-chung Lui, "Censor, Regent and Emperor in the early Manchu Period," pp. 84–85.

hunting trip to the imperial game preserve of Rehe, he undoubtedly would have approved of the meeting which was subsequently held by Chen Mingxia, Hong Chengchou, and Chen Zhilin to discuss reforming the Censorate.  

**Purging the Censorate**

Hong Chengchou was particularly concerned about corruption in the Censorate, because he was now one of the heads of that body. He therefore may have been the first to suggest that the three new Chinese chief ministers hold a secret meeting at the Huoshen Temple in Beijing in order to evaluate the relative merits and demerits of the officials currently serving in the Censorate. The result of their conclave was a sudden announcement by Hong a few days later that a major purge of the Censorate was at that very moment underway. While there were to be twenty-two newly commissioned censors appointed to office, and two men currently serving were to be promoted, eleven other censors presently in office were to be “transferred out of the capital” (wai zhuang).

Evidently, Hong and the other two ministers hoped that by planning the purge in secret and then carrying it out so suddenly, they would be able to keep the dismissed censors off balance long enough to prevent them from rallying organized opposition. They may have calculated that the momentum of the purge would be so swiftly and clearly established that the dismissed censors would be hard pressed to devise a successful countermove. As for the new censors, they were pledged to a complete and vigorous loyalty to the emperor and his reform-minded policies. In this way, the purge hoped to remove the potential threat of taking advantage of the vacuums in the upper echelons of the Censorate, which might possibly occur if the dismissed censors were to regroup and regain some influence in the central government. It would, in other words, achieve the clean sweep that the new ministers hoped to make.

62 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:49.
63 Ibid., p. 3722.
64 Ibid., pp. 3722, 3785; Shizu shilu, 57:11b; Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 362. To be “transferred out of the capital”—which was initially designed to give officials in the central government experience in the field—was not necessarily a punishment. In fact, it amounted to a kind of promotion, and gave the officials so transferred an opportunity to work closer to the source of informal surcharges. By 1653, when it was codified as neisheng waizhuan (promotion within and transfer without), it was meant to provide Hanlin officials chosen for their literary skill with practical administrative experience in the provinces. In practice, however, this additional experience did not always lead to higher office (only 5 out of the 21 Hanlin officials sent out in 1653 rose above Rank Four later), though it did give them an opportunity to work closer to the source of informal surcharges. Lui, Corruption, pp. 40–41; idem, Hanlin Academy, pp. 93–95.
enough to prevent a counterattack. But one of the censors “transferred out of the capital” took the offensive at once. Just as soon as Zhang Xuan, who had developed a reputation for investigative integrity on the Henan circuit in the last years of the Ming, heard of his transfer, he wrote a final impeachment. The object of his attack was the most vulnerable of the three new ministers. Chen Mingxia was charged with ten malfeasances (including two criminal actions). He was accused of having “curried favor serving Prince Rui,” for which sycophancy he had been rewarded with a board presidency; and for having “relied upon others for advancement [in a way] to do violence to one’s feeling.” In addition to having conducted an irregular and anarchic administration of the Board of Civil Appointments, Chen Mingxia was also said to have “formed a faction to carry out private interests.” Finally, the secret meeting at the Huoshen Temple was described, and Chen Mingxia, Hong Chengchou, and Chen Zhilin were accused of a treasonable conspiracy: “they ordered their retainers out and secretly discussed rebellion.” This last charge was accompanied by the additional piece of information that Hong Chengchou had without the emperor’s permission sent his mother back to their home in Fujian, as though preparing to have her in a safe place should some kind of Southern Ming cabal be plotting a coup in the capital.

Hong Chengchou had indeed sent his mother home, but he firmly rejected the accusation of conspiracy, explaining that the ministers had met at the temple in order to evaluate the talents of

65 Zhang Xuan had come into conflict with Ming Grand Secretary Chen Yan, and had been dismissed. In 1644 he had accepted a censorial post in Beijing in charge of the Zhejiang circuit, and then served once more on the Henan circuit, becoming known for the number of his impeachments against official corruption, even at the gubernatorial level. Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3785.
66 Ibid. At this time, it was permissible to use rumor (fenguen) in memorials of impeachment. Because that practice got out of hand, the Oboi regency forbade the use of information from unsigned placards in impeachments; and in 1671 the Kangxi Emperor specifically prohibited the use of rumor as evidence altogether. Kessler, K'ang-hsi, pp. 135–136; Lui, Corruption, p. 63.
67 Shizu shilu, 57:11b.
68 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3723.
all the censors. The case, however, was not decided on its merits. Chen Mingxia had a powerful ally in the person of his fellow President of Civil Appointments, the duke Tantai, whose corrupt practices he encouraged. Tantai, of course, would have stood condemned as well for administrative incompetence if the charges concerning Chen Mingxia’s “irregular” management of their Board were proved true. Perhaps it was for that reason, then, that Tantai rode in person to the emperor’s hunting lodge to dispute the impeachment and accuse Zhang Xuan of making false charges in turn because of his anger at being dismissed by Hong Chengchou from the Censorate. According to the emperor’s own recollection of the visit, which he discussed frankly with his court the following year:

At the time we were on an imperial tour of inspection outside [the Forbidden City] and had temporarily made Mandahai, Prince Xun, our deputy. The prince convoked the Assembly of Princes and High Officials. One by one, each [of the charges against Chen Mingxia and Hong Chengchou] was judged to be of substance. Consequently, Mingxia and Chengchou were held in custody and troops were detached to guard them. Because the implications were important, an envoy was quickly sent [to Us on our tour] to memorialize the news. When Tantai heard about it his countenance showed his displeasure, and he made signs he wished to reopen the case. Then we returned to the capital [on July 4, 1651] and ordered all of

69 According to Liu Xianting, when Hong Chengchou’s mother joined him in Beijing, she had been enraged by her son’s collaboration with the Manchus. Striking him in the face with her walking stick, she is supposed to have screamed: “You come to greet me like this! You have made me into nothing more than an old maid-servant in the banners. I’m going to beat you to death, so I can remove this evil from the face of the earth.” Liu Xianting, Guangyang zaji, p. 30. If Hong’s earlier account to the throne of his tearful reconciliation with his mother in Nanjing is authentic, then this story must be apocryphal. However, Hong did subsequently send his mother away from the capital, because according to a report from the governor of Fujian in 1652, she died in her home there at that time. Li Guangtao, “Hong Chengchou bei Ming shimo,” p. 246.

70 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3791. Tan Qian believed that Zhang Xuan was motivated by this anger. Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 362.
the princes, *beile*, *beise*, dukes, and marquises, together with the high officials to hold a court hearing [on July 15, 1651,] to call witnesses and judge [the matter]. Tantai roared and shouted, baring his arms [for a fight]. He forcefully protected the members of his faction (*dang ren*), and wanted to kill Zhang Xuan in order to close up the pathway of words. The princes and high officials shrank back from such violence and ferocity. There were some who went along with [Tantai because of his] reputation and acceded. There were some who bowed their heads without speaking. And there were also some who privately took issue [with Tantai]. When the memorial had been presented, once We saw that there were so many items [of impeachment], We could not overcome our sense of alarm. Tantai, standing erect, came before Us. He lied, declaring the accusations to be entirely false. He also said that they concerned [acts that had taken place] before the pardon [of February 20 when the Empress Dowager was promoted]. And he also wrongfully implicated [Zhang Xuan,] a loyal minister, in a capital crime, [saying there] should be retribution.71

Whether persuaded or cowed, then, the Assembly went along with Tantai and acquitted Chen Mingxia and Hong Chengchou on July 15, 1651. Their accuser, Zhang Xuan, was in their place convicted of “nourishing envy in his heart and calumniating high officials.” His sentence was capital punishment.72

**Curbing the Aristocracy**

Despite the emperor’s later recollection that he had thought there was considerable substance to the charges against Chen Mingxia, Shunzhi did continue in the months after the July hearing to rely upon and promote the former Ming official. If anything, Chen Mingxia appeared to rise in his esteem; and, after the dismissal of Centai and Li Shuaitai as grand secretaries, Chen was, on Septem-

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71 *Shizu shilu*, 62:3b–4. For the pardon, see ibid., 53:1–3. The date of the emperor’s return to the capital is given in Zhang, *Qing shi*, p. 49.
72 *Shizu shilu*, 57:12a.
ber 8, 1651, reappointed Grand Secretary of the Court of Vast Learning.\(^73\) At the same time, the emperor continued to support policies that either gave greater scope and favor to the ministers and grand secretaries just around his own person, or sought to curb some of the privileges and excesses of the Manchu aristocracy.\(^74\) For example, it had been the practice of the Board of Punishments to accept immediately for trial officials who had been impeached and convicted within the bureaucracy for illegal acts. This placed the ultimate authority for deciding the fate of most middle and lower-ranking officials in the hands of ministry bureaucrats. Shunzhi ordered instead that all impeachments first be sent directly to the throne, for its advisors to decide whether or not a given official should stand trial or should remain in office, thus placing more discretion in the hands of the members of the Inner Three Courts than they had held before.\(^75\) At the same time, Shunzhi ordered that criminal charges be extended to members of the Manchu aristocracy whose slaves (touchong) had committed depredations against the Chinese population. The imperial rhetoric was couched in paternalistic tones very similar to Dorgon’s comments on the same issue:

\(^73\) Zhang, *Qing shi*, 1:49. Centai and Li Shuaitai had been dismissed on August 28 on charges of having mishandled the emperor’s pardon announcement earlier that year. Centai, of the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner, was the grandson of Eifu. A respected military officer, Centai had fought against Yuan Chonghuan in the northeast, and had commanded his own contingent during the Shandong campaign. In 1644 he had served in the campaign against Li Zicheng, and three years later, while being rewarded with an honorary title as Vice-President of Rites, he campaigned against Kong Youde in Huguang, and then against the generals of the Prince of Lu in Fujian. After 1650 he held a series of important civil posts: President of Punishments in 1651; then President of Civil Appointments and Grand Secretary, heading the Historiographical Court. Ibid., p. 3713.

\(^74\) That winter, after eight years of being attached to the Bordered Yellow Banner as a Chinese adherent, Hong Chengchou was permitted to enter the niru as a full-fledged seminar, “donning armor and serving as a praetorian.” Thereafter, Hong Chengchou referred to himself before the throne as one of Manchu registry, grateful to have received the benevolent permission of the emperor to come “under the niru.” Ming-Qing *shiliao*, 3:131, 160, cited in Li, *Shizu shilu*, pp. 250–251.

\(^75\) *Shizu shilu*, 58:3. This order was issued on August 16, 1651.
When we heard [that touchong were harming the people], we were overcome with hatred. An emperor takes the under-Heaven to be his family. For what reason should he look with generosity upon touchong who treat the people with contempt? Besides, the people are the very ones who present us with taxes and corvée. The health of the country depends upon them. The touchong are slaves (nuli). Now they turn and use their masters' influence to protect themselves like a charm. From now on, beginning with Our own bond-servant companies and extending on down to the princes of the first and second degree, to beile and beise, and to dukes, marquises, and earls: if they possess touchong who continue to cause trouble and harm the people as they have done in the past; and if their masters, including those who are in charge of the niru, are aware of these activities, then [the masters] will be sentenced as accomplices.  

But though the tone was similar to the former prince-regent's, Shunzhi's policy was much more draconian. By depriving the Manchu aristocratic owners of touchong of their prior immunity to arrest in such cases, the Shunzhi Emperor was pushing the throne's authority over nobles much farther than Dorgon had ever done. In fact, he and his advisers were announcing that official and aristocratic privileges had to be curbed severely if the dynasty were to continue to win the loyalty of its subjects—a policy that was also manifested by the appointment of especially courageous "speaking officials" like Zhao Kaixin, who was known for his willingness to confront official malefactors, to the associate presidency of the Metropolitan Censorate.  

76 Shizu shilu, 58:2. For the emperor's bondservant companies, see Spence, Ts'ao Yin, pp. 17–18.  
77 Zhao, a former Ming jinshi from Changsha (Hunan), was particularly well known for his concern for protecting the people from government abuses. It was Zhao who devised a special settlement program in four selected villages during the great quarantine scare over smallpox, when the ill people were summarily transported outside the city and often just left to die. Other policies associated with Zhao were the establishment of court rituals and protocols of procedure for Dorgon, as described earlier; and the suggestion that civil governments be established as soon as possible for recently conquered provinces like Jiangnan, Zhejiang, and Huguang. He had been Associate President of the Censorate in 1645, but then retired. He was recalled by Shun-
To a certain degree, the emperor's sudden attack on Tantai on October 1, 1651 represented the same kind of monarchical denial of special aristocratic influence and privilege. The Manchu duke was arraigned by Subai before the Assembly primarily for having curried Dorgon's favor. But Shunzhi's indictment of the President of Civil Appointments was mainly couched in terms of Tantai's having sought to extend his personal influence over all the other boards of government, often misleading officials into thinking that Tantai's will was also the throne's wish. There were other charges, of course, and many of the witnesses at Tantai's trial spoke of his arrogance and cruelty toward others, including members of the royal family. But while these charges helped enlist the support of imperial kinsmen and other nobles in the Assembly who were either affronted by Tantai's parvenu conceit as a recently appointed duke or angered by his sycophantish association with Dorgon, it was in the end the throne's outrage at his "deceitful and obscuring memorials" and his constant "scheming for private advantage at the public interest" that led to his execution.

With the death of Tantai, Shunzhi seems at last to have become his own master, at least as far as the conflict between crown and nobility was concerned. Jirgalang was still an extremely powerful figure at court, and would remain a major leader among the nobility until his death in 1655, but hereafter no aristocratic figure, or even coalition, effectively challenged the power of the throne as long as Shunzhi was alive. The last months of 1651, then, saw the completion of Shunzhi's transformation from young ward of a powerful regent to monarch in his own right. On October 31, 1651, the name of the great gate facing south from the palace was changed from "Receiving Heaven" (Chengtian) to the "Gate of Heavenly Peace": Tiananmen. There is no reason given for this

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78 Zhang, *Qing shi*, p. 3791.
79 *Shizu shilu*, 59:14. Tantai's son and grandson were also sentenced to death, but they were pardoned. Ibid., 59:17a. Tantai was succeeded as the Manchu President of Civil Appointments by Jolo. Zhang, *Qing shi*, 1:49.
80 Zhang, *Qing shi*, 1:50.
change in nomenclature in the *Veritable Records*, but it appeared to symbolize a transformation from celebration of a mandate just won (which was Dorgon’s pride) to glorification of a realm well governed (which was Shunzhi’s hope).\(^{81}\) And as Shunzhi attained greater political maturity, so did he leave his boyhood forever behind. In September, he was married to his cousin; and on December 13, perhaps more importantly, a palace concubine gave birth to his first son.\(^{82}\)

Of course, the increasing scope and breadth of imperial power cannot be altogether identified with Fulin’s individual authority. Undoubtedly, the young emperor was carefully coached and aided by personal advisors during these months of competition with

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81 Shunzhi’s ecumenical rule was also acknowledged tacitly by the Dalai Lama’s visit to Beijing in 1651. To honor and celebrate his own personal accession, the emperor ordered built, at the cost of several tens of thousands of taels, the White Dagoba on the site of Qubilai Khan’s former palace, the allegorical mountain of Kunlun (Sumeru) on Qionghua Island in the Beihai, northwest of the Forbidden City. According to a stele with inscriptions in Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese, Shunzhi “nourishes the people” and rules over the western regions. The Chinese version of the inscription, which still stood at the foot of the Dagoba when I was in Beijing in 1981, was composed by Ning Wanwo.

82 Zhang, *Qing shi*, 1:49–50. The baby only lived a few weeks, however. See also Robert B. Oxnam, “Policies and Factionalism in the Oboi Regency,” pp. 19–20. The Shunzhi Emperor—who was said by the Jesuit fathers to have both a violent temper and a strongly sexed nature—eventually had two empresses, seven secondary consorts, and eight ordinary consorts. Three were from the same Mongol family. One of his wives was the daughter of a Chinese bannerman. His favorite consort, Donggo Osi, with whom he was passionately in love, was the daughter of a Manchu officer. As a young man, the emperor was described by Westerners like Adam Schall (who was at the peak of his influence at court at this time and who was often visited at home by the emperor, who addressed him as “grandfather” in Manchu) as being very well formed, of medium height, and with white skin. A contemporary portrait of him shows a fairskinned young man with very dark hair, an even countenance, eyes squarely set, contemplative and searching, and a broad mouth with thin lips. Though the portraitist has drawn a powerful body, beneath the robes a certain slightness is suggested. Gugong bowuyuan wenxianguan, ed., *Qingdai di hou xiang*, vol. 1. He was a fine horseback rider and a very good calligrapher. John Gilbert Reid, “Peking’s First Manchu Emperor,” *passim*; George H. Dunne, *Generation of Giants*, pp. 329, 347–352.
Empress Xiaokang (1640–1663), secondary consort of Shunzhi and mother of the Kangxi Emperor. Xiaokang was the daughter of Tong Tulai, the Chinese frontiersman who became a Manchu general. *Qingdai di hou xiang* (Beiping, 1934).
powerful aristocrats. There is no question that the eunuch Wu Liangfu played a very important role behind the scenes in mustering official support for the throne against Dorgon’s supporters in the Assembly and bureaucracy. Some measure of the importance of eunuch support, in fact, can be derived from the creation later, in July of 1653, of the notorious Thirteen Offices, composed of palace eunuchs, some of whom composed edicts and appointed officials.  

One of the results of the succession struggle was thus the renewal of eunuch power in the palace, which represented a partial return to the practices of the Ming. Another result, which was also a return to Ming practice, was the enhancement of the power of the grand secretaries as personal advisors to the throne. Here, too, the victory of the throne set up new tensions between the monarch and his Confucian advisers.

**Settling Accounts**

Of all the emperor’s Chinese advisors, Chen Mingxia was in the most difficult position after Tantai’s downfall. He was deeply compromised by Tantai’s irregular practices in the Board of Civil Appointments, of course; but he was also—although he did not realize it at the time—associated in the emperor’s eyes with Tantai’s usurpation of imperial authority. As Shunzhi later told his court:

> We had just taken over personal rule [then], and [Tantai] exercised undue control over the Six Boards, intervening in imperial rule. We were young and frail, and he usurped Our authority. He received many bribes, and perversely granted fortune and misfortune [in return]. At that time Chen Mingxia was also a president of that [same] board.  

Nevertheless, Chen appeared to continue to enjoy the emperor’s personal favor; and it must have been with considerable surprise

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84 *Shizu shilu*, 62:3b.
that ministers received the news on February 17, 1652, that Centai had once more been made a grand secretary. They were stunned the following day, February 18—which happened to coincide with an earthquake in the capital—to discover that Chen Mingxia was going to be put on trial again.  

At the trial, the court learned from the emperor himself that for some time now a secret investigation had been underway. Shunzhi explained to the Assembly of Princes and High Officials that ever since the hearing the previous July when Tantai had brought about Chen Mingxia's acquittal and caused the death of Censor Zhang Xuan, he—the emperor—had been wondering if there were not some truth to the charges which Zhang Xuan had made. Shunzhi had therefore ordered the case reopened, and an investigation of both Hong Chengchou and Chen Mingxia had been conducted by Prince Zheng, Jirgalang. Once this became known to Hong Chengchou, he had admitted that the charges against him were true insofar as he had indeed sent his mother home without permission, although the meetings at Huoshen Temple he still defended as sessions to evaluate the performance of the metropolitan censors. Chen Mingxia, on the other hand, steadfastly denied any guilt whatsoever, and this ultimately faulted him in the eyes of the emperor, who told the Assembly:

It was on his own, then, that Chen Mingxia strongly disputed [the accusations] in sharp tones, presenting his own case in flashing [terms], and litigating until he ran out of words. Then, weeping, he spoke of his own merit for having submitted his allegiance (tou-cheng) [to the Qing]. This was when We first realized that Mingxia was a vacillating and hypocritical wretch (zhanzhuan jiaozha zhi xiaoren). It truly is hard to avoid [being struck by] Mingxia's crimes, but We did [announce] in a former edict that the persons connected with Tantai would all be pardoned. If we were to seize

85 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:50.
86 It is possible that Jirgalang was the main force behind this new investigation, and that he was motivated by a desire to discredit some of the throne's Confucian advisers. This is only speculation, however. I have found no evidence to support this hypothesis.
Mingxia and sentence him now, this would be a betrayal of our former edict. So let us now dismiss Mingxia from his post [as grand secretary] but [let him keep] the same official rank and receive the same salary as before. Assign him to the Han army of the Yellow Banner, and let him, along with officers on inactive duty (xiansen guan), join the retinue of the court.⁸⁷

At the same time, Zhang Xuan was vindicated and posthumously elevated two ranks in order to celebrate his loyalty and the importance of keeping open the "pathway of words" between the Censorate and the emperor.⁸⁸

One of Shunzhi’s primary motives in reopening the case, therefore, was to encourage Chinese censors to be more forthright and frank in the future. Another was to settle final accounts in the Tantai case, where many Manchu nobles must have been nettled by Chen Mingxia’s acquittal while Tantai himself received the death sentence. Nevertheless, the emperor did not want to go so far as to alienate the many southerners who were now in the government thanks to Chen Mingxia’s recommendations—men like Hao Luo, Xiang Yuxuan, Song Zhengbi, Li Renlong, Wang Chongjian, Yang Tingjian, and Song Zhisheng. Some of these prominent literati (several of whom had served in the Ming Hanlin Academy) were jinshi classmates of Chen Mingxia; others had been members of the same literary society he had joined. All looked to him as their chief government sponsor.⁸⁹ If it were known outside the closed ranks of the Assembly that the emperor had called Chen Mingxia a "vacillating and hypocritical wretch," then their political loyalties might be stretched to the breaking point, while the emperor’s desire to recruit more southern literati would be thwarted. Consequently, Shunzhi decided to let people outside the Assembly only know about the exoneration of Zhang Xuan and the crimes of Tantai.

⁸⁷ Shizu shilu, 62:5a.
⁸⁸ Ibid., 62:5b.
⁸⁹ Xie Guozhen, Ming-Qing zhi ji dangshe yundong kao, p. 121; Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 390.
We also think that the Manchu officials and people all know of Tantai’s crimes and evil [behavior], but that the Han people everywhere have not been completely informed. Let the enumeration of Tantai’s crimes along with the announcement of Zhang Huan be detailed in a printed proclamation and posted throughout the empire in order to clarify that We are without prejudice and self-interest.90

Chen Mingxia’s punishment was thus kept secret, and his public reputation remained intact. In fact, his assignment to the Han Yellow Banner, which was intended to be a punishment, was mistaken by ordinarily perciipient outsiders like the historian Tan Qian to be a sign of great imperial favor.91

The young emperor’s decision to keep Chen Mingxia’s political disgrace a state secret was sagacious. It permitted Chen to maintain his public reputation as a well-connected collaborator who was furthering the interests of southern literati at court. He in turn was then able to score a major victory in his recruiting efforts by persuading the famous Jiangnan poet and leading intellectual, Wu Weiye, to join the Qing government.92

**Wu Weiye’s Effort to Revive the Literary Societies**

The recommendation of Wu Weiye for a post in the Qing government was an extremely sensitive matter because he was known by all to have once served the Southern Ming government and thought by many still to nurture loyalist sympathies. Wu had seriously considered committing suicide when he had learned of the Chongzhen Emperor’s death while he was serving as a junior supervisor of instruction in the southern capital.93 Instead, he had

90 *Shizu shilu*, 62:5b.
93 According to Wu’s biography, it was only his mother’s concern for herself (“If you die, what will become of us old folks?”) that had kept him from hanging himself. Ma Daoyuan, *Wu Meicun nianpu*, p. 43.
continued on in his post, with a rank increase of one grade, under the Prince of Fu. He had only served for two months, however, before becoming convinced that Ma Shiy ing and Ruan Dacheng had destroyed all hope of recovering the north. Openly pleading the need to take care of his aged parents and privately believing that “the task of [reuniting] the empire cannot be accomplished,” Wu had returned home to Taicang, where, at the age of 36 sui, he had immured himself in the family estate. At first dreading arrest for his loyalist activities, Wu Weiye had remained initially in seclusion, refusing to receive calling cards or invitations. But his personal withdrawal was compromised by his growing public fame as a romantic poet whose lyrics—like “Old Flame,” sung to the tune of “The Fairy by the River”—were known throughout China.

Racketing round the landscape, one vintage to the next,
Ten misspent years, and here’s Yunying again.
Complaisant as ever, tiny, dance-on-your-palm,
One quick smile in the lamplight
And she’s fumbling with her waistband.

Ah, but the feelings I had are worn as my face,
I’ve nothing for you, sweetie, not in this life.
The moon fades, at Suzhou, over the city wall,
By her green window some pass, some stay,
And crisscross go the pink-stained tears.

Lecturing at Jiaxing in 1652, Wu’s name came to the attention of Governor-General Ma Guozhu, who had just been ordered by

94 Wu, Wushi jilan, tan sou shang, p. 2a; Ma, Wu Meicun nianpu, p. 45.
95 Ma, Wu Meicun nianpu, p. 45. At this time Wu Weiye declared in a letter to Hou Fangyu that he was resolved to die rather than serve the Qing. Hou Fangyu, Zhuanghui tang ji, Siyi tang shij i, 6:3b. However, Wu’s eremitism was somewhat exaggerated. An examination of his poetry during those years, and especially after 1650, shows that Wu travelled around Jiangnan, visiting cities like Jiaxing and Hangzhou where he resumed the literary friendships and official contacts that he had engaged in before the fall of Nanjing. His acquaintances included Qing officials of the highest rank. Sun Kekuan, “Wu Meicun beixing qianhou shi,” pp. 4–5.
96 Cyril Birch, Anthology of Chinese Literature, 2:133.
the court to recommend worthy notables from Jiangnan for high office in the capital. Ma Guozhu consequently sent Wu Weiye’s name forward, but when the poet found out about his nomination he wrote the governor-general a long letter, declining the honor on grounds of ill health.\(^7\)

Wu Weiye’s friends and admirers refused to be deterred by his initial refusal. His son-in-law, Chen Zhilin, who was President of the Board of Rites, continually importuned him, as did Chen Mingxia; and early in 1653, Sun Chengze recommended Wu Weiye to the throne once again as being one of the most talented and famous men of the southeast.\(^8\) This time Wu Weiye said nothing, and thereby strongly signalled his intention to accept a high post in the new government if it were offered to him. It must have been an ambivalent decision, as the following poem, “The Green of New Rushes” (Xin pu lü), which he wrote at the time, suggests.\(^9\)

The white-haired Chan monk comes to the temple hall
In priest’s robes with abbot’s staff to worship past emperors all.
Half a tumbler of larch leaves is food for the ancient tombs;
Heavy smoke from an incense stick perfumes the inner rooms.
The mountains and rivers are filled with hatred as the empty years go by,
Yet birds of a feather lack all decency as they fill up the spring sky.
If you wish to know where the old remnants abide with their broken hearts,
Then look at the bell tower under the moon, reflecting ten thousand parts.

\(^7\) Ma, *Wu Meicun nianpu*, p. 55; Zhao Erxun, ed., *Qing shi gao*, 117:8a. Wu’s health was not good. He had had a pulmonary hemorrhage when he was a young boy, and his lungs were still weak. At this time he was 44 sui old. It was said that Chen Zhilin had married Wu Weiye’s daughter in the first place because he hoped to make use of Wu’s brilliant reputation in order to enhance his own standing among literati. Sun, “Wu Meicun beixing,” p. 3.


\(^9\) Sun, “Wu Meicun beixing,” p. 4. Torn between his wish to serve society as an official and the desire to preserve his integrity, Wu Weiye was deeply interested in historical figures of the Yuan-Ming transition, like Yang Weizhen (1296–1370) and Song Lian (1310–1381), who had apparently retained their rectitude in spite of going to court at the summons of the Yuan ruler. John D. Langlois, Jr., “Chinese Culturalism and the Yuan Analogy,” pp. 370–371.
What grief I felt in the year Jiashen when the dragon had to go.
How much since then has the wind from the east caused the green
moss to grow?
Disturbed and shaken for the last ten years, as the mounds and
valleys were transformed,
I’m lonely and desolate these seven days as the purgatory rites are
performed.
Livers pierced, the righteous ones sink into the deep cold sea.
Tasting gall, the king’s heirs bury his ashes bitterly.
Who’s to help an old monk weeping in the dead of night?
Only cranes and monkeys are there to answer, if indeed they
might.\textsuperscript{100}

Yet even as he celebrated the funeral rites of the last Ming em-
perors andcondemned the “birds of a feather” who indecently
staffed the government bureaus of Beijing, Wu Weiye was doing
nothing to discourage the many collaborators who were now
pressing upon upon him the importance of accepting the invitation
to serve, arguing that his appointment to the Nei San Yuan would
give the literati of the southeast a crucial opportunity to regain
the influence at court which they had lost in 1644.\textsuperscript{101}

However, Wu Weiye must have known that packing the Inner
Courts with eminent southern literati like himself would only re-
vive one wing of the political coalition that had ruled the Ming
government just prior to the coming of the Manchus. If the elites
of Jiangnan were to dominate the government once more, then
their regional network of literary societies would have to be re-

\textsuperscript{100} Ma, \textit{Wu Meicun nianpu}, p. 59. This poem appeared in print in Nanjing in the
fifth lunar month of 1653 while Wu Weiye was pondering his decision. It is
not published among his collected works, but it is attributed by commenta-
tors to him.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., pp. 57–58. Wu Weiye may also at this time have hoped to become
tutor to the emperor. In his preface to Zhang Juzheng’s edition of the \textit{Four
Books}, which was republished in 1651 under the title \textit{Zhang gelao zhijie
[Grand Secretary Zhang’s colloquial commentary]}, Wu wrote admiringly of
the way in which Zhang had tutored the Wanli Emperor as a boy. Knud
Lundbaek, “Chief Grand Secretary Chang Chü-cheng and the Early China
Jesuits,” p. 5; David E. Mungello, “The Jesuits’ Use of Chang Chü-cheng’s
suscitated as well. The societies themselves had already begun to appear once more, undoubtedly because southerners were trying again to pass the higher civil service examinations.\(^{102}\) It was certainly no coincidence that in 1651, at the very time he had made the decision to sit for the Henan provincial examination, Hou Fangyu was also founding a literary society called the Six Masters of the Snow Garden.\(^{103}\) Alone, such a club was innocuous, especially since it was avowedly devoted to art for art’s sake.\(^{104}\) But if other societies like this one could join together as a sworn federation or league, then something akin to the old Restoration Society might reemerge as a major political force in China. The main hindrance to this reconciliation, so far as Wu Weiye was concerned, was the enmity between collaborators like Chen Mingxia or Qian Qianyi, and the loyalists like Gui Zhuang or Gu Yanwu.\(^{105}\) The latter had founded their own literary society, the Club of Startled and Secretive Poets (Jing yin shishe), which had attracted so many other Ming loyalists like themselves that it was also popularly known as the League of Fugitives (Tao zhi meng).\(^{106}\) Hoping, therefore, to bring together loyalists such as these with collaborators like his son-in-law (and himself), Wu Weiye convened in the

103 John D. Langlois, Jr., “Ku Ssu-li, the Yuan-shih-hsuan, and Loyalism in Late 17th-Century China,” p. 7. Hou Fangyu’s father, Hou Xun, had returned to the family home in war-torn Shangqiu in 1646. He became an eremite. As we have seen, Hou Fangyu decided to seek a degree, emulating his elder brother, Fangxia, who won a jinshi in 1646. This aspect of the family’s history is traced in R. V. Des Forges, “Rebellion in the Central Plain,” pp. 34–35.
105 Qian Qianyi was frequently in contact with Wu Weiye during these years. He wrote the preface to the collection of Wu’s poetry published in 1660. Sun, “Wu Meicun beixing,” p. 6.
106 Members included Pan Chengzhang, who wrote “Ochre Mountain” and who was later executed in 1663 for being involved in the Zhuang Tinglong case; and Dai Li, the loyalist who was to become famous as the youngest scholar to pass the Boxue hongru (the special exam held in 1679 by Kangxi to attract former loyalists into government service). Xie, Dangshe yundong, pp. 193–194; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 427, 606, 883.
spring of 1653 a joint gathering of all the best known Suzhou and Songjiang clubs at Tiger Hill (Huqiu) where the Restoration Society had held its meetings. Several thousand scholars, including major leaders like Gui Zhuang, came to this meeting, and plans were announced to resume the sorts of activities—lectures, publishing, annual gatherings—that the Fushe had engaged in before 1644.107

Wu Weiye’s effort to re-create the political coalitions of the last three decades of the Ming failed for two reasons. The first was that the opinions of literati remained divided over the issue of collaboration. Toward the end of the Tiger Hill meeting, a young man suddenly came forward and threw a letter before the chair where Wu Weiye was sitting. The letter contained the following couplet:

A thousand men, a thousand men, sitting on a rock,
Half are from the Qing, half are from the Ming.

At the same time, the young scholar chanted tauntingly: “Two dynasties’ Sons of Heaven, one dynasty’s minister.” Wu Weiye rose from his seat, but said nothing.108

The second reason was the government’s reaction to these literati activities in Jiangnan. Shunzhi admired southern scholars for their cultural attainments, but he was also advised by other officials that the scholars of that part of China were particularly prone to unorthodox behavior and heterodox thinking. Li Songyang, a censor appointed by the Qing government to oversee the Jiangnan circuit in 1650, reported that:

At this time the custom of the literati is as before to go along with the atavistic customs of the Ming period: stitching together phrases in great quantity into writings of their own without revering the transmitted commentaries.109

Moreover, the emperor and his court were also aware that literary

107 Xie, Dangshe yundong, pp. 195–196; Gui Zhuang ji, p. 548.
108 Liu, Guangyang zaji, p. 10.
109 Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 112–33b.
Wu Weiye (1609–1672) in retirement. Ye Gongchuo, comp., Qingdai xuezhe xiang zhuang (Shanghai, 1930), vol. 1, ce 1.
clubs had, during the last years of the Ming, become a vehicle for mobilizing public opinion, engaging in political disputes, and bringing the gentry’s social influence to bear upon local government. In 1652, therefore, Shunzhi took the advice of several of his censors and had regulations issued that banned the clubs.

Licentiates are not allowed to form parties (dang) of several people or to take oaths and form clubs. Nor can they influence local officials nor arbitrarily mediate local disputes. Any literary works which they write cannot be freely printed. Those who disobey the law must be punished by local officials.

In the eyes of the government, then, the convocation led by Wu Weiye in 1653 at Tiger Hill was an illegal association. No direct steps were actually taken at this time to enforce that law; no one was indicted or arrested for illegal activities. But the combination of disunity over the issue of political loyalties with such explicit government opposition meant that Wu Weiye’s effort to create a “Great Society of the Ten Counties” (Shi jun da she), modeled on the Fushe, failed. The Songjiang groups broke away from the Suzhou clubs, and each of the coteries clustered around its own primary nucleus. Thus, when Wu Weiye finally did make the

110 Ono Kazuko, “Shinsho no shisō tosei o megutte,” p. 340. The Manchus began to restrict the access of lower degree-holders to local yamens in 1651. Two years later, in the summer of 1653, the court required that all proper shengyuan report their names to the government, and that public tax exemptions be announced for them in order to prevent them from selling their privileges. In 1654 the court also debated stopping the practice of proxy tax remittance by shengyuan, and declared illegal the practice of degree-holders filling lizhang posts as village headmen. Joshua A. Fogel, trans., “Shantung in the Shun-chih Reign,” Part 2, pp. 18–19.


112 Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 87:3b; Xie, Danshe yundong, p. 196. Some accounts stress the rivalry between Suzhou and Songjiang scholars as being a primary cause of the dissolution of the Shi jun da she. Peng Shidu, son of
The Shunzhi Court

public decision to accept the Qing government’s invitation to come to Beijing and join the Inner Courts, he travelled north without the base behind him upon which he had hoped to build a new political federation. Moreover, being unable to justify his own collaboration in broader terms than individual participation and personal interest, Wu Weiye was more than ever vulnerable to charges of disreputability.\(^\text{113}\)

**Emperors and Martyrs**

Strictly speaking, it was in the emperor’s best political interest to cultivate the disreputability of major collaborators like Wu Weiye. If committed loyalists could not bear to swear oaths of brotherhood with notorious “twice-serving ministers,” then it would be all the more difficult for the Chinese metropolitan gentry to coalesce into powerful political groups like the old Donglin and Restoration Society movements. Though that might encourage an astute monarch like Shunzhi to praise safely dead loyalists, because such acclaim further shamed those who had chosen to collaborate,

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\(^{113}\) Wu Weiye’s parents were both still alive, and his mother—who was 69—did not take his departure well: she was afraid that she would never see him again. Although many sources state that he left Jiangnan in the autumn of 1653, he actually left Nanjing in late May or early June of 1654. His appointment to the Mishu Yuan (where he eventually worked on the editing of the *Xiao jing yanyi*) was made early in 1654 as part of a package arrangement proposed by a coalition composed of northerners and southerners alike. Together, Chen Mingxia, Feng Quan, Cheng Kegong, Zhang Duan, and Lü Gong recommended that Wu be appointed along with Yang Tingjian and Song Zhisheng. Because it was Feng Quan who signed the key memorial nominating him, Wu Weiye was calumniated in many people’s eyes. Ma, *Wu Meicun nianpu*, pp. 56–60; Sun, “Wu Meicun beixing,” pp. 4, 8–9.
it was not the overt reason for the emperor’s subsequent decision to honor some of the martyrs of 1644.\(^{114}\) For some time now, there had been a growing movement to honor the officials, filial sons, righteous scholars, and chaste women who had lost their lives during the rebel occupation of Beijing. The most prominent official involved in this effort was the Zhejiang bibliophile Cao Rong, who had become the provincial literary chancellor of Shuntian.

Cao Rong, who had also advocated many of the reforms of the early Dorgon regency, had become a kind of patron of Ming historians since 1644. One of his personal secretaries was the famous Jiaxing erudite Zhu Yizun, who later achieved great fame as a historian and archaeologist.\(^ {115}\) And Tan Qian himself was to be granted access by Cao to his own extensive library during the years 1653–1656 when Tan wrote his masterpiece on Ming history, the Guo que.\(^ {116}\) It would have been untoward for Cao to suggest honoring the Ming dead any earlier than this time, because he was punished in 1646 for passing several hereditary Ming nobles as gongsheng and jiansheng when he administered the Shuntian examinations that year. But by 1652 his rank had been restored, and he was a full Vice-President of Revenue. Perhaps sensing a respon-

\(^{114}\) Nor was Shunzhi as consciously discerning of the political effects of condemning collaborators as might be suggested here. He simply shared some of the contempt for collaborators that many loyalists felt and that Shunzhi acquired through his immersion in contemporary Chinese culture. During dinner, for example, Shunzhi liked to have his courtiers read to him the satirical epic by Gui Zhuang called Wangu chou [Sorrow of the ages]. That poem depicts the surrender of Beijing to Li Zicheng in these terms: “Hateful are all those officials who receive the imperial favor in peaceful days. / Accepting patents of nobility, / Encircling their waists with gold belts; / And who hasten to knock their heads on the ground in front of the bandit court. / Such toadying and treacherous officials, / Promiscuous as camp followers, / Continue to cherish those sentences of the ‘Proclamation Urging Entry.’ / Those timorous, wriggling nobles should have been slaughtered east of the city wall like sheep and swine.” Gui Zhuang ji, p. 159. The “Proclamation Urging Entry” refers to Zhou Zhong’s Quan jin biao, which implored Li Zicheng to assume the throne.

\(^{115}\) Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 182–185.

\(^{116}\) Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, pp. 1239–1242.
sive chord in the emperor, he presented a request, signed by himself, Wang Chongjian, and three other officials for posthumous honors for Fan Jingwen, Ni Yuanlu, and more than fifty additional people who had died during the Shun interregnum. On August 9 the emperor ordered the Board of Rites to initiate discussions regarding "ceremonies to praise and honor the spirits of the loyal" (baolu youzhong kuangdian), thus providing an opportunity for other former Ming officials to state their opinions on this matter. However, the most penetrating and influential memorial to result from this invitation was written not by a Ming holdover, but by a brilliant Qing scholar-official, Wei Yijie, who had won his jinshi degree in the 1646 metropolitan examinations.

In his memorial, Wei Yijie thanked the Shunzhi Emperor for raising the question of honoring the loyal dead. It was a most timely suggestion because, after so long a period of disorder, a time of peace had arrived, and one of the best ways to insure the defeat of lawlessness and corruption was to hold up for all to see the example of those "ardent gentlemen" (lieshi) who had "repaid their country" (bao guo) with their lives. Abstracting their moral integrity from actual political circumstances, Wei first described their self-sacrifice in cosmic terms, as an act of highest duty which placed them on a par with the heavenly bodies themselves, supporting the very pneuma of the universe (qiankun). To honor them would be to invoke the memory of other loyal ministers in Chinese history, a well as other great emperors who had also firmly established their Mandate after periods of disorder. One such emperor, Wei boldly went on to say, was Ming Taizu (r. 1368–1398), who had even recognized the self-sacrifice of righteous enemies of

117 Er chen zhuan, 6:17–21a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 740.
118 Wei Yijie (1616–1686) was to become one of the most famous censors in Qing history. In 1657 he became President of the Censorate, and in 1664 a grand secretary. He was a good friend of Adam Schall and was secretly a Catholic, receiving the sacrament in the same church where Xu Guangqi's family congregated. He kept his faith a secret because of his equally strong devotion to Confucianism, and his Catholicism was not publicly discovered until the Guangxu period. In 1736, he was canonized by the Qianlong Emperor. Liu Shengmu, Changchu zhai suibi, 5:1b. See also Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 849–851; Lui, Hanlin Academy, p. 128.
his like Yu Que (1302–1357). Even though Yu Que had died defending Anqing against a four-year siege, Ming Taizu had given his body a public funeral and had canonized him for his loyalty. In this way, Ming Taizu had been able to use the loyalist’s suicide to mobilize the morality and commitment of an entire generation of ministers, “who thereby knew the proper mode of behavior.” In addition to stressing the parallel between the Ming founder and the Shunzhi Emperor now that he had come to “possess the land of Xia,” and in addition to calling boldly for the Qing to study the regulations of the Ming, Wei Yijie also invoked classical antiquity. Was not Ming Taizu’s canonization of Yu Que analogous to the honors Zhou Wuwang had paid to Bi Gan? Bi Gan had died horribly at the hands of Zhou Xin, the cruel last emperor of the Shang. When the Zhou had assumed the Mandate of Heaven, and the Shang had been overthrown, the new emperor, Wuwang, had enfeoffed the tomb of Bi Gan to honor his manes. So, too, should the Qing now honor those who had been martyred when the Ming fell and Beijing was occupied by Li Zicheng’s soldiers. Whatever still existed of their remains should be appropriately kept and spiritually honored.

After receiving Wei Yijie’s memorial, the Shunzhi Emperor issued an edict in honor of the martyrs of Beijing. Twenty names were listed, headed by Fan Jingwen, Ni Yuanlu, and Li Banghua. A later edict commanded that a shrine be built for their remains. Seventy mu of land would be given as endowment, sacrifices would be made, and the shrine would be regularly maintained.

119 When Anqing fell, Yu Que committed suicide and his wife and children threw themselves into a well. Giles, Biographical Dictionary, p. 955.
120 Bi Gan, who was a relative of Zhou Xin, reproached the tyrant for his excesses. The ruler said: “They say that a sage has seven orifices in his heart. Let us see if this is the case with you.” Then he had him disemboweled in front of the throne and pickled the remains. Giles, Biographical Dictionary, p. 626; Laurence A. Schneider, A Madman of Ch’u, pp. 37–38.
121 Wei Yijie, Jianji tang wenji, 1:5–8a.
122 Zhang Tingyu, et al., comps., Ming shi (Guofang yanjiuyuan), p. 2993. The endowment was set up on July 11, 1653. The emperor also ordered Jin Zhijun to compose a funeral ode for the Chongzhen Emperor. Shizu shilu, 76:5b–6a; Zhang, Qing shi, p. 53; Okamoto Sai, “La Crise politique et mo-
Shunzhi’s honoring of the loyal dead may well have set new standards of behavior for some scholar-officials, though it obviously discomfited collaborators like Chen Mingxia who had served the Ming and Shun both. The conjuncture of this imperial gesture with the publication of Tantai’s criminal activities and the

dale des mandarins du sud à l’époque de transition,” p. 104; Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:361. On March 6, 1655, the emperor sent down a rescript which ordered the Board of Rites to implement a combined and unified ruling on the matter of officials who died as martyrs (sunnan). Wei Yijie was then supervising secretary of the Office of Scrutiny of the Board of War, and he replied in much the same spirit as his earlier remarks, relating loyalty and filial piety to the forces that hold the firmament together. “If there are loyal ministers and filial sons then there will be proper human relationships. If there are proper human relationships then Heaven and Earth can rely upon them in order not to be destroyed.” Wei, Jianji tang wenji, zhuan, 1:27a. Wei also discussed the details of commemoration, including how to discover where the remains of these dead heroes were, the places where they died, the use of stone tablets, and the designation of existing temples in their memory. Ibid., p. 28. During these years Shunzhi identified himself more and more strongly with the Chongzhen Emperor. In 1657 he issued an edict to the Board of Works which read: “We remember how the Ming Emperor Chongzhen diligently sought to govern and sacrificed himself for the altars of the soil and grain. If we do not hasten to praise him openly, I fear that a thousand years hence, he will eventually be regarded as being together with the same category [of rulers] as those who brought about the fall of their dynasties by failing to be virtuous. We therefore wish to have a special stele made in order to display our sympathy. So as to pass this clearly on to posterity, let your Board reverently carry out the command that a stele be carved and set up in front of Chongzhen’s tomb. Furthermore, add to his posthumous title these several characters in order to praise his excellence: Upright Emperor Who Cherishes the Ancestors (Huaizong Duan huangdi).” Li Qing, Sanyuan biji, zhongbuyi, p. 1b. Later, the emperor visited the tomb in person and climbed the tumulus, where he wept openly and was heard to cry out: “Big brother (dage), big brother! We are both the same: rulers without ministers. I will be mourned by later generations just like this—and they [i.e., the collaborators] are his ministers and subjects too!” Ibid., p. 2a. On this occasion Shunzhi must also have become concerned about the neglected condition of the Ming imperial tombs. There is a stele in a pavilion just inside the main gate of the Yongle Emperor’s tomb upon which is engraved an edict dated December 30, 1659. The emperor states that, having observed the decrepit condition of the Ming tombs, he has decided to order the Board of Works to repair them, and that he will send officials thereafter once or twice a year to inspect them and make sure they remain well tended.
The exoneration of Zhang Xuan certainly encouraged censors like Wei Yijie to continue sending in reports of corruption—even if they concerned powerful Manchu officials who had sold their influence in the government to the highest bidder. On December 27, 1652, the emperor responded to these reports by calling all of the heads of the Six Boards to a meeting with him at the Tower of the Five Phoenixes (Wufeng lou). During that meeting, Shunzhi told them that "people" had told him of the corruption rampant in the Six Boards. He said that he knew that they themselves were not engaging in such practices, but nevertheless that their "tolerance" for corruption was letting their underlings get away with the worst kinds of abuses. Both "old ministers" (jiu chen) who had been serving since before the entry into China, and the "newly promoted" (xin ba) had a common debt of loyalty to the dynasty for its "generous benevolence." It was their responsibility, therefore, to see that these corrupt practices—practices, incidentally, which were not attributed to Ming holdovers but were rather more intimately associated with the Manchu elite—ceased abruptly.

123 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:388.
124 Shizu shilu, 70:12a. That previous fall, in September, 1652, several major
Racketeers and Corruption

Shortly after this, the emperor also held a meeting of the officials of his Inner Three Courts. He told his grand secretaries that he had heard rumors that a man named Li San had built or acquired a number of buildings around the capital besides his own house. “What were these buildings used for?” he asked. Hong Cheng-chou responded that, “His houses are divided according to the Six Boards. If a person has business with a given board, he enters the house [corresponding to] that board. No one dares to interfere.” Shunzhi was deeply shocked by this blunt revelation. To allow a “petty man” like this Li San to attain such influence over the affairs of the Six Boards meant that the dynasty could actually lose the Mandate of Heaven. The emperor promptly ordered Jirgalang to hasten to conduct a full investigation of Li San, whose real name was Li Yingshi, and whose ostensible profession was that of horse broker (zang). On January 23, 1653, Jirgalang’s investigation was completed and a full report was made to the Assembly of Princes and High Officials.

According to Jirgalang’s investigation, Li San was the major gang boss of Beijing, linked to officials and clerks in all the yamens, and running a protection racket in the southern Han portion of the city where most of the stores and firms paid off his gangsters. The racket was so well organized, in fact, that there was a set list of rates. Anyone who refused to pay was killed, and the dead person’s family members were usually so terrified of further reprisals that they failed even to report the murder. The criminals at Li San’s

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125 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:389.
126 Ibid.
127 Shizhishilu, 70:24b.
beck and call were brought together by his henchman, Pan Wen-xue, who was also a horse dealer (ma fan). Supplying most of the gangs of bandits around the capital with their mounts, Pan Wen-xue was also in touch with his own agents in the various yamens of the city, bribing them to protect his clients in the criminal world.\(^{128}\)

Li San used his considerable wealth to entertain lavishly. As one of the major horse dealers in Beijing, he was able to provide the Manchu nobility with the best available livestock. Thus Han officials who felt distant from the “inner organs” (feifu) of power and influence in the regime thought that by cultivating him they would be able to gain some form of access to important princes and beile.\(^{129}\) At the time of Li San’s arrest, the government’s sleuths had gathered enough verbal and written evidence to implicate nine officials. All but one of these—Li Yunchang, who was the censor in charge of the sensitive Office of Scrutiny in the Board of War—were quite junior.\(^{130}\) And even Censor Li was not as important as other officials rumored to have been guests at Li San’s dinner parties. It was said, for instance, that the aged Ning Wanwo was one of Li San’s “guests.”\(^{131}\) This was not hard to believe, given Ning’s known proclivity for gambling—a habit that had led to ten years of official disgrace after being caught in a game with a captured Chinese officer at Dalinghe in 1635. But after the capital of the Qing had been moved to Beijing, Ning Wanwo had been redeemed, and he was such a venerable Chinese adherent of the dynasty (having served under Nurhaci) that he had been forgiven his involvement in the Ganglin affair two years earlier.\(^{132}\) High-ranking bannermen

128 Ibid., 70:24b–25a.
129 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 374.
130 Others included Gao Sijing, Gao San, Wang Guozhen, Gu Lin, Huai Qizhang, Li Zhidong, Li Dongming, and Liu Wendeng. Li Yunchang had behaved toward Li San as though he were his own uncle. Li San’s nephew, a man named Li Tianfeng, was treated by Censor Li as though they were cousins; and Tianfeng’s son, Li Zhen, was virtually adopted by the censor, who passed him off as an official. Shizu shilu, 70:25–26a. See also Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 374.
131 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:389.
132 Li, Guochao xianzheng, 2:10a.
and Manchu nobles were not, then, openly named as friends and protectors of Li San when the matter was brought before the Assembly of Princes and High Officials. In fact, Chen Zhilin, who was also said to be implicated, called for Li San's death, as though to shut the man up before more names were revealed. And so the racketeer and his followers were killed immediately, along with Censor Li Yunchang who thereby became a scapegoat for the many others who were not singled out by name.\(^{133}\)

The Shunzhi Emperor was not entirely satisfied with this outcome. He was particularly upset by the failure of his "ears and eyes" to report independently on the existence of such large-scale influence-peddling to him. On the day after the trial, he asked all of his junior metropolitan censors to explain how his own surveillance personnel could have ignored the existence of this sort of dang (party) in the bureaucracy. Must this not have been an intentional cover-up?\(^{134}\) And were there not other higher officials whose role had been concealed? The emperor's suspicions settled upon Grand Secretary Chen Zhilin, whose comments about immediately putting Li San to death had aroused some doubts about his own role. Jirgalang, too, suspected Chen Zhilin, and began a further investigation of his own. Finally, on March 14, 1653, Chen Zhilin admitted that he had been faintly involved with Li San. Jirgalang wanted to press for punishment, but the emperor expressed his content at the confession, and ordered that Chen be given a chance to reform himself.\(^{135}\) However, Shunzhi did have Chen Zhilin removed as grand secretary and transferred instead to the presidency of the Board of Revenue.\(^{136}\)

\(^{133}\) *Shizu shilu*, 70:266. Xiao Yishan claims that Li San may have been plotting rebellion in collusion with Han officials and thus was representative of the loyalist yimin (righteous people) rebelling in the south. Given his connections with the Manchu aristocracy, this seems hard to believe. Xiao, *Qingdai tongshi*, 1:389–390.

\(^{134}\) *Shizu shilu*, 70:27–28a.

\(^{135}\) Ibid., 72:8b–9a.

\(^{136}\) Zhang, *Qing shi*, p. 3788.
Personnel Evaluation and Factions

The Li San case thus resulted in Chen Zhilin’s demotion from the Inner Three Courts, and in this sense Chen Mingxia replaced him there, just as he had replaced Feng Quan when he was dismissed earlier by the emperor. However, Chen Mingxia was not entirely free from implication in the Li San case himself. During the trial Chen Mingxia had urged leniency for Li San, and this alone made him somewhat suspect in the eyes of Shunzhi.137 Thus, when he appointed Chen Mingxia grand secretary, the emperor specifically warned him that he must resist the tendency at court to form illicit factions: “Manchu and Han form a single body. Do not form factions with each other.”138 This statement reflected the emperor’s conviction that regular bureaucratic procedures, impartially applied to all of his officials, whether Manchus or Chinese, would render government uniformly fair and therefore remove the causes of factionalism, which were created in the Li San case by Han officials seeking the support of favored Manchu aristocrats.

Consequently, while Shunzhi warned Chen Mingxia against forming factions that would fractionate the unity of the bureaucracy, where each individual official regardless of race functioned as a singular unit rather than a party member, the emperor also continued to take steps to remove discrimination in the government. In addition to complaining that only Manchu board presidents were presenting memorials and requesting that Han presidents should henceforth memorialize as well, the emperor ordered that punishments for Han officials be the same as for Manchu officials, who were often allowed to retain their rank instead of being demoted.139 However, this created fresh difficulties for the throne. As Shunzhi moved toward more established and regular forms of personnel control, his own Han officials saw this as an opportunity to restore the personnel evaluation procedures of the late Ming pe-

137 Shizu shilü, 71:26b–27a.
138 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3788.
139 Shizu shilü, 72:2a. The latter order was issued on February 28, 1653. See also Thomas A. Metzger, The Internal Organization of Ch’ing Bureaucracy, p. 434; Lui, Corruption, p. 45.
period—procedures which substituted for the ruler’s personal judgment, as well as for the approval of the Assembly of Princes and High Officials, a bureaucratic process of annual personnel review conducted by the offices of scrutiny of the various boards. That meant in turn strengthening the powers of junior metropolitan censors, who were most often Han Chinese, at the expense of the throne.  

This procedure was recommended to Shunzhi on February 2, 1653 by Wei Xiangshu, the junior censor who had proposed the fiscal reforms two years earlier. Wei was a close associate of Chen Mingxia who remembered how much attention this kind of review process had received from the Donglin and Fushe leaders when they controlled the Office of Scrutiny of Civil Appointments. It was certainly with Chen Mingxia’s approval, then, that Wei Xiangshu suggested that the Ming method of evaluating personnel in a “great reckoning” (daji) be adopted once again, and that a strict division of labor be observed: provincial officials would report on the activities of local officials, board officials would investigate and confirm the reliability of these reports, and the offices of scrutiny would evaluate and determine the outcome of the report.

The Shunzhi Emperor approved this request, primarily because the throne viewed the matter at that time as correcting abuses in the past. Just as the emperor believed that breaking down the distinctions between Manchus and Hans would reduce one of the major causes of factionalism, so did he assume that strict adherence to the daji would increase the flow of information to the throne and improve the quality of censorial surveillance.

140 Wang and Jin, “Cong Qing chu de lizhi,” p. 140.
141 Wei Xiangshu’s relation to Chen Mingxia is revealed in Ning Wanwo’s indictment of Chen in 1654. See Shizu shilu, 82:5b.
142 Shizu shilu, 71:5; Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3897.
143 Shizu shilu, 71:7b. The system of daji continued to be used until August 13, 1661, when the Oboi regency ordered Chinese department directors and all officials down as far as Manchu clerks of the 7th to 9th ranks to report to their respective offices to be investigated. Each person was ordered to forward a report on each person under him, and then send the evaluation to his own superior for direct investigation. This revised system of metropolitan
Yet by approving Wei Xiangshu’s request for strict Ming-style personnel evaluations, the emperor inadvertently encouraged the belief on the part of some of his Han officials that the regime was becoming altogether sinified. On March 8, 1653, an extraordinary proposal was received from the Supervisor of Imperial Instruction, Li Chengxiang. In a memorial to the emperor, Li (a Ming jinshi from Shandong) proposed that each board and yamen of the government dismiss its Manchu officials and henceforth only employ Han Chinese.\(^{144}\) As soon as they received word of this shocking suggestion, Grand Secretaries Hong Chengchou, Fan Wencheng, Esehei, Ning Wanwo, and Chen Mingxia met together with the emperor. The grand secretaries were dismayed, and argued strongly that this proposal was “altogether unreasonable.” The emperor was infuriated. “We do not discriminate between Manchus and Hans,” he said, and then angrily added, “I am beginning to think that you are all Ming ministers, because you speak so foolishly.”\(^ {145}\) Li Chengxiang himself was immediately dismissed from office and his case sent to the Board of Punishments, which recommended that he be executed. The emperor relented somewhat—sentencing Li to exile in Mukden instead—but he was not about to forget that there were some among his Han

\(^{144}\) Li Chengxiang may have been intending to use the second- and third-class honors jinshi who had not been selected probationers for the Hanlin Academy. It was the practice then to send these recent graduates to guan zheng (observe administration) for three months in any of the Six Boards, the Transmission Office, the Censorate, and the Court of Judicature and Revision, before being given an official appointment. This practice ended during the later Shunzhi reign, and when it was revived after the Oboi regency, jinshi only spent a few days at their assigned observation posts before taking home leave. Adam Yuen-chung Lui, “The Practical Training of Government Officials under the Early Ch’ing, 1644–1795,” pp. 82–83.

\(^{145}\) Shizu shilu, 72:3b–4a. See also Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:363–364.
officials who still regarded the Manchus as incapable of running a civil government.\textsuperscript{146}

Perhaps that is why Shunzhi turned at this time to one Han official who had repeatedly praised Manchu rule, albeit sycophantically. On April 25, 1653, Feng Quan was recalled to office by the emperor, who stated that people were not always to be judged by their past errors and that Feng should have a chance to prove that he had “renewed himself.”\textsuperscript{147} Feng Quan was immediately brought into the personnel discussions which Shunzhi was having with his two most important Han grand secretaries, Hong Chengchou and Chen Mingxia.\textsuperscript{148}

At that time the emperor and his grand secretaries were reviewing the results of palace examinations.\textsuperscript{149} Partly because he wanted to win more Chinese support, Shunzhi had set a fairly high quota for the metropolitan and palace examinations, and the average number of successful candidates was about 380 persons each time the tests were given. The emperor had also, at Fan Wencheng’s urging, matriculated the younger brothers and sons of Manchu leaders in the National Academy for the first time in 1651–1652, and over 106 of these were given the \textit{jinshi} degree in 1652 and 1655.\textsuperscript{150} One reason for conferring these extra degrees was to off-

\textsuperscript{146} Zhang, \textit{Qing shi}, p. 3783. Li Chengxiang was pardoned after 8 years in Mukden. He returned to his hometown of Zhanhua in northern Shandong, where he passed away in 1687.

\textsuperscript{147} Zhang, \textit{Qing shi}, 1:52. See also Xiao, \textit{Qingdai tongshi}, 1:382.

\textsuperscript{148} Zhang, \textit{Qing shi}, p. 3786.

\textsuperscript{149} The “presented scholars” (\textit{gongshi}) who took the examinations inside the palace precincts were required to write a theme on current affairs. The emperor himself was expected to determine the order of the ten most brilliant examinations, taking content and calligraphy into account. Lui, \textit{Hanlin Academy}, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{150} Zha Shenxing, \textit{Renhai ji}, 1:2b. Fifty received special Manchu \textit{jinshi} degrees, and another fifty-six bannermen received regular \textit{jinshi} degrees. Trained at the elementary level in banner or charitable schools, many of these degree-holders had gone on to enter the “eight banner government schools” (\textit{ba qi guanxue}) established to train students in Chinese classics and the Manchu language in 1644. It should be noted, however, that a bannerman’s entry into the government did not depend as heavily upon possessing higher degrees as Han literati’s appointment to the civil service did. During the entire period from 1644 to 1795 only 449 bannermen received the \textit{jinshi}, so these high
set the growing dominance of the palace examinations by southerners. In 1646, there were no first-ranking southerners; and only 5 percent of the second rank and 1 percent of the third rank among the 373 successful candidates were from the south. Between 1647 and 1652, on the other hand, 89 percent of the first-ranking jinshi were southerners; and an average of 65 percent in the second rank and 54 percent in the third rank were also from the south. (See Table 12.) Most telling to many observers was the way in which men from the lower Yangzi region dominated the first positions (i.e. first rank). Between 1647 and 1652, two-thirds of the top three palace candidates were from either Jiangnan or Zhejiang. (See Table 13.)

Although all agreed that southerners were on the average more skilled at passing the eight-legged examinations than northerners, many believed that the ordering also reflected Chen Mingxia's influence. It was said that Chen was always partial in his ranking, favoring his protégés and political clients noticeably over others who were backed by the other grand secretaries, but who frequently did not have the same literary skills as Chen's favorites. Tan Qian, who was living in the capital then, noted stories of his favoritism, and pointedly remarked that at just about this same

Shunzhi figures were not typical for the dynasty as a whole. Spence, Ts'ao Yin, pp. 75-76; Lui, Hanlin Academy, pp. 25-26, 143; Adam Yuen-chung Lui, "The Education of the Manchus, China's Ruling Race," pp. 130, 133. See also Oxnam, Horseback, p. 87. Stele dated 1652 and 1655 now in the Municipal Museum (formerly the Confucian Temple) of Beijing list separately the ranked jinshi candidates of Manchu origin.

This was certainly not a new problem. The quota system itself had been established by Ming Taizhu after the 1397 examinations when there was not a single northerner among the 51 men who passed the jinshi tests. Charles O. Hucker, The Ming Dynasty, pp. 49-50.

Because jinshi had to be recommended by senior officials to take the court examinations for admission to the Hanlin, ambitious young degree-holders would call upon important officials, often bringing samples of their literary writings with them. The officials themselves were delighted to recommend those literati who had a reputation as accomplished stylists. However, because they would be held responsible for the future behavior of those they recommended, sponsors were also concerned with the political probity of their protégés. Lui, Hanlin Academy, p. 25.
Table 12.
Regional Distribution of Successful Palace Examination Candidates during Shunzhi Reign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Examination</th>
<th>1st Rank</th>
<th>2nd Rank</th>
<th>3rd Rank</th>
<th>Numerical Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1646</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1647</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1649</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1652¹</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655²</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1658</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1661</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Li Zhouwang, comp., *Ming-Qing like jinshi timing beilu*. North includes Shuntian fu, Zhili, Liaodong, Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi. South includes Jiangnan, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Huguang, Sichuan, Guangdong, Guangxi.

¹This year the numerical total also includes 69 bannermen—22 in the regular exams and 47 who were specially awarded the palace degree. They are not counted in the northerners, although most of them were probably from the north.

²This year the numerical total also includes 82 bannermen—35 who passed the regular exams and 47 who were given special palace degrees. They are not counted in the northerners either.

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time, Chen Mingxia paid 1,500 taels to build a house in Beijing—strongly implying that this sum of money may have come from successful candidates for the Hanlin.¹⁵³ Perhaps because some of these rumors had reached him, Shunzhi had called a meeting the evening of Feng Quan’s appointment so that the two of them together with Hong Chengchou and Chen Mingxia could re-review the qualifications of Hanlin compilers.¹⁵⁴ When Shunzhi indi-

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¹⁵³ Tan, *Beiyou lu*, p. 389. For Tan Qian’s reliability, see Wu Han, “Tan Qian he Guo que.”

¹⁵⁴ These were the first “royal examinations" (*yushi*) held in the Qing. Shunzhi wished to examine all of his Hanlin officials above Rank Three. Each scholar was asked to comment on the *Analects* and write a memorial on the establishment of the ever-normal granaries system. Lui, *Hanlin Academy*, p. 87.
Table 13.
Place of Origin of Rank One Palace Examination Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1. Shandong</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1. Zhejiang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1646</td>
<td>2. Zhili</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>2. Zhili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Jiangnan</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Jiangnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1649</td>
<td>1. Huguang</td>
<td>1659</td>
<td>1. Jiangnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Huguang</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Jiangnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td>1. Jiangnan</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td>1. Jiangnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Shuntian fu</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Sichuan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

cated that he personally intended to test each compiler’s literary skills, Feng Quan interjected a remark that was to become famous. He said:

Some people are literarily endowed while lacking in [administrative] ability. Others are short on literary [skills] yet quite capable and resolved. Southerners are literarily endowed, but their actions do not correspond [to this excellence]. Northerners may be short on literary [skills] yet they are sometimes [quite] good [at being administrators].

He was thereby advising the emperor not to select officials solely on the basis of wen (literature), but also for their xing (behavior). At the same time, he was suggesting none too subtly that southern officials had made the literary criterion the most important, which was enhancing their chances because they were, after all, the most erudite and eloquent scholars in the empire. There is very good reason to suppose, then, that Shunzhi was recalling Feng Quan, in

155 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3786.
spite of his unsavory reputation, partly because of his well known acceptance of the Manchus' rule, but also partly because he represented a way of redressing the balance between northern and southern groups of officials in the bureaucracy. Indeed, that very same evening, after Feng Quan had made this remark, Shunzhi appointed him Grand Secretary of the Court of Vast Learning.\textsuperscript{156}

Because Shunzhi tried to offset the influence of Han officials who were pressing for an all-out return to Ming bureaucratic procedures by recalling more avowedly pro-Manchu collaborators like Feng Quan, he exacerbated the regional tensions among Chinese literati. While there was not an absolute identification of southern provenance with, say, advocacy of Ming-style personnel reviews (Wei Xiangshu, after all, was from Shanxi province), Chen Mingxia had brought in enough former friends from the south to make it seem as though there was a distinct north-south difference of opinion on this issue of personnel recruitment and evaluation. Regularity and adherence to rational procedures—including routine judicial procedures—were becoming identified with the coterie of former Ming scholar-officials, many of them from Jiangnan, who were conventionally thought of as being allied with Chen Mingxia. This was not a terribly disturbing development, from the perspective of the emperor, as long as it did not seriously hamper his relations with the Manchu nobility. He would continue himself to play down the distinctions between Han and Manchus in order to avoid sides being taken which would divide the court even further. But what if a case arose in which the Chinese civil officials stood together, more or less as a single group, defending rules and regulations which also offended Manchu and Chinese bannermen?

Such a judicial case arose only ten days after Feng Quan had been reappointed Grand Secretary of the Hongwen Yuan. It was, by the standards of the time, only a modest affair as far as the magnitude of the crime itself was concerned. Yet it was to have the greatest effect of any court hearing to that date upon the fortunes of the Han collaborators in high office in Beijing.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
The Ren Zhen Case

On May 5, 1653, Shunzhi ordered that the Nine Courts and Offices of Scrutiny be convened to consider a legal case prepared both in Manchu and Chinese written versions by the Board of Punishments. The case concerned Ren Zhen, the Chinese banner-man who had played such an important role in the pacification of Shaanxi under the command of Meng Qiaofang. Most recently, Ren Zhen had served with Gadahun on campaign in the Ordos against Mongol tribesmen, fighting several battles in the Helan mountains on the border between what is now Ningxia and Inner Mongolia.157 Just after that campaign, while at Xing’an, Ren Zhen had on his own authority killed several “licentious and lewd dependents of his household.” The persons who were killed included several children; and though Ren Zhen may have regarded his act as an executioner perfectly within proper bounds as far as frontier customs were concerned, in the eyes of Chinese judicial officials he was a murderer.158 To keep the homicide a secret, therefore, Ren Zhen had bribed several officials in the Boards of Punishments and War to hush up the case. News of his bribery got out, however, and by way of punishment, Ren Zhen was reduced one degree in rank in the bureaucracy and demoted to the lowest rank of nobility: duwei.159

157 Ibid., p. 3726; Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 362; For Gadahun’s military record during the 1643 invasion of China, see the commendation in Kanda, Matsumura, Okada, Kyū Manshū tō, Tensō kyū nen, p. 258.

158 According to the Qing code: “If a slave committed an offense (theft or fornication), the master had to report the matter to the magistrate and was not permitted to punish the slave himself. If he did, and the slave died, his punishment would be one hundred strokes of the heavy bamboo provided the slave was guilty. If a master went so far as to kill three of his slaves without their being guilty of a capital crime, he would be exiled and put to hard labor in the region of the Amur River if he was an official or a bannerman; he would be exiled and himself made a soldier’s slave if he was a commoner.” Marinus J. Meijer, “Slavery at the End of the Ch’ing Dynasty,” p. 333.

159 Qing shi liezhuan, p. 39a; Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3762. According to the Veritable Records, Ren Zhen had without permission killed his wife and concubine for having “illicit intercourse” with others. Then he had sent someone to the
This punishment pleased no one. In the eyes of Chinese who learned about the case later, it was tantamount to letting him off altogether. To Ren Zhen himself, a man who had slain hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of the dynasty’s enemies in the name of honor and loyalty, this was an unjust humiliation. To make matters worse, two months later he was accused of further crimes against his dependents by one of his household maids (bei), and disgraced even more. He made no effort to hide his anger and bitterness, and on several occasions he was overheard making treasonable comments about the government and observed behaving defiantly in word and deed. Consequently, the Board of Punishments had been asked to look into the case. After investigating these reports, the board concluded that Ren Zhen was indeed guilty of sedition, and for this crime—not the original murders—he should be killed and his property confiscated.\(^{160}\)

The emperor was not satisfied with this conclusion. Evidently, Shunzhi believed that to kill a man of Ren Zhen’s military prowess would risk provoking another spate of mutinies like the Jiang Xiang uprising. He therefore issued two rescripts, asking the Nine Courts, in effect, to act as a superior court of appeal and re-try the case.\(^{161}\) After considering the matter carefully, the officials—Manchus and Han together—upheld the original recommendation of the Board of Punishments that Ren Zhen be condemned to death. However, they differed with respect to the reason for upholding the death sentence. The Manchus and almost all of the Chinese bannermen wished to have Ren Zhen killed because of his later treachery, not because he had killed some of his household dependents. The other Chinese officials, appalled by his butchery and the special treatment which the bannerman was being given,

\(^{160}\) Ibid., 76:6a.
\(^{161}\) Qing shi liezhuan, p. 39a.
wished him to be executed because of the murders. Twenty-eight Han officials, led by Chen Mingxia, Chen Zhilin, and Jin Zhijun, therefore set themselves apart from the other members of the court and insisted that their prescription of the death sentence was for the first crime of homicide alone. Noting that Ren Zhen had never recognized the seriousness of his first crime, the twenty-eight ministers suggested that, “If we take this case and reverse the principle by which it was expounded, then that is not as [good as] trying him for the crime for which he should have [originally] been punished.”

The Shunzhi Emperor was puzzled by this legal hair-splitting. “Who is it who ‘expounded’ the case and for what crime should punishment be received? Respond and elucidate!” he peremptorily commanded. As spokesman for the group, Chen Mingxia answered that Ren Zhen had not acknowledged the gravity of the homicide charge, and that if he were therefore sentenced to death simply on the basis of overheard comments, he would have good cause to question the justice of the government’s sentence. At the same time, Chen also acknowledged that there was no formal provision in the code for sentencing Ren Zhen to death on the basis of the first charge, and that he would therefore recommend that the emperor order Ren Zhen to commit suicide rather than hold a public execution.

This last statement infuriated Shunzhi. If there were no provision in the code, then how could they legally suggest suicide? Was that “a statute for a prosperous age?” Would they have offered that same advice for an arbitrary edict of suicide to Yao or Shun? Were not these “clever” (qiao) legalistic comments just designed to keep them from admitting that they were wrong in the first place?

All of you ministers are supposed to assist Us in clarifying and improving our hopes and good intentions. What shall I do, then, with

162 Feng Quan also came out for the death sentence, but apparently for the former reason because he was not implicated among the ministers later attacked by the emperor. Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3787.
164 Ibid., 74:6b.
the sort [of officials] who sink into factionalism and fall into vile practices?\textsuperscript{165}

Once again, and growing angrier, the emperor ordered Chen Mingxia to explain the reasons for the twenty-eight ministers suggesting a different judgment, and especially for recommending that Ren Zhen be ordered to kill himself.\textsuperscript{166}

This time Chen Mingxia answered abjectly—submissively in fact—without attempting to explain the reasons for the original recommendation. His Majesty was absolutely right, Chen said in formally polite submission. There was no provision in the statutes for ordering suicide in this case, and the emperor’s ministers had been wrong to suggest that sentence. They now could only humbly await their own punishments for being mistaken.\textsuperscript{167}

Whether this struck the emperor as mock humiliation or not, he became furious at Chen Mingxia’s evasiveness. These were words designed to cajole and hoodwink him, he exclaimed. Chen Mingxia and Chen Zhilin had in the past committed crimes of their own, but the emperor had forgiven them and they had been allowed a chance to zixin (renew themselves). But had there been any real changes? No. Chen Mingxia and Chen Zhilin were as bad as ever. Therefore, without any delay whatsoever, let the Manchu and Han officials of the Inner Three Courts, of the Nine Courts, the Six Offices of Scrutiny, the Fourteen Circuits, all academicians above the seventh rank, and the Department Directors of the Six Boards assemble outside the Wu Gate to try and punish the twenty-eight men who had so fractiously acted in collusion to disrupt the court.\textsuperscript{168}

This extraordinary meeting, which included virtually the entire upper third of the bureaucrats in the central government, was held at once. Dutifully, the assembled officials demanded and received Chen Mingxia and Chen Zhilin’s admissions that they had tried to cajole and hoodwink the emperor in order to stay in office, and that they were continuing to conceal their own bureaucratic malfeasances. They also accused Jin Zhijun and his associates of form-

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 74:7a.  \textsuperscript{166} Ibid.  \textsuperscript{167} Ibid.  \textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 74:74b.
ing a private faction, and convicted him on that charge. For these crimes the three top-ranking ministers should be executed, the hearing concluded. And for forming a dang (party), and betraying the emperor's kindness by trying to hoodwink him with legalities, thirteen others, including Wei Xiangshu and Wang Yongji were banished to the frontier. Eight more officials, including Zhang Duan, were accused of belonging to a clique, and it was recommended that they be dismissed from office, never to be employed again. Finally, three other officials, including Sun Chengze, were to be cashiered, and one other person was to be demoted and transferred.\textsuperscript{169}

The Shunzhi Emperor, having extracted from his bureaucratic judges the severity he wished, could now afford to exercise his clemency. Having asserted his authority and demonstrated his power as a despot, Shunzhi chose not to sentence Chen Mingxia, Chen Zhilin, and Jin Zhijun to death. Instead, they were degraded two full ranks and fined a year's salary. The three kept their current posts except for Chen Mingxia, who remained a grand secretary but was removed as President of Civil Appointments.\textsuperscript{170} The other sentences were also reduced: the officials to be exiled were instead demoted one rank and fined one year's salary, while being kept in their same posts; the eight clique members were fined nine months' salary; the three cashiered officials were forced to pay six months' salary; and the transferred official had his punishment suspended.\textsuperscript{171}

Throughout the discussion between Shunzhi and Chen Mingxia there were hints that Chen and his allies had other, ulterior reasons for wanting Ren Zhen put to death. If that was indeed the case, there is no evidence to prove it; but the suggestion of collusion remained always present in Shunzhi's remarks. In attacking factionalism, in other words, he was not just condemning it for its own sake, but also suggesting that the entire group of twenty-

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 74:8a.
\textsuperscript{170} He was replaced by Cheng Kegong on May 20, 1653. Zhang, Qing shi, 1:52.
\textsuperscript{171} Shizu shilu, 74:8b; Zhang, Qing shi, pp. 3788, 3897; Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:382.
eight officials had private, hidden motives for joining together. On the face of the Ren Zhen affair, it is difficult to find a justification for this suspicion. The men who were threatened with banishment or dismissal did not appear to share any particular factional identity. (See Table 14.) Almost evenly split between north and south, the accused men represented every board, plus the Censorate and the Inner Three Courts. They included men who, like Wei Xiangshu, had passed the Qing exams and were not Ming holdovers, as well as Chinese bannermen. The only quality that they all had in common was their native Han background. And so it was to this common characteristic that the emperor turned the day after the sentencing in order to explain the reasons for his anger and distress. 172

On May 6, Shunzhi ordered Grand Secretaries Fan Wencheng, Hong Chengchou, and Esehei to assemble the twenty-eight officials once again at the Wu Gate in order to be addressed by him. Once they had gathered, the emperor told the convicted men that their first crime had simply been their refusal to admit their error of judgment. He had twice told them to elucidate their original statement, and they had continued to submit confusing advice without admitting that they were wrong. Their second crime had been to act as a group of Han officials, developing an opinion that they collectively held and that placed them apart from Manchu officials at the meeting.

Even though there will sometimes necessarily exist diverse opinions, why was there not a single Han official among the Manchu officials who were deliberating? And why was there not a single Manchu among the Han officials deliberating? This was because none of you have developed a spirit of cooperation. 173

The emperor went on to say that this kind of behavior—factionalism along ethnic lines—on the part of Han and Manchu officials would surely doom the Qing to destruction. Therefore, Shunzhi

172 Shizu shilu, 74:9a.
173 Ibid., 74:9b. Han bannermen were here lumped together with Manchus rather than with regular Han officials.
Table 14.
Leading Figures Convicted in the Ren Zhen Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Bannerman</th>
<th>Punishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chen Mingxia</td>
<td>Jiangnan</td>
<td>Civil</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demotion, fine¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Zhilin</td>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>Rites</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demotion, fine²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Shian</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>Rites</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demotion³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin Weicheng</td>
<td>Liaodong</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Demotion⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin Zhijun</td>
<td>Jiangnan</td>
<td>Censorate</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demotion, fine⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Yuanding</td>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
<td>War</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demotion⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Chang</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>Works</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demotion⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Yuyou</td>
<td>Shuntian</td>
<td>Punishments</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dismissal⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Yongji</td>
<td>Jiangnan</td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demotion⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Zhouyun</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>War</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demotion¹⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Xiangshu</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>Censorate</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demotion¹¹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Zhang Qiyun, ed., Qing shi, p. 3788; Qing shi liezhuan, 79:57a–59a.
² Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3788; Qing shi liezhuan, 79:30a–31b.
³ Zhao Erxun, ed., Qing shi gao, p. 6625 (244:7b).
⁴ Ibid., p. 6618 (237:18b).
⁵ Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3735; Da Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu, 74:8b.
⁶ Qing shi liezhuan, 79:49.
⁷ Ibid., 79:46–47a.
⁸ Ibid., 79:43b–44.
⁹ Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3735; Shizu shilu, 74:8b.
¹⁰ Qing shi liezhuan, 78:53–54.
¹¹ Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3897.

had commanded his censors to memorialize immediately if they again detected similar “perverse” activities, and in the meantime the three leading ministers among the twenty-eight officials—Chen Mingxia, Chen Zhilin, and Jin Zhijun—were to be put on special notice to avoid such behavior in the future.¹⁷⁴

While Shunzhi may have been able to congratulate himself on

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.
nipping this kind of racial factionalism in the bud, the Ren Zhen affair plainly continued to trouble him. For one, he may have realized that a clear and divisive ethnic split at court would compromise his own imperial eminence because he would then be identified with one or the other group, thereby losing the support of the other, whether altogether Han or Manchu. For his own policy of strengthening the powers of the throne to succeed, it was essential that the emperor retain his own neutrality while at the same time creating a sense of individuality in each of his own officials, who ideally stood before their ruler as separate bureaucratic integers in a one-to-one relationship between minister and monarch.\(^\text{175}\) Yet, the men he had selected to help him realize this relationship—officials like Chen Mingxia and Chen Zhilin—were severely compromised by the Ren Zhen affair. They had showed how prone they were to split away from Manchu officials, and even though their reasons for division were ostensibly to implement regular judicial procedures, the result had been a fundamental Han-Manchu division. Moreover, there was always the possibility that there were additional reasons for such a division: hidden connections and illicit collusions. The case of Li San had proven how such networks of intrigue and illegal influence could exist within the various boards, and now with the Ren Zhen case just over, the emperor seemed to be losing trust in his officials' ability to remain free from compromise. As his constant injunctions to his "speaking officials" show, and as he was later that fall openly to admit, Shunzhi was not confident that his surveillance officers could be trusted to report on illegal factions and patronage because they might also have crimes of their own to conceal.\(^\text{176}\)

\(^{175}\) This form of Manchu overlordship, as practiced by later Qing emperors, was intended "to neutralize the power of officialdom, to render it 'more equal' and hence less effective before the throne." Harold L. Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes*, pp. 7–8.

\(^{176}\) *Shizu shilu*, 77:7, dated September 9, 1653. On June 27 Shunzhi had insisted that he personally review all cases of official malfeasance. Ibid., 76:3.
Emulate the Early Ming

In short, the Ren Zhen case seemed to confirm Shunzhi’s fears that the Qing dynasty was succumbing to the same forms of corruption and factionalism that had doomed the Ming. On February 11, 1653, the emperor asserted that, “The literati’s customs have been growing decadent (huimi) now for a long time”; and he asked for memorials in response.177 Again, it was Wei Yijie who responded at length, first by enthusiastically affirming the emperor’s observation, and second by warning that the new regime was heedlessly perpetuating the errors of the late Ming by overlooking the critical importance of basic moral principles to good government. The early Ming monarchy had succeeded in creating a strong empire because a sense of basic morality, the foundation of which was filial piety, was shared by all the literati. Instead of preparing for the examinations, or reading later commentators, men of talent cultivated themselves with the fundamental classical texts, returning to the works which Confucius had written with his own hand. During the early Ming period, the directors of studies (xundao) in each province were especially charged with nurturing the noble spirit of service among the literati, and at the same time they directed their students toward practical learning (shixue). That was why the early Ming saw the rise of so many talented scholars who were also conscientious officials.178

Wei Yijie’s stress on Confucian texts instead of Neo-Confucian commentaries, on basic moral principles instead of metaphysics, and on practical learning instead of belles-lettres may have been a simplistic prescription for many of the social and economic problems that remained to be solved, but it certainly reflected the temper of the times. His ethical fervor also stemmed from a particular sense of moral probity that characterized younger Han officials who had earned their degrees in the Qing and hence were not compromised by earlier Ming service. When censors like Wei Yijie attacked the corruption of the late Ming and urged the emperor to emulate the early Ming, they were self-righteously detaching

177 Wei, Jianji tang wenji, 1:13a.
178 Ibid., 1:13–17.
themselves from the cohort of Ming holdovers who, while only a few years older than they, were distinctly of an earlier generation of collaborators. Men like Chen Mingxia were always prone to accusations of political opportunism that were neither levelled against the "old men" like Ning Wanwo or Fan Wencheng who had joined the Manchus on the marches and had shared their struggle with them, nor against the freshly minted bureaucrats of the early 1640s and 1650s.

Already an admirer of the loyalists and dubious about Chen Mingxia's character after the Tantai incident, the Shunzhi Emperor felt great ambivalence about his grand secretary's qualities, suspecting his deviousness while admiring his unusually vast scholarship. To subordinates and even equals Chen Mingxia seemed raspy and irritating, speaking bluntly and often too directly to the point. But to Shunzhi he was the epitome of erudition—a walking library. The emperor once remarked to Feng Quan: "Chen Mingxia read many books. [One could] ask him about matters ancient and modern and he would be clear and distinct. He was able to bring up the names of works that one had never seen before."  

As an awesome polymath, then, Chen stood in a special relationship to the young emperor, who was even then trying hard to master classical Chinese learning. In that respect, Shunzhi both dominated and depended upon his grand secretaries. Unlike his future son, the Kangxi Emperor, Shunzhi could not compose imperial edicts alone. When he first took direct charge of the monarchy, in fact, he did not even personally endorse memorials. Rather, he issued oral instructions for their preparation to one of his grand secretaries who then had the endorsements prepared in red ink by one of the Inner Courts. This left considerable discre-

179 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 390.
180 Ibid., p. 391. The emperor often spoke with Chen Mingxia about the rise and fall of dynasties, and discussed the great rulers of such flourishing periods as the Tang and Song. Sun, “Wu Meicun beixing,” p. 6.
181 Ibid., p. 374. When a board president presented a memorial, the emperor would give the minister oral instructions which would be jotted down on a slip of paper and taken by the official back to his ministry. There, the instructions were written out and sent to the Inner Courts where the endorsement
tion in the hands of his grand secretaries; and Chen Mingxia, in fact, was known on several occasions to have altered the wording of important documents or simply not to have included certain phrases with which he disagreed in the final vermillion endorsement of the emperor. To avoid such errors, willful or not, the emperor insisted in 1653 that written copies of his oral instructions be returned to him for his approval. This required adding more grand secretaries to his staff. On July 21, 1653, provisions were made for two additional Han grand secretaries for each of the Inner Three Courts; and five days later three new grand secretaries were appointed: Cheng Kegong to the Secretarial Court (Mishu Yuan), Zhang Rui to the Historiographical Court (Guoshi Yuan), and Liu Zhengzong to the Court of Vast Learning (Hongwen Yuan). At the same time, some of the pedagogical responsibilities of the former Hanlin Academy were assigned to the Inner Courts by an edict that ordered those offices to take charge of educational policy (xue zheng) for Zhili, Jiangnan, and Jiangbei.

As the Inner Courts came to function more and more like the Ming Inner Secretariat, Shunzhi spent much more time with his grand secretaries, discussing the composition of ministerial instructions. This aroused the fear among Manchu officials that there would once again be a barrier between the outer court and bureaucracy, and the emperor's inner court and quarters. Some of those fears were realized on December 15, 1653, when Shunzhi decided to set apart a special room inside the Forbidden City where

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182 Shizu shilu, 82:16a.
183 At this time, Shunzhi was strongly advised by one of his censors, Zhu Dindyen, to use more Chinese officials as his personal attendants. Lui, "Censor, Regent and Emperor," p. 90.
184 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 53.
185 Shizu shilu, 76:12a.
186 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 371. At this time the emperor also revived the Ming practice of piaoni, which was first requested nine years earlier by Feng Quan and which meant sending a copy of each board memorial to the Inner Courts.
grand secretaries and sub-chancellors could be on duty to draft re-
scripts.\textsuperscript{187} Not long afterwards the emperor also ordered his Han
grand secretaries to move their households inside the Donghua
Gate where they were given residences, had their households reg-
istered as slaves with the Board of War, and were issued special
identification tallies so that they could gain entry past the guard
posts.\textsuperscript{188}

From the emperor’s point of view, most of these changes were
designed to render the throne’s executive role more efficient and
effective. Quickly grasping the principles of despotic government,
Shunzhi showed himself increasingly interested during 1653 and
1654 in ensuring the flow of reliable information to him from his
“ears and eyes.” In 1653, in order to encourage more impeach-
ments, he stopped the practice of counter impeachment in which
the accused official routinely lodged countercharges against his
prosecutor. Reporting procedures were also simplified, and cen-
sors were relieved from some of the duties of describing ministry
administrative practices in tedious and time-consuming detail.\textsuperscript{189}
Still, the emperor continued to harbor doubts about the willing-
ness of his censors to speak frankly. On March 23, 1654, Shunzhi
told his “speaking officials” how concerned he was that his re-
pealed requests for “true words” actually be met. If he were really
going to establish a “great peace” (taiping) over the land, then his
censors were going to have to keep him informed of both de-
viancy and orthodoxy throughout the empire. But he, the em-

\textsuperscript{187} Wu, \textit{Communication and Imperial Control}, pp. 16–17.
\textsuperscript{188} Tan, \textit{Beijou lu}, p. 378. Although this appeared to Manchu nobles yet another
example of the palace’s encroachment upon regular government functions
and a sign of the growing intimacy between Shunzhi and his confidants, the
primary reason for this was the unavailability of real estate elsewhere. After
the Chinese officials were moved out of the Forbidden City and over to the
Southern City, the supply of residences suddenly declined while real estate
prices and rents soared. Bannermen could live quite comfortably in Beijing
because the Forbidden City had plenty of residences available, and Han
grand secretaries were very envious of bannermen’s privileges while they
simply could not find decent houses in which to live. It was their com-
plaints, then, that led to this move, which took place on April 14, 1654.
\textsuperscript{189} Lui, “Censor, Regent and Emperor,” pp. 91–92.
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The emperor, feared that his censors' tendency "to form parties (dang) for private ends" would hinder fair and honest reporting. In fact, by now Shunzhi seemed to realize the inherent contradiction between ideal bureaucratic behavior (impartiality and impersonality) and ideal literati behavior (moral discretion and personal engagement). He thus warned his censors that they were "once more affronting Our feelings by receiving and accepting each other as friends (na-jiao or neijiao) and by forming parties."\(^{190}\)

While he ordered his information-gathering officials to report to him individually, thereby providing him with intelligence from many different single persons, Shunzhi also tried to impose a more collective form of decision making upon his executives. Once he had received the information, the emperor wished to have his officials jointly discuss the matter in a meeting, work out a consensus, and then eschew individuality in order to execute the policy efficiently. On March 28, 1654, five days after he had warned his censors not to form friendships that would prevent them from reporting impartially, he summoned the officials of the Inner Courts and expressed to them his displeasure with the present format of court meetings, which often ended in inconclusive bickering. Instead, Shunzhi insisted that once the majority (qun) had decided that a particular course of action was correct, then it should be unanimously implemented. Henceforth, if "one person clung stubbornly to his own opinion" and thus delayed implementation, then that would be considered obstructionism and correspondingly punished.\(^{191}\)

The emperor's insistence that his grand secretaries and subchancellors cooperate with each other once a clear consensus had been reached, however, was thwarted by two conditions. First was the rapidly expanding network of personal factions that only seemed to unite around issues dividing Han from Manchus. The emperor had already begun to take steps against overt political coalitions, and had warned against Manchu-Chinese divisions.

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190 *Shizu shilu*, 81:2b. See also Zhang, *Qing shi*, p. 54. *Najiao* is praised in the *Mencius*, *Gong sun chou shang*. On July 23, 1653, the emperor also emphasized the need for preventing palace eunuchs from forming alliances with court officials. Yu Minzhong, *Guochao gong shi*, 1:2.

191 *Shizu shilu*, 81:5b.
Now he would have to try to solve the problem of personal cliques, which were particularly troublesome for him because they involved favorite members of the Inner Courts like his cultural mentor, Chen Mingxia. The second condition that prevented efficacious unanimity was closely related to the first. This was the existence of enmities and grudges that still existed among his grand secretaries themselves, and especially between Chen Mingxia and some of the other members of the Inner Courts. Ning Wanwo, for instance, could not forget that it was Chen Mingxia who had prepared the indictment in 1651, accusing him of covering up Grand Secretary Ganglin’s alteration of the *Veritable Records*. And although Jirgalang had cleared Ning Wanwo of the charge, Ning could hardly forgive Chen Mingxia, who was also known by other officials like Feng Quan and Fan Wencheng to have been the author of similar accusations issued with the vermilion endorsement of the throne.²⁹²

Perhaps it was this sense of being envied and disliked that had led Chen Mingxia in 1653 to request to be posted outside the capital.²⁹³ At that time the court was alarmed by the victories of Li Dingguo and Sun Kewang—Zhang Xianzhong’s former lieutenants who now fought on the side of the Southern Ming regime of the Yongli Emperor—in Guangxi, Hunan, and Sichuan. Kong Youde, who had been sent in 1649 at the head of twenty thousand Qing soldiers to subdue Guangxi, had the previous summer been campaigning in Guilin when his line of retreat into Hunan was cut off by Li Dingguo. Kong Youde had consequently committed suicide on August 7, 1652, and now there was need for a governor-general to take over command of the civil and military officials in Huguang, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou, and coordinate the campaigns against Li Dingguo and Sun Kewang.²⁹⁴

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²⁹³ Another motive may have been cupidity. Whoever commanded such forces in the field was certain to find plenty of opportunities for self-enrichment, if only by means of official military rewards. Hong Chengchou, for example, was later paid 50,000 taels for leading the campaign in the southeast, according to the *Guangyang zaji*, cited in Li, “Hong Chengchou,” p. 251.
²⁹⁴ Initially, Li Dingguo had accepted Sun Kewang as the senior figure among
was this post for which Chen applied, but the emperor instead turned to the far more experienced Hong Chengchou, who was named special commissioner and governor-general in 1653.\textsuperscript{195} Refused this request, Chen Mingxia had applied again for provincial duty in February of 1654, when the governor-generalship of Shaanxi fell vacant. According to informed opinion at the time, Chen wished to leave the capital “because he was [trying to] escape the envy of many while being treated with such unusual generosity by his ruler.”\textsuperscript{196} But Shunzhi refused to let his minister depart from Beijing. Chen Mingxia remained in the Inner Three Courts, supervising selections for the Hanlin Academy.\textsuperscript{197}

Selection for the status of a Hanlin probationer constituted one of the most important means of staffing the highest level of the emperor’s inner bureaucracy: the Inner Three Courts.\textsuperscript{198} Whoever

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  \item the “four kings” who inherited Zhang Xianzhong’s army. Later, after Sun had had Li publicly beaten for insubordination in 1648, the two men had a falling out and became rivals for control of the court of the Southern Ming Yongli Emperor, who was isolated in Anlong in southwestern Guizhou during 1652–1656. In the late spring of 1652 Li Dingguo began a series of successful campaigns against the Qing, using war elephants and aboriginal fighters he had acquired in the southwest. On August 7, 1652, Li’s men took Guilin, and within a month most of the commanders in Guangxi had reverted to the Ming side. Lynn Struve, “The Southern Ming,” p. 116.
  \item Xie Guozhen, ed., 
  \begin{itemize}
    \item Qingchu nongmin qiyi ziliao jilu
    \end{itemize}
  \item pp. 359, 436; Li, “Hong Chengchou,” pp. 269–291.
  \item Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 389.
  \item Ibid. As explained earlier, the Hanlin Academy was in these years conflated within the Inner Three Courts. In 1658 Shunzhi gave it a more formal status in its own right, and it acted as an agency combining together the functions of all the Inner Three Courts: compiling the Veritable Records, maintaining the imperial genealogy, and supervising the civil service exams. Nearly half of the probationers were Manchus, and Chinese who entered the Hanlin were given an opportunity to learn Manchu. The Academy itself was southeast of the imperial palace, just north of what later became the grounds of the British Legation and catty-corner across Chang’an Street from what is now the Beijing Hotel. Lui, Hanlin Academy, p. 4; Robert B. Oxnam, “Policies and Institutions of the Oboi Regency,” p. 269; A. L. Y. Chung, “The Hanlin Academy in the Early Ch’ing Period.”
  \item Lui, Hanlin Academy, p. 44.
\end{itemize}
controlled those examinations was well along the way to controlling imperial policy insofar as the emperor relied upon his grand secretaries and sub-chancellors for the preparation of his personal endorsements. When the examination scrolls were brought before the grand secretaries for discussion and ranking in the Wenhua Palace, therefore, each official had an opportunity to present candidates whose literary gifts presumably qualified them for acceptance, but who also might be that particular grand secretary’s protégé. The ranking of the Hanlin candidates was consequently a tense and important moment for the grand secretaries who supervised the examinations. That spring, 1654, discussions were dominated by Chen Mingxia. Altogether, eighteen candidates were presented. Although Fan Wencheng and Feng Quan made very positive recommendations, their candidates were ranked second on the list to Chen Mingxia’s. And when it came Ning Wanwo’s turn, the three men whose names he presented were struck off the list altogether. Challenged for this action, Chen Mingxia responded testily that, “When it comes to writing, how could I not know [best]?” Ning Wanwo could not dispute Chen Mingxia’s superior education and literary skill. But he could nurture his anger at this fresh humiliation and bide his time.

On March 28, 1654, Ning Wanwo was accorded the unusual honor by the Shunzhi Emperor of being entered on the list of Manchu high officials who belonged to the Assembly. This was an exceptional honor for a Han Chinese—even a Han bannerman like Ning: it was also an event that posed great danger for Chen Mingxia. Ning Wanwo now was able to participate as a full member in the meetings of an Assembly dominated by Manchu princes who distrusted southerners like Chen Mingxia, whom they associated with dissident loyalists and effete literati—literati who were in the process of encouraging the Shunzhi Emperor to adopt more and more Han practices, even including personal clothing styles.

199 Ichisada Miyazaki, *China’s Examination Hell*, pp. 80–82.
201 Shizu shilu, 81:6b.
202 Tan, *Beiyou lu*, p. 389. Word had just about this time reached Beijing of the
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Going Too Far: The Court Clothing Issue

When Shunzhi had first taken over power himself after the death of Dorgon, he had still been somewhat overshadowed by Jirgalang and some of the other Manchu princes. Perhaps for that reason, the emperor had initially turned down a request in 1651 by Censor Kuang Lanzhao that the imperial robe and crown (gunmian) be adopted in court. Each dynasty has its own regulations [, the throne answered.] A court consists in venerating Heaven and loving the people, and in ruling the empire in peace. Why must it consist of using the robe and crown?

Later however, the emperor did adopt an imperial robe and crown of the Han dynastic style. And on occasion, the emperor himself personally had shown his Inner Courts’ officials Ming-style robes and caps, which his courtiers praised.

It may have been because of the emperor’s tacit approval on that occasion of the voluminous wide-sashed Ming court dress that Chen Mingxia acted as he did. There may even have been deeper motives of atonement for the guilt associated with his own collaboration, his own abandonment of the cause of the Ming, which led Chen to adopt the stance he took. Whatever his reasons, in retrospect Chen Mingxia’s behavior appeared extremely foolhardy.

attacks by Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga) on Chongming Island and on Jinshan on March 10 and 12. Zhang, Qing shi, p. 53.
203 The formal Ming crown was actually a black mortarboard fringed with strings of beads. Ray Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance, p. 6.
204 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:388.
205 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 389. Court dress at this time was a mixture of Han, Jin, and Yuan dress. Ibid., p. 351. Shunzhi was certainly used to presenting himself in different guises to different categories of subjects. In order to help him rule over the Mongols, he was quite willing to allow himself to be viewed as a bodhisattva; and in 1653 he accepted from the Dalai Lama a gold plate which referred to him as the “God of the sky.” But this was strictly reserved for Mongols and Tibetans. Shunzhi did not mention his Buddhahood to Chinese. David M. Farquhar, “Emperor as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the Ch’ing Empire,” pp. 8, 21–25.
Shortly before April 17, 1654, he approached his rival, Ning Wanwo, and suggested to the old bannerman that the Qing court adopt the Ming style of dress, including long hair and wide-sleeved robes, in order to bring peace to the empire. Ning Wanwo promptly disclosed Chen’s plan to the emperor.\(^{206}\)

Mingxia has told me that if one wanted the empire to be in great peace (taiping), only one or two things were needed: set those up and there would then be a great peace. I asked him, “What things?” Mingxia took off his cap and rubbed his head, saying, “We only need to keep our hair and recover our [Ming] caps and robes. Then the empire will be in great peace.” I laughed and said, “Whether the empire is in great peace or not does not solely depend upon shaving the head. During the Chongzhen period no one by any means shaved their head, so how was it that they lost the realm? The essence was [poor] government. When laws and regulations are strict and enlightened, then the officials and clerks will have a sense of integrity and shame, the local gentry will not harm the people, infantry and cavalry will assemble in great strength, and the people’s minds will be happy and obedient. Then the empire will bring about the great peace by itself.” Mingxia said, “No matter what you say, the first important task is just to keep one’s hair and restore [the old] caps and robes.”\(^{207}\)

At best, Chen Mingxia’s proposal was based upon a fundamental miscalculation. If he had hoped to accelerate the trend toward restoring Ming political forms that had been gathering momentum since Shunzhi assumed direct control of the throne, its immediate effect was precisely the opposite. Even Ning Wanwo, a Han who had been one of the leading proponents of early bureaucratization along Ming lines in 1631, was by now convinced that sinification may have gone too far and was vitiating the military vigor of the Qing.\(^{208}\) Chen Mingxia’s suggestion therefore seemed calculated to enervate the martial vigor of the regime all the more. The

\(^{206}\) Li, Guochao xianzheng, 2:10a.

\(^{207}\) Shizu shilu, 82:1b–2a, memorial dated April 17, 1654. See also Wang Xianqian, Donghua lu, Shunzhi 11, juan 5, pp. 4b–6a.

\(^{208}\) Li, Guochao xianzheng, 2:9.
Ming clothing that Chen proposed to wear once again was suited for office workers, not military conquerors. As Ning explained to the emperor: “Those who are capable of unifying the empire [need to] have clothing which makes it convenient for them to ride and shoot. That is the reason our infantry and cavalry are so quick and strong. Now, Mingxia’s wish to broaden robes and widen sashes, changing Qing to Ming, is a plan to weaken our country.”

In addition to claiming that Chen Mingxia had fomented a plan to weaken the military strength of the dynasty, Ning Wanwo also accused Chen of “forming a party to nurture sedition” (jie dang huai jian).

Your minister thinks that because Chen Mingxia has repeatedly received the emperor’s lenient favor and his generous devotion, being appointed to office, then he ought to have purified his thought and altered his behavior, devoting himself loyally to our dynasty. Who would have thought that his nature was so wicked, and his deceit so artfully practiced? He bitterly hates our dynasty’s (chao) coiffure, and contemptuously despises our country’s (guo) apparel. He has bewitched the former gentry (gu shen) and he has summoned together a southern party (nan dang), arranging confidence tricks in order to carry out his selfish [plans]. He has concealed his malicious designs to foment disorder. How can we understand his [doing] such [things]?\(^\text{209}\)

Ning Wanwo’s impeachment of Chen Mingxia also enumerated a list of eight crimes committed by the grand secretary and his relatives. Together, the detailed accusations portrayed a fascinating picture of political corruption in 17th-century China.

First, Chen Mingxia’s own father, Ning, was depicted as a cruel and evil man, so hated by the local gentry and people of their

\(^{209}\) *Shizu shilu*, 82:2. If Ning Wanwo was making this serious accusation mainly in order to drum up support among the Manchu nobility for his own vendetta against Chen Mingxia, he made no effort to conceal the personal enmity between them: “Even though Mingxia treats me with deference, his hatred for me is deep. This has been observed in public by my fellow officials.” Ibid., 82:2b.

\(^{210}\) *Shizu shilu*, 82:1b–2a.
hometown of Liyang that he was forced to flee to Jiangning, the
district capital just southeast of Nanjing. There, Chen Mingxia’s
father, wife, and children had simply occupied the grounds and
buildings of the Guogong Huayuan, a park maintained for the use
of the public by the subscriptions of local officials. None of these
officials dared report this expropriation because of Chen Mingxia’s
high office and great influence.\(^\text{211}\)

Second, Chen’s family had harbored a fugitive. Wu Changshi,
the former Ming Minister of Personnel, had been arrested by the
authorities in Jiangning. The Chen family had ordered him re-
leased into their custody, and the local officials had been too fright-
ened to refuse.\(^\text{212}\)

Third, Chen Mingxia’s son, Yechen, was a local tyrant who
went about Jiangning and Nanjing in a large insignia-bedecked
sedan-chair, bullying officials, interfering in the governor-general’s
yamen, and extorting sums of money from the people. Local post-
ers had been put up by the people of that area, denouncing him
and saying that: "Mingxia is neither loyal nor filial. He allows his
son to be harsh and cruel." Yet even though his actions had been so
publicly denounced, and even though the crimes had been re-
ported to Cheng Kegong, nothing had been said to the throne.
"Why was there not a single memorial reporting this?" Ning de-
manded, adding that, "one can envision the mob of his partisans
[who covered up Yechen’s crimes]."\(^\text{213}\)

Fourth, Chen Mingxia himself had adopted unfair practices of
promotion in the bureaucracy, as was especially obvious in the
rapid elevation of his adopted father, Zhao Yanxian, when Chen
was President of Civil Appointments.\(^\text{214}\) Chen Mingxia had been

\(^{211}\) Ibid., 82:3a. The property was worth 100,000 taels. Each of the officials in
Jiangning had contributed 3,000 taels in cash to pay for public use.

\(^{212}\) Ibid.

\(^{213}\) Ibid., 82:3b. Ning recommended that Chen Yechen be arrested along with
his servants and household clerks, and that they all be interrogated with judi-
cial torture. At the time of his arrest, Chen Yechen was reported as owning
900 qing of fields (about 13,600 acres) and 700 ounces of silver. Tan, Beiyou
lu, p. 391.

\(^{214}\) Yan is given as Qi in Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3788.
impeached for this by Censor Guo Yie, supported by Liu Zhengzong, but Mingxia had not only survived the challenge; he had also gone on to exercise the same arbitrary power over appointments in the Hanlin.\textsuperscript{215}

Fifth, Chen Mingxia had continually protected one of his relatives-in-law, Shi Rugang, who was a member of one of the noted local families (shijia) of Liyang. A gentryman who owned vast amounts of property, Shi Rugang had served as a circuit intendant in Zhejiang where he used his office to seize the wealth of another person.\textsuperscript{216} When the governor of Zhejiang, Xiao Qiyuan, got wind of this and brought Shi Rugang to trial, Chen Mingxia manipulated the legal proceedings in Shi's favor, delaying judgment for years, arbitrarily granting appeals for reconsideration, and even attacking Governor Xiao himself for incompetence.\textsuperscript{217}

Sixth, Censor Wei Xiangshu, who had been in charge of the Office of Scrutiny for the Board of Civil Appointments when Chen Mingxia was President, was related by marriage to Chen Mingxia.\textsuperscript{218} Wei Xiangshu was, of course, none other than the official who had recommended the resumption of the "great reckoning" system of personnel evaluation, which placed such great discretionary power in the hands of the President of Civil Appointments and the Censor in Charge of Scrutiny. With Chen in the former post and Wei in the latter, control over the whole process of higher-level bureaucratic promotion would have been in the hands of two intimate relatives. But that was not the crime for which Chen Mingxia was denounced. Rather, Ning Wanwo went on to explain that after Wei Xiangshu was demoted for mistakenly impeaching another official, Chen Mingxia had without proper authority on his own issued a notice from the Board of Civil Ap-

\textsuperscript{215} Shizu shilu, 82:4.
\textsuperscript{216} The man, surnamed Zhu, was denounced by Shi Rugang as being a member of the Ming imperial family.
\textsuperscript{217} Shizu shilu, 82:4b–5a.
\textsuperscript{218} Ning Wanwo specified that Wei Xiangshu was one of Chen Mingxia's "wife's relatives" (yin qin). However, in his biography in the Qing shi, Wei Xiangshu is said to have been a close friend of Chen Mingxia's father-in-law, Niu Shedou. Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3897.
pointments that Wei Xiangshu was only guilty of a lesser charge of “carelessness” (shuhu), and thus Wei was merely fined six months’ salary instead of being demoted.219

Seventh, Chen Mingxia had frequently used his official position to further his own personal ends and was not above feathering his own nest in unscrupulous ways.

The Hanlin tertius Zhang Tianzhi requested leave to return south. Mingxia helped with one hundred taels of silver for expenses on the road. From his wife’s residence, Tianzhi sent back five hundred taels of principal and interest. Because Mingxia did not know this and thought that he had been cheated, he said Tianzhi had offended us. Therefore, [Tianzhi] was transferred out. Then the letter returning the money arrived. [Mingxia] saw Tianzhi again and said, “It is possible to return you to the Hanlin.” Tianzhi is one of my students and I know him fairly well. Yesterday I saw listed in the memorial among the twelve names recommended by Feng Quan and others the name of Tianzhi.220

Thus we see, added Ning Wanwo, “the clever scheming of Mingxia to use public means for private ends.”221

Finally, Chen Mingxia had on several different occasions used his bureaucratic skills to alter sentences or amend documents. For example, in lightening Wei Xiangshu’s sentence, he had, even after being challenged by Cheng Kegong and Feng Quan, reversed the intention of the emperor by annihilating certain sentences in the vermillion endorsement which his Court prepared. On another occasion, he had blotted out a total of 114 characters in the central register of documents which each official was supposed to sign when checking in or out a memorial with its instructions. No one

219 *Shizu shilu*, 82:5b–6a.
220 Ibid., 82:5. This was the same list of nominations in which appeared Wu Weiye’s name. Thus, by the time Wu Weiye got to Beijing, the attack upon Chen Mingxia had begun. It may have been in self-protection, then, that Wu allowed his name to be associated with that of Chen’s enemy, Feng Quan. Sun, “Wu Meicun beixing,” pp. 6–7.
221 *Shizu shilu*, 82:5b.
knew what this coverup concealed, but it certainly must have been some information implicating Chen Mingxia in some scandal—perhaps, as Ning was to imply later, even in the Li San affair. And on March 22, 1654, when the Shunzhi Emperor had ordered his grand secretaries to prepare an edict on cliques to be sent to the censors, Chen Mingxia had taken Ning Wanwo’s approved draft and in preparing the vermilion endorsement had on his own erased phrases which related the fall of the Ming dynasty to censorial concealment of the true conditions of the time. The emperor’s own words were thus being distorted and changed by Chen Mingxia—an act of lèse majesté. As Cheng Kegong had remarked at the time Chen had deleted those phrases: “It’s as though one were to draw a dragon [showing] its eyes gouged out by someone.”

Ning Wanwo summarized his accusations by stressing what a great danger Chen Mingxia’s efforts to form a party (dang) posed to the government. Once such a clique existed, it inevitably encouraged corruption because officials would have to pay bribes in order to join it or benefit from it. Then, once in power, the party would solidify its position, and become impossible to extricate. To Ning Wanwo, therefore, the formation of a dang threatened to jeopardize all that the Qing dynasty had accomplished by winning the Mandate. That outcome he could not bear to see as an old and trusted servant of the ruling house. In a strongly moving conclusion, Ning told the Shunzhi Emperor:

I also have my own humble opinion. In the prime of my life I was rude and reckless, careless and prone to lust for everything. I was ungrateful to the former emperor. With a single [stroke] I wasted ten years. Your Majesty founded a capital in Yanjing, and I was [one of the] first to be allowed to follow [from Shengjing,] and enter the forbidden territory [of China]. I gazed up at the Imperial

222 Ibid., 82:7a. The earlier charges are given on pp. 5–6.
223 Almost everyone agreed at this time that bureaucratic factionalism was a major cause of dynastic decline and fall. For one of the most eloquent presentations of this historiographical cliché, see Wang Fuzhi, Du Tong jian lun, pp. 104–105.
224 For Ning Wanwo’s disgrace in 1635, see Zhang, Qing shi, pp. 3666–3667.
countenance and was allowed to move quickly into public office, holding on like a stump to my post so that once again I was thereby able to recover those ten [lost] years. During that decade I [had learned to] restrain my character and keep my mouth shut, and no longer acted like a rabid dog. Yet with my stupid and blunt disposition, whenever something [like this] happens I have to burst forth at once. [As for] Li Yingshi and Pan Wenxue, [frankly] it was not I who spoke of seizing them again after they had already evaded justice. But even if I was not daring enough to carry on by burying my tracks and altering the records, I would prefer to die at present rather than rely upon a dang and use public means to gain private wealth and rank. It has been a long time since I was left alone without kin to follow a solitary course, but I will hold on to my resolve until death. I did not want Your Majesty to consider me as other than feeble and useless, to be entered on the list of Manchu officers [as one who has] already passed out of sight. Yet recently, on the Imperial Birthday, a time of such thanksgiving, I was invited along with the other great ministers of the Inner [Courts] to enter deep into the palace. I personally participated in the ceremony of being gifted with wine by the Emperor. As I held the cup to receive His gift, I could not keep from choking with emotion and wanting to burst into tears. Recently, I have also been commanded to attend the Assembly of High Officials. Since I am not of earth and wood, I cannot but hope to repay Your Majesty for favor and compassion. The remaining years of my life are as fleeting as a single day. As I, Your minister, painfully think of how that other minister so cruelly and avariciously broke the law, tormenting the kingdom like a ringworm, [I know that] it is not enough to grieve. Nurturing seditious thoughts, he has formed a party to plot clandestinely and secretly to influence [others]. Disaster threatens the Ancestral Altars. There is no greater calamity. Chen Mingxia’s seditious and rebellious [activities] grow by each day. The party’s formation is more complete by each day. Others were warned by Zhang Xuan, but no one dared to speak aloud. I have set aside [fears of] harm to myself so that I can answer my Imperial Lord. I implore Your Majesty to make a legal judgment and enforce the careful investigation by the great minis-

225 Ning Wanwo was strongly implying that Chen Mingxia altered the central register in order to cover up his collusion with Li San, with whom Ning was publicly implicated.
ters that I have presented in this memorial. Then the seditious party will be destroyed and the country will be brought to order.²²⁶

In his own crudely eloquent way, Ning Wanwo was warning his emperor against the dangers of personal political patronage. He was claiming, with considerable historical foresight, that this was a critical moment in the history of the dynasty. If the emperor again let Chen Mingxia off, or misinterpreted this latest attack as the expression of a personal grudge, then the dynasty would be doomed to repeat the doleful history of the late Ming. Inner court would dominate outer court; personal favoritism would displace impartial political judgment; and in sheer self-defense, other members of the government would have to adopt the same subtle techniques of patronage that Chen Mingxia manipulated so skillfully.

The Final Trial of Chen Mingxia

The following day at noon, after Shunzhi had had time to absorb Ning Wanwo's memorial, the emperor personally questioned Chen Mingxia, who responded with characteristic spirit and verve, refusing to admit any guilt whatsoever. His defense was so lively and articulate that Chen Mingxia apparently thought that the emperor had been satisfied, and that the charges would be dropped, as others had been before. After this hearing, and without telling Chen Mingxia why he was doing so, Shunzhi asked all of his leading ministers to attend a meeting in the Inner Courts. Once they had assembled, he came into the hall and gave them the memorial from Ning Wanwo to read. Without waiting for Shunzhi to explain the case or his opinion of it, Chen Mingxia immediately began to go through each point of the impeachment again, refuting the accusations one by one. This attempt to forestall the verdict made the emperor furious. He immediately had Chen Mingxia seized, and then ordered that all of the officials of the Nine Courts be assembled at the palace gate. When they had gathered there,

²²⁶ Shizu shilu, 82:7b–9a.
they were seated in a circle, and Chen Mingxia was forced to kneel before them. Ning Wanwo thereupon announced the charges to the top ranks of the Six Boards and Three Courts, and to substantiate the charges had two of Chen Mingxia’s clerks and two of his former servants brought in to testify. At the end of this hearing Chen was taken into formal custody and locked up in the palace.  

On April 19, one day later, two more officials were arrested: Zhang Tianzhi, the man who had been recommended for the Hanlin after sending Chen Mingxia five hundred taels of silver; and Wang Chongjian, the tongnian recommended by Chen for high office. The two were detained in the palace, and the next day brought along with Chen Mingxia before the court, which was held at the Meridian Gate. The emperor observed the trial from an imposing throne at the head of the gate high above the Assembly. The hearing did not at first proceed as the emperor had planned. Censor Liu Yumou, who was in charge of the Office of Scrutiny of the Board of Punishments, thought that Chen Mingxia had a reasonable defense against the charges that had been made against him. The emperor ordered Liu to explain why this was so, and had the censor brought up the stairs to his throne partly by way of awing him into silence. Censor Liu was not silenced, however, and it was only after Shunzhi became angry and ordered the official dismissed that the trial proceeded to prosecution. During this April 20th hearing some of the officials implicated in the case were acquitted. Centai testified that Wei Xiangshu was in no way connected with Chen Mingxia, as Ning Wanwo had claimed, and that charge was dismissed.  

Wang Chongjian was also acquitted, and would soon become a sub-chancellor in the Inner Courts—where, incidentally, his son and future grand secretary, Wang Xi, also served.  

And Zhang Tianzhi, after testifying about the incident of the loan, corroborating Ning Wanwo’s charge against Chen Ming-

227 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 389.
228 Centai actually testified that Wei Xiangshu had never met Chen Mingxia’s father-in-law, Niu Shedou. Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3897.
229 Wang Chongjian was to become President of Rites in 1658, and would retire in 1661.
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xia, was also on this day released from custody. Chen Mingxia, however, continued to hear the charges detailed against him by Ning Wanwo and Liu Zhengzong. Although he freely admitted to advocating the revival of Ming hair styles and clothing, he insistently defended himself against the criminal accusations, trying to refute each of the items of impeachment. Nevertheless, at the end of the day's hearing he was remanded to the formal custody of the Board of Civil Appointments and taken under guard to the Wisteria Lodge (Tenghua Ting) of the board, where he was temporarily imprisoned. And the next day, April 21, formal charges were lodged against his father and his son.230

During the next ten days the Board of Civil Appointments conducted a careful investigation, its representatives meeting with officials from other yamens to consider the accusations against Chen Mingxia. The verdict of the Board was that Chen Mingxia was guilty: all of the charges against the former grand secretary were in main substance correct. The Board therefore recommended that Chen be beheaded, his household property confiscated, and his wife and children sent as slaves to Mukden. On April 27, 1654, Jirgalang, Prince Zheng, convened the Assembly of Princes and High Officials within the palace. The Assembly confirmed the sentences levied by the Board of Civil Appointments, and recommended the immediate decapitation of Chen Mingxia.231 Shunzhi concurred in the verdict of wrongdoing, and even imposing the death sentence, but the thought of displaying his grand secretary's mutilated body, like that of Li San, before the populace of Beijing disturbed the emperor.

The crimes which Chen Mingxia committed truly were great. It is therefore reasonable that he should be punished by decapitation. But [We] remember that he has served [Us] long and intimately. [We] could not bear to have his corpse displayed in the marketplace. Let the punishment be strangling, and let his household property be spared from being confiscated and wife and children from being

230 Tan, Beiyou lu, pp. 389–390; Shizu shilu, 82:9a; Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3788.
231 Shizu shilu, 82:13b.
separated and distributed as slaves. The rest [of the sentences should be executed] according to [the Assembly's] judgment.  

Officials were immediately sent to the Wisteria Lodge to bring Chen Mingxia back to the palace. When the agents arrived to get him, Chen asked if they intended to chain him. No, they answered, he would not be chained; and in his relief Chen appeared to think that the outcome was positive for him. As he left the Board of Civil Appointments, he called out to a friend that, "My appearance is quite composed," and on the way to the palace he spoke briefly with the clerk of another official just as though he believed all was well. Smiling confidently, he was taken into the Xuanwu Gate. That was the last time anyone outside the palace saw Chen Mingxia alive. It is said that once inside the walls he was taken directly into the Lingguan Temple just inside the Meridian Gate. There he was told of the Assembly's verdict and of the emperor's grace. He said not a word. Moments later the executioner slipped a knotted bowstring around his neck, and Chen Mingxia died. He was 54 years old.  

Tan Qian, living in the city at the time, only heard of Chen Mingxia's death a week after the execution. He had been for several evenings past reading a collection of Mingxia's poems, Shiyun ju ji, published the year after Chen had joined Dorgon's government. Tan Qian's laconic entry in his diary that day reads:  

Kuimao [May 4, 1654]: I have read to the end of the Shiyun ju ji. On this day I heard that Chen Baishi came to the end of his life. "Men last, books perish." How can that be said?  

The day afterwards Tan Qian took a walk over to the Xuanwu Gate, curious for a glimpse of the guardhouse there where Chen

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232 Shizu shilu, 82:14a. Chen Yechen, Chen Mingxia's son, was brought to Beijing, flogged forty strokes, and exiled to the northeast. Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 391.

233 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 390; Zha, Renhai ji, 1:2b. Hummel gives 50 sui as his age. I am following Tan Qian, who also says that relatives were allowed to claim and bury his corpse three days later.

234 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 57. Baishi was Mingxia's zi.
Mingxia had been kept, but he lost his way and never found it.  

Chen Mingxia was not universally mourned. Tan Qian himself described him after his death as being “quick and acute,” but also “oily” (angzang): a man of overweening ambition. Perhaps the kindest words that were said about him in public came from Shunzhi, who never seems to have resolved his ambivalent feelings toward Chen. That winter, visiting the Nanhai park, Feng Quan made an unkind comment to the emperor about the dead man. The emperor did not speak for a moment. Then he said very gravely, “Chen Mingxia, after all, was good.” Thereafter Feng Quan spoke of Chen no more.

235 Ibid. His diary refers to the “Liyang” abode, that is, the hometown of Chen Mingxia who is not otherwise mentioned by name.
236 Ibid., p. 391.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

A Certain Kind of Solution

As I view those two years [of 1660 and 1661], the new laws were like frost withering the autumn grass. The district magistrate was like a voracious tiger. The lictors were like rapacious dogs. Scholars were flogged with bamboo in order to make up the taxes. This became a constant occurrence in the capital. Yours truly could not endure to [see] his parents pass away [without proper mourning rites, but at that very time] the district police hauled me into the law court. Bent down before tyrannical yamen officers, my body was stripped naked and beaten. I escaped from this [disaster] resolved to avoid calamity [in the future].

Shao Changheng, Qing men lü gao [Boxed drafts from the green gate], cited in Meng Sen, Xinshi congkan, p. 22.

Chen Mingxia may not have been a martyr to Manchu rule; he may have been rather more accurately viewed by the public at the time as a clever opportunist who had served Chongzhen, Li Zicheng, Dorgon, and Shunzhi in the course of a single decade. Yet his execution was regarded by many as an attack upon the southerners at court. Shunzhi tried to avoid giving that impression. The only close associate of Chen Mingxia who was purged at the same time was the man who had recommended him for his presidency, Sun Chengze, who was impeached and dismissed in 1654.¹ The other officials who were punished right after Chen’s

¹ Sun went on to produce a voluminous study of Beijing architecture, along
trial were the emperor’s “speaking officials.” Eight of the emperor’s censors, including Zhao Kaixin and Wei Xiangshu, were demoted and transferred after Shunzhi excoriated them for failing to inform him earlier about the presence of such a prominent faction in the government. They were thus singled out not because of any connection with a “southern party” (nan dang) but rather because they had failed to perform their intended function as the emperor’s “ears and eyes.” And, as if to further emphasize that he had nothing against southerners as such, the emperor, on the very day that Chen Mingxia was strangled, bestowed posthumous honors on several other Jiangnan literati who had died as loyalists when the Chongzhen Emperor had taken his life in 1644.

with other famous art works. Qing shi liezhuan, 79:47; Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, pp. 669–670. Wang Yongji, who had re-organized the water conservancy administration, was also dismissed from the presidency of the Board of War and lost his post as grand secretary at this time. But this was not because of any association with Chen Mingxia. Wang had been reproved by the emperor for a supposedly corrupt act in the Board of War. He had responded angrily, and was thus demoted 5 ranks and placed in charge of the government granaries system. With characteristic verve, Wang Yongji proceeded to reorganize the granaries system, ordering circuit intendants throughout the empire to compile a complete inventory of their jurisdictions’ grain reserves. Thereafter these lists were to be revised twice a year and submitted to the Board of Revenue. Wang Yongji thus laid the foundation for the excellent welfare system of the Kangxi period, when granary reserves were built up after an order in 1679 to officials and commoners to donate grain. In 1655, Wang Yongji was again named a grand secretary and made President of Civil Appointments. He died in 1659. Er chen zhuan, 8:27–28a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 43–46. For the government granary system, see Lu Lien-tching, Les Greniers publics de prevoyance sous la dynastie des Ts’ing, pp. 43–46; and Shen Yiji, ed., Zhejiang tongzhi, 77:8b–9b.

2 Da Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu (hereafter Shizu shilu), 82:9. The Shunzhi Emperor believed that Chen Mingxia’s crimes either were known, or should have been known, to the capital censors, and that they had failed him. In the following year, (1655) his trust in his provincial censors was also shattered. Gu Ren, a provincial censor, was incriminated of corruption by a posthumous letter from a clerk who committed suicide. Adam Yuen-chung Lui, “Censor, Regent and Emperor in the early Manchu Period,” p. 93.

3 Shizu shilu, 82:13b.
The Southern Ming Naval Threat

The emperor may have intended to disassociate the execution of Chen Mingxia from an imputed attack upon southerners both because he wanted to preserve a critical balance in his Inner Courts, and because, even now, the military situation in Jiangnan made it prudent for Shunzhi to continue to hold open the way for southern literati to serve the Qing. Despite the setback of 1651, the sea lord Zhang Mingzhen had managed for a second time to regroup his naval forces, and once more was fomenting rebellion in Jiangnan while he threatened to attack by sea. At the same time, there were—the court discovered to its consternation—at least two different rebel conspiracies in Jiangnan around Wuxi, where loyalists were secretly in touch with both the Prince of Lu and the other Southern Ming court of the Yongli Emperor who was under the protection of Sun Kewang in Yunnan and Guizhou.

4 Guo Songyi, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji yu Qing chu zhongyang jiquan de maodun ji qi fazhan he bianhua,” p. 132.
5 In 1651, when Wu Sangui had advanced into Sichuan, three of Zhang Xianzhong’s “adopted sons”—Li Dingguo, Liu Wenxiu, and Sun Kewang—led the remnant rebel bands into Guizhou and Yunnan. Earlier, Sun Kewang had already sent emissaries to the Yongli Emperor’s court requesting the title of prince, but he had been turned down on the grounds that he was not a member of the Ming imperial family. In 1651, however, the Southern Ming emperor was so badly pressed by the Qing imperial forces attacking Nanning that he had to seek Sun Kewang’s protection at Guiyang. The former rebel then had all those who had opposed him at court killed, and took the title of prince. From 1652 to 1656 the Yongli Emperor was kept a virtual prisoner at Anlong in southwestern Guizhou, where an imperial court was set up under Sun’s control. Liang Fu, Lingnan lishi renwu congtao, pp. 116–119; Lynn Ann Struve, “Uses of History in Traditional Chinese Society,” pp. 25–26; idem, “The Southern Ming,” pp. 73–75, 86–88, and 116–119. Sun Kewang’s imprisonment of the Yongli Emperor is seen by some historians as proof that the Great Western Army of peasant rebels, formerly led by Zhang Xianzhong, was the dominant force in the Southern Ming resistance, especially during its later years. Noting that Sun Kewang initially wanted to unite with the Southern Ming court against the Qing, and that his request for a title was merely incidental to the former motive, Gu Cheng has presented the Da xi jun as being less a Ming loyalist force than an army loyal to the memory of Zhang Xianzhong, whom Sun and his followers continued to call by his imperial title,
Early in 1650, a former Ming ministry secretary named He Wangsheng living near Wuxi had been contacted by an envoy from Sun Kewang, bringing letters from one of He's former teachers who was then serving with the loyalists in the southeast. He Wangsheng had persuaded a friend of his, Hui Ben, who belonged to the same literary society, to travel with him to the Yongli court; and though the friend had not gone beyond Changsha, the two had returned together to Jiangnan toward the end of that year with Yongli commissions, as well as commissions from Sun Kewang himself. A year or so later, He Wangsheng had secretly gotten in touch with Zhang Mingzhen's forces at the court of Lu, and had begun to make plans for yet another uprising on land timed to coincide with an invasion from the sea.\(^6\)

A second group of Jiangnan loyalists had also begun meeting together under the leadership of two men, Ping Yitong and Rao Jing. In Rao Jing's own words:

Because the armies of the Qing dynasty arrived, destroying my home and killing four members of my family, I moved to Wuxi district to earn a living by practicing medicine. A certain Jiang Zhilong came to me and said that a man named Ping Yitong, [currently] living in the household of Lü Zhixuan, was a courageous man who had received a general's seal from the Yongli Emperor and who intended to recruit men [for the loyalist cause]. We met with him on one occasion and at that time requested several commissions from him. On another occasion we paid a call upon him. Then Ping Yitong said that we should wait until he had gone up there [to the Yongli Emperor] and got [more] commissions. Then he would be in touch with us. After a year went by he came back with the commissions.\(^7\)

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6 Confessions of He Wangsheng and Hui Ben, from the memorial by Ma Guozhu, commander-in-chief of Qing forces in Jiangnan and Jiangxi. According to Ma’s memorial, He Wangsheng held a Ming jinshi degree, and his father had been a Ming provincial governor. Nanming shiliao, pp. 375–377.

7 Confession of Rao Jing in Ma Guozhu’s memorial, Nanming shiliao, p. 377.
Ping Yitong must have inspired great awe and respect as someone freshly arrived from the far south with news of the Yongli court. He had come to Lü Zhixuan's house in the summer of 1649, and was introduced to the household by Jiang Zhilong. During Ping's five-month stay there, he gathered around him a number of people in the Wuxi area who remained sentimentally loyal to the Ming dynasty. Lü later told the authorities that Ping would conduct collective sacrificial ceremonies in the house, worshipping the image of the Chongzhen Emperor and weeping over his death. At the same time, Ping Yitong also possessed commissions from the Southern Ming court. These tallies or letters of appointment also enhanced Ping in the eyes of others, like Rao Jing, who could use them to appoint followers as putative officials for a local Ming regime when the loyalists took power. They were both a source of great power and a cause of grave danger to local adventurers like Rao. Tempted by the opportunity to enhance his own power, Rao Jing accepted one of these commissions (which, incidentally, must have borne a genuine Ming seal because Ping Yitong had to return to loyalist territory to get more tallies as the conspiracy extended). Yet, once Rao had done so, he was thereby terribly compromised. "I thought I would accept a commission. But then I did not know how to save myself, because Ping Yitong said that he had horses and men down [south, and I realized he meant to revolt]."

Compared to the loyalist movements of 1645 and 1647, the circle of Wuxi loyalists was pitifully restricted. According to one of the group, a man named Dong Huankui who accepted a Yongli commission from Rao and Ping as a provincial judge, over the course of 1651 and 1652 a total of fifteen men were given secret Ming commissions. Early in 1653, during the third lunar month (March 29–April 26), the conspirators finally learned that the moment of rebellion had come. Imperial orders had arrived from the south appointing Rao Jing commanding general, and the group

8 Nanming shiliao, p. 380.
9 Rao Jing's confession, in Nanming shiliao, p. 377. Note that this is after all a confession to Qing authorities, so that Rao Jing may have been trying to have his interrogators believe that he was only inadvertently involved, and that Ping Yitong beguiled him into joining the conspiracy.
began to hold collective meetings at the Green Mountain (Qing shan) Temple outside Wuxi.\textsuperscript{10}

Whether or not the orders from the south were directly from Zhang Mingzhen, the gathering at the Green Mountain Temple came shortly before a new invasion by the Ming loyalist navies at Zhoushan Island. Once again, in the spring and summer months of 1653, Zhang Mingzhen’s forces attacked the coast of Jiangnan, defeating the Qing garrison on Chongming Island and raiding up the Huangpu River as far as the Temple of Peace and Tranquility (Jing’an si) in Shanghai.\textsuperscript{11} Simultaneously, pirate and bandit groups arose around the Su-Song circuit, encouraging the Ming loyalist circles in the area to begin preparations for their own uprisings.\textsuperscript{12}

The loyalist uprisings that occurred in the remaining months of 1653 were on the scale of bandit or pirate attacks on district and prefectural capitals. Indeed, they were viewed by local Qing officials like Li Zhenghua, the prefect of Su-Song, as being bandit uprisings.\textsuperscript{13} Nevertheless, they were not easy to quell. In the case of the attacks on Shanghai, local officials led the inhabitants in prayers to the city gods to protect them against what was seen as a scourge of murdering pirates.\textsuperscript{14} Gradually, however, the attacks were repelled and individual conspirators like Wu Ding were ar-

\textsuperscript{10} Confession of Dong Huankui, in Ma Guozhu’s memorial, Nanming shiliao, pp. 379–380. The conspirators may initially have been heartened—if they knew of it—by the Southern Ming advance in the latter part of 1652. Li Dingguo reoccupied southern Hunan then, and took Guilin once more, defeating a number of Qing armies in Guangxi. At the same time, Liu Wenxiu blocked Wu Sangui from moving farther south and took all but the very northern part of Sichuan. In 1653 and 1654 there was a seesaw struggle for control of Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hunan, with neither side gaining a decisive advantage. Struve, “Uses of History,” p. 26; idem, “Southern Ming,” p. 117.

\textsuperscript{11} Wang Yunwu, ed., Da Qing yitongzhi, p. 856 (76:9a); Chu Hua, Hucheng beikao, 6:1b. Zhang Mingzhen’s expedition entered the mouth of the Yangzi three times: in May, 1653, and in March and May, 1654. His men harrassed Grand Canal traffic and conducted loyalist ceremonies on Jinshan island. Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 140.

\textsuperscript{12} Huang Zhijun, comp., Jiangnan tongzhi, 114:15b.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} Chu, Hucheng beikao, 6:2a.
rested. As they were in turn interrogated, names of some of the other conspirators were obtained and more arrests were made. 

"When [my fellow Ming loyalist] Wu Minglie was arrested, I became terrified that he would implicate me in the rebellion," Rao Jing later told the authorities. "Consequently, in the third lunar month (April 17–May 15, 1654) I took all of the letters which I had received and burned them, along with the commissions, at the Green Mountain Temple."^15

By then it was too late. Rao Jing was arrested, along with many of his fellow loyalists; and so too was He Wangsheng. After interrogations were made and depositions taken, the prisoners were beheaded, their wives and children were transformed into slaves for meritorious officials, their household goods were confiscated, and their parents, grandparents, grandsons, and brothers were all exiled east of the passes. By May 28, 1654, the commander-in-chief of the Jiangnan area, General Ma Guozhu, was able to report to the Qing throne that the rebellion was all over.^16

Detailed reports of the recent Ming loyalist uprisings in Jiangnan reached the Shunzhi Emperor on June 19, 1654, just about the same time that the court learned of a fresh naval threat from Zhang Mingzhen, backed up by Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga).^17 From a

15 Rao Jing's confession, as cited above in Nanming shiliao, p. 379.
16 Nanming shiliao, pp. 375–376.

The Shunzhi Emperor had been trying to get Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga) to surrender for some time now. Although Zheng (who had been a pupil of Qian Qianyi) had rejected an appeal by his father, Zheng Zhilong, to surrender (as he had) to the Manchus, messages exchanged between the pirate and the Qing government had resulted in an agreement for Zheng to have complete control over the four prefectures of Zhangzhou and Quanzhou in Fujian and Chaozhou and Huizhou in Guangdong. However, Shunzhi insisted that Coxinga must also cut his hair and wear the queue, and that Coxinga refused to do. C. R. Boxer, “The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan,” pp. 438–439; Lawrence D. Kessler, K‘ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Chi’ing Rule, p. 40; Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 138–141; idem, “The Psycho-historical Coxinga, 1624–62,” p. 7. According to the Dutch, many of Coxinga's men were surrendering to the Manchus at this time because of the harsh discipline he imposed upon them. See the May 26, 1653, despatch from the Batavia Council to Governor Verburg, cited in Wm. Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, pp. 459–460.
memorial submitted later that summer by the governor of Nanjing, the emperor learned that in spite of his earlier defeat by Chen Jin, Zhang Mingzhen had managed once again to acquire a formidable navy composed of over 1,000 vessels manned by 20,000 sailors and marines. Governor Zhou Guozuo further reported that the garrison defending Nanjing from Zhang Mingzhen’s expected attack up the Yangzi River was no match for these experienced naval forces. The 14,600 troops attached to the Nanjing Garrison were scattered up and down the coast in local maritime defense posts; and while they were very good infantrymen, accustomed to fighting on land, they were inexperienced in naval operations. Moreover, the Nanjing naval forces consisted of only 194 poorly equipped flat bottomed shachuan (sand vessels) and 1,950 sailors of mixed background and experience.  

Shunzhi’s Southern Ministers

With such a major military force threatening Nanjing and with evidence of such frightening disloyalty in Jiangnan, the Shunzhi Emperor must have feared the consequences of letting the Han bannermen and northerners who helped bring about Chen Mingxia’s fall go on to attack his southern collaborators as well. Thus, when Ning Wanwo followed up his accusations against Chen Mingxia with an all-out denunciation of the “southern party,” providing the emperor with the names of forty-one officials whom

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18 Nanming shiliao, pp. 273–274. These reports of the threat to Jiangnan coincided with despatches from the far south clamoring for help in Guangdong. In the early spring of 1654, Li Dingguo attacked Gaozhou and Leizhou; in May and June, his men also attacked Luoding and Yangchun. Later, in December, 1654, Li Dingguo would lay siege to Guangzhou (Canton) proper, setting up his own provincial administration outside the walls while trying to cut off all food supplies to Shang Kexi’s army within the embattled city. Li Dingguo plainly hoped that Zheng Chenggong would sail to join him, but that did not happen. Instead, a Qing relief column under Jumara arrived from Nanjing. Li Dingguo’s 40,000 soldiers were defeated, and he was driven out of Gaozhou in Guangxi in March, 1655. Lynn Struve, “A Sketch of Southern Ming Events Affecting the Canton Delta Area,” pp. 26–27.
Ning claimed were conspiring together on the basis of common regional origin, Fulin dismissed the matter and ordered Ning Wanwo to drop the matter altogether. At the same time, the emperor evidently decided to show special and even symbolic favor to one of the most famous southern literati in the empire: Lü Gong of Wujin, Jiangnan. During the Qing metropolitan examinations of 1647, Lü Gong had been awarded primus (zhuangyuan). As the leading jinshi of that year, his reputation was almost without peer. Nevertheless, as a southerner, he had become closely associated with Chen Mingxia; and after Chen was executed, another promising literatus, Wang Shizhen, had impeached Lü Gong for belonging to the “southern party” that Chen Mingxia was supposed to have formed. Now, the Shunzhi Emperor not only dismissed those charges; he went on to praise Lü Gong as an outstanding official, and during the next two years repeatedly showered gifts upon the man as a sign of his special favor to eminent adherents from the Jiangnan region.

Shunzhi selected Lü Gong for these favors not only because he was from Jiangnan. He also chose to honor him because Lü Gong was one of the “new” Han officials: a literatus who had received his degree under the reigning dynasty, and was therefore neither a Ming holdover nor a “twice-serving minister.” In the same way, Wang Chongjian’s son Wang Xi was honored. For, like Lü Gong, Wang Xi had passed the jinshi examination of 1647 (and would in 1658 be chosen to head the emperor’s newly renamed Hanlin

19 Tan Qian, Beiyou lu, p. 391.
20 Zhang Qiyun, ed., Qing shi, p. 3733; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 550–551. But see Adam Yuen-chung Lui, The Hanlin Academy, pp. 99–100, which is a misinterpretation of these events.
21 The readiness of the next generation of southern literati (many of whom were the sons of Ming loyalists) to take the civil service examinations was noted by contemporaries. Chen Que (1604–1677), whose own children sat for the exams, wrote: “After jiashen (1644) very few of my friends came out to take the examinations, but their children gradually began to take the exams.” And Dai Mingshi (1653–1713) said: “After the fall of the Ming the old officials of the southeast were by and large righteously unwilling to become officials. However, the children in their households continued as before to study for a career and take examination degrees. Most did not think this was wrong.” Both are cited in He Guanbiao, “Lun Ming yimin zidi de chushi,” p. 23.
It was to these "new men," then, that the emperor turned after the purge of Chen Mingxia in order to check the influence of the older southern literati, especially the Ming holdovers, who continued to serve in the Inner Courts despite Ning Wanwo’s efforts to extend the purge of the nan dang beyond Chen Mingxia and Sun Chengze to include other prominent southern officials like Chen Zhilin and Wu Weiye. On August 16, 1654, the emperor approved a fresh roster of appointments to the Literary, Historiographical, and Secretarial Courts. This roster included a number of new Qing degree-holders from the south—men who were proficient in both Chinese and Manchu—and was headed by the two leading young Han banner men with the jinshi degree: Ding Sikong and Fan Chengmo. In the next two years, as a num-

22 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 819. Peng Zhifeng (jinshi 1658, Hunan) was another leading "new man" from the south who joined the government in these years and went on to have an illustrious government career. Li Huan, ed., Guochao qixian leizheng, 50:33a.

23 Wu Weiye thus continued to serve as a libationer, guiding the compilation of the Sacred Edicts and the editing of the Classic of Filial Piety, until 1657, when he returned to Jiangnan ostensibly to mourn his dead mother. Actually, he may have been implicated in the examination scandal of that year. Wu Weiye, Wushi jilan, xing zhuang, p. 2a; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 882–883; Sun Kekuan, "Wu Meicun beixing qianhou shi," 4:9–10. For the examination scandal, see also Joshua A. Fogel, trans., "Shantung in the Shun-chih Reign," Part 2, p. 20.

24 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 372. Ding Sikong’s father, Wensheng, had joined the Manchus in 1622. Zhang, Qing shi, pp. 3744–3745. Fan Chengmo was Fan Wencheng’s second son. Before the edict opening up the civil service examinations to banner men, he served in the Imperial Guards. Fan Chengmo, Fan Zhongzhen gong quan ji, pp. 15–16; Shen, Zhejiang tongzhi, 121:3a. The Imperial Guards altogether had 570 Manchu, Mongol, and Han bannermen-officers who guarded the gates to the Forbidden City and the palaces within it. Jonathan D. Spence, Ts’ao Yin and the K’ang-hsi Emperor, p. 49. During the early Qing, half of the Hanlin probationers were selected to study Manchu in order to translate documents for the emperor. Those who were chosen for language study were usually handsome, young, and endowed with pleasant voices. All of these traits together helped ensure that they would learn the language quickly and get along easily with the emperor and his high officials. Such graciousness also meant that the language students, once graduated, were often called upon to serve as masters of ceremony during ritual or celebratory gatherings. Lui, Hanlin Academy, pp. 66–67.
ber of older officials were transferred out, these younger Han officials in the Inner Courts gradually acquired more and more of a voice in the Qing government. By 1656, in fact, even junior officials of the fifth rank in the Inner Courts were given the privilege to report directly to the emperor.

This is not to say that Shunzhi suddenly ceased relying upon senior Han officials, nor that he abruptly stopped appointing Ming holdovers to high office. Liu Zhengzong, the emperor’s favorite minister after Chen Mingxia’s death, was also a Ming jinshi. Liu, who was from Shandong, had first been named grand secretary in 1652, and had succeeded Chen Mingxia as President of Civil Appointments in 1653. From 1654 until 1660 Liu was to serve contin-

25 In the fall of 1655, a total of 18 officials were transferred out of the Inner Courts and given a one-rank raise. Zha Shenxing, Renhai ji, 1:46. During this period Hong Chengchou’s son, Shiqin, also entered the bureaucracy, having passed the jinshi examination in the second rank in 1655. Because Hong Shiqin had been a bannerman for several years and was familiar with Manchu regulations, the emperor ordered that he be immediately appointed to a magistracy or bureau secretaryship (zhushi). He subsequently became a zhushi. Ming-Qing shiliao, 1:551, cited in Li Guangtao, “Hong Chengchou bei Ming shimo,” p. 248.

26 Okamoto Sai, “La Crise politique et morale des mandarins du sud à l’époque de transition,” p. 5. Shunzhi especially turned to “new men” from Zhejiang for help supervising the examination system. In 1657, 10 of the 25 provincial examiners were from Zhejiang; all had gotten their advanced degrees in 1649, 1652, or 1655. Fashishan, Qing mi shuwen. Out of the 189 first-class Hanlin scholars appointed in the 1644–1795 period, 148 (or 78%) came from Zhejiang and Jiangnan. The training required to pass the literary examinations was more readily available in those areas, with the region’s high proportion of academies and teachers, than elsewhere in China. Lui, Hanlin Academy, p. 151.

27 Nor is it meant to suggest that Shunzhi ceased relying upon his Manchu supporters. Contrary to the propaganda of the Oboi regency, Shunzhi was very concerned about the status of Manchus at this time. During 1654 and 1655, for example, there were many complaints about the harsh penalties imposed upon people who harbored runaway slaves. In April, 1655, the emperor defended these laws, saying that they had to be maintained lest the Manchus lose their slaves. “Then who will be our servants? How will we survive? Is there no concern for Manchu hardship?” Kessler, K’ang-hsi, pp. 16–17. See also Yang Xuechen, “Guanyu Qing chu de ‘taoren fa.’” pp. 46–49.
Peasants reverently worshipping the god of grain (ji shen) after an especially abundant harvest. This being the last in the series of imperially commissioned drawings of agriculture made in 1712–1713, the painter Jiao Bingzhen signs his name to the left of the Chinese caption. Jiao Bingzhen, *Peiwen zhai geng zhi tu* [The Peiwen studio pictures of tilling and weaving] (Tokyo reprint, 1892), part 1.
iously as a senior grand secretary for the emperor, who kept him in this high office despite a strongly worded impeachment for corruption in 1657 and despite the knowledge that Liu’s brother had accepted an appointment from Coxinga. Shunzhi also continued to recognize talented former Ming officials who were able to prove their merit in the Qing administration. Perhaps the most outstanding example of this sort of mandarin was Zhou Lianggong, the famous editor, poet, and art connoisseur from Nanjing. Zhou had gotten his jinshi in 1640 and had been given a magistracy in Shandong just in time to defend Weixian against the invasion of Abatai in 1643. When Li Zicheng took Beijing, Zhou Lianggong was a censor there, but he managed to escape south to Nanjing. There, he refused to serve the Prince of Fu, and surrendered to Dodo in 1645, becoming salt controller of the Huai River area, and then from 1647 to 1654 serving as a provincial official in Fujian. His success in suppressing rebels and loyalists, including some of Coxinga’s forces, was so outstanding that Shunzhi had him brought to Beijing in 1654 to become Senior Vice-President of the Censorate. Although Zhou Lianggong’s career as a high official in Beijing was brief, he was yet one other example of a

28 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3789; Zhao Erxun, ed., Qing shi gao, 251:6a (p. 6632). Liu’s brother was named Zhengxue, and in spite of having served Coxinga, he was given a military post in the Qing army because of Liu Zhengzong’s influence. Another brother, Liu Fangming, was made a brigade-general. Like Chen Mingxia, Liu Zhengzong—who was singled out for blame in Shunzhi’s forged testament—represented some of the worst practices of late Ming court favoritism. See Robert B. Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback, p. 55; idem, “Policies and Institutions of the Oboi Regency,” pp. 268–269; idem, “Policies and Factionalism in the Oboi Regency,” p. 18. Six months before the death of Shunzhi, Wei Yijie, President of the Censorate, denounced Liu Zhengzong and Zhang Jinyan. On July 7, 1660, Wei brought to the attention of the throne a phrase which Zhang Jinyan had used in a foreword to a book of Liu’s poetry. The phrase, which was from the Book of Songs, was jiang ming zhi cai, meaning “efficacious and enlightening.” However, the phrase might also be read to mean “talent that helps the Ming.” For this, Liu Zhengzong was removed as grand secretary and half of his property was confiscated; Zhang was sent to Ningguta and permanently exiled. Tom Fisher, “Ming Loyalism and ‘Literary Inquisition,’” pp. 6–7; Er chen zhuan, 12:20.
prominent southern literatus whose merit was recognized by the Shunzhi Emperor at this time.\(^29\)

Nevertheless, younger officials continued to resent the importance—and criticize the corrupt ways and bureaucratic laxness—of older southern collaborators like Zhou Lianggong and Chen Zhilin.\(^30\) On April 13, 1656, Censor Wang Shizhen once again

\(^{29}\) In 1655 Zhou Lianggong was accused of cruelty and corruption by Tongtai, governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang. Sent back to Fujian for trial and punishment, Zhou was in jail in Fuzhou in 1656 when Coxinga attacked. Because of the crisis, he was released temporarily and led the defense of the city against the sea raiders. Afterwards, however, he was remanded to Beijing for a continuation of the trial, and was still in jail in 1661 when the enthronement of the Kangxi Emperor was accompanied by a general amnesty. Zhou again served as an official, acting as grain intendant of Nanjing until 1669 when he was once more accused of corruption, only to be released yet a second time during the general amnesty of 1670. He died two years later. *Er chen zhuan*, 10:9–11a; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 173–174. Like Qian Qianyi, Zhou Lianggong had justified his own collaboration by extending his protection to former loyalists, and especially to many of the artists who formed the Nanjing circle in the early Qing. There is some indication on an inscription written in 1669 by the loyalist poet and painter Gong Xian (who was Zhou Lianggong’s next door neighbor) that Zhou’s defense of his former Fushe friends was appreciated by such *yimin*. Jerome Silbergeld, “The Political Landscapes of Kung Hsien in Painting and Poetry,” p. 564.

\(^{30}\) Wei Yijie continued to be one of the most vociferous critics of what he viewed as the decadent customs inherited from the Ming. On November 25, 1654, he memorialized: “Ever since the Ming period customs have been decadent, excessive, unrestrained, frivolous, and degraded. Imperial administration, rites and music have all fallen into decline. Your minister has seen in recent years at the very gates of the boards, cohorts of clerks and actors whose carriages are grand and pretentious, and wives of the common people whose pearls and jades are dazzling and gaudy. Although there are rules to forbid this there are none who obey them. Families that are supposed to be in mourning completely squander their inherited wealth in order to make offerings to corrupt Buddhist clerics.” Wei Yijie, *Jianji tang wenji, zhuan*, 1:25b. Wei, who was of course secretly a Catholic himself, attacked the corrupt activities of the Buddhist church, and urged a return to the draconian policies of the Hongwu period when the Ming founder forced priests and monks to remain in their churches, refused to allow people to let their children become monks, and so forth. The main point of his attack was that Chinese society had become riven and divided, and that the country lacked unity. People had become obsessed
linked service to both dynasties with moral failure, memorializing against Grand Secretary Chen Zhilin for dishonest behavior. Shortly after this another censor, Jiao Chongrui, came up with a much more serious charge against Chen, accusing him of conspiring with yet another “twice-serving minister,” President of Rites Hu Shian. Other officials simply suggested that there were too many southerners in the government altogether, and that their numbers should be reduced. Shunzhi rejected all these attacks as unwarranted. Once again he affirmed his belief that it was the current performance of individual officials that mattered—not the past behavior of political or regional groups. “The court,” he said, “employs worthy men regardless of their connections.”

by the individualistic search for gain, and traditional institutions like the village covenant system had declined. “The teachings of the village covenants and the six [sacred] edicts are as empty words. Among the myriads there is not a single person to be found who would prefer to have the people not be so distressed by [their concern for] wealth but rather elevated by rites and protocol.” A restoration of the rites—a normative revolution—was thus needed in order to curb selfish profit-seeking, reknit society, return to the fundamental vocation of agriculture, and ultimately strengthen the country. “Let there be one Dao and common customs so that all the people can devote themselves to filial piety toward their elders and to working in the fields, so that the country (guojia) can receive the advantages of wealth (fu) and power (qiang).”

Ibid., 1:26.

31 Wang Shizhen (jinshi 1656, Henan) was another “new man” who was to become both a major official under Kangxi and one of the best-known poets of the day. While police magistrate of Yangzhou in 1659 he came to know many of the leading Jiangsu poets, including Qian Qianyi and Mao Xiang. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 831–832.

32 Edict dated April 18, 1656, cited in Xie Guozhen, Ming-Qing zhi ji dangshe yundong kao, p. 120. For the censorial attacks on Chen Zhilin, see Okamoto, “La Crise politique,” p. 101. Some measure of the vulnerability of southern Chinese collaborators can be seen in the practice known as jing zhai (capital debt). This practice was described a little later by the philosopher Zhu Zhiyu, who in 1657 or 1658 made a secret trip to the Jiangnan coast to gather intelligence prior to a loyalist naval invasion. According to his report, when a collaborator wanted political protection, he sought out a leading banner official in the capital and gave him a sum of money. This was not a single payment, however; rather, the payment of jing zhai was repeated every year, even when the collaborator left the capital to take office in the provinces. Zhu pointed out that this meant that banner officials could use Han bureaucrats to “fish for
Nevertheless, the emperor's attitude toward Chen Zilin and other older Jiangnan literati still in high office began to shift shortly after these latest accusations, perhaps in part because of a momentary abatement of attacks by Southern Ming naval forces. With the help of Coxinga, the sea lord Zhang Mingzhen had retaken Zhoushan Island in 1655 and had gained control of the city of Tai-zhou in Zhejiang. From this base, he increased his raids along the coast during the latter months of 1655, and his attacks coincided with increased pirate and bandit activities from other, independent groups like the force at Daitou Mountain in Zhejiang led by Shen Guoqing. Early in 1656, however, Qing forces defeated Shen's group and captured a man whom Governor Zhou Guozuo discovered to be Zhang Mingzhen's son Wenkui. This discovery provoked considerable excitement among Qing officials in Jiangnan and Zhejiang, because it was believed that by holding Zhang's son a hostage, they might be able to persuade the sea lord to surrender. Zhou Guozuo therefore requested the Board of War to grant a stay of execution and was beginning to make efforts to contact Zhang Mingzhen when the commander-in-chief of the military forces in Jiangnan and Zhejiang, Viceroy Ma Mingpei, announced that statements taken from prisoners recently captured along the coast and sent to Nanjing for interrogation revealed that Zhang Mingzhen had died at Zhoushan earlier that year. "This whole matter

people" (yu min) exactly the same way a fisherman used a cormorant to catch fish. That is, the collaborators became surrogates for the Manchu high officials, who indirectly levied an additional tax upon the people in that way. Zhu Zhiyu, Zhu Shunshui wenxuan, p. 57. (For Zhu's later travels, see Ernest W. Clement, "Chinese Refugees of the Seventeenth Century in Mito.") If the emperor had known of jing zhai, then he would have had yet another reason to turn from collaborators and to use "new men."

33 In 1648–1649, Zheng Chenggong had taken the territory adjacent to Amoy and Quemoy on the mainland and, in 1650, the Chaozhou area. In 1652, he had laid siege to Zhangzhou for several months and had raided Qing bases in Fujian. Ostensibly loyal to the Yongli court, he allowed the Prince of Lu to stay in Amoy and Quemoy from 1652 until the prince died in 1662. The prince renounced his title as Administrator of the Realm in 1653. Struve, "Uses of History," pp. 27–28; E. H. Parker, "The Maritime Wars of the Manchus," pp. 276–278.

34 He died on January 24, 1656, according to Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 47.
of inviting him to surrender,” Ma Mingpei wrote to Beijing, “is in the end no more than empty talk.” After a brief investigation of its own, the Board of War confirmed the death of Zhang Mingzhen and, in late April, 1656, ordered that his son, Zhang Wenkui, be decapitated and his head hung high “to display the laws of the state.”\textsuperscript{35} Wenkui’s execution did not by any means signal the end of this particular Southern Ming naval threat, of course, because Zhang Mingzhen’s navy was inherited by his lieutenant, Zhang Huangyan. But, when the infamous pirate Gu San, who had raided for so long up and down the Jiangnan coast, was also captured and killed in the autumn of 1656, the emperor and his coastal defense officials experienced a discernible sense of relief.\textsuperscript{36}

Whether or not this momentary suspension of the fear of maritime invasion also meant that Shunzhi no longer had to worry about alienating the prominent literati of the southeast, the emperor certainly began, after 1656, to turn against many of the “twice-serving ministers” he had protected in the past. A fresh onslaught of impeachments against them Shunzhi now upheld. In succession during the next eighteen months Xue Suoyun was fined, Gong Dingzi was suspended, and Fang Daxian was imprisoned.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, in 1657 a number of leading officials from Jiangnan, including Grand Secretary Wang Yongji, were implicated in a major examination scandal that seemed to many corroboration of the corruption and influence-peddling associated with literati from the southeast.\textsuperscript{38} Moralistic officials like Yang

\textsuperscript{35} Nanming shiliao, p. 453–458.

\textsuperscript{36} Chu, Hucheng beikao, pp. 1–6. Farther south, however, Qing naval fortunes were not so promising. After negotiations between Coxinga and the Qing court failed, the Manchus appointed imperial kinsman Jidu to head an expeditionary force in 1655 against the sea lord. Jidu reached Fujian that October, and seven months later, on May 9, 1656, he assaulted Jinmen (Quemoy) with ships and soldiers. The battle was interrupted by a storm, and the Qing fleet was almost completely destroyed. Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 144–145.

\textsuperscript{37} Okamoto, “La Crise politique,” p. 104.

\textsuperscript{38} Central government officials’ sons were eligible to sit for the province-level examinations (juren) in Beijing itself, instead of having to return home. In 1657, eight candidates from Jiangnan who were the sons of officials in Beijing bribed fourteen examination supervisors in the capital. One of the eight was
Yongjian cited the examination case as a manifestation of the ethical laxity that had by now, even in Shunzhi’s mind, become linked with Ming holdovers, Jiangnan literary coteries, social decadence, and a decline in classical scholarship. Calling for a new moral order, Censor-in-Chief Wei Yijie proceeded in May, 1658 to accuse Grand Secretary Chen Zhilin of corrupt behavior; and, this time, Shunzhi endorsed the impeachment. Not only did he banish Chen and his family to the northeast as political exiles; he also alarmed the important circle of Catholic collaborators in Zhejiang by arresting and banishing their protector, Governor Tong Guoqi, when the latter repeatedly postponed deporting Chen Zhilin’s aged mother from the family seat at Haining.

Grand Secretary Wang Yongji’s nephew. After this scandal was uncovered, officials in the Board of Rites and Board of Civil Appointments came to suspect the Jiangnan juren examinations held in Nanjing proper. As it turned out, there were no major irregularities in the Nanjing examinations; but the moment the examiners there heard that the results were going to be scrutinized, they hastily left Nanjing. In the public’s eyes, this seemed proof of their guilt; and as their boat travelled along the Grand Canal, the gentry of Suzhou and Changshu followed them, shouting insults and epithets. The successful Nanjing candidates were forced to sit for the examination a second time. Guo, “Jiangnan dizhujieji,” p. 133; Harold Lyman Miller, “Factional Conflict and the Integration of Ch’ing Politics,” p. 66; Ping-ti Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China, pp. 191–192; Meng Sen, Xinshi congkan, pp. 33–85.

39 Yang Yongjian was the censor who urged enforcement of the prohibition of clubs in 1660, and Ono Kazuko thus argues that there was a direct connection between that decision and the earlier examination scandal. Ono Kazuko, “Shinsho no shisō tōsei o megutte,” pp. 342–343.

40 At the same time Wei Yijie insisted that the moral integrity of officials was more important than their bureaucratic efficiency. He recommended that commoners particularly noted for filial piety be nominated for posts as district or assistant district magistrates. Adam Y. C. Lui, Corruption in China during the Early Ch’ing Period, p. 51.

41 Zheng Tianting, Tan wei ji, p. 99; Okamoto, “La Crise politique,” pp. 101–102; Lui, “Censor, Regent and Emperor,” pp. 94–95; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 663, 793; Lui, Corruption, p. 36. It is not merely coincidence that the attack on literary coteries and official patronage in the south took place at the same time that there was an effort to prevent contacts between literati circles and Catholic missionaries. Upholders of orthodoxy—the political puritans of the age—associated both Catholicism and Buddhism with the degeneration of
Qing Autocracy and Manchu Personalism

In the same year that Chen Zhitin was banished, Ning Wanwo also died. The fifteenth year of the Shunzhi reign thus marked the exit from politics of the two most representative southern "twice-serving ministers," as well as the very symbol of the older generation of Liaodong Han bannermen who had joined the Manchus in their ascent to the imperial throne in Beijing. As these two groups—to some degree, adversaries—both passed from high court politics after 1658, Shunzhi evidently felt that old political forms, now seemingly bereft of substance, could be revived. Chen

the gentry. In his treatise Willing to Study (Yuan xue), Zhang Lüxiang (1611–1674) wrote that, "In recent times many of the gentry (shidaifu) have treated monks as their teachers. In Jiangnan they even command their wives and concubines to call themselves disciples before the gates of priests. Ever since the hostilities and famines, resources have greatly contracted. Yet even though the people cannot bear it, they are constructing temples where the priests all gather to preach." Zhang described this Buddhist religiosity as a kind of mass insanity that had seized the people of Jiangnan, similar in kind to the Catholic piety that had spread in Hangzhou, where the foreign priests (who had first presented themselves as mathematical specialists) were turning the people away from ancestral rites and Confucian proprieties. To him, this was cultural as well as political treason. Officials were betraying their ethical responsibilities as well as betraying their ruler; they were becoming "overwhelmed by the barbarians." Zhang Lüxiang, Chongding Yangyuan xiansheng quanj, 27:12. The regime was quite successful in curbing contact between Confucian literati and Christian missionaries, transforming the European Catholics from intellectual companions of the gentry into expert advisers to the throne. As Gernet points out: "The Jesuit fathers no longer had under the Manchus the opportunity to participate, as did Ricci, in philosophical discussions. On the other hand, the missionaries of Peking who under the Ming had not been able to get access to the emperors . . . were soon on intimate terms with the most important person [in the empire]." Jacques Gernet, "Philosophie chinoise et christianisme de la fin du XVIe au milieu du XVIIe siècle," p. 14. See also Zürcher's important point that, in the eyes of conservative literati, the activities of Christian circles in China were regarded at best as being equivalent to the activities of politically active gentry literary societies, and at worst as being like the subversive religious movements associated with the White Lotus cult. Erich Zürcher, "The First Anti-Christian Movement in China," pp. 192–195.
A Certain Kind of Solution

Zhilin and his ally Chen Mingxia had, after all, continued to embody that particular combination of self-seeking cliquishness and self-righteous literati idealism that we associate with the factious partisanship of the late Ming. To a certain extent, the political crisis of 1653–1654 had centered upon their attempts to revive that tradition of autonomous, and often heroic, moral judgment of the throne that had been instrumentally expressed in the personnel scrutinies of Donglin days. Ning Wanwo and the "old men" from Liaodong had stifled that revival. Now, it seemed possible to the emperor to restore the framework of imperial Ming despotism without running the risk of its attendant factionalism. With Chen Mingxia and Chen Zhilin gone from the scene, Shunzhi, on August 13, 1658, changed the old Manchu Inner Three Courts into a Palace Secretariat (Diange) and formally reinstated the old Hanlin Academy as a separate organ. The grand secretaries, instead of being assigned to a given court, were after October 16 attached, two by two, to individual palaces within the whole imperial palace: Bahana and Jin Zhijun to the Palace of Central Harmony (Zhonghe Dian), Hong Chengchou and Hu Shian to the Palace of Martial Heroes (Wuying Dian), and so forth. These were not functional designations, but rather arbitrary assignments; because the real functional division of the new Palace Secretariat was, like the Ming Grand Secretariat (Neige), by ministry. Individual grand secretaries were thus deputed by the emperor to supervise (guan) the president of a given board. And, as the Palace Secretariat became more and more of an Inner Secretariat, the grand secretaries were given, like their Ming predecessors, permission to draft the throne's rescripts on their particular board's memorial. Rule by grand secretary thus appeared to be revived.

42 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 60; Piero Corradini, "À propos de l'institution du nei-ko sous la dynastie des Tsing," p. 417.
43 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:60; Er chen zhuan, 8:4b–5a; Zhaolian, Xiaoting zalu, 2:2b.
44 Oxnam, Horseback, p. 36. Permission to draft the emperor's rescripts was given in 1660. Of course, the Inner Secretariat of Shunzhi would be replaced by the Inner Three Courts when the Oboi regency restored Manchu political institutions in reaction to Shunzhi's supposedly fawning sinophilia—a sino-
The first chancellor of the newly revived Hanlin Academy was Wang Xi. His father, Wang Chongjian, was at this time serving as a president of the Board of Civil Appointments, which was then in the process of reforming the civil service ranking system, equalizing the ranks between Manchus and Chinese so that officials of either race in the same post now had the same status. Later, in 1659, Wang Chongjian would be appointed President of Rites and put in charge of organizing the special jinshi examination announced to celebrate the news that the Yongli Emperor had fled into Burma. Normally, to have father and son both serving in such sensitive positions would have raised the spectre of Ming factionalism again. But Wang Xi, fluent in Manchu, was one of the “new men” perfectly combining the traits Shunzhi desired at this point: a Hanlin chancellor who had good southern connections (his father had helped organize the Restoration Society) and an excellent literary style, as well as an untainted political background and a manner acceptable to the Qing nobility. Above all, he had the emperor’s confidence.

The emperor was not just relying upon personnel changes and a new bureaucratic couche; he wanted to fashion a stable autocracy tightly controlled from the top by a trustworthy Secretariat, and

philia which I hope I have shown to be much more tempered than historians have heretofore believed. In 1670, the Kangxi Emperor reestablished the Grand Secretariat; and by 1690, when the collected statutes were issued, the Secretariat—now called the Neige—was firmly ensconced. Silas H. L. Wu, Communication and Imperial Control in China, pp. 16–17. See also Lui, Hanlin Academy, p. 31.

45 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:60; Kessler, K’ang-hsi, p. 123. Wang Chongjian had been appointed to this presidency on July 18, 1658.

46 When Shunzhi had read the 1658 exams, for instance, he liked best one by Sun Cheng’en from Changshu. Knowing that one of the offenders in the 1657 examination scandal was a Sun from Changshu, the emperor asked Wang Xi if the two were related. Wang Xi promised to find out, and told Sun Cheng’en, an old friend, about the query. Actually, Wang Xi was willing to try to cover up the matter if his friend wanted him to, but Sun Cheng’en decided to be honest and Wang subsequently told Shunzhi that the two were, indeed, brothers. The emperor was so impressed by Sun’s honesty that he named him primus. Jerry Dennerline, “Politics of Examination,” pp. 14–15.
a Hanlin Academy freed from chancellorial patronage, factional influence-seeking, and the literati’s divisive bickering in the bureaucracy below. Obviously, even the “new men” were going to be somewhat connected to the old patronage networks, and personal relationships were going to continue to matter. However, Shunzhi was evidently hoping that by strengthening the bonds between him and his top court officials, very much in the tradition of his forefathers, he would be able to create an atmosphere of warmth and trust at the top so that officials could depend on that vertical relationship rather than on horizontal connections to assure a predictable political future. The emperor was, in short, attempting to impose a new political style upon the conventional monarch-minister relationship that formed the crux of Confucian political ideology. This new style of leadership was characteristic of all of the early Manchu rulers, and especially of Taizong, who had consciously developed distinct personal ties with his ministers in reaction against the impersonal, though idealized, relationship between emperor and adviser that had characterized late Ming court politics. Naturally, the vast courtyards and towering walls of the Forbidden City did not encourage the same degree of intimacy as the villa-like grounds of Hung Taiji’s palace in Mukden. Shunzhi’s closeness to his advisers was thus inevitably more restrained by imperial hauteur. Nevertheless, he managed to lend a distinct personal touch to the otherwise highly ritualized ruler-minister relationship of the Chinese court in a way that also foreshadowed the Kangxi and even Yongzheng Emperors.

47 Lui, Hanlin Academy, pp. 26–27.
48 It was also characteristic of Kangxi after he took power for himself. When Kangxi visited Qufu in 1684 to see the Confucian shrine, Kong Shangren, the author of Peach Blossom Fan, conducted him on a tour of the grounds. At one point, standing next to Confucius’s tomb, Kong marveled to think that he was there alone, with the Son of Heaven. “I am just a blade of grass. How can I be standing here alone beside him?” Later the emperor asked him how old he was and whether he was a poet. Kong Shangren, who was 36, admitted that he could, indeed, write poetry. “Then I knelt to receive the imperial command, but His heavenly countenance smiled with delight and quickly ordered me to rise. He dispersed the awesome air of his surroundings; sovereign and minister became like father and son. That in one day he should have thrice
This was especially evident in Shunzhi’s relationship with the two venerable old officials appointed after Chen Mingxia’s death: Dang Chongya and Jin Zhijun. Both were aged “twice-serving ministers” long ready for retirement. Dang Chongya was the first to request leave to resign from his position as grand secretary in the Historiographical Court in 1655. Shunzhi granted his permission, and honored the old gentleman by presenting him with a gift of clothing after he had been given the title of Tutor to the Heir Apparent. “Now,” the emperor said, “you are leaving Us to return to your native place. Never again will you be able to see Us. After you reach home, wear the clothing We have given you, and it will be as though you were seeing Us face-to-face.”

When Jin Zhijun requested permission to retire the following year, however, Shunzhi refused to let him go. Just as he had stressed the importance of an intimate and personal relationship with Deng Chongya upon allowing him to leave, so did he emphasize the same kind of close bond when he turned down Jin Zhijun’s request.

The obligation between a ruler and minister is a perpetual bond. Hereafter you should not think of requesting retirement because of your age. You have received [extraordinarily] great bounty from Us. How can you bear to abandon Us? How can We bear to let you mark your retirement?

Then Shunzhi turned to the other officials present and added:

Last year Zhijun was very ill. We sent someone to paint his portrait. We knew that he was already old and that if he did not recover we would not see each other again. Thus, while he was still alive We ordered an artist to draw his portrait. We cannot conceal that We are as strongly attached [to him] as this. Among all the ministers there are some who are old and feeble. How could there not be thought of peaceful retirement from public office? But this is a person whom

49 *Qing shi liezhuan*, 79:41b.
50 Ibid., 79:5a.
We have selected for promotion [to grand secretary], and We want his hoary head to aid and advise Us. We cannot bear to be separated [from him].

Jin Zhijun could hardly retire in the face of such strong imperial affection, and like most Confucian literati, he was extremely vulnerable to a direct appeal for service from the Son of Heaven in person. Jin thus remained in high office for another six years, helping compile the Qing statutes in 1658 and selecting an appropriate passage for the late Chongzhen Emperor's commemorative tablet in 1659.

In return for his favor, the emperor expected direct and faithful personal service. There should be no ethical ambiguity about this kind of obligation, for the duty of a minister to his ruler was clear-cut and above other forms of moral commitment, including the kinds of political ideals that animated the party movements of the late Ming. As Shunzhi told Grand Secretary Hong Chengchou early in 1654, just before Chen Mingxia was arrested: "It is absolutely unreasonable for the great ministers of the Six Boards to form factions (jie dang) with one another. Their only obligation is to serve the ruler and the realm by firmly adhering to loyalty and righteousness. Good is good, and bad is bad; and [this kind of sharp moral differentiation] is what is correct."

Later Qing rulers continued to encourage the same sort of close personal relationship between ruler and minister, built around Confucian forms of intellectual intercourse, while simultaneously prohibiting bureaucratic factions. The Kangxi Emperor's South Library (Nan shufang), where Han officials (many of them southerners) served as the monarch's cultural tutors, even provided an institutional setting for this bond between an idealized sage-ruler and his Confucian advisers. And as Kangxi and his son, Yong-

51 Ibid., 79:5.
52 Ibid., 79:5b-6a; Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 160–161. Jin Zhijun was eventually dismissed from office by the Oboi regents because his son and nephew were among those listed as evaders in the 1661 tax case. Guo, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji,” p. 134.
53 *Qing shi liezhuan*, 79:47b.
zheng, gradually developed a secret palace memorial system to provide the throne with the kind of reliable intelligence Shunzhi had frequently missed in his own censors' reports, the "ears and eyes" of the emperor were considerably strengthened. While mutual surveillance thus inhibited the formation of bureaucratic alliances and while the relationship between the throne and the outer
government was increasingly depersonalized, the ties between the emperor and his individual confidants (a Gao Shiqi for Kangxi or a Tian Wenjing for Yongzheng) grew ever more personal as Qing autocracy matured.54

The Shunzhi Emperor had brought the Manchu aristocracy to heel with the institutions of the Ming dictatorship: a subservient censorial apparatus to report on bureaucratic malfeasance, a revived Office of Scrutiny of Civil Appointments to impose regular personnel evaluations upon Manchu bannermen in the central government, and a palace secretariat to help the throne formulate policy and control the Six Boards.55 Then, in order to prevent the men he had chosen to staff these institutions from manipulating them to their own advantage, Shunzhi had purged his inner secretariat of leading holdovers who were attempting to revive late Ming political styles of autonomous political criticism. Finally, after replacing those older men with younger literati who had received their degrees after 1644, or with second-generation Han bannermen whose loyalty to the new regime was unquestionable, the emperor had melded Manchu tribal personalism with Chinese imperial patrimonialism to forge an intimate bond between the throne and its advisors, while continuing fiercely to forestall incipient bureaucratic factionalism.

All of this was above normal reproach by officials at the time, although Manchus would later criticize his reliance upon Chinese officials and his apparent denigration of the Assembly once he had used it so effectively against Chen Mingxia. However, one other step that Shunzhi took, and that he himself regarded as a similar kind of rationalization of imperial power, was not so invulnerable to bureaucratic criticism. On July 23, 1653, two days after he had reestablished the Han grand secretaries, the emperor had announced his plans to re-create the eunuch directorates in the palace and Forbidden City. In his own eyes, this had represented an effort to bring a formerly disorderly and irregular privy establishment

54 Wu, Communication and Imperial Control, pp. 79–85.
55 In addition to the “great accounting” (daji) which had been instituted back in 1646, Shunzhi in 1653 authorized the triennial “metropolitan inspection” (jìngchá) for all capital officials. Lui, Hanlin Academy, pp. 55–57.
under better control. In his edict, Shunzhi had announced that since Han times, when eunuchs first came into formal positions in the emperor’s palace, they had committed tremendous abuses. They had involved themselves in court affairs, become inextricably engaged in the supervision of the army, enriched their relatives, promoted corruption and favoritism, and formed alliances with evil members of the gentry to impede local officials. All of this, the emperor had noted, was precisely because their power was informal and undefined; and even the most courageous ruler found it very difficult to prevent them from carrying out these activities. However, learning a lesson from history, he—Shunzhi—would be able to avoid these abuses by establishing a formal organization to control eunuch power.

The power of this group is hard to extirpate completely. When We deliberated upon the earlier reasons [for their unofficial power], We decided upon establishing offices especially in order to clean up the officials who manage affairs in the palace. Shunzhi had gone on to designate the thirteen palace directorates used by the Ming emperors to organize eunuch activities in the Forbidden City, and then to say that there would be definite restrictions placed upon their activities, to wit: (1) eunuchs would be used alongside Manchu servants in the palace; (2) in each yamen their rank would never be higher than rank four; (3) the eunuchs were officials of the inner court, and they would not be allowed to acquire special commissions outside the palace nor to leave the Forbidden City; (4) they would not be allowed to come into contact with outsiders, including their own relatives, nor would they be allowed to adopt children; (5) neither the eunuchs nor regular officials would be allowed to be in regular contact with each other,

56 The emperor had already, on October 6, 1652, dismissed 55 eunuchs in charge of the Treasury; and on November 2 of that same year another 113 eunuchs attached to the Board of Works were discharged from their posts. Zheng, Tan wei ji, p. 95.
57 Shizu shilu, 76:17a.
and any alliances at all between the two groups would be strictly punished.\textsuperscript{58}

At the time, many officials had criticized this decision, and the actual establishment of the thirteen directorates was postponed until two years later in July, 1655.\textsuperscript{59} One of the major concerns was that the eunuchs would take over the transmission of documents, but it soon became clear that the emperor intended to have senior officials of the Imperial Household Bureau oversee the eunuchs and prevent them from illegally appropriating political power.\textsuperscript{60} Partly because of the spurious testament forged after Shunzhi's death by Oboi and the other regents that expressed the emperor's supposed shame for having permitted eunuchs free run of the

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 76:17. Six months later, a fourteenth directorate was added to the table of organization. Zheng, \textit{Tan wei ji}, pp. 94, 104–105.

\textsuperscript{59} Yu Minzhong, \textit{Guochao gong shi}, 1:2–3a. On August 26, 1653, Censor Tulai connected the creation of the eunuch yamen with the unusually heavy rains and subsequent flooding around the capital. Representing the entire Censorate, Tulai pointed out that the emperor had no need for eunuchs because he already had a corps of bondservants as personal retainers. Shunzhi rejected this advice, remarking: “Although the [eunuch] yamen have been established, they are completely under the control of tending Manchu officials. No authority rests in [the hands of] eunuchs.” Zheng, \textit{Tan wei ji}, p. 97. However, Shunzhi's confidence that eunuchs could be kept under regular bureaucratic control was unjustified. Within less than thirty years the Kangxi Emperor (who called eunuchs “persons equivalent to the meanest of insects” in spite of his friendship with some of them) had to admonish his palace servants for failing to rise when Guards officers and ministers came into the room; and by 1724 it was becoming necessary to forbid indigent bannermen from having themselves castrated to enter the directorates. Spence, \textit{T's'ao Yin}, pp. 12–13.

\textsuperscript{60} Yu, \textit{Guochao gong shi}, 1:3a. The Imperial Household Bureau (or Department) was located on the west side of the Forbidden City just inside the Xihua Gate in the outer palace where the Ming-Qing Archives are presently housed in new buildings. Although it was not nearly as large an organization then as during the High Qing (in 1662, the year after Shunzhi's death, there were 402 members; in 1722, 939 officials; and by 1796, 1,623 officials), its importance as a control organ for balancing eunuch directorates under Shunzhi has been underestimated. For a very good study of the Imperial Household Bureau, see Preston M. Torbert, \textit{The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department}, especially pp. 21–30.
palace once more, the establishment of the directorate has been grossly misunderstood. Shunzhi plainly intended to bureaucratize the privy portion of his government, and to use Manchu and Han bannermen to check any expansion of eunuch power outside the limits strictly imposed in his 1653 edict.\(^1\) When he learned on March 17, 1658, for example, that Wu Liangfu, the eunuch who had been one of his major advisers during the struggle with the princes, was taking bribes, he immediately ordered the eunuch punished within the palace, and had the Board of Civil Appointments chastize outer officials implicated in the case.\(^2\)

### The Han Banner Elite

Many of the Han bannermen upon whom the emperor relied to staff most higher central government offices and to police the palace directorates were, like Fan Chengmo and Ding Sikong, second and even third generation adherents of the dynasty.\(^3\) At the highest level of society, these second and third generation descendants of Han officers who had joined Nurhaci or Hung Taiji in Liaodong

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\(^1\) On July 31, 1655, the emperor ordered the Board of Works to erect an iron sign describing the way in which eunuchs like Wei Zhongxian had become illegally engaged in political alliances with “outer” officials. Similar malefactors in the future would be direly punished. On April 14, 1656, Shunzhi also closed down the special eunuch office created six months earlier to handle the imperial seal. Control of the seal reverted to regular civil officials. Zheng, *Tan wei ji*, pp. 97–98.


\(^3\) Some even took Manchu names. Spence, *Ts'ao Yin*, p. 15. In discussing Han bondservants and bannermen, Spence describes a style of life genuinely both Manchu and Chinese at once. “In the case of [Cao] Yin a balance had been attained between the two cultures. It is clear that he flung himself with passion into the active horse riding life of the Manchu military exercises, but also that he was a sensitive interpreter of Chinese culture.” Ibid., p. 53. The chance of a bannerman becoming an official was about thirty times greater than that of a Chinese. In the central government at this time more than half of the directorships and vice-directorships of the various bureaus and departments were filled by bannermen: 50% by Manchus or Mongols, and the other 50% by Han who often were bannermen also. Wei-ping Wu, “The Development and
were barely distinguishable from the Manchu nobility. The family of Geng Zhongming was a prominent example of this fusion. Geng himself had been named Prince Jingnan (Pacifies the South) in 1648 after victories against the Southern Ming. Although he had committed suicide on December 30, 1649, after being accused of shielding subordinates who had concealed three hundred run-away slaves, his army continued to fight Ming loyalists under the command of his son Geng Jimao. In 1654, Geng Jimao requested that his two elder sons, Jingzhong and Zhaozhong, be allowed to come to court and be placed in attendance upon the emperor. Shunzhi, wishing to strengthen his ties with his leading Han officers, not only granted this request; he made both sons viscounts, and arranged for Jingzhong to marry a daughter of Haoge and for Zhaozhong to marry the granddaughter of Prince Abatai. Because the latter was an imperial princess, Geng Zhaozhong—who was a famous art connoisseur—also received the Manchu aristocratic title of Dolo efu (Consort of the Second Degree). Finally, the em-

Decline of the Eight Banners,” pp. 77–78; Lui, Hanlin Academy, pp. 142–143. A famous example of both a well entrenched Han banner family and its dominance of certain bureaucratic posts was the Tong household, whose mansion on Dengshikou was famous throughout Beijing. Descended from Tong Yangzhen, Tong Yangxing, and Tong Tulai (maternal grandfather of the Kangxi Emperor), the descendants became known during the Kangxi period as Tong ban chao—“the Tongs that fill up half the court.” Tong Yangxing’s brothers and grandsons played important roles in the conquest, as well. Tong Yangjia followed Bolo south in 1645, took Hangzhou, pacified Fujian, and became viceroy of the Liangguang. Tong Yangliang, at the head of his own niri, commanded the artillery units at Yangzhou and Jiangyin. Another brother, Tong Dai, helped subjugate Yan’an. Under Kangxi, a grandson, Tong Guoyao occupied Xiangyang, while two other grandsons, Tong Guoqi and Tong Guozhen, captured Ma Shiying, helped bring about Zheng Zhilong’s surrender, and garrisoned Ganzhou. Li Yuandu, Guochao xianzheng shiliue, 2:21a, 23, 24a, 25.

64 Geng Zhaozhong’s seal appears on many famous Chinese paintings. In the 18th century the bulk of his collection was acquired by the Qianlong Emperor, and many of his scrolls now hang in the Freer Gallery with his colophon still upon them. Geng Zhaozhong retained his high rank even after his first wife died, being Minister of Banqueting (Guanglu daiifu). He was particularly favored by the Kangxi Emperor, who had medicine prepared by his own
peror invited Geng Jimao’s third son, Juzhong, to court, where he became Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent after marrying one of Yolo’s daughters.\(^6\)

At a less prominent level, second and third generation Han bannermen also became devoted servants of the throne by entering the court through their fathers’ own recommendation. A notable example of this was Ma Xiongzhhen, who was recommended by his father, Ma Mingpei, to become an assistant administrator (fu lishi) in the Board of Works. Ma Mingpei, himself the descendant of the famed Liaoyong family whose women had committed mass suicide in 1621, had begun his own career under Hung Taiji as a qixinlang in the newly formed Board of Works. (See Figure 2.) Later, as we have seen, he earned an excellent reputation in Shanxi as a troubleshooter for pacifying difficult areas. Sent to Jiangnan on detached duty from the Board of Revenue (of which he was a vice-president), Ma Mingpei had organized the grain shipment system and was promoted to President of Revenue, serving as governor-general of Jiangnan and Jiangxi in 1654.\(^6\) His son, Xiongzhhen, was a member of the Han Bordered Red Banner, and after entering the Board of Works, he first went on in 1656 to take charge of the imperial mint and glazed-tile factory in Liulichang in southern Beijing; and then later, like his father, became a qixinlang

\[^6\] Thomas Lawton, “Notes on Keng Chao-chung,” pp. 150–151.

\[^6\] Concurrently he also held the title of President of the Board of War. Ma Mingpei did an excellent job as viceroy. He was well known at the time for having stopped lictors and yamen runners from harming commoners. Later, the Kangxi Emperor praised his administration of Jiangnan also. Ma shi jia pu, zuanxiu (compiled records), n.p.; ming huan zhuan (biography of a famous official), n.p.; gao ming (confering a patent of nobility), n.p. For the Jiangnan merchants’ stele inscriptions detailing the depredations of yamen clerks and lictors, and thanking the new government for curbing such corruption then, see Shanghai bowuguan tushu ziliao shi, eds., Shanghai beike ziliao xuanji, pp. 113–116, 457–458. Ma Mingpei later fought against Coixinga on Taiwan, and his protégé, Liang Huafeng, helped the Manchus extend their control over the southeastern coastal area. Shao Changheng, Shao Zixiang quan ji, 5:24–25a.
Figure 2. The Ma Family Tree

Ma Zhongde

(Originally from Penglai, Shandong, he moved to Liaoyang. Served as magistrate in Jiangsu.)

? ?

Ma Yujin (A good friend of Xiong Tingbi)

Ma Mingdai Ma Mingpei

(Pacified Shanxi bandits; supervised Jiangnan taxes; later served as viceroy of Jiangnan and Jiangxi.)

Ma Xiongzhen

Ma Shitai Ma Shihong Ma Shiyong Ma Shiji

(Executed along with father and rest of family.)

Ma Guozhen

Source: Shao Changheng, Qing men lü gao, in Meng Sen, Xinshi congkan, 5:21–26.
in the Imperial Clan Court (Zong ren fu). As we shall see, Ma Xiongzhen was to be one of the best known Qing loyalists in years to come.67

Shunzhi's faith in Han bannerman was particularly obvious in the way in which he favored appointing them to governorships (xunfu) and governor-generalships (zongdu) in the provinces. Indeed, the Shunzhi reign saw the transformation of Han bannermen into a new supra-elite, acting almost like provincial janissaries for the throne in Beijing. Partly this was because Manchus and Mongols were deliberately kept from governing provinces: there was not a single Manchu governor appointed until 1658, and no Manchu zongdu until the nativist Oboi regents began naming them viceroys in 1668. Han bannermen thus functioned in place of Manchus as provincial administrators, but under Shunzhi they even replaced Han degree-holders, who began to have trouble finding posts to fill.68 Under Dorgon's regency, there had been roughly an equal amount of regular Chinese officials and Han bannermen acting as provincial xunfu. In 1651, however, when the Shunzhi

67 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 556.
68 Between 1644 and 1668, 96 Chinese bannermen were appointed as governors. Spence, Ts'ao Yin, pp. 4–5, and see also p. 72. In 1651, Wei Yijie urged the emperor to stop relying so heavily on bannermen and to fill more posts with regular Chinese officials. One solution to the problem of finding posts for regular Chinese degree-holders would have been to cut back on the number of degrees granted: During the Shunzhi period, the national examination quotas had been consciously inflated in order to win Chinese support. In 1658, however, the entrance into shengyuan ranks through the prefectural examinations was drastically restricted; the frequency of the shengyuan examinations was reduced from twice to once every three years; and the student quotas from each prefecture were cut by more than half. This decreased shengyuan numbers by at least 25%. Nevertheless, the problem of a glut of candidates and a paucity of posts continued. In 1664, the Board of Rites urged cancellation of the examinations altogether. Kessler, K'ang-hsi, pp. 17, 156. See also Struve, "Uses of History," pp. 53–54. Even though examination quotas were restricted, the sale of degrees (both the gongsheng and jiansheng) was not. In fact, because the government needed revenue, especially later during the Revolt of the Three Feudatories, both offices and degrees were sold under the euphemism of "subscriptions" (juanma). In 1668, for example, a jiansheng degree sold for a mere 200 taels of silver or 600 piculs of rice; and by 1674 the
Emperor gained control of the government, the ratio began to change. By 1659, three-quarters of all the governors of China were Han bannermen, and this would roughly remain the same until Oboi decided in 1668 to begin naming Manchus and Mongols to governorships in significant numbers. (See Figure 3.) If one looks at the Qing as a whole, in fact, one can see that as far as governorships were concerned, the dynasty's history can be divided into three major periods: from 1650 to 1700, when Han bannermen ruled the provinces; from 1700 to 1800, when regular Chinese officials and Manchus shared governorial rule about equally; and from 1800 to 1900 when regular Chinese officials dominated the provincial bureaucracy. (See Figure 4.)

The same general pattern characterized the appointments of governors-general for the Qing reign in its entirety, although Manchu zongdu decisively outnumbered regular Chinese viceroys during the middle decades of the eighteenth century. (See Figure 5.) However, in the early years of the Qing, the office of governor-

title was worth as little as 100 taels. During 1677, after repeated complaints, the government briefly stopped selling offices; but in 1678 it took the unprecedented step of selling the shengyuan degree—a practice which ceased five years later. Ho, Ladder of Success, p. 47; Lui, Hanlin Academy, pp. 53, 225; Kessler, K'ang-hsi, pp. 156–157. Had the shengyuan degree been an hereditary rank, sales would no doubt have been greater. (In 1664 Kangxi decreed that only the eldest sons or grandsons of senior officials were qualified for yin or hereditary privilege, and the following year all yinsheng were forced to study in the Imperial College before being eligible for appointment. Lui, Hanlin Academy, pp. 48–49.) Unlike Louis XIV, however, Shunzhi did not create a noblesse de robe to swell his coffers. The Chinese therefore eventually devalued such oft sold titles while the French continued to purchase them; in the words of King Louis' comptroller: “When the King of France creates an office, God immediately creates an idiot to buy it.” Samuel E. Finer, “State- and Nation-building in Europe,” p. 128.

69 Kessler’s figures are different. He claims that in 1651 every governor-general and 17 of the 22 governors were Chinese bannermen. Kessler, K'ang-hsi, p. 118.

70 According to Kessler, from 1644 to 1722, 80% of the governorships and governor-generalships were held by bannermen, mostly Chinese. Kessler, K'ang-hsi, pp. 188–189.

71 The average length of term of service also varied according to whether or not
Figure 3. Percentage of Manchu and Han Qing Governors (xunfu), 1644–1680

Note: The total number of xunfu during 1644–1680 was 181.
Figure 4. Percentage of Manchu and Han Qing Governors (*xunfu*) by Decade

Note: Total number of *xunfu* during Qing was 1,255.  
Figure 5. Percentage of Manchu and Han Qing Governors-General (zongdu) by Decade

Decade


Note: The total number of zongdu during the Qing was 560.
general was already, even before Shunzhi’s reign, virtually monopolized by Han bannermen. The reasons for this are not hard to find. The governor-generalship was mainly, before the Three Feudatories Rebellion, an ad hoc post, created according to the exigencies of military conquest. The appointment was often attached to a person, not the area, and ended with his tour of duty, so that before 1659 there were really only seven viceroyalties in existence. (See Table 15.)

These viceroyalties were in the very first years of the conquest given to non-banner Chinese crucial to the pacification program: northerners like Luo Yangxing, the Commander of the Embroidered Uniform Guard who welcomed Dorgon into Beijing and who was immediately appointed zongdu of Tianjin (a post he occupied for four months until the military crisis was over); or like Wu Zichang, the Ming censor who was named Governor of Datong and Governor-General of Xuanda and Shanxi as soon as the Manchus took the capital. By 1646, however, these initial Chinese appointees had been either removed along with the post they occupied, or altogether replaced by Han bannermen, who continued for the next nine years to hold all viceroyalties exclusively. During the middle 1650s, there were some regular non-banner officials appointed to governor-generalships; but during Shunzhi’s actual reign after he assumed personal charge of the government in 1651, ninety percent of his zongdu were Han bannermen. (See Figure 6.)

Because it was the governors-general who coordinated the military and civil affairs of the province or provinces under their command, supervising generals in the field while mobilizing regular administrative authorities to levy taxes and provide rations, it is obvious that the ongoing conquest of south China during the 1650s was mainly conducted by Han bannermen. The composi-

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72 Fu Zongmao, *Qingdai dufu zhidu*, p. 9.
73 Ibid., p. 12.
Table 15.
Early Qing Governor-Generalships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>First Zongdu</th>
<th>Hqrs (^1)</th>
<th>Yr. post estbd.</th>
<th>Yr. post ended</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tianjin</td>
<td>Luo Yangxing</td>
<td></td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>Dismissed for disobeying imperial order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xuanda/ Shanxi</td>
<td>Wu Zichang</td>
<td>Datong</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huaiyang</td>
<td>Wang Wenkui</td>
<td></td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>Meng</td>
<td>Guyuan</td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>1653</td>
<td>Although this was first under Wang Wenkui’s jurisdiction, Meng took over one month after the post was established, and was also named zongdu of the Sanbian border region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qiaofang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaanxi/ Sichuan</td>
<td>Meng</td>
<td>Qiaofang</td>
<td>1653</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td>Sichuan was transferred out from the Hu-guang viceroyalty because the latter was such a troubled region. Meng only remained in this newly enlarged post for a few months, requesting retirement on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) If other than provincial capital.
Table 15 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>First Zongdu</th>
<th>Hqrs</th>
<th>Yr. post estbd.</th>
<th>Yr. post ended</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Hanzhong</td>
<td></td>
<td>1661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhejiang/Fujian</td>
<td>Zhang</td>
<td>Fuzhou</td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cunren</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>Zhao Guozuo</td>
<td>Wenzhou</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks:
- Because of heavy military activities, the two provinces of Zhejiang & Fujian were divided into separate zongdu. In 1661 the capital of the viceroyalty was transferred to the provincial capital in Hangzhou.
- See above.

- In 1653, this area fell under Hong Chengchou's command, along with most of the

1If other than provincial capital.
Table 15 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>First Zongdu</th>
<th>Hqrs$^1$</th>
<th>Yr. post estbd.</th>
<th>Yr. post ended</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huguang</td>
<td>1653</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangnan/ Jiangxi</td>
<td>Hong</td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>Hong reported that disorder had been quelled, and asked to retire.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangnan/ Henan</td>
<td>Ma Guozhu</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangnan</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liangguang</td>
<td>Tong</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td>Tong died in office when the Prince of Gui's forces retook the Liangguang. The post remained vacant until 1653, when Li Shuai-tai was named viceroy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangjia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxi</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fu Zongmao, Qingdai dufu zhidu, pp. 9–12.

$^1$If other than provincial capital.
Figure 6. Percentage of Manchu and Han Qing Governors-General (zongdu), 1644–1680

Note: The total number of zongdu during 1644–1680 was 74.
Source: Narakino Shimesu, Shindai jūyō shokkan no kenkyū, pp. 64–66.
tion of this elite group was varied. (See Table 16.) Some Han bannermen were old Liaodong natives who had surrendered early; others were Ming officials who had joined the Manchus after 1644; and yet others were second-generation adherents, or men who had risen through the Qing ranks from first degree to highest office. Most were professional military men, but the truly common denominator was, of course, ethnic: all were Han Chinese. As governors-general, therefore, it was they—not the Manchus themselves—who assumed the major responsibility for extirpating the remnants of the Southern Ming forces in south China.

During 1652–1653, while Sun Kewang “protected” the Yongli Emperor at Anlong in southwestern Guizhou, the pro-Ming forces of Li Dingguo and Sun Kewang had pushed back Qing troops in Guangxi, Hunan, and Sichuan. To counter this threat, Shunzhi deemed it essential to send a commander south with the experience, ability, and personal authority to coordinate a multi-provincial campaign on many different fronts. He consequently appointed Hong Chengchou as Viceroy of Huguang, Liangguang, Yunnan, and Guizhou. Hong was recalled from retirement and sent to Changsha to assume full control of the imperial expeditionary force. Under his banner, troops were now mustered against the former rebel armies of Li Dingguo and Liu Wenxiu, who were beaten back in 1655 into Guangxi, and then in 1656 driven out of Nanning. In the meantime, at Anlong, Sun Kewang had begun behaving as though he intended to depose the Yongli Emperor and make himself ruler in his place. Fearing treachery, the emperor had secretly communicated with Sun’s rival, Li Dingguo. Already forced back into Guizhou, Li decided to come to the emperor’s rescue. After defeating Sun in battle near Anlong, Li Dingguo took the last Southern Ming ruler under his own protection in Yunnanfu, where he established the strife-ridden Yongli court anew in Sun Kewang’s recently completed mansion. Sun Kewang tried one last time to defeat Li Dingguo; but at the battle of Jianshui in eastern Yunnan on October 24,

75 Hong Chengchou, Hong Chengchou zhangzou wence huiji, pp. 88–89.
77 Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 120.
Table 16.  
Han Bannermen Serving as Governors-General during the Personal Reign of the Shunzhi Emperor (1651–1661)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Banner</th>
<th>Prior service as Governor</th>
<th>Also zongdu under Dorgon</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bai Sechun</td>
<td>B. White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military officer under Qing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cai Shiyong</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Surrendered Ming officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Jin</td>
<td>B. Blue</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Ming dusi who surrendered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Chengchou</td>
<td>B. Yellow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ming jinshi who surrendered before the entry into Beijing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin Li</td>
<td>B. Red</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ming military jinshi who surrendered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lang Tingzuo</td>
<td>B. Yellow</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>A “new man”: father had surrendered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Guoying</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ming zongbing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Xifeng</td>
<td>B. Yellow</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ming zhusheng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Yinzu</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ming zhusheng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Qingtai</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ancestors surrendered to Qing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lu Chongjun</td>
<td>B. Yellow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ming zhusheng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo Xiujin</td>
<td>B. Blue</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Ming military juren.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Guanghui</td>
<td>B. Yellow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 16 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Banner</th>
<th>Prior service as Governor</th>
<th>Also zongdu under Dorgon</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>ming zhusheng; an older adherent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ma Guozhu</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Mingpei</td>
<td>B. Red</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Zhixian</td>
<td>B. Blue</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meng Qiaofang</td>
<td>B. Red</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tong Yangjia</td>
<td>B. Blue</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tong Yangliang</td>
<td>B. Blue</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongtai</td>
<td>Blue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Guoguang</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Wenkui</td>
<td>B. White</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ming zhusheng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Weihua</td>
<td>No affiliation listed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ming zhusheng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Fangxing</td>
<td>B. White</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ming zhusheng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Maoxun</td>
<td>B. Red</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>appointed an official because of a relative's services to the throne.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Changgeng</td>
<td>B. Yellow</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>formerly a compiler in the Inner Courts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 16 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Banner</th>
<th>Prior service as Governor</th>
<th>Also zongdu under Dorgon</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Cunren</td>
<td>B. Blue</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Ming fujiang who surrendered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhao Guozuo</td>
<td>B. Red</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A “new man”: father had surrendered to Qing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhao Tingchen</td>
<td>B. Yellow</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>A Qing gong-sheng who first served as magistrat, then governor, and finally governor-general.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zu Zeyuan</td>
<td>B. Blue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Surrendered Ming officer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1657, Sun’s troops were routed, and the warlord had no choice but to flee to Baoqing and surrender to Governor-General Hong Chengchou.78

The rift between Li Dingguo and Sun Kewang provided Hong Chengchou with the opportunity he had been awaiting for years. After Sun Kewang surrendered, plans were laid for a major Qing campaign into Guizhou against Li Dingguo’s Southern Ming forces.79 The Qing expedition advanced in three different columns:


79 Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 123–124. The troops under Hong Cheng-
one from Sichuan led by the Generalissimo Who Pacifies the West (Ping xi da jiangjun), Wu Sangui; one from Guangxi led by Jaobtai; and one from Hunan led by Governor-General Hong.80 The campaign ended in a great and decisive series of victories for the Qing dynasty. On January 23, 1659, Yunnanfu fell to the expeditionary force; and on March 7, the main body of the Southern Ming army was defeated at Dali (Yunnan) and the Yongli Emperor was forced to flee into Burma.81

chou’s command were both Chinese and Manchu, the latter led by Loto and Doni. One of the most important Chinese commanders was a Han collaborator, though not a bannerman, named Zhang Yong. Zhang had surrendered when the Nanjing regime fell, taking his men directly to Ajige at Jiujiang. He was only 30 sui then. Made a major in the Qing army, he was transferred to the northwest, where he earned a reputation for unstinting bravery in a number of major battles against the White Cap Muslim rebels in 1648. Repeatedly commended, he was transferred to Hong Chengchou’s command in 1658. After the conquest of Yunnan, he became commander-in-chief of that province in 1661. Two years later he was transferred to Gansu to protect the empire’s northwestern borders against the tribal peoples of Kokonor. In spite of war injuries that crippled him, Zhang Yong defended that area through the period of the Three Feudatories Rebellion, when he remained staunchly loyal to the Qing. His loyalty, in fact, was a key factor in the dynasty’s ultimate victory. Later, after driving off the Khoshotes and aborigines of Kokonor from Gansu’s borders where they had been pushed eastward by Galdan, Zhang Yong was made a noble of the realm. Er chen zhuan, 4:1–12; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 66–67.

80 Shore, “Last Court,” pp. 194–196, 201–204.
81 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 194; Struve, “Uses of History,” p. 27. The path of flight taken by the Yongli Emperor roughly corresponded to the later Burma Road. In March, 1659, the emperor and 646 members of his party boarded boats on the Irrawaddy River at Bhamo while the rest of his escort went overland to the Burmese capital of Ava. The overland group was mistaken for an invasion force and was slaughtered. Yongli himself reached Ava in late June and was put up in a special camp across the river from the Burmese court, which began receiving demands from the Qing government to surrender the Southern Ming pretender. After his brother was deposed, the new Burmese monarch, Pye Min, had all of the able-bodied male adults in Yongli’s entourage massacred. Yongli, stricken with asthma, was kept alive in terrible conditions, along with four family members, a few eunuchs, one lame official, and a hundred surviving women and children. Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 125–128.
The aging Hong Chengchou did not have the will to pursue his
quarry to the end.\textsuperscript{82} Requesting permission to return to Beijing be-
cause of his worsening blindness, Hong advised the Shunzhi Em-
peror to look to the pacification of Yunnan by appointing Gener-
alissimo Wu Sangui a prince of the first degree (qin wang)—an
exalted rank briefly held by Wu after he had helped Ajige defeat Li
Zicheng in 1645—and by charging him with the occupation of the
province.\textsuperscript{83} The court accepted Hong Chengchou’s resignation as
governor-general, recalling him to Beijing to serve briefly as a
grand secretary in 1660 before permitting him to retire in 1661,
after nearly twenty years of service to the dynasty. Certainly one
of the most valuable collaborators the Manchus ever had, Hong
Chengchou was formally canonized when he died four years later
in 1665.\textsuperscript{84} In the meantime, his suggestion for the pacification of
Yunnan was adopted, and Wu Sangui was given permission to
press on and hunt down the fugitive Ming pretender.\textsuperscript{85} After cross-
ning over into Burma with the Manchu duke Aisingga, Gener-
alissimo Wu finally captured the Yongli Emperor on the outskirts
of Ava.\textsuperscript{86} Wu returned to Yunnanfu with his prisoner, and, on June
11, 1662, had the former Prince of Gui strangulated with a length of
silk fabric.\textsuperscript{87} The last Ming emperor was forty sui at the time. For

\textsuperscript{82} Tsao Kai-fu, “The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories against the Manchu
Throne in China,” p. 58. For Viceroy Hong’s pacification policies, see Hong,
Hong Chengchou, pp. 196b–198.

\textsuperscript{83} Shore, “Last Court,” pp. 206–207.

\textsuperscript{84} Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 360. Even the Qianlong Emperor, who was not
forgiving of twice-serving ministers and who pointed to some of Hong
Chengchou’s “defects,” regarded the famous collaborator as a man of “great

\textsuperscript{85} Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 128. Li Dingguo died of illness sometime in
early August, 1662, near the border between Yunnan and Laos. Shore, “Last

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 207.

\textsuperscript{87} On January 22, 1662, the Burmese monarch, Pye Min, had the Yongli Em-
peror put in an old sedan-chair and carried to boats to be taken to Wu Sangui’s
camp at Aungbinle near Ava. The emperor thought that he was being taken to
Li Dingguo’s camp and did not recognize his mistake until he was met by a
committing regicide, Wu Sangui was rewarded with a princely title and granted a virtual satrapy in the provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou. 88

The Consequences of Manchu Dependence

The Manchus could not by themselves have conquered south China at the time. They had no choice but to rely upon their Chinese adherents to carry out that commission. Yet they apparently did not foresee the dangerous consequences of this course of action. First, and most obviously, the ruling house placed virtually unchecked power in the hands of Wu Sangui and the other two feudatories who helped conquer south China, Geng Jingzhong and Shang Kexi. In effect, the dynasty created the kind of aristocratic threat it had feared from the Manchus' own quarter, but embodied this time in the form of Chinese military nobles. Wu Sangui's princedom, his private army of liegemen, was the very sort of feudal force that Dorgon and then Shunzhi had kept their own Manchu beile from acquiring. 89 Sooner or later, the Qing throne would have to counter this threat to its own hegemony, and when that time came civil war was almost certain to be the outcome.

A second, more fundamental consequence was the displacement of the Manchus' monopoly on military authority and power. This was immediately visible in the Lu Guangxu affair of 1660. Lu, a 1651 jinshi who was the provincial censor for the Shaanxi

88 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 194–195. In the Chinese sources, the Yongli Emperor dies with great dignity. It is claimed that upon capturing him, Wu Sangui prostrated himself and promised to take the emperor back to Beijing to see his ancestors' tombs. Later some of Wu's soldiers plotted to rescue Yongli, but the conspiracy was discovered and Wu felt constrained to kill the emperor. According to one source, Wu Sangui then invited Yongli to play chess near the north gate, and had both the emperor and the heir apparent strangled. The usual omens, including a dragon seen by everyone circling Yunnanfu in the sky, were reported. Shore, "Last Court," p. 209.

89 Kanda Nobuo, "The Role of San-fan in the Local Politics of Early Ch'ing," passim.
circuit, presented a memorial in September, 1660, attacking Manchu corruption. Citing the efforts of Manchu nobles to stifle censorial criticism, Lu Guangxu also harshly criticized their military activities in the provinces, and especially the way in which they drained revenue from the civilian sector, arrogated power to themselves, and so forth.\(^90\) Lu’s memorial was discussed at length before a meeting of the Assembly of Princes and High Officials. During the meeting, Liang Qingbiao, one of the Ming holdovers who had served as grand secretary as well as Vice-President of Rites and of Civil Appointments under the Qing, argued the case for the Chinese side.\(^91\) As it was debated during the meeting, the issue became a procedural one. Did censors like Lu Guangxu possess the privilege to discuss matters of strategic military significance? Were not such sensitive issues the sole purview of Manchu officials in the Assembly? The Manchu side of the case was that Chinese officials should not intrude in military affairs.

Previously in all meetings concerning military matters, Chinese officials have not been allowed to deliberate. If Chinese officials were permitted to offer their opinions, and if we dismissed their words as if they had not been spoken, they would soon usurp power and we would have to accept the consequences.\(^92\)

Liang Qingbiao, on the other hand, argued that Chinese and Manchus should each present their own positions on matters of this sort without restriction. Draft proposals could be drawn up by both groups in advance, and then the differences between them

\(^90\) There were no systematic banner garrisons established before the Three Feudatories Revolt. There was a military cordon around Beijing, and in the Manchu homeland in southern Liaodong, and there were temporary banner garrisons stationed in areas where there were military threats, but these were not formally organized, which may have been one reason why these complaints were made. Wu, “Eight Banners,” p. 63. For an account of the demands imposed by Qing troops on the inhabitants of Songjiang at this time, see the stele inscription in Shanghai bowuguan, *Shanghai beike ziliao xuanji*, pp. 116–118.

\(^91\) *Qing shi liezhuang*, 79:39–40a.

could be worked out. Although the Shunzhi Emperor did not specifically endorse this procedure, he did at this time affirm Lu Guangxu’s right to memorialize on military affairs, and thus gave permission to higher Chinese officials to involve themselves in strategic military discussions. The Manchu aristocracy’s claim that they, and they alone, had that right was overthrown.93

The throne’s decision to bring Chinese into the formulation of military policy reflected actual Han leadership in the field of battle. It also reaffirmed the ruling house’s decision taken much earlier not to enfeoff Manchu nobles and bannermen as an entirely separate and superstratified elite. Once Dorgon had found his own keys to the kingdom in the persons of Chinese literati, he had become determined not to create a feudal elite within China over and above these allies of the dragon throne. This was not because Confucian bureaucratic forms and government by feudal military elite were structurally incompatible. Had Dorgon visited Japan at that time, he could have observed that it was indeed possible to establish a feudal-bureaucratic system where the military nobility, subject to the feudal discipline of a kuni, also served as bureaucratic functionaries of the lord, receiving a specific salary and rank. Bureaucratic service, with its tangible results and rewards, thus kept alive the performance ethic of what was still ostensibly defined as a feudal military elite.94

But the Manchu, Mongol, and Han banner forces could not play such a bureaucratic role within a Confucian civil service without relinquishing their military identity over time.95 Precisely be-

94 “The formal education and the entire environment of the samurai were saturated with inducements to performance and reminders that he was the leader of his society, the bulwark of his state.” John Whitney Hall, “The Nature of Traditional Society: Japan,” p. 31.
95 In fact, because so many banner officers were used by the government to run the bureaucracy, especially in the provinces, the military leadership of the banners themselves was badly affected. The Han banners were most poorly staffed because so many Chinese bannermen were appointed to the imperial administration, and by the mid-1660s, the Kangxi Emperor was being told of certain division commanders and lieutenant generals who were incapable of handling their jobs. Wu, “Eight Banners,” pp. 77–78.
cause of the throne’s need to keep Manchu aristocrats, Chinese feudalatories, and the new supra-elite of Han bannermen in check, a completely civil bureaucracy had to be perpetuated. If the Qing banners were not to evolve completely into praetorian kingmakers, like their contemporary janissaries on the other side of Eurasia in the Ottoman Empire, then they would have to share their central and provincial military authority with representatives of a separate government of civilians, while at the same time being conditioned to emulate that separate bureaucracy by adopting its values.

For the civil bureaucracy was deeply rooted in, and ultimately sustained by, Confucian political values, which in turn made a mockery of a martial elite’s own self-perpetuating ideals. As long

96 The Qing dominion represented a compromise between the two social orders in late imperial China: the military and the civil. It was the division of these structural counterparts, beginning in the wars of the late 16th century both on the inner Asian frontier and in Korea against the Japanese, that provoked the crisis of the late Ming. Soaring military budgets bankrupted the state, and that in turn created the conditions that helped set off the peasant rebellions of the 1620s and ’30s. The onset of those rebellions in turn created the conditions that further distanced military from civil, giving the former ascendancy over the latter. Manchu rule represented a new stabilization of these two orders, a compromise between them that—in Wallerstein’s terms—“constricted the political margin” of the lower orders. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System II, p. 125.

97 The turn of the seventeenth century saw the replacement of a territorial cavalry (supported by the timariots’ fiefs) by a new standing army concentrated around the Ottoman capital. In addition to bankrupting the state (in 1669 62.5% of the budget was spent on soldiers’ salaries), the imperial Ottoman army exacted more and more privileges, including tax-farming patents and extensive farming rights. Omar Lutfi Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century,” pp. 17–25. For the blunting effect of price inflation upon the janissaries—the “whetted blade” of the Ottoman military machine—see William H. McNeill, Europe’s Steppe Frontier, pp. 57–60.

98 The one countervailing influence was the emperor himself, especially a ruler like Kangxi. Opposed to the values of the Nan Shufang were the ideals of the hunt, which Kangxi deliberately instituted as one way of maintaining Manchu military vigor. As Father Verbiest commented on his trip in 1683 with the emperor, who led 100,000 cavalrymen and 60,000 infantrymen on a tour beyond the Great Wall: “The first [reason to take this tour] was to maintain his rough militia, in peace as in war, in a perpetual movement and exercise. That
Presentation of the *primus*. There is a touch of irony in this print depicting the honor due the examination candidate who passed first on the list, and who now stands smugly upon a rising dragon. *Zhuangyuan tu kao* [Illustrated inspection of the *primus*] (1607–1609), in Zheng Zhen-duo, comp., *Zhongguo banhua shi tulu* [Pictorial record of the history of Chinese prints] (Shanghai, 1940–1942), vol. 6.
as the civil service examination system existed with all its rewards, literati virtues would prevail: scholarly erudition, moral mastery, artistic connoisseurship, and bureaucratic amateurism. In the long run, then, the Qing throne was so successful in sustaining its Confucian allies among old adherents and new recipients of the imperial bounty that the military elite ended by emulating the civilians. Aspiring officers were graded on weight-lifting, halberd-twirling, and bow-bending as a kind of physical travesty of the eight-legged essay, while Manchu bannermen fought for their own quotas to enter the regular civil service as bona fide classicists and poetasters. 99 By the mid-eighteenth century, most bannermen could neither ride nor hunt; and the majority of those residing in Beijing spent their days drinking, gambling, going to the theater, and watching cock fights. 100 And by the 1920s, after the dynasty had fallen, the bannermen of Beijing—who composed a significant proportion of the city’s population—were mainly either ricksha

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99 It was precisely to avoid this military degeneration that Qing bannermen were initially not allowed to sit for the examinations. Tu Wei-ming, “Yen Yüan: From Inner Experience to Lived Concreteness,” p. 127.

100 The government required bannermen to remain at the capital except when they were assigned duty elsewhere. Prone to the pleasures of the capital, they let their military skills atrophy. In 1746, when the Qianlong Emperor reviewed specially selected banner vanguards, he found them terribly wanting. “Their bows were weak, their skill in archery was crude. They did not even know how to stretch the bow or release the arrow. Their aim was so poor that their arrows slid along the ground before reaching the target.” In Fuzhou the garrison soldiers sold their mounts for horsemeat, and the city had more than 20 butcher shops selling horsemeat soup in 1740. And in 1767 when they were sent to Burma on campaign, many of the bannermen had to ride in sedan-chairs. Wu, “Eight Banners,” pp. 82–88, quote from p. 86.
pullers or policemen, colorful but powerless descendants of the
warriors who had ridden across the face of China nearly three cen-
turies before. 101

**Coxinga’s Invasion**

The final defeat of the Yongli loyalists in the far south not only
accompanied the shift of military power into Chinese hands; it also
marked an end to effective anti-dynastic opposition in the Yangzi
delta, which had remained the cultural and economic heartland
of the empire. For, by destroying the last loyalist court, Hong
Chengchou and Wu Sangui had severed the link between internal
dissidents and political legitimation. There still remained Coxinga
and his naval forces on the coast, but by the time they posed an
actual threat to the Yangzi region, the provincial authorities had
managed to neutralize their remaining allies within Jiangnan.

Ever since the defeat of Wu Shengzhao, the marshy banks of
Lake Tai south of Suzhou and of the Mao lakes west of Songjiang
had been the domain of small gangs of indigent fishermen and
swamp dwellers who lived outside the law, “selling food and rob-

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101 David Strand, “Yamen Runners, Roving Chüntzu or Urban Cadre?,” pp. 25–26. Strand estimates that of Beijing’s 1.2 million residents in the 1920s, one-third were bannermen and their families. Three-quarters of the policemen were Manchus. Lao She, who was born into a bannerman’s family toward the end of the Qing, has left a perfectly brilliant description of a typical Manchu bannerman in the 20th century. “Although my sister’s father-in-law was a military officer of the fourth rank, he rarely spoke of leading soldiers or fighting. When I asked him if he could ride a horse or shoot with a bow and arrow, his response was a fit of coughing after which he steered the conversation back to bird-raising techniques. He was certainly well worth listening to on this subject, about which he could even have written a book. . . . Truly, he seemed to have forgotten that he was a military officer, for he was spending all his life’s energy trying to imbue little feeding vessels and shovels [for his collection of birds] as well as his coughing and laughter with a sublime artistry enabling him to intoxicate himself whenever he pleased with small stimulations and interests.” Lao She, “Beneath the Red Banner,” pp. 15–16.
bing villages” as the occasion offered itself.102 Early in 1654, these bands found a new leader in a man named Qian Ying, who had participated in earlier loyalist uprisings, and then remained hidden away in his native village for a number of years before venturing forth to form a gang once again. Gathering a group of about thirty followers with ten small boats, Qian Ying had joined forces with another bandit named Lu Er, but the group as a whole was not large enough to engage in more than sporadic robbery and looting.103

In 1656 the group’s fortunes began to change. Early that year two envoys from the Yongli court made their way into the Mao lakes district: a Yangzhou commoner named Li Zhichun, and a Buddhist monk called Qiu Jie. The ten blank commissions bearing Ming imperial seals which they brought with them and offered to Qian Ying suddenly elevated him from being the leader of his own gang and partner of another bandit into being a clandestine Ming paramilitary agent. Overnight he and his band ceased living from hand to mouth and began gathering men and subscriptions (some of which were probably donated by gentry sympathizers) for an uprising. “Upon my receiving this letter of deputation (zha fu),” he later recalled, “the number of people I could summon suddenly increased and I now had two to three hundred boats.”104 Employing the subscriptions to purchase weapons, Qian Ying used his Yongli letters of commission to appoint “heads” (toumu) of each unit of boats and men that joined him. That April even more commissions came Qian Ying’s way by means of a secret agent named Wang Xiufu. News of Qian’s activities had even reached Coxinga’s headquarters in the south, and the sea lord had therefore sent Wang along with a document on beautiful yellow silk, bearing a Yongli seal, and appointing Qian Ying both a Ming magistrate and General to Pacify the South (Ping nan jiangjun). With Wang

102 Confession of Qian Ying, in Ming-Qing shiliao, ding, ben 2, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 136–137.
103 Ibid. Qian Ying was also known by other names: Qian Da, Qian Yingxi, and Qian Xiao.
104 Ibid.
Xiufu also came the promise that, if their cause succeeded, Qian Ying would be named zongbing of Jiangnan, while Lu Er would be given the military command of the city of Jiaxing across the border in Zhejiang province. Qian Ying responded positively, and Wang Xiufu became a courier between the loyalist camp at the Mao lakes and Coxinga’s navy in Fujian. More letters were brought from the south, asking Qian Ying to recruit additional troops (bingding), build ships, and accumulate weapons in order to prepare for a maritime invasion. He was also told that when news reached him that deep sea vessels had been sighted off the coast, then he should be prepared to raise the banner of revolt in the Su-Song area.105

Before this promised invasion could occur, however, Qian Ying attracted the attention of the authorities by raiding back and forth across the Zhejiang-Jiangnan border, attacking villages on one side, then slipping back into the other province when that area’s Qing troops responded. Although he had no knowledge of the planned uprising, nor even of the ambitions and size of Qian Ying’s enterprise, Lang Tingzuo, the Han bannerman who was Governor-General of the Liangjiang, decided that this kind of banditry had to be stopped at once, and so mounted a simultaneous operation over the two provinces. The first effort was a failure. Lang’s troops merely succeeded in driving Qian Ying’s navy out of Lake Mao and downriver to the sea, where the flotilla sailed as far south as Taizhou in Zhejiang before returning to the Jiangnan coast, defeating a Qing naval contingent along the way. Realizing now that Qian Ying’s forces were much larger than he had expected, Governor-General Lang alerted the governor of Zhejiang so as to seal off escape to the south, and then mobilized every garrison (ying) in his jurisdiction. Nevertheless, when a second expedition (under Feng Wuqing) was sent into the Lake Mao area, it failed too because Qian Ying got wind of the force and escaped in time. Lang Tingzuo prepared for yet a third attempt by tightening security, reducing the visibility of his troops by stationing them at nine different points around the outskirts of the lake, and cordon-

105 Ibid.
A Lake Tai fisherman. His wife, hidden behind the sail, is at the helm while he drags the bottom for periwinkles. Photograph by F. Wakeman.

ing off the area with troops requested from the governors of the two adjoining provinces. On February 4, 1658, his efforts were rewarded. Reports arrived from Songjiang saying that Qian Ying’s navy and marines had been sighted in a network of small villages northeast of Songjiang along the Huangpu River. Governor-General Lang immediately assembled his troops and set off for the area, having decided to oversee the campaign in person.106

When Lang Tingzuo’s force engaged Qian Ying’s men in combat, the governor-general was at first quite astonished. This was a much larger and better equipped armada than he had ever ex-

106 Memorial from Lang Tingzuo, dated March 28, 1658. Ming-Qing shiliao, ding. ben 2, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 134–137.
pected. But just as surprised were Qian Ying and his followers, who were surrounded in their encampment and placed entirely on the defensive from the moment the Qing troops attacked. In the melee, at least ten of Qian’s ships were set on fire, and many of his men jumped into the river and drowned. Lu Er and a number of other lieutenants were captured, along with Qian Ying’s mother. When night fell, however, Qian Ying was able to take some of his boats and escape down the Huangpu River. But Lang Tingzuo pursued them. Moreover, the Qing governor-general had so widely publicized the campaign that Qian Ying was recognized wherever he went, and it became almost impossible to evade pursuit. On March 17, 1658, Qian and his surviving lieutenants fell into a Qing ambush. His aides were killed, many followers were drowned, his wife, Madame Cao, was captured; and even though Qian Ying tried to escape in disguise, he too was seized and imprisoned.107

Thus, when Coxinga finally did decide to risk a major attack upon Jiangnan in 1659 there was no organized uprising within the province to aid him.108 A few people—about one hundred were arrested and jailed—did respond to the invasion; but their activities were negligible, and Coxinga was forced to rely entirely upon his

107 With that, Governor-General Lang Tingzuo was able to report that the two critical prefectures of Suzhou and Songjiang were finally completely under the control of the government, and promised that all of their taxes would now be available for the imperial treasury. Ibid., p. 137.

108 Coxinga’s assault on the Yangzi region was the fourth stage of his attack upon the Qing domain. First, he had moved against Zhoushan and northeastern Fujian during November, 1655—April, 1657; then, during September—November, 1657, he had taken Taizhou prefecture in Zhejiang; and, third, he had attacked southeastern coastal Zhejiang in June, 1658—June, 1659. During this fourth stage he disabled the Qing naval post at Dinghai, sailed on to Chongming (where he encountered some stiff resistance), and stationed his fleet in the outer mouth of the Yangzi in July, 1659. His top lieutenant, Zhang Huangyan, meanwhile broke the thick cable stretching between Jinshan and Jiaoshan islands, sank the defenders’ cannon barges, and sailed on ahead. Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 145, 148–149. For having resisted Coxinga so fiercely, the inhabitants of Chongming were later rewarded with tax remissions by the Oboi regents. Oxnam, “Policies and Institutions,” pp. 282–284.
own resources. However, these were considerable. His 400 ships were filled with 250,000 well-equipped soldiers, most of his men being armed either with shield and short sword, or with a heavier battle sword attached to a meter-long stick that was wielded with both hands. Over their torsos they wore a kind of mail: a coat of overlapping iron scales which protected them against rifle bullets. The sea lord also had guns of his own, cannons and ammunition, and two companies of black soldiers—former Dutch slaves—who had learned how to fire rifles and muskets. In addition, he had an excellent corps of archers, who were quite accurate at long distances and even more formidable than the riflemen; and his shield-bearers were among the most aggressive assault forces in all of East Asia. The Qing troops defending Nanjing were mainly

109 Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, p. 165. According to Adrien Greslon, Coxinga did send deputies to contact major provincial officials for their support, and most decided to wait and see how his attack on Nanjing fared before responding. Cited in Donald Keene, *The Battles of Coxinga*, pp. 49–50. Altogether, 7 prefectural seats, 3 sub-prefectures and 32 districts surrendered—some by coercion, others voluntarily—either to Coxinga or to his ally Zhang Huangyan, who secured 29 cities upriver in Anhui before being defeated by a Qing river fleet cast of Digang on September 23, 1659. But the populace did not rise in the lower Yangzi in sufficient numbers to overthrow Manchu rule there. Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 150–152; Ralph C. Croizier, *Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism*, p. 18. Gu Yanwu was in the Jiangnan area at the time of the naval invasion, but there is no evidence to support the view that he was there to join Coxinga’s military effort. Willard J. Peterson, “The Life of Ku Yen-wu, Part II,” pp. 207–208.


111 Coxinga’s tactics have been described by eyewitnesses of his successful assault on the Dutch in Fort Provintia in southern Taiwan two years after the Yangzi expedition: “The shield-bearers were used instead of cavalry. Every tenth man of them is a leader, who takes charge of and presses his men on to force themselves into the rank of the enemy. With bent heads and their bodies hidden behind the shield, they try to break through the opposing ranks with such fury and dauntless courage, as if each one had still a spare body left at home. They continually press onwards, notwithstanding many
Chinese bannermen, supported by five hundred Manchu soldiers. If taken by surprise, they were probably not a match for Coxinga’s army and navy. But after capturing Guazhoul on August 4, 1659, and Zhenjiang six days later, Coxinga rejected the advice of his lieutenant, Gan Hui, to overwhelm Nanjing with a single massive onslaught. Instead, he decided to proceed more cautiously by laying siege to the former Ming capital.\footnote{The defenses of Nanjing (Jiangning) were coordinated by Governor Zhu Guozhi of the Han Plain Yellow Banner. Li Huan, \textit{Guochao qixian leizheng}, 338:9; Zhao, \textit{Qing shi gao}, 493:1. For a complete roster of Coxinga’s forces, see Liao Hanchen, “Yanping wang bei zheng kaoping,” pp. 56–57.}

The siege, which began on August 24, lasted for twenty days.\footnote{Biography of Yao Yan from the \textit{Qing shi gao}, cited in Xie, \textit{Qingchu nongmin}, p. 131.} At first the people of Nanjing suffered great hardships: many died of hunger and others committed suicide. Several hundred of Coxinga’s sympathizers in the city, known as the \textit{Yangwei dang} (Goat-tail Party), were even discovered and the Manchu commander briefly toyed with the idea of ordering a major round-up and execution of potential loyalists, but was dissuaded by other officials who feared the panic this might cause.\footnote{Liao, “Yanping wang,” pp. 64–68.} But withal, public morale was maintained. Even more important, Coxinga’s encirclement was not complete. Three of the city’s gates remained open, and Governor-General Lang Tingzuo was able to get some rice supplies from the surrounding countryside, as well as send for Manchu cavalry contingents from the north. Because many of his sol-

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are shot down; not stopping to consider, but ever rushing forward like mad dogs, not even looking around to see whether they are followed by their comrades or not. Those with the swordsticks—called soap-knives by the Hollanders—render the same service as our lancers, in preventing all breaking through of the enemy, and in this way establishing perfect order in the ranks; but when the enemy has been thrown into disorder, the sword-bearers follow this up with fearful massacre among the fugitives.” Wm. Campbell, \textit{Formosa under the Dutch}, pp. 420–421. Note, however, that the philosopher Zhu Zhiyu—who followed Coxinga’s men north—later commented upon their indiscipline and disarray. Julia Ching, “The Practical Learning of Chu Shun-hui,” p. 196.

\footnote{Keene, \textit{Coxinga}, p. 50; Zhang Qijun et al., eds., \textit{Quanjiao xianzhi}, p. 418.}
diers were battle-toughened veterans just back from the military expeditions to the southwest, Viceroy Lang decided not to wait for reinforcements to arrive. On September 8, while many of Coxinga’s men were out gathering firewood, Manchu light cavalry attacked and took the front lines of the sea lord’s encampment, forcing Coxinga to move his own tent farther back from the city. The following night, just before dawn, a general assault was launched from the two northwestern gates of Nanjing, and the Qing cavalry and infantry charges overwhelmed Coxinga’s shield-bearing phalanxes and battle-swordsmen. Defeat turned into rout, and Coxinga’s men slipped back aboard their ships and sailed out to sea. The last great Ming loyalist threat to the Qing government in Jiangnan had been averted.

115 The reinforcements were commanded by a chamberlain of the Imperial Guards named Dasu who continued on to Fuzhou after he failed to reach Nanjing in time. Struve, “Southern Ming,” p. 152.

116 Keene, Coxinga, p. 49; Struve, “Southern Ming,” pp. 148–153; idem, “Uses of History,” pp. 28–29. Some contemporary Western sources claimed that Coxinga’s men had been celebrating his birthday the night of September 8 (though Earl Swisher gives August 28, 1624 as Coxinga’s probable birth date in Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 108.) and were hung over the day of the battle. Francois de Rougemont, Historia Tartaro-Sinica Nova, pp. 49–55, cited in Keene, Coxinga, pp. 50–51; Le P. Louis Gaillard, Nankin d’alors et d’aujourd’hui, pp. 240–242. Coxinga’s navy was pursued south to Amoy by a large Qing fleet, eager to follow up this victory with another. However, when the armada, commanded by Governor-General Li Shuaitai and General Dasu, attacked Amoy on June 17, 1660, it was destroyed. For weeks the beaches of Quemoy (Jinmen) Bay were littered with rotting corpses. Despite this Qing defeat, the Manchus continued in August and September to assign other major forces to the campaign, eventually driving Coxinga away from the coast to Taiwan. The following year (1661) Coxinga’s father, Zheng Zhilong, was killed by the Manchus, his usefulness to them ended. Keene, Coxinga, pp. 63–66. In 1662–1663, the Qing government decided to move the coastal population along the southeastern seaboard 40 to 50 li inland. Coastal villages were then destroyed, all towns were barricaded, and troops were posted at every spot where there might be some means of getting back to the coast. It was this stringent and draconian measure which finally brought peace to more isolated portions of the coastline in the Jiangnan area, such as the area around Haizhou near Mt. Yuntai, where the local inhabitants had become professional bandits and pirates. The prohibition
Social and Political Leveling

Although only a small number of Jiangnan natives responded to Coxinga’s invasion with loyalist conspiracies of their own, the gentry of the Yangzi delta were made to seem even more reprehensible in the eyes of the Manchu regime in Beijing. Just as Qing officials had in 1645–1646 strongly identified the Jiangnan loyalists with their literary clubs, so did they again in 1659 re-establish that connection, whether justifiedly or not. Moreover, the activity of clubs and literary societies somehow seemed to embody the social complexities of the Jiangnan area itself. The region—so heavily populated—appeared to pullulate with rebellious students, corrupt gentry, and dangerous gangsters; and the sheer complexity and heterogeneity of Jiangnan society seemingly defied the Shunzhi Emperor’s drive for rational rule and despotic universality. How much more amenable were the flat plains and level social topography of the northland when compared to the uneven patchwork of Jiangnan, Zhejiang, and Fujian—which remained among the most difficult parts of the empire to govern.

The court’s impatience with the social complexities of Jiangnan must have been sensed by a man who has been called the greatest remonstrating official of the early Qing period: Yang Yongjian, a southerner himself from Haining (Zhejiang), but also a “new man” who had gotten his jinshi degree in 1655 and who was fearlessly pledged to seek out corruption and malfeasance no matter


117 Liao, “Yanping wang,” p. 69. In the towns of Liuhe and Tianchang some Qing officials were killed by loyalists. Guo, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji,” p. 133.


119 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “The Evolution of Local Control in Late Imperial China,” pp. 3–4.
who the practitioner. In 1660, Yang was serving as senior supervising secretary in the Office of Scrutiny for the Board of Rites. It was that board, of course, which supervised the educational and examination system; and it was therefore perfectly appropriate for Yang to address himself to the topic of gentry clubs and societies which had been proscribed eight years earlier. In March 1660, he therefore submitted a memorial to the emperor which was a stunning indictment of the literati associations of Jiangnan, and which for the first time provided Shunzhi with a sociological explanation for the factionalism which he had so long sought to combat at court.

Cliques and factions—Yang Yongjian declared—began not within the government, but rather stemmed from social organizations formed outside the bureaucracy. “This minister has heard,” he said, “that all the evil of factions and cliques originates outside the government and then gradually moves into the court.” In the past, the most outstanding example of this phenomenon had been the Restoration Society (Fushe), which had had so many members in the Jiangnan area. There was a certain legitimacy to such activities, Yang freely admitted, because societies of that ilk acquired a good name by publishing poetry anthologies and pursuing other literary activities. Furthermore, the clubs themselves were based upon the closest ties of friendship between students, or of a master-disciple relationship between a teacher and his followers. This was why they were so hard to wipe out, and why even now clubs continued to flourish in places like Suzhou and Songjiang in Jiangnan, and Hangzhou and Huzhou in Zhejiang. But, as everyone knew, these clubs not only formed political alliances with ministers at court; they also provided the gentry with an opportunity to gain allies among the people, impeding direct relations between the

120 Wang Shizhen so called him. See Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, 1:382–384.
121 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3953; Okamoto, “Crise politique,” p. 114.
122 Yang’s memorial is cited in Xie, Danshe yundong, p. 252. By now all forms of association were severely prohibited in the capital. When Yan Yuan sat for the metropolitan examinations in 1659, for example, he had no opportunity to consort with other literati because such gatherings were forbidden. Tu, “Yen·Yüan,” p. 517.
throne and its subjects. "High officials and gentry each wish to reach a number of people at lower levels in order to increase the number of their allies. They thus set themselves between the court and the provinces."  

Club members were also guilty of interfering in local government: "they become involved with petty officials and tyrannize the yamens; they control taxes and public affairs."  

In Fujian, local literati associations even controlled district markets and organized local feuds—all of these being "evil practices which find their origins among the Confucian literati and thence spread down to the common people of the marketplaces."  

Such activities as these, Yang Yongjian darkly warned, had brought about the fall of the Ming dynasty. Even under the present government, the southern literary societies also critically threatened political stability, introducing the same sort of debilitating factionalism into the Qing court's discussions. Until the present, the Shunzhi Emperor had tried to prevent this factionalism from emerging by treating its outbreak at the political apex of society. Yang Yongjian now argued that the emperor should uproot the more fundamental cause of dang (parties) at a much lower level in the social hierarchy,

123 Xie, Dangshe yundong, pp. 252–253. "Provinces" here is literally "wilds" (ye).
124 Ibid., p. 253.
125 Ibid. An anonymous essayist of the Qing wrote a little later: "During the Ming period literary clubs (wenshe) prevailed. When people sent in their calling cards there were none who failed to announce themselves as members of a club (shedi). When this dynasty was first founded, sworn societies (menghui) flourished. When people sent in their calling cards there were none who failed to announce themselves as sworn members (mengdi). This was so because arrogant clerks and runners colluded with the powerful, and the gentry were constantly in litigation, none of them failing to need a sworn brother for support. It was truly impossible to hold back the flood." Yantang jianwen zaji, p. 60.
126 This was more than a purely rhetorical flourish. Yang believed, like Zheng Lian, that late Ming factionalism had provoked rebellion. Zheng Lian, who wrote about the occupation by Li Zicheng of his native province of Henan, blamed partisan cliques for the conditions that incited the uprisings. He believed that factionalism had provoked mistrust between ruler and minister, and consequently led to the misgovernment that ultimately produced local peasant rebellions. Zheng Lian, Yubian jilüe, 1:2b–3a.
where the roots of factionalism began. "If you want to block off the source, then you should prohibit alliances and clubs (meng she)."\(^{127}\)

The implications of Yang Yongjian’s memorial were far-reaching. In his view, political factionalism at court was actually the expression of gentry home rule, and it could be related to the entire range of informal district-level organizations dominated by local elites who threatened to cut the emperor off from direct access to his subjects.\(^{128}\) Not only that: factionalism was also a manifestation of the same protective abilities that had enabled the Ming gentry to preserve their own economic interests at the expense of the central government. Echoing the attack by Li Jin in 1636 against the tax exemption privileges of the rich and powerful late Ming gentry, Yang Yongjian was in effect arguing that the private interests of local landlords, urban rentiers, and scholar-officials were finding collective expression in the clubs and societies of the south.\(^{129}\) If these organizations were allowed to flourish like the gentry organizations of the Tianqi and Chongzhen periods, the ability of the Qing state to control that wealthy region’s economic resources would be hindered. Denied direct and unmediated access

\(^{127}\) Zhang, *Qing shi*, p. 3953. See also Ono, “Shinsho no shisō tōsei,” pp. 343–344.

\(^{128}\) Though I would not regard it as “feudal,” this concept of “gentry rule” is similar to Shigeta Atsushi’s notion of kyōshin shihai in that it comprised the gentry’s political (justice, mediation), cultural (education, guidance of public opinion), and economic (market intervention, public works, irrigation) roles in their native places. Mori Masao, “The Gentry in the Ming,” pp. 32–33.

\(^{129}\) This is also the argument put forth in Li Xun, “Lun Mingdai Jiangnan jituan shili.” However, Li Xun stresses the important role of managerial landowners and landlords. Managerial landlordism was also associated with the spread of cash crops like tobacco and cotton in the early Qing. Cash cropping provided a greater return for lesser amounts of land tilled and thus leveled out the productive power of poor and rich peasants by reducing the differential advantage of wealthier households owning draft animals. Within a fairly short time, commercialization of agriculture led to a more managerial form of land ownership and landlordism, with the employment of a great deal of hired labor and the improvement of farm management techniques. Kataoka Shibako, “Minmatsu Shinsho no Kahoku ni okeru nōka keiei,” pp. 99–100.
to the country’s most productive peasant population and unable to
tax the lands as it wished, the Qing government would find itself
just as impotent as the late Ming state had been.

Yang Yongjian’s call for action against the political activities of
the privileged gentry coincided with the major effort now being
exerted by the central government to limit the control exercised
by local notables over their social dependents, on the one hand;
and, on the other, to overcome the resistance to tax collection by
gentrymen who were trying to reentrench themselves now that
peaceful conditions had returned.

Government efforts to curb servitude began in earnest in 1660,
when the governor of Jiangning, Wei Zhenyuan, asked the Shun-
zhí Emperor to prohibit the practice of many “great families” (da
jia) of turning their tenants into “estate slaves” (zhuang nu).130 The
emperor duly complied, and it was the combination of these offi-
cial prohibitions with the labor shortage of the time, owing to the
great decrease in population in the mid-1660s, which eventually
attenuated such dependency relations in most parts of China.131
For, as the population fell, the demand for labor grew.132 Tenancy

130 Fu Yiling, Ming-Qing nongcun shehui jingji, pp. 149–150.
131 Chin Shih, “Peasant Economy and Rural Society in the Lake Tai area,
1368–1840,” ch. 5, pp. 15, 23–25. Kataoka, “Minmatsu Shinso no Ka-
hoku,” p. 83; Thomas A. Metzger, “On the Historical Roots of Economic
Modernization in China,” p. 39.
132 Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 5, pp. 48–50. The net effect of the epidemics,
famines, and wars of the mid-seventeenth century in China was a tremen-
dous demographic blow to China. The Chinese population, which had
climbed from about 65–80 million in the 14th century to 150 million in the
16th century, may have declined by 35 to 40% between 1585 and 1645. One
estimate of the population in 1661 was that it was between 76 and 92 million,
a drop of roughly 40 to 50% from the 16th-century estimate. Ping-ti Ho sees
population growth resuming after 1683, but the net population in 1700
might not have registered much of an increase over that of 1600. The popu-
lation growth of Europe was more or less stagnant at this time. England held
5 million people, and France had 20 million inhabitants. Brandenberg Prus-
sia was a thinly populated area with a population of less than half-a-million
and a capital town of only 15,000 people. Europe did not attain a population
level of 150 million until about 1750, when China alone had nearly twice that
number. Yeh-chien Wang, Land Taxation in Imperial China, p. 7; Ping-ti Ho,
conditions improved immediately, with the practice of permanent tenure (yongdian quan) growing, and with landlords perforce much more willing to write out contracts favorable to their tenants.\textsuperscript{133} Multiple ownership rights were devised in some parts of China, especially the southeast, so that the original proprietor held the subsoil rights while another party owned surface rights: \textit{yi tian liang zhu} (two owners to one field).\textsuperscript{134}

At the same time, both to attract tenants and to alleviate the class tensions that had come to such an antagonistic point during the serf and tenant riots of the 1640s, landlords and gentry men proposed measures to ameliorate the lot of bondservants and improve the relations between landowners and their tenants.\textsuperscript{135} During the period 1658–1661 proposals were made to distribute land to bondservants and turn them into tenants, in effect paying rent with their labor through a form of sharecropping. It was suggested that they be allowed to give up their status as a serf at the age of sixty and that their children be treated as regular tenants.\textsuperscript{136}


\textsuperscript{133} Han Hengyu, “Shilun Qingdai qianqi diannong yongdian quan de youlai ji qi xingzhah,” pp. 37–41; Wiens, “Lord,” pp. 11–12; Yang Guozhen, “Shilun Qingdai Minbei minjian de tudi maimai,” pp. 3–8. Contractual relationships continued to replace patriarchal ones during the eighteenth century, as well. An analysis of law cases in the Qianlong period shows that there was an increasing number of fixed-quota rents, and that very little rent was paid in terms of labor service or share cropping. Liu Yongcheng, “Qingdai qianqi de nongye zudian guanxi,” pp. 57–58, 61–68.

\textsuperscript{134} Fu-mei Chang Chen, “A Preliminary Analysis of Tenant-Landlord Relationships in Ming and Qing China,” pp. 5–6, 10–11, 18, 20. By the 20th century, approximately 30 to 40% of the land farmed by tenants in Jiangnan would be done in permanent tenure, with the subsoil owner being responsible for tax payments. Wiens, “Lord,” p. 29. See also Fu, \textit{Ming-Qing nongcun}, pp. 44–45.

\textsuperscript{135} Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 5, pp. 16–17; Hilary J. Beattie, \textit{Land and Lineage in China}, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{136} Wiens, “Lord,” pp. 17–19. Estate managers, bailiffs, and other better off
In Zhejiang in 1661 landlord-sponsored measures also improved conditions for their tenants. Regulations were issued to promote lower rent payments in the case of drought or flood, as well as lower rents for widows, or for tenants who suffered misfortunes. That and a host of other measures—including providing wine at rent collection time, and piglets if the tenants had no animals—were intended to restore the old patrimonial relations of the 16th century to the countryside. In fact, landlords were even urged to adopt tenants if they were in need of support and had no one else to rely upon.  

The government, on the other hand, continued to prohibit such bondage. In 1681 the Kangxi Emperor was to approve a memorial from the governor of Anhui, Xu Guoxiang, who requested that landlords be forbidden from compelling tenants to perform labor services, or from selling them along with the fields. Through the Board of Revenue the emperor consequently ordered that: “From now on if there exist conditions in which the great households of the gentry turn the tenant households or convicted people or poor people through oppression into slaves (mi), the the governor or governor-general of that province will be impeached.”

By the late 17th century, therefore, wealthy households in most parts of China had ceased to employ bondservants; and it was only in scattered places like Huizhou and Ningguo prefectures that shipu (hereditary servants) or ximin (chattel) continued to exist until the Yongzheng period, when they too were sternly prohibited in 1727 and 1728. The net effect of both economic and political

bondservants were to be given two to four times as much land as a regular serf.

138 The most common examples of dependency were to be found in official households. A censor reported to the throne in 1679 that as soon as a person became an official, he immediately built himself a large dwelling, bought fields and gardens, and employed no less than one hundred estate workers (zhuangding) and servants. Wei Qingyuan, Wu Qiyun, and Lu Su, “Qingdai nubci zhidu,” p. 2.
139 Fu, Ming-Qing nongcun, p. 150. See also Mark Elvin, “Market Towns and Waterways,” p. 460.
140 Fu, Ming-Qing nongcun, p. 149; Wiens, “Lord,” pp. 27–29; idem, “Masters
pressures upon the society of the time was thus to bring about a kind of social leveling.\textsuperscript{141} The distance between gentry and commoners, in fact, narrowed. In matters of dress, for instance, there had been a distinct difference between the collars and hats worn by higher degree-holders and the clothing of others during the Chongzhen period. In these early years of Qing rule, however, it became increasingly difficult to tell at a glance if a person was a member of the gentry or not. Even the higher gentry—the shidaifu—began to dress less extravagantly, and status lines blurred.\textsuperscript{142} At the same time, the number of great landowners grew proportionally smaller while owner-cultivators emerged as a new economic stratum, protected by the state and able to contribute its labor through small and petty landholding to agricultural development and economic growth.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{141} Beattie, \textit{Land and Lineage}, p. 17. For the increase in numbers of middle range landlords owning less than 500 \textit{mu} of land in the early Qing, see Kitamura Hirotada, “Minmatsu Shinsho ni okeru jinushi ni tsuite,” p. 17. The character of private property changed in that the appropriation of large private landholdings became more commercialized, being acquired through straightforward market purchase. This represented the end of the “privileged rural sector” of the Ming period; the status of the elite was lowered and that of commoners was raised. Metzger, “Historical Roots,” p. 37.

\textsuperscript{142} Yantang \textit{jianwen zaji}, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{143} Kuang-ching Liu, “World View and Peasant Rebellion,” pp. 315–316; Han, “Qingdai qianqi diannong,” p. 42. The decline of big gentry landlord families in the early Qing gave merchants a chance to invest in agricultural land, which in the Lake Tai area brought a 4–7% return on the capital so invested. The ensuing flow of commercial capital into the agricultural sector helped bring about a rapid recovery of the rural economy in the early Qing. Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 5, pp. 33, 43–44, 52.
As this social leveling took place, and the distance between superior and inferior grew shorter, the practice of toukao (turning oneself into a dependent) became less common. This would probably have happened even without the central government's attack upon enserfment because toukao had arisen in the first place owing to the government's inability to collect taxes efficiently and equitably. That is, once the tax collection system was reformed, so that the gentry could not offer the promise of tax evasion to those who became their dependents, toukao naturally ceased to take place.  

**Tax Reform**

Both under Dorgon and just after Shunzhi took power, efforts had been made to reform the tax collection system. As we have seen, the greatest accomplishment of these early reforms was the partial abolition of the supernumerary Ming military taxes. Another major accomplishment was an increase both in the number of ding (number of adult male taxpayers liable for labor services) and the amount of land registered on the landtax rolls. Between 1645 and 1661, for instance, the number of ding had increased nearly 90% from 10 million to 19 million persons. At the same time, the registered acreage nearly doubled between 1651 and 1661, rising from about 290 million mu to approximately 526 million mu. (See Table 17.) These increases were in no small part due to the administrative tax reforms of the fiscal specialist Wang Hongzuo, who was

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144 A careful analysis of all the local land and household registers now collected in the Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing reveals that the biggest landlord is recorded in 1675 as owning 400 mu (64 acres). The second largest, recorded in 1647, owned 293.6 mu (47 acres). Kang Chao, “New Data on Land Ownership Patterns in Ming-Ch'ing China,” p. 721. In some parts of Jiangnan, rural gentry declined in number as well as influence. A study of Tongxiang district southeast of Lake Tai between Songjiang and Hangzhou shows that between 1449 and 1644 most juren lived in the countryside. From 1644 to 1908 most juren were urban residents. In that area only 10% of the population produced more than 80% of the social elite. Shih, “Peasant Economy,” ch. 3, pp. 54-55.

Table 17.
Expansion of Qing Land Reclamation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five-year increments</th>
<th>Land in qing¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td>2,908,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td>4,781,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1661</td>
<td>5,265,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1666</td>
<td>5,395,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1671</td>
<td>5,459,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1676</td>
<td>4,864,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1681</td>
<td>5,315,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1686</td>
<td>5,903,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1691</td>
<td>5,932,684</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These figures are compiled in Harold Lyman Miller, “Factional Conflict and the Integration of Ch'ing Politics,” p. 77. For the figures from the Veritable Records which are appended at the end of each reign year, see the convenient collection, Qing shilu jingji ziliao jiyao, pp. 10–22.

¹ One qing equals 100 mu.

typical of those officials who collaborated with the Qing because the new dynasty offered them an opportunity to carry out changes that would have been denied them under the Ming.¹⁴⁶ Under the Qing, Wang Hongzuo was given the critical task of compiling new tax quotas, and was then rewarded with a presidency for completing the task successfully.¹⁴⁷ According to the Biographies of Ministers Who Served Both Dynasties (Er chen zhuans):

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¹⁴⁶ Li Hua, “Qingdai qianqi fuyi zhidu de gaige,” p. 102.

Wang Hongzuo, who was an official of only medium examination level performance, would probably never have risen to ministerial rank under the Chongzhen Emperor. Yet the new government recognized his fiscal expertise, which he had acquired while serving as a bureau director in the Ministry of Finance, and then as local taxation supervisor in the city of Datong.
In the first year of Shunzhi he tendered his allegiance and was made military circuit intendant of Kelan. Later he was appointed bureau director in the Board of Revenue. At that time the Central Plain had just been settled. The registers (tuijī) were scattered and lost. The president of the board memoralized about Wang's experience with records, and he was ordered to compile the Fuyi quanshu (Complete text of the land and labor imposts). Later, having been impeached for a crime, he was demoted three ranks, but in 1658, having completed the Fuyi quanshu, he was promoted one rank and named president of the Board of Revenue as well as Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent. He was ordered along with Grand Secretary Bahana to revise the code and statutes (lù lì).148

Lacking the administrative wherewithal to carry out a national land survey, Wang correctly decided that the best way to reform the system at the top was to reevaluate all of the quotas, and then use the Ming surveys to bring ownership records up to date.149 At the same time he integrated some local impositions and transferred a number of items of income to the Board of Revenue.150

148 Er chen zhuan, 5:20.
149 Beginning in 1653 there had been repeated efforts to bring the fish-scale registers up to date. Magistrates were even ordered to measure landholdings themselves, but this was obviously beyond their capability. The one region where an effort was made to use local officials (including local shezhang or community leaders) to carry out actual land surveys was in Henan and Shandong, where Ming princely estates had engrossed so much land, removing thousands of arable mu from the tax rolls. However, the government learned in 1659 that the measurement had simply provided yamen underlings and local magnates with an opportunity to delude the magistrates and carry out false registration. The official who condemned the practice, and who urged the emperor to stop having uncultivated (huang) fields registered was Wei Yijie. Nishimura Genshō, "Shinsho no tochi jōyō ni tsuite," pp. 426–428, 464–465. Generally speaking, the effort to make a land survey in the 1650s and '60s was dropped because of local opposition. Beattie, Land and Lineage, p. 17. For efforts to register Ming imperial and aristocratic estates between 1654 and 1656, see the memorials in Gugong bowuyuan, Qingdai dang'an shiliào congbian, fascicle 4, pp. 160, 168–186.
150 Ray Huang, "Fiscal Administration during the Ming Dynasty," p. 122; Zhang, Qing shi, 122:1463–1464; Yunlu et al., comps., Da Qing huidian, 24:20 and 25:8b–10b.
Although Wang Hongzuo’s reform for the first time created a consistent national tax collection register, it was—like some of the other reforms in the 1650s—an adjustment of the administrative procedures for tax collection rather than a direct attack upon tax evasion and gentry privileges. Yet tax evasion really remained the major reason for the continuing arrears and deficits that had afflicted the Qing government ever since it took over the old Ming capital in Beijing. It was not as though landowners could not af-

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151 Other administrative reforms included the introduction in 1653 of the jie piao (cut receipts) system, whereby the ratepayer was given one half of a tax receipt which informed the householder how many taxes he owed in a given year. After he paid his taxes, he was given the other half as a receipt. This, of course, was intended to prevent yamen underlings and clerks from falsifying tax quotas to extort more money from the people—a problem which continued to plague the dynasty. Two years later, in 1655, the Shunzhi Emperor ordered officials working in the Board of Revenue to not take on cases involving their native provinces. Thus, an official from Fujian, for instance, was ordered placed in charge of taxes for the eight prefectures of Zhili, while any Zhili natives in that bureau were transferred. In 1658, another statute made it a punishable crime for local officials to fail to submit proper registers to the Board of Revenue, or to fail to report accurate figures for a given area. He Bingdi, Zhongguo huiguan shilun, pp. 6–7; Miller, “Factional Conflict,” pp. 75–76; Kung-chuan Hsiao, Rural China, p. 106. By the 19th century, the Jiangnan department of the Board of Revenue was staffed with three Manchu assistant directors, acting as a check on a single Chinese official. This department also had the duty of overseeing the accounts of the imperial silk factories at Nanjing and Suzhou. E-tu Zen Sun, “The Board of Revenue in Nineteenth-Century China,” p. 186.

152 Guo, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji,” p. 132. In 1664, the government estimated that during the period 1644–1660 there had been total deficits of over 27 million taels of silver and over 7 million piculs of rice. Most of these were owing to the Jiangnan tax arrears. Wang Sizhi and Jin Chengji, “Cong Qing chu de lizhi kan fengjian guanliao zhengzhi,” p. 140; Oxnam, Horseback, pp. 219–222; Shen, Zhejiang tongzhi, 87:25a. At first, these deficits were blamed upon lax punishments for “corrupt officials and rapacious underlings.” In 1655, Grand Secretary Jiang Hede complained: “Recently, any time we see a military governor making an impeachment pointing out the matter and listing the indictments, with all the evidence of bribes accumulated, only twenty to thirty percent receive a rescript commanding that there be an investigation and sentencing, so that the case is judicially decided after the bribes have been determined. If it isn’t said that, ‘This is a case of imagina-
ford to pay their taxes, for the Shunzhi period saw a boom in real estate, especially in Jiangnan, where inflated rice prices encouraged landowners to invest as much money as they could in land. Ye Mengzhu described this phenomenon in eastern Jiangnan:

At the beginning of the Shunzhi period, the price of rice rose and people fought to buy property. Property which had already been sold was added to, redeemed or litigated. Fields which had adjoining boundaries changed hands, and were coveted and disputed. And so some families were ruined, while others were catapulted upwards. At Huaqingshi where the fields [yielded] five or six piculs (dou) [of rice per mu], each mu was worth 15 or 16 ounces of silver. Yet at Shanghai, where the fields [only yielded] six or seven piculs, each mu sold for 3 or 4 ounces unequally. Real estate had become so extremely expensive! In the spring of 1680, because the price of rice rose, the price of land increased sharply. Thus in my own town, fields producing a rent of seven piculs reached a price of 2 ounces of silver per mu. There were so many struggling to buy the local fields around them that the price went up to 2 ounces and 5 cash and even reached 3 ounces. Fields at Huaqingshi which yielded a rent of 4 or 5 piculs cost as much as 7 or 8 ounces per mu. There swarmed those who wished to redeem, at a higher price, land which in former years had been relatively worthless.  

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153 If the year 1682 is taken as a base, then a rough price index for 1646 would be 688; and for 1647, 500. The end of the inflation seems to have been between 1657 and 1661. By 1682 the base index of 100 was reached, and in 1698 the price index was still only 131. Yeh-chien Wang, “The Secular Trend of Prices during the Ch’ing Period,” pp. 348, 363.

154 Fu Yiling, Ming-Qing shidai shangren ji shangye ziben, p. 37. For a corresponding boom in cotton prices, see Nishijima Sadao, “Shina shoki mengyō shijō no kōsatsu,” p. 124.
Eventually, when the price of rice fell in the 1680s, a number of these investors were driven into bankruptcy, but before that occurred many Jiangnan landowners—especially those with tax exemption privileges—made huge profits during the early Qing economic boom.  

In order to gain the support of the gentry in the first place, the Qing government had exempted all shengyuan (district degree-holders) and above from corvée. This policy had been established by the Manchus in 1635, and it had been the practice since then to expand, not restrict, gentry tax exemption privileges.  

Now, beginning in 1657, Shunzhi began to reverse that policy. After reviewing the tax exemption system, he ordered that members of the examination-rank gentry, regardless of rank, all receive an equal corvée exemption of just one ding each. Furthermore the exemption applied only to the gentry member in question, and could not be extended to members of his family. Nor was any mention made of land tax (fu) exemptions whatsoever. Next, the emperor moved against abuses of these restricted privileges as such. The following year, 1658, saw the Shunzhi Emperor issuing an edict that blamed the continual tax deficits upon tax evasion pure and simple. “The powerful and famous” were concealing the ac-

155 A censor reported in 1661 that in Suzhou and Songjiang, where land changed hands so quickly that the revised registers were soon out of date, “there are those who sit back and enjoy the fertility and riches of fields that stretch out in every direction. Yet they owe no labor duties whatsoever.” He Changling, Huangchao jingshi wenbian, 30:13a.

156 All juren, for example, were given exemptions of four ding each. In 1648 these privileges were extended according to one’s bureaucratic position, and officials of the first rank enjoyed as many as 30 exemptions each, while even lower office-holders had two exemptions. In addition certain portions of the fu tax were also exempted for bureaucrats. For example, an official of the first rank received a land tax exemption of 30 piculs. Hsiao, Rural China, p. 59.

157 Ibid., pp. 59, 125. “This drastic move must surely have been aimed at ending the selfish and disruptive exploitation of excessive privilege that had helped to bring about such social chaos at the end of the Ming. Its enforcement, though initially difficult, was crucial to the stability and long-term survival of the new government, which may in part explain the severity of Qing measures against continued tax evasion and malpractice by the upper classes.” Beattie, Land and Lineage, p. 70.
tual amount of land which they owned. "From top to bottom everyone makes excuses and no one is willing clearly to come out with concrete figures [for tax quotas]."\(^{158}\) After Wang Hongzuo’s revised *Fuyi quanshu* quotas were published in 1659, local magistrates were required to file a statement of accounts (*zou xiaoce*) for their district, listing the names of all local gentry members and yamen underlings who owed back taxes.\(^{159}\)

As Yang Yongjian had argued, political factionalism in the capital was a manifestation of the literati’s social organizations in the provinces, which in turn protected the gentry’s economic interests at the local level. The attack on gentry clubs, therefore, was made in concert with the attack on gentry privileges. At the same time that magistrates were ordered to report gentrymen in arrears, local officials were also ordered to enforce the 1652 prohibition of societies (*she*). On March 23, 1660, Shunzhi endorsed Yang Yongjian’s memorial, reaffirming that prohibition and strictly forbidding the public display of posters and placards criticizing the government.\(^{160}\) Henceforth, and until the last few years of Qing rule at the turn of the twentieth century, Chinese literati would be forci-

158 Tang Di, “Lüelun Qingdai de diding zhidu,” p. 46; Hsiao, *Rural China*, p. 127. The emperor also discovered some of the ways local landowners concealed the amount of land they held. In north China, and especially in Shandong, for instance, there was considerable discrepancy between the units of measurement used to record the area of Ming imperial or princely manor lands, and commoners’ fields. The former were counted in *mu* measuring 540 steps, and the latter in ones measuring only 240 paces. Obviously, landowners holding property formerly registered on the tax books as part of a princely landholding were paying less than a fifth of the taxes on land registered as having been a commoner’s property. In the south, on the other hand, influential landowners succeeded in removing their own lands from the tax rolls, or in falsely registering the land under other people’s names, or in not reporting at all land which was reclaimed as polder from lakes or river fronts. Tang, “Diding zhidu,” pp. 46–47; Shen, *Zhejiang tongzhi*, 52:27b.

159 Hsiao, *Rural China*, p. 127. As the emperor increasingly blamed gentry tax evasion for the deficits, he correspondingly shifted his attention away from official corruption. In 1658, Censor Biao Gu recommended that customary fees and surcharges be formally reported and legalized. Shunzhi rejected this suggestion on the grounds that it would give the impression that the regime was condoning corruption. Lui, *Corruption*, p. 5.

bly prevented from engaging in spontaneous political movements. In the name of administrative exigencies and practical statesmanship—in the name, in fact, of the harsh imperial despotism of the early Ming—the individual heroism and collective idealism of late Ming political movements were rejected and declared against the regulations of the realm. Law and order would be restored, but at the price of righteous dedication and autonomous social criticism.

It would be an exaggeration to claim that the demise of the she of Jiangnan was entirely the result of imperial persecution. As

161 Later, when southern literati recovered their prominence in the state examinations and began entering the Hanlin Academy (which by 1725 once again fully monopolized the administration of the key civil service tests) in great numbers, some of the integuments of the old gentry networks appeared once more. In reality, however, the networks' influence was greatly attenuated. It has been demonstrated that even though Hanlin membership was attained by academically superior candidates from counties like Wuxian in Suzhou prefecture, these officials seldom rose to third rank and above, and only rare exceptions attained the post of grand secretary. Indeed, the rise of Chen Mingxia in the early Qing was exceptional, given the high proportion of natives from districts such as Wanping (Shuntian) who became grand secretaries and helped bring tongxiang (fellow townsmen) up with them. Though 49 Wuxian scholars became Hanlin members between 1644 and 1795, only 4 of these succeeded in reaching third rank. Brilliant examination results did not win high office. Lui, Hanlin Academy, pp. 128–134.

162 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “The Price of Autonomy,” passim. The Qing thus curbed the voluntary activities and associational spirit of statecraft-minded gentry, causing them to lead “lives pursuing only their own private interest.” The monographs on “manners and customs” in Qing local gazetteers consequently lack the same sense of the gentry’s local duty and social mission that informs corresponding sections in late Ming gazetteers. Mori, “Gentry,” pp. 52–53. This was concretely manifested in the management of local waterworks by the guandu minban (official supervision, popular management) system in which deputy magistrates now organized peasants and farmers into a labor force, instead of leaving hydraulic responsibility up to the gentry. Hamashima Atsutoshi, “Konan no u ni kansuru jakkan no kōsatsu,” pp. 123–130; idem, “Rural Society in Jiangnan during the Ming Dynasty,” p. 12; Pierre-Etienne Will, “Un Cycle hydraulique en Chine,” p. 280; Hamashima Atsutoshi, “The Organization of Water Control in the Kiangnan Delta in the Ming Period,” p. 81.

163 Quite apart from government policy, the urban social setting which had fos-
we have seen, by the middle 1650s the literary and philosophical societies were already much weakened by divisive squabbling. Wu Weiye's bold attempt in 1653 to reunite all the clubs of Jiangnan into the Great Society of the Ten Counties had already failed well before the crackdown of the 1660s. Nevertheless, the fact remained that under the Shunzhi Emperor's new prohibition, local degree-holders were no longer immune from arrest by their district magistrate if they were found guilty of club membership. The emperor's endorsement had given teeth to the original prohibition, and although literary societies did not disappear altogether, they ceased being ubiquitous expressions of gentry social organization.\textsuperscript{164} In fact, whereas members of the elite had once identified each other as belonging to such-and-such a club, henceforth literati adopted the practice of identifying themselves as simply being fellow students. It was at this time, then, that the concept of t\-ong\-x\-ue (fellow students) gained such currency, lasting down into the present day.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{164} In Zhejiang, for example, there was later formed the Association to Discuss the Classics (Jiang jing hui) among the circle of literati surrounding Huang Zongxi. In 1667, these scholars, who included Wan Sitong and Wan Sida, also revived the Zhengren Shuyuan (Witness Academy) of Liu Zongzhou. Ono, “Shinsho no shisō tōsei,” p. 636.

\textsuperscript{165} “This custom [of mentioning club membership as a way of gaining access to the powerful] subsequently changed. Hence, they no longer called themselves tongmeng (fellow members), but rather tongxue (fellow students).” Yantang jianwen zaji, p. 60. Another common term, tongnian (same year), indicated that scholars had passed the exams simultaneously. Critics of the examination system attacked this form of identification because it implied that the examination relationship held priority over family ties and respect for the aged. Paul S. Ropp, Dissent in Early Modern China, p. 109. As several scholars have pointed out, after scholarly clubs were prohibited by the Qing
The Monarchy’s Attack upon Gentry Privileges

During the next reign’s Oboi regency (1661–1669), Shunzhi was made to seem an overly ardent protector of the Chinese gentry, especially the southern gentry. In fact, a close study of his policies shows that it was he who initiated and extended the attack on gentry privileges that was carried to an extreme conclusion later, after his premature death, by the nativist Manchu nobles who served under Oboi. Yet, Shunzhi was not unwilling to seek a compromise with the interests of local elites. Before he fell ill early in 1661, probably stricken with consumption, he had heeded the advice of Wang Hongzuo and of Civil Appointments President Sun Tingquan to be relatively lenient toward Jiangnan landowners who were deeply in arrears. Had the emperor lived longer, the Manchus’ attack on gentry privileges might have even abated. But on February 5, 1661, three days after contracting smallpox, the Shunzhi Emperor passed away, barely 24 sui old. On his death-

government, the substitution for these literary associations was patronage by powerful bureaucrats. The hierarchical relationship between individual patrons and small coteries of followers changed the tone and quality of gentry society during the early Qing, producing more dependence and servility than had characterized the behavior of “men of culture” during the late Ming. Tom Fisher, “Loyalist Alternatives in the Early Ch’ing,” p. 42; Lynn A. Struve, “Ambivalence and Action,” p. 348; idem, “The Hsü Brothers and Semi-official Patronage of Scholars in the K’ang-hsi Period,” pp. 29–31, 39. H. Lyman Miller, “Fathers and Sons,” pp. 1–5. For the importance of political patrons to local elites, see Beattie, Land and Lineage, p. 74.

166 Jerry Dennerline, “Fiscal Reform and Local Control,” p. 112. It has been argued that as long as there was a separate corvée element in the general tax system the state had an interest in limiting the degree of landlord control because it competed with landlords for the service of tenants and peasantry. When, during the Ming–Qing transition period, corvée was commuted to monetary payments and the land became the crucial unit of taxation, the state had a much stronger interest in supporting the landlord with respect to the tenant. Thus, there may have been a growing convergence of landlord and state interests during the late Ming and early Qing. Linda Grove and Joseph W. Esherick, “From Feudalism to Capitalism,” p. 409.

167 Shunzhi was already exhausted by the elaborate funeral ceremonies for his beloved consort Xiaoxian, daughter of Osi of the Donggo clan. Xiaoxian,
bed he had named his seven year-old son, Xuanye, his heir; and since the future Kangxi Emperor was too young to rule in person, Shunzhi had also named four regents headed by Oboi. It was these Manchu nobles—all of whom were determined to tolerate no opposition from the literati of Jiangnan—who carried the campaign against gentry privileges to its furthest point. In March, 1661, when a group of Suzhou gentrymen took advantage of commemorative ceremonies for the dead emperor in the local Confucian temple to present a request to Governor Zhu Guozhi, asking that he dismiss an especially heavy-handed magistrate, the Han bannerman had the petitioners thrown in jail. Awaiting them as cellmates were some of those arrested earlier as agents of Coxinga, and among all these together a total of eighteen people were publicly decapitated. Shortly after this draconian response, which became known as the Temple Lament Case (Ku miao an), another blow was struck by the new government. Three thousand gentry landowners in Jiangnan and Zhejiang were declared tax dodgers

who was 22 years old, had died four months earlier, and at the time of her cremation, Shunzhi had ordered thirty members of the dead woman’s entourage to take their own lives, reviving a Manchu custom which the Chinese abhorred. George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants, pp. 352–353.

168 On February 21, 1661, the censor for the Fujian circuit in the Board of Revenue memorialized about the tax arrears in Jiangnan, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi, pointing out the resulting difficulty of obtaining sufficient military rations. In response, six days later, the Oboi regents ordered the Boards of Civil Appointments and Revenue to demote and transfer officials whose districts were in arrears. On March 16, Governor Zhu Guozhi recommended that officials serving in the provinces be scrutinized by the same evaluation process that applied to those serving in the capital. The throne agreed, and two weeks later ordered punishments inflicted on officials who failed to meet their tax quotas. By April 7, however, the regents had come to realize that stern measures against their own bureaucracy would not suffice because of the tacit alliance in many locales between local landowners and officials. “[The arrears] are generally because the gentry holds the law in contempt and refuses to pay taxes. Local officials are partial to [the gentry] and too lenient. They do not enforce the law to the utmost in collecting taxes.” From then on all governors were ordered to “apply heavy punishments” to tax evaders, regardless of their station in society. Da Qing lichao shilu, Shengzu chao, 1:15, 16b–17, 23a, and 2:1b. The quotation is from 2:3b–4a.

169 Li, Guochao qixian leizheng, 338:9.
and thrown in jail, where they were humiliated or beaten by soldiers and policemen. Another ten thousand gentrymen were also implicated in the Statement of Accounts Case (Zou xiao an); they were declared in arrears and therefore in disgrace, and were stripped of their gentry titles and degrees.¹⁷⁰ Thoroughly cowed, the gentry of the lower Yangzi valley realized that they would have to cooperate fully with the new Qing government in exposing tax-evasion procedures in order to retain their own limited tax-exemption privileges.¹⁷¹

Once the Statement of Accounts Case had been thoroughly prosecuted and the gentry brought to heel, the central government backed off somewhat, and a compromise began to emerge in the form of the new tax registration system called jun tian jun yi (equal fields, equal labor services).¹⁷² Reorganizing the lijia system according to land ownership, so that the amount of taxes and labor services were proportionate to the amount of land owned, local officials in Jiangnan divided the land into standardized units for registration and strictly limited the responsibilities of landowners without gentry privileges.¹⁷³ The new system took hold slowly, starting first in Songjiang prefecture and not being applied to the

¹⁷⁰ Da Qing lichao shilu, Shengzu chao, 3:3a. The memorial giving details of the arrest was received on June 28, 1661. The crackdown came on the heels of a major reform and reorganization of the maritime defense system of the Su-Song area, involving the expensive construction of bridges, roads, ramparts, and boats. These orders were issued on May 22, 1661. Ibid., 2:21. See also Li, Guochao qixian leizheng.

¹⁷¹ Meng, Xinshi congkan, pp. 11–13; Wakeman, “Evolution of Local Control,” pp. 9–13. According to a censorial report, methods of tax evasion included shifting residences across county lines, tax-farming (baolan), falsely pretending to hold examination-degree rank, and setting up estates in neighboring xian. Da Qing lichao shilu, Shengzu chao, 3:16b.

¹⁷² Ibid., 3:15b–16a. The social position of the Jiangnan gentry was seriously undermined for at least a generation by the demeaning treatment it received. See also Taniguchi Kikuo, “Peasant Rebellions in the Late Ming,” p. 60; Yamamoto Eishi, “Historical Studies in Japan, 1976,” p. 19.

¹⁷³ Da Qing lichao shilu, Shengzu chao, 4:2a. Tax quotas were also rationalized and assessed in a single lump sum on the land. See the memorial dated August 24, 1661, in Gugong bowuyuan, Qingdai dang’an shiliao congbian, fascicle 4, pp. 3–4; and see also Li Hua, “Qingdai qianqi fuyi,” pp. 102–103; Hamashima, “Rural Society,” p. 13.
entire province until 1674 after the Three Feudatories Rebellion had broken out. But gradually a new system of tax registers was established, land was properly recorded therein, and liability was attached to the individual household without relying upon the old tax headman system that the Qing had inherited from the Ming. Thanks to this thorough restructuring of the tax collection system in Jiangnan, which provided such a large part of the empire's revenue, and thanks also to revised quota arrangements in the north, the revenue of the dynasty was appreciably increased just at a time when its military budget was also growing. In 1651 the income of the Qing government had been 5.7 million piculs of grain, and 21.1 million taels of silver. By the 1680s, the government would be receiving 7 million piculs of grain, and 27 million taels of silver, representing an increase of about twenty-three percent. It would

174 Hamashima, “Rural Society,” p. 11.
175 New registers were ordered compiled on January 12, 1662. Da Qing lichao shilu, Shengzu chao, 5:13b–14a.
176 Miller, “Factional Conflict,” pp. 80–83; Dennerline, “Fiscal Reform,” pp. 112–113; Elvin, “Market Towns,” p. 455. Revenues also increased because better land reclamation policies were initiated in provinces like Henan in 1661 in order to get land on to the tax rolls. That is, peasants were pardoned from labor services in order to encourage them to register their land and thus, while ostensibly avoiding disputes over litigation, create a property record for the taxation officials. Princely estates were converted into regular minhu or commoner lands throughout the north, beginning around the capital, and then extending to Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Gansu, and Shaanxi. Tang, “Diding zhidu,” p. 47. According to an August 3, 1661, memorial from Cheke, President of War, the military budget that year for the first time exceeded 5.7 million taels because of the hostilities in Fujian. The Assembly of Princes and High Officials therefore decided to reintroduce the extra military taxes (lian xiang) of the late Ming. This was endorsed by the throne, even though the government realized how difficult it would be to collect these taxes. Gugong bowuyuan, Qingdai dang’an shiliang congbian, fascicle 4, pp. 1–2, 6–21. On December 23, 1661, taxes in Jiangnan were increased by one fen per mu. Once again, many governors and viceroys reported how hard it would be to impose these surcharges, but the order was respected. Ibid., pp. 27, 29–30. See also Guo, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji,” p. 134.
177 Huang, “Fiscal Administration,” p. 122. In 1663 the government attempted to carry out a national land survey, but this was successfully resisted by many locales which simply held to pre-conquest tax quotas, arguing that
take another three-quarters of a century for Qing tax revenues to reach the levels of the early Wanli era, when foreign silver was flowing into China at such a rapid rate; but the foundation for the government fiscal surpluses of the late Kangxi and Yongzheng reigns had been laid. 178 The early Qing state was now financially in the black, and had created the institutional wherewithal to extract resources with reasonable equity and efficiency from the population and lands which the central government now controlled. 179

In the history of autocracies, the despot usually builds his power by creating a bureaucracy to destroy the feudal privileges of the aristocracy. In China, ever since the 10th or 11th centuries when bureaucrats replaced the great aristocratic lineages of the Six Dynasties and Tang periods as the dominant elite, the monarchy's greatest competitor for power was the examination-degree gentry itself. Although its status and ranks were always conferred by the crown, the gentry constantly attempted to make its temporary privileges permanent ones. Because it was ultimately dependent upon the military force, political legitimacy, and legal authority of the emperor, however, the bureaucratic gentry never went so far as to infeudate itself. But even after the powerful 14th-century despot Ming Taizu created an imperial military nobility and broke the economic hold of the great landowners of the lower Yangzi while replacing the bureaucrats' hereditary rights of recommendation with civil service examination selection procedures, the gentry continued to extend its informal local power, and either broke the law or stretched its tenets in order to acquire serfs and quasi-enslaved tenants. By the time the Ming fell, weakened by the gen-

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178 Miller, "Factional Conflict," p. 78. By 1663, Tongcheng's tax revenues had once again reached late Ming levels. Beattie, Land and Lineage, pp. 68–69.

179 John Robertson Watt, "Theory and Practice in Chinese District Administration," p. 378. During the early 1660s, the government also tried to curb the illegal exactions of yamen underlings and prohibited the imposition of wastage and meltage fees. Gugong bowuyuan, Qingdai dang'an shiliao congbian, fascicle 4, pp. 4–5; Da Qing lichao shilu, Shengzu chao, 4:2–3 and 5:8b–9.
certain kind of solution

try's usurpation of its full powers of taxation and conscription, some statecraft scholar-officials were even calling for formal recognition of local gentry administrative powers, while they tried to transform culturally legitimate educational institutions into illegitimate bases of partisan political power.

This movement toward gentry home rule was halted by the Qing, partly because the empire's literati sorely needed Manchu military help against the rebels and warlords, and partly because the new Manchu-Chinese state had two sets of allies to call upon in place of its own tribal aristocracy to curb the bureaucrats' economic privileges and political pretensions. The first of these allies was a hybrid—neither purely aristocratic nor purely bureaucratic: the Han bannermen who constituted a new supra-elite mostly loyal to the throne, and who stood between the Manchu nobility and the Chinese literati. The second set of allies was less categorically defined, owing its coherence to the political alignments of the Dorgon regency when regional interests set northern and southern civil officials sharply apart. Because of the northerners' animus—a brief period of their ascendancy when the Ming fell—against the again rapidly rising literati of the south, the leading ministers of the time were momentarily diverted from preserving the general rights of bureaucrats in general to attacking the special interests of southern gentrymen in particular. The 1660–1661 attack on the Jiangnan gentry, which had such far-reaching consequences, was thus the result both of Manchu nativism and of Han regionalism. The economic changes that occurred as a result

180 Of 10 Chinese grand secretaries serving in late 1660 and early 1661, 7 were from Zhili (Hebei), Shandong, or Shanxi. The northern Chinese who monopolized the grand secretary positions from 1622 to 1675 were mainly jinshi from the early 1640s. Then, beginning in the late 1670s and on into the late 1680s, the next examination generation of top-ranking candidates took over the Hanlin Academy and the Southern Study (Nan shufang) of the Kangxi Emperor. These men were mainly southerners who had passed the palace examinations during the heyday of Chen Zhilin and Chen Mingxia. For discussions of regional provenance and factionalism during the Kangxi period, see Kessler, K'ang-hsi, p. 31; Miller, "Factional Conflict," pp. 117–121; Oxnam, Horseback, pp. 208–210.
stemmed as much from the political contingencies of Qing rule as from necessities imbedded deep within Chinese society itself. In their own purposeful way, the barbarians were, after all, a certain kind of solution to the institutional crisis of late imperial Chinese despotism.  

181 The title of this chapter and its last lines are, of course, inspired by Cavafy’s famous poem “Expecting the Barbarians.” See C. P. Cavafy, Poimata, 1896–1918, p. 108.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN

From Ming to Qing Loyalism

Centralization easily imposes an aspect of regularity on day to day business; it can regulate the details of social control skilfully; check slight disorders and petty offenses; maintain the status quo of society, which cannot properly be called either decadence or progress; and keeps society in that state of administrative somnolence which administrators are in the habit of calling good order and public tranquility. In a word, it excels at preventing, not at doing.

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 91.

The effect of the 1660–1661 attack by the government was to unnerve completely the Jiangnan gentry, which was crushed and humiliated by the experience.1 By now, serious thought of loyalist resistance to the Qing government had nearly dissipated. To be sure, there continued to be sporadic incidents of social banditry.

1 According to the monograph on popular customs in the Guangxu edition of the Kunshan and Xinyang gazetteer: “As a result the cunning and reckless rogues among the masses saw that there was nothing to fear from members of the gentry (shenshi) and treated them with contempt. The gentry members as well bowed their heads in acquiescence, and customs at once changed.” The same is reported in the Taicang gazetteer: after the shidaifu were terrorized by the police, “they gradually lost all respect in the alleys and lanes.” Cited in: Guo Songyi, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji yu Qing chu zhongyang jiquan de maodun ji qi fazhan he bianhua,” p. 135. See also: Tsing Yuan, “Urban Riots and Disturbances,” p. 300.
Although the notorious Zhang San was finally captured by Governor Han Xinkang’s men in the early 1660s, it would be several years more before the Lake Tai region was finally cleared of outlaws by the Qing authorities in Suzhou. But Ming loyalism as a political cause now fell into the hands of charlatans and poseurs. In 1666, for instance, it was discovered that two self-styled Ming descendants named Zhu Guangfu and Zhu Gongjian had been distributing Ming commissions in Pinghu (Jiaxing prefecture) and Changshu (Suzhou prefecture). At first, these elaborately sealed and fancily written documents reminded the governor’s yamen of the kinds of commissions that had been circulated before Coxinga’s invasion. But even the Qing authorities, hyper-sensitive as they were to tales of Ming loyalist conspiracy, quickly realized that this was more of a confidence game than a political plot. The two Zhus were actually selling their commissions (which promised high office after a Ming restoration) through a ring of medical students and alchemists led by one Yan Junfu who made his living by persuading the gullible that he could manufacture cinnabar. Along with the spurious Ming commissions was discovered a gaudy bangle which the swindlers claimed to be a royal gem from the Zhou period. Their Ming loyalist plot, in short, was a theatrical affair: bunco fit for dreamers; fantasy for misfits.

3 Ming-Qing shiliao, ding, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 138–139. Another example of this sort of fantastic conspiracy involved two of the sons of Qi Biaojia—Qi Bansun and Qi Lisun—who were famous for their collection of rare books and endless parties. “All of the sons were notables who loved to gather together guests to explore the classics. On all sides were the hairpins and shoes [of literati], the prime choice of the sleekest of the rich endlessly meeting together. Now the two young gentlemen, elder and younger brother, have assumed their responsibilities [as heirs to this family], fine saplings of our ancient land, and even the butchers and peddlers of the marketplaces have been elevated by them. Their family inhabits Mei villa at Shanyin [in Shaoxing], and their country house is on Yu Mountain. It is impossible to ascertain how many wide carts arrive on the heels [of each other], climbing up through the pavilion’s double walls in a long line.” Xie Guozhen, Ming-Qing zhi ji dangshe yundong kao, p. 235. Around 1660, these two idle men fell in with an adventurer
The Last Ming Loyalists

For the lyrically minded, the history of the fall of the Ming house had already begun to shimmer in a tragi-romantic glow. Wu Weiye, who had retired from the Qing Imperial Academy in 1657 at the time of the Jiangnan examination scandal with most of his property confiscated, evoked the beautiful Chen Yuanyuan for whom Wu Sangui was supposed to have betrayed the realm.  

Have you not seen the lady of the inner chamber arising from a night of love?  
The lady of Yue is like a flower one can never see enough.  
Along the perfumed path, buried now in dust, birds sing each to each.  
The Verandah of Musical Sandals is gone to moss, empty and emerald green.  
Altering *yu*, changing *gong*: ten thousand *li* of sorrow.  

named Wei Geng, who was a commoner from Ciqi along the southern shore of Hangzhou Bay. Wei had set up a secret association named *Bo she* after the district in northern Anhui, and spoke darkly of his plans to unite all the loyalists of the region again under a single banner. Titillated, the two Qi brothers invited him to their country house. Wei would grow surly and unpleasant unless his appetites were satisfied, and the brothers had to provide wine, prostitutes, and books on swordfighting to keep the bravo happy. They found this distasteful, but "for the sake of loyalty and duty" they maintained the relationship. Eventually, in 1662, the Qing police put Wei Geng on a wanted list, and the two brothers were arrested as accomplices. The Qi family was subsequently impoverished by the bribes it paid, trying to secure the young men's release; Lisun died in captivity; and, after exile in Liaodong, Bansun finally managed to regain his freedom in 1677 and returned to Jiangsu to become a monk. Xie, *Dangshe yundong*, pp. 235–236. See also Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, p. 126.

4 Wu Weiye, who was then in charge of compiling and editing the *Sacred Edicts* of emperors Taizu and Taizong, requested leave in 1656 to mourn for his dead adopted mother, Madame Zhang. He reached Taicang in the second lunar month of 1657. When the examination scandal broke out, Wu wrote some poetry lamenting the punishment meted out to several of his friends. Ma Daoyuan, *Wu Meicun nianpu*, pp. 62–66.

5 Wu Weiye, "Yuanyuan qu," in Wu Weiye, *Wushi jilan*, 7 *shang*, p. 9a. My translation was done after reading Ann Waltner's version in her essay "Wu
Such haunting nostalgia was overshadowed by Wu’s sense of guilt, which he wore like a shroud for having, after all, collaborated with the Manchus.

So many stalwart friends, men of high constancy;
And I, because I wavered at the crucial moment,
I hide in the reeds on borrowed time.
Burn moxa between the brows, clear the nose with gourd stalks,
Nothing brings relief
As old disasters come again thousandfold.
Too hard to sacrifice wife and children, cast them off like an old shoe,
And still I can boast not a penny to my name.
Why are some lives so flawed
When others find wholeness?  

As if to atone, Wu Weiye dedicated many of his poems to the memories of dead loyalists. He also became interested in Buddhism, and during the years before his death he studied with the monk Hongchu, who was also Qian Qianyi’s teacher. But he continued to spend most of his time with fellow poets like Peng

Weije’s ‘Yuan Yuan Ch’ü’ and Ming Loyalty,” p. 7. References are to Xi Shi, the lovely courtesan given by the king of Yue to Fu Chai, king of Wu, in the fifth century B.C. Enraptured, Fu Chai spent all the moneys in his treasury on Xi Shi, who then secretly informed the king of Yue. After being defeated by the armies of Yue, Fu Chai committed suicide. So too did Xi Shi when she finally recognized her role in this famous intrigue. The “Verandah of Musical Sandals” refers to Xi Shi walking upon a specially hollowed porch of white marble on earthen jars which left a melodic sound like bells ringing. Yu and Gong are the first and last notes on the pentatonic scale.

6 Cyril Birch, Anthology of Chinese Literature, 2:134.
7 See, for example, Wu Weiye, Wushi jilan, 15 xia:13b. Wu Weiye’s poetry consistently reflects a sense of guilt for not having committed suicide when so many of his fellow classmates died in 1644–1655. For example: “Old friends in days past sacrificed their lives. / How dared I die while relatives survived? / My melancholy now is distress from then: / The conscience-stricken historian wants to follow them.” Wu Weiye, “Melancholy of an Old Remnant,” cited in Sun Kekuan, “Wu Meicun beixing qianhou shi,” p. 3.
8 Huang Zhijun, comp., Jiangnan tongzhi, 174:7b. Hongchu was a disciple of the famous Jiangnan Buddhist thinker Sanfeng.
Shidu, Wu Hancha, and Chen Qinian—the “Three Phoenixes of the Left Bank of the Yangzi”—in his new home on the estate of a wealthy friend. Publicly, he may have seemed carefree. “There, screened and shaded by vegetation, copses and streams in plenty, he met with gentlemen friends from all parts, drinking and singing away till the end of his days, weariness forgotten.” But privately Wu Weiye was pervaded by a deep melancholy that seems to have been associated with his decision not to commit suicide in 1644 when the Chongzhen Emperor took his own life. On his deathbed in 1671, Wu Weiye asked for brush and paper, and he wrote:

In all my life my lot has been such that in all things there was anxiety and dread. There was not a single moment when I was not experiencing distress. There was not a single place where I did not taste hardship. Truly I am the most unfortunate man under Heaven. After I die, I want you to dress me as a monk and bury me near the Dengwei and Lingyan mountains. Set up a round stone in front of the tomb with an inscription that says: “The tomb of Wu Meicun the poet. Do not make this a shrine. Do not solicit subscriptions from others.”

He was 63 sui when he died.

For Wu Weiye the fall of the Ming had become personified in an ancient and romantic archetype: the seductive courtesan who distracts statesmen from their public responsibilities and brings about the fall of the realm. In this way, the pathos of the loss of a kingdom could excite poetic appreciation and intensify aesthetic sensibility. As Zhuo Erkan, the seventeenth-century compiler of an

9 Wu, Wushi jilan, tan sou shang, p. 2a.
11 Ma, Wu Meicun nianpu, p. 78. Dengwei Mountain is in western Wuxian. Lingyan Mountain is below that, near Lake Tai. Zhao Erxun, ed., Qing shi gao, 117:8a.
12 Many must have shared this form of understanding of the fall of the Ming. Sympathetic identification with the failure of Southern Ming loyalism was also quite common. When Peach Blossom Fan opened in Beijing in the autumn of 1699, and played on to packed audiences through the spring of 1700, many wept openly during the performances. The author, Kong Shangren, wrote
From “Figures in Landscapes” by Chen Hongshou (1599–1652). The painting juxtaposes starkly different styles, deliberately creating a sense of archaism that was designed to evoke a cultural past Ming loyalists sought to preserve. This was probably painted not long before the artist’s death after the Manchus had consolidated their hold over northern China. Courtesy of the Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.
anthology of Ming loyalist poetry (Ming mo sibai jia yimin shi), put it: "When the destiny of a kingdom is at the point of transfer, that is the time when the birth of men of genius is unusually common." 13 Literati of less poetic talent than Wu Weiye often turned to historical writing both to enshrine the events of 1644 and to lay them to rest. "As I look back on that period," Huang Zongxi once wrote, "everyone—no matter who it was—liked to speak of being an historian." 14 This generation of Ming loyalists, then, was extremely self-conscious about its own history, and its members divided their lives distinctly into what came before and after 1644. Some, like the famous figure painter Chen Hongshou (1599–1652), adopted new names after the fall of the Ming that reflected their own tragic sense of losing part of themselves—in Chen’s case, Huichi, "repenting belatedly." 15

Others, like the historian Zhang Dai, radically changed their style of life. Zhang, who was the descendant of an eminent Shao-

then that: "In the capital the show Taohua shan was on everyday. . . . But amid the luxurious setting and the music and singing of the opera, there were people in the audience who could not help sobbing; they were the Ming loyalists." Chun-shu Chang and Hsueh-lun Chang, "K’ung Shang-Jen and his T’ao-Hua Shan,” p. 322.

13 John D. Langlois, Jr., “Ku Ssu-li, the Yuan-shih-hsuan, and Loyalism in Late 17th-Century China,” p. 21. There was great interest in transitional figures like Song Lian, the early Ming statesman who may also have served the Yuan. Seen as a perpetuator of Chinese culture during a period of foreign rule, Song Lian was described by Wu Weiye as having "topped the world in literary composition. When it was time to meet the sage [ruler, the Ming founder], he assisted in the administration of government and helped to establish the glorious order which was enacted in antiquity and from which proceeded the civil values. . . . Had it not been for the frail men of the hills and marshes, who would there have been to carry on this strand (siwen), to permit it to await the rise of brilliant men to bring glory and greatness to it?” (Siwen comes from Analects IX.5, where Confucius says that in the absence of a sage-king, culture must be in the safekeeping of worthy men.) John D. Langlois, Jr., “Chinese Culturalism and the Yuan Analogy,” p. 372.


xing lineage (his great-grandfather had been *primus* of 1571) noted for its love of opulence, had before 1644 been unabashedly devoted to the enjoyment of handsome pages and pretty serving maids; of opera, music, and fireworks; of fashionable clothes, high cuisine, and fine teas. After the Qing conquest of Zhejiang, where he served in the loyalist court of Zhu Yihai, Prince of Lu, Zhang Dai renounced all these pleasures. Abandoning his family’s villas, his library, his rare antiques, Zhang Dai took to the mountains as a hermit to compose his famous history of the Ming, *Shigui cangshu*. He wrote at the time:

Now I am a man without a country and without a family. I have no place to go but into the wilderness, the mountains, with my hair unbraided, looking as terrible as a wild man. . . . Thinking in repentance of the luxurious days in my noble family, I am going to wear a bamboo helmet over my head and put bamboo buckets on my feet instead of hairpin and shoes. I shall do this in repentance of my past extravagance.  

Whether or not one practiced such extreme repentance—a sentiment clearly inspired by guilt over the fall of the Ming—loyalists all observed the caesura and changed their lives accordingly.  

16 Wu, “Tung Ch’i-ch’ang,” p. 261. See also Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 53–54. In many such instances, Ming loyalists consciously invoked the memory of 13th-century Southern Song *yimin* (left-over subjects) like the painter Gong Kai or the essayist Deng Mu, who coined the famous slogan: *cheng wang, bai kou* (successful, a king; defeated, a bandit). Wai-kam Ho, “Chinese under the Mongols,” pp. 93–95.  

17 Some, of course, did try to carry on into the Qing the activities they had enjoyed under the Ming. Li Yu, the reputed author of the erotic novel *Rou putuan* (*Prayer mat of flesh*) and the townsman of Mao Xiang, continued to be a kind of professional literary guest. His plays were produced in the houses of high officials by troupes of singing girls whom he maintained after the conquest. After a trip to Beijing in 1657, he returned to Nanjing and opened a bookstore near the south gate where he built the famous Mustard Seed Garden (*Jiezi yuan*). Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 495–496. Many scholars, especially of the second generation, were intensely ambivalent about serving the Qing government. Lynn A. Struve, “Ambivalence and Action,” pp. 326–331.
Huang Zongxi autographed his own portrait: "First persecuted as an opposition party leader, next outlawed as a fugitive rebel, finally respected as a scholar, I have lived three ages. Am I a child of the age or am I a man of multiple incarnations?"  

Scholarship was certainly one outlet for frustrated Ming loyalists. "All of these men harbored great gifts in their breasts which they were unable to carry into action," wrote Zhuo Erkan. "It was because they were frustrated that they entrusted [these gifts] to

18 Lin Mousheng, Men and Ideas, p. 188. In his later years Huang Zongxi revived the philosophy of his teacher Liu Zongzhou, whose academy he re-opened in Shaoxing in 1667. Huang wrote: "When I was young I had ambitions of achieving success through the examination system but, failing in this, I turned to Liu [Zongzhou] and became one of his many disciples. Later, after Heaven had moved and the Earth turned, and I was living on the verge of starvation deep in the mountains, I got out his books and read them. Thus after twenty years the clouds of ignorance were slowly dispelled from my mind, and I came to realize how much I had lost through my earlier indifference to my Master's teaching." Quoted in William Theodore de Bary, A Plan for the Prince, p. 42. Two kinds of Ming loyalty have been identified: "generational accommodation," which would characterize figures like Huang Zongxi and Gu Yanwu, who encouraged their sons and nephews to work for the Qing government; and "ethnic fundamentalism," which is associated with Lü Liuliang, who forfeited his own shengyuan degree and believed the next generation should not compromise itself by serving foreign conquerors. Tom Fisher, "Loyalist Alternatives in the Early Ch'ing," pp. 37–43. Huang Zongxi and Lü, originally friends, quarreled over the disposition of Qi Biaojia's library, the famous Dansheng tang. Ibid., p. 9. See also T. S. Fisher, "The Life of Lü Liu-liang," pp. 38–41.

19 Etienne Balazs once made the point that many surviving loyalists had in effect two separate lives: "the first part filled with feverish political activities, and the second part—longer, more important, but uneventful and silent about public affairs—being the period of creative work." Etienne Balazs, Political Theory and Administrative Reality in Traditional China, p. 19. And Elman notes: "After the Manchu takeover in 1644, southern literati led the way in solving the dilemmas posed by the collapse of Ming rule. Their turn away from moral cultivation to precise scholarship was a key element in the Chinese response to the Ming collapse." Benjamin Elman, "Ch'ing Dynasty 'Schools' of Scholarship," p. 6. See also Paul S. Ropp, Dissent in Early Modern China, p. 47. For suggestive remarks about a similar "cooling off" in European thought at that time, see William J. Bouwsma, "The Secularization of Society in the Seventeenth Century," p. 10; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System II, p. 33.
words and refused to have anything to do with profane affairs. Naturally they devoted all their strengths to scholarship."  

20 Scholarship enforced a certain detachment upon survivors of the resistance; and history—*their* history—was objectified.  

21 That, incidentally, was why the Kangxi Emperor's decision to hold the special examination in 1679 (the *boxue hongru*) and then to invite the successful candidates to help compose the official *Ming History*, was such a vital gesture of welcome to the loyalists.  

22 Even if many of them could not publicly join in the compilation, they could at least submit their own works on the late Ming through friends who had accepted Kangxi's invitation.  

23 And in that way, through the *Ming History* project, their own historical existence was au-

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21 This desire to objectify their history was the main motivation behind Zhuang Tinglong's compilation of a collective Ming history in the 1640s. However, the unofficial *Ming shi jilüe* (Summary of Ming history) went too far in the direction of loyalist sentiments by using Ming reign dates and calling the early Manchu emperors by their personal names. Eventually, in 1663, 70 of the compilers and publishers were executed and their families sent off as slaves to the northeast. Robert B. Oxnam, "Policies and Institutions of the Oboi Regency," pp. 281–282.

22 The exam was announced in February, 1678, during the middle of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories when Kangxi was hoping to keep the old Ming loyalists from joining Wu Sangui. It was actually held in April, 1679, and of the 152 candidates who sat, 50 passed. Eighty percent (40) of the ones who passed came from Jiangnan and Zhejiang. This was perhaps only just. Wen Ruilin, author of the *Nanjiang yishi*, felt that the success of the sons and grandsons of loyalists was the way Heaven recompensed those who had fallen for the Ming. Struve, "Uses of History," p. 41. Kessler, *K'ang-hsi*, p. 158; Miller, "Factional Conflict," p. 97. Struve, "Ambivalence," pp. 328–329; idem, "The Hsü Brothers and Semi-official Patronage of Scholars in the K'ang-hsi Period," *passim*; Hellmut Wilhelm, "The Po-hsieh hung-ju Examination of 1679." In 1680, Huang Zongxi wrote to Grand Secretary Xu Yuanwen, who had just been appointed director of the Ming History Office, and requested a position for his son to work in the compilation. De Bary, *Plan for the Prince*, p. 44.

23 In effect, the 1679 examination provided a staff of historians for the *Ming shi* because it was held at precisely the right time for recruiting the next generation of scholars. Almost all of the historians who worked on that project were only ten or fifteen years old at the time of the initial Manchu conquest. Struve, "Hsü Brothers," pp. 16–17.
induced authenticated officials out fiercely ate fractionating controversies tors accomplished, accomplish.^^ achievements commitment any Southern gendered the Zongxi's autograph suggests. Yet that same movement had also, in the fierce competition for political power during the late Ming, engendered an intense factionalism that played as large a part as any other factor in bringing down the dynasty. And those bitter controversies had continued on through the years of rule of the Southern Ming, dividing the Nanjing court of the Prince of Fu, fractionating the followers of the Prince of Gui. The loyalists' commitment to remote moral goals had, in brief, caused immediate political disorders. Furthermore, while they had remained fiercely opposed to government service under the new Qing dynasty, they were also able to observe the concrete day-by-day achievements of those fellow Chinese who by collaborating with the Manchus fulfilled their vocation as literati, actually carrying out the fiscal, legal, and economic reforms that late-Ming scholar-officials would have liked to implement but had been unable to accomplish. Of what ultimate good, then, was their defiance as
loyalists? Was their refusal to serve, after all, just an empty gesture? Would history judge the collaborators the better men for having stifled the illusion of heroism in order to get on with the compelling task of resettling the empire after the great peasant wars of the 1630s and 1640s had ended?

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one's own duty and responsibility. Self-cultivation was to them mere quietism, yet the only other alternative was scholarship or "empirical studies." Even the most obsessive scholars—historical typologists like Huang Zongxi or philologues like Gu Yanwu—must have experienced gnawing doubts about the gap between the books they wrote and the world they refused to govern. That, of course, is why they wrote so much. For an insightful study of this dilemma, see Yang, "A Late Survivor," pp. 2–5. To be sure, Gu Yanwu did make an effort to distinguish between individual service to a dynasty and the common effort necessary to preserve a civilization. In the Rizhi lu (Record of daily learning), "Lun zhengshi fengsu," he wrote: "When a dynasty (guo) is lost, then the empire (tianxia) is lost. How differentiate between losing the dynasty and losing the empire? It is said, 'To change the surnames and designation [of the dynasty] is called losing the dynasty, but when humaneness and righteousness are blocked up and even wild beasts are let in to devour men so that all men become cannibals eating each other, then that is called losing the empire...'. Therefore, first we must know how to preserve the empire, then later learn how to preserve its dynasty. The preservation of a dynasty is the concern of its rulers and ministers, its eaters of meat. Preserving the empire should be the equal responsibility of all common men!" Cited in Mu Po, "Zhongguo wenhua yu tianxia guannian," 6.10:9. Thus, Gu would ultimately have, in place of an ethic of individual heroics in the face of extreme circumstances (guantou), a collective commitment to make the world livable once again in a time of general reconstruction.

27 This is very similar to the distinction which Max Weber made between "hero ethics" (Heldenethik) and "average ethics" (Durchschnittsethik). See Marianne Weber, Max Weber, p. 382. There were certainly plenty of examples of officials in the past who chose an ethic of responsibility over an ethic of ends. Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322), for instance, was a lineal descendant of the Song founder, and yet he held office both under that dynasty and under the Yuan. He was criticized for being a turncoat, but he was such a great statesman that he almost rose above the cavilling. Frederick W. Mote, "Confucian Eremitism in the Yuan Period," pp. 236–238. And Xu Heng (1209–1281) was supposed to have justified his collaboration with the Yuan by saying: "Were I to behave otherwise, then the Way would not be practiced"—to which the loyalist Liu Yin (1241–1293) is said to have tartly responded: "Were I to behave otherwise, then the Way would not be honored." Langlois, "Yuan Analogy," p. 358. The concept of loyalty, in any case, had been somewhat rationalized
These sorts of questions were not only morally troubling; they also prompted thinkers like Wang Fuzhi to develop a much more subtle appreciation of the complexity of historical causation than earlier philosophers had held.\textsuperscript{29} Wang's vivid historicism placed institutions in their own particular context. On the one hand, this meant that old-fashioned restorationism was intellectually untenable: one simply could not restore the well-field system in a late imperial era when feudal institutions were no longer appropriate.\textsuperscript{29} On the other hand, Wang Fuzhi's historical relativism did take the tragic sting out of the rise and fall of dynastic orders. Instead of seeing institutions in conflict with their times (as Huang Zongxi often believed) or, even more naively, as a perpetual conflict between moral government and tyranny, Wang Fuzhi suggested that political institutions perfectly suited the particular historical stages in which they appeared. In Wang's own philosophy of history, this perception implied a certain evolutionism: from primitive societies through barbarism to feudalism and finally high civilization. But

during the 13th and 14th centuries because of the Yuan and Ming foundings. In the same way, during the 17th century, there was certainly a movement away from "the irrational excesses of over-devotion to extreme loyalty" that had characterized Neo-Confucian opinion during the Song. Situational ethics were much more prevalent than stereotyped historiography—especially that which emerged during the High Qing—cared to admit. Langlois, "Ku Ssu-li," p. 29. See also, James T. C. Liu, "Yueh Fei and China's Heritage of Loyalty," p. 297. The intellectual historian Thomas Metzger has sought to isolate a "trend" in the late Qing towards what he calls, evoking Weber, a "world-accommodating realism." In his view this trend continued an earlier tendency toward "moderate realism," while suspending "the Neo-Confucian quest for 'inner' transformation through the comprehension of linkage and the attainment of sagehood." Thomas A. Metzger, "Some General Remarks on Building Philosophical Systems in Modern China," p. 9. I would argue that this tendency was really manifested in the early Qing abandonment of "hero ethics" for "average ethics," and that the impulse to attain heroism, and the commitment to reach sagehood, were not recovered until the Gongyang revival of the early 19th century. For the latter, see Frederic Wakeman, Jr., History and Will, pp. 101–114.


\textsuperscript{29} Balazs, Political Theory, pp. 43–44.
insofar as Wang Fuzhi represented some of the more intriguing intellectual currents of his time—currents swirling in and around the scholastic years of an entire generation of former Ming loyalists—it was his functionalism that was most suggestive. If institutions are appropriate to their times, then any social phenomenon is simply symptomatic or characteristic of its era. Moral ideals, in short, are not abstract, supra-historical, and transcendental notions. Rather, morality and moral criticism had to rest upon a profound and comprehensive appreciation of the necessary relationship between men and events at a given moment.  

In his commentary on Sima Guang’s eleventh-century historical masterpiece, Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Government, Wang Fuzhi observed:

When he says “comprehensive” (tong), what does [Sima Guang] mean? This refers to the king’s Way; it refers to the nation’s policy; it refers to the borders’ defense; it refers to the ministers’ righteousness; it refers to the ministers’ integrity; it refers to the literati governing themselves so as to be without disgrace; it refers to the scholars’ preserving rectitude so as not to be biased. Though gripped by poverty and living alone, one can still be virtuous to oneself. One can still teach others. One can still know the Way and rejoice. Thus it is called “comprehensive.”

Wang Fuzhi thus firmly believed that universalities were imbedded in the pluralities of particular relationships. Individual rela-

30 Wakeman, History and Will, pp. 82–86. For an interesting discussion of this point, see Lin, Men and Ideas, pp. 205–207. Wang Fuzhi believed that metaphysical principles had no life of their own apart from tangible situations; any way or function (dao) was only a way or function of a concrete instrument (qi). Wang did not quite reduce metaphysical principles to mere organizational patterns of relationships, because a categorical imperative like ren (humaneness) exercised a priori authority over concrete situations. However, ethical principles like xiao (filial piety) and zhong (loyalty) existed because they were embodied in events. For Wang Fuzhi’s distinction between fact-oriented reflection and metaphysical thinking, see Alison Harley Black, “Nature, Artifice, and Expression in the Philosophical Thought of Wang Fu-chih,” pp. 277–280; and for Wang’s notion of order or organization (tiaoli) see Ian McMorran, “Wang Fu-chih and the Neo-Confucian Tradition,” pp. 438–439.

31 Wang Fuzhi, Du Tong jian lun, p. 1114.

Although Wang Fuzhi’s conception of historical relativism was unusually sophisticated, his “relationism”—his rejection of singular abstract moral categories, divorced from the relationships they held their own exigency, and acted according to their own laws.  

described—was not unique. During the first few decades after the fall of the Ming, all serious moral philosophers were in one way or another obliged to respond to that great cultural trauma. Certain schools of Confucian thought had an inner life of their own, and it is possible to link writers of the 1610s and 1620s di-

33 Of Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu, and Fang Yizhi, Willard Peterson has written: “They were all concerned with evidencing assertions. They all tended to approach their subject matter historically in a manner which implies that understanding comes only through grasping the developmental dynamic character of moral thought, politics, geography, language or whatever. They all, by emphasizing the plethora of phenomena, their complexity and multiplicity, manifested disinclination or even resistance to the dominant view that there is an underlying overarching or unchanging unity that could and should be revealed to men's minds.” Peterson, Bitter Gourd, p. 12. There is also an intriguing connection between what I have called “relationism” in Wang Fuzhi’s thought, and orthodox painting styles in the early Qing. As James Cahill points out, the orthodox school maintained Yuan styles by emulating Dong Qichang, who used an architectonic technique common to Yuan landscape paintings of building up the whole from clearly defined parts; “and the relationship between these parts formed the basis on which the composition is organized.” James Cahill, “The Orthodox Movement in Early Ch’ing Painting,” p. 174. Cahill also notes how restricting this use of formal parts could be because all of the elements had roots in past masters’ works, so that the orthodox school’s paintings as a whole did not depart from established values but rather sought new interacting relations between old ones. The result was an “inter-play of parts” as “complex, as formal and almost as abstract as a fugue by Bach.” Ibid., p. 176. Thus we admire the four Wangs (Wang Shimin, Wang Jian, Wang Hui, and Wang Yuanqi) for their maturity and technical finish as painters, but not their independence. In their early careers they recapitulated the structural elements of the school of Dong Qichang, but at midpoint in their lives, “All of them went bad in more or less the same way, settling into the routine and heavyhanded production of stereotyped landscapes.” Ibid., p. 171.

34 Tu Wei-ming, “Yen Yüan,” p. 521. In the extraordinary early Qing stories collected in Aina's Doupeng xianhua (Idle talk under the bean arbor), the Manchu conquest is presented as a disaster loosed upon the Central Kingdom by Heaven because the Chinese population had grown too large. A caricatured Neo-Confucian scholar is asked to explain why the Manchus have occupied China. Without mentioning the Manchus, but referring to the Jurchen and Mongols, the scholar responds that: "Before the Xia and the Shang, there was only a tiny population, and so Heavenly Destiny produced many sages to increase and nurture the people. After eight hundred years of peace under the Zhou house, there was a huge population, and the wicked and violent people
rectly with philosophers of the late seventeenth century without any break whatsoever. But these were connections within the most fundamental stratum of moral philosophy. The surface layer was deeply sundered between late Ming and early Qing, and the rift itself was the division between the two dynasties and the experience of foreign conquest. Responding to that shocking histori-

far outnumbered the good. The Way of Heaven abhors a plethora of people, and so it produced men with a passion for slaughter to fight each other. For example, it produced Bai Qi, who buried alive the four hundred thousand men of the Zhao army and it allowed Robber Zhi to rampage throughout the country and then die in his own home at a ripe old age. It helped the Jin ruler get back over the river so that he could ravage the Central Plains, and it gave the crown prince of the Yuan a golden bridge so that he could preserve his line. It is not that the Way of Heaven acted in ignorance; it acted in order to reduce a surplus.” Cited in Patrick Hanan, *The Chinese Vernacular Story*, pp. 197–198.

35 Edward T. Ch’ien, “Chiao Hung and the Revolt against the Sung Learning,” pp. 5–7, 33; Robert Crawford, “Chang Chü-chêng’s Confucian Legalism,” pp. 367–368. Yu Ying-shih argues, for instance, that the philological movement of the early Qing was not merely a methodological shift; rather, it represented a new sense of the Confucian calling in which it was believed that morality grows on scholarship and knowledge. This Qing intellectualism he identifies with the tendency in late Ming metaphysical controversies to turn increasingly to arguments from the earliest sages and classics. “Once textual evidence was introduced into the metaphysical law suit,” he argues, “it was practically impossible not to call philology to the stand as an expert witness.” Yu Ying-shih, “Some Preliminary Observations on the Rise of Ch’ing Confucian Intellectualism,” p. 126. Yu thus sees a major shift in late Ming and early Qing from a metaphysical to an intellectualistic strain of thought in which faith depended on learning. He likens this transformation to the development of Western humanism, insofar as Lorenzo Valla and Erasmus believed that erudition was the certain basis for faith and that philological probing would bring out the true meanings of canonical texts. Although Yu Ying-shih does not deny the validity of political, economic, or social explanations for this shift in Neo-Confucian thought, his own theory rests upon an interpretation of the inner logic of that development. Yu, “Some Preliminary Observations,” pp. 106–129.

36 Writing in the early 19th century, the historian Zhaolian noted that most Chinese students of li xue (school of principle, i.e., Cheng-Zhu Confucianism) believed that the Ming had fallen because Ming philosophers had lost sight of the fundamental notions of Song Neo-Confucianism. “Ming disciples knew
cal event, many Confucianists turned away from transcendental idealism, whether rational (li xue) or intuitive (xin xue).\textsuperscript{37} The philosopher Hui Dong (1697–1758), for instance, described Neo-Confucian “principle” (li) as simply the interaction between the metaphysical forces of expansion (expressed as hao or ren) and contraction (e or yi). Zhu Xi’s primary li—the rational relations of the cosmos—were thus firmly wedded to matter, and spiritual values were understood to be relations of things.\textsuperscript{38}

**Public Virtue and Private Conscience**

Wang Yangming’s notion of a spontaneous and innate moral conscience also lost persuasiveness.\textsuperscript{39} To many Confucianists, the moral laxity of late Ming society was mainly to be attributed to how to preach (jiang xue), but they did not know the great essence (da ti). Therefore, they lost the country.” Zhaolian himself denied this view quite firmly, and blamed the fall of the Ming on the ineptitude of its rulers and the development of factional controversies. Zhaolian, *Xiaoting zalu*, 10:9b.

37 “The intellectual temper of the [Qing] was consequently one of extreme nominalism. . . .” David S. Nivison, *The Life and Thought of Chang Hsüeh-ch’eng*, p. 14. See also Mansfield Freeman, “The Ch’ing Dynasty Criticism of Sung Politico-Philosophy”; Balazs, *Political Theory*, p. 37. Yan Yuan criticized both the vacuous philosophizing and suicidal ineffectuality of the previous generation with unforgiving disdain. “In times of leisure they discussed with folded hands the lofty ideas of mind and human nature; when they were confronted with a crucial situation they would repay their prince only by committing suicide.” Quoted in Tu, “Yen Yüan,” pp. 521–522.

38 Edward Ch’ien tries to relate this shift to changes in mid- and late-Ming philosophy, when the Cheng-Zhu dualism of li and qi prompted philosophers to suggest a “monism of qi,” in which li was no longer the li in the qi, but the li of the qi. This led to a new view of the self, which stressed the physical and affective side of human nature. Edward T. Ch’ien, “The Transformation of Neo-Confucianism as Transformative Leverage,” p. 257. There is a remarkable parallel to this monism of qi in the thought of the Song loyalist Chen Liang (1143–1194), who believed that the spatial energy of the north China plain had been contaminated by the nomadic Jurchen. Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, “Proto-nationalism in 12th Century China?” pp. 406–408.

39 For Wang Yangming’s intense commitment to achieve moral sageliness, see Tu Wei-ming, *Neo-Confucian Thought in Action*, pp. 1–12.
Wang’s conceit that all individuals, regardless of the degree of their learning or moral self-cultivation, possessed sufficient ethical control to constitute their own moral authorities. The reaction against intuitive idealism was thus even more intense. Wang Yangming’s works, said Gu Yanwu scornfully, were “the writings of an illiterate.” And Lu Longqi (1635–1692) not only denounced Wang’s school as being based upon “incorrect learning”; he also blamed all of the disorder of the late Ming upon his immoral influence. Lu argued that Wang Yangming and his followers had acted as though a new sage had arisen; they had deprecated the teachings of the ancients as though Wang himself were better than all of the early sages. And as Wang Yangming’s influence turned scholars away from the Cheng-Zhu school, “deviant doctrines” (xie shuo) had corrupted the public.

Thus when it came to the Tianqi and Chongzhen periods, customs were ever more corrupt. Propriety and righteousness were dragged in the dust to such an extent that it was impossible to clean things up. This was a long-term [development]; it was not a single day’s [doing]. Therefore, I think that the Ming empire did not fall because of banditry and factionalism. It fell because of learning (xue-shu). It was because learning was corrupted that the calamities of banditry and factionalism were fomented.

40 Rizhi lu, chap. 18, folio 31, p. 5. Otto Franke translates wu wen zhi shu as “an abuse of literature” (einen Missbrauch der Literatur), but I believe that Gu’s condemnation is directed against Wang Yangming and not his literary style. See O. Franke, Li Tschi, p. 5. According to Gu, Wang Yangming’s doctrine of innate moral conscience (liang zhi) had set many intellectuals off on the path of empty speculation. This kind of “pure talk” (qingtan) had resulted in the fall of the empire. Edward T. Ch’ien, “Chiao Hung and the Revolt Against Ch’eng-Chu Orthodoxy,” pp. 271–272. Wang Fuzhi had similar opinions. McMorrnan, “Wang Fu-chih,” pp. 430–433.

41 Lu Longqi, who took office under the Qing in 1675, justified his action by saying: “Even the lowest ranking official, if he has the intention of benefitting things, will certainly aid mankind in some way.” Fisher, “Lu Liu-liang,” p. 22.

42 Lu Longqi, Sanyutang wenji, 2:1b–2a.

43 Ibid., 2:2a.
In spite of the many efforts made by philosophers such as Huang Zongxi, Li Yong (1627–1705), and Sun Qifeng (1585–1675) to mediate between Wang Yangming and his critics, retaining the best of both intuitive spontaneity and the Cheng-Zhu ideal of exhaustively “investigating things,” the wider intellectual reaction against Wang Yangming was overwhelming.\(^4\) In fact, it even overcame the subtle functionalism of Wang Fuzhi, and later Hui Dong. While a new kind of academic scholasticism (which largely rejected epistemology altogether) absorbed the attention of the so-called schools of empirical studies and of Han studies, moral philosophers returned to puritanical Song rationalism. Zhang Lüxiang may have begun as a student of Liu Zongzhou, but he ended by turning away from the school of idealism, and like Lu Longqi he blamed the fall of the Ming upon political factionalism, social banditry, and Wang Yangming’s *Instructions for Practical Living*. The teacher to whom he turned thereafter was Lu Shiyi (1611–1672), who reiterated the Cheng-Zhu ideal of “dwelling in seriousness and investigating principles to the utmost” (*jiu jing qiong li*).\(^4^5\)

As Cheng-Zhu Confucianism revived in the early Qing and gained the personal support of emperors like Kangxi, the values that had been called into question by the experience of the generation of 1644 were once more reified.\(^4^6\) As an antidote, then, to moral

44 Ropp, *Dissent*, p. 100.
45 Wing-tsit Chan, “The Hsing-li ching-i and the Ch’eng-Chu School of the 17th Century,” pp. 8–10; Ernst Schwintzer, “A Few Brief Comments on the Yang Yuan Hsien Sheng Ch’üan Chi,” *passim*; Fisher, “Lü Liu-liang,” pp. 4–5. Knud Lundback, “Chief Grand Secretary Chang Chü-cheng and the Early China Jesuits,” p. 6; David E. Mungello, “The Jesuits’ Use of Chang Chü-cheng’s Commentary in Their Translation of the Confucian Four Books,” p. 20. It has been suggested that this kind of reaction to the social turmoil of the era also produced a kind of nativism (such as we have seen in Zhang Lüxiang’s *Willing to Study*) that may partly account for the disinterest in Western science in the 1660s and 1670s. “Increasingly, the emphasis was on ‘our tradition,’ ‘our culture,’” because of the need “to re-establish the moral and intellectual foundations of the literati as a social group.” Willard J. Peterson, “From Interest to Indifference,” p. 82. See also Ropp, *Dissent*, p. 37; Hellmut Wilhelm, “Chinese Confucianism on the Eve of the Great Encounter,” pp. 294–298.
46 In 1717 Kangxi had the tablet of Zhu Xi placed in the Confucian Temple un-
relativism, opponents and supporters of the regime alike sought to restore the absolute obligation of duties such as filial piety and loyalty. Whatever inner doubts the loyalists themselves may have experienced were swept aside as their own history was gradually appropriated and sanctified by the Qing rulers themselves.

...der his own auspices. The Cheng-Zhu school was now virtually beyond attack, and a number of followers of Wang Yangming’s philosophy destroyed books they were about to publish. Yang, “Late Survivor,” pp. 23–25.

47 The institutional core of this ethical puritanism was the imperial project to compile the work entitled: Exploration and Amplification of the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao jing yan yi). Although Wu Weiye worked on this project, it mainly employed the efforts of new young talents like Gu Yanwu’s nephew, Xu Yuanwen, the zhuangyuan of the 1659 jinshi; and Ye Chonghua’s son, Ye Fang’ai, who was also primus in 1659. Both young men were degraded in 1661 because of the Jiangnan tax case, which hit the gentry of Kunshan with a particularly hard impact. After their verdicts were reversed in 1665, they were recalled. Xu went on to supervise the Xiao jing yan yi project in 1676, and he was succeeded as director by Ye in 1677. The compilation of the Exploration and Amplification of the Classic of Filial Piety was just as important in focussing the ethical puritanism of the next generation of “new men” as the Ming History project was to be in concentrating the historical idealism of the generation of ’44. Xu and Ye both participated in the later project as well. For their biographies in English, see Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 327, 902. See also Struve, “Hsü Brothers.” It is important to note the difference between Neo-Confucian puritanism and true 17th-century English Puritanism with respect to the family. Puritanism heralded the shift from the patriarchal to the conjugal family in England, paralleling the rise of secular political sovereignty. Thus in Puritan thought the conjugal family, which is formed by civil agreement and shaped by the Puritan notion of household government, became the local unit of the sovereign state, freeing the individual from the bonds of the corporate family. Neo-Confucian puritanism, on the other hand, strengthened patriarchal authority and curbed the independence of individual members of the lineage, especially women. During the early Qing the status of women was demeaned, perhaps in reaction to the expansive urban culture (with its new female audience) of the late Ming. Wives were told to be obedient and yielding, even tolerant of their husbands’ trips to houses of prostitution; concern over the chastity of women grew more intense; foot-binding was never more widely practiced; and though widow-suicide was initially frowned upon by early Qing rulers, by the mid-eighteenth century it was officially rewarded. Paul S. Ropp, “The Seeds of Change,” pp. 5–9; idem, Dissent, pp. 120–125. For the Puritan family, see Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, pp. 188–189.
This was not a sudden or immediate appropriation. Qing rulers necessarily bore a strong ambivalence toward the Ming loyalists, especially where anti-Manchuism was concerned. As partisans of a particular regime, devoted to a southern restoration government which, until 1662, still had a monarch and armies pledged to recover the Central Plain, Ming loyalists were considered traitors to the Qing.\(^{48}\) As exemplars of an abstract virtue, Transferable to any government that fulfilled Confucian expectations, however, the moral commitment of these men deserved to be commended. Admiration for loyalty in general, then, was shared by the Manchu emperors and their Han ministers.\(^{49}\) While Qing monarchs appreciated the political constancy of zhong (loyalty) as it expressed fervent devotion to the ruler on the throne, their own Confucian officials understood such absolute loyalty to be directed toward a further abstraction: the Mandate of Heaven which supported the ruling dynasty. Loyalist paragons like Bi Gan (whose heart was torn out by the cruel last Shang Emperor) were praised for their willingness to risk death by challenging tyrants who immorally betrayed the mandate. "With Bi Gan's death came the fall of tyranny," the eighth-century Tang scholar Li Han had once written. "Bi Gan's life was a pivot on which turned the Mandate. Was he not a man of decisive importance to the history of the Shang dynasty?"\(^{50}\) It was his stoic readiness to sacrifice himself to adversity that made Bi Gan such an immortal figure for men who had survived 1644 with their reputations intact. When Sun Qifeng visited

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48 The Zhuang Tinglong case of 1661–1663 was an isolated but not unsymptomatic incident. Struve, "Uses of History," pp. 103–104.
49 Tōa kenkyūjo, *Iminzoku no Shina tōchi gaisetsu*, pp. 239–240. The Manchu monarchs also shared with Ming loyalists an admiration for the early Ming rulers. An edict of May 14, 1699, from Kangxi stated that he had noted on his visit to Nanjing that the tomb of Ming Taizu was in need of repair. He ordered the tomb to be restored and wrote the praiseful phrase that is still on one of the cenotaphs there: "The rule of Ming Taizu surpassed that of Tang and Song times." Jonathan D. Spence, *Ts'ao Yin and the Kang-hsi Emperor*, p. 139. Kangxi also—one might add—ordered the entrance hall of the tomb torn down and replaced by a smaller one, so that the tomb would not exceed in scale his own. The remains of the original, more extensive column foundations are visible today.
the grave of Bi Gan in the mountains of Ji district in Henan, he wrote:

In the wake of two thousand years
Come I a mourner, eyes filled with tears.
The universe has never been darkened;
To his pure loyalty may it be likened.
The sun and moon are ever hung high,
Like a sage’s heart that will never die.  

Just as Bi Gan was admired for his resolve and not his success, so were the Ming loyalists increasingly vaunted for their commitment even in failure. Although their cause did not succeed and although they must have wondered if their deeds would be remembered, loyalist martyrs had been celebrated during the Shunzhi reign and their fame increased over the course of the Qing. Kangxi also praised the loyalists, but it was really the Qianlong Emperor who, more than a century later, carried their fame to its Confucian apogee; and, interestingly enough, it was primarily because of his anger at the long-dead collaborator Qian Qianyi that he did so. During 1768–1769, Qianlong read through Qian Qianyi’s complete works, and in them found repeated demeaning references to the Manchus and other “barbarians.” Qianlong claimed that he might have found these comments acceptable if they had been written by a proper loyalist, but because they came from the brush of a turncoat, the slurs infuriated him. In a poem the emperor wrote:

Although throughout his life Qian continually talked about loyalty, he served two dynasties;

51 Transl. in ibid., p. 8.
52 As early as 1760, in ordering the establishment of a special Historiographical Office on the Founding of the Dynasty (Kai guo shiguan), Qianlong commanded that there be a clear differentiation of merits and demerits in the biographies of early collaborators. Later, in 1765, he read in the Veritable Records of the illicit alliance between Wei Xiangshu and Chen Mingxia, and repeated his order. Langlois, “Yuan Analogy,” pp. 278–279.
Having no principles as to when to take office and when to retire, How can his literary productions then be worthy of attention? It really makes one spill out the wine in disgust.\textsuperscript{53}

Or, as Qianlong explained in an edict issued in the sixth lunar month of 1769: “If Qian Qianyi had courted death for the sake of the last dynasty and refused to turn coat and with brush and ink ranted against [us], this would have been appropriate and reasonable. But having accepted office under our rule, how could he continue to use this wild howling language of former days in his writings?”\textsuperscript{54}

The emperor answered his own question. Qianlong astutely realized that precisely because Qian Qianyi had surrendered, now he felt obliged to attack the Manchus.

In my opinion, it was due to his wish to cover up the shame of having been disloyal to the Ming which only makes his disgrace worse. Now Qian Qianyi is already dead and his bones have long ago rotted away. We will let him be. But his books remain, an insult to right doctrines, and a violation of [the principles of] loyalty. How can we permit them to exist and be handed down any longer? They must early be done away with.\textsuperscript{55}

On the one hand, therefore, the Qianlong Emperor launched a literary inquisition to “safeguard the morals and the hearts of men.”\textsuperscript{56}

His governors and governors-general were ordered to see that every bookshop and library in their jurisdictions send in all copies of Qian Qianyi’s works. Orders were even despatched to remote mountain villages and isolated hamlets announcing the emperor’s determination to destroy every existing copy of Qian’s published works plus all the blocks used to print them. On the other hand, Qianlong became resolved to honor the loyalists to whom Qian

\textsuperscript{53} Luther Carrington Goodrich, \textit{The Literary Inquisition of Ch’ien-lung}, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 102.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 103.
Qianyi seemed opposed.\textsuperscript{57} In 1776 there was completed at his command the \textit{Record of All Officials Who Died out of Loyalty to the Fallen Dynasty} (\textit{Shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu}), which contained biographies of 33 loyalist figures given honorary titles, and another 1,505 people to be given standard titles, plus an additional 2,249 persons to be commemorated in their local temples. Ironically, the edict which accompanied the appearance of this book in December, 1776, both completely vindicated the “righteous” Donglin and Fushe elements who died as loyalists, declaring that the Ming would not have been annihilated if their advice had been heeded; and also spelled out some of the rules for conducting what was to become known as the greatest literary inquisition in Chinese history.\textsuperscript{58} That which connected both, of course, was the primary theme of undying loyalty to one’s ruler, be he tyrannical or not, in order to prove the minister’s determination to “maintain rectitude in the face of difficulty” (jian zhen). The loyalists’ individual performances, not their collective accomplishments, were valued; personal endurance, not political victory, was vaunted.\textsuperscript{59}

Yet even that sort of objectified praise came long after the par-

\textsuperscript{57} He also at this time began to connect collaboration with the corruption of the late Ming. On January 11, 1777, the Qianlong Emperor issued orders to the Historiographical Office to draw up a special collection called \textit{Er chen zhuan} [Biographies of ministers who served both dynasties]. He explained in his edict that while it was not right to place twice-serving ministers alongside more deserving officials in the dynastic history, their biographies should be recorded in some fashion. “If those who served two dynasties are omitted altogether from the records, people will never know that they were evil, for their misdeeds will be covered up; no place must be accorded them. In my opinion, with regard to these men who failed in their supreme duty of loyalty we may not, because of the merit they achieved [in our service], overlook their earlier misconduct. Nor should we, because they still have descendants, forgive their past misdeeds. I have accordingly conceived a method whereby they can be included in the Dynastic History. Let us create a separate division termed the \textit{Er chen zhuan} and in it place the accounts of those who held office first under the Ming, then under ourselves. Let these accounts not deviate from the truth.” Goodrich, \textit{Literary Inquisition}, p. 155. See also Kanda Nobuo, “Shinchō no kokushi retsuden to jishinden,” pp. 280–281; Langlois, “Yuan Analogy,” p. 368.


\textsuperscript{59} Chen Zilong, \textit{Chen Zhongyu quan ji}, introduction.
ticular commitment of Ming loyalists had attenuated. It was only after Neo-Confucian loyalism had ceased being specifically attached to the Ming cause and had begun to bond to the destiny of the Qing that the new dynasty could endorse the virtue without ambivalence, setting the seal upon its own transformation from an alien military regime to a legitimate monarchy, holder of Heaven's Mandate to rule the empire. This final accomplishment—the eclipsing of Ming loyalism by a rising Qing loyalism—came during the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories in 1673.

The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories

The Three Feudatories (San fan) of Wu Sangui in Yunnan and Guizhou, of Shang Kexi in Guangdong, and of Geng Jingzhong in Fujian represented the last major impediment to the consolidation of Qing rule. Shortly before his death, the Shunzhi Emperor had permitted these satraps to entrench themselves in the south because without their help the Manchus would not have been able to crush the remnant armies of Li Chengdong, nor hold off the maritime forces of Coxinga's heir, Zheng Jing, on Formosa. But the price which the Feudatories exacted was costly. Wu Sangui made the greatest demands: virtual suzerainty within the borders of the two provinces he directly administered, an imperial subsidy of over ten million taels per year for his army, and the right to make appointments to the administration of contiguous provinces like Hunan, Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu.

On April 28, 1673, the Qing court in Beijing received a memorial from Shang Kexi, the Prince Who Pacifies the South (Ping nan wang). Shang, who had fought with the Manchus since 1633, had now reached the venerable age of seventy sui. Old and infirm, he requested permission from the Kangxi Emperor to retire. The throne willing, he would leave the princedom of Guangdong in the hands of his son Zhixin, and take the two companies of his personal troops descended from the old Tian Zhu-Bing (Heavenly 60 Kanda Nobuo, "The Role of San-fan in the Local Politics of Early Ch'ing."
Assisted Troops) that had participated in the conquest of the Central Plain and, along with twenty-four thousand civilians, retire to his former home in Liaodong.61

Without too much delay the Kangxi Emperor agreed to Shang Kexi's request—in part. The old general was given permission to take all of the troops under his command, save regular members of the Green Standard forces, and return to Liaodong. However, the throne did not agree to Shang Kexi's request that his son inherit the princedom. Kangxi pointed out that Guangdong had already been successfully pacified by Shang Kexi. There was consequently no need for the princedom to be perpetuated.

Knowing of Shang's petition and the action taken by the emperor, Geng Jingzhong and Wu Sangui also submitted their resignations the following August. In light of what happened later that year, it may be assumed that Wu Sangui was only testing the water, and did not expect his submission to be taken seriously. Certainly, the Assembly of Princes and High Officials believed Wu Sangui's resignation to be only a gesture; and a majority of the Assembly's membership—led by the Solid Yellow Banner faction of Songgotu—recommended that it not be accepted, for fear the s-trap would retaliate. However, another faction—mainly consisting of younger Manchu bannermen and led by the president of the Board of War, Mingju—argued that the emperor should accept Wu Sangui's resignation.62 After all, Mingju said, the Manchus did

61 This and the following account of the San Fan rebellion relies heavily upon Tsao Kai-fu, "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories against the Manchu Throne in China." Other sources are cited as they occur.

62 Miller, "Factional Conflict," pp. 101–102. Miller argues that the Three Feudatories led both to the triumph of Mingju's faction over Songgotu's group, and to the rise of the literati of the lower Yangzi into the higher echelons of the bureaucracy—mainly because Kangxi needed their support. Then, after the uprisings were settled, there followed seven years in which Kangxi mediated between Mingju and his "northern party" (bei dang), and a "southern party" (nan dang) led by Xu Qianxue and Gao Shiqi. According to this hypothesis, Kangxi played one faction off against the other until he was able to become the major political force at court himself in 1690. Then, for reasons which Miller does not explain, the regional factions ceased to exist. Ibid., pp. iv–v, 101–104, 138, 182, 185–186.
hold Wu Sangui’s eldest son, Yingxiong (a viscount married to Shunzhi’s half-sister, Princess Kechun), hostage in Beijing. Moreover, under the leadership of Mishan, President of Revenue, the government had managed to transfer enough annual surplus funds from provincial treasuries to the capital to finance a ten-year conflict, if necessary. The emperor hesitated between these two positions, and then—at the advice of his grandmother—Kangxi, on September 16, 1673, finally approved Mingju’s recommendation, and proceeded to accept Wu Sangui’s resignation, deputing two special commissioners nine days later to go to Yunnan and arrange for the transfer of authority.63

Wu Sangui and his closest advisers (including his nephews and sons-in-law) were furious when they received word of the emperor’s decision. Overnight the prindedom was to be taken from Wu Sangui, and his heirs would be deprived of the legacy that they had long expected. If they resisted, on the other hand, the chances for military success looked good. Not only were the Manchu garrison forces spread much too thinly across the empire; there were a number of key Chinese military commanders and officials in neighboring provinces who could be counted on as former lieutenants to go along with Wu Sangui should he declare himself in open rebellion. On December 28, 1673, Wu Sangui therefore murdered Governor Zhu Guozhi, arrested the Kangxi Emperor’s two special commissioners, ordered Ming customs to be revived, and raised the flag of the Zhou dynasty, of which he named himself Commander-in-Chief (Da yuanshuai).64 Calling on all former subordinates to support him, and requesting the aid of the other two feudatories, Wu Sangui set out on January 7, 1674, for Guizhou, where the governor quickly surrendered to him. By February 17, his armies had reached the border of Hunan province. Let-

63 Silas H. L. Wu, Passage to Power, p. 27.
64 Zhu Fangzeng, comp., Cong zheng guan fa lu, 3:6b–7a; Guoshi guan, comp., Man-Han ming chen zhi, 19:24a; Li Huan, ed., Guochao qixian leizheng, 338:10a. Wu Sangui treated those who refused to join his revolt ruthlessly. When Ma Hongru (1661 military jinshi) defied him, Wu had all of Ma’s teeth knocked out with a metal mallet and then threw him in prison in Kunming, where he died. Zhao, Qing shi gao, 493:1b.
ters had been sent ahead to all the officials in the province (many of whom had been appointed at Wu's earlier request), and circulars were disseminated. As the Zhou army marched in, city after city surrendered without resistance. By the end of April, Wu Sangui controlled nearly all of that rice-rich province and was preparing to tax the coming harvest. Indeed, whether because he hoped to save the life of his son in Beijing or because he thought it strategically important to develop a strong base there before proceeding further, Wu Sangui remained in Hunan, allowing the Qing forces time to assemble lines of defense in Hubei.

The stability of Wu Sangui's base in Hunan rested upon the support of neighboring provinces, and especially those farther south. Guangxi was particularly critical in this regard, because if it remained loyal to the Qing, then Guangdong probably would as well, providing the Manchus with forces to attack his rear. The civil governor of Guangxi when the rebellion broke out was none other than Ma Xiongzhen, who was one of the second-generation bannermen favored by the Shunzhi Emperor in the late 1650s. After observing a year's mourning for the death of his father, Mingpei, former governor-general of the Liangjiang, Ma Xiongzhen had in 1667 become Senior Vice-President of the Censorate. Finding favor under the Oboi regency, he was the following year made sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat; and in 1669, when the young Kangxi Emperor was beginning to come into his own as a monarch, Ma Xiongzhen was named governor of Guangxi province at the relatively young age of thirty-five. Before he left to take up his new post, Ma was granted an imperial audience where Kangxi, as a sign of special favor, bestowed upon him an imperial robe.65

As governor of Guangxi, Ma Xiongzhen was able to supervise the suppression of a number of bandit groups, and carried through

65 This and the following biographical information on Ma Xiongzhen is drawn from five sources: Ma Wenyi gong zhu an (Biography of Duke Ma Wenyi) in Jiang Shiquan, Jiang Shiquan jiuzhou qu, ce 9, 3 double folio pages; Jiang Shiquan, Zhongya tong ji, jian 3; Shao Changheng, Shao Zixiang quan ji, jian 5; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 556–557; Xu Qianxue, Danyuan wenji, jian 36.
measures to abolish unnecessary expenses while at the same time maintaining the costly salaries of the frontier troops in the province. But he was, after all, a civil official; and the major responsibility for military affairs rested in the hands of the provincial commander-in-chief, Sun Yanling. No older than Ma himself, Sun had acquired his command in a most unusual way. The son of an officer in the Chinese Red Banner who was also a lieutenant of Kong Youde, Sun Yanling had as a young child been betrothed to Youde's daughter, Kong Sizhen. Kong Youde himself had been one of the mainstays of the regime during the years 1646–1652, first subduing Hunan in 1646, then Guangxi in 1648, and finally driving the Southern Ming armies back into Guizhou until he was outflanked by Li Dingguo in 1652 and committed suicide in Guilin. For this unstinting service the Shunzhi Emperor had buried Kong with honors outside the Zhangyi Gate in the capital, and had favored Kong's sole heir, his daughter Sizhen, with special treatment. In 1660, when she and Sun Yanling were finally married, she was adopted as a hosoi gege (princess of the royal blood), Sun was made her hosoi efu (consort of a princess) and a member of the Assembly with the rank of baron (nan), and the two of them were provided with a special mansion outside the Xihua Gate of the Forbidden City. Moreover, as the surviving daughter of Kong Youde, Princess Kong Sizhen was also given nominal control of her father's soldiers still in Guangxi. In 1666, Princess Kong had requested permission to move to Guangxi with her family. Because the military governor there was retiring, Sun Yanling was named head of the troops in her place even though he had virtually no experience at all in taking such command. The result was considerable instability in the province during the next several years when Governor Ma Xiongzhen took on his post. In 1672, Sun Yanling had to be censured for making appointments on his own to lower military posts without securing proper permission. And in 1673, his own officers—men who had been loyal to Kong Youde—reported to Beijing that Sun was letting his soldiers abuse the populace, a charge that brought Ledehun to Guilin to inves-

66 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 683.
tigate. Yet even though the accusations proved to be true, the Kangxi Emperor decided to let him retain the military governorship of the province because of his connection with the Kong family.  

Thus, when Wu Sangui openly revolted in December, 1673, and occupied Hunan in February and March, 1674, the provincial administration of Guangxi was already quite unstable. Sun Yanling continued to harbor resentment against those of his lieutenants who had brought accusations against him before the emperor, and it was not long before Sun decided to take advantage of the turmoil to revenge himself upon those men. On March 24, 1674, Sun carried out a bloody purge, having his men seize and kill more than thirty of the Guangxi military command's ranking officers, including virtually all of the lieutenant-generals. He then proclaimed himself successively Generalissimo and Prince of Anyuan, that being a place-name associated with the capitals of both the Southern Qi and the Southern Liang dynasties. At the same time, he laid siege to the yamen of the civil governor of the province, Ma Xiongzhen.

Governor Ma had no hope of resisting the siege because he controlled few soldiers of his own. His first instinct was to take his own life rather than surrender, but servants kept him from doing so. Subsequently placed under a kind of house arrest by Sun, the governor was not killed. Instead Sun Yanling tried to persuade, and then to force, Ma Xiongzhen to join his cause. Ma remained intransigent. In fact, he secretly sent his eldest son (Shiji) in May, and then his second son (Shiyong) and eldest grandson (Guozhen) three months later, to Beijing to report on the situation in Guangxi and to plead for immediate military help. He also sent back for safekeeping the robe he had been given by Kangxi. But no answers came back; no help was forthcoming. Finally, infuriated by Ma's stubbornness, Sun Yanling had the governor seized and thrown into the provincial prison along with his entire family, his clerical staff, and his household servants. At that time Ma tried to
take his life a second time with a knife, but the weapon was taken away from him by his guards before he could actually cut himself.

During the next three years one of Ma Xiongzhen’s daughters, four of his grand-children, and fourteen of his servants died in jail. But Ma was left alive, perhaps because Sun Yanling could not seem to make up his own mind about the likely outcome of Wu Sangui’s revolt. Wu had given Sun a title of his own (Prince of Linjiang) after he rebelled, but Sun was only partly attached to the Zhou cause. Some claim that Ma Xiongzhen’s unstinting allegiance to the Qing during those prison years kept Sun from joining Wu Sangui wholeheartedly. More likely, Princess Kong Sizhen continued to remind her husband of the favors that they had received from the Manchus, and thus kept Sun Yanling partially loyal to the Qing. In the event of a Qing victory, of course, Sun Yanling’s own eventual freedom might be guaranteed by the well-being of his illustrious prisoner.

A remarkably similar situation occurred in Geng Jingzhong’s feudatory in Fujian. Like Wu Sangui, Geng had requested permission to resign in August, 1673; and, even sooner than Wu, Geng was told that the court accepted his petition and that he would be allowed to return to Liaodong with fifteen companies of his troops. Of course, half expecting Wu Sangui to rebel, the Kangxi Emperor was under no illusion about the certainty of Geng’s loyalty, and so informed his newly appointed governor-general for Fujian, Fan Chengmo.

The Martyrdom of Fan Chengmo

Fan Chengmo, son of Fan Wencheng and one of the first jinshi-holding Chinese bannermen to enter the Inner Three Courts, had been made a reader in the Historiography Court (Guoshi yuan)

69 Jiang, Zhongya tang ji, 3:8b.
70 The following information about Fan Chengmo is based upon the various biographies given in Fan Chengmo, Fan Zhongzhen gong quan ji, pp. 15–92; “Notices of Eminent Statesmen of the Present Dynasty,” p. 97; Hummel, Eminent Chinese.
after the Shunzhi Emperor died.\textsuperscript{71} Never a very healthy man, Fan had requested sick leave in 1664, but he was turned down by the Oboi regents because of the nearly unanimous opinion of other officials, who knew of Fan's fine reputation, that he be kept in the government. This was a pattern that was to be repeated after Fan entered the Secretarial Court as a reader and became assistant editor of Shunzhi's \textit{Veritable Records}. In 1668 Fan Wencheng was given his first provincial assignment, becoming governor of Zhejiang and conducting a model administration.\textsuperscript{72} His concern for famine relief, tax reduction, and postwar land reclamation led him to take extensive tours of the province, which only weakened his physical condition even more.\textsuperscript{73} But, once again, when he requested in 1671 to be allowed to take sick leave, the public requests to keep him in office were so numerous that Kangxi turned down his plea. In fact, during the winter of the following year Fan was promoted to the governor-generalship of Fujian. Instead of proceeding directly south, however, Fan Chengmo asked for an imperial audience, reaching Beijing late in the summer of 1673. Kangxi received him with great concern. A physician was sent from court to see to his illness before the audience, and when Fan Chengmo presented himself at the palace he was greeted with warmth and affection.

\textsuperscript{71} In the first year of Kangxi's reign, the Oboi regents singled out Fan Wencheng for special praise as being one of the most illustrious of Taizong's ministers, and commanded that his son be given special employment at court. Li Yuandu, \textit{Guochao xianzheng shilüe}, 1:3b.


\textsuperscript{73} When Fan Chengmo took office as governor of Zhejiang, the northern portion of the province around Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou had been struck by severe floods. Fan obtained a government loan of 80,000 taels to provide famine relief there, selling grain at cost and remitting the salt duties. Furthermore, he—and the court—were aware that a lot of Zhejiang land had fallen fallow and was being unjustly taxed. After Fan personally inspected the areas, the Kangxi Emperor remitted taxes on 274,600 \textit{mu} of wasteland as well as on 21,000 \textit{mu} which were under water. Fan was also noted for his frequent trips around the province to examine personally the condition of the people. During his tenure he cancelled some of the more onerous enactments of the coastal prohibition policy, and allotted land to soldiers for cultivation. He also indicted a number of corrupt local magnates and yamen runners. Li, \textit{Guochao xianzheng}, 1:4a; "Notices of Eminent Statesmen," p. 97.
The emperor had already received Geng Jingzhong’s resignation, and so told Fan Chengmo of his intention to dissolve the feudatory and recall Geng. Fan’s assignment was obviously a difficult one under such delicate circumstances as these, and Kangxi saw his governor-general off with special attention and fanfare. Upon leaving, Governor-General Fan was presented with clothes which the emperor himself had worn, with horses, and with a private bodyguard of eighty Mongol soldiers.74

It was only a short time after Fan Chengmo reached Fuzhou to take on his new post that news came of Wu Sangui’s rebellion. While Geng Jingzhong showed signs of restlessness, Fan tried rapidly to build up his own military forces as governor-general. He asked the throne for permission to cease disbanding forces in the province, suggested the formation of military colonies (tuntian) under the governor-general’s supervision, and requested that Geng be ordered to transfer two companies to his own personal command.75 But it soon became obvious that Geng was likely to move before these measures could be effected. Fan Chengmo thought of summoning the garrison commanders throughout the province to Fuzhou on the pretext of reviewing them as the new governor-general, and even tried to flee to Zhangzhou or Quanzhou, where he might escape Geng’s military forces. On April 21, 1674, however, Geng took up arms against the Qing, pronouncing himself marshal of his armies and restoring Ming customs in Fuzhou. Fan Chengmo and his followers were seized and thrown into jail, and Geng sent one wing of his army under Zeng Yangxing into Zhejiang, where it broke through to the coast in June; and personally led another wing into Jiangxi, reaching Poyang Lake by the end of July, 1674. Meanwhile, at Chaozhou across his southern border in Guangdong, General Liu Jinzhong joined Geng’s rebellion on May 25, 1674.

The Kangxi Emperor’s reaction was initially conciliatory. On July 4, the throne issued a special decree promising Geng Jingzhong a pardon and high position if he would surrender. The em-

74 Li, Guochao xianzheng, 1:4b.
75 Ibid., 1:5a.
Imperial great fear, of course, was that Geng would now ally himself with the Formosan forces of Zheng Jing. Fortunately for the Manchus, Geng and Zheng Jing were not able to effect an alliance; in fact, in 1674 and 1676 because of disagreements over previous exchanges, Zheng Jing’s naval forces actually raided Amoy and other cities along the coast of Fujian. At the time of the initial uprising, however, this was not a likely outcome, and the court in Beijing waited anxiously for a response. There was none forthcoming, and on July 28, 1674, Green Standard forces were detached from Jiangnan to Hangzhou and overall responsibility for the campaigns against Geng was given to Nurhaci’s grandson Gi-yesu, Prince Kang. Nevertheless, General Zeng Yangxing’s soldiers were doing so well in their attacks on northern parts of the province (by the end of the year only Hangzhou remained in Gi-yesu’s hands), and Geng Jingzhong was gaining so many victories in eastern Jiangxi, that Kangxi actually considered coming to terms with the Zheng regime on Formosa. The summer and fall of 1674, then, saw the dynasty at its lowest point since the capture of Beijing three decades earlier. Most of south China was in the hands of the rebels; Wu Sangui was suggesting that Kangxi either commit suicide or return to the northeast (where he would be “allowed” to take Korea); and the Dalai Lama was even proposing that China be partitioned at the Yangzi River.

The Kangxi Emperor held firm during what he later described as being one of the most harrowing episodes of his life. In April, 1674, a general mobilization of Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese troops was ordered; and eventually up to two hundred thousand bannermen and four hundred thousand Green Standard soldiers were in arms against the rebels. On May 18, enraged by the high-handed tone of Wu Sangui’s message to him, boasting that one-third of the former Ming territory had been restored, Kangxi or-

76 The previous January, 1674, when news of Wu Sangui’s revolt reached the capital, there had been considerable panic. A small number of banner slaves rebelled, and several fires were set in the city. Many people in Beijing then thought that the Manchus would abandon the capital and return to their homeland in the northeast. Kessler, K’ang-hsi, p. 82; Miller, “Factional Conflict,” p. 111.
dered that Wu’s son, the hostage Yingxiong, be executed. Yet, from the dynasty’s perspective, matters only worsened in the months just ahead. In rugged Sichuan, General Wang Pingfan turned coat and declared himself an ally of Wu Sangui.  

When Kangxi ordered the provincial commander of Shaanxi (and a former lieutenant of Wu Sangui), Wang Fuchen, to attack Sichuan, he in turn mutinied in December, 1674, and early the following year took over eastern Gansu. With Lanzhou in rebel hands, the Qing court was now completely cut off from any communication with loyalist forces under Zhang Yong in western Gansu. On April 19, 1675, the Mongols of Chahar arose under Burni and threatened Mukden; it was only by good fortune that a mixed force of untrained bannermen, hastily assembled servants, and estate slaves commanded by Prince Oja and Grand Secretary Tuhai managed to protect the former Qing imperial capital from devastation. In March, 1676, the son of Shang Kexi, Zhixin, openly acknowledged the fact that he was in rebellion against the Manchus by accepting Wu Sangui’s commission as Prince of Fude. Shang Kexi was still alive—and loyal to the Qing—but he was pushed aside by his son, and died shortly afterwards, leaving Guangdong in the hands of a notorious sadist and murderer now pledged to overthrow the imperial government. 

Qing control over the desolated province, where hordes of wild dogs and tigers stalked the devastated cities, was quite fragile. The capital, Chengdu, was not permanently occupied until 1659, and it took another five years to suppress the last of the rebels who were active in the eastern part of the province. It is impossible to say how many Sichuanese died during the civil war and because of the famine of 1647, but earlier estimates were probably too low. Well over one million people must have been killed, and the local gentry was virtually exterminated by Zhang Xianzhong. V. H. Donnithorne, “The Golden Age and the Dark Age in Szechwan: II, Chang Hsien-Chung and the Dark Age,” pp. 166–167; Robert Entenmann, “Sichuan and Qing Migration Policy,” pp. 37–38, 50–51.

In May, 1674, Kangxi had appointed a younger brother, Zhixiao, to succeed Shang Kexi. This was a concession to the wish to have the princedom retained, but it naturally angered Shang Zhixin who took up arms the following year. His sadism was legendary. He kept, for example, a troop of Mongolian dogs, which he enjoyed watching mangle and mutilate hapless Cantonese
The Manchus, however, retained the loyalty of most Han Chinese. Partly this was because the spectacle of Wu Sangui—who had betrayed the Ming for the Qing and now was turning coat in the most opportunistic way once again—was so distasteful. Even so staunch a Ming loyalist as Gu Yanwu could not forgive Wu Sangui his earlier treachery, and said that his rebellion now "had no more significance than the 'wriggling of worms.'"79 Therefore, the economic heartland of the empire, Jiangnan, remained firmly under Qing control.80 With Jiangnan's resources at its command, plus the revenue-producing areas of the north and the provincial surpluses now gathered in the central treasury, the imperial government could better afford to pay its troops and equip them with expensive artillery pieces than could the rebels, who were cut off from the lower Yangzi.81 Hunan had its own rice harvests, of captives. Often he killed people in drunken rages, and once ripped open a pregnant female attendant to find out the sex of her fetus. E. C. Bowra, "The Manchu Conquest of Canton," p. 95.


80 In 1674 half of the regular taxes of the prefectures of Suzhou, Changshu, Zhenjiang, and Huai’an were remitted; and during the following year, many of the people whose names had been struck from the list of degree-holders because of the 1661 tax case were restored to the official gentry’s ranks. Guo, "Jiangnan dizhu jieji," p. 136.

81 The contest for military superiority between Kangxi and the San fan leaders also involved an arms race. In areas which they controlled, the rebels ordered plows melted in order to make sabres, and used bronze from temple bells to cast cannon. Initially, this gave the feudatories’ forces a distinct advantage over the imperial armies, which were provisioned with ancient Chinese cannons that often could not even be fired. Provincial commanders sent 300 of these old pieces—some made of bronze, some of iron—to the capital and asked for new weapons. Father Verbiest, the Jesuit who was President of the Tribunal of Mathematics and who had learned Manchu in order to converse with Kangxi, was ordered in 1674 by the emperor to repair these pieces, and 149 were successfully put back in service. Kangxi also wanted lighter ordnance for use in mountainous terrain and Verbiest designed and made 20 ligno-metallica (part-wood, part-metal) cannons, weighing 1,000 catties each and capable of throwing a ball three catties in weight. These cannons, some of
course, but Wu Sangui’s taxes were more than the population could really bear. And in the northwest Wang Fuchen found it nearly impossible to find either food or reinforcements for his army. In 1675, then, the civil war was really only tactically being won by the Three Feudatories. The strategic balance would be determined by the material resources of each side, plus the ability of Kangxi to retain the allegiance of his Han field commanders, especially in the strategic northwest from which the main thrust downward into Sichuan and Hubei would have to come. In 1676, thanks to the crucial support of key Chinese Green Standard and banner commanders in the northwestern provinces, the strategic balance began to shift in favor of the Qing throne. On July 11, 1676,

which were mounted on carriages, were sent to Shanxi. After moving the imperial foundry close to the quarters of Verbiest, Kangxi ordered heavier bronze cannon that could throw a ball 8 or 10 catties in weight. Altogether 132 of these heavier pieces were cast. For Father Verbiest’s account of his somewhat reluctant role as an arms manufacturer, see his letter to Charles de Noyelle in H. Bosmans, “Ferdinand Verbiest,” pp. 389–390, and pp. 393–398; and Jonathan D. Spence, To Change China, p. 29. Judging from the cost of such pieces cast 6 or 7 years later, the total cost of the heavier artillery pieces, which were much in demand by provincial commanders who declared them decisive in battle, was by my estimation 825,000 taels, or about 3% of the annual cash revenue of the central government at that time. By contemporary European standards—where there was an “institutionalization of war” in the seventeenth century—these were paltry sums. (Wallerstein, Modern World System II, pp. 116–118.) The wars between England and France, for instance, caused the British military budget to assume stupendous proportions. Before 1688 annual revenue had come to about 2 million pounds sterling. Between 1689 and 1702 it amounted to 72 million pounds; and between 1702 and 1711, 99 million pounds. Of this 40% went to the army and 35% to the navy. Public loans had to be carried out to meet the deficit. In the War of Spanish Succession, 35 million pounds were borrowed thanks to the help of the Bank of England and the backing of Parliament. Finer, “Nation-building,” pp. 122–123. In contrast, the Kangxi Emperor had only the Shanxi bankers for help, and their financial capacity was not nearly so great. Wei Qingyuan and Wu Qiyan, “Qingdai de zhuming huang shang Fan shi de xinghuai,” pp. 2, 10–15. For the consolidation of “gunpowder empires” and the “symbiosis of cannon with a limited number of imperial bureaucracies” in the 16th and 17th centuries, see William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, pp. 232–233; Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, pp. 3–15.
beleaguered and impoverished, Wang Fuchen surrendered to the Qing, opening the way for a government attack upon Sichuan and releasing troops for Hubei to be used against Wu Sangui.\(^8^2\)

Geng Jingzhong, too, was finding it difficult to sustain his campaigns because supplies were running low. His own generals began to refuse to carry out orders, and, as the tide turned against them, General Zeng Yangxing at Wenzhou (southeastern Zhejiang) and General Ma Jiuyu at Quzhou (southwestern Zhejiang) had to bear the brunt of a major Qing campaign against the Fujianese feudatory. As Geng pondered his own chances, perhaps now thinking of Kangxi's earlier offer to pardon him if he should surrender, he

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82 A critical moment in the northwest occurred when the Xining commander Wang Jinbao, aided by Mongour troops, recaptured Lanzhou in the summer of 1675. Among other Han commanders who remained loyal to the throne were officers who had either surrendered as relatively young men to the Manchus, so that virtually their entire career was in the service of the Qing; or were second-generation adherents, being sons of Liaoyang collaborators. Zhao Liangdong was an example of the former. A lieutenant of Zhang Yong, he had joined the Manchus at the age of 23 as a captain. A native of Suide in Shaanxi, he was assigned to Ningxia, where he made his home. In 1656, Zhao served as an adjutant to Hong Chengchou in the southwest. In 1676 he was especially recommended to the throne as an absolutely loyal soldier. Zhao thereupon stabilized Ningxia, where he commanded all the Qing military forces in the region, and later helped recover Sichuan and Yunnan from Wu Sangui's forces. Sun Sike was a good example of the second kind of military officer. The son of Sun Dengong, who had turned over Dalinghe to the Manchus, Sike was only 16 when Dorgon entered Beijing. A member of the Plain White Banner, he joined Dorgon’s bodyguard. In the 1650s, Sun Sike participated in the campaign against the Southern Ming in Guizhou and Yunnan, and was put in charge of border defenses in Gansu in 1663. In 1676, he helped Tulai defeat Wang Fuchen, and was subsequently ennobled as a baron and named commander-in-chief of all the Qing forces in Gansu. Sun Sike incurred the displeasure of Kangxi (who put Green Standard Chinese troops in the vanguard during the 1679 invasion of Sichuan because he felt that they could handle themselves better in that kind of terrain than could Manchu cavalrymen) for his apparent reluctance to move into southern Shaanxi, but he was to win great favor in 1695 for his victory over Galdan at the battle of Jao Modo. Louis M. J. Schram, The Mongours of the Kansu-Tibetan Frontier, Part 3, p. 54; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 77–78, 682–683; Kessler, K’ang-hsi, p. 110.
continued to keep Governor-General Fan Chengmo in prison in Fuzhou.  

When he and his men had first been thrown into jail in 1674, Fan Chengmo had tried to starve himself to death and thus end his life immediately. Before long, however, he had decided not to commit suicide in this way. Rather, as the weeks, then months, of captivity passed, Fan Chengmo began to prepare himself for a more spiritually transcending martyrdom. To those around him, his secretaries and followers, he spoke aloud of his hopes that the Buddha (Fa wang) and Tathagata (Rulai fo) would deliver them of their ordeal. Practicing meditation, he also used terms like biqu (bhikshu, a Buddhist mendicant capable of performing miracles) and shamen (sramana, a Buddhist monk) to describe himself and his followers. And on the walls of his cell—which he called meng gu, “valley of darkness”—Fan Chengmo wrote in charcoal of the loyalists Tian Heng and Su Wu; and of the great Qu Yuan (?343–?280 B.C.), whose poem Li Sao he now read and re-read. The latter figure especially obsessed him, and he again and again discussed the suicide of Qu Yuan with one of his secretaries, Ji Yongren, who stimulated his fascination for that haunting southern poet-statesman. Qu Yuan, by taking his own life, had achieved a spe-

83 Geng Jingzhong repeatedly sent deputies to try to persuade Fan Chengmo to submit to him. Each visitor was rejected. Li, Guochao xianzheng, 1:5b.
84 Fan Chengmo, Fan Zhongzhen gong quan ji, pp. 273–274.
85 Ibid., pp. 271,283,312,371. “In [Qu Yuan] lore, the instrument for keeping king and official together, in their appropriate relationship, is the idea of loyalty. On the face of it, this suggests the official’s concession to a passive role, but there is no easy and no one answer given as to just what comprises loyalty; nor how to construct the hierarchy of loyalties demanded by life’s complexities. . . . I do not think it too much to conclude that all of these loyalties simultaneously exerting their demands are the ‘entanglements’ . . . which lead to [Qu Yuan’s] tragedy in the classical formulation of his story. In Li Sao, [Qu Yuan] himself remarks in a characteristically portentous tone: ‘How well I know that loyalty brings disaster.’” Laurence A. Schneider, A Madman of Ch’u, pp. 46–47.
86 Ji Yongren was from Wuxi. He wrote a quartet of plays (zaju) called Li Sao Continued (Xu Li Sao) while he was imprisoned. He took his own life when Fan Chengmo died. Wang Yunwu, ed., Da Qing yitongzhi, 88:26a; Schneider, Madman, pp. 81–83.
cial kind of spiritual and historical immortality, and Fan Chengmo now considered that to be his own destiny as well. He wrote to Ji Yongren: “Although mankind knows that Lord Sanlu (Qu Yuan) embraced loyalty as he died, it really does not know if he was able to believe that he would become immortal (xian).” In his prison cell, Fan began to regard his own clothing as symbols of Confucian loyalty and familial piety. Reverently, on the first and fifteenth day of each month, Fan Chengmo would put on the hat which the emperor had given him and don the garment he had been wearing the last time he had seen his mother, making obeisances of loyalty (zhong) to his ruler and of piety (xiao) to his parent. His frail and sickly body became for him a vessel of sacrifice to the two supreme objects of his intense devotion. “My body has been given to the service of my ruler,” Fan wrote. “The body that belongs to my parents is now the body that belongs to my ruler. The ancients have said, ‘When the ruler is distressed, the minister is ashamed. When the ruler is ashamed, the minister dies.’”

While Fan Chengmo passed his days inside Fuzhou prison nurturing his will to achieve Confucian martyrdom as an exemplary Qing loyalist, Geng Jingzhong was learning that Giyesu had moved south against Ma Jiuyu’s forces at Quzhou. In September, 1676, the Manchu prince took that city, and Geng Jingzhong began to realize that there was very little time remaining for him to come to terms with the Qing commander. If he were to surrender, however, it was important not to have witnesses to his earlier perfidy, capable of testifying against him at some future date. On October 22, therefore, Geng ordered that Fan Chengmo and his retainers be killed, and on that night the rebel’s executioners entered the prison to carry out their mission. The deadly moment for which Fan Chengmo had been preparing himself for the last seven hundred days had come around at last. Garbed in his now-sacred hat and robe, he received his executioners with quiet dignity, but when one of them contemptuously knocked from his head the emperor’s hat, Fan’s composure turned to rage. His manacled

87 Fan, Zhongzhen quan ji, p. 287.
88 Ibid., p. 263.
hands flailed out and trapped the blasphemer's throat, the fetters nearly strangling the fellow before guards could save him. Then, as the now-impressed assassins kept their silence and distance, Fan quietly replaced his hat, arranged his robe, turned to face in the direction of Beijing, and knelt. Slowly, he performed nine kowtows, offering his body in sacrifice as he praised aloud his mother and his ruler in the capital to the north. It was only when Fan Chengmo had completed his ritual that the assassins stepped forward and cut him down. That same night they killed fifty-three of his followers, and the next morning they tried to conceal their infamy by secretly taking the corpses to a deserted area and burning them. A few weeks later, after the city of Yanping fell to Giyesu on November 9, 1676, Geng Jingzhong surrendered to the Qing and offered to support its cause against the other feudatories.

**Qing Loyalism**

Although *raison d'état* dictated discretion about Geng Jingzhong's crime of sedition (Kangxi forbade Giyesu to punish the satrap because he did not want to discourage other rebel leaders from surrendering), Fan Chengmo's death could not be concealed. One of Fan's bodyservants who survived, a man named Xu Ding, managed to retrieve Fan's charred remains from the pyre and had them taken to Beijing, where he also made public copies of the poems and essays that the Qing loyalist had written on the walls of his cell. News of Fan's martyrdom, coming as it did at a time when the future of the empire still hung in the balance, had a power-

89 One of Fan's assailants—a Mongol named Mani—was so moved by Fan Chengmo's courage and devotion that he asked to be killed with him. Before Geng Jingzhong had him dismembered, Mani said: "I prefer to die with a loyal minister. I am not willing to live alongside you treacherous bandits." Li, *Guochao xianzheng*, 1:5b.

90 Fan, *Zhongzhen quan ji*, p. 45.

91 Dai Zhen described this later in a short sketch of Fan's life written in the 18th century. Fan, *Zhongzhen quan ji*, pp. 65–68.
ful impact upon public opinion. Stories about Fan Chengmo’s heroism and devotion immediately circulated through the capital, and there was great public anticipation for the funeral ceremonies, which featured the famous dramatist Li Yu as the main speaker. In his funerary ode, Li—who had been a close friend of Fan Chengmo—dramatically underscored the importance of Fan’s moral resistance to the salvation of the ruling house. Because Fan’s family was the chief lineage (ju zu) of all the great Liaoyang families that originated “East of the Pass” (Guandong), and because his father, Fan Wencheng, was considered to have played a major role in helping Dorgon “settle the Mandate,” Fan Chengmo’s behavior determined the reaction of many other Han bannermen. Had he joined the revolt of Geng Jingzhong, then undoubtedly—Li Yu argued—many of the other great lineages (da zu) of Guandong would also have rebelled, and the Qing would have been doomed. Truly, this was a loyalty that was nearly incomparable; a loyalty certainly on a par with history’s most famous figures. And so, Li Yu concluded, there would be not one, but two, funeral tablets placed at the foot of his shrine: one to Fan Chengmo himself, and one to the great Song patriot Wen Tianxiang.

Because, in seeking such ministerial fidelity as the master’s, one can seek high and low throughout antiquity and only find one man sufficiently [virtuous] with which to compare him: [Wen] Tianxiang. The great righteousness of his life and death can be equally compared with that of Fan Chengmo!92

Shortly afterwards, the Kangxi Emperor bestowed upon the Qing loyalist the posthumous name “Loyal and Honest” (Zhongzhen), along with the titles Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent and President of the Board of War.93 In years to come, the emperor would continue to speak of Fan Chengmo’s devotion, and often

92 Li Yu, “Ji Fujian Jingnan zongdu Fan Jingong xiansheng wen” [Funeral ode to the Fujian pacifier of difficulties, Governor-General Fan Jingong], in Li Yu, Li Weng yijia yan guanzi, 1:68.
93 Kangxi also conferred special favors on his younger brother, Fan Chengxun, to whom he once said: “You belong to the ‘old men’ (jiu ren) from Shengjing.” Li, Guochao xianzheng, 1:7b.
movingly recalled his martyrdom. In 1682, when the Three Feudatories had finally been decisively defeated and the need for caution had vanished, Kangxi personally ordered that Fan’s murderer, Geng Jingzhong, be painfully drawn and quartered.  

But this was still to be. In 1676 when Geng had surrendered, his renewal of allegiance to the Qing must have given Sun Yanling, leader of the rebellion in Guangxi, considerable pause. Geng’s treason had apparently been forgiven. Could his as well? Whether or not Sun Yanling actually put the question to himself in this way, Wu Sangui had good reason to believe that his ally to the rear was wavering. In the autumn of 1677, therefore, Wu sent his grandson Shizong to Guilin. Sun was led to believe that Wu Shizong was on his way through Guangxi to attack Guangdong, where Shang Zhixin had surrendered to Field Marshal Yolo (commander of the Qing forces in Jiangxi) in January of that year. But when Sun Yanling met Wu outside of Guilin’s walls, he was seized and beheaded, and the province was claimed by Wu Shizong in the name of the Feudatory.  

94 Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, pp. 495–497. The people of Fujian also built a temple in Fan Chengmo’s honor at Daoshan. “Notices of Eminent Statesmen,” p. 97. For examples of Kangxi’s later praise of Fan Chengmo, see Fan, *Zhongzhen quan ji*, p. 13. The emperor did not fail to see the clear connection between his personal audience with Fan Chengmo and the martyr’s subsequent devotion to the imperial cause. In 1683, he extended the special ruler-minister tie to provincial officials as well through the institution of a systematic practice in which high-ranking provincial officials were routinely invited to the capital for an imperial audience. “Commanders-in-chief and brigade generals in the frontier regions,” Kangxi told his grand secretaries at the time, “often become arrogant and are apt to start revolts because they have held military power for long periods. If they are frequently summoned to the court for special audiences, their hearts will learn to respect and fear [imperial authority].” Silas H. L. Wu, *Communication and Imperial Control in China*, pp. 21–22. Kangxi had learned his lesson well. There were no more provincial military revolts by Qing officials until the Revolution of 1911.  

95 Shang Zhixin was put under arrest and imprisoned. Because of his father’s eminence, he and three of his brothers were allowed to commit suicide with dignity. The Manchus opened the tomb of Shang Kexi and were extremely satisfied to find the corpse dressed in Manchu robes with the head shaven. Bowra, “Conquest of Canton,” pp. 233–234.  

96 Sun’s wife, Kong Sizhen, escaped to the south with remnants of their army.
When Wu Shizong took over Guilin he discovered that Governor Ma Xiongzhen was still being held in prison along with the surviving members of his staff and household. Sun Yanling had been keeping Ma alive as a bargaining counter in the event of his surrender. Wu Shizong had no such plans, but he did realize that if this well known bannerman, son of such a famous Qing governor-general and descendant of the Liaoyang family whose women had all been Ming martyrs, joined Wu Sangui's side, then other Han officials might come over in turn. He therefore pressed Ma Xiongzhen to surrender to the Zhou, but the governor repeatedly refused. Finally, altering tactics, Wu Shizong invited Ma and his two young sons to an elaborate banquet on November 6, 1677, where they were treated with highest honor. After the toasts had been given, Wu Shizong respectfully entreated Governor Ma to join their just cause. In a later dramatization of this famous incident, Ma Xiongzhen reiterated his loyalty to the Qing dynasty, which had "grasped the divine troops, killed the bandits, and settled the Central Plain; Heaven and the people belong to it." 97 Then Ma angrily turned upon Wu Shizong and abused his grandfather, Wu Sangui, for being such a treacherous official:

He has already served two rulers, and now once again there sprouts an errant will. When he dies he will have no face to look upon his former rulers... He does not feel being attached to one's lord and king is as good as being attached to that whore [Chen] Yuanyuan. 98

Wu Shizong dropped all pretense of respect and affection once he heard this insult, and furiously ordered his lieutenants to take Ma Xiongzhen and his sons outside to one of the foundries. Ma continued to revile the Wu family for its base treachery all the time that he, the two boys, and nine of his retainers were being hustled

97 Act 17, Guilin shuang [Guilin frost], in Jiang Shiquan, Jiang Shiquan jiu zhong qu, juan xia, p. 15b.
98 Ibid., pp. 15b–16a.
out of the governor’s palace and into the castle grounds. When they reached the foundry, the guards told Ma that he had one last chance to surrender. Then they seized the two boys and held knives to their throats. If he would not yield, they said, his sons would die. Ma Xiongzhen refused to compromise his and his family’s honor, but could not bear to look on as the boys were slaughtered. Turning away to the side, he steadfastly insisted that Wu Sangui and his soldiers were no more than murderers and bandits. Moments later, Wu’s men threw the bloody heads of his sons at his feet. Ma shuddered, then grabbed the heads in both hands and thrust their bloody stumps in the faces of the soldiers. The assassins struck back with their knives, and Ma reeled away long enough to pay obeisance to his emperor before they struck him, again and again, until he died. He was forty-four years old. Finally, each of the nine retainers, who had had to be forcibly restrained while this butchery was going on in front of them, was asked if he would surrender. Each refused and each was killed, down to the last man.

The murder of Ma Xiongzhen was of no help to Wu Sangui. By April 22, 1677, Yolo had taken Ji’an from the Zhou armies in western Jiangxi and was beginning to probe the perimeters of Wu Sangui’s base in Hunan. The satrap, now sixty-five years old, commanded the defenses personally, travelling from position to position himself as the Qing enclosure tightened. On March 23, 1678, almost as a gesture of desperation, Wu Sangui took the imperial crown, named himself monarch of Zhou, and declared the reign era to be Zhaowu. Some believe that Chen Yuanyuan was with him at this time, her features aged but still quite beautiful. By the summer of 1678, the Emperor of Zhou had withdrawn to Hengzhou where he planned to take his stand. But in the autumn he contracted dysentery and became debilitated. Finally, on October 2, 1678, Wu Sangui passed away. Chen Yuanyuan—it is said—took her vows and became a Buddhist nun.

99 Hezang muzhi ming [Memorial inscription at the grave of joint burial], in Ma shi jia pu, n.p.; “Ma Wenyi gong zhuan,” in Jiang, jiu zhong qu, ce 9, pp. 1b–2a.

100 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 880.
The Jin dian (Golden Temple), on Mingfengshan outside of Yunnanfu, was used by Wu Sangui as a summer house during the reign of his feudatory. Photograph by F. Wakeman.

son Shifan inherited the crown, but the Zhou was not to last for long. Although the young Honghua Emperor fled farther south to Guizhou after Hengzhou fell on March 24, 1679, a massive military campaign under Tuhai was launched by Kangxi from the northwest early in November, 1679. By February, 1680, Chengdu had fallen, and a month later Chongqing was in Qing hands. In October, 1680, Kangxi appointed Laita to lead yet another expedition from Guangxi into Yunnan; he then announced that all of the land illegally appropriated by Wu Sangui in Yunnan would be returned to its rightful owners. With the local elite on their side, the two wings of the Qing armies encountered little opposition as they met in front of the walls of the provincial capital of Yunnan in April, 1681. On December 7, 1681, nearly eight years to the day after his grandfather rose to overthrow the Qing, Wu Shifan took his life inside Kunming. The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories was over.
By then, the Wu family’s murder of Ma Xiongzhen was well known to the Kangxi Emperor. Like Fan Chengmo’s death, Ma’s self-sacrifice as a loyalist was greeted with great acclaim and praise. Coming as it did, when the Qing ruling house was fast on its way to overcoming the greatest challenge it had ever faced, the martyrdom of Ma Xiongzhen symbolized a new and lasting commitment to the reign of the Manchu emperors. Eventually, in fact, Ma’s death came to mean even more than victory over the San fan. With his death, and the circumstances surrounding it, the history of the Manchus and their conquest of China seemed to have come full circle. Ma Xiongzhen’s great-grandfather, Ma Zhongde, had after all been a great Ming official, as loyal to that dynasty as Xiongzhen had proved to be to this one. Not only that: as details of the events in Guilin became more fully known in Beijing, the court realized that more had died than the twelve males in the castle foundry. The tragedy was even more arresting than their martyrdom.

On that same November night in 1677 the news of the death of Ma Xiongzhen and his two younger sons had been carried back to the damp cells of Guilin prison where the rest of the family remained confined. There, when they received the news, the women of the Ma household recalled how proudly the family’s genealogy had described that doleful day in 1621, nearly six decades earlier, when the women of the lineage—forty-two relatives and servants—committed mass suicide in Liaoyang after Ma Yujin was captured by the Manchus. Now, while Ma Xiongzhen’s wife, Madame Li, looked on, the same scene was repeated. First, Ma Shiji’s wife, Madame Dong, tried to hang herself from the rafter.

101 News of Ma’s death initially reached the ears of Fu Honglie, the acting Qing governor of Guangxi. Fu, a native of Jinxian in Jiangxi, had warned the government of Wu Sangui’s treacherous intentions well in advance of the rebellion—an act of foresight that led to his temporary banishment. When Wu actually did revolt, Fu Honglie trained his own volunteer army and offered his services to the Manchus. After recovering many districts in the Liangguang, he was appointed governor. He relayed the news of Ma’s death to the capital. Later, Fu was captured by allies of Wu Sangui and sent to Guiyang where he, too, was martyred as a Qing loyalist. Hu Qian, comp., Guangxi tongzhi, 253:72a.
The noose broke and she smashed her face against the pavement, but she tried again, and this time the rope held. Then, one after the other, Ma Shiji's concubine Madame Miao; Ma Xiongzhen's two teenaged daughters, erjie and wujie; and Ma Xiongzhen's two concubines, Madame Gu and Madame Liu, all killed themselves. As each one hanged herself, Madame Li took the corpse down and dressed the body for burial, covering it with a quilt. Then she watched again while eighteen female servants killed themselves. The suicides went on through the night and into the next morning. When all twenty-four women were dead, Madame Li faced to the north, performed nine kowtows, and hanged herself last. Weeping, two male servants took her body down, and were allowed to carry all of the corpses outside where they were cremated. The ashes they placed in the Guangfu Temple nearby.102

This tragic crescendo of repeated self-immolations stunned the court in Beijing to the point of awe. Even more than Fan Chengmo's death, the sacrifice of thirty-eight members of the Ma household epitomized the fidelity of those who had stood by the dynasty during the darkest days of the civil war with the Three Feudatories. Honors were posthumously lavished upon the family. In 1680 a solemn ceremony was conducted by the Kangxi Emperor, who appointed the dead Ma Xiongzhen Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent and President of the Board of War, and canonized him as Wenyi: "Cultured and Intrepid." His eldest surviving son, Ma Shiji, was presented with the same imperial robe that Kangxi had given his father in 1669, and was asked to serve as the Director of the Emperor's Banqueting Court. On August 15, 1682, Madame Li herself was awarded a posthumous patent of nobility for "so deeply repaying the dynasty's benevolence." And that same year, well after the Three Feudatories had been utterly destroyed, a special temple was built in Guangxi in Ma Xiongzhen's memory devoted to the worship of Qing loyalism.103

The suicidal devotion of the house of Ma inspired the 18th-century playwright Jiang Shiquan to write a play about it called

102 "Ma Wenyi gong zhuan," in Jiang, Jiu zhong qu, ce 9, pp. 2b–3a.
103 "Gao ming" [Patent of nobility], in Ma shi jia pu, n.p.
**Guilin shuang** (Guilin frost) which was very popular during the Qianlong period. Partly the play extolled the virtue of the family; in its final act the Liaoyang women are reunited in the after-life with the Guilin martyrs, to whom they sing:

Sixty years a family to be pitied,
Sixty years a family carries on.¹⁰⁴

But most of all the play itself, and the chroniclers and family historians who wrote about the incident at the time, present the family’s sacrifices as a unique symbol of loyalty transcending, and yet concretely embodying, the attachment to specific, separately legitimate dynasties. There were many Ming loyalists, and there were some Qing loyalists. But the Ma lineage of Liaoyang was proof that a single coherent tradition of family duty could accommodate both particular dynastic loyalties in a single world order, and within a unified moral universe combine civil idealism and martial puritanism in absolute dedication to the honor of one’s name. Through the Ma lineage, history had finally come full circle, and the Qing was now fully paired with the Ming, both successor and equal to it. “In ancient history there have been thousands upon thousands of loyalists,” the playwright commented in *Guilin shuang*, “but in this dynasty’s history the loyalists who come later are paired with those who came first.”¹⁰⁵

The Ma family suicides also captured the popular imagination because they summed up the slow and reluctant transfer of the Mandate of Heaven from one dynasty to the next: the grandmother, a Ming loyalist; the father, a Manchu collaborator; the son, a Qing loyalist—three generations and six decades of imperial history. In a very real sense, Ma Xiongzheng’s own death epitomized the stabilization of Qing rule after such a long period of military conquest. For many years the near-fatal weakness of the dynasty had been the Manchus’ dependence upon their Chinese al-

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¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 49a. See also the Yongzheng Emperor’s comments about the Ma family, in “Yu jiwen” [Imperial funeral ode], *Ma shi jia pu*, n.p.
lies. Repeatedly they had been shown how fickle some of those allies were, and how—precisely because the Manchus had been regarded as alien intruders—they were continually vulnerable to adventurers like Jiang Xiang or militarists like Wu Sangui who could raise the banner of the Ming or some other Chinese house. The civil war with the Three Feudatories represented, therefore, the final confrontation with those turncoats who felt the Manchus needed them more than they the Manchus. When the San fan were defeated, largely because most Han collaborators chose to stand by the dynasty, Kangxi and his ministers knew that the Qing’s mandate was no wei ding—no “bogus settlement”—but really the beginning of another glorious cycle in Chinese imperial history.106

They were right, of course. Under Qing rule the Chinese recovered sooner than any other major power from the 17th-century global economic crisis.107 The envy of European rulers, the Man-

106 Kangxi’s suppression of the Three Feudatories marked the culmination of the Qing dynasty’s consolidation. By way of contrast, the contemporary Deccan Wars (1658–1689) of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb marked the beginning of the decline of that great Indian empire. “Aurangzeb’s annexations in the Deccan were not the work of a military steamroller, but of a slow and cumbersome machine, which sought energy and strength by recruiting deserters bribed to come over from the enemy.” The result was great loss of life for the Mughal nobility, the granting of tax-farming privileges that undermined the central government, and the perpetual diversion of Aurangzeb’s attention away from northern India to the south. M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, p. 173, and see also pp. 102–106.

107 By 1661, the population of some Jiangnan market towns and cities had returned to 16th-century levels. In Suzhou and Hangzhou, where all the looms had been destroyed in 1644–1645, textile manufacture resumed by at least 1659, and in 1686 had attained original production levels. The same could be said in 1688 for Jingdezhen’s porcelain works. By the late 1680s, people were eating as well in Beijing as they had been before 1620. Between 1683 and 1712, there was a 23% increase in the amount of land under cultivation, which came to be 93% of what it had been in 1626. Cultivated acreage by 1770 had increased to 950 million mu, compared with 600 million mu in 1650. Between 1661 and 1685, there was a 13.3% increase in the amount of fu tax and a 43.7% increase in the revenues from the salt gabelle. By 1685, in fact, the total amount of land tax, salt income, and miscellaneous taxes entering the government treasury was 29 million taels. Liu Shiji, “Ming-Qing shidai Jiangnan shizhen zhi shuliang fenxi,” pp. 27–28; Chin Shih, “Peasant
chu monarchy erected upon the solid institutional foundation laid by Dorgon, Shunzhi, and Kangxi an imperial superstructure of awesome proportions, clothed in dazzling cultural array. For nearly another two centuries, while China’s borders expanded to incorporate nearly twice as much territory as the Ming had ruled, there were no serious domestic and no genuine external rivals to challenge Manchu rule over China. But there was a paradoxical price to the Pax Manchurica of the High Qing. Because the great wars of the eighteenth century swept over the European continent between nearly equal combatants, those states had both to revolutionize their military technology and rationalize their autocratic administrative systems. China, lacking competitive contenders,

Economy and Rural Society in the Lake Tai area,” ch. 3, p. 7; Peng Zeyi, “Qingdai qianqi shouqongye de fazhan,” pp. 6, 8–9, 12–15; Shanghai bowuguan, Shanghai beike ziliao xuanji, pp. 84–85; Li Hua, Ming-Qing yilai Beijing gong shang huiguan beike xuanbian, p. 12; Yeh-chien Wang, Land Taxation in Imperial China, p. 7; Will, “Cycle hydraulique,” p. 278; Mori Masao, “Minmatsu no shakkai-kankei ni okeru chitsujo no hendō ni tsuite,” p. 235; Thomas A. Metzger, “On the Historical Roots of Economic Modernization in China,” p. 34; Dwight H. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, pp. 16–17, 216; Chi-ming Hou and Kuo-chi Li, “Local Government Finance in the Late Ch’ing Period,” p. 571; McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, pp. 242–244.

108 Luc Kwanten, Imperial Nomads, p. 283. See also Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800, p. 58.

109 André Corvisier, Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789, p. 125; Fernand Braudel, Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, pp. 34–35, 102–104; Wallerstein, Modern World System II, pp. 113–116, 268, 278. During the decade 1550–1560, European armies abandoned the Spanish tercio formation—which bore some resemblance to Coxinga’s phalanxes—for the infantry square, half shot and half pike. After Gustavus Adolphus invented a rapid-fire cartridge and lightened the musket, troops were arranged in an oblong formation of infantry with cavalry on the wings and field guns defended by pike and musket. Then, around 1700, the matchlock was replaced by the flintlock which could fire one round per minute with a range of 80 yards. To this was attached the socket bayonet invented by Vauban in 1680, making the infantry, stretched out in a thin line, both pikemen and musketeers, capable of advancing through the smoke of field artillery pouring down fire ahead to charge the enemy at close range with naked steel. Finer, “Nation-building,” pp. 105–108. It was Max Weber, of course, who first argued that China’s unified empire was spared “rational warfare”; it did not experience an “armed peace during which several competing autonomous
had no overwhelming need to improve its military technology beyond the stage needed to conquer relatively backward Inner Asian peoples, restrain Cossack adventurers, and maintain suzerainty over Southeast Asia and Korea.110 And, although the establishment of the Grand Council in the eighteenth century represented a new centralization of power at the highest levels of the imperial government, the fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng period—reforms which might have given the Qing state the fiscal means it needed later in order to tax its population more effectively during its struggle with the West—were not sustained for more than a few years.111 This was not only because of the absence of adversaries formidable enough to force rationalizations upon the Qing imperial system, if it were to survive among other international states. It was also because of the sheer success of the early Qing state in recovering political stability through the use of remarkably advanced but still quite traditional institutions and techniques. Power was strongly centralized without being thoroughly rationalized. Monarchical authority waxed while bureaucratic initiative waned.112

In 1835, still somewhat imbued with the philosophes' admiring image of China, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:

Travelers tell us that the Chinese have tranquility without happiness, industry without progress, stability without strength, and material order without public morality. With them society gets along fairly well, never very well. I imagine that when China is open to Europeans they will find it the finest model of administrative centralization in the world.113

---


113 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 91.
The Europeans who finally did force open China's gates found the Qing empire less well governed than de Tocqueville had thought. Authority was still strongly centralized, but the administrative periphery was already losing touch with the command posts of the bureaucracy. Even worse, the entire system had relinquished the resilience it had enjoyed under early Qing rule. Yet, tragically, the very success of the Manchus' initial reconstruction of imperial order in the seventeenth century made it difficult to contemplate institutional alternatives when formidable external challengers appeared once more in the nineteenth century. This last time when the dynasty fell, the entire political fabric collapsed with it. The great enterprise was finally exhausted; the imperial order beyond repair.
Ministers Who Served Two Dynasties

The exigencies of occupying the north, the fatigue of local elites that had spent years combatting rebels before the arrival of the Qing armies, and the strategy adopted by the dynasty to rely upon collaborators all meant that the Han members of the early Qing government were likely to be predominantly northerners. And indeed, among the relatively prominent military officers and civilian officials whose biographies are included in Er chen zhuan, exactly 100 (80 percent) came from the provinces north of the Yangzi River.

Table A-1
Provincial Provenance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Civil</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhili</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside of Shuntian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuntian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoyang</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fengtian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaodong</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Er chen zhuan. This collection, which includes 120 main biographies, plus 5 appended ones, provides the primary data for this appendix. The information is also skillfully analyzed in Sun Zhentao, Qing shi shulun, pp. 10–25, upon which I have drawn heavily.

2 This includes two bandits.
The largest single group, consisting of nearly one-third of the total, were civil officials from north China, and the next largest were military officers from the northeast (about 20 percent), as the following macroregional division shows.

The largest single group, consisting of nearly one-third of the total, were civil officials from north China, and the next largest were military officers from the northeast (about 20 percent), as the following macroregional division shows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Civil</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningxia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huguang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangnan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A-2
Macroregional Provenance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Civil Officials</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest China</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Yangzi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Yangzi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 These correspond inexacty to G.W. Skinner’s nine physiographic macroregions of agrarian China. The main disparities would be Shanxi which is counted as being part of north China, though the western part of the province is in the northwest; northern Jiangsu and Anhui, which are counted as being in the lower Yangzi; and southern Zhejiang, which is counted also as being in the lower Yangzi.
Although there were slightly more civilian adherents among the er chen than soldiers, military men were ultimately the most prominent and benefitted the most from Qing rule, judging by the number who eventually became board presidents or vice-presidents. Of the 60 military adherents, 23 became board presidents and 23 served as vice-presidents of boards. Of the 65 civilian collaborators (including 56 jinshi), only 3 became board presidents.4

Holding the title of board president or vice-president did not mean that the recipient actually served in that particular board. Usually, as the following table of the activities of several prominent Chinese bannermen (not all necessarily in Er chen zhuan) shows, the bureaucratic post one held in the central government had little to do with one’s duties in the field.

Table A-3
Activities & Posts of Selected Chinese Bannermen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Activities at that time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jin Weicheng</td>
<td>Vice-President of War</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>Military campaigns in Huguang.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin Yuhe</td>
<td>Vice-President of Punishments</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>Suppression campaigns in Henan. Named acting brigade-general in charge of Huaiqing. Killed while fighting Shun remnants.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Of the rest, 27 served as censors, educational officials, or civil servants in the provinces.
5 Zhao Erxun, ed., Qing shi gao, 237: 10b.
6 Ibid., 237: 10.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Activities at that time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ke Ruji</td>
<td>Vice-President of Punishments</td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>Appointed lieutenant-general of Han Bordered Red Banner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-President of Rites</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>Garrisoned in Hangzhou until death in 1650.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Shuaitai</td>
<td>Vice-President of Punishments</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>On campaign in Shandong and Henan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>Overwhelmed Jiangning; garrisoned Suzhou.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1646</td>
<td>Subdued Zhejiang and Fujian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Chongjin</td>
<td>Vice-President of War</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>On campaign in Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Huguang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1649</td>
<td>Campaign versus Jiang Xiang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Guanghui</td>
<td>Vice-President of Civil Appointments</td>
<td>1648</td>
<td>Campaigns versus Jin Shenghuan in Jiangxi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-President of Revenue,</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>Appointed viceroy of Zhili, Shandong, and Henan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-President of Punishments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meng Qiaofang</td>
<td>Vice-President of Punishments</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>On campaign in the northwest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>Appointed governor-general of Shaanxi. Pursued Zhang Xianzhong and his followers in Sichuan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 Li Huan, ed., *Guochao qixian leizheng*, 265: 8a.
8 Zhao, *Qing shi gao*, 279: 1–2.
9 Ibid., 249: 11b–12a.
10 Ibid., 237: 8a.
11 Ibid., 243: 7–10a.
Ministers Who Served Two Dynasties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Activities at that time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wang Guoguang</td>
<td>Vice-President of Revenue</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>Participated in attack on Xi’an.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1649</td>
<td>On campaign against Jiang Xiang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Rujie</td>
<td>Vice-President of Rites</td>
<td>1649</td>
<td>Stationed in Hangzhou.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>On campaign against Prince of Lu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1652</td>
<td>On campaign against Zheng Chenggong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu Dagui</td>
<td>Vice-President of Punishments</td>
<td>1646</td>
<td>On campaign in Henan and Jiangnan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zu Zehong</td>
<td>Vice-President of Civil Appointments</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>Pursued Shun remnants in Shanxi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>Participated in attack on Xi’an.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zu Zeyuan</td>
<td>Vice-President of Rites</td>
<td>1652</td>
<td>Named governor-general of Huguang.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vice-presidencies, usually of the Board of Punishments, were routinely given to field commanders on campaign. Presidencies, which were not infrequently given to major Manchu leaders, were only rarely given to Chinese “old men” (jīn rén) who had “entered the pass” (ru guān) with Dorgon in 1644. (Meng Qiaofang, shown in the table above as President of War in 1645, was an exception, being—as Kangxi once said—the single most valuable Han field commander on the Qing side during the early years of the pacification in the north.) Later Han adherents, on the other hand, did garner a significant number of board presidencies, as the following table shows.

---

12 Ibid., 237: 11.
13 Qing shi liezhuân, 78: 46b–47a.
14 Li, Guochao qixian leizheng, 272: 4.
15 Qing shi liezhuân, 78: 43b–44a.
16 Zhao, Qing shi gao, 240: 17b, 20a, 21a.
Table A-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Adherence</th>
<th>Number of Board Presidencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1644</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During 1644</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 1644</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The later military collaborators were mainly regional commanders (generals) and regional vice-commanders (colonels) in the regular Ming army. Among the er chen, they included at least four separate cohorts.

Table A-5

**Military Adherents to the Qing during and after 1644 listed among “twice-serving ministers”**

I. *Ming military officials who surrendered to Li Zicheng, then to the Qing*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tang Tong</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong Xueli</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Regional Vice-Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bai Guang’en</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan Yikui</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Regional Vice-Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo Yangxing</td>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>Military Commissioner-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. *Ming military officials who surrendered to Dorgon in Beijing*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zu Zepu</td>
<td>Liaodong</td>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kong Xigui</td>
<td>Fengtian</td>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. *Ming military officials who surrendered locally or were recommended after October, 1644*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liu Fangming</td>
<td>Ningxia</td>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu Qiyuan</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>Military Commissioner-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Maozhen</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao Di</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jia Hanfu</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>Regional Vice-Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Ning</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>Local Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao Douguang</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Supreme Commander (Fengyang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Yongji</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Guobao</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lu Guonan</td>
<td>Shuntian</td>
<td>Regional Vice-Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ren Zhen</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>Regional Vice-Commander</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ministers Who Served Two Dynasties

IV. Ming military officials who surrendered during and after the fall of Nanjing, or when territory was occupied after Nanjing fell

Ma Degong Liaodong Regional Commander
Zhang Yong Shaanxi Regional Vice-Commander
Tian Xiong Beizhili Regional Commander
Chang Jingong Liaodong Regional Vice-Commander
Gao Jinku Shaanxi Regional Vice-Commander
Liu Liangzuo Beizhili Regional Commander
Liu Zehong Beizhili Regional Vice-Commander
Xu Dingguo Henan Regional Commander
Wu Luiqi^17 Guangdong Regional Commander
Wang Zhigang Beizhili Regional Commander
Chen Shikai^18 Hubei Regional Vice-Commander

Relatively speaking, this group of Ming soldiers was much more homogeneous than the civilian er chen who were spread up and down the bureaucracy at the time of their surrender.

Table A-6
Military and Civilian Ranks Compared^19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military posts</th>
<th>Number of men</th>
<th>Civilian posts</th>
<th>Number of men</th>
<th>Bureaucratic rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner-in Chief</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Grand Secretary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Vice-Minister</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Vice-Commander</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Commander</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^17 Wu did not surrender until 1650.
^18 Chen did not surrender until 1659.
^19 This includes all the “twice-serving ministers” except for the two classified as bandits.
Appendix A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian posts</th>
<th>Number of men</th>
<th>Bureaucratic rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Court Minister</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court Vice-Minister</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jr. Supervisor of Instruction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanlin Academician</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4a to 4b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National University Director of Study</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3a to 7a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervising Secretary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Director</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circuit Intendant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3a to 4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree-Holder</td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td>unranked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the civil officials, nearly two-thirds (35 men) were members of the upper bureaucracy, being ranked 4b or above. Thus the civilian collaborators who are included in Er chen zhuan constituted a relatively prominent group at the time of their surrender.

It is impossible to rank the military posts, because these were tactical designations that did not necessarily correspond to the ranked military titles in the regular army hierarchy. However, we can roughly distinguish between comparable higher and lower ranks corresponding to the division in the civilian bureaucracy at rank 4, which placed ministers and vice-ministers in the upper group, and bureau directors and supervising secretaries below. The equivalent division would be commissioners-in-chief, commissioners, and regional commanders above; and regional vice-commanders and local commanders below. According to that distinction, the military collaborators were initially a less exalted group: there were slightly more officers below (30) than

---

20 In spite of the lower rank of 5a assigned to grand secretaries, I include those two collaborators in the upper bureaucracy because they concurrently held ministerial posts, not otherwise listed here, which gave them a rank of at least 2a. Although censors-in-chief qualify for inclusion in the upper rungs, I have included all of the censors in the lower portion. The figures are thus slightly skewed in favor of the lower bureaucracy, which reinforces my point all the more.

21 The exceptions are commissioners-in-chief who, like Hong Chengchou, were usually civilians and held a 2a rank.
above (28). The largest number of military collaborators being generals and colonels, it might be assumed that the many board presidencies distributed among these officers represented a reward to entice them to serve the Qing. That would be incorrect. The Han presidencies of the early Qing government were indeed dominated by Shaanxi and Dongbei militarists who had surrendered after 1644; most Han vice-presidencies were also held by military officers who had joined the regime after it occupied Beijing. However, of the eleven presidencies held by officers from the northwest and northeast, three were granted to former lieutenants of the warlord Zuo Liangyu whose army had surrendered to Ajige at Jiujiang in 1645, and four were granted to military leaders who had served under Li Zicheng. And of the vice-presidencies, almost one-half were bestowed upon lieutenants of Zu Dashou, Zuo Liangyu, and Li Zicheng. High honorary rank (for that is precisely what these posts were), then, went either to reward extremely successful officers who campaigned against the Southern Ming or pacified rebel-held areas in the north; or else it was bestowed upon men who had commanded independent armies under one or another of the great rebel leaders and warlords of the late Ming. Thus, if the Er chen zhuan is deemed a fairly representative collection of biographies of early Qing collaborators, then the archetype of that group's leadership would be a professional military officer, holding the rank of colonel at the time of the conquest, hailing from the northwestern or northeastern regions of China, commanding a force recruited by himself, and prepared to do service against the enemies of his new masters in Beijing.
"Twice-serving Ministers" in 1644

Of the 50 officials who joined the Qing government in 1644 and are in the Er chen zhuan (Biographies of ministers who served both dynasties), most were administrators in the capital, and 36 held the jinshi degree. Of those in office, nearly two-thirds were in Beijing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Civil Service at Time of Surrender</th>
<th>Beijing</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Prefectures</th>
<th>xian or zhou</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Posted to Beijing</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posted to provinces</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posted to prefectures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posted to xian or zhou</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately one-fourth of the collaborators were from Shandong.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial Provenance of 1644 Collaborators</th>
<th>Shandong</th>
<th>Beizhili</th>
<th>Nanzhili</th>
<th>Henan</th>
<th>Shaanxi</th>
<th>Shanxi</th>
<th>Jiangxi</th>
<th>Sichuan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1138
"Twice-serving Ministers" in 1644

Provincial Provenance of 1644 Collaborators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Collaborators</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoyang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This was a considerable contrast to the average composition of the central government throughout the Chongzhen reign, when over a third of the bureaucrats came from Nanzhili and Zhejiang. If we divide China at the Yangzi and take Huguang and Sichuan as southern provinces, the following difference appears:

1644 Adherents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northerners</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southerners</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chongzhen Ministerial Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southerners</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northerners</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the ratio between northerners and southerners in high office virtually reversed between the Chongzhen and Shunzhi reigns.

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1 These figures are taken from: James B. Parsons, "The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy," p. 185.
## Banner Officials in Local Administration

In general throughout the Qing there was a much higher percentage of bannermen (and these were likely Han bannermen, rather than Manchus or Mongols in the early years of the dynasty’s reign) at the prefectural level than in *zhou* (county) or *xian* (district) offices.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Han</th>
<th>Banner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prefecture</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhili zhou mag.:</td>
<td>84.3%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhou mag.:</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xian mag.:</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the early years of the dynasty, the number of bannermen available for appointment even to prefectural posts was quite limited, as we see in the following figures which show the percentage of bannermen by periods in prefectural and *zhou* positions.²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Zhili zhou</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shunzhi reign</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangxi reign</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Li Guoqi, Zhou Tiansheng, Xu Hongyi, *Qingdai jiceng difang guan renshi chandi xianxiang zhi lianghua fenxi*, pp. 22–23. The category “bannermen” includes imperial clansmen, Manchu, Mongol, and Han bannermen, and Imperial Household *baoyi*.  

1140
Banner Officials in Local Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reign</th>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Zhili zhou</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yongzheng</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qianlong</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiaqing</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daoguang</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xianfeng</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongzhi</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxu</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, in the Shunzhi reign proper, a significant number of local officials, especially at the prefectural level, were adherents from the old guard that had joined the Manchus prior to the occupation of Beijing. Or at least, we can so infer from the following figures on the provincial provenance of prefects during the early and middle reigns of the Qing.\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reign</th>
<th>Prefects originally from Jiangsu</th>
<th>Prefects originally from Fengtian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shunzhi</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangxi</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongzheng</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qianlong</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiaqing</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daoguang</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xianfeng</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, Chinese officials from Fengtian did play a very important role in the first couple of decades of Qing rule at the prefectural level; but, to repeat, at the district level, the linchpin of administration, the zhou and xian magistrates were mainly Chinese who surrendered later.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 25.
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